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918 APPENDIX 

### A PROOF OF GENERALIZED RADEMACHER COMPLEXITY

### A.1 PRELIMINARY

For simplicity, denote  $f(\theta_i; x)$  as  $f_i(x)$ . For 1-Lipschitz loss function  $\ell(yf(x))$  (for example, hinge loss  $\ell(f(x), y) = \max(0, 1 - yf(x))$ ), there holds:

 $\leq \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}} \left[ \sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_i y f_i(x) \right]$ 

 $= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\sigma} \left[ \sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_i f_i(x) \right] := \Re_N(\mathcal{Z}).$ 

 $\mathcal{R}_N(\mathcal{Z}) = \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\sigma} \left[ \sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \sigma_i \ell(f_i(x), y) \right]$ 

So we can bound  $\Re_N(\mathcal{Z})$  instead of  $\mathcal{R}_N(\mathcal{Z})$ .

A.2 LINEAR MODEL

# Given Section A.1, we provide the bound below.

**Lemma 3** (Linear Model). Let  $\mathcal{H} = \{x \mapsto w^T x\}$ , where  $x, w \in \mathbb{R}^d$ . Given N classifiers from  $\mathcal{H}$ , assume that  $||x||_2 \leq B$  and  $||w||_2 \leq C$ . Then

$$\Re_N(\mathcal{Z}) \le \frac{BC}{\sqrt{N}}$$

Proof. We have

$$\begin{aligned} \Re_{N}(\mathcal{Z}) &= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\sigma} \left[ \sup_{\|x\|_{2} \leq B} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} f_{i}(x) \right] \\ &= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\sigma} \left[ \sup_{\|x\|_{2} \leq B} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} w_{i}^{T} x \right] \\ &= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\sigma} \left[ \sup_{\|x\|_{2} \leq B} x^{T} \left( \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} w_{i} \right) \right] \\ &= \frac{B}{\sigma} \left[ \sup_{\|x\|_{2} \leq B} x^{T} \left( \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} w_{i} \right) \right] \\ &= \frac{B}{N} \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\sigma} \left\| \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} w_{i} \right\|_{2} \\ &\leq \frac{B}{N} \left( \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\sigma} \left\| \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} w_{i} \right\|_{2}^{2} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \\ &= \frac{B}{N} \left\{ \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\sigma} \left[ \left( \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} w_{i}^{T} \right) \left( \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} w_{i} \right) \right] \right\}^{\frac{1}{2}} \end{aligned}$$
(Jensen inequality:  $\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x} \leq \sqrt{\mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{x^{2}}}$ )

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$$= \frac{B}{N} \left[ \mathbb{E} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{N} \underbrace{\sigma_i^2}_{1} w_i^T w_i + \underbrace{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{j=1, j \neq i}^{N} \sigma_i \sigma_j w_i^T w_j}_{0} \right) \right]^{\frac{1}{2}}$$

The proof is complete.

### A.3 TWO-LAYER NEURAL NETWORK

Given Section A.1, we provide the bound below.

**Lemma 4** (Two-layer Neural Network). Let  $\mathcal{H} = \{x \mapsto w^T \phi(Ux)\}$ , where  $x \in \mathbb{R}^d$ ,  $U \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times d}$ ,  $w \in \mathbb{R}^m$ , m is the number of the hidden layer, and  $\phi(x) = \max(0, x)$  is the element-wise ReLU function. Given N classifiers from  $\mathcal{H}$ , assume that  $||x||_2 \leq B$ ,  $||w||_2 \leq B'$ , and  $||U_i||_2 \leq C$ , where  $U_j$  is the j-th row of U. Then

$$\Re_N(\mathcal{Z}) \le \frac{\sqrt{m}BB'C}{\sqrt{N}}.$$

Proof. We have

$$\begin{split} \Re_{N}(\mathcal{Z}) &= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\sigma} \left[ \sup_{\|x\|_{2} \leq B} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} f_{i}(x) \right] \\ &= \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\sigma} \left[ \sup_{\|x\|_{2} \leq B} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} w_{i}^{T} \phi(U_{i}x) \right] \qquad (f_{i}(x) = w_{i}^{T} \phi(U_{i}x)) \\ &= \frac{B'}{N} \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\sigma} \left[ \sup_{\|x\|_{2} \leq B} \left\| \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} \phi(U_{i}x) \right\|_{2} \right] \qquad (\|w\|_{2} \leq B') \\ &= \frac{B'}{N} \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\sigma} \left[ \sup_{\|x\|_{2} \leq B} \left\| \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} V_{i} \right\|_{2} \right] \qquad (\text{Denote } V_{i} = \left[ \frac{\phi(U_{1i}x)}{\phi(U_{mi}x)} \right] \in \mathbb{R}^{m}) \\ &= \frac{B'}{N} \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\sigma} \left[ \sup_{\|x\|_{2} \leq B} \sqrt{\left( \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} V_{i}^{T} \right) \left( \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} V_{i} \right) \right] \\ &= \frac{B'}{N} \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\sigma} \left[ \sup_{\|x\|_{2} \leq B} \sqrt{\left( \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i}^{2} V_{i}^{T} V_{i} + \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{j=1, j \neq i}^{N} \sigma_{i} \sigma_{j} V_{i}^{T} V_{j} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \right] \\ &= \frac{B'}{N} \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\|x\|_{2} \leq B} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{N} V_{i}^{T} V_{i} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \\ &\leq \frac{B'}{N} \sup_{\|x\|_{2} \leq B} \left( N \max_{i} \|V_{i}\|_{2}^{2} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \\ &\leq \frac{B'}{\sqrt{N}} \sup_{\|x\|_{2} \leq B} \left( \max_{i}^{N} \|V_{i}\|_{2} \right) \end{split}$$

For 
$$V_{i} = \begin{bmatrix} \phi(U_{1i}x) \\ \vdots \\ \phi(U_{mi}x) \end{bmatrix} \in \mathbb{R}^{m}$$
, we have  

$$\sup_{\|x\|_{2} \leq B} \left( \max_{i} \|V_{i}\|_{2} \right) = \sup_{\|x\|_{2} \leq B} \left( \max_{i} \left\| \begin{bmatrix} \phi(U_{1i}x) \\ \vdots \\ \phi(U_{mi}x) \end{bmatrix} \right\|_{2} \right)$$
( $|\phi(x)| \leq |x|$ )  

$$\sup_{\|x\|_{2} \leq B} \left( \max_{i} \left\| \begin{bmatrix} U_{1i}x \\ \vdots \\ U_{mi}x \end{bmatrix} \right\|_{2} \right)$$
( $|\phi(x)| \leq |x|$ )  

$$= \sqrt{m} \sup_{\|x\|_{2} \leq B} \left( \max_{i} \max_{j} \|U_{ji}x\|_{2} \right)$$
( $|\phi(x)| \leq |x|$ )  

$$= \sqrt{m} \sup_{\|x\|_{2} \leq B} \left( \max_{i} \max_{j} \|U_{ji}x\|_{2} \right)$$
( $|\phi(x)| \leq |x|$ )  

$$= \sqrt{m} \sup_{\|x\|_{2} \leq B} \left( \max_{i} \max_{j} \|U_{ji}x\|_{2} \right)$$
( $|\phi(x)| \leq |x|$ )  

$$= \sqrt{m} BC \qquad (\|x\|_{2} \leq B \text{ and } \|U_{ji}\|_{2} \leq C)$$
Finally,  

$$\Re_{N}(Z) \leq \frac{B'}{\sqrt{N}} \sup_{\|x\|_{2} \leq B} \left( \max_{i} \|V_{i}\|_{2} \right) \leq \frac{\sqrt{m}BB'C}{\sqrt{N}}$$
The proof is complete.  

$$\square$$
A.4 PROOF OF LEMMA 2  
For simplicity, denote  $f(\theta_{i}; x)$  as  $f_{i}(x)$  and  $i \in \{1, \dots, N\}$  as  $i \in [N]$ .  
First, we begin with a lemma, which is a similar version of Lemma 1 from (Golowich et al., 2018).  
Lemma 5. Let  $\phi$  be a 1-Lipschitz, positive-homogeneous activation functions  $F$  and any convex and monotonically increasing function  $g : \mathbb{R} \to [0, \infty)$ , there holds:  

$$\mathbb{E}_{\sigma} \sup_{t \in F} W_{0}\|W\|_{t = C} g\left( \left\| \sum_{t \in F} \sigma_{i}(W_{1}(x)) \right\| \right) \leq 2 \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\sigma} \sup_{t \in F} g\left( \mathbb{R} \cdot \left\| \sum_{t \in F} \sigma_{i}(x) \right\| \right)$$
(13)

$$\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}} \sup_{f \in \mathcal{F}, W: \|W\|_{F} \le R} g\left( \left\| \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} \phi\left(Wf_{i}\left(x\right)\right) \right\| \right) \le 2 \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}} \sup_{f \in \mathcal{F}} g\left(R \cdot \left\| \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} f_{i}\left(x\right) \right\| \right)$$
(13)

*Proof.* Let  $w_1, \dots, w_h$  be the rows of W, we have 

$$\left\|\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} \phi\left(Wf_{i}\left(x\right)\right)\right\|^{2} = \sum_{j=1}^{h} \left[\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} \phi(w_{j}f_{i}(x))\right]^{2}$$
$$= \sum_{j=1}^{h} \|w_{j}\|^{2} \left[\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} \phi\left(\frac{w_{j}^{\top}}{\|w_{j}\|}f_{i}\left(x\right)\right)\right]^{2} \qquad (\phi(ax) = a\phi(x))$$

Therefore, the supremum of this over all  $w_1, \dots, w_h$  such that  $||W||_F^2 = \sum_{j=1}^h ||w_j||^2 \le R^2$  must be attained when  $||w_j|| = R$  for some j and  $||w_i|| = 0$  for all  $i \ne j$ . So we have 

$$\begin{aligned} & \underset{f \in \mathcal{F}, W: \|W\|_{F} \leq R}{\text{1076}} g\left( \left\| \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} \phi\left(Wf_{i}\left(x\right)\right) \right\| \right) = \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}} \sup_{f \in \mathcal{F}, w: \|w\| = R} g\left( \left| \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} \phi\left(w^{\top}f_{i}\left(x\right)\right) \right| \right). \end{aligned} \right) \end{aligned}$$

Since  $g(|z|) \leq g(z) + g(-z)$ , this can be upper bounded by 

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$$\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}} \sup g\left(\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} \phi\left(\boldsymbol{w}^{\top} f_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}\right)\right)\right) + \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}} \sup g\left(-\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} \phi\left(\boldsymbol{w}^{\top} f_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}\right)\right)\right)$$

$$= 2 \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}} \sup g\left(\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} \phi\left(\boldsymbol{w}^{\top} f_{i}\left(\boldsymbol{x}\right)\right)\right),$$
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where the equality follows from the symmetry in the distribution of the  $\sigma_i$  random variables. The right hand side in turn can be upper bounded by

$$2 \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}} \sup_{f \in \mathcal{F}, w: \|w\| = R} g\left(\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} w^{\top} f_{i}\left(x\right)\right) \leq 2 \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}} \sup_{f \in \mathcal{F}, w: \|w\| = R} g\left(\|w\| \left\|\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} f_{i}\left(x\right)\right\|\right)$$
$$= 2 \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}} \sup_{f \in \mathcal{F}} g\left(R \cdot \left\|\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} f_{i}\left(x\right)\right\|\right).$$

With this lemma in hand, we can prove lemma 2: 

*Proof.* For  $\lambda > 0$ , the rademacher complexity can be upper bounded as 

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$$N\Re_N(\mathcal{Z}) = \mathbb{E}_{\sigma} \sup_{f_1, \cdots, f_n} \sum_{i=1}^N \sigma_i f_i(x)$$
  
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$$\leq \frac{1}{\lambda} \log \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}} \sup \exp\left(\lambda \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} f_{i}(x)\right)$$
(Jensen's inequality)  
$$\leq \frac{1}{\lambda} \log \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}} \sup \exp\left(\sup_{\substack{i \in [n] \\ T_{l}}} \left\|W_{i,l}\right\|_{F} \left\|\lambda \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} \phi_{l-1} \underbrace{(W_{i,l-1} \phi_{l-2} (\dots \phi_{1} (W_{i,1} x)))}_{f_{i,l-1}(x)}\right\|\right)$$

### We write this last expression as

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
1112 & & \frac{1}{\lambda} \log \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}} \sup \exp \left( T_{l} \cdot \lambda \left\| \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} \phi_{l-1} \left( f_{i,l-1}(x) \right) \right\| \right) \\
1114 & & \\
1115 & \\
1116 & & \leq \frac{1}{\lambda} \log \left( 2 \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}} \sup \exp \left( T_{l} \cdot T_{l-1} \cdot \lambda \left\| \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_{i} f_{i,l-2}(x) \right\| \right) \right) & (\text{Lemma 5}) \\
1117 & & \leq \cdots & (\text{Repeatedly apply Lemma 5})
\end{array}$$

(Repeatedly apply Lemma 5)

$$\leq \frac{1}{\lambda} \log \left( 2^{l-2} \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\sigma} \sup \exp \left( \lambda \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{l-1} T_i \cdot \left\| \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_i \phi_1(W_{i,1}x) \right\| \right) \right)$$

$$\leq \frac{1}{\lambda} \log \left( 2^{l-1} \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}} \sup \exp \left( \lambda \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{l} T_i \cdot \left\| \sum_{i=1}^{l} \sigma_i W_{i,1} x \right\| \right) \right)$$

Assume that  $W_{i,1}^*, i \in [N]$  maximizes 

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sup exp 
$$\left(\lambda \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{l-1} T_i \cdot \left\|\sum_{i=1}^N \sigma_i W_{i,1} x\right\|\right)$$
.

Therefore,

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$$\frac{1}{\lambda} \log \left( 2^{l-1} \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\sigma} \operatorname{sup} \exp \left( \lambda \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{l-1} T_i \cdot \left\| \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_i W_{i,1} x \right\| \right) \right)$$

$$\begin{array}{l} 1134 \\ 1135 \\ 1136 \\ 1137 \\ 1138 \\ 1139 \\ 1140 \end{array} = \frac{1}{\lambda} \log \left( 2^{l-1} \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\sigma} \exp \left( \lambda \cdot \underbrace{\prod_{i=1}^{l-1} T_i \cdot \left\| \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma_i W_{i,1}^* x \right\|}_{Z} \right) \right) \\ = \frac{1}{\lambda} \log \left( 2^{l-1} \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\sigma} \exp \left( \lambda Z \right) \right)$$

$$= \frac{(l-1)\log(2)}{\lambda} + \frac{1}{\lambda}\log\left\{\mathbb{E}_{\sigma}\exp\left(\lambda Z\right)\right\}$$
$$= \frac{(l-1)\log(2)}{\lambda} + \frac{1}{\lambda}\log\{\mathbb{E}\exp\lambda(Z - \mathbb{E}Z)\} + \mathbb{E}Z$$

For  $\mathbb{E}Z$ , we have 

1148	$l-1$ $\begin{bmatrix} \parallel N \\ \parallel^2 \end{bmatrix}$
1149	$\mathbb{E}Z = \prod T_i \  \mathbb{E}_{-} \  \  \sum \sigma_i W_{-}^* r \  \ $
1150	$\prod_{i=1}^{n} \prod_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{i$
1151	
1152	$l-1$ $\begin{bmatrix} N \end{bmatrix}$
1153	$= \prod T_i \left[ \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}} \left[ \sum \sigma_i \sigma_i \left( W^*_{,i} x \right)^T \left( W^*_{,i} x \right) \right] \right]$
1154	$\prod_{i=1}^{n-1} \sqrt{-0} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \sqrt{-0} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \sqrt{-0} \right) \right]$
1155	
1156	$\left( \prod_{l=1}^{l-1} \pi \left( \prod_{l=1}^{l} p \left( \overline{M} \right) \right) \right)$
1157	$\leq \prod T_i \left( T_1 B \sqrt{N} \right)$
1158	<i>i</i> =1
1159	$D \sqrt{N} \prod_{l=1}^{l} T$
1160	$= B \sqrt{N} \prod_{i=1}^{I_i} I_i$
1161	i=1

Note that Z is a deterministic function of the *i.i.d.* random variables  $\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_N$ , and satisfies 

$$Z(\sigma_1, \cdots, \sigma_i, \cdots, \sigma_N) - Z(\sigma_1, \cdots, -\sigma_i, \cdots, \sigma_N) \le 2B \prod_{\substack{i=1\\T}}^{l} T_i.$$

This means that Z satisfies a bounded-difference condition. According to Theorem 6.2 in Boucheron et al. (2013), Z is sub-Gaussian with variance factor 

$$\frac{1}{4}\sum_{i=1}^{N} (2BT)^2 = NB^2T^2,$$

and satisfies 

$$\frac{1}{\lambda} \log\{\mathbb{E} \exp \lambda(Z - \mathbb{E}Z)\} \le \frac{1}{\lambda} \cdot \frac{\lambda^2}{2} N B^2 T^2 = \frac{\lambda}{2} N B^2 T^2$$

Choosing  $\lambda = \frac{\sqrt{2\log(2)l}}{BT\sqrt{N}}$  and using the above, we get that  $\frac{(l-1)\log(2)}{\lambda} + \frac{1}{\lambda}\log\{\mathbb{E}\exp\lambda(Z - \mathbb{E}Z)\} + \mathbb{E}Z \le \left(\sqrt{(2\log 2)l} + 1\right)BT\sqrt{N}$ 

Finally, we get 

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$$\Re_N\left(\mathcal{Z}\right) \le \frac{\left(\sqrt{(2\log 2)l} + 1\right)BT}{\sqrt{N}}$$

The proof is complete. 

## 1188 B PROOF OF TRANSFERABILITY ERROR

# 1190 B.1 TRANSFERABILITY ERROR AND GENERALIZATION ERROR

1192 For z = (x, y), there holds

$$TE(z) = L_P(z^*) - L_P(z) \le L_P(z^*) - L_P(z) + (L_E(z) - L_E(z^*)) = (L_P(z^*) - L_E(z^*)) + (L_E(z) - L_P(z)) \le \sup_{x \in \mathcal{B}_{\epsilon}(x)} (L_P(z) - L_E(z)) + \sup_{x \in \mathcal{B}_{\epsilon}(x)} (L_E(z) - L_P(z)) \le \sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} (L_P(z) - L_E(z)) + \sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} (L_E(z) - L_P(z)). \le 2 \sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} |L_P(z) - L_E(z)|.$$

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#### B.2 PROOF OF THEOREM 1

1204 We prove a general version of the theorem as follows:

**Theorem 3.** Consider the squared error loss  $l(\theta, x, y) = [f(\theta; x) - y]^2$  for a data point z = (x, y). Assume that the data is generated by a function g(x) such that  $y = g(x) + \rho$ , where the zero-mean noise  $\rho$  has a variance of  $\eta^2$  and is independent of x. Then there holds

$$TE(z,\epsilon) = L_P(z^*) - \eta^2 - \underbrace{Var_{\theta \sim \mathcal{P}_{\Theta}} f(\theta; x)}_{Diversity} - \underbrace{[g(x) - \mathbb{E}_{\theta \sim \mathcal{P}_{\Theta}} f(\theta; x)]^2}_{Attack}.$$
 (14)

**Remark.** The irreducible error  $\eta^2$  is constant because it arises from inherent noise and randomness in the data (Geman et al., 1992).

1214 Now we start our proof of it.

1216 *Proof.* Given Eq. (5), it is equivalent to prove

 $L_P(z) = \mathbb{E}_{\theta \sim \mathcal{P}_{\Theta}} \left[ f(\theta; x) - y \right]^2$ 

$$L_P(z) = Var_{\theta}f(\theta; x) + [g(x) - \mathbb{E}_{\theta \sim \mathcal{P}_{\Theta}}f(\theta; x)]^2 + \eta^2.$$
(15)

1219 1220 Note that

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1227 1228 Recall that  $y = g(x) + \rho$  with  $\mathbb{E}(\rho) = 0$  and  $Var(\rho) = \eta^2$ , we have

 $= \mathbb{E}_{\theta \sim \mathcal{P}_{\Theta}} \left[ f(\theta; x) - g(x) + g(x) - y \right]^2$ 

$$\mathbb{E}_{\theta \sim \mathcal{P}_{\Theta}}(g(x) - y)^2 = \eta^2$$

 $= \mathbb{E}_{\theta \sim \mathcal{P}_{\Theta}} \left[ (f(\theta; x) - g(x))^2 + (g(x) - y)^2 + 2(g(x) - y)(f(\theta; x) - g(x)) \right].$ 

1229 and 1230

$$\mathbb{E}_{\theta \sim \mathcal{P}_{\Theta}}\left[2(g(x) - y)(f(\theta; x) - g(x))\right] = -2\mathbb{E}(\rho)\mathbb{E}_{\theta \sim \mathcal{P}_{\Theta}}\left[f(\theta; x) - g(x)\right] = 0.$$

1231 Therefore, 1232

$$L_P(z) = \mathbb{E}_{\theta \sim \mathcal{P}_{\Theta}} \left[ f(\theta; x) - g(x) \right]^2 + \eta^2.$$
(16)

Likewise, we decompose the first term as

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$$\mathbb{E}_{\theta} \left[ f(\theta; x) - g(x) \right]^{2} \\
= \mathbb{E}_{\theta} \left[ f(\theta; x) - \mathbb{E}_{\theta} f(\theta; x) + \mathbb{E}_{\theta} f(\theta; x) - g(x) \right]^{2} \\
= \mathbb{E}_{\theta} \left[ (f(\theta; x) - \mathbb{E}_{\theta} f(\theta; x))^{2} + (\mathbb{E}_{\theta} f(\theta; x) - g(x))^{2} \\
- 2(f(\theta; x) - \mathbb{E}_{\theta} f(\theta; x))(\mathbb{E}_{\theta} f(\theta; x) - g(x)) \right] \\
= \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{\theta} (f(\theta; x) - \mathbb{E}_{\theta} f(\theta; x))^{2}}_{Var_{\theta} f(\theta; x)} + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{\theta} (\mathbb{E}_{\theta} f(\theta; x) - g(x))^{2}}_{(g(x) - \mathbb{E}_{\theta} (f(\theta; x))^{2}}$$

$$-2\underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{\theta}\left[f(\theta;x)-\mathbb{E}_{\theta}f(\theta;x)\right)(\mathbb{E}_{\theta}f(\theta;x)-g(x)\right]}_{0},$$

$$\mathbb{E}_{\theta}(f(\theta; x) - \mathbb{E}_{\theta}f(\theta; x))^{2} = (\mathbb{E}_{\theta}f(\theta; x))^{2} - 2g(x)\mathbb{E}_{\theta}f(\theta; x) + g^{2}(x)$$
$$= (g(x) - \mathbb{E}_{\theta}(f(\theta; x))^{2},$$

1250 and

$$\mathbb{E}_{\theta} \left[ f(\theta; x) - \mathbb{E}_{\theta} f(\theta; x) \right) (\mathbb{E}_{\theta} f(\theta; x) - g(x)] \\= (\mathbb{E}_{\theta} f(\theta; x))^2 - g(x) \mathbb{E}_{\theta} f(\theta; x) - (\mathbb{E}_{\theta} f(\theta; x))^2 + g(x) \mathbb{E}_{\theta} f(\theta; x) \\= 0.$$

As a result,

$$\mathbb{E}_{\theta}\left[f(\theta;x) - g(x)\right]^{2} = Var_{\theta}f(\theta;x) + \left[g(x) - \mathbb{E}_{\theta \sim \mathcal{P}_{\Theta}}f(\theta;x)\right]^{2}.$$
(17)

1258 Combining the above results and we complete the proof.

1262 To prove Theorem 1, we just set  $\rho = 0$  in the above general version of theorem.

1263 Similarly, consider the empirical version of Theorem 1, we decompose  $L_E(z)$  as follows:

**Theorem 4** (Vulnerability-diversity Decomposition (empirical version)). Consider the squared error loss  $l(f(\theta; x), y) = [f(\theta; x) - y]^2$  for a data point z = (x, y). Let  $\hat{f}(\theta; x) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} f(\theta_i; x)$  be the expectation of prediction over the distribution on the parameter space. Then there holds

$$L_E(z) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \ell(f(\theta_i; x), y)$$
  
=  $\underbrace{l(\hat{f}(\theta; x), y)}_{Vulnerability} + \underbrace{\frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} \left(f(\theta_i; x) - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} f(\theta_i; x)\right)^2}_{\text{Diversity}}.$ 

Diversity

1276 The proof is similar to the above:

$$\begin{split} L_E(z) &= \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \left( f(\theta_i; x) - y \right)^2 \\ &= \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \left( f(\theta_i; x) - \sum_{i=1}^N f(\theta_i; x) + \sum_{i=1}^N f(\theta_i; x) - y \right)^2 \\ &= \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \left[ \left( f(\theta_i; x) - \sum_{i=1}^N f(\theta_i; x) \right)^2 + \left( \sum_{i=1}^N f(\theta_i; x) - y \right)^2 + \left( f(\theta_i; x) - y \right)^2 \right] \\ &= \underbrace{l(\hat{f}(\theta_i; x) - \sum_{i=1}^N f(\theta_i; x))}_{\text{Vulnerability}} + \underbrace{\frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N \left( f(\theta_i; x) - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N f(\theta_i; x) \right)^2}_{\text{Diversity}} + \underbrace{\frac{2}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \left( f(\theta_i; x) - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N f(\theta_i; x) \right) \left( \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N f(\theta_i; x) - y \right). \end{split}$$

The last terms equals to 0 because

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1297 1298  $\sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( f(\theta_i; x) - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} f(\theta_i; x) \right) \left( \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} f(\theta_i; x) - y \right)$ 1299 1300  $=\frac{1}{N}\left(\sum_{i=1}^{N}f(\theta_{i};x)\right)^{2}-y\sum_{i=1}^{N}f(\theta_{i};x)-\frac{1}{N}\left(\sum_{i=1}^{N}f(\theta_{i};x)\right)^{2}+y\sum_{i=1}^{N}f(\theta_{i};x)$ 1301 1302 1303 =0.1304 1305 The proof is complete. 1306 1307 B.3 PROOF OF THEOREM 2 1308 1309 We first define a divergence measure taken into account. Given a measurable space and two measures 1310  $\mu, \nu$  which render it a measure space, we denote  $\nu \ll \mu$  if  $\nu$  is absolutely continuous with respect to 1311  $\mu$ . Hellinger integrals are defined below: 1312 **Definition 4** (Hellinger integrals (Hellinger, 1909)). Let  $\nu, \mu$  be two probability measures on  $(\Omega, \mathcal{F})$ 1313 and satisfy  $\nu \ll \mu$ , and  $\varphi_{\alpha} : \mathbb{R}^+ \to \mathbb{R}$  be defined as  $\varphi_{\alpha}(x) = x^{\alpha}$ . Then the Hellinger integral of 1314 order  $\alpha$  is given by 1315  $H_{\alpha}(\nu \| \mu) = \int \left(\frac{d\nu}{d\mu}\right)^{\alpha} \mathrm{d}\mu.$ 1316 1317 1318 It can be seen as a  $\phi$ -Divergence with a specific parametrised choice of  $\phi$  (Liese & Vajda, 2006). For 1319  $\alpha > 1$ , the Hellinger integral measures the divergence between two probability distributions (Liese & Vajda, 2006). There holds  $H_{\alpha}(\nu \| \mu) \in [1, +\infty), \alpha > 1$ , and it equals to 1 if the two measures 1320 coincide (Shiryaev, 2016). Given such a divergence measure, we now provide the proof. 1321 1322 *Proof.* From Section B.1, we know that 1323 1324  $TE(z) = L_P(z^*) - L_P(z) \le L_P(z^*) - L_P(z) + (L_E(z) - L_E(z^*))$  $= (L_P(z^*) - L_E(z^*)) + (L_E(z) - L_P(z))$ 1326  $\leq \sup_{x \in \mathcal{B}_{\epsilon}(x)} (L_P(z) - L_E(z)) + \sup_{x \in \mathcal{B}_{\epsilon}(x)} (L_E(z) - L_P(z))$ 1327 1328  $\leq \sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} (L_P(z) - L_E(z)) + \sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} (L_E(z) - L_P(z)).$ 1330 Let  $(\theta'_1, \ldots, \theta'_N) \sim \mathcal{P}'_{\Theta^N}$ , where  $\mathcal{P}'_{\Theta^N}$  be a distribution over the product space, and the *m*-th member is different from  $\mathcal{P}_{\Theta^N}$ , i.e.,  $(\theta'_1, \ldots, \theta'_m, \cdots, \theta'_N) = (\theta_1, \ldots, \theta'_m, \cdots, \theta_N)$ , where  $\theta'_m \neq \theta_m$ . The training process of N surrogate models  $f(\theta'_1), \cdots, f(\theta'_N)$  can be viewed as sampling the parameter 1332 1333 sets  $(\theta'_1, \ldots, \theta'_N)$  from the distribution  $\mathcal{P}'_{\Theta^N}$ . 1334 1335 We define 1336  $L_{E'}(z) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \ell(f(\theta'_i; x), y),$ 1337 1338 1339 and 1340  $\Phi_1(E) = \sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \left\{ L_P(z) - L_E(z) \right\},\,$ 1341  $\Phi_1(E') = \sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \left\{ L_P(z) - L_{E'}(z) \right\}.$ 1344 We have 1345

> $\Phi_1(E) - \Phi_1(E') = \sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \{ L_P(z) - L_E(z) \} - \sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \{ L_P(z) - L_{E'}(z) \}$  $\leq \sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \{ L_P(z) - L_E(z) - (L_P(z) - L_{E'}(z)) \}$

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$$= \sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \{ L_{E'}(z) - L_E(z) \}$$

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$$= \frac{1}{N} \sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \ell(f(\theta'_i; x), y) - \sum_{i=1}^{N} \ell(f(\theta_i; x), y) \right].$$
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By assuming that loss function  $\ell$  is bounded by  $\beta$ , we have 

$$|\Phi_1(E) - \Phi_1(E')| \le \frac{\beta}{N}.$$

According to Theorem 1 in Esposito & Mondelli (2024), for all  $\delta \in (0, 1)$  and  $\alpha > 1$ , with probability at least  $1 - \delta$ , we have 

$$\Phi_{1}(E) \leq \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{P}_{\Theta^{N}}}[\Phi_{1}(E)] + \sqrt{\frac{\alpha\beta^{2}}{2(\alpha-1)N} \ln \frac{2^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}}H_{\alpha}^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}\left(\mathcal{P}_{\Theta^{N}} \| \mathcal{P}_{\bigotimes_{i=1}^{N}\Theta}\right)}{\delta}}.$$
(18)

Denote  $f(\theta_i; x)$  as  $f_i(x)$  and  $f(\theta'_i; x)$  as  $f'_i(x)$ . Then we estimate the upper bound of  $\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{P}_{\Theta^N}}[\Phi_1(E)]$ as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{P}_{\Theta^{N}}}[\Phi_{1}(E)] = \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{P}_{\Theta^{N}}}\left[\sup_{z\in\mathcal{Z}}(L_{P}(z) - L_{E}(z))\right] \\ & = \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{P}_{\Theta^{N}}}\left[\sup_{z\in\mathcal{Z}}\mathbb{E}_{(\theta'_{1},\cdots,\theta'_{N})\sim\mathcal{P}'_{\Theta^{N}}}\left(L_{E'}(z) - L_{E}(z)\right)\right] \\ & = \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{P}_{\Theta^{N}}}\left[\sup_{z\in\mathcal{Z}}\left(L_{E'}(z) - L_{E}(z)\right)\right] \\ & \text{(Jensen inequality)} \\ & = \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{P}_{\Theta^{N}},\mathcal{P}'_{\Theta^{N}}}\left\{\sup_{z\in\mathcal{Z}}\frac{1}{N}\left[\sum_{i=1}^{N}\ell(f(\theta'_{i};x),y) - \sum_{i=1}^{N}\ell(f(\theta_{i};x),y)\right]\right\} \\ & = \mathbb{E}_{\sigma}\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{P}_{\Theta^{N}},\mathcal{P}'_{\Theta^{N}}}\left\{\sup_{z\in\mathcal{Z}}\frac{1}{N}\left[\sum_{i=1}^{N}\sigma_{i}\ell(f'_{i}(x),y) - \ell(f_{i}(x),y)\right]\right]\right\} \\ & = \mathbb{E}_{\sigma}\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{P}_{\Theta^{N}}}\left\{\sup_{z\in\mathcal{Z}}\frac{1}{N}\left[\sum_{i=1}^{N}\sigma_{i}\ell(f'_{i}(x),y)\right]\right\} + \mathbb{E}_{\sigma}\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{P}_{\Theta^{N}}}\left\{\sup_{z\in\mathcal{Z}}\frac{1}{N}\left[\sum_{i=1}^{N}\sigma_{i}\ell(f_{i}(x),y)\right]\right\} \\ & = 2 \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\sigma}\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{P}_{\Theta^{N}}}\left\{\sup_{z\in\mathcal{Z}}\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}\sigma_{i}\ell(f_{i}(x),y)\right\} \\ & = 2 \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\sigma}\left\{\sup_{z\in\mathcal{Z}}\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}\sigma_{i}\ell(f_{i}(x),y)\right\} \\ & = 2 \cdot \mathbb{E}_{\sigma}\left\{\sup_{z\in\mathcal{Z}}\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}\sigma_{i}\ell(f_{i}(x),y)\right\} \\ & = 2R_{N}(\mathcal{F}). \end{aligned}$$

Likewise, if we define

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$$\Phi_2(E) = \sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \{L_E(z) - L_P(z)\},$$

$$\Phi_2(E') = \sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \{L_{E'}(z) - L_P(z)\},$$

then we have 

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$$\Phi_{2}(E) - \Phi_{2}(E') = \sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \{L_{E}(z) - L_{P}(z)\} - \sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \{L_{E'}(z) - L_{P}(z)\}$$

$$\leq \sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \{L_{E}(z) - L_{P}(z) - (L_{E'}(z) - L_{P}(z))\}$$

$$= \sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} \{L_{E}(z) - L_{E'}(z)\}$$

According to the assumption that loss function  $\ell$  is bounded by  $\beta$ , we have

$$|\Phi_2(E) - \Phi_2(E')| \le \frac{\beta}{N}$$

1411 According to Theorem 1 in Esposito & Mondelli (2024), for all  $\delta \in (0, 1)$  and  $\alpha > 1$ , with probability 1413 at least  $1 - \delta$ , we have

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$$\Phi_2(E) \le \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{P}_{\Theta^N}}[\Phi_2(E)] + \sqrt{\frac{\alpha\beta^2}{2(\alpha-1)N}\ln\frac{2^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}}H_{\alpha}^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}\left(\mathcal{P}_{\Theta^N}\|\mathcal{P}_{\bigotimes_{i=1}^N\Theta_i}\right)}{\delta}}.$$
(19)

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1417 We estimate the upper bound of  $\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{P}_{\Theta^N}}[\Phi_2(E)]$  as follows: 1418

1443 Therefore, with probability at least  $1 - \delta$ , there holds 1444

$$TE(z,\epsilon) = \Phi_1(E) + \Phi_2(E) \le 4\mathcal{R}_N(\mathcal{F}) + \sqrt{\frac{2\alpha\beta^2}{(\alpha-1)N}\ln\frac{2^{\frac{\alpha-1}{\alpha}}H_\alpha^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}\left(\mathcal{P}_{X^n} \|\mathcal{P}_{\bigotimes_{i=1}^n X_i}\right)}{\delta}}.$$

The proof is complete.

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1453 C MORE RELATED WORK

1455 C.1 TRANSFERABLE ADVERSARIAL ATTACK

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 1457 Input transformation. Input transformation-based attacks have shown great effectiveness in improving transferability and can be combined with gradient-based attacks. Most input transformation

techniques rely on the fundamental idea of applying data augmentation strategies to prevent overfitting
techniques rely on the fundamental idea of applying data augmentation strategies to prevent overfitting
to the surrogate model (Gu et al., 2024). Such methods adopt various input transformations to further
improve the transferability of adversarial examples (Wang et al., 2023b;a). For instance, random
resizing and padding (Xie et al., 2019), downscaling (Lin et al., 2019), mixing (Wang et al., 2021),
automated data augmentation (Yan et al., 2023), block shuffle and rotation (Wang et al., 2024), and
dynamical transformation (Zhu et al., 2024).

1464 Gradient-based optimization. The central concept of these methods is to develop optimization 1465 techniques in the generation of adversarial examples to achieve better transferability. Dong et al. 1466 (2018); Lin et al. (2019); Wang & He (2021) draw an analogy between generating adversarial 1467 examples and the model training process. Therefore, conventional optimization methods that improve 1468 model generalization can also benefit adversarial transferability. In gradient-based optimization 1469 methods, adversarial perturbations are directly optimized based on one or more surrogate models during inference. Some popular ideas include applying momentum (Dong et al., 2018), Nesterov 1470 accelerated gradient (Lin et al., 2019), scheduled step size (Gao et al., 2020) and gradient variance 1471 reduction (Wang & He, 2021; Xiong et al., 2022). There are also other elegantly designed techniques 1472 in recent years (Gubri et al., 2022b; Wang et al., 2022; Xiaosen et al., 2023; Li et al., 2024; Wu 1473 et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2024b), such as collecting weights (Gubri et al., 2022b), modifying gradient 1474 calculation (Xiaosen et al., 2023) and applying integrated gradients (Ma et al., 2023). 1475

Model ensemble attack. Motivated by the use of model ensembles in machine learning, researchers 1476 have developed diverse ensemble attack strategies to obtain transferable adversarial examples (Gu 1477 et al., 2024). It is a powerful attack that employs an ensemble of models to simultaneously generate 1478 adversarial samples. It can not only integrate with advanced gradient-based optimization methods, 1479 but also harness the unique strengths of each individual model (Tang et al., 2024). Some popular 1480 ensemble paradigms include loss-based ensemble (Dong et al., 2018), prediction-based (Liu et al., 1481 2017), logit-based ensemble (Dong et al., 2018), and longitudinal strategy (Li et al., 2020). There 1482 is also some deep analysis to compare these ensemble paradigms (Zhang et al., 2024b). Moreover, 1483 advanced ensemble algorithms have been created to ensure better adversarial transferability (Zou 1484 et al., 2020; Gubri et al., 2022a; Xiong et al., 2022; Chen et al., 2023; Li et al., 2023; Wu et al., 2024; 1485 Chen et al., 2024).

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### 1488 C.2 STATISTICAL LEARNING THEORY

Statistical learning theory forms the theoretical backbone of modern machine learning by providing 1490 rigorous frameworks for understanding model generalization (Vapnik, 1999). It introduces founda-1491 tional concepts such as Rademacher complexity (Bartlett & Mendelson, 2002), VC dimension (Vapnik 1492 & Chervonenkis, 1971), structural risk minimization (Vapnik, 1998). It has also been instrumental in 1493 the development of Support Vector Machines (Cortes & Vapnik, 1995) and kernel methods (Shawe-1494 Taylor & Cristianini, 2004), which remain pivotal in supervised learning tasks. Recent advances 1495 extend statistical learning theory to deep learning, addressing challenges of high-dimensional data 1496 and model complexity (Bartlett et al., 2021). These contributions have significantly enhanced the 1497 capability to design robust learning algorithms that generalize well across diverse applications (Du 1498 & Swamy, 2013). In addition, there are also some other novel theoretical frameworks, such as 1499 information-theoretic analysis (Xu & Raginsky, 2017), PAC-Bayes bounds (Parrado-Hernández et al., 2012), transductive learning (Vapnik, 2006), and stability analysis (Bousquet & Elisseeff, 2002; Shalev-Shwartz et al., 2010). Most of them derive a bound of the order  $\mathcal{O}(\frac{1}{\sqrt{M}})$ , while some others 1500 1501 1502 derive sharper bound of generalization (Li & Liu, 2021) of the order  $\mathcal{O}(\frac{1}{M})$ . Such theoretical analysis 1503 suggests that with the increase of the dataset volume, the model generalization will become better. 1504

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- **D** FURTHER DISCUSSION
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### D.1 ANALYZE EMPIRICAL MODEL ENSEMBLE RADEMACHER COMPLEXITY

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1511 In particular, we present detailed analysis for the simple and complex cases below, within the context of transferable model ensemble attack.

The simple input space. Firstly, consider the trivial case where the input space contains too simple examples so that all classifiers correctly classify  $(x, y) \in \mathbb{Z}$ . Then there holds

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1516 1517  $\mathcal{R}_N(\mathcal{Z}) = \ell(y, y) \mathop{\mathbb{E}}_{\sigma} \left[ \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \sigma_i \right] = 0.$ 

In this case, Z is simple enough for  $f_1, \dots, f_N$ . Such Z corresponds to a  $\mathcal{R}_N(Z)$  close to 0. However, it is important to note that an overly simplistic space Z may be impractical for model ensemble attack: the adversarial examples in such a space may not successfully attack the models from D, leading to a small value of  $L_P(z^*)$ . In other words, the existence of transferable adversarial examples implicitly imposes constraints on the minimum complexity of Z.

1523 **The complex input space.** Secondly, we consider the complex case. In particular, given arbitrarily 1524 N models in  $\mathcal{H}$  and any assignment of  $\sigma$ , a sufficiently complex  $\mathcal{Z}$  contains all kinds of examples 1525 that make  $\mathcal{R}_N(\mathcal{Z})$  large: (1) If  $\sigma_i = +1$ , there are adversarial examples that can successfully attack  $f_i$  and leads to a large  $\sigma_i \ell(f_i(x), y)$ ; (2) If  $\sigma_i = -1$ , there exists some examples that can be correctly 1526 classified by  $f_i$ , leading to  $\sigma_i \ell(f_i(x), y) = 0$ . However, such a large  $\mathcal{R}_N(\mathcal{Z})$  is also not appropriate 1527 for transferable model ensemble attack. It may include adversarial examples that perform well against 1528  $f_1, \dots, f_N$  but are merely overfitted to the current N surrogate models (Rice et al., 2020; Yu et al., 1529 2022). In other words, these examples might not effectively attack other models in  $\mathcal{H}$ , thereby limiting 1530 their adversarial transferability. 1531

The above analysis suggests that an excessively large or small  $\mathcal{R}_N(\mathcal{Z})$  is not suitable for adversarial transferability. So we are curious to investigate the correlation between  $\mathcal{R}_N(\mathcal{Z})$  and adversarial transferability, which comes to the analysis about the general case in Section 3.4.

1535 Explain robust overfitting. After a certain point in adversarial training, continued training 1536 significantly reduces the robust training loss of the classifier while increasing the robust test loss, a 1537 phenomenon known as robust overfitting (Rice et al., 2020; Yu et al., 2022) (also linked to robust generalization (Schmidt et al., 2018; Yin et al., 2019)). From the perspective in Section 3.4, the 1538 cause of this overfitting is the *limited complexity of the input space relative to the classifier* used 1539 to generate adversarial examples during training. The adversarial examples become too simple for 1540 the model, leading to overfitting. To mitigate this, we could consider generating more "hard" and 1541 "generalizable" adversarial examples to improve the model's generalization in adversarial training. 1542 For a less transferable adversarial example (x, y), it is associated with a small  $L_P(z)$ , which in turn 1543 makes  $TE(z, \epsilon)$  large.

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### D.2 COMPARE WITH GENERALIZATION ERROR BOUND.

1547 We note that a key distinction between transferability error and generalization error lies in the 1548 independence assumption. Conventional generalization error analysis relies on an assumption: each 1549 data point from the dataset is independently sampled (Zou & Liu, 2023; Hu et al., 2023). By contrast, the surrogate models  $f_1, \dots, f_N$  for ensemble attack are usually trained on the datasets 1550 with similar tasks, e.g., image classification. In this case, such models tend to correctly classify easy 1551 examples while misclassify difficult examples (Bengio et al., 2009). Consequently, such correlation 1552 indicates dependency (Lancaster, 1963), suggesting that we cannot assume these surrogate models 1553 *behave independently for a solid theoretical analysis*. Additionally, there are alternative methods for 1554 analyzing concentration inequality in generalization error analysis that do not rely on the independence 1555 assumption (Kontorovich & Ramanan, 2008; Mohri & Rostamizadeh, 2008; Lei et al., 2019; Zhang 1556 et al., 2019). However, such data-dependent analysis is either too loose (Lampert et al., 2018) 1557 (because it includes an additional additive factor that grows with the number of samples (Esposito & 1558 Mondelli, 2024)) or requires specific independence structure of data (Zhang & Amini, 2024) that may not align well with model ensemble attacks. Therefore, we uses the latest techniques of information 1560 theory (Esposito & Mondelli, 2024) about concentration inequality regarding dependency. To our 1561 best knowledge, it is the first mathematical tool in concentration inequality that fits our needs.

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1563 D.3 THE ANALOGY BETWEEN GENERALIZATION AND ADVERSARIAL TRANSFERABILITY

Besides providing inspiration for model ensemble attacks, the theoretical evidence in this paper also offers new insights into another fascinating idea. Within the extensive body of research on 1566 transferable adversarial attack algorithms accumulated over the years (Gu et al., 2024), we revisit a 1567 foundational analogy that is universally applicable in the adversarial transferability literature: The 1568 transferability of an adversarial example is an analogue to the generalizability of the model (Dong 1569 et al., 2018). In other words, the ideas that enhance model generalization in deep learning may 1570 also improve adversarial transferability (Lin et al., 2019). Over the past few years, this analogy has significantly inspired the development of numerous effective algorithms, which directly reference it 1571 in their papers (Lin et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2021; Wang & He, 2021; Xiong et al., 2022; Chen et al., 1572 2024). And some recent papers are also inspired by it (Chen et al., 2023; Wu et al., 2024; Wang et al., 1573 2024; Tang et al., 2024). Thus, validating this influential analogy is indispensable for defining the 1574 future landscape of research in adversarial transferability. Interestingly, our paper sheds light on this 1575 insight in several ways. 1576

First, the mathematical formulations in Lemma 1 is similar to generalization error (Vapnik, 1998; Bousquet & Elisseeff, 2002), which also derives an objective as a difference between the population 1578 risk and the empirical risk. Such similarity between transferability error and generalization error 1579 suggests the possible validity of the analogy. Also, Lemma 2 is similar to the bound of the original 1580 Rademacher complexity (Golowich et al., 2018), which also suggests that obtaining a larger training 1581 set as well as a less complex model contribute a tighter bound of Rademacher complexity. Such similarities between transferability error and generalization error suggests the possible validity of the analogy. More importantly, if the analogy is correct, then recall that in the conventional framework 1584 of learning theory: (1) increasing the size of training set typically leads to a better generalization 1585 of the model (Bousquet & Elisseeff, 2002); (2) improving the diversity among ensemble classifiers makes it more advantageous for better generalization (Ortega et al., 2022); and (3) reducing the 1587 model complexity (Cherkassky, 2002) benefits the generalization ability. It is natural to ask: In model ensemble attack, do (1) incorporating more surrogate models, (2) making them more diverse, and (3) reducing their model complexity theoretically result in better adversarial transferability?

In Section 4, our theoretical framework provides consistently affirmative responses to the above question as well as the analogy. Considering a higher perspective, the theory is also instructive in two ways. On the one hand, from the perspective of a theoretical researcher, the extensive and advanced generalization theory may yield enlightening insights in the field of adversarial transferability. On the other hand, from an practitioner's point of view, ideas from deep learning algorithms can also be leveraged to develop more effective transferable attack algorithms.

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1597 D.4 CONFLICTING OPINIONS ON "DIVERSITY"

We observe a significant and intriguing disagreement within the academic community concerning the role of "diversity" in transferable model ensemble attacks:

- Some studies advocate for enhancing model diversity to produce more transferable adversarial examples. For instance, Li et al. (2020) applies feature-level perturbations to an existing model to potentially create a huge set of diverse "Ghost Networks". Li et al. (2023) emphasizes the importance of diversity in surrogate models and promotes attacking a Bayesian model to achieve desirable transferability. Tang et al. (2024) supports the notion of improved diversity, suggesting the generation of adversarial examples independently from individual models.
- In contrast, other researchers adopt a diversity-reduction strategy to enhance adversarial transferability. For example, Xiong et al. (2022) focuses on minimizing gradient variance among ensemble models to improve transferability. Meanwhile, Chen et al. (2023) introduces a disparity-reduced filter designed to decrease gradient variances among surrogate models in ensemble attacks.

Although all these studies reference "diversity," their perspectives appear to diverge. In this paper, we advocate for increasing the diversity of surrogate models. However, we also recognize that diversity-reduction approaches have their merits.

1617 Consider the vulnerability-diversity decomposition of transferability error presented in Theorem 1. It
1618 suggests the presence of a vulnerability-diversity trade-off in transferable model ensemble attacks.
1619 In other words, we may need to prioritize either vulnerability or diversity to effectively reduce
transferability error. Diversity-reduction approaches aim to stabilize the training process, thereby

increasing the "bias." In contrast, diversity-promoting methods directly enhance "diversity." This
 analysis, framed within our unified theoretical framework, provides insight into the differing opinions
 regarding adversarial transferability in the academic community.

## 1624 D.5 VULNERABILITY-DIVERSITY TRADE-OFF CURVE

The relationship between vulnerability and diversity, as discussed in Section 5, merits deeper exploration. Drawing on the parallels between the vulnerability-diversity trade-off and the bias-variance trade-off (Geman et al., 1992), we find that insights from the latter may prove valuable for understanding the former, and warrant further investigation.

The classical bias-variance trade-off suggests that as model complexity increases, bias decreases
while variance rises, resulting in a U-shaped test error curve. However, recent studies have revealed
additional phenomena and provided deeper analysis (Neal et al., 2018; Neal, 2019; Derumigny &
Schmidt-Hieber, 2023), such as the double descent (Belkin et al., 2019; Nakkiran et al., 2021).

Our experiments indicate that diversity does not follow the same pattern as variance in classical bias-variance trade-off. Nonetheless, there are indications within the bias-variance trade-off literature that suggest similar behavior might occur. For instance, Yang et al. (2020) proposes that variance exhibits a bell-shaped curve, initially increasing and then decreasing as network width grows. Additionally, Lin & Dobriban (2021) offers a meticulous understanding of variance through detailed decomposition, highlighting the influence of factors such as initialization, label noise, and training data. Overall, the trend of variance in model ensemble attack remains a valuable area for future research. We may borrow insights from machine learning literature to get a better understanding of this.