
<DOC>
<DOCNO>
WSJ911030-0008
</DOCNO>
<DOCID>
911030-0008.
</DOCID>
<HL>
   Reform Congress
   By Limiting
   Committee Stints
   ----
   By Albert R. Hunt
</HL>
<DATE>
10/30/91
</DATE>
<SO>
WALL STREET JOURNAL (J), PAGE A16
</SO>
<NS>
POLITICS (PLT)
</NS>
<GV>
CONGRESS (CNG)
</GV>
<RE>
NORTH AMERICA (NME)
UNITED STATES (US)
</RE>
<LP>
   The mood in the House majority leader's conference room
darkened with each passing moment as leading Democratic
congressmen heard one of their party's most prominent
pollsters report what the public thought about them.
   The ostensible purpose of the recent session with Peter
Hart was to discuss the public mood on campaign finance
reform. Mr. Hart and a Republican cohort, Douglas Bailey,
conducted six focus groups in July in three states --
Illinois, Florida and Massachusetts -- to get a deeper
feeling of public opinion.
</LP>
<TEXT>
But as Mr. Hart summarized their findings, the discussion quickly centered on the dismay and disgust many voters feel about politics and government these days. The reaction in the room was one of "deep depression," according to one participant. Another described it as "combustible."

The Hart-Bailey report found the public "downbeat" about the way the country is going, convinced that Washington politicians are "more concerned with political self-preservation" than with the public good. Average citizens, the pollsters found, believe they "simply are not being heard in Washington," and more and more are losing confidence in the electoral system as a means of influencing government.

Accordingly, these politicians may be in real trouble this year. The 1990 election offered some early warning signs. True, 96% of all incumbents were re-elected. But a few days after the election, political analyst Alan Baron offered a revelation: For the first time since World War II the average re-election margin of House incumbents from both parties declined from the previous election.

Normally, when Republicans have a good year, Democrats' average victory margin declines, and vice versa. But in 1990, voters declared a plague on both parties' houses, underscoring what polls and other focus groups demonstrate: The disaffection with politicians isn't ideological. Voters don't want more conservative or more liberal representation; they want more responsive representation.

This helps explain the strong momentum for limiting lawmakers' terms, a sentiment fueled by the recent disclosures of the House banking and restaurant fiascos. Term limits would accomplish few of their proponents' goals -- more-independentminded and less-beholden lawmakers -- and would result in many unintended consequences-far more power accruing to unelected staff and special-interest lobbyists .But that's of little concern to frustrated voters who are lashing out because nothing else seems to work.

Plainly, Congress can best address this frustration by doing a better job on the issues bothering people-health care, taxes, jobs. But there's little consensus among either politicians or the voters themselves on these issues. So progress will be slow.

Congress can make some symbolic moves, however. It can eliminate its more indefensible perquisites, such as the free prescription drugs. More important, lawmakers ought to overhaul the disgraceful campaign-finance system to make congressional elections more competitive, and to reduce the role of money and influence peddlers in campaigns. Granted, incumbents have little incentive to work against their narrow self-interest. But the threat of term limits or of electoral defeat focuses even the narrowly self-interested mind.

But there also have to be more fundamental changes in Congress's cozy arrangements. The nexus of many of the problems -- entrenched arrogance, more concern for powerful interests than average citizens and the obscene preoccupation with campaign contributions -- is the committee system. A powerful antidote would be to limit committee service, which would have few of the political and constitutional drawbacks of term limits.

The case is well articulated by two of the most experienced congressional observers: Richard Fenno, a University of Rochester political scientist and author of numerous books on Congress, and Charles Ferris, an attorney who served as chief counsel to both former Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and former House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill.

While both men are deeply dismayed at the current state of Congress, they see term limits as a cure worse than the illness. "Term limits really hit at democracy," says Prof. Fenno. Argues Mr. Ferris: "Voters never should be prevented from electing a person who they think is the best representative of that community."

But they see a lot of virtue in limiting committee assignments. "This really would challenge these guys to shake up the system," says Mr. Fenno, noting that the power of interest groups is centered in committees. Mr. Ferris believes this would "put a vitality in the system" while not resulting, unlike overall term limits, in "a bunch of neophytes who'd be more dependent on staff and lobbyists."

Mr. Ferris notes that the current system, in which a lawmaker gets a cherished committee assignment in his first or second term and then stays there for the rest of his tenure, breeds staleness. "Technology and economics and world dynamics are moving so quickly, but many of these members, while very bright, are locked into outdated beliefs and approaches," he says. If lawmakers had to change areas of expertise every three or four terms, "they wouldn't have the luxury of being intellectually lazy."

Currently, the Intelligence committees in both houses and the House Budget Committee limit members to six or eight years. Why shouldn't the Commerce committees and the tax-writing and appropriations panels be subjected to the same limits? Any loss of legislative expertise would be more than offset by new ideas, new receptivity -- new thinking.

There'd be one other incalculable benefit. This would drive the lobbyists crazy.

Mr. Hunt is the Journal's Washington bureau chief.
</TEXT>
</DOC>

