
<DOC>
<DOCNO>
WSJ920103-0037
</DOCNO>
<DOCID>
920103-0037.
</DOCID>
<HL>
   Letters to the Editor:
   `Culture of Ruling'
   Corrupts Politicians
</HL>
<DATE>
01/03/92
</DATE>
<SO>
WALL STREET JOURNAL (J), PAGE A7
</SO>
<NS>
POLITICS (PLT)
</NS>
<GV>
CONGRESS (CNG)
</GV>
<RE>
NORTH AMERICA (NME)
UNITED STATES (US)
</RE>
<LP>
   As an economist, Robert Barro ("A Free Marketeer's Case
Against Term Limits" editorial page, Dec. 24) sees no
difference between minimum-wage legislation, rent control and
other government interventions in the free market, and the
intervention of congressional term limitation. Mr. Barro
argues that as one should have confidence in the wisdom of
consumers, so one should, when dealing with the electoral
process, "have similar confidence in the public." But his
dewy-eyed, high-school-civics-text vision of the American
electoral process is naive at best. Incumbent legislators
have carefully crafted a web of perks and privileges that
make challenging them a futile crusade, unless they happen to
be convicted of child molestation, in which case the race may
be closer.
   Had the Framers envisioned the kind of Imperial Congress
we have today, they without question would have included term
limits in the Constitution. As it was, tradition dictated
"rotation in office," and the need to spell out such a
restriction was deemed unnecessary. With 95% re-election
rates, times have changed.
</LP>
<TEXT>
   There are two solid reasons for congressional term limitation that economists, at least those of the public-choice persuasion, should fully appreciate. First, the less time that a politician spends inside the Beltway the less his or her common sense will be corrupted by the "culture of ruling" that exists there. To have microphones pushed in your face every day and to be asked your opinion on everything under the sun is a corrupting influence. Soon you start thinking your opinion is more important than it really is and, worse, that perhaps you should codify your opinion on everything under the sun. Other than this corruption of common sense, for instance, what could explain Congress's attempt to repeal the laws of economics through federal deposit insurance?

   Second, term limits end the adverse pre-selection process that exists whereby most individuals seeking office today actually find the prospect of spending the rest of their lives in Washington, D.C., attractive. Such individuals are the last ones we should want passing laws governing the rest of us. What Congress needs is experience in living in the real world, not in passing legislation. Today, business people, teachers, computer programmers and other productive citizens look at the prospect of running for Congress and recognize that they must be willing to commit 10 or 15 years of their lives to being politicians if they expect to have any legislative influence. They opt not to run.

   With six-year limits in the House (which most term-limit initiatives are now proposing for state congressional delegations), such individuals would recognize that they would immediately be on a par with their colleagues in Congress and that they would not have to give up their productive careers in the private sector in order to serve. Indeed, a true citizen Congress would consist of legislators who view their time there as essentially a leave of absence from their real jobs. Certainly the composition of Congress under term limitation would reflect something other than 95% men and 46% lawyers, as it does now.

   Seventy-five percent of Americans support term limitation -- everyone from Ralph Nader to Milton Friedman -- because they recognize it as an opportunity for citizens to wrest control of government from an impervious Congress full of check-bouncing, power-lusting professional politicians.
   
   Edward H. Crane    President    Cato Institute    Washington
</TEXT>
</DOC>

