


Problem

- DNNs can be easily fooled by subtle noise added to the input in imitation learning, which is even non-detectable by humans.
- In real robots, sensors unavoidably contain uncertainty that naturally originates from sensor errors or equipment inaccuracy.
- In Dagger-styled imitation learning, the learning agent is especially vulnerable to attacks and can struggle to recover from errors.
- How can we design a new attacker which can
 1. Be general enough such that it requires less hand-crafted hyperparameters.
 2. Improve the learning agent's robustness

We formulate the problem as a zero-sum game and learn an adversary that perturbs the transition dynamics.



Our Paper and supplementary




Method

- Expert policy π^e
 - Student policy $\pi_\theta: \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$ pretrained by expert demonstration
 - Attacker $f_\phi: \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \mathcal{S}$
-
- Assuming expert robustness:

$$\pi^e(s) = \pi^e(f_\phi(s))$$

Such that expert decision will not be affected by the attacker
 - The competition is set between

$$\mathcal{J} = \mathbb{E}_{\tau \sim \pi_\theta \circ f_\phi} [\|\pi^e(f_\phi(s)) - \pi_\theta(f_\phi(s))\|_2]$$



- Train two models alternatively

Student Policy Robustness


Theorem: As $T \rightarrow \infty$, our algorithm outputs a policy $\pi_{i^*} \in \{\pi_t\}_{t=0}^T$ such that

$$\max_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \mathbb{E}_{s \sim d_{\pi_{i^*} \circ f}} \mathbb{E}_{a \sim \pi_{i^*} \circ f(s)} [\|a - \pi^e(s)\|_2] \leq \epsilon_{rl}$$

with $\epsilon_{rl} \in \mathbb{R}^+$

Please refer to our paper for more details

Two types of attack




Sensory Attack



Physical Attack

Experiments

ARIL SENSORY ATTACK AND DEFENSE



ARIL PHYSICAL ATTACK AND DEFENSE

