31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

LanEvil: Benchmarking the Robustness of Lane Detection to Environmental Illusions

Anonymous Authors

ABSTRACT

Lane detection (LD) is an essential component of autonomous driving systems, providing fundamental functionalities like adaptive cruise control and automated lane centering. Existing LD benchmarks primarily focus on evaluating common cases, neglecting the robustness of LD models against environmental illusions such as shadows and tire marks on the road. This research gap poses significant safety challenges since these illusions exist naturally in real-world traffic situations. For the first time, this paper studies the potential threats caused by these environmental illusions to LD and establishes the first comprehensive benchmark LanEvil for evaluating the robustness of LD against this natural corruption. We systematically design 14 prevalent yet critical types of environmental illusions (e.g., shadow, reflection) that cover a wide spectrum of real-world influencing factors in LD tasks. Based on real-world environments, we create 94 realistic and customizable 3D cases using the widely used CARLA simulator, resulting in a dataset comprising 90,292 sampled images. Through extensive experiments, we benchmark the robustness of popular LD methods using LanEvil, revealing substantial performance degradation (-5.37% Accuracy and -10.70% F1-Score on average), with shadow effects posing the greatest risk (-7.39% Accuracy). Additionally, we assess the performance of commercial auto-driving systems OpenPilot and Apollo through collaborative simulations, demonstrating that proposed environmental illusions can lead to incorrect decisions and potential traffic accidents. To defend against environmental illusions, we propose the Attention Area Mixing (AAM) approach using hard examples, which witness significant robustness improvement (+3.76%) under illumination effects. We hope our paper can contribute to advancing more robust auto-driving systems in the future. Part of our dataset and demos can be found at the anonymous website.

CCS CONCEPTS

 \bullet Security and privacy; \bullet Computing methodologies \rightarrow Machine learning;

KEYWORDS

Lane Detection, Environmental Illusion, Robustness Benchmark

Unpublished working draft. Not for distribution.

for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republich to page on correct or to addictibute to the prior prior gracific participants.

- ACM ISBN 978-x-xxxx-xxxx-x/YY/MM
- 57 https://doi.org/10.1145/nnnnnnnnnnn
- 58



Figure 1: Illustration of naturally existing yet overlooked environmental illusions (e.g., shadow). Perception of these patterns that objectively exist in such a way could cause misinterpretation of their actual nature leading to wrong lane recognition.

1 INTRODUCTION

Lane detection aims to identify the location of lane lines or road edges [24, 41–43, 63], which now serves as the foundation for many driving assistant functions in the real-world auto-driving vehicles [21], such as lane centering and adaptive cruise control.

Though demonstrating promising results on datasets of common traffic cases (*e.g.*, TuSimple [55], CULane [41]), the robustness of LD models on cases containing environmental illusions remains unexplored. In real-world traffic cases, there exists a range of *naturally existing yet overlooked environmental illusions*, such as shadow and reflection in Figure 1. These environmental illusions are natural to human perception. However, perception of these deceiving patterns that objectively exist in such a way could bring natural corruption and cause misinterpretation of their actural nature leading to wrong lane recognition. This sparsity of research presents a severe risk to the safety of auto-driving systems, as it increases their vulnerabilities and poses risks to human lives and properties [58]. Considering the safety-critical nature of autonomous driving, it is of paramount importance to rigorously evaluate LD robustness on such environmental illusions before deployment.

In this paper, we take the first step in studying LD model robustness towards the environmental illusions. In contrast to the common corruption datasets [12, 20] (*e.g.*, snow) that directly perturb the overall clean input images with noises, environmental illusions target adding case-specific and naturally-looking modifications to some regions of the case. Thus, environmental illusions should be considered as a new type of natural corruption robustness problem. Though naturally existing in practice, it is still difficult to directly collect such large-scale real-world images containing different types of environmental illusions. Simulation testing, renowned for its cost-efficiency and reproducibility, has become a widely adopted

116

59 60

61 62

63

and/or a fee Request nermissions from nermissions@acm org

ACM MM. 2024. Melbourne. Australia

^{© 2024} Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM

alternative to real-world experimentation, especially within the
realm of autonomous driving research [1, 16, 47]. Therefore, we
adopt the commonly used simulation testing pipeline [28, 29, 56]
to collect synthetic images [45, 46, 49]. In particular, we utilize the
commonly used CARLA simulator [13] to intricately design 3D traffic environments; we then physically perturb the visual properties
of the target objects (*e.g.*, roads) with our proposed environmental
illusions and finally render the corrupted images.

125 Based on the pipeline, we rigorously analyze the critical influence 126 factors in LD scenarios including Dynamic Objects, Static Facilities, and Environmental Conditions, and systematically design 14 illu-127 sion types with 5 severity levels that collectively address a wide 128 spectrum of real-world environmental illusions on the road and pro-129 pose the LanEvil LD robustness evaluation benchmark. Overall, our 130 benchmark encompasses 94 cases with editable 3D environments 131 and a 90,292 sampled image dataset with 40,000 clean training im-132 ages and 50,292 test images. Leveraging LanEvil, we conducted 133 extensive experiments to benchmark the robustness of commonly 134 135 adopted LD models, where we observed severe performance degeneration (-5.37% Accuracy and -10.70% F1-Score on average). Notably, 136 137 the shadow effect caused the most considerable reduction (-7.39% 138 Accuracy). To improve model robustness against environmental 139 illusions, we propose the Attention Area Mixing (AAM) approach, a novel noise defense baseline leveraging hard examples, achieving 140 a 3.76% improvement over vanilla detectors towards these illusions. 141 142 To better demonstrate the potential of our LanEvil, we conducted joint simulation experiments on commercial autonomous driving 143 systems (OpenPilot [9] and Apollo [3]), where we observed incor-144 rect decisions resulting in car accidents. Finally, we also conducted 145 case studies on real-world scenarios containing environmental il-146 lusions, which demonstrate the threats in practice. We hope this 147 148 paper will raise awareness regarding potential security threats in 149 autonomous scenarios. Our **contributions** are as follows:

- As far as we know, we are the first to study the influence of environmental illusions on the robustness of LD models (an essential component in auto-driving).
- We build the *LanEvil* benchmark, which contains 14 typical environmental illusions, 90,292 images, and 94 editable 3D cases supporting user customization.
- We introduce the Attention Area Mixing (AAM) approach, leveraging hard examples to surpass existing noise defense techniques in addressing environmental illusions.
- We conduct extensive experiments on commonly used LD models, and commercial autonomous driving systems, which substantiates its real-world threats.

2 RELATED WORK

150

151

152

153

154

155

156

157

158

159

160

161

162

163

164

165

174

2.1 Lane Detection

Lane detection addresses the identification of lane lines or road 166 edges. Currently, deep learning-based LD methods have emerged as 167 168 the predominant paradigm, harnessing their ability to learn complex features and patterns. In general, the mainstream LD methods can 169 be divided into the following five categories as segmentation-based 170 methods [37, 39, 41] that treat LD as a pixel-level classification 171 172 task; keypoint-based methods [25, 44, 57] that identify critical points 173 for LD and subsequently group these key points into lane line instances; *anchor-based methods* [30, 52, 53] that utilize predefined anchor points to efficiently identify and locate lane boundaries in images; *row-wise classification methods* [23, 42, 43, 60] that estimate the cell that most probably contains a lane line for each row and repeat this process for each lane; and *parameter-based methods* [8, 15, 36, 54] that model the LD task as a curve fitting problem.

In this paper, we will then benchmark and evaluate the robustness of all the above types of LD methods.

2.2 Lane Detection Datasets

The advancement of LD is closely tied to high-quality datasets under various traffic cases. Early datasets are relatively simple, such as the CalTech dataset [2], which contains 1,224 frames in common urban streets without weather changes. In contrast, VPGNet [27] introduces more complexity, offering 20,000 images featuring intricate urban traffic cases; TuSimple [55] primarily concentrates on the annotated lane under highway scenes. Besides, some other datasets introduce more diverse traffic conditions. For example, CU-Lane [41] includes over 130,000 images, with approximately 72.3% of the dataset featuring challenging cases such as traffic crowds and dazzling light; BDD-100K [61] covers diverse lighting conditions and 6 extreme weather types; in LLAMAS [4], the count of marked lane pixels is sparse and varies with marking distance and position; in addition, CurveLane [59] places emphasis on curved lanes.

Besides the above common datasets, the **robustness benchmarks** that study natural corruption in LD scenarios are rare. Some pioneering benchmarks are devoted to assessing the robustness of image classification [20] and object detection [20] against common perturbations such as blur, weather conditions, and digital corruption. Recently, some studies have proposed to investigate the perception robustness of autonomous driving against common corruption [12, 26]. However, these works primarily focus on general 3D perception tasks such as detection and segmentation, and the generated corruption (*e.g.*, motion blur) is not specially designed for LD. Moreover, there also exist some studies that generate specially designed lane-like adversarial attacks for autonomous driving [6, 48], which is out of the scope of this paper.

To sum up, though existing LD datasets have achieved notable milestones in assessing the performance of LD methods, there still exist no systematic investigations on LD scenario-related corruption, such as shadows and reflections. Our *LanEvil* aims to bridge this gap by providing a comprehensive dataset for LD corruption robustness evaluation. *The detailed comparison of* LanEvil and other datasets are shown in Supplementary Materials.

3 THE LANEVIL DATASET

3.1 **Problem Definition**

Lane detector. A lane detector $f_{\theta}(\mathbf{I}) \to \mathbf{loc} \in \mathbb{N}^{K}$ with parameters θ , which takes an image $\mathbf{I} \in [0, 255]^{3}$ as input, outputs *K* lane line locations as **loc**. The formulation of the training is as follows:

$$\min_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \mathbb{E}_{(\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{loc}_{qt}) \sim \mathbb{D}} \mathcal{L}(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{I}), \mathbf{loc}_{qt}), \tag{1}$$

where \mathbb{D} denotes the dataset, and $\mathcal{L}(\cdot)$ is the loss function that measures the difference between the output of the lane detector f and the ground truth \mathbf{loc}_{at} .

LanEvil: Benchmarking the Robustness of Lane Detection to Environmental Illusions

Environment. In practice, the autonomous vehicle first perceives the real-world scenario environment Φ via the sensor and then projects/renders the 3D objects into the 2D image $\mathbf{I} = R(\Phi)$ as the input, where $R(\cdot)$ is the environmental sampling function. Specifically, the environment highly related to the LD scenario can be roughly divided into the static facilities $\mathbb{S} = \{\mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{s}_2, ..., \mathbf{s}_n\}$ (*e.g.*, roads, fences) and dynamic objects $\mathbb{X} = \{\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2, ..., \mathbf{x}_m\}$ (*e.g.*, pedestrians, vehicles). In addition, the environmental conditions C, such as weather and lighting, can also pose influences on the environment. Therefore, the environment Φ should be defined as

233

234

235

236

237

238

239

240

241

242

243

244

245

246

247

248

249

250

251

252

253

254

255

256

257

258

259

260

261

262

263

264

265

266

267

268

269

270

271

273

274

275

276

277

278

279

290

$$\Phi = (\langle \mathbb{S}, \mathbb{X} \rangle, \mathbb{C}). \tag{2}$$

The input I of LD should be rendered from the environment with specific sets of static/dynamic objects with certain conditions as

$$\mathbf{I} = R(\langle \mathbb{S}, \mathbb{X} \rangle, \mathbf{C}). \tag{3}$$

Environmental illusions on LD models. Natural changes/ modifications of the aforementioned static facilities, dynamic objects, and environmental conditions would bring certain corruption to the rendered input I and cause the performance degeneration of LD models. In particular, to generate environmental illusions, we directly modify the attributes of each parameter under the environment Φ in Equation 2 to get $\hat{\Phi}$. Then, the rendered image $\hat{\mathbf{I}} = R(\hat{\Phi})$ is slightly perturbed and contains environmental illusions in specific regions. Therefore, the performance $f_{\hat{\theta}}(\hat{\mathbf{I}})$ of LD model may decrease. In this paper, we mainly design single-factor changes and generate the corresponding environmental illusions.

3.2 Environmental Illusion Design

As shown in Figure 2, our benchmark encompasses four environmental illusion categories with 14 types. We then illustrate the design of each category.

● Road Damage. The road damage corresponds to the influences brought by the perturbations added to the static facilities S on the road. Here, we design four typical types of environmental illusions including Road Crack, Road Repair, Tire Marks, Guard Rail. In particular, Road Crack illusion encompasses common forms of cracks, ranging from minor transverse and longitudinal cracks to mesh-like fissures. The repaired regions are visually obvious and some of them exhibit linear patterns that are similar to lane markings, and we term this Road Repair illusion. We also design the Tire Marks illusion which depicts the case of emergency braking or collisions.Moreover, we consider the potential misidentification of Guard Rail as lane markings, which can affect the detection of road edges.

Given an existing static object \mathbf{s}_i (e.g., road) in the environment 280 Φ , we modify the appearance attributes of object s_i by physically 281 adding the above specific perturbation type on specific regions and 282 obtain the perturbed object as $\hat{s}_i = s_i + g(\delta)$, where $g(\cdot)$ is the 283 perturbed function and δ denotes the severity levels and perturbed 284 mask. Additionally, we add new object s_i on the roadside in Φ , 285 such as guard rails. Therefore, the environmental illusions caused 286 by Road Damage can be formulated as perturbing or adding the 287 static facilities in the environment as $\hat{\mathbb{S}} = {\hat{\mathbf{s}}_1, ..., \hat{\mathbf{s}}_i, \mathbf{s}_{i+1}, \cdots, \mathbf{s}_{i+N}},$ 288 289 where N is the number of added objects.

ACM MM, 2024, Melbourne, Australia

291

292

293

294

295

296

297

298

299

300

301

302

303

304

305

306

307

308

309

310

311

312

313

314

315

316

317

318

319

320

321

322

323

324

325

326

327

328

329

330

331

332

333

334

335

336

337

338

339

340

341

342

343

❷ Traffic Obstruction. This category of illusion corresponds to the influence of dynamic objects X on the roads. Traffic participants constitute a pivotal element in the realm of autonomous driving, often necessitating stringent safety measures. In this paper, we mainly focus on three classical types of traffic participants Pedestrian, Vehicle, and Bicycle. These participants could obstruct the view of lane lines and influence the performance of LD. In addition, we also generate different quantities of participants to simulate traffic flow with different levels of complexity.

In detail, for each specific case, we generate *n* instances \mathbf{x}_i of the specific illusion type. Different from Road Damage, we set the default \mathbb{X} in the environment as \emptyset and add participants at different regions on the roads. Therefore, the environmental illusions caused by Traffic Obstruction can be formulated as adding extra *m* participants in the environment as $\hat{\mathbb{X}} = {\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2, \mathbf{x}_3, \cdots, \mathbf{x}_m}$.

Shadow. The environmental conditions C, such as weather and lighting, can affect the visual appearance of the roads and related objects resulting in extra illusions. One influential factor is the lighting condition changes over time, which would project different shadows on the road. These shadows (e.g., shadows of the fence or streetlight) have patterns that are similar to lane lines, which could cause a decrease in LD performance. For example, at nightfall, the light angle is comparatively huge resulting in a larger shadow area; the light intensity at noon is high while the angle is small causing clearer shadow edges. Considering the above circumstances, we design four types of environmental illusions for shadows including Streetlight, Fence, Rail, and Wire. Specifically, Streetlight and Fence cast elongated shadows on the road when the sun is at a low elevation angle. Meanwhile, we also devise a type of shadow deception caused by the translucent parts of Rail. By adjusting the lighting angles, rails can project bright lines on the road that closely resemble lane markings in both color and shape, creating a highly deceptive visual effect. Finally, we observe a similar effect of Wire. Both the opaque parts of the shadow and the translucent areas between two power lines could be mistaken for lane markings.

Based on the above analysis, we generate the shadow illusion by altering the lighting factor in the simulation environment. The perturbation images $I^{(l,a)}$ can be calculated by Equation 3 with hyper-parameter (l, a) luminance and angle.

O Reflection. Another environmental condition weather changes, such as rains, would create water puddles on the roads, which can reflect the light and influence the accurate capture of lane lines. Images captured by autonomous vehicles at backlit angles are significantly distorted due to the impact of reflection. Based on the above observation, we design three types of illusion including Sunlight Reflection, Streetlight Reflection, and Vehicle Reflection. In particular, when the vehicle travels into the sun, intense Sunlight Reflection can blur lane markings, especially white lines and dashed lines. Moreover, after heavy rain, this effect becomes more pronounced, as the reflection from water on the road makes lane markings invisible in the images. Similarly, nighttime Streetlight Reflection also strongly affects the recognition of road lane markings. To make the illusion more severe and practical, we also consider the two most common colors of streetlights, i.e., white and yellow, coincidentally matching the common colors of lane markings. Additionally, we introduce Vehicle Reflection,

```
344
345
346
```

Anonymous Authors



Figure 2: The framework of our *LanEvil* benchmark, which contains 14 specially-designed environmental illusion types from 4 categories including road damage, traffic obstruction, reflection, and shadow.



Figure 3: Illustration of our data collection pipeline.

which denotes the reflection of the surface of some vehicles, affecting the visibility of the front vehicles.

3.3 Construction Details

Data collection. Though the proposed environmental illusions naturally exist, it is difficult to directly collect large-scale real-world images containing diverse types of illusions. Therefore, we use CARLA [13] simulator to generate high-quality perturbed cases and then sample the images with high visual fidelity. The data collection pipeline is as follows: O according to real-world scenarios, we customize the 3D environment and design road types (map segmentations) that are commonly witnessed for traffic, such as T-junction; ② we perturb the properties of specific objects in the simulation environment based on the illusion generation methods in Section 3.2; 3 we place objects in different positions and generate traffic flow; • we run our vehicle agent under the given routing path, and then save the case and capture the first-view images. The sampling RGB camera is positioned in front of the vehicle agent with 1280×720 resolution and 90.0° field of view. To make it more practical, we follow [5, 14] and replicate the most basic and common traffic cases for autonomous driving such as following other vehicles and executing sharp turns. The pipeline and collected images are shown in Figure 3 and 5, respectively.



Figure 4: The statistics of *LanEvil* dataset. (a) The number of original and perturbed cases under four categories. (b) The case distribution of four illusion categories.

Quality control. We follow a similar annotation quality control procedure to classical datasets [31, 55]. Here, all of our annotators followed the same annotation guidelines, including what to annotate and how to annotate lanes. Moreover, to ensure the accuracy of annotation, we divide the annotators into 3 groups. Each image was assigned to 2 groups for annotation. Then the average results were reviewed by the third group.

3.4 Data Properties

Subset division. Our *LanEvil* contains two subsets, *i.e.*, a training set with normal images and a test set with environmental illusions. We first generate the training set with 40,000 randomly sampled clean images without designed environmental illusions. The test set consists of 50,292 images. For each basic environmental illusion, we provide an original case without any illusion and 2 - 10 perturbed cases, each consisting of 50 to 300 consecutively captured driving images. The statistics of original and perturbed cases are shown in Figure 4a and Table 1b. *More dataset details including license can be found in Supplementary Material*.

LanEvil: Benchmarking the Robustness of Lane Detection to Environmental Illusions

ACM MM, 2024, Melbourne, Australia



Figure 5: Visualization of images from our LanEvil dataset under different environmental illusions.

Table 1: Detailed data properties of LanEvil.

| | Туре | Number | Typical examples | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|--------------------------|-------------|---|--------|------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| | Scene | 5 | Urban, Highway | | | | | | | | |
| | Lane line | 9 | White single solid, Yellow double solid | | | | | | | | |
| | Weather | 12 | SoftRainNoon, ClearNoon | | | | | | | | |
| | Road type | 9 | T-junction, Uphill | | | | | | | | |
| | (b) Quality distribution | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Image Type | Road Damage | Traffic Obstruction | Shadow | Reflection | | | | | | |
| Original 2.600 | | | 5.000 2.051 4 | | | | | | | | |

Category distribution. Our *LanEvil* test set contains 50,292 images comprising a total of 94 basic cases (*e.g.*, straight ahead, turn) with editable 3D environments. The quantity of cases and images for each type of environmental illusion is illustrated in Figure 4b. In addition, The *LanEvil* dataset encompasses 9 line types in different shapes and colors. It also covers multiple driving scenes and multiple road types, as shown in Table 1a.

10,000

15,000

6,441

8,492

17,000

21,600

Other application possibilities. Besides image collection, our dataset also involves the meticulous construction of large-scale corrupted 3D simulation scenarios. These scenarios are saved in editable formats which could support further development; in addition, these dynamic scenarios could be used as input to other software for evaluation, since CARLA has been successfully connected to many other systems.

4 ATTENTION AREA MIXING (AAM)

To address environmental illusions, we introduce the Attention Area Mixing (AAM) here. The framework is shown in Figure 6.

Recent studies, such as Geirhos et al. [17], highlight a significant texture bias in DNNs. Following this, Liu et al. [35] proposed utilizing category-specific features to improve training. Drawing on prior research and [62], we introduce the AAM approach, specifically designed to meet the unique requirements of LD. We create a repository of high-attention (HAA) areas from hard examples, which are then blended with dataset images for augmentation. This method aims to enhance LD model performance significantly.

4.1 Attention Area Generation

The attention graph is instrumental in visualizing the regions that the model prioritizes during the prediction phase. By incorporating visual attention mechanisms such as CAM [64], Grad-CAM [50], and Grad-CAM++ [7], we significantly bolster the interpretability



Figure 6: The Attention Area Mixing (AAM) Framework

and insight into deep learning models. Our approach meticulously evaluates the precision of the model's focus on relevant sectors by examining its attention map. More precisely, for a given image I, we compute its attention map M employing an attention module \mathcal{A} , specifically designed for LD:

$$M = \mathcal{A}(I). \tag{4}$$

More precisely, the attention module \mathcal{A} for LD is

$$\mathcal{A}(I) = \operatorname{relu}\left(\sum_{k}\sum_{i}\sum_{j}\alpha_{ij}^{k}\cdot\operatorname{relu}\left(\frac{\partial\mathcal{L}}{\partial A_{ij}^{k}}\right)\cdot A_{ij}^{k}\right),\tag{5}$$

where α_{ij}^k represents the gradient weights for the lane detection task within activation map k, $\mathcal{L}(\cdot)$ denotes a loss function optimized for lane detection, A_{ij}^k is the pixel value in position (i, j) of the *k*-th feature map, and relu(\cdot) denotes the RELU function.

Additionally, our methodology concentrates exclusively on hard examples—images that the model does not readily detect accurately. For any given image, should its Accuracy or F1-score be lower than the dataset's mean, we designate it as a hard example.

4.2 High Attention Area Extraction

The process of High Attention Area (HAA) Extraction identifies mismatches between model focus and ground truth. It begins by applying Gaussian blurring to the heatmap M to improve generalization, represented as:

$$M' = G(M, \sigma), \tag{6}$$

with M' as the blurred heatmap, where σ is the Gaussian kernel's standard deviation. This step is followed by thresholding M' to produce a binary map B:

Perturbed

Total

2.600

5,200

here, *T* is the threshold, with x, y as pixel coordinates. We identify connected regions in *B*, remove areas smaller than size threshold *S*, forming interest areas *A*:

$$A = \{r \mid \operatorname{area}(r) > S, r \subset B\}.$$
(8)

Discrepancies are pinpointed by comparing each region $r \in A$ with ground truth *G*, defining mismatches as regions with insufficient overlap and extracting the minimum bounding rectangles (MBR) for these regions :

$$\mathbb{R}_{HAA} = \{ MBR(r) \mid r \in A \land overlap(r, G) < \theta \},$$
(9)

where \mathbb{R}_{HAA} represents the set of mismatched regions enclosed by their minimum bounding rectangles, and θ establishes the threshold for acceptable overlap.

4.3 Attention Area Mixing

Following the creation of the \mathbb{R}_{HAA} , we perform mixed operations to infuse the dataset with hard examples. Given the dataset \mathbb{D} , for each image *I* within \mathbb{D} , we integrate a randomly selected High Attention Area *H* from *HAA Repo* into *I*, through the operation:

$$I_{\text{mixed}} = I \oplus \text{Locate}(H, G_I), \tag{10}$$

here, I_{mixed} signifies the augmented image, incorporating H based on the ground truth G_I , with \oplus representing the blending action. This method enhances model resilience to real-world variability by embedding critical High Attention Areas into training images, fostering improved recognition and detection accuracy.

5 EXPERIMENTS

5.1 Experimental Setup

Dataset. In our main experiments, we first train the LD models from scratch using the training set of our *LanEvil*, and then evaluate their robustness on the test set of *LanEvil*. We also evaluate the domain gap between simulated data and real data in Section 5.4.

Target models. To provide a comprehensive evaluation, we choose five representative and commonly-used LD models from the five LD categories as introduced in Section 2.1 for experiments: LaneATT [53], UltraFast [42], BezierLaneNet [15], GANet [57], SCNN [41]. For the backbones, we use the ResNet [19] series including ResNet-18, ResNet-34, ResNet-50, and ResNet-101 with weights pre-trained on ImageNet [10]. Note that, the official SCNN model implementation only supports VGG-16 [51] architecture. Therefore, we only use VGG-16 as its backbone.

Evaluation metrics. We select the two most widely used metrics in lane detection, *i.e.*, *Accuracy* and *F1-score*, as the main evaluation metrics to calculate the performance of LD methods. For both of these metrics, *higher* values indicate *better* performance/robustness. *Detailed definitions can be found in the Supplementary Materials.*

5.2 Main Results

We first evaluate the model robustness of five LD models on *LanEvil*. Due to the space limitations, we report the average performance of models on each of the four main illusion categories here. *The breakdown results of each illusion type and level can be found in the Supplementary Material.* As shown in Table 2, we can **identify**:

• Overall, the proposed environmental illusions have demonstrated certain impacts on the robustness of LD models. In general, these illusions can cause an average absolute **5.37**% Accuracy drop and **10.70**% F1-Score drop.

② Different environmental illusions show different threat impacts on LD model robustness. For instance, Shadow demonstrates the most pronounced effect, leading to an average model performance decrease of 7.39%; in contrast, Road Damage shows comparatively weak influence with only 2.49% decreases on average.

❸ Following a comprehensive analysis of the model and backbone, we observe that different models display various degrees of resistance to these types of corruption. In particular, GANet showcases the highest clean performance. However, the Accuracy decreases the most after attacks, amounting to approximately 7.53%. Conversely, SCNN has the lowest Accuracy in clean images but experiences the least Accuracy decrease. Additionally, in terms of model backbones, as the depth of layers increases, the performance and robustness of the model tend to improve.

④ As the severity level increases, the performance degeneration increases significantly. Specifically, the level-1 images cause an average 2.61% Accuracy drop and 7.06% F1-Score drop; in contrast, the level-5 images can cause an average **19.12%** Accuracy drop and **34.10%** F1-Score drop.

5.3 Results on Noise Defense Methods

In this section, we further investigated the effectiveness of our proposed AAM method and existing noise defense methods on our *LanEvil* dataset. Specifically, we choose ResNet-18 as the backbone for the LaneATT and UFLD models and apply PGD adversarial training [38], cutout [11], copy-paste [18], Augment HSV and MixUP [62] for the noise defense methods as they improve the model robustness towards adversarial noises [32–35] or natural corruption.

Figure 7 demonstrates that, across various noise defense methods, our AAM leads with a notable 3.76% average increase in accuracy, outperforming competing methods. Other defense strategies yield only modest gains, typically below 1.5%, with an overall average improvement of +1.24%. Notably, PGD-AT experienced performance declines compared to vanilla models (-1.45%). These outcomes suggest that the environmental illusions introduced by our method diverge from conventional adversarial noise and corruption, highlighting the need for specialized defense studies.

5.4 Visual Fidelity Analysis

In this part, we further study the visual fidelity of our generated corrupted images. Specifically, we conduct two experiments: (1) training on either simulated or real-world datasets and then testing on another dataset; (2) conducting human perception studies on the visual quality of our dataset.

Cross-domain model prediction. ① *LanEvil* \rightarrow *Real-world.* For each of the three real-world datasets (TuSimple, CULane, LLAMAS), we separately train a model on the original real-world dataset, a model on the generated *LanEvil*, and a *LanEvil* pre-trained model fine-tuning on 100 images from the corresponding real-world datasets.

Table 2: Evaluation results of different LD models using ResNet-18 on the *LanEvil* dataset. LD models are trained using the *LanEvil* training set. For each category of illusion, we report the average value over different types and severity levels. The bold values represent the minimum in each column, and "Gap" is computed by "Perturbed" minus "Original". *More results of other backbones and illusions breakdown can be found in Supplementary Material.*

| Mathal | Road Damage | | | Traffic Obstruction | | | Shadow | | | Reflection | | | Average | | |
|--------------------|-------------|----------|-------|---------------------|----------|-------|-----------|----------|-------|------------|----------|--------|-----------|----------|-------|
| Method | Perturbed | Original | Gap | Perturbed | Original | Gap | Perturbed | Original | Gap | Perturbed | Original | Gap | Perturbed | Original | Gap |
| LaneATT [53] | 76.23 | 78.66 | -2.43 | 73.18 | 75.84 | -2.66 | 79.48 | 86.07 | -6.59 | 71.33 | 78.93 | -7.59 | 73.53 | 78.85 | -5.32 |
| UFLD [42] | 65.90 | 68.47 | -2.57 | 65.64 | 67.58 | -1.94 | 67.73 | 74.01 | -6.27 | 64.45 | 70.88 | -6.42 | 65.45 | 69.90 | -4.44 |
| BezierLaneNet [15] | 73.14 | 75.76 | -2.62 | 71.44 | 74.51 | -3.07 | 68.79 | 78.32 | -9.54 | 69.44 | 75.31 | -5.87 | 70.00 | 75.52 | -5.52 |
| GANet [57] | 85.32 | 89.33 | -4.01 | 80.53 | 84.75 | -4.22 | 83.44 | 93.02 | -9.58 | 79.21 | 89.23 | -10.02 | 80.55 | 88.08 | -7.53 |
| SCNN [41] | 71.11 | 71.94 | -0.84 | 67.17 | 69.67 | -2.50 | 65.38 | 70.33 | -4.95 | 63.88 | 68.05 | -4.16 | 65.31 | 69.36 | -4.05 |

| (a) Results under Accuracy (%) |
|--------------------------------|
|--------------------------------|

(~)

() n

1.

| N d l | Road Damage | | | Traffic Obstruction | | | Shadow | | | Reflection | | | Average | | |
|--------------------|-------------|----------|-------|---------------------|----------|--------|-----------|----------|--------|------------|----------|--------|-----------|----------|--------|
| Method | Perturbed | Original | Gap | Perturbed | Original | Gap | Perturbed | Original | Gap | Perturbed | Original | Gap | Perturbed | Original | Gap |
| LaneATT [53] | 49.20 | 52.63 | -3.43 | 46.03 | 51.87 | -5.84 | 48.23 | 60.35 | -12.12 | 38.81 | 53.23 | -14.41 | 42.95 | 53.80 | -10.85 |
| UFLD [42] | 21.25 | 24.54 | -3.30 | 28.23 | 31.85 | -3.62 | 26.18 | 36.32 | -10.13 | 19.96 | 30.82 | -10.85 | 23.57 | 31.65 | -8.08 |
| BezierLaneNet [15] | 37.84 | 40.68 | -2.85 | 42.53 | 50.03 | -7.49 | 41.41 | 50.93 | -9.52 | 37.06 | 45.86 | -8.81 | 39.49 | 47.95 | -8.46 |
| GANet [57] | 79.01 | 84.16 | -5.15 | 70.34 | 80.79 | -10.45 | 73.50 | 89.33 | -15.83 | 65.25 | 83.03 | -17.78 | 68.64 | 83.25 | -14.61 |
| SCNN [41] | 48.69 | 52.88 | -4.19 | 43.63 | 50.47 | -6.85 | 34.92 | 49.42 | -14.50 | 34.70 | 46.94 | -12.24 | 37.71 | 49.19 | -11.49 |

(b) Results under F1-score (%)



Figure 7: Evaluation of noise defense methods. The designed illusions are resilient to the data defense methods employed. The x-axis indicates different types of environmental illusions. *More details can be found in Supplementary Material.*

All the models are LaneATT with ResNet-34. Here, we report the F1-score (%) on the testing set of TuSimple (96.77, 91.56, 94.23), CULane (76.68, 69.32, 73.98), and LLAMAS (93.74, 89.15, 92.58). The results indicate acceptable domain gaps despite differences between the real world and our simulated images. Additionally, the gap can be narrowed by incorporating a small number of real images. **@** *Real-world* \rightarrow *LanEvil*. Furthermore, we use LaneATT models with ResNet-34 and train them on real-world datasets (*i.e.*, TuSimple, CULane, and LLAMAS), and then w/ or w/o fine-tuning them on the *LanEvil*. For each model, we test it separately on corresponding real-world datasets and *LanEvil*. Table 3 shows minor performance reductions, indicating a comparatively small domain gap between *LanEvil* and other real-world datasets.

Human perception study. Following [29], we conduct human
perception studies and ask the participants to evaluate the naturalness of the collected 300 images (150 from *LanEvil* and 150 from
real-world scenarios). Specifically, We recruited 100 participants
from campus, all with normal (corrected) eyesight. For each image,
participants first view it for 3 seconds, and then rate the image by
a 5-point Absolute Category Rating (ACR) [22]. All participants

Table 3: F1-Scores (%) of LaneATT with ResNet-34 w/o and w/ fine-tuning on *LanEvil* training set.

| _ | Real- | world te | st set | LanEvil test set | | | | |
|---------------|-------|---------------|--------|------------------|---------------|--------|--|--|
| Dataset | w/o | $\mathbf{w}/$ | Gap | w/o | $\mathbf{w}/$ | Gap | | |
| TuSimple [55] | 96.77 | 95.40 | -1.37 | 48.34 | 62.92 | +14.58 | | |
| CULane [41] | 76.68 | 76.14 | -0.54 | 55.98 | 68.41 | +12.43 | | |
| LLAMAS [4] | 93.74 | 93.09 | -0.65 | 58.26 | 66.95 | +8.69 | | |

are asked to finish the evaluation in 30 minutes. The average ACR results (our images: 3.89 and real-world images: 3.98) suggest that our simulated images are comparatively natural to human vision when compared to real-world images.

6 EVALUATION ON COMMERCIAL SYSTEMS

Here, we conduct software-in-the-loop tests on two commercial autonomous driving systems including OpenPilot and Apollo. These systems contain perception and decision modules, which have been applied in real-world auto-driving vehicles (*e.g.*, TOYOTA, Baidu Apollo). To conduct experiments, we directly feed the 3D cases in *LanEvil* as the perception input for the systems and evaluate their final decision performance.

6.1 **OpenPilot Simulation**

We first evaluate *LanEvil* on OpenPilot, an open-sourced commercial driver assistance system that provides a range of functions. We chose eight cases (two types under each category of illusion) in *LanEvil* and configured their starting points and directions to ensure they traverse the road sections we have designed. The pipeline for implementing joint simulation is: **0** we connect OpenPilot with the source-compiled CARLA 0.9.14, and specify CARLA's initialization parameters (*e.g.*, maps); **2** for each case pair (clean and perturbed CARLA 3D cases), we select the vehicle model (*i.e.*, Audi)



(b) perturbed scenario

Figure 8: The Tire Marks case causes OpenPilot to incorrect decisions leading to collisions on the wall.

and set the starting point; **③** we start up the auto-driving mode with a speed limit of 45 mph and observe/evaluate the decision performance. Note that, the starting point is positioned with a 5-10 *meters* distance away from the perturbed location.

We repeat the experiment five times for all eight cases and report the average results. To quantify the results, we follow [48], and use the Attack Success Rate (ASR) as the evaluation metric. Following the US traffic policy [40], the criterion determines an attack or per-turbation is successful (i.e., the car is deceived) when it achieves over 0.285m lateral deviations within the required success time (2.5 seconds). As the driving time from the starting point increases, we observe that the ASR for all types of illusions significantly increases. In other words, the auto-driving vehicle turns to make incorrect decisions. In particular, for 92.31% of the frames, the Road Damage can make OpenPilot achieve over 0.285m lateral deviations within 2.5 seconds. More results can be found in Supplementary Material. We also provide a visualization of the Tire Marks cases in Figure 8, where nearly all frames of the OpenPilot system encounter recog-nition errors, resulting in decision-making mistakes and ultimately leading to car collisions on the wall. The above results indicate that our proposed environmental illusions present certain impacts on the robustness of commercial autonomous driving systems.

6.2 Apollo Simulation

We also evaluate *LanEvil* on an auto-driving software platform Apollo developed by Baidu. The evaluated cases are similar to Open-Pilot. However, the evaluation protocol is different since Apollo will stop when encountering the lane lines. Therefore, we measure the percentage of cases where Apollo stops. Also, different from the pipeline in Section 6.1, in step **③**, we simultaneously select the start point and end point of the vehicle for each case. During the experiments, the Apollo vehicle stopped in 6 cases over the 8 tests, demonstrating its comparatively weak robustness towards environmental illusions.

To sum up, the above studies on two systems demonstrate the potential threats of our proposed environmental illusions to commercial autonomous driving systems, which yield strong safety concerns on real-world auto-driving vehicles. *More visualizations and details can be found in Supplementary Material.*



Figure 9: Real-world environmental illusion images.

7 REAL-WORLD CASE STUDIES

Finally, we extend our experiments from the simulation environment to the real-world images (as shown in Figure 9) to verify the threats of the proposed environmental illusions in real-world scenarios. Specifically, a stationary camera was mounted on a vehicle to acquire video recordings from various highways and urban routes. These routes were repeatedly navigated under different weather and time conditions to capture a wide range of environmental illusions. Subsequently, we meticulously select 1,400 images that cover 14 types of illusions as the perturbed set from all collected frames and select the corresponding normal scene frames as the clean set. All images were subject to manual annotation for precise analysis.

We use TuSimple pre-trained LaneATT with ResNet-34 to report the Accuracy drop (%) on Road Damage (-7.48%), Traffic Obstruction (-8.61%), Shadow (-13.55%), and Reflection (-12.84%). The tendency of the impact of illusions on real-world images stays the same with simulator conclusions basically, where Shadow demonstrates the most pronounced effect while Road Damage shows comparatively weak influence. In particular, the main observations in the simulator hold for real-world images, showcasing an even more pronounced impact, which indicates that environmental illusions also pose a significant threat in the real world.

In addition, we drove a real car and turned on the assistantdriving mode in the real-world shadow illusion scenario, where we identified incorrect decisions with noticeable steering deviation. Since the vehicle has not been released, we are bound by the confidentiality agreement and cannot disclose more details. However, we report a demo video on the website. The above results demonstrate that the proposed environmental illusions also have high risks in the real world, which requires wider attention in the future.

8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

This paper studies the potential threats caused by the environmental illusions to LD models and establishes the first comprehensive benchmark *LanEvil* for evaluation. Large-scale experiments on *LanEvil* demonstrate that those naturally existing environmental illusions significantly reduce the performance of LD models, which necessitates further attention for building robust auto-driving systems. We will release our dataset upon paper publication.

Limitations. Despite the promising results, there are several directions/limitations we would like to explore: **①** evaluation of *LanEvil* on end-to-end foundation models for autonomous driving; **②** evaluation of *LanEvil* on other common tasks in autonomous driving such as 3D obstacle detection; **③** extending the size of real-world images with environmental illusions; and **④** testing more product-level real-world autonomous driving vehicles.

LanEvil: Benchmarking the Robustness of Lane Detection to Environmental Illusions

ACM MM, 2024, Melbourne, Australia

987

988

989

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1000

1001

1002

1003

1004

1005

1006

1007

1008

1009

1010

1011

1012

1013

1014

1015

1016

1017

1018

1019

1020

1021

1022

1023

1024

1025

1026

1027

1028

1029

1030

1031

1032

1033

1034

1035

1036

1037

1038

1039

1040

1041

1042

1043 1044

929 **REFERENCES**

930

931

932

933

934

935

936

937

938

939

940

941

942

943

944

945

946

947

948

949

950

951

952

953

954

955

956

957

958

959

960

961

962

963

964

965

966

967

968

969

970

971

972

973

974

975

976

977

978

979

980

981

982

983

984

- Hesham Alghodhaifi and Sridhar Lakshmanan. 2021. Autonomous vehicle evaluation: A comprehensive survey on modeling and simulation approaches. *IEEE Access* (2021).
- [2] Mohamed Aly. 2008. Real time detection of lane markers in urban streets. In *IV*.[3] Baidu. 2022. Apollo. https://github.com/ApolloAuto/apollo.
- [4] Karsten Behrendt and Ryan Soussan. 2019. Unsupervised labeled lane markers using maps. In ICCV Workshop.
- [5] Debby Bezzina and James Sayer. 2014. Safety pilot model deployment: Test conductor team report. *Report No. DOT HS* (2014).
- [6] Adith Boloor, Karthik Garimella, Xin He, Christopher Gill, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, and Xuan Zhang. [n. d.]. Attacking vision-based perception in end-to-end autonomous driving models. JSA ([n. d.]).
- [7] Aditya Chattopadhay, Anirban Sarkar, Prantik Howlader, and Vineeth N Balasubramanian. 2018. Grad-cam++: Generalized gradient-based visual explanations for deep convolutional networks. In WACV.
- [8] Haoxin Chen, Mengmeng Wang, and Yong Liu. 2023. BSNet: Lane Detection via Draw B-spline Curves Nearby. arXiv preprint arXiv:2301.06910 (2023).
- [9] comma. 2017. openpilot. https://github.com/commaai/openpilot.
- [10] Jia Deng, Wei Dong, Richard Socher, Li-Jia Li, Kai Li, and Li Fei-Fei. 2009. Imagenet: A large-scale hierarchical image database. In CVPR.
- [11] Terrance DeVries and Graham W Taylor. 2017. Improved regularization of convolutional neural networks with cutout. arXiv preprint arXiv:1708.04552 (2017).
- [12] Yinpeng Dong, Caixin Kang, Jinlai Zhang, Zijian Zhu, Yikai Wang, Xiao Yang, Hang Su, Xingxing Wei, and Jun Zhu. 2023. Benchmarking Robustness of 3D Object Detection to Common Corruptions. In CVPR.
- [13] Alexey Dosovitskiy, German Ros, Felipe Codevilla, Antonio Lopez, and Vladlen Koltun. 2017. CARLA: An open urban driving simulator. In CoRL.
- [14] Shuo Feng, Xintao Yan, Haowei Sun, Yiheng Feng, and Henry X Liu. 2021. Intelligent driving intelligence test for autonomous vehicles with naturalistic and adversarial environment. *Nat. Commun.* (2021).
- [15] Zhengyang Feng, Shaohua Guo, Xin Tan, Ke Xu, Min Wang, and Lizhuang Ma. 2022. Rethinking efficient lane detection via curve modeling. In CVPR.
- [16] Daniel J Fremont, Edward Kim, Yash Vardhan Pant, Sanjit A Seshia, Atul Acharya, Xantha Bruso, Paul Wells, Steve Lemke, Qiang Lu, and Shalin Mehta. 2020. Formal scenario-based testing of autonomous vehicles: From simulation to the real world. In *ITSC*.
- [17] Robert Geirhos, Patricia Rubisch, Claudio Michaelis, Matthias Bethge, Felix A Wichmann, and Wieland Brendel. 2018. ImageNet-trained CNNs are biased towards texture; increasing shape bias improves accuracy and robustness. arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.12231 (2018).
- [18] Golnaz Ghiasi, Yin Cui, Aravind Srinivas, Rui Qian, Tsung-Yi Lin, Ekin D Cubuk, Quoc V Le, and Barret Zoph. 2021. Simple copy-paste is a strong data augmentation method for instance segmentation. In CVPR.
- [19] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian Sun. 2016. Deep residual learning for image recognition. In CVPR.
- [20] Dan Hendrycks and Thomas Dietterich. 2019. Benchmarking neural network robustness to common corruptions and perturbations. arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.12261 (2019).
- [21] Aharon Bar Hillel, Ronen Lerner, Dan Levi, and Guy Raz. 2014. Recent progress in road and lane detection: a survey. MACH VISION APPL (2014).
- [22] Vlad Hosu, Hanhe Lin, Tamas Sziranyi, and Dietmar Saupe. 2020. KonIQ-10k: An ecologically valid database for deep learning of blind image quality assessment. *IEEE TIP* (2020).
- [23] Yuenan Hou, Zheng Ma, Chunxiao Liu, Tak-Wai Hui, and Chen Change Loy. 2020. Inter-region affinity distillation for road marking segmentation. In CVPR.
- [24] Dongkwon Jin, Dahyun Kim, and Chang-Su Kim. 2023. Recursive Video Lane Detection. In ICCV.
- [25] Yeongmin Ko, Younkwan Lee, Shoaib Azam, Farzeen Munir, Moongu Jeon, and Witold Pedrycz. 2021. Key points estimation and point instance segmentation approach for lane detection. *IEEE Trans. Intell. Transp. Syst.* (2021).
- [26] Lingdong Kong, Youquan Liu, Xin Li, Runnan Chen, Wenwei Zhang, Jiawei Ren, Liang Pan, Kai Chen, and Ziwei Liu. 2023. Robo3d: Towards robust and reliable 3d perception against corruptions. In *ICCV*.
- [27] Seokju Lee, Junsik Kim, Jae Shin Yoon, Seunghak Shin, Oleksandr Bailo, Namil Kim, Tae-Hee Lee, Hyun Seok Hong, Seung-Hoon Han, and In So Kweon. 2017. Vpgnet: Vanishing point guided network for lane and road marking detection and recognition. In *ICCV*.
- [28] Quanyi Li, Zhenghao Peng, Lan Feng, Qihang Zhang, Zhenghai Xue, and Bolei Zhou. [n. d.]. Metadrive: Composing diverse driving scenarios for generalizable reinforcement learning. *IEEE TPAMI* ([n. d.]).
- [29] Simin Li, Shuning Zhang, Gujun Chen, Dong Wang, Pu Feng, Jiakai Wang, Aishan Liu, Xin Yi, and Xianglong Liu. 2023. Towards Benchmarking and Assessing Visual Naturalness of Physical World Adversarial Attacks. In CVPR.
- [30] Xiang Li, Jun Li, Xiaolin Hu, and Jian Yang. 2019. Line-cnn: End-to-end traffic line detection with line proposal unit. *IEEE Trans. Intell. Transp. Syst.* (2019).

- [31] Tsung-Yi Lin, Michael Maire, Serge Belongie, James Hays, Pietro Perona, Deva Ramanan, Piotr Dollár, and C Lawrence Zitnick. 2014. Microsoft coco: Common objects in context. In ECCV.
- [32] Aishan Liu, Jun Guo, Jiakai Wang, Siyuan Liang, Renshuai Tao, Wenbo Zhou, Cong Liu, Xianglong Liu, and Dacheng Tao. 2023. X-Adv: Physical Adversarial Object Attacks against X-ray Prohibited Item Detection. In USENIX Security.
- [33] Aishan Liu, Xianglong Liu, Jiaxin Fan, Yuqing Ma, Anlan Zhang, Huiyuan Xie, and Dacheng Tao. 2019. Perceptual-sensitive gan for generating adversarial patches. In AAAI.
- [34] Aishan Liu, Shiyu Tang, Xinyun Chen, Lei Huang, Haotong Qin, Xianglong Liu, and Dacheng Tao. 2023. Towards Defending Multiple Lp-norm Bounded Adversarial Perturbations via Gated Batch Normalization. *IJCV* (2023).
- [35] Aishan Liu, Jiakai Wang, Xianglong Liu, Bowen Cao, Chongzhi Zhang, and Hang Yu. 2020. Bias-based universal adversarial patch attack for automatic check-out. In ECCV.
- [36] Ruijin Liu, Zejian Yuan, Tie Liu, and Zhiliang Xiong. 2021. End-to-end lane shape prediction with transformers. In WACV.
- [37] Yin-Bo Liu, Ming Zeng, and Qing-Hao Meng. 2020. Heatmap-based vanishing point boosts lane detection. arXiv preprint arXiv:2007.15602 (2020).
- [38] Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt, Dimitris Tsipras, and Adrian Vladu. 2017. Towards deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.06083 (2017).
- [39] Davy Neven, Bert De Brabandere, Stamatios Georgoulis, Marc Proesmans, and Luc Van Gool. 2018. Towards end-to-end lane detection: an instance segmentation approach. In *IV*.
- [40] A. A. of State Highway and T.O.(AASHTO). 2018. Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets (7th Edition). American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO).
- [41] Xingang Pan, Jianping Shi, Ping Luo, Xiaogang Wang, and Xiaoou Tang. 2018. Spatial as deep: Spatial cnn for traffic scene understanding. In AAAI.
- [42] Zequn Qin, Huanyu Wang, and Xi Li. 2020. Ultra fast structure-aware deep lane detection. In *ECCV*.
- [43] Zequn Qin, Pengyi Zhang, and Xi Li. 2022. Ultra fast deep lane detection with hybrid anchor driven ordinal classification. *IEEE TPAMI* (2022).
- [44] Zhan Qu, Huan Jin, Yang Zhou, Zhen Yang, and Wei Zhang. 2021. Focus on local: Detecting lane marker from bottom up via key point. In CVPR.
- [45] Stephan R Richter, Zeeshan Hayder, and Vladlen Koltun. 2017. Playing for benchmarks. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision. 2213–2222.
- [46] Stephan R Richter, Vibhav Vineet, Stefan Roth, and Vladlen Koltun. 2016. Playing for data: Ground truth from computer games. In Computer Vision–ECCV 2016: 14th European Conference, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, October 11-14, 2016, Proceedings, Part II 14. Springer, 102–118.
- [47] Francisca Rosique, Pedro J Navarro, Carlos Fernández, and Antonio Padilla. 2019. A systematic review of perception system and simulators for autonomous vehicles research. Sensors (2019).
- [48] Takami Sato, Junjie Shen, Ningfei Wang, Yunhan Jia, Xue Lin, and Qi Alfred Chen. 2021. Dirty road can attack: Security of deep learning based automated lane centering under {Physical-World} attack. In USENIX Security.
- [49] Ahmed Rida Sekkat, Yohan Dupuis, Pascal Vasseur, and Paul Honeine. 2020. The omniscape dataset. In 2020 IEEE International conference on robotics and automation (ICRA). IEEE, 1603–1608.
- [50] Ramprasaath R Selvaraju, Michael Cogswell, Abhishek Das, Ramakrishna Vedantam, Devi Parikh, and Dhruv Batra. 2017. Grad-cam: Visual explanations from deep networks via gradient-based localization. In *ICCV*.
- [51] Karen Simonyan and Andrew Zisserman. 2014. Very deep convolutional networks for large-scale image recognition. arXiv preprint arXiv:1409.1556 (2014).
- [52] Jinming Su, Chao Chen, Ke Zhang, Junfeng Luo, Xiaoming Wei, and Xiaolin Wei. 2021. Structure guided lane detection. arXiv preprint arXiv:2105.05403 (2021).
- [53] Lucas Tabelini, Rodrigo Berriel, Thiago M Paixao, Claudine Badue, Alberto F De Souza, and Thiago Oliveira-Santos. 2021. Keep your eyes on the lane: Real-time attention-guided lane detection. In CVPR.
- [54] Lucas Tabelini, Rodrigo Berriel, Thiago M Paixao, Claudine Badue, Alberto F De Souza, and Thiago Oliveira-Santos. 2021. Polylanenet: Lane estimation via deep polynomial regression. In *ICPR*.
- [55] Tusimple. 2017. Tusimple Benchmark. https://github.com/TuSimple/tusimplebenchmark.
- [56] Jiakai Wang, Aishan Liu, Zixin Yin, Shunchang Liu, Shiyu Tang, and Xianglong Liu. [n. d.]. Dual attention suppression attack: Generate adversarial camouflage in physical world. In CVPR.
- [57] Jinsheng Wang, Yinchao Ma, Shaofei Huang, Tianrui Hui, Fei Wang, Chen Qian, and Tianzhu Zhang. 2022. A keypoint-based global association network for lane detection. In CVPR.
- [58] wiki. 2018. Death of Elaine Herzberg. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_ Elaine_Herzberg.
- [59] Hang Xu, Shaoju Wang, Xinyue Cai, Wei Zhang, Xiaodan Liang, and Zhenguo Li. 2020. Curvelane-nas: Unifying lane-sensitive architecture search and adaptive point blending. In *ECCV*.

Anonymous Authors

| [60] | Seungwoo Yoo Hee Seok Lee Heesoo Myeong Sungrack Yun Hyoungwoo Park | | (2017) | 1103 |
|------|--|------|---|------|
| [00] | Janghoon Cho, and Duck Hoon Kim. 2020. End-to-end lane marker detection via | [63] | Tu Zheng, Hao Fang, Yi Zhang, Wenjian Tang, Zheng Yang, Haifeng Liu, and | 1104 |
| r | row-wise classification. In CVPR Workshop. | | Deng Cai. 2021. Resa: Recurrent feature-shift aggregator for lane detection. In | 1105 |
| [61] | Fisher Yu, Haofeng Chen, Xin Wang, Wenqi Xian, Yingying Chen, Fangchen Liu, Vashisht Madhayan, and Trevor Darrell. 2020. Bdd100k: A diverse driving dataset | [64] | AAAI. Bolei Zhou Aditya Khosla Agata Lanedriza Aude Oliva and Antonio Torralha | 1105 |
| | for heterogeneous multitask learning. In CVPR. | [01] | 2016. Learning deep features for discriminative localization. In <i>CVPR</i> . | 1100 |
| [62] | Hongyi Zhang, Moustapha Cisse, Yann N Dauphin, and David Lopez-Paz. 2017. | | | 1107 |
| | mixup: Beyond empirical risk minimization. arXiv preprint arXiv:1710.09412 | | | 1108 |
| | | | | 1109 |
| | | | | 1110 |
| | | | | 1111 |
| | | | | 1112 |
| | | | | 1113 |
| | | | | 1114 |
| | | | | 1115 |
| | | | | 1116 |
| | | | | 1117 |
| | | | | 1118 |
| | | | | 1119 |
| | | | | 1120 |
| | | | | 1121 |
| | | | | 1122 |
| | | | | 1123 |
| | | | | 1124 |
| | | | | 1125 |
| | | | | 1126 |
| | | | | 1127 |
| | | | | 1128 |
| | | | | 1129 |
| | | | | 1130 |
| | | | | 1131 |
| | | | | 1132 |
| | | | | 1133 |
| | | | | 1134 |
| | | | | 1135 |
| | | | | 1136 |
| | | | | 1137 |
| | | | | 1138 |
| | | | | 1139 |
| | | | | 1140 |
| | | | | 1141 |
| | | | | 1142 |
| | | | | 1143 |
| | | | | 1144 |
| | | | | 1145 |
| | | | | 1146 |
| | | | | 1147 |
| | | | | 1148 |
| | | | | 1149 |
| | | | | 1150 |
| | | | | 1151 |
| | | | | 1152 |
| | | | | 1153 |
| | | | | 1154 |
| | | | | 1155 |
| | | | | 1156 |
| | | | | 115/ |
| | | | | 1158 |
| | | | | 1159 |
| | | | | 1100 |