TOWARD RELIABLE, SAFE, AND SECURE LLMS FOR SCIENTIFIC APPLICATIONS

Saket Sanjeev Chaturvedi, Joshua Bergersona, & Tanwi Mallick
MCS
Argonne National Laboratory
Lemont, IL 60439, USA
{schaturvedi,jbergersona,tmallick}@anl.gov

ABSTRACT

As large language models (LLMs) evolve into autonomous "AI scientists," they promise transformative advances but introduce novel vulnerabilities, from potential "biosafety risks" to "dangerous explosions." Ensuring trustworthy deployment in science requires a new paradigm centered on reliability (ensuring factual accuracy and reproducibility), safety (preventing unintentional physical or biological harm), and security (preventing malicious misuse). Existing general-purpose safety benchmarks are poorly suited for this purpose, suffering from a fundamental domain mismatch, limited threat coverage of science-specific vectors, and benchmark overfitting, which create a critical gap in vulnerability evaluation for scientific applications. This paper examines the unique security and safety landscape of LLM agents in science. We begin by synthesizing a detailed taxonomy of LLM threats contextualized for scientific research, to better understand the unique risks associated with LLMs in science. Next, we conceptualize a mechanism to address the evaluation gap by utilizing dedicated multi-agent systems for the automated generation of domain-specific adversarial security benchmarks. Based on our analysis, we outline how existing safety methods can be brought together and integrated into a conceptual multilayered defense framework designed to combine a red-teaming exercise and external boundary controls with a proactive internal Safety LLM Agent. Together, these conceptual elements provide a necessary structure for defining, evaluating, and creating comprehensive defense strategies for trustworthy LLM agent deployment in scientific disciplines.

1 INTRODUCTION

The proliferation of LLMs as autonomous "AI scientists" is poised to revolutionize scientific discovery, with applications already emerging that autonomously conduct experiments and facilitate discoveries across various disciplines Xi et al. (2023); Tang et al. (2025); Boiko et al. (2023); Bran et al. (2024); Gao et al. (2024); Ramos et al. (2025). However, the transformative potential of LLMs in science introduces novel vulnerabilities and significant safety concerns that require careful consideration Greshake et al. (2023); Wei et al. (2023); Gueroudji et al. (2025). In biological research, an agent's mistake in pathogen manipulation could lead to "biosafety risks"; or in chemistry, incorrect reaction parameters could "trigger dangerous explosions" Chen et al. (2023b); Gao et al. (2025); Reese et al. (2025). Given these high stakes, it is imperative to explore solutions such as robust safety alignment and safeguarding frameworks Tang et al. (2025); Dai et al. (2024); Ouyang et al. (2022).

Building such safeguarding frameworks requires a new paradigm centered on three pillars: *reliability*, *safety*, and *security*. In scientific contexts, *reliability* denotes factual accuracy and reproducibility; *safety* pertains to the prevention of unintentional physical or biological harm (e.g., biorisks, chemical hazards), extending beyond mere social biases; and *security* involves protection against the malicious or adversarial misuse of scientific knowledge. Ideally, verifying these properties would require rigorous evaluation against benchmarks that encompass a full spectrum of domain-specific adversarial prompts. However, a critical evaluation gap exists: general-purpose benchmarks are fundamentally misaligned with the unique threat landscape of scientific research.



Figure 1: Demonstration of Ethical Compliance Evasion (jailbreak-style) user inputs across three scientific domains, chemical science, biology science, and infrastructure resilience, evaluated on three LLM agents (GPT-3.5, Claude 3.7, and Gemini 2.5 Pro). Each user input is designed as a *red team* scenario to probe model robustness against domain-specific unsafe or dual-use instructions. The red-colored text highlights potentially harmful content. ***Note:*** *The "User Input" text shown represents a conceptual demonstration snippet rather than the complete adversarial prompt. Full prompt structures, which include complex role-playing wrappers, have been abbreviated to adhere to responsible disclosure and safety protocols. Complete prompts can be made available upon request for verification purposes.*

This vulnerability gap stems from three systemic issues in current evaluation methodologies. First, there is a domain mismatch: benchmarks such as TruthfulQA Lin et al. (2022a), HaluEval Li et al. (2023a), and FEVER Thorne et al. (2018) validate general-domain facts rather than complex scientific reasoning, while bias benchmarks such as BBQ A Parrish, A Chen, N Nangia, V Padmakumar, J Phang, J Thompson, PM Htut, SR Bowman (2022) target social stereotypes rather than critical misuse cases such as unsafe experimental protocols. Second, limited threat coverage leaves models exposed; standard security suites such as JailbreakBench Chao et al. (2024a) and AdvBench Zou et al. (2023) focus on generic attack patterns, neglecting vectors specific to automated research. Third, the field suffers from benchmark overfitting, where models are fine-tuned to pass well-known tests without achieving measurable gains in true safety Qi et al. (2023). Consequently, current evaluations fail to capture the nuanced, high-stakes risks inherent to scientific domains.

The practical consequences of this misalignment are evident in the susceptibility of even the most robustly aligned models. As illustrated in Figure 1, state-of-the-art LLMs (e.g., GPT, Gemini, and Claude) can still be prompted to provide instructions to "exploit critical infrastructure weak points," describe methods to "tamper with environmental sensor data," or suggest "plausible but highly dangerous chemical combinations." Crucially, these specific examples are sample adversarial prompts generated utilizing our conceptualized Multi-Agent Framework for Vulnerability Benchmark Generation (illustrated later in Figure 4), demonstrating the framework's practical utility in producing domain-specific jailbreaks. Furthermore, our comprehensive literature survey (Section 2) reveals a near-total absence of formal benchmarks for other critical threats, such as denial of service, data poisoning, and backdoor attacks, tailored to scientific or biomedical fields. These combined limitations highlight the urgent need for a systematic approach to define, evaluate, and defend against threats in multi-agent LLM systems deployed in scientific domains.

Addressing this critical gap requires a holistic perspective to systematically *define*, *evaluate*, and *defend* domain-specific LLM vulnerabilities in scientific applications. This perspective paper explores the components of such a framework. We begin by synthesizing a detailed taxonomy of LLM threats contextualized for scientific research, to better *define* the unique risks associated with both inference-time and training-time compromises in this domain. Next, we argue that new approaches are required to *evaluate* these LLMs in scientific domains, conceptualizing a mechanism that utilizes dedicated multi-agent systems for the automated construction of domain-specific adversarial security benchmarks. Then, to *defend* against these threats, we outline a conceptual multilayered defense architecture comprising (1) a red-teaming layer for continuous, automated adversarial testing; (2)



Figure 2: LLM threats taxonomy covering inference-time and training-time attack categories.

an internal safety layer featuring a safety-aligned LLM agent to protect inter-agent communication; and (3) an external safety layer providing robust boundary controls. Together, these layers offer a comprehensive mechanism to mitigate the different attack vectors identified in our LLM threats taxonomy (Figure 2).

2 Unique Vulnerability Landscape of Science

This section establishes the critical need for a science-specific security framework by presenting a detailed taxonomy of vulnerabilities (Figure 2) relevant to LLMs in research workflows. Vulnerabilities in science differ sharply from general domains; for example, safety-aligned models can be induced to suggest dangerous chemical combinations when framed as a "red team" scientific scenario (Figure 1). We systematically analyze this landscape by categorizing risks into two primary areas: inference-time threats (immediate, active risks during deployment) and training-time compromises (persistent, deep-seated attacks on knowledge bases). Figure 3 outlines the motivations and risks associated with these attacks in the scientific research pipeline.

2.1 Inference Time: The Immediate Threat

Inference-time attacks exploit vulnerabilities in how deployed models process inputs, threatening research validity, practitioner safety, and intellectual property Tang et al. (2025). Existing benchmarks quantify these risks Yupeng Cao, Aishwarya Muralidharan Nair, Elyon Eyimife, Nastaran Jamalipour Soofi, K.P. Subbalakshmi, John R. Wullert II, Chumki Basu, David Shallcross (2024); Yu et al. (2023); walledai (2023); Y Zhu, A Kellermann, D Bowman, P Li, and others (2025) across four primary areas.



Figure 3: Motivations & Risks of LLM Attacks in the Scientific Research Pipeline.

Scientific Narrative Manipulation: This critical threat targets the integrity of scientific information. It manifests as hallucinations of nonexistent compounds Ramos et al. (2025), misinterpreted genomic data Jin et al. (2024), or flawed experimental protocols that waste resources Gao et al. (2024); Tang et al. (2025). Evaluation has evolved from general fact-checking (FEVER Thorne et al. (2018), FEVEROUS Aly et al. (2021), EX-FEVER Kotonya et al. (2023)) and misconception correction (TruthfulQA Lin et al. (2022b)) to introspection (HaluEval Li et al. (2023b)) and meta-benchmarking (FELM Chen et al. (2023a)). Recent tools encompass multilingual (Phare Giskard AI (2024)) and multimodal (OmniFake Li et al. (2024a)) scopes. In science, specialized benchmarks verify claims (SciFact Wadden et al. (2020); Wadden & Lo (2021)) and detect medical errors (MedHallu Pandit et al. (2025), DAHL Jean Seo, Jongwon Lim, Dongjun Jang, Hyopil Shin (2024), MedHallBench Kaiwen Zuo, Yirui Jiang (2024)), while resources like COSMIS Cao et al. (2025) and TREC 2021 Data.gov (2021) address AI-generated scientific misinformation.

Data Confidentiality Breach: This involves extracting high-stakes data, ranging from protected health information (PHI) Tang et al. (2025) and proprietary formulas Ramos et al. (2025) to sensitive genomic sequences Jin et al. (2024). Collaborative research introduces further risks of exposing unpublished partner data Tang et al. (2025). Evaluation methodologies have advanced from simple extraction (Bag of Tricks Yu et al. (2023)) to rigorous membership inference attacks (MIMIR Duan et al. (2024), OLMoMIA Shi et al. (2024), Tab-MIA German et al. (2025), DPDLLM Zhou et al. (2024)). While ProPILE Kim et al. (2023) empowers user probing, frameworks like PII-Scope Krishna Kanth Nakka, Ahmed Frikha, Ricardo Mendes, Xue Jiang, Xuebing Zhou (2024) and PrivAuditor Silberg et al. (2024) simulate persistent adversaries, revealing that simple evaluations underestimate risk Gunika Dhingra, Saumil Sood, Zeba Mohsin Wase, Arshdeep Bahga, and Vijay K. Madisetti (2025). Mindgard Hackett et al. (2025) further benchmarks guardrails against prompt injection. A gap remains for dedicated PHI extraction, though Priv-IQ S Shahriar, R Dara (2025) and benchmarks like CARDBiomedBench O Bianchi, M Willey, CX Alvarado, B Danek, M Khani, N Kuznetsov, A Dadu, and others (2025) and CaseReportBench Zhang et al. (2025b) have begun addressing sensitive medical data leakage.

Ethical Compliance Evasion: Encompassing jailbreaking, bias, and toxicity, these threats challenge safety alignment. A "jailbroken" scientific LLM poses biosecurity risks Tang et al. (2025), potentially providing instructions for hazardous synthesis Bran et al. (2024), pathogen modification Tang et al. (2025), unethical gene-editing Tang et al. (2025); He et al. (2023), or unsafe lab procedures Zhang et al. (2025a); Tang et al. (2025). General evaluation has progressed from AdvBench walledai (2023) to dynamic ecosystems like JailbreakBench Chao et al. (2024b) and semantic attacks (JailTrickBench Xu et al. (2024), Camouflaged Jailbreak Prompts Y Zheng, M Zandsalimy, S Sushmita (2025)). Similarly, bias and toxicity benchmarks have evolved from Kaggle datasets Jigsaw/Conversation AI (2018) to ToxiGen Hartvigsen et al. (2022), RealToxicityPrompts Gehman et al. (2020), CEB Wang et al. (2024b), and BBQ A Parrish, A Chen, N Nangia, V Padmakumar, J Phang, J Thompson, PM Htut, SR Bowman (2022). However, science requires distinct definitions: MedSafetyBench Zhang et al. (2025a) highlights jailbreak risks for medical advice, while RoBBR Wang et al. (2024a) and UniTox Silberg et al. (2024) redefine bias and toxicity for research contexts, necessitating specialized evaluations R Cantini, A Orsino, M Ruggiero, D

Talia (2025); Z Ma, W Wang, G Yu, YF Cheung, M Ding, J Liu, W Chen, L Shen (2025); Q Chen, Y Hu, X Peng, Q Xie, Q Jin, A Gilson, and others (2023).

Computational Resource Disruption: Attacks targeting workflow availability include recursive queries or malformed data aimed at exhausting HPC resources OWASP (2025); OWASP GenAI Security Project (2024). In cyber-physical labs, such vectors could sabotage robotic equipment, causing physical hazards Tang et al. (2025). While the OWASP Top 10 OWASP (2025); OWASP GenAI Security Project (2024) raises awareness, science-specific benchmarks are lacking. Existing tools like CVE-Bench Y Zhu, A Kellermann, D Bowman, P Li, and others (2025) and CIRCLE Nakka et al. (2025) address general DoS and code interpreters, but fail to cover complex scientific workflow disruptions.

2.2 Training-Time Attacks: The Silent Compromise

Training-time attacks represent stealthy, persistent threats that compromise the model during creation by poisoning data or embedding vulnerabilities. These are categorized into four primary areas.

Experimental Data Corruption: Manipulating training data can degrade performance or integrity Lakera (2025). Adversaries may inject fabricated clinical data DA Alber, Z Yang, A Alyakin, E Yang, S Rai, AA Valliani, and others (2025); Yang et al. (2024), skew historical weather records, or alter material properties Tang et al. (2025). General benchmarks like PoisonBench Fu et al. (2025) show that even low poison ratios (1–5%) significantly alter behavior, with sophisticated attacks like Gradient Matching Geiping et al. (2020). SANI Boutet & Magnana (2025) offers methods for defense evaluation. In medicine, poisoning just 0.001% of a dataset can induce harmful content while passing standard exams DA Alber, Z Yang, A Alyakin, E Yang, S Rai, AA Valliani, and others (2025), demonstrating that conventional metrics miss subtle poisoning and highlighting the need for robust data provenance OWASP Gen AI Security Project (2025).

Embedded Scientific Bias: This involves "Trojan" behaviors triggered by specific inputs. Risks include sabotaged experiments via chemical identifiers Tang et al. (2025), commercial bias in drug discovery Tang et al. (2025); He et al. (2023), or demographic misclassification in diagnostics Tang et al. (2025). General evaluation utilizes BackdoorLLM Li et al. (2024b) and ELBA-Bench Liu et al. (2025) for attacks like LoRA injection. Specific vectors include BadGPT J Shi, Y Liu, P Zhou, L Sun (2023) (RL attacks), TrojanLLM T Dong, M Xue, G Chen, R Holland, Y Meng, S Li, Z Liu, H Zhu (2023) (supply chain), and D-REX Krishna et al. (2025) (deceptive reasoning). While CTIBench Alam et al. (2024) addresses cybersecurity, the catastrophic potential of scientific backdoors—such as shadow-activated biases Z Yin, M Ye, Y Cao, J Wang, A Chang, H Liu, J Chen, T Wang, F Ma (2025)—requires urgent attention Q Liu, W Mo, T Tong, J Xu, F Wang, C Xiao, M Chen (2024).

Literature Retrieval Distortion: RAG systems introduce risks of knowledge base poisoning. Poisoned databases (e.g., PubMed) can lead to fabricated citations Tang et al. (2025); Yang et al. (2024) or harmful clinical recommendations Tang et al. (2025); DA Alber, Z Yang, A Alyakin, E Yang, S Rai, AA Valliani, and others (2025). Infrastructure models could be fed corrupted sensor data, leading to flawed assessments Liang et al. (2025); Tang et al. (2025). General defenses are tested by RAG Security Bench (RSB) Liang et al. (2025), PoisonedRAG Zou et al. (2025), RGB Chen et al. (2024) (counterfactuals), SafeRAG Li et al. (2025), and KG-RAG T Zhao, J Chen, Y Ru, H Zhu, N Hu, J Liu, Q Lin (2025). A critical gap exists in biomedical RAG security, where a single piece of misinformation can compromise clinical decision support systems.

Research Pipeline Manipulation: Attacks on the research pipeline target model provenance and compute allocation. Adversaries may distribute malicious artifacts via unsafe deserialization Casey et al. (2024), inject poisoned gradients in federated learning Yu et al. (2024), or exploit HPC scheduling Authors (2025); Kong (2023). General evaluations use SignGuard Huang & et al. (2021), HumanEval Chen & et al. (2021), APPS Hendrycks & et al. (2021) (logic), SurgeProtector Atre et al. (2022), and Husky Kong (2023) (resource). Science lacks benchmarks connecting infrastructure attacks to scientific outcomes; current tools like OpenFOAM Somasekharan et al. (2025) and SciBench Wang & et al. (2023) measure performance, not security integrity.



Figure 4: Conceptual Multi-Agent Framework for Vulnerability Benchmark Generation for High-Stakes Scientific Applications. This model illustrates how specialized agents could collaborate to create and refine adversarial prompts. The conceptual workflow includes assigning specialized domain and adversarial roles, generating candidate prompts, and iteratively improving clarity and subtlety, as well as a quality control phase to filter redundancy, test guardrail efficacy, and ensure robustness. Such a system, with optional human-in-the-loop oversight, is envisioned to produce a high-quality, domain-specific benchmark dataset.

3 The Benchmarking Gap: Why Static Tests Fail

The development of robust safety guardrails for LLMs fundamentally depends on the quality and comprehensiveness of the benchmarks used to evaluate them. However, current benchmark generation mechanisms predominantly rely on single-agent systems Perez et al. (2022); Zou et al. (2023) or manual curation through extensive human red teaming Ganguli et al. (2022); Perez et al. (2022). Both approaches present critical limitations when applied to high-stakes scientific domains. Single-agent systems inherently suffer from three key deficiencies: a lack of deep domain specialization, limited adversarial creativity compared with diverse human teams, and conflicting internal objectives arising when one model attempts to simultaneously act as a domain expert, an attacker, and a judge Chao et al. (2024a). These constraints often result in benchmarks containing generic, scientifically implausible, or easily defensible prompts that fail to stress-test specialized agents Qi et al. (2023); Zhang et al. (2025a). For instance, although a generic "jailbreak" attack is easily detected, a sophisticated request to "optimize a viral vector for increased transduction" requires deep biological context to identify as a threat. Consequently, static and general-purpose evaluation methods are insufficient, necessitating a paradigm shift toward automated, domain-specific benchmark generation.

4 Multi-Agent Paradigm for Active Defense

To address the unique vulnerability landscape of scientific LLMs outlined previously, we examine a dual-pronged methodological framework. This framework acknowledges that standard safety measures (e.g., existing safety benchmarks) are insufficient for the high-stakes nature of scientific discovery. First, to effectively *evaluate* risks, we discuss the concept of a multi-agent benchmark framework. This system is envisioned to move beyond static datasets by autonomously generating domain-specific adversarial prompts, ensuring that safety metrics remain ahead of evolving threats. Second, to *defend* against these identified risks, we outline a layered defense architecture. This architecture is designed to implement a defense-in-depth strategy, combining proactive red teaming, intrinsic model alignment, and rigorous external guardrails to secure the entire lifecycle of the scientific agent.

4.1 Automated Adversarial Benchmark Generation

To address the limitations of static benchmarking, this section explores a multi-agent benchmark framework as an automated and collaborative approach to generating scientifically plausible and adversarially potent vulnerability benchmarks. This paradigm shift seeks to mitigate the weaknesses of single-agent systems by decomposing the complex task of benchmark creation into specialized roles, each managed by a dedicated agent.

As illustrated in Figure 4, the framework is conceptualized as a collaboration between an orchestrator agent ($\mathcal{O}$), a pool of specialized domain expert agents ($\mathcal{D} = \{D_1, \ldots, D_n\}$), adversary agents ($\mathcal{A} = \{A_1, \ldots, A_m\}$), a refiner agent ($\mathcal{R}$), and a quality control agent ($\mathcal{Q}$). This collaborative architecture is intended to ensure that the generated adversarial prompts are relevant to high-stakes scientific applications.



Figure 5: Conceptual Defense Architecture for Multi-agent LLMs, Enhancing Reliability, Safety, and Security. The diagram illustrates the flow from user prompt through the external and internal Safety layers to produce a trusted response.

In this conceptual model, the benchmark generation process, led by an orchestrator agent ($\mathcal{O}$), would begin with a high-level goal defined by a tuple $G = (\text{Domain}, \text{Attack Category}, k)$, where k represents the desired number of examples. The orchestrator would first select an appropriate domain expert agent $D_i \in \mathcal{D}$ specializing in the given scientific field. This agent would then generate a set of k foundational "concepts," $\mathcal{C} = \{c_1, \ldots, c_K\}$, which represent scientifically plausible scenarios or vulnerabilities. For instance, in infrastructure resilience, a concept c_j might involve "exploiting public uncertainty regarding evacuation zone boundaries." These concepts would be passed to a specialized adversary agent $A_j \in \mathcal{A}$, selected for its expertise in the specified attack category. The adversary agent A_j would leverage each concept $c_k \in \mathcal{C}$ to generate a pool of draft prompts $\mathcal{P}_{draft}$, each designed to probe the core vulnerability identified in c_k.

A critical component of this proposed framework is a rigorous, multistage validation process. First, a refiner agent ($\mathcal{R}$) would be utilized to evaluate each draft prompt $p \in \mathcal{P}_{draft}$ against three crucial criteria: clarity, effectiveness, and subtlety. A prompt p would be considered successful by the refiner if it satisfies a predefined threshold τ_R across all criteria:

$$p \text{ passes Refiner if } \min\big(\text{score}_{\text{clarity}}(p), \text{score}_{\text{effective}}(p), \text{score}_{\text{subtle}}(p)\big) \geq \tau_R. \quad (1)$$

Prompts that fail this evaluation would be returned to the originating adversary agent with structured feedback, initiating an iterative refinement loop. This process aims to generate a refined set of prompts $\mathcal{P}_{refined} \subseteq \mathcal{P}_{draft}$.

Once a prompt passes this initial stage, it would be forwarded to a quality control agent ($\mathcal{Q}$) for final validation. This agent is envisioned to perform three critical checks: filtering for semantic redundancy using cosine similarity, evaluating LLM robustness across a suite of models $\mathcal{L}$, and assessing the prompt against established safety filters. A prompt p is accepted into the final benchmark $\mathcal{P}_{benchmark}$ if its adversarial success rate $\text{ASR}(p) \geq \tau_{\text{ASR}}$ and its guardrail pass score $\text{GPS}(p) \geq \tau_{\text{GPS}}$. Prompts that do not meet these criteria may be directed to a human-in-the-loop ($\mathcal{H}$) for nuanced review. This structured separation of expertise and iterative refinement is intended to enable the systematic creation of high-quality benchmarks critical for advancing safe and trustworthy LLMs in science.

4.2 LAYERED DEFENSE ARCHITECTURE

The escalating complexity of multi-agent LLM systems in critical scientific applications introduces unique vulnerabilities Zou et al. (2023); Park et al. (2023). Traditional single-point defenses, often restricted to reactive input filtering or post hoc content moderation Jain et al. (2023); Inan et al. (2023), may be insufficient to address these threats. To mitigate these risks, this paper proposes a multilayered conceptual defense framework. We emphasize that while the underlying mechanisms within this architecture (e.g., Constitutional AI, RLHF, and input/output screening) are well-established in general NLP deployments, the architectural novelty of our framework lies in its strict domain-specific contextualization. Rather than relying on generic safety filters, each layer is fundamentally grounded in the scientific threat taxonomy (Section 2) and actively driven by the automated, multi-agent benchmark generation process (Section 4.1). This creates a specialized defense-in-depth strategy uniquely calibrated to the high-stakes, specialized nature of autonomous scientific discovery, where standard social-harm guardrails are inadequate. As illustrated in Figure 5, the framework is conceptualized in three complementary layers.

4.2.1 RED TEAMING LAYER

The red teaming Layer is envisioned as a proactive vulnerability discovery engine. This process involves the development of adversarial inputs targeting threats specific to scientific domains, such as scientific narrative manipulation, data confidentiality breaches, and ethical compliance evasion Perez et al. (2022). These inputs would be utilized to evaluate surrogate LLM agents, with the resulting successful prompts curated to form a comprehensive science benchmark. This benchmark is intended to serve as a primary training and evaluation tool for hardening the internal safety layer.

4.2.2 INTERNAL SAFETY LAYER

The internal safety layer represents a deep, integrated level of defense focused on instilling inherent safety properties within LLM agents and establishing proactive self-monitoring. This layer is conceptualized to address sophisticated training-time attacks and the emergent, unpredictable behaviors of autonomous agent systems.

Conceptualizing the Safety-Aligned LLM The core of the internal safety layer is envisioned as a safety-aligned LLM. This specialized, hardened model is intended to serve as the core, trusted reasoning engine within the multi-agent LLM system.

Trustworthy Finetuning and Alignment The development process would begin with the "comprehensive science benchmark" curated by the red teaming layer. This benchmark would be used to align the model by instilling a profound understanding of scientific safety and ethics. As Figure 5 indicates, this could be achieved through advanced techniques such as constitutional AI Bai et al. (2022), where agents learn to self-critique against safety principles, and reinforcement learning from human or AI feedback (RLHF/RLAIF) Dai et al. (2024), which aims to prioritize safe and grounded responses.

4.2.3 EXTERNAL SAFETY LAYER

The external safety layer is conceptualized as the primary interface with the external environment, providing a critical boundary defense. It serves as the initial checkpoint for incoming requests and the final verifier for outgoing responses. By integrating pre- and postprocessing steps, this layer is designed to enforce domain-specific policies, ensure auditability, and mitigate threats originating from user interactions.

Input Guardrails: These guardrails constitute the first line of defense at inference time, scrutinizing user prompts before they reach the core multi-agent system. This proactive screening is vital for preventing prompt injection Greshake et al. (2023) and malicious queries from compromising computational agents.

- *Prompt Analysis:* This module performs a multifaceted analysis of the raw input. Techniques such as calculating perplexity and entropy could be employed to detect anomalous linguistic structures that often characterize adversarial prompts Jain et al. (2023).
- *Intent Detection and Risk Assignment:* Beyond linguistic analysis, this module seeks to ascertain the user's underlying intent. For instance, a request to "summarize side effects" would be classified as low risk, whereas a request to "generate novel chemical structures ignoring toxicity filters" would be assigned a high-risk tier. This assessment allows the system to proactively block high-risk queries.
- *Prompt Sanitization:* Input prompts may undergo sanitization, such as rephrasing or retokenization, to neutralize syntactic-based injection attacks and disrupt malicious structures used for obfuscation.

Output Guardrails: Once the system generates a response, the output guardrails serve as the final verification layer to ensure that the information is accurate, safe, and secure.

- *Reliability (Correctness and Groundedness)*: This focuses on the factual accuracy and verifiability of generated content.
  - *Fact Checking and Citation Enforcement:* This module is envisioned to automatically cross-reference claims against trusted knowledge bases (e.g., peer-reviewed literature). It actively flags ungrounded assertions or hallucinations Li et al. (2023b) and enforces strict citation requirements for auditability.
- *Safety (Preventing Harm):* This evaluates whether the output could lead to dangerous outcomes if acted upon.
  - *Harmful Content Filtering:* This module assesses the implications of scientific advice, preventing the suggestion of unsafe lab protocols or incorrect medical dosage recommendations.
  - *Bias and Toxicity Detection:* The output is filtered for biased language or toxic content, targeting issues such as demographic stereotypes in epidemiological models or geophysical biases in hazard assessments.
- *Security (Data Protection and Integrity):* This focuses on protecting sensitive information and preventing malicious use of the output.
  - *PII Detection and Redaction:* This component scans the output for confidential data, such as patient identifiers or specific locations of critical infrastructure. Sensitive data is automatically redacted to prevent privacy breaches.
  - *Malicious Code / Exploit Prevention:* This module ensures that the output does not contain executable code snippets or descriptions of exploits that could facilitate cyberattacks on research computing systems Greshake et al. (2023).

5 Conclusion and Discussion

As LLMs become increasingly integral to high-stakes scientific applications, their transformative potential is directly challenged by critical adversarial vulnerabilities. Standard safety measures and general-purpose benchmarks designed for public-facing models may prove insufficient for specialized scientific domains, where the consequences of misinformation, data leakage, or unsafe outputs are severe. This paper proposes a paradigm shift, exploring a move from reactive filtering toward a proactive, integrated, and domain-aware defense strategy.

The proposed perspective is built on three conceptual pillars. First, we establish a comprehensive threat taxonomy to define and contextualize the nuanced risks specific to scientific applications. Second, to address these specific threats, we analyze how automated multi-agent frameworks might be utilized to continuously generate relevant, domain-specific vulnerability benchmarks, potentially filling the critical gaps in current evaluative methods. Third, we conceptualize a multilayered defense architecture that leverages this generative approach. This architecture is envisioned not as a simple filter but as a holistic system integrating the following:

1. A *red-teaming layer* designed to automate adversarial benchmark generation

2. An *internal safety layer* that utilizes these benchmarks to develop and deploy a hardened, safety-aligned LLM as the core reasoning engine

3. An *external safety layer* of robust guardrails intended to manage the security of all inputs and outputs.

These components are designed to be synergistic: the taxonomy provides the foundation for benchmark generation, which in turn facilitates the hardening of the internal model, while the entire system remains shielded by external guardrails. This perspective outlines a robust and adaptive pathway toward the trustworthy deployment of LLMs, aiming to foster the confidence necessary for their integration into critical scientific disciplines. Future exploration should focus on the conceptual application of this framework across diverse scientific fields and on advancing the theoretical co-evolution of automated red teaming and defensive alignment.

6 Future Research Agenda

The conceptual framework presented in this paper establishes a foundation for a new generation of secure scientific AI; however, several open questions remain for future investigation. Moving from this architectural vision to a deployable system requires addressing the following research frontiers:

- **Empirical Validation and System Prototyping:** With the theoretical architecture established, the immediate next step is rigorous empirical validation. We are currently developing prototype implementations of both the multi-agent benchmark generator and the three-layered defense system. Upcoming publications will present quantitative evaluations of this framework, explicitly measuring the computational overhead of the defense layers and their efficacy against the threats outlined in our taxonomy.
- ***Cross-Domain Transferability of Adversarial Agents:*** Future exploration is needed to determine whether adversary agents ($\mathcal{A}$) trained in one scientific domain (e.g., bioinformatics) can effectively transfer their adversarial creativity to unrelated fields (e.g., climate modeling). Investigating the existence of "universal scientific vulnerabilities" could lead to more efficient red teaming protocols.
- ***Dynamic Guardrail Scaling:*** In high-velocity scientific workflows, such as real-time disaster response, the computational overhead of multilayered guardrails must be balanced against the need for immediate output. Developing methods for "adaptive scrutiny," where the depth of the external safety layer scales based on the risk level detected in the input, presents a vital area for future study.
- ***Human-AI Collaborative Red Teaming:*** While we propose a multi-agent framework, the role of the human-in-the-loop ($\mathcal{H}$) remains conceptual. Future work should investigate the optimal interface for human experts to provide feedback to adversarial agents, ensuring that benchmarks capture nuanced ethical considerations that models might overlook.

By addressing these frontiers, the scientific community can move closer to realizing the potential of LLMs as safe, reliable, and transformative partners in complex discovery and resilience planning.

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