
Supplemental Material for *T2V-OptJail*: Discrete Prompt Optimization for Text-to-Video Jailbreak Attacks

1 Experiments on More Defenses

Table 1: Attack success rate (GPT-4 / Human) and semantic similarity on two defense methods. Bold indicates best performance.

Method	Llama-Guard			WildGuard		
	GPT-4 (%)	Human (%)	Similarity	GPT-4 (%)	Human (%)	Similarity
T2VSafetyBench	40.6	43.0	0.251	38.2	40.7	0.258
DACA	10.4	11.9	0.240	9.8	10.7	0.239
T2V-OptJail (Ours)	50.3	52.2	0.256	46.4	48.5	0.254

We further validate the effectiveness of our attack on more defense methods (Llama-Guard [1] and WildGuard [2]). We use the default parameters of Llama-Guard and WildGuard. The malicious prompts are generated against Open-Sora. As shown in Table 1, when Llama-Guard or WildGuard is utilized as defense, our attack still achieves the highest ASR and similarity among all the methods. This also reveals the robustness of our attack against defense mechanisms and rises the need for more effective defenses.

2 More Ablation Studies

2.1 Balance Factor γ

Figure 1a illustrates the attack success rate and semantic similarity of our attack with different values of γ , while other hyper-parameters are fixed. When γ is increased, the attack success rate improves but semantic similarity drops. To balance the attack success rate and semantic similarity, we set $\gamma = 1.0$ in our experiments.

2.2 Number of Variants

Figure 1b illustrates the attack success rate and semantic similarity of our attack with different number of iterations, while other hyper-parameters are fixed. When the number of variants is not more than 5, both the attack success rate and semantic similarity improve as the number of variants increases. However, when the number of variants exceeds 5, the improvement in attack success rate becomes marginal, and the semantic similarity remains nearly unchanged. Additionally, using more variants in each iteration requires more computation overhead during the optimization. To balance the attack success rate, semantic similarity and computation overhead, we set the number of variants to 5 in our experiments.



Figure 1: Ablation studies of balance factor γ and number of variants.

3 More Video Visualization

Figure 2 showcases additional visualization results of videos using prompts crafted by T2V-OptJail. These examples demonstrate how our method effectively transforms an unsafe input prompt into a semantically similar, yet stealthier version that bypasses standard moderation mechanisms. The resulting video frames visibly preserve the malicious intent, underscoring the effectiveness of our attack in evading safety filters while maintaining semantic fidelity.




Figure 2: Video visualization results.

4 Broader Impacts

This work presents the first optimization-based method to generate jailbreak prompts targeting text-to-video generative models, revealing critical security vulnerabilities in these emerging AI systems. By exposing these weaknesses, our research contributes to the advancement of safer and more robust generative models. We hope this will guide the development of improved defense mechanisms, thereby enhancing the trustworthiness of text-to-video generation technology in practical applications. However, the proposed attack methods could potentially be exploited by malicious attackers to bypass safety filters and generate inappropriate or harmful content. This underscores the importance of continuous monitoring, ethical considerations, and responsible deployment of generative AI technologies. We encourage researchers and developers to use our findings to strengthen security measures and uphold ethical standards. Ultimately, we believe this work will foster further studies on the security of generative models and contribute to building safer AI systems for the broader community.

References

- [1] Hakan Inan, Kartikeya Upasani, Jianfeng Chi, Rashi Rungta, Krithika Iyer, Yuning Mao, Michael Tontchev, Qing Hu, Brian Fuller, Davide Testuggine, et al. Llama guard: Llm-based input-output safeguard for human-ai conversations. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2312.06674*, 2023.
- [2] Seungju Han, Kavel Rao, Allyson Ettinger, Liwei Jiang, Bill Yuchen Lin, Nathan Lambert, Yejin Choi, and Nouha Dziri. Wildguard: Open one-stop moderation tools for safety risks, jailbreaks, and refusals of llms. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 37:8093–8131, 2024.