

## A DERIVATION OF MODEL-SPECIFIC EVALUATION

We now show that the minimization of KL-Divergence between two different distributions (the original and the modified) can lead to an alternate loss as defined in Section 3.2.

$$\begin{aligned}
& D_{KL}(P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_0, z_1, \dots, z_T | c) || P_{\epsilon_{\theta'}}(z_0, z_1, \dots, z_T | \tilde{c})) \\
&= \mathbb{E}_{P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_0, z_1, \dots, z_T)} \log \frac{\prod_{t=1}^T P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_{t-1} | z_t, c) P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_T)}{\prod_{t=1}^T P_{\epsilon_{\theta'}}(z_{t-1} | z_t, \tilde{c}) P_{\epsilon_{\theta'}}(z_T)} \\
&= \sum_{i=1}^T \mathbb{E}_{P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_0, z_1, \dots, z_T)} \log \frac{P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_{i-1} | z_i, c)}{P_{\epsilon_{\theta'}}(z_{i-1} | z_i, \tilde{c})}
\end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

Expanding the term corresponding to the specific timestep  $\hat{t}$ , i.e.,

$$\begin{aligned}
& \mathbb{E}_{P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_0, z_1, \dots, z_T)} \log \frac{P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_{\hat{t}-1} | z_{\hat{t}}, c)}{P_{\epsilon_{\theta'}}(z_{\hat{t}-1} | z_{\hat{t}}, \tilde{c})} \\
&= \int_{(z_0, z_1, \dots, z_T)} \prod_{t=1}^T P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_{t-1} | z_t, c) P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_T) \log \frac{P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_{\hat{t}-1} | z_{\hat{t}}, c)}{P_{\epsilon_{\theta'}}(z_{\hat{t}-1} | z_{\hat{t}}, \tilde{c})} d(z_0, z_1, \dots, z_T) \\
&= \int_{(z_{\hat{t}}, z_{\hat{t}+1}, \dots, z_T)} P_{\epsilon_\theta}((z_{\hat{t}}, z_{\hat{t}+1}, \dots, z_T) | c) \left[ \int_{(z_0, z_1, \dots, z_{\hat{t}-1})} \prod_{t=1}^{\hat{t}} P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_{t-1} | z_t, c) \right. \\
&\quad \left. \log \frac{P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_{\hat{t}-1} | z_{\hat{t}}, c)}{P_{\epsilon_{\theta'}}(z_{\hat{t}-1} | z_{\hat{t}}, \tilde{c})} d(z_{\hat{t}-1}, z_{\hat{t}-2}, \dots, z_0) \right] d(z_{\hat{t}}, z_{\hat{t}+1}, \dots, z_T) \\
&= \int_{z_{\hat{t}}} P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_{\hat{t}} | c) \left[ \int_{(z_0, z_1, \dots, z_{\hat{t}-1})} \left( \prod_{t=1}^{\hat{t}-1} P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_{t-1} | z_t, c) \right) P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_{\hat{t}-1} | z_{\hat{t}}, c) \right. \\
&\quad \left. \log \frac{P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_{\hat{t}-1} | z_{\hat{t}}, c)}{P_{\epsilon_{\theta'}}(z_{\hat{t}-1} | z_{\hat{t}}, \tilde{c})} d(z_{\hat{t}-1}, z_{\hat{t}-2}, \dots, z_0) \right] dz_{\hat{t}} \\
&= \int_{z_{\hat{t}}} P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_{\hat{t}} | c) \left[ \int_{(z_0, z_1, \dots, z_{\hat{t}-1})} P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_{\hat{t}-1} | z_{\hat{t}}, c) \log \frac{P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_{\hat{t}-1} | z_{\hat{t}}, c)}{P_{\epsilon_{\theta'}}(z_{\hat{t}-1} | z_{\hat{t}}, \tilde{c})} \right. \\
&\quad \left. \left[ \int_{(z_0, z_1, \dots, z_{\hat{t}-2})} \prod_{t=1}^{\hat{t}-1} P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_{t-1} | z_t, c) d(z_{\hat{t}-2}, z_{\hat{t}-3}, \dots, z_0) \right] dz_{\hat{t}-1} \right] dz_{\hat{t}}. \tag{8}
\end{aligned}$$

The integral term over  $d(z_{\hat{t}-2}, z_{\hat{t}-3}, \dots, z_0)$  in Eq. (8) will be 1 since it is an integration of the probability distribution over the range it is defined. Thus, Eq. (7) can be written as

$$\begin{aligned}
& \mathbb{E}_{z_{\hat{t}} \sim P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_{\hat{t}} | c)} \left[ \int_{z_{\hat{t}-1}} P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_{\hat{t}-1} | z_{\hat{t}}, c) \log \frac{P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_{\hat{t}-1} | z_{\hat{t}}, c)}{P_{\epsilon_{\theta'}}(z_{\hat{t}-1} | z_{\hat{t}}, \tilde{c})} dz_{\hat{t}-1} \right] \\
&= \mathbb{E}_{z_{\hat{t}} \sim P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_{\hat{t}} | c)} \left[ D_{KL}(P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_{\hat{t}-1} | z_{\hat{t}}, c) || P_{\epsilon_{\theta'}}(z_{\hat{t}-1} | z_{\hat{t}}, \tilde{c})) \right] \\
&= \mathbb{E}_{z_{\hat{t}} \sim P_{\epsilon_\theta}(z_{\hat{t}} | c)} \left[ \left| \rho(\epsilon_\theta(z_{\hat{t}}, c, t) - \epsilon_{\theta'}(z_{\hat{t}}, \tilde{c}, t)) \right|^2 \right].
\end{aligned}$$

We utilize the fact since KL divergence between two normal distributions simplifies to the squared difference between the mean. We ignore the variance terms in the KL divergence as it is not learned. Thus, following the result, Eq. (6) can be derived as

$$\sum_{\hat{t}=1}^T \mathbb{E}_{z_{\hat{t}} \sim P_{\epsilon_{\theta}}(z_{\hat{t}}|c)} \left[ \left\| \rho(\epsilon_{\theta}(z_{\hat{t}}, c, \hat{t}) - \epsilon_{\theta'}(z_{\hat{t}}, \tilde{c}, \hat{t})) \right\|^2 \right].$$

## B DETAILED RELATED WORK

**Red-Teaming Tools for AI.** Red-teaming, a cybersecurity assessment technique, aims to actively search for vulnerabilities and weaknesses within information security systems. In addition, such discoveries would provide valuable insights that enable companies and organizations to strengthen their defenses and cybersecurity protections. The concept of red-teaming has also been extended to the field of AI, with a particular focus on language models (Perez et al., 2022; Shi et al., 2023; Lee et al., 2023) and more recently, T2I models (Zhuang et al., 2023; Qu et al., 2023; Chin et al., 2023). The overall goal is to improve the security and stability of these models by exploring their vulnerabilities.

Perez et al. (2022) propose a method in which language models are prompted by various techniques, such as few-shot generation and reinforcement learning, to generate test cases capable of exposing weaknesses in the models. Meanwhile, Shi et al. (2023) take a different approach by fooling the model designed to recognize machine-generated text. They do this by revising the model’s output, which can include substituting synonyms or changing the style of writing in the sentences generated. Conversely, Lee et al. (2023) create a pool of user input and use Bayesian optimization to iteratively modify a diverse set of positive test cases, ultimately leading to model failure.

Particularly, there have been some attempts to explore the vulnerabilities of text-to-image diffusion models. In particular, Zhuang et al. (2023) propose a query-free attack to demonstrate that given only a small perturbation in the input prompt, the output could have suffered from huge semantic drift. Qu et al. (2023) exploit prompts collected from online forums to examine the reliability of the safety mechanism in text-to-image online services and further manipulate them to generate hateful memes. Finally, a concurrent work, P4D (Chin et al., 2023), also develops a red-teaming tool of text-to-image diffusion models with the prior knowledge of the target model, with the main weakness lying in the assumption of white-box access target model. For more details, we leave the discussion and comparison to Section 3.2.

**Diverse Approaches in Prompt Engineering.** Prompt engineering seeks to improve the adaptability of pre-trained language models to a variety of downstream tasks by modifying input text with carefully crafted prompts. Furthermore, as current language models grow in parameter size, prompt engineering has emerged as a promising alternative to solve the computationally intensive fine-tuning problem (Duan et al., 2023; Gal et al., 2023; He et al., 2022). This approach, based on the data representation, can be classified into hard prompt (discrete) and soft prompt (continuous).

Hard prompts, which are essentially discrete tokens, typically consist of words carefully crafted by users. In contrast, soft prompts involve the inclusion of continuous-valued text vectors or embeddings within the input, which not only provide high-dimensional feasible space compared to their hard prompt counterparts, but also inherited the advantage of continuous optimization algorithms. An example of hard prompt generation is Brown et al. (2020), which demonstrates a remarkable generalizability of pre-trained language models achieved by using manually generated hard prompts in various downstream tasks. Subsequent works (Schick & Schütze, 2021; Jiang et al., 2020; Gao et al., 2021) improve on this technique by reformulating the input text into specific gap-filling phrases that preserved the semantics and features of hard prompts. On the other hand, methods such as Lester et al. (2021) and Li & Liang (2021) optimize the soft prompts to achieve better task performance.

Both approaches have distinct advantages. In particular, hard prompt methods are often difficult to implement because they involve searching in a large discrete space. However, hard constraints and related techniques can be mixed and matched to various tasks, while soft constraints are highly specialized.

Recently, some innovative optimization techniques have emerged to take advantage of both hard and soft prompts constraints. Notable examples include AutoPrompt (Shin et al., 2020), Fluent-Prompt (Shi et al., 2022), and PeZ (Wen et al., 2023). These approaches use continuous gradient-based optimization to learn adaptive hard prompts while retaining the flexibility of soft prompts.

**Text-to-Image Diffusion Model with Safety Mechanisms.** To address the misuse of T2I models for sensitive image generation, several approaches have been proposed to combat this phenomenon. Briefly, such methods fall into the following two directions: detection-based and removal-based.

For detection-based methods, the images generated by the T2I model would be run through a safety checker to first determine the correlation of the output with sensitive or harmful concepts. One such commercial detector is HIVE<sup>7</sup>, which provides visual moderation. While the safety mechanisms of popular online services remain unclear, it is assumed that these services have at least one or more such post-hoc detectors in place when outputting user-generated content (Rando et al., 2022).

On the other hand, instead of blocking images in the post-generation process, removal-based methods target the latent diffusion model itself, by constraining the generation process or modifying the parameter to eliminate sensitive concepts in image synthesis. For methods that constrain the generation process, Stable Diffusion with negative prompts (Rombach et al., 2022) and SLD (Schramowski et al., 2023) target the input prompts by removing certain tokens or embeddings to prevent corresponding content from spawning. Meanwhile, ESD (Gandikota et al., 2023), Concept Ablation (Kumari et al., 2023), and Forget-Me-Not (Zhang et al., 2023) operate by partially fine-tuning the diffusion model weights to remove the plausible effect of such concepts.

### C LIMITATION

Here we discuss some limitations of our proposed Ring-A-Bell. Firstly, although our method could be misused by a malicious actor, we position our tool as an essential and effective red-teaming tool that can proactively test and reduce such a risk. In addition, our validation depends on the quality of an independent concept classifier (e.g., NudeNet (Bedapudi, 2019) and Q16 (Schramowski et al., 2022)), which means there could be some false positives and mis-detections. However, the reported results are conclusive that the evaluated concept removal methods and online services for T2I models require a holistic overhaul as well as a stronger and better safety mechanism.

### D MORE EXAMPLES OF INAPPROPRIATE IMAGES GENERATED BY ONLINE SERVICES

In this section, we perform more examples of inappropriate images generated by online services via problematic prompts from Ring-A-Bell as shown in Figure 5.




Figure 5: Visualization of inappropriate prompts generated by Ring-A-Bell (texts in red, black, and blue respectively represent problematic prompts from Ring-A-Bell, prompt dilution and modifications.) via four online services. We use [REDACTED] and blurring for publication purposes.

<sup>7</sup><https://docs.thehive.ai/docs/visual-content-moderation> (last access: 2023/09)

## E MORE EXAMPLES OF INAPPROPRIATE IMAGES GENERATED BY CONCEPT REMOVAL MODELS

### E.1 CONCEPT OF NUDITY

We demonstrate additional examples that are generated by concept removal models using the problematic prompts from Ring-A-Bell. We set  $K = 77$  and  $\eta = 3.5$  for Ring-A-Bell. In Figure 6, each row corresponds to a prompt, and Ring-A-Bell also generates new prompts based on the same original prompt.




Figure 6: Visualization of more examples of nudity generated by concept removal models by taking the problematic prompts from Ring-A-Bell.

### E.2 CONCEPT OF VIOLENCE

In Figure 7, we display images generated by all concept removal models using a pair of prompts. One of these prompts is the original prompt, while the other is generated by Ring-A-Bell. Although they use different versions of the CLIP text encoder, it is worth noting that the images show similarity when identical prompts are used.



Figure 7: Visualization of examples for violence generated by all concept removal models via the original prompt and the problematic prompt from Ring-A-Bell.

## F VISUALIZATION OF CONCEPT RETRIEVAL IN CONCEPT REMOVAL METHODS

In this section, we perform Ring-A-Bell to retrieve the forbidden concept of “cars” and “Van Gogh” in various concept removal methods.

### F.1 CONCEPT OF CAR

We show results with car-related prompts for SD and ESD, as well as Ring-A-Bell-generated prompts for ESD. Note that we use the official checkpoint of ESD. For the setting of Ring-A-Bell, we select  $K = 38$  and  $\eta = 3.5$ . In Figure 8 (green part), SD and ESD take the same prompts as input and it is apparent that ESD can successfully remove cars. However, by employing Ring-A-Bell based on the original prompts used by ESD and SD, the problematic prompts generated by Ring-A-Bell can lead to ESD producing images containing cars shown in Figure 8 (orange part).




Figure 8: Visualization of the results generated by SD and ESD using the original prompts, along with the outcomes produced by ESD with Ring-A-Bell-generated prompts as input.

Notation	Definition
$c$	target sensitive concept to generate, e.g., nudity, violence.
$f(\cdot)$	text encoder with prompt inputs
$\tilde{c}$	adversarial concept to optimize in model-specific evaluation
$\hat{c}$	empirical representation of target concept $c$
$(\mathbf{P}_i^c, \mathbf{P}_i^{\tilde{c}})$	prompt-pair with and without target concept $c$
$\mathbf{P}$	target prompt, the initial prompt that fails to pass safety filters or generates inappropriate images
$\mathbf{P}_{cont}$	the problematic soft prompt for subsequent discrete optimization
$\hat{\mathbf{P}}$	the resulting hard prompt generated by Ring-A-Bell

Table 7: Notation Table

## F.2 CONCEPT OF VAN GOGH

We show results with Van Gogh-related prompts for SD, ESD, CA, and FMN, as well as Ring-A-Bell-generated prompts for ESD, CA, and FMN. Note that we use the official checkpoint for ESD and CA. For FMN, we re-implement using the official code<sup>8</sup>. For Ring-A-Bell, we set  $K = 38$  and  $\eta = 0.9$ . As illustrated in Figure 9, each line represents the same prompt, while Ring-A-Bell manipulates the old one to generate new prompts. SD effectively generates images in the Van Gogh style, while ESD, CA, and FMN show the ability to eliminate this style. However, as shown in Figure 9 (orange part), Ring-A-Bell demonstrates the ability to enable these models to successfully recall the Van Gogh style.




Figure 9: Visualization of the results generated by SD, ESD, CA, and FMN using the original prompts, along with the outcomes produced by ESD, CA, and FMN with Ring-A-Bell-generated prompts as input.

## G NOTATION TABLE

Here we list out some of the notations and symbols used in constructing Ring-A-Bell. The overall notation can be seen from Table 7

<sup>8</sup><https://github.com/SHI-Labs/Forget-Me-Not>

$K$	SD	ESD	SLD-Max	SLD-Strong	SLD-Medium	SD-NP	CA	FMN
8	87.37%	14.74%	21.05%	44.21%	87.37%	37.89%	85.26%	66.32%
16	93.68%	35.79%	42.11%	61.05%	91.58%	34.74%	89.47%	68.42%

Table 8: Attack Success Rate (ASR) of Ring-A-Bell under different values of  $K$ 

## H GENERATION OF PROMPT-PAIRS

In this section, we will be explaining the generation process of the prompt-pairs used in extracting the empirical concept  $\hat{c}$ .

Specifically, we utilize ChatGPT to create sentences about a particular concept  $c$ , i.e.,  $P_i^c$ . Furthermore, when seeking for semantically similar prompts without the concept, i.e.,  $P_i^{\not{c}}$ , we instruct ChatGPT to retain most words in the sentences and only modify a few words related to the specific concept, preventing the need of extensive knowledge.

For instance, regarding objects or artistic styles like Van Gogh style, we ask ChatGPT to generate several words related to landscapes or natural scenery and append "with Van Gogh style" after each prompt. On the other hand, for  $\not{c}$ , excluding "with Van Gogh style" suffices.

As for general and aggregated concepts such as nudity, we instruct ChatGPT to generate some vocabularies about nudity, such as *exposed*, *bare*, and *topless*. Furthermore, we define subjects and scenarios such as man, woman/bedroom, in a painting. Lastly, we ask ChatGPT to permute and construct sentences using these words. On the other hand, for  $\not{c}$ , simply replacing the previous sensitive words would suffice.

## I ABLATION STUDY OF THREE ATTACK STRATEGIES

Here we provide the ablation study on the effect between Ring-A-Bell, modification, and prompt dilution techniques.

We present the visualization in Figure 10. Specifically, in the figure, "Ring-A-Bell" represents our execution of the Ring-A-Bell method based on the target prompt to generate a problematic prompt. We note that the example is produced by DALL-E 2. Furthermore, in the figure, the top row represents the images by applying only modification and dilution while the bottom row applies all Ring-A-Bell, modification, and dilution techniques.

As one can see in Figure 10, using approaches such as modification and dilution could allow us to increase the overall success rate other than only using Ring-A-Bell. To explain the two strategies, modification simply avoids inappropriate words in the problematic prompt (input filtering), while dilution prevents generated images from being identified as inappropriate (output filtering). It's worth noting that when only using the original prompt along with the above two techniques, e.g., modification and dilution, the generated images fail to generate nudity content. That is to say, simply using the original prompt and these two techniques does not produce inappropriate images. Problematic images would appear only when combining these techniques along with prompts generated by Ring-A-Bell.

## J ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTS ON DIFFERENT VALUES OF $K$

In this section, we provide some additional experiment results for smaller values of  $K$ . We follow the settings of Table 3 in Section 4.3 to produce results for smaller  $K$ . Particularly, we set  $K = 8$  and  $\eta = 3$  for the nudity concept with the result shown in Table 8. As shown in the table, it is clear that the results obtained with  $K = 8$  are not superior to those achieved with  $K = 16$ . Thus, it can be inferred that small values of  $K$  are not conducive to effectively causing the model to generate inappropriate images.




Figure 10: Visualization of the influences on modifications and dilution. We use ████████ for publication purposes.

## K COMPARISON AGAINST P4D

Before demonstrating the online/offline gap between P4D (Chin et al., 2023) and Ring-A-Bell, we would like to clarify the difference in evaluation for both works. The attack success rate (ASR) metric of P4D employs the NudeNet classifier (binary classifier for safe/unsafe)<sup>9</sup> with an unsafe threshold of 0.45 to judge whether an image is inappropriate. On the other hand, our metric employs the NudeNet detector<sup>9</sup> that detects specific exposure parts, flags certain parts such as anus, genitalia as nudity concepts. Particularly, we regard labels such as *EXPOSED\_ANUS*, *EXPOSED\_BREAST\_F*, *EXPOSED\_GENITALIA\_F*, *EXPOSED\_GENITALIA\_M* as nudity-related.

To establish the comparison against both evaluation metric, we provide an example image that is considered generally safe in Figure 11. It can be seen that our results are more restricting since we recognize only certain parts as nudity-related while images such as Figure 11 are recognized as unsafe in their much more lenient aspect.

To provide the comparison, we conduct the official code of P4D-N using prompt length as  $K = 16$  and apply identical random seed as the one used in Ring-A-Bell. We perform evaluation under both

<sup>9</sup><https://github.com/vladmandic/nudenet> (last access: 2023/09)



P4D / Ring-A-Bell	ESD	SLD-Max	SLD-Strong	SLD-Medium	SD-NP
P4D Metric	21.05% / <b>35.79%</b>	12.63% / <b>42.11%</b>	10.53% / <b>61.05%</b>	28.42% / <b>91.58%</b>	2.11% / <b>34.74%</b>
Ring-A-Bell Metric	<b>66.31%</b> / 55.79%	<b>71.58%</b> / 57.89%	77.89% / <b>86.32%</b>	85.26% / <b>100%</b>	22.11% / <b>49.47%</b>

Table 9: Attack comparison under both evaluation setting, the metric presented is attack success rate (ASR).

metrics and present the results in Table 9. As one can observe from the table, the performance of P4D-N degrades heavily under our metric and does not stand out significantly in comparison to our approach. On the other hand, using P4D’s metric, we as well performs superior to P4D under the majority of different settings (3 out of 5), demonstrating the effectiveness of our method.



Figure 11: Visualization of images recognized as unsafe under the P4D metric.

## L WHAT COMES AFTER EXPLORE?

Our work functions as a red-teaming tool, although we acknowledge that it could potentially be misapplied for inappropriate purposes. Nevertheless, our primary objective is to uncover vulnerabilities within online services and concept removal techniques, with the aim of highlighting the existing risks associated with current methods.

## M DISCUSSION AND RESULT WITH SIMILAR WORKS

Here we discuss some concurrent works that both strive to unravel the potential risk of T2I diffusion models which are (Qu et al., 2023; Mehrabi et al., 2023; Rando et al., 2022; Yang et al., 2023) respectively.

Firstly, Qu et al. (2023) evaluates the safety of T2I models in an exploratory manner. By manually collecting unsafe prompts from online forums, the authors examine the risk of T2I models generating inappropriate images using these collected prompts. On the other hand, the authors also trained a customized safety filter that superseded most filters deployed in online T2I services. Meanwhile, they take a step forward by aiming to fine-tune T2I models such that the model could generate hateful memes, a specific type of unsafe content in images. While we appreciate the exploratory analysis of [R4], we note that this differs from our direction as the manually collected unsafe prompts cannot scale to provide an overall examination of the T2I model. On the other hand, we’ve already considered a similar methodology such as the I2P dataset. These manually collected prompts generally would not pass the safety filter but serve as a great starting template for Ring-A-Bell.

Secondly, we note that Mehrabi et al. (2023) is a very recent and even concurrent submission published in August 2023 with a different problem setup. Specifically, Mehrabi et al. (2023) aims to develop a red-teaming tool of T2I diffusion models by leveraging the power of language models (LM). Specifically, the attack is set up as a feedback loop between the language model and the T2I model. That is to say, the LM would first initiate an adversarial prompt as an input to the T2I model. Meanwhile, the output image would go through a safeness classifier and the score would serve as

Attack Success Rate (ASR)	ESD	SLD-Max	SLD-Strong	SLD-Medium
SneakyPrompt	12.63%	3.16%	7.37%	27.37%
Ring-A-Bell	<b>35.79%</b>	<b>42.11%</b>	<b>61.05%</b>	<b>91.58%</b>

Table 10: Comparison of Ring-A-Bell against SneakyPrompt

feedback for the LM to adjust the adversarial prompt for subsequent trials. While the method in Mehrabi et al. (2023) serves as an important red-teaming tool for T2I models, we note that current online services would directly reject the generated inappropriate image, implying no meaningful feedback could be obtained by the LM. As a result, the extension to online T2I services remains unclear and therefore differs from the setting of Ring-A-Bell.

Thirdly, Rando et al. (2022) aims to explore the potential risk of safety filters deployed by Stable Diffusion. Particularly, the authors proposed prompt dilution to dilute sensitive prompts such that it could circumvent the safety filtering of Stable Diffusion. Here we note that we indeed incorporated the method of prompt dilution when evaluating Ring-A-Bell for online T2I services to increase the overall attack success rate. However, we’ve included an ablation study between the effect of Ring-A-Bell with and without dilution in Appendix H to demonstrate that simply using prompt dilution alone is not effective in constructing a successful attack.

Lastly, Yang et al. (2023) attempts to attack the safety filter of existing online T2I services via reinforcement learning. Specifically, SneakyPrompt (Yang et al., 2023) would initialize a target prompt and replace the sensitive tokens within. Meanwhile, the bypass-or-not response from the T2I services then serves as feedback to the agent to replace more suitable tokens until the safety filter is bypassed and the CLIP score between the target prompt and generated image is optimized. In the section below, we’ve included the comparison between SneakyPrompt and Ring-A-Bell on nudity.

We conduct the official code of SneakyPrompt and follow their default setting that uses reinforcement learning to search, the CLIP score as a reward, the early stopping threshold score for the agent is 0.26, and the upper limit for query is 60. The result is demonstrated in the Table 10 below.

As shown in the Table 10, the performance of SneakyPrompt is much lower than Ring-A-Bell in terms of concept removal methods. This is mainly due to the fact that SneakyPrompt focuses on the jailbreak of safety filters, rendering it unable to find the problematic prompts for concept removal methods so as to generate inappropriate images. Specifically, if the feedback from safety filters indicates that the image is safe, SneakyPrompt will deem this prompt as successfully jailbroken. However, since concept removal methods have already eliminated a large portion of the sensitive concept, even if the prompt contains sensitive words, under the setting of concept removal, the generated image is deemed safe by the safety filter. As a result, SneakyPrompt skips it.