
## Plurality Veto: A Simple Voting Rule Achieving Optimal Metric Distortion
Fatih Erdem Kizilkaya, David Kempe
Keywords: Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice
Award: Distinguished Paper
IJCAI/2022/Proceedings/0050 - Plurality Veto: A Simple Voting Rule Achieving Optimal Metric Distortion.pdf

[X] Theoretical

### Implementation
_Given the documentation given by the authors on the method, how much time investment would it be to re-implement the method from scratch?_

[1]

The authors provide pseudo code on their algorithm but no implementation (not used) so no re-implementation applicable.

### Data
_Given the data description in the documentation, how much effort take to either: Find the same dataset the authors used, or similar datasets and defend the comparability, or acquire one from scratch?_

[1]

(0/0)

No data sets used.

### Configuration 
_Given the (hyper)parameters, including semantic parameters, of the method: How much effort would it take to acquire the algorithm configurations used for their results, and compare against their budgetary constraints?_

[1]

Algorithms presented in pseudo code 1 and 2, where 2 seems to have some configurable weight vectors but no configurations used.

### Experimental Procedure
_Given the experimental set-up of the work, how difficult is it to set up a new experiment, similar to those presented in the original work, with the same procedure?_

[1]

No empirical evaluation done.

### Expertise
_How much effort would it take to acquire the expertise required to reproduce the work independently relying on the available documentation?_

[8]

Requires experience in social computation and voting systems to understand the proofs presented.
