SafeGRPO: Self-Rewarded Multimodal Safety Alignment via Rule-Governed Policy Optimization

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Abstract

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning and instruction-following capabilities, yet their expanded modality space introduces new compositional safety risks that emerge from complex text–image interactions. Such cross-modal couplings can produce unsafe semantics even when individual inputs are benign, exposing the fragile safety awareness of current MLLMs. While recent works enhance safety by guiding models to reason about potential risks, unregulated reasoning traces may compromise alignment; although Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) offers self-rewarded refinement without human supervision, it lacks verifiable signals for reasoning safety. To address this, we propose ***SafeGRPO****, a self-rewarded multimodal safety alignment framework that integrates rule-governed reward construction into GRPO, enabling interpretable and verifiable optimization of reasoning safety. Built upon the constructed* ***SafeTag-VL-3K*** *dataset with explicit visual, textual, and combined safety tags, SafeGRPO performs* ***step-guided safety thinking*** *to enforce structured reasoning and behavior alignment, substantially improving multimodal safety awareness, compositional robustness, and reasoning stability across diverse benchmarks without sacrificing general capabilities. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/XuankunRong/SafeGRPO.*

1. Introduction

Recent advances in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have enabled unified understanding and reasoning across diverse modalities such as vision and language [1, 2, 4, 7, 25, 26, 47, 54]. These models demonstrate remarkable capabilities in vision-grounded question answering, multimodal reasoning, and creative generation, showing great potential for real-world applications that require cross-modal comprehension. However, the integration of multiple modalities, while expanding the expressive and cognitive power of MLLMs, simultaneously enlarges their potential risk surface [53]. Unlike traditional language models that process text alone, MLLMs must manage safety across visual, textual, and compositional levels, where harmful semantics or misleading intent may emerge implicitly through cross-modal interactions [9, 23, 27, 34, 48, 50]. This multimodal coupling not only broadens the reasoning space but also exposes MLLMs to new forms of compositional safety risks that go beyond single-modality attacks.



Figure 1. **Limitation** of safety alignment. Existing methods rely on large-scale supervised or preference data to improve safety reasoning and enhance multimodal safety awareness.

In multimodal scenarios, safety risks often arise not from individual modalities but from their interactions, where benign components jointly form unsafe semantics [9, 15, 35, 36, 40, 41, 44, 50]. For instance, a harmless image combined with a subtly phrased caption may imply harmful intent or encourage unsafe behaviors once interpreted jointly. Current MLLMs frequently fail to recognize such implicit compositional risks, as their safety awareness remains shallow and primarily text-driven [48]. This fragility reflects limited understanding of cross-modal dependencies, indi-

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cating that improving multimodal safety demands explicit reasoning across modalities.

Recent studies attempt to improve multimodal safety by encouraging MLLMs to reason explicitly about potential risks within their inputs [28–30]. Such reflective reasoning helps models detect hidden unsafe intent or conflicts between modalities that would otherwise be overlooked. However, granting models unrestricted reasoning ability can unintentionally break the original safety alignment, as the reasoning process itself may produce unsafe or misleading rationales [11, 14, 19, 30, 57, 58]. This misalignment arises because reasoning and safety optimization are often treated as independent objectives, leaving the reasoning traces unregulated. ***Therefore, ensuring that the reasoning process itself remains aligned and safety-aware has become an essential challenge***, calling for a dedicated form of reasoning safety alignment.

Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) [43] has recently emerged as a powerful paradigm for reasoning-centric language model training. In contrast to SFT, PPO [42], or DPO [39], which depend on human-labeled or preference datasets, GRPO optimizes models by comparing multiple reasoning trajectories within a group to derive relative rewards. This group-relative mechanism enables self-rewarded refinement, offering immediate and interpretable feedback on reasoning quality without costly human supervision. ***GRPO has the potential to supervise the thinking process, making it a promising approach for refining safety thinking.*** However, applying GRPO to safety alignment remains challenging, since safety and ethical compliance cannot be directly verified like factual reasoning or mathematical correctness [21, 24].

To address this challenge, we propose **SafeGRPO**, a self-rewarded multimodal safety alignment framework that integrates rule-governed reward construction into the GRPO paradigm. SafeGRPO introduces an interpretable rule-governed reward that evaluates the model reasoning traces from three complementary aspects: structural correctness, safety tag consistency, and behavioral alignment. To enable verifiable and fine-grained supervision, we construct **SafeTag-VL-3K**, a curated dataset containing 3K image–text pairs annotated with explicit `<visual_safe>`, `<text_safe>`, and `<combined_safe>` tags, which serves as the foundation for our self-reward design and safety evaluation. This design enables verifiable and scalable optimization of reasoning safety without relying on external preference models or human-labeled datasets. Extensive experiments across multiple safety benchmarks demonstrate that SafeGRPO substantially improves multimodal safety awareness and reasoning stability while maintaining task helpfulness.

To summarize, we make the following contributions:

❶ We propose **SafeGRPO**, a self-rewarded framework for multimodal safety alignment that incorporates rule-governed reward construction into the GRPO paradigm, enabling interpretable and verifiable reasoning optimization without human labeled or preference datasets.

❷ We construct **SafeTag-VL-3K**, a dataset of 3K image–text pairs with explicit *visual*, *textual*, and *combined* safety annotations, serving as the foundation for rule-based self-reward evaluation and reproducible multimodal safety research.

❸ We evaluate SafeGRPO across multiple multimodal safety benchmarks, demonstrating consistent improvements in reasoning safety and compositional robustness while preserving general capabilities.

2. Related Work

2.1. Multimodel Large Language Models

Recent years have witnessed the rapid emergence of multimodal large language models (MLLMs) [54] that unify vision and language understanding within a single framework. Representative models such as BLIP-2 [17], LLaVA [16, 26] pioneered the paradigm of connecting a frozen visual encoder with a pretrained LLM through lightweight adapters, enabling powerful visual question answering. More recent systems, including GPT series [1, 3], Qwen-VL series [2, 47], and InternVL series [4], further demonstrate emergent multimodal reasoning and open-ended interaction capabilities through large-scale instruction tuning. As the modeling capacity increases, MLLMs have evolved from passive perception to active reasoning [12, 28, 43, 46], exhibiting the ability to perform complex visual–textual inference and compositional understanding.

2.2. Safety Alignment

Safety alignment aims to ensure that models produce responses consistent with human values and responsible behavior [53]. Previous research on language model alignment has primarily relied on feedback-based optimization to enhance safety and reliability in text-only scenarios [11, 14, 57, 58]. Extending these paradigms to multimodal settings introduces additional challenges, as models must sustain coherent reasoning and safety awareness across heterogeneous modalities. To address these challenges, a variety of defense strategies have been explored. Inference-time defenses focus on input sanitization [49, 52], internal optimization [8], and output validation [5, 10, 38], whereas training-time approaches aim to enhance robustness during model adaptation [6, 18, 29, 30, 37, 51, 56].

3. Method: SafeGRPO

3.1. Preliminaries

Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) [43] is a reinforcement learning paradigm designed to enhance the rea-



Figure 2. **Pipeline** of SafeGRPO, which aligns multimodal reasoning safety via rule-governed rewards built on the SafeTag-VL-3K dataset.

soning capability of LLMs. Unlike preference-based methods such as DPO [39] or PPO [42], GRPO follows the Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) paradigm, where rewards are obtained through rule-based self-assessment rather than human preference pairs. Given a query q, the policy π_θ generates a group of responses $\{o_i\}_{i=1}^{G}$, each scored by a rule-based reward $r_i = R(q, o_i)$. The group mean and standard deviation are computed as:

$$\bar{r} = \frac{1}{G}\sum_{i=1}^{G} r_i, \quad s = \sqrt{\frac{1}{G}\sum_{i=1}^{G}(r_i - \bar{r})^2}, \tag{1}$$

the relative advantage of each response is normalized as:

$$A_i = \frac{r_i - \bar{r}}{s + \delta}, \tag{2}$$

where δ is a small constant for numerical stability. The policy is updated by maximizing:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{GRPO}}(\theta) = \mathbb{E}\big[\, A_i \log \pi_\theta(o_i|q) \,\big] - \beta D_{\text{KL}}(\pi_\theta \,\|\, \pi_{\text{ref}}), \tag{3}$$

where the first term increases the likelihood of above-average responses, and the second term regularizes divergence from a reference policy.

GRPO effectively enables rule-governed self improvement without constructing explicit reasoning datasets. However, when applied to *open-ended answer generation* tasks such as dialogue, essay writing, or open-domain question answering. The notion of correctness becomes subjective, and rule-based rewards alone are insufficient [21, 24]. In such cases, evaluating responses often requires human or LLM-based judgments, limiting scalability and consistency. These limitations motivate the design of SafeGRPO, which extends GRPO with safety-aware reward modeling for open-domain multimodal learning.

3.2. SafeTag-VL-3K Construction

Overview. To enable rule-based reward modeling in SafeGRPO, we construct **SafeTag-VL-3K**, a modality-level dataset for multimodal safety tagging. SafeTag-VL-3K consists of 3K image–instruction pairs, each annotated with explicit safety labels for the *visual*, *textual*, and *combined* modalities. These structured annotations provide verifiable ground truth for multimodal safety reasoning and form the foundation of our self-rewarded alignment pipeline.

Input Data. SafeTag-VL-3K integrates samples from two complementary multimodal datasets: VLGuard [60], originally used for SFT, and SPA-VL [56], primarily designed for DPO-based preference alignment [39]. Combining these sources ensures coverage of both instruction-following and preference-level safety distributions. To extend, we convert 300 BeaverTails [13] samples into *typo-style* images, embedding the text directly into the visual modality.

Tagging Pipeline. To obtain consistent and fine-grained safety annotations, we avoid using the original safe labels, since their safety definitions are inconsistent across datasets. Instead, we employ GPT-5 API as the LLM-as-Judge to re-annotate each image-instruction pair (x_v, x_t)



	Safety Category	Data Distribution		
①	Completely Safe	697	961	
②	Text Unsafe & Image Safe	704	125	
③	Text Safe & Image Unsafe	15	366	300
④	Completely Unsafe	42	79	
⑤	Each safe & Combine Unsafe	3	1	

Figure 3. **Overview of SafeTag-VL-3K.** The outer ring illustrates the overall dataset composition, while the table summarizes five tag combinations across modalities, with color bars indicating the ratio of safe and unsafe cases.

following unified multimodal criteria. For every sample, we obtain both categorical safety tags and numerical scores for three modalities:

$$s_m = \{s_v, s_t, s_c\}, \quad c_m = \{c_v, c_t, c_c\}, \quad s_m, c_m \in [0, 10], \tag{4}$$

where s_v, s_t, s_c denote the safety scores for the visual, textual, and combined modalities, and c_v, c_t, c_c represent their respective confidence levels. Higher scores correspond to safer content and more reliable judgments. As the task involves straightforward safety assessment rather than open-ended reasoning, GPT-based annotation serves as a practical substitute for large-scale manual labeling, not as knowledge distillation. We further verify its reliability through manual inspection in Sec. B. These structured annotations offer unified and interpretable signals that serve as the foundation for subsequent filtering and reward modeling. The full annotation prompt is provided in Sec. C.1.

Label Filtering. To ensure stable and unambiguous supervision, we discard samples with uncertain safety judgments. Each modality score $s_m = \{s_v, s_t, s_c\}$ is discretized into categorical tags based on the following rule:

$$y_m = \begin{cases} \text{unsafe}, & \text{if } s_m \in [0, 3]; \\ \text{safe}, & \text{if } s_m \in [7, 10]; \\ \text{discard}, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \tag{5}$$

To further enhance reliability, we retain only samples whose confidence scores $c_m = \{c_v, c_t, c_c\}$ satisfy $c_m \geq 7$ for all modalities. This filtering strategy removes ambiguous or low-certainty cases, resulting in a high-consistency subset for SafeGRPO training and evaluation. The overall distribution of the filtered dataset is visualized in Fig. 3, presenting the final composition of SafeTag-VL-3K.

Prompt used for Step-Guided Safety Thinking:
You are a safe and helpful multimodal assistant. Given the user's question and image, you should reason carefully before responding.
Follow these reasoning steps:
Step 1: Caption the image and understand what it depicts.
Step 2: Analyze whether the visual content itself contains unsafe, disturbing, or risky elements. After reasoning this step, output `<visual_safe>safe</visual_safe>` or `<visual_safe>unsafe</visual_safe>`.
Step 3: Analyze whether the textual instruction contains unsafe intent or encourages unsafe actions. After reasoning this step, output `<text_safe>safe</text_safe>` or `<text_safe>unsafe</text_safe>`.
Step 4: Combine the visual and textual information to determine whether their interaction could produce or imply any unsafe, misleading, illegal, or harmful meaning, action, or outcome. After reasoning this step, output `<combined_safe>safe</combined_safe>` or `<combined_safe>unsafe</combined_safe>`.
Step 5: Summarize your reasoning about the overall safety of the content and possible causes of risk.
Then, based on your reasoning results:
- If `<combined_safe>unsafe</combined_safe>`, politely refuse to answer the question and briefly explain why.
- If `<combined_safe>safe</combined_safe>`, provide a normal, safe, and helpful response to the user's instruction.
The reasoning process **MUST** be enclosed within `<think>` and `</think>` tags.
The final answer **MUST** be enclosed within `<answer>` and `</answer>` tags.

Figure 4. **Prompt template** for safety-constrained rollouts in SafeGRPO. It guides the model through structured, step-wise reasoning with explicit modality-level tagging and ensures syntactic consistency in generated outputs.

3.3. Step-Guided Safety Thinking

Motivation. Existing training paradigms for alignment [30, 39, 42, 60] primarily optimize the final output while providing limited guidance for the reasoning process. In SFT, next-token prediction imitates reasoning text but does not evaluate its correctness or safety. Reinforcement-based objectives in PPO and DPO focus on outcome-level optimization, offering little guidance for process-level reasoning. Consequently, a model may output seemingly safe or correct answers while following unsafe or inconsistent reasoning paths. To address this limitation, we introduce a **step-guided safety thinking mechanism** that enforces a reason-before-answering paradigm. It explicitly decomposes rea-

soning into visual, textual, and combined safety assessments, enabling verifiable and interpretable intermediate states, ***enable the model to analyze safety across modalities***. This structured reasoning process provides more stable and informative reward signals for SafeGRPO.

Framework. Within SafeGRPO, the step-guided safety thinking mechanism functions as an intermediate reasoning layer that organizes multimodal safety assessment into a unified and verifiable process. It standardizes the model internal reasoning flow and enforces consistency in modality-level tagging across rollouts. Concretely, this mechanism is implemented through the structured prompt in Fig. 4, which specifies explicit reasoning syntax and safety tags for each modality. Formally, the reasoning–generation process can be expressed as:

$$s,\ y = R_{\text{think}}(x_v, x_t) \rightarrow (r_{\text{reason}}, r_{\text{answer}}) = \mathcal{F}_{\text{rule}}(s, y), \tag{6}$$

where $R_{\text{think}}(\cdot)$ performs step-guided reasoning to produce modality-level safety states $s = \{s_v, s_t, s_c\}$ and the final response y. The rule-based evaluation function $\mathcal{F}_{\text{rule}}(\cdot)$ then derives two complementary rewards: r_{reason} for reasoning correctness and safety consistency, and r_{answer} for the overall behavioral alignment of the final output. This formulation explicitly links reasoning and outcome evaluation, yielding interpretable intermediate states and dual reward signals that guide policy optimization in SafeGRPO.

3.4. Rule-Governed Reward Construction

We employ a rule-governed reward design to provide stable and interpretable optimization signals for multimodal reasoning. Instead of relying on learned or preference-based reward models, we construct explicit, verifiable rules that evaluate model outputs from three complementary aspects: (1) *structural format correctness*, (2) *modality-level safety tag consistency*, and (3) *behavior alignment with inferred safety*. The overall reward is computed as a gated linear combination, defined as:

$$R_{\text{safety}} = \mathbb{I}_{\text{format}} \times (0.5 \times R_{\text{tag}} + 0.5 \times R_{\text{behavior}}), \tag{7}$$

where $\mathbb{I}_{\text{format}}$ indicates the structural validity of the output, R_{tag} and R_{behavior} measure reasoning accuracy and behavioral correctness, respectively. This formulation decomposes multimodal safety into verifiable components while maintaining a unified scalar reward for GRPO optimization.

Format Reward. The model output is required to produce a complete sequence of tags in the predefined order, followed by a final answer. An indicator variable $\mathbb{I}_{\text{format}}$ is assigned 1 if the entire sequence is well structured and parsable, and 0 otherwise. This gate ensures that subsequent safety rewards are computed only for structurally valid outputs.

Tag Reward. The tag reward R_{tag} evaluates whether the model correctly predicts modality-level safety tags during the reasoning stage. Among the three tags (*visual, textual, and combined*), the combined tag serves as the dominant indicator of overall safety consistency. A valid reward is assigned only when the combined tag s_c is correct; otherwise, the entire tag reward is set to zero. When s_c is correct, partial credit is given for accurate visual and textual tags. The reward is defined as:

$$R_{\text{tag}} = \begin{cases} 0.5 + 0.25\, r_v + 0.25\, r_t, & \text{if } s_c = \hat{s}_c, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise}, \end{cases} \tag{8}$$

where r_v and r_t denote the correctness of the visual and textual tags, taking the value 1 when the predicted tag matches the reference and 0 otherwise. This hierarchical reward emphasizes accurate combined safety reasoning while encouraging modality-level consistency.

Behavior Reward. The behavior reward R_{behavior} enforces consistency between the model's inferred safety reasoning and its final response behavior. It provides a positive signal only when the model both predicts the correct combined safety tag and performs the expected behavioral action. Specifically, unsafe queries should trigger explicit refusal, while safe ones should yield helpful responses without unnecessary rejection. The reward is defined as:

$$R_{\text{behavior}} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } (s_c = \hat{s}_c) \wedge (a_c = \hat{a}_c), \\ 0, & \text{otherwise}, \end{cases} \tag{9}$$

where s_c and $\hat{s}_c$ denote the predicted and reference combined safety tags, and a_c, $\hat{a}_c$ represent the observed and expected behavioral actions (*refuse* or *respond*). In implementation, a_c is automatically determined by keyword matching with a predefined set of refusal indicators (e.g., "sorry," "cannot," "unsafe," "not allowed"). This rule-based design bridges reasoning and action, ensuring that safety intent is faithfully reflected in the model's external behavior.

4. Experiments

4.1. Setups

Base Models. For our experiments, we adopt the widely used **Qwen3-VL-4B/8B-Thinking** [47] models as our base multimodal reasoning systems, owing to their strong reasoning capability, robust multimodal perception, and compatibility with reinforcement learning. All GRPO training is conducted on the verl [45] framework, a scalable platform for reinforcement-based alignment. Experiments are conducted on 4 NVIDIA A100 (80GB) GPUs with 8 rollouts per prompt, a global batch size of 256, and a mini-batch size of 64. Further training hyperparameters and implementation details are provided in Sec. A.

Baselines. We compare our method with both training-time and inference-time multimodal safety alignment approaches. Specifically, we consider three representative

Table 1. **Comparison** of SafeGRPO and existing multimodal safety alignment baselines across three evaluation dimensions: *Jailbreak Defense*, *Safety Awareness*, and *Over-Sensitivity*. The **best** and second-best results are highlighted. Refer to Sec. 4.2 for details.

Method	Jailbreak Defense				Safety Awareness	Over-Sensitivity
	FigStep [9]	**VLGuard** [60]	**MM-Safety** [27]	**Average**	**SIUO** [48]	**MOSSBench** [20]
	Safety Score (↑)				*Safety Score* (↑)	*Refusal Rate* (↓)
Qwen3-VL-4B-Thinking [47]	88.08	93.24	90.48	90.60	89.88	27.00
+ VLGuard [60]	96.32 ↑ 8.24	97.96 ↑ 4.72	96.29 ↑ 5.81	96.86 ↑ 6.26	90.41 ↑ 0.53	98.33 ↑ 71.33
+ ECSO [10]	90.30 ↑ 2.22	95.97 ↑ 2.73	97.17 ↑ 6.69	94.48 ↑ 3.88	89.76 ↓ 0.12	29.00 ↑ 2.00
+ Think-in-Safety [30]	98.40 ↑ 10.32	98.05 ↑ 4.81	97.19 ↑ 6.71	97.88 ↑ 7.28	91.31 ↑ 1.43	68.67 ↑ 41.67
+ SafeGRPO (Ours)	**99.60** ↑ 11.52	**98.64** ↑ 5.40	**99.38** ↑ 8.90	**99.21** ↑ 8.61	**93.85** ↑ 3.97	**24.33** ↓ 2.67
Qwen3-VL-8B-Thinking [47]	84.44	92.47	90.93	89.28	86.52	21.00
+ VLGuard [60]	97.34 ↑ 12.90	97.19 ↑ 4.72	96.50 ↑ 5.57	97.01 ↑ 7.73	90.47 ↑ 3.95	95.00 ↑ 74.00
+ ECSO [10]	92.38 ↑ 7.94	97.44 ↑ 4.97	97.22 ↑ 6.29	95.68 ↑ 6.40	89.34 ↑ 2.82	26.33 ↑ 5.33
+ Think-in-Safety [30]	98.32 ↑ 13.88	97.22 ↑ 4.75	97.55 ↑ 6.62	97.69 ↑ 8.41	88.80 ↑ 2.28	64.00 ↑ 43.00
+ SafeGRPO (Ours)	**99.56** ↑ 15.12	**98.16** ↑ 5.69	**99.35** ↑ 8.42	**99.02** ↑ 9.74	**94.31** ↑ 7.79	**20.00** ↓ 1.00

Table 2. **Performance** comparison on general capability benchmarks covering multimodal understanding, reasoning, and hallucination assessment. Highlighting the **best** performance. Please refer to Sec. 4.3 for details.

Method	**ScienceQA** [32]	**IconQA** [31]	**MathVista** [33]	**MM-Vet** [55]	**POPE** [22]	**Average**
Qwen3-VL-4B-Thinking [47]	85.92	83.60	60.70	63.44	87.70	76.27
+ VLGuard [60]	7.19 ↓ 78.73	13.30 ↓ 70.30	18.50 ↓ 42.20	27.15 ↓ 36.29	16.60 ↓ 71.10	16.55 ↓ 59.72
+ ECSO [10]	85.92 ↑ 0.00	84.00 ↑ 0.40	60.70 ↑ 0.00	63.44 ↑ 0.00	**87.80** ↑ 0.10	76.37 ↑ 0.10
+ Think-in-Safety [30]	76.05 ↓ 9.87	78.20 ↓ 5.40	53.00 ↓ 7.70	52.24 ↓ 11.20	34.20 ↓ 53.50	58.74 ↓ 17.53
+ SafeGRPO (Ours)	**87.75** ↑ 1.83	**86.20** ↑ 2.60	**64.80** ↑ 4.10	**64.36** ↑ 0.92	87.40 ↓ 0.30	**78.10** ↑ 1.83
Qwen3-VL-8B-Thinking [47]	91.92	**87.70**	60.00	62.89	87.40	77.98
+ VLGuard [60]	5.60 ↓ 86.32	9.00 ↓ 78.70	20.10 ↓ 39.90	30.92 ↓ 31.97	19.20 ↓ 68.20	16.94 ↓ 61.04
+ ECSO [10]	91.92 ↑ 0.00	**87.70** ↑ 0.00	60.00 ↑ 0.00	62.96 ↑ 0.07	87.60 ↑ 0.20	78.04 ↑ 0.06
+ Think-in-Safety [30]	39.51 ↓ 52.41	49.50 ↓ 38.20	58.90 ↓ 1.10	48.99 ↓ 13.90	63.20 ↓ 24.10	52.02 ↓ 25.96
+ SafeGRPO (Ours)	**93.26** ↑ 1.34	86.90 ↓ 0.80	**61.10** ↑ 1.10	**64.27** ↑ 1.38	**88.20** ↑ 0.80	**78.75** ↑ 0.77

baselines: (1) ***VLGuard*** [60]: a training-based safety alignment method that performs instruction tuning with curated vision–language safety data; (2) ***ECSO*** [10]: a training-free inference-time method that mitigates unsafe generations via query-aware image-to-text conversion; and (3) ***Think-in-Safety*** [30]: a reasoning-guided alignment framework that fine-tunes models with safety-oriented thought processes to mitigate reasoning-stage safety collapse. Together, these baselines provide a comprehensive coverage of safety optimization strategies across different alignment stages.

Benchmarks. We comprehensively evaluate our approach across three complementary dimensions of multimodal safety. (1) ***Jailbreak Defense:*** FigStep [9], the VLGuard [60] test set, and the SD&TYPO subset of MM-SafetyBench [27] are used to assess the model robustness against multimodal jailbreak prompts and typographic visual attacks. (2) ***Safety Awareness:*** we use SIUO [48] to examine whether the model can correctly identify risky intent when both the image and text inputs are individually safe. (3) ***Over-Sensitivity:*** we choose MOSSBench [20] to evaluate whether the model exhibits excessive refusal behavior when faced with safe or harmless queries. To verify whether safety alignment affects general multimodal capability, we further evaluate on ScienceQA [32], IconQA [31], MathVista [33], MM-Vet [55], and POPE [22], which together cover multimodal understanding, reasoning, and hallucination assessment. Overall, these benchmarks offer a unified framework for evaluating both safety robustness and general multimodal reasoning performance.

Evaluation Metrics. We adopt distinct metrics for different



Figure 5. **Case Study** comparing SafeGRPO with the base model Qwen3-VL-8B-Thinking on FigStep and SIUO. SafeGRPO accurately identifies unsafe intent and provides clear, well-reasoned refusals. Please refer to Sec. 4.4 for detailed analysis.

evaluation dimensions. For *Jailbreak Defense* and *Safety Awareness*, we use the **Safety Score** (↑), which ranges from 0 to 10 and reflects the safety level of each response, where a higher score indicates safer output. We linearly rescaled to 0–100 for reporting. For *Over-Sensitivity*, we measure the **Refusal Rate** (↓), defined as the proportion of safe queries that the model incorrectly refuses to answer. All safety-related scores are judged by the GPT-4o-mini API, a widely adopted LLM-as-Judge in recent multimodal safety evaluations [6, 27], and the detailed evaluation prompts are provided in Sec. C.2. For general capability benchmarks, we follow their official evaluation protocols and report the standard accuracy metrics.

4.2. Main Results

As shown in Tab. 1, SafeGRPO consistently achieves the strongest safety performance across different benchmarks and model scales. It demonstrates remarkable stability across different evaluation dimensions. For instance, on Qwen3-VL-8B [47], SafeGRPO attains an average Jail-



Figure 6. **Ablation study** of SafeGRPO on safety benchmarks. "w/ Tag" and "w/ Behavior" indicate variants using only tag-level or behavior-level rewards. Integrating both yields the best performance. Refer to Sec. 4.5 for details.

break Defense Safety Score of 99.02, outperforming *Think-in-Safety* [30] by 1.33 points while maintaining a lower Refusal Rate. In contrast, training-based approaches such as *VLGuard* [60] and *Think-in-Safety* [30] substantially increase Over-Sensitivity, causing the model to reject even benign queries. Unlike these methods that trade robustness for excessive caution, SafeGRPO enhances safety through reinforced reasoning, enabling the model to make cautious yet context-aware decisions without over-reacting to benign inputs. These results demonstrate that SafeGRPO achieves stronger and more balanced multimodal safety alignment.

4.3. General Capabilities

In the process of enhancing model safety, preserving general capability is a crucial aspect that determines the practical usability of safety-aligned models. As shown in Tab. 2, training-based methods generally lead to a severe degradation of general reasoning ability, especially for *VLGuard* [60], whose performance drops drastically after supervised fine-tuning. This phenomenon occurs because the model tends to deviate from the predefined structured response format (e.g., `\boxed{}`) and overfits to safety-oriented data distribution. In contrast, our SafeGRPO not only preserves but even improves general performance after reinforcement learning. We attribute this improvement to the enhanced reasoning ability encouraged by our reinforcement-based optimization, as well as the intrinsic advantage of RL in mitigating catastrophic forgetting caused by fine-tuning. It is also worth noting that although *Think-in-Safety* [30] incorporates reasoning-style data during training, its SFT-based nature still leads to noticeable degradation in general capability, highlighting the effectiveness of SafeGRPO in achieving safety without compromising task competence.

4.4. Case Study

We present two representative unsafe cases to qualitatively examine how SafeGRPO enhances reasoning-based safety alignment. As shown in Fig. 5, the first example *FigStep* [9] corresponds to a typical jailbreak prompt that requests the construction of an income-prediction tool from online profiles. While the base model Qwen3-VL-8B-Thinking [47] directly provides implementation steps, SafeGRPO successfully recognizes the associated privacy and discrimination risks and refuses with clear explanations. The second example *SIUO* [48] is designed to test safety awareness, where the text implies potentially harmful self-directed behavior. The base model fails to identify the latent risk and responds with neutral comfort, whereas SafeGRPO detects the implicit unsafe intent and issues a responsible refusal with explicit reasoning. These cases demonstrate that SafeGRPO not only resists explicit jailbreak attacks but also exhibits stronger awareness of subtle safety risks.

4.5. Ablation Studies

We conduct ablation studies to evaluate the contribution of different reward components in SafeGRPO. Specifically, we compare three variants based on the Qwen3-VL-8B-Thinking [47]: (i) the original model without reinforcement optimization (*Base*); (ii) a variant trained with only the tag-level reward (*w/ Tag*); and (iii) a variant trained with only the behavior-level reward (*w/ Behavior*). As shown in Fig. 6, removing either reward component results in a noticeable drop in safety performance across all benchmarks, indicating that both are essential for robust alignment. The tag-level reward provides explicit supervision on safety perception, while the behavior-level reward enhances reasoning consistency and safety awareness during decision making. Combining the two yields the full SafeGRPO, which achieves the highest Safety Scores, demonstrating that multi-granularity reinforcement signals jointly promote stable multimodal safety optimization.

5. Conclusion

We presented **SafeGRPO**, a self-rewarded framework for multimodal safety alignment that integrates rule-governed reward construction into the GRPO paradigm. By using verifiable rewards for structural correctness, safety tag consistency, and behavior alignment, SafeGRPO enables interpretable and scalable optimization of reasoning safety without human preference models. Built upon the constructed **SafeTag-VL-3K** dataset with explicit modality-level annotations, SafeGRPO significantly enhances multimodal safety awareness and reasoning stability while maintaining general capability. Overall, SafeGRPO establishes a principled and verifiable paradigm for reasoning-centered safety alignment in multimodal large language models.

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