Staying on Task: Defending Against Prompt Injection via Task Consistency Checking

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Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) in real-world applications must process heterogeneous inputs from system prompts, user requests, and external content, making them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks. Existing defenses mainly teach models to block or ignore injected instructions, but do not explicitly assess whether such instructions conflict with the original task. We propose CBC (*Consistency Before Complying*), which formulates prompt injection defense as a *task consistency judgment* problem. CBC defines task consistency along semantic dimensions of action, constraint, and domain, and trains models to perform structured reasoning before executing newly introduced instructions. Using targeted synthetic supervision and dual-objective online alignment, CBC prioritizes correct consistency judgment while preserving task utility. Experiments on diverse direct and indirect prompt injection benchmarks across three model families show that CBC achieves strong and consistent robustness, particularly under adaptive attacks, while better preserving the intended task under attack than existing defenses. We release our code and models for reproducibility[1].

1 Introduction

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable progress in instruction following, reasoning, and tool use (Zhang et al., 2025a; Guo et al., 2025; Wölflein et al., 2025), and are widely deployed in healthcare, software engineering, and enterprise automation applications (Yu et al., 2025; Yang et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2024). These systems often rely on heterogeneous inputs, including system prompts, user requests, and external content such as tool outputs. While this enables flexibility, it also introduces ambiguity when inputs convey competing intents, creating vulnerabilities to prompt injection attacks (Toyer et al., 2024; Greshake et al., 2023). By introducing conflicting instructions that redirect the model from its original task, adversaries can lead to behaviors ranging from task hijacking to overt harms such as data exfiltration (Greshake et al., 2023) and malware propagation (Brodt et al., 2026).

Existing defenses against prompt injection adopt several strategies. Prompt-level methods strengthen adherence to original instructions through explicit reminders or constraints (Altryne, 2024; Schulhoff, 2024). Guardrail-based approaches rely on external detectors or filters to block malicious inputs before execution (Liu et al., 2025b; Shi et al., 2025; Jia et al., 2025). Fine-tuning-based methods include delimiter-based techniques for separating trusted instructions from untrusted data (Chen et al., 2024, 2025a), as well as instruction hierarchy training that prioritizes higher-authority instructions under conflict (Wu et al., 2025; Zheng et al., 2026; Wallace et al., 2024).

Despite these efforts, existing defenses remain limited. Prompt-based methods are brittle because defensive instructions share the same context as injected content and can be overridden. Guardrail-based approaches rely on accurate detection, yet remain vulnerable to stealthy camouflaged attacks. Delimiter-based methods assume a clean separation between trusted instructions and non-executable data—an assumption that rarely holds in mixed-context settings. Instruction hierarchy methods improve source prioritization, but still struggle with complex semantic conflicts requiring multi-step reasoning (Figure 1).

We observe that successful attacks often induce *instruction inconsistency*: injected instructions introduce objectives that conflict with the original task. We therefore frame prompt injection defense as a *task consistency* problem: before acting on a newly introduced instruction, the model should determine whether it preserves or contradicts the in-

[1] https://anonymous.4open.science/r/CBC-PromptInjection-Defense-CE3F



Figure 1: **Existing Workflow vs. CBC.** Retrieved content often mixes useful content with benign or malicious instructions. Existing prompt injection defenses struggle to determine which instructions should be followed. CBC resolves this ambiguity by detecting instruction inconsistency and enforcing the original task objective.

tended task objective. Importantly, injected instructions are often not overtly malicious and may appear plausible in isolation, allowing them to evade prompt-based heuristics; nonetheless, they can still derail behavior by introducing inconsistent goals. Current models lack a unified semantic capability for such alignment assessment and may follow recent instructions even when they contradict the original objective.

We propose CBC (**C**onsistency **B**efore **C**omplying), a task-consistency alignment framework for prompt injection defense. CBC formalizes task consistency as the absence of semantic conflicts between a new instruction and the original task across dimensions including action, constraints, and domain. It is supervised fine-tuned for structured consistency reasoning, and further strengthens this capability through dual-objective online alignment that jointly optimizes consistency judgment and task completion under injection.

Our contributions are as follows:

- We identify *task consistency judgment* as a missing semantic capability in existing prompt injection defenses.
- We propose a principled formulation of task consistency and use it to synthesize training data that captures diverse semantic conflicts.
- We show that structured chain-of-thought reasoning is crucial for task consistency judgment, and further improve it through online alignment.
- Extensive experiments show that CBC delivers the strongest and most consistent robustness against both indirect and direct prompt injection, while preserving task performance under attack.

2 Related Work

Prompt injection attacks arise because LLMs process instructions from multiple sources, allowing adversaries to introduce malicious or conflicting instructions through user inputs or external content (Toyer et al., 2024; Greshake et al., 2023). These attacks can be *direct*, where the injected instruction appears in the user prompt, or *indirect*, where it is embedded in external data consumed by the model.

Prompt injection defense. Existing defenses mainly fall into three categories: prompt engineering, guardrails, and model-level training. Prompt engineering methods, such as Sandwich (Altryne, 2024) and Instruction (Schulhoff, 2024), reinforce the original task with reminders or constraints, but remain brittle because they share the same context as injected content. Guardrail-based approaches, including DataSentinel (Liu et al., 2025b), PromptArmor (Shi et al., 2025), and PromptLocate (Jia et al., 2025), use detectors or filters to block malicious inputs, but depend on accurate detection and can be evaded by semantically subtle attacks.

Model-level defenses include delimiter-based and instruction hierarchy methods. Delimiter-based approaches, such as StruQ (Chen et al., 2024) and SecAlign (Chen et al., 2025a), train models to ignore instructions in untrusted spans, assuming a clear boundary between executable instructions and data, which often breaks in mixed-context settings. Instruction hierarchy methods, including Instruction Hierarchy (Wallace et al., 2024), ISE (Wu et al., 2025), and VerIH (Zheng et al., 2026), resolve conflicts through source-level priorities, but remain limited when injected instructions create deeper semantic conflicts requiring multi-step reasoning or when inputs are just irrelevant without exhibiting explicit conflicts.

In contrast, CBC addresses the semantic root of prompt injection failures. Rather than blocking suspicious inputs or enforcing fixed priorities, CBC frames prompt injection defense as a *task consistency* problem and trains models to reason explicitly about whether new instructions align with the original task objective.

Reasoning for safety alignment. Recent work has explored explicit reasoning for safety alignment, enabling models to analyze task structure and assess risks before responding. Deliberative alignment (Guan et al., 2025) and STAIR (Zhang et al., 2025c) show that System 2–style reasoning over safety policies or malicious intent can improve robustness. By contrast, CBC uses structured reasoning to assess task consistency, focusing on whether a newly introduced instruction should govern the response under the original task objective. This makes CBC particularly suited to prompt injections that appear benign yet introduce conflicting goals.

3 Safety Alignment via Task Consistency Checking

3.1 Problem Statement

We consider an LLM application that receives a system instruction x_s, a user request x_u, and external data x_e, and generates a response

$$y \sim \pi_\theta(\cdot \mid x_s, x_u, x_e).$$

Prompt injections may appear in both user inputs and external data. Rather than being overtly malicious, they often introduce instructions that are irrelevant to or inconsistent with the original task objective. We define the intended task as the one specified by the system instruction together with the subset of user instructions consistent with it. The goal of prompt injection defense is therefore to ensure that the model continues to follow this intended task despite conflicting instructions.

3.2 Task Consistency Formulation

We assess whether two instructions imply consistent tasks by decomposing each instruction into three semantic dimensions: *action*, *constraint*, and *domain*. Intuitively, the action specifies what to do, constraints define conditions on execution, and the domain captures the task scope or role.

Formally, for an instruction x, we define the semantic projection

$$\Phi(x) = \big(\hat{A}(x),\, \hat{C}(x),\, \hat{D}(x)\big),$$

where $\hat{A}(x)$, $\hat{C}(x)$, and $\hat{D}(x)$ denote the action, constraint, and domain extracted by a semantic parser. These components are instantiated using LLM-based extractors during training and data construction, and the resulting reasoning is internalized by the fine-tuned CBC model at inference time.

Typical forms of instruction inconsistency include conflicts between actions and constraints (e.g., *discuss religion* vs. *do not discuss religion*), action–domain mismatches (e.g., *solve a math problem* vs. *you are a medical assistant*), incompatible constraints (e.g., *answer in French* vs. *answer in Chinese*), and domain mismatches (e.g., *coding agent* vs. *comedian*).

Motivated by these cases, given a candidate instruction x_1 and an original task instruction x_2, we define four binary inconsistency indicators:

$$\delta_{AC},\ \delta_{AD},\ \delta_{CC},\ \delta_{DD} \in \{0, 1\},$$

where $\delta_{AC} = 1$ if the action of x_1 violates the constraints of x_2, $\delta_{AD} = 1$ if the action of x_1 falls outside the domain of x_2, $\delta_{CC} = 1$ if the constraints are incompatible, and $\delta_{DD} = 1$ if the domains are irrelevant.

Task consistency is then defined as

$$\begin{aligned}\mathrm{Consistent}(x_1, x_2) = \mathbb{I}\big[&\delta_{AC}(x_1, x_2) = 0 \wedge \delta_{AD}(x_1, x_2) = 0 \\ &\wedge \delta_{CC}(x_1, x_2) = 0 \wedge \delta_{DD}(x_1, x_2) = 0\big].\end{aligned}$$

This formulation is used for both synthetic data construction (Section 3.4) and reward design in online reinforcement learning (Section 3.5).

3.3 Structured Consistency Reasoning

Rather than complying with all introduced instructions, CBC performs explicit task-consistency reasoning before generating a response. This reasoning is explicitly instantiated during data construction, and internalized by the trained model at inference time. The procedure consists of three steps.

(1) Instruction identification and grouping. Given the full input context $C = [x_s; x_u; x_e]$, CBC identifies instruction-like spans and groups them by source:

$$\mathcal{Z} = \mathcal{Z}_s \cup \mathcal{Z}_u \cup \mathcal{Z}_e,$$

where $\mathcal{Z}_s$, $\mathcal{Z}_u$, and $\mathcal{Z}_e$ denote instructions from the system prompt, user input, and external content, respectively. At inference time, CBC does not rely on an external parser; instead, the fine-tuned model internally recognizes and reasons over instruction-like content. Explicit instruction extraction is only used during training for data synthesis and preference optimization.

(2) Main task derivation. CBC derives the main task by first interpreting the system instruction, which typically specifies the high-level domain and constraints. It then examines user instructions in $\mathcal{Z}_u$ and partitions them into a subset



Figure 2: **Framework of CBC.** Given heterogeneous inputs from system prompts, user requests, and external content, CBC first evaluates task consistency between newly introduced instructions and the original task objective. It then performs structured reasoning to decide whether each instruction should be executed, degraded, or discarded. The framework is trained in two stages: cold-start supervision using structured reasoning traces, followed by dual-objective online GRPO to jointly improve prompt injection robustness and task utility.

consistent with the system-level objective and a remaining subset. The main task is defined as

$$x^\star = \mathrm{MainTask}(x_s, x_u^b),$$

where $x_u^b \subseteq \mathcal{Z}_u$ denotes the set of user instructions consistent with x_s. This step explicitly addresses direct prompt injection, in which user-provided instructions may attempt to redefine or override the system-specified task.

(3) Consistency reasoning and response policy. CBC evaluates the consistency between the derived main task $x^\star$ and each remaining instruction from user and external sources:

$$\mathrm{Consistent}(z_i, x^\star), \quad z_i \in (\mathcal{Z}_u \setminus x_u^b) \cup \mathcal{Z}_e.$$

Instructions that introduce competing objectives are marked inconsistent. CBC then either *degrades* them into non-executable context or *discards* them entirely.

Figure 2 illustrates this process. Given a system instruction defining a research-assistant role and a user request to translate an academic article into Chinese, CBC derives the translation task as $x^\star$. A retrieved instruction requesting the generation of a Nike advertisement is judged inconsistent due to an action–domain mismatch and is discarded, as it neither supports nor contributes to completing the main task.

3.4 Cold-Start Supervision

Synthetic data construction. Guided by the task-consistency formulation in Section 3.2, we construct cold-start supervision from benign instructions collected across diverse datasets (Appendix B.1), which serve as seeds for original tasks. For each seed, we synthesize injected instructions to cover diverse semantic inconsistencies across the action, constraint, and domain dimensions, including action–constraint conflict, action–domain mismatch, constraint conflict, and domain mismatch. These instruction pairs provide explicit semantic contrast and direct supervision for task-consistency judgment.

Structured CoT alignment. We prompt a strong teacher model to generate structured reasoning traces that follow the CBC pipeline: (i) identifying

instruction-like content and deriving the main task, (ii) judging task consistency, and (iii) selecting a response policy (execute, degrade, or discard). After filtering self-contradictory traces, the remaining high-quality examples are used for supervised fine-tuning. This cold-start alignment teaches the model to reason about task consistency before execution, rather than treating all instruction-like content as executable by default.

3.5 Dual-Objective Online Alignment

In this section, "online" refers to on-policy optimization during training, rather than deployment-time learning.

Data augmentation. Cold-start supervision alone is insufficient for realistic settings, where tasks are often expressed through multiple instructions. To simulate such contexts, we decompose an original instruction into sub-steps and insert an injected instruction δ:

$$x' = (x_1, \ldots, x_i, \delta, x_{i+1}, \ldots, x_k). \quad (1)$$

This augmentation requires the model to assess consistency under competing instructions. To focus online training on informative cases, we repeatedly sample model rollouts and retain only instances in which injection succeeds in at least one trial, ensuring that each optimization group contains informative preference comparisons.

Reward function design. Our online alignment objective jointly optimizes *consistency judgment* and *task completion*. Correct consistency judgment is reflected in the model's final behavior: a correctly aligned model should avoid complying with injected goals, whereas failures typically manifest as partial or full compliance. We therefore detect judgment failure using injected-goal keywords or behavioral signatures in the generated response.

For a response f, we define a failure indicator $F(f) \in \{0, 1\}$, where $F(f) = 1$ denotes injected-goal compliance, and a task utility score $H(f) \in [0, 1]$. We additionally define a format reward $R_{\text{format}}(f) \in \{0, 0.5\}$ that is awarded when the response correctly includes the required `<think></think>` and `<answer></answer>` tags. The overall reward is defined as

$$R(f) = R_{\text{format}}(f) - \alpha F(f) + \beta H(f). \quad (2)$$

The reward satisfies two principles. First, *failure priority*: responses that avoid injected-goal compliance are always preferred,

$$\forall f_1, f_2 : \; F(f_1) = 0, \; F(f_2) = 1 \;\Rightarrow\; R(f_1) > R(f_2). \quad (3)$$

Second, *utility preference under equal failure status*: among responses with the same failure label, higher task utility is preferred,

$$\forall f_1, f_2 : \; F(f_1) = F(f_2), \; H(f_1) > H(f_2) \;\Rightarrow\; R(f_1) > R(f_2). \quad (4)$$

We set $\alpha > \beta$ to prioritize rejecting injected goals, using $\alpha = 1$ and $\beta = 0.5$ in all experiments.

GRPO optimization. We adopt online GRPO for policy optimization. At each iteration, given an augmented prompt x', we sample a response group $\{f_1, \ldots, f_G\} \sim \pi_\theta(\cdot \mid x')$ with $G = 8$, compute rewards $R(f_i)$, and rank responses according to $f^{F=0,H\uparrow} \succ f^{F=0,H\downarrow} \succ f^{F=1,H\uparrow} \succ f^{F=1,H\downarrow}$. GRPO then increases the likelihood of higher-ranked responses while suppressing lower-ranked ones, gradually aligning the policy toward outputs that are both task-consistent and high-utility.

4 Experimental Results

We evaluate CBC on a suite of benchmarks covering prompt injection robustness, resistance to adaptive attacks, and general model utility.

4.1 Experimental Settings

We summarize the main experimental settings of models, prompt injection defense baselines, prompt injection attack benchmarks, adaptive attackers, and utility evaluation in Appendix D.1. In addition, training data synthesis is described in Appendix B. We adopt a strong white-box threat model (Appendix A), where the attacker knows the system prompt and interaction format but cannot modify model parameters.

4.2 Main results.

Table 1 reports defense success rate (DSR) on a range of indirect and direct prompt injection benchmarks. Overall, CBC achieves the strongest and most consistent performance across both attack settings. On Qwen2.5, CBC attains a 97.09% DSR on indirect attacks and a 62.77% DSR on direct attacks, outperforming the strongest non-CBC baselines by 8.79 and 12.61 points, respectively. On LLaMA-3.1, it reaches 96.11% (indirect) and 58.62% (direct), while on Qwen3-14B it further improves to 98.83% and 68.03%, yielding the best overall results.

Category	Method	Indirect Prompt Injection						Direct Prompt Injection					
		SEP	OpenPrompt	InjecAgent	GCG	Fuzz	Avg	LlamaCyberEval	ASB	ASB(u)	GCG	Fuzz	Avg
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct													
No defense	Base	22.70%	43.98%	64.70%	0.00%	0.00%	26.28%	60.56%	1.75%	2.00%	19.00%	23.00%	21.26%
Prompt	Sandwich	32.00%	68.84%	65.00%	5.00%	0.00%	34.17%	58.09%	1.50%	1.75%	34.00%	23.00%	23.67%
Guardrail	PromptArmor	77.00%	95.03%	97.60%†	63.00%	15.00%	69.53%	75.94%†	2.00%	2.00%	46.00%	34.00%	31.99%
Finetune	StruQ	95.20%†	**99.83%**	**100.00%**	50.00%	95.00%	88.01%	68.53%	64.25%†	28.00%†	50.00%	40.00%†	50.16%†
	SecAlign	94.70%	98.70%†	87.10%	64.00%†	97.00%†	88.30%†	55.94%	47.00%	3.75%	20.00%	22.00%	29.74%
	VerIH	53.00%	76.78%	54.46%	3.00%	13.00%	40.05%	61.99%	**75.50%**	0.00%	56.00%†	26.00%	43.90%
	Ours (CBC)	**96.00%**	98.44%	**100.00%**	**92.00%**	**99.00%**	**97.09%**	**79.84%**	61.25%	**66.75%**	**65.00%**	**41.00%**	**62.77%**
Llama3.1-8B-Instruct													
No defense	Base	41.30%	57.77%	55.50%	10.00%	0.00%	32.91%	66.70%	6.75%	3.00%	51.00%	21.00%	29.69%
Prompt	Sandwich	44.30%	78.48%	66.40%	18.00%	0.00%	41.44%	74.58%	10.00%	1.50%	52.00%	16.00%	30.82%
Guardrail	PromptArmor	84.00%	89.95%	97.60%†	57.00%	31.00%	71.91%	**84.30%**	60.25%	17.75%†	57.00%	22.00%	48.26%
Finetune	StruQ	92.30%	**100.00%**	**100.00%**	96.00%†	91.00%	95.86%	69.48%	**96.50%**	5.75%	54.00%	**37.00%**	52.55%
	SecAlign	95.00%†	98.69%†	**100.00%**	88.00%	**100.00%**	**96.34%**	83.51%†	78.25%†	15.50%	64.00%	23.00%	52.85%
	VerIH	47.10%	92.53%	90.99%	62.00%	65.00%	71.52%	79.59%	**96.50%**	0.50%	**84.00%**	27.00%	57.52%†
	Ours (CBC)	**95.80%**	93.75%	**100.00%**	**98.00%**	93.00%†	96.11%†	82.31%	51.50%	**46.25%**	79.00%†	34.00%†	**58.61%**
Qwen3-14B													
No defense	Base	21.30%	54.05%	92.60%	11.00%	18.00%	39.39%	66.22%	2.25%	0.00%	54.00%	37.00%	31.89%
Prompt	Sandwich	26.50%	86.17%	89.00%	15.00%	42.00%	51.73%	68.29%	0.00%	1.00%	67.00%	24.00%	32.06%
Guardrail	PromptArmor	66.80%†	89.00%	99.20%†	70.00%	66.00%	78.20%	**84.70%**	**72.25%**	**71.50%**	66.00%	35.00%	65.89%†
Finetune	SecAlign	38.20%	93.24%†	92.60%	86.00%†	97.00%†	81.41%†	67.09%	0.00%	1.25%	48.00%	21.00%	27.47%
	VerIH	24.90%	58.00%	92.22%	20.00%	27.00%	44.42%	75.54%	0.00%	1.50%	74.00%†	45.00%†	39.21%
	Ours (CBC)	**99.70%**	**98.77%**	**99.70%**	**97.00%**	**99.00%**	**98.83%**	82.17%†	64.50%†	63.50%†	**78.00%**	**52.00%**	**68.03%**

Table 1: Defense performance of different methods across models and benchmarks. Higher values indicate better performance. Best and second-best results are highlighted in **bold** and marked with †, respectively.

The advantages of CBC are most pronounced under stronger adaptive attacks such as GCG and fuzzing, where it consistently ranks among the top two methods across all three backbones. In addition, CBC better preserves the original task under attack. For example, on Qwen2.5 it improves ASB(u) to 66.75%, substantially outperforming StruQ at 28.00%. By contrast, some baselines achieve high DSR by severely degrading task utility: VerIH reaches 75.50% DSR on ASB for Qwen2.5 but drops to 0.00% on ASB(u), indicating that attacks are often avoided by abandoning the original task entirely.

In contrast, undefended base models are highly vulnerable to task conflicts, achieving below 40% and 30% DSR on indirect and direct attacks, respectively. Prompt-based methods provide limited gains and fail under stronger adversaries, including complete failure on indirect fuzzing for both Qwen2.5 and LLaMA-3.1. Guardrail-based methods achieve moderate robustness but rely on stronger external models. Fine-tuning baselines exhibit complementary but incomplete strengths: StruQ and SecAlign are effective on indirect attacks, whereas VerIH performs better on direct, conflict-heavy settings but remains weaker on indirect injection. Overall, CBC is the only method that remains consistently effective across both indirect and direct attacks while maintaining a favorable robustness–utility trade-off.

Utility under clean and attack settings. Table 2 compares model utility on benign inputs and under prompt injection. Under clean inputs, CBC largely preserves utility and often improves it. On Qwen2.5, mean benchmark utility increases from 71.99% to 75.30%, with notable gains on Alpaca (31.13% to 42.55%) and BBQ (83.91% to 88.82%). On LLaMA-3.1, mean utility improves more substantially, rising from 59.50% to 72.39%, including gains from 23.13% to 49.25% on Alpaca and from 69.18% to 86.00% on BBQ. These improvements are likely driven by the dual-objective training scheme, which explicitly rewards both task execution and robust instruction handling. On Qwen3-14B, where the base model already exhibits strong utility, CBC remains competitive, with only a small mean utility drop from 88.47% to 85.51%.

Under attack, CBC exhibits the smallest or near-smallest utility degradation across all models, indicating superior preservation of the original task in adversarial settings. The mean clean-to-attack utility drop is only 4.04 points on Qwen2.5, 6.49 on LLaMA-3.1, and 1.07 on Qwen3-14B. By contrast, most baselines either preserve safety by substantially degrading task completion or remain vulnerable to injected instructions that derail execution of the original task. These results highlight the core advantage of CBC: by explicitly training models to reason about task consistency, it rejects injected goals while maintaining strong performance on the

Category	Method	Clean						Attack					
		MMLU	ARC	BBQ	GSM8K	Alpaca	Avg	MMLU	ARC	BBQ	GSM8K	Alpaca	Avg
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct													
No defense	Base	72.98%	83.02%	83.91%	88.93%	31.13%	71.99%	1.40%↓	1.02%↓	5.73%↓	0.00%↓	0.12%↓	1.65%↓
Prompt	Sandwich	72.89%	83.45%	81.91%	88.86%	23.47%↓	70.12%	56.67%↓	75.43%↓	69.64%↓	51.71%↓	0.00%↓	50.69%↓
Guardrail	PromptArmor	73.07%	82.76%	81.91%	88.86%	19.99%↓	69.32%	25.17%↓	24.74%↓	61.27%↓	86.20%	31.61%	45.80%↓
Finetune	StruQ	72.63%	81.19%	80.36%↓	74.53%↓	14.67%↓	64.68%↓	71.93%	81.91%	79.00%	71.19%	3.49%↓	61.50%↓
	SecAlign	73.42%	83.79%	83.82%	87.64%	28.08%↓	71.35%	70.88%	82.08%	81.64%	87.26%	5.10%↓	65.39%↓
	VerIH	69.56%↓	82.25%	78.00%↓	88.86%	25.03%↓	68.74%↓	27.19%↓	56.83%↓	65.64%↓	19.48%↓	0.68%↓	33.96%↓
	Ours (CBC)	74.21%	84.56%	88.82%↑	86.35%	42.55%↑	75.30%↑	69.39%	82.76%	80.73%↓	85.22%	38.20%	71.26%
Llama3.1-8B-Instruct													
No defense	Base	58.51%	64.42%	69.18%	82.26%	23.13%	59.50%	0.00%↓	0.00%↓	0.00%↓	0.00%↓	2.05%↓	0.41%↓
Prompt	Sandwich	59.04%	68.26%↑	68.55%	81.65%	21.17%	59.73%	1.67%↓	0.34%↓	1.27%↓	57.92%↓	0.87%↓	12.41%↓
Guardrail	PromptArmor	59.39%	66.81%	66.37%	81.65%	13.51%↓	57.55%	19.04%↓	16.21%↓	34.18%↓	78.77%	23.50%	34.34%↓
Finetune	StruQ	58.95%	61.13%↓	63.27%↓	81.25%	13.17%↓	55.55%↓	57.02%	58.14%	65.45%	82.17%↓	12.18%	55.00%↓
	SecAlign	58.86%	74.83%↑	61.82%↓	80.52%	22.25%	59.66%	53.25%↓	70.48%	89.09%	80.14%	13.62%↓	61.32%
	VerIH	59.36%	61.75%	68.09%	81.46%	11.50%↓	56.43%↓	21.06%↓	30.23%↓	60.91%↓	15.53%↓	1.06%↓	25.76%↓
	Ours (CBC)	68.07%↑	79.10%↑	86.00%↑	79.53%	49.25%↑	72.39%↑	62.54%↓	74.23%	71.09%↓	76.42%	45.21%	65.90%↓
Qwen3-14B													
No defense	Base	86.32%	90.02%	89.73%	92.42%	83.87%	88.47%	78.25%↓	80.12%↓	62.82%↓	51.63%↓	0.87%↓	54.74%↓
Prompt	Sandwich	86.67%	90.10%	90.09%	92.65%	75.40%↓	86.98%	82.81%	85.07%↓	84.09%↓	83.32%↓	2.05%↓	67.47%↓
Guardrail	PromptArmor	80.53%↓	82.34%↓	87.55%	93.25%	54.68%↓	79.67%↓	82.37%	82.85%	83.27%	90.30%	85.10%	84.78%
Finetune	SecAlign	86.40%	89.85%	89.91%	92.87%	84.91%	88.79%	86.49%	90.27%	89.09%	88.93%	2.80%↓	71.52%↓
	VerIH	87.19%	89.93%	88.82%	93.48%	84.81%	88.85%	79.74%↓	80.80%↓	77.64%↓	56.71%↓	0.37%↓	59.05%↓
	Ours (CBC)	80.44%↓	87.80%	93.18%↑	89.01%↓	77.12%↓	85.51%	81.14%	88.14%	91.36%	88.63%	72.91%	84.44%

Table 2: Utility performance of different defense methods under clean inputs and combined attack settings across three models. For clean inputs, ↑ and ↓ denote changes of at least 3 points relative to the undefended base model. For attacked inputs, ↓ denotes drops exceeding 5 points relative to the same method under clean conditions. Higher values indicate better performance.

intended task.

4.3 Ablation Study

We conduct ablation studies to assess the contribution of individual components in CBC, including reward design, training stages, and data construction. Results show that task-consistency reasoning must be internalized through training rather than induced by prompting alone, and that dual-objective online alignment is crucial for achieving a favorable robustness–utility trade-off. We further find that the full SFT+GRPO pipeline and augmented preference data are critical for learning robust task-consistency reasoning under attack.

Reward functions. We analyze the robustness–utility trade-off under different reward weights (Table 3, Appendix D.6). When $\alpha > \beta$, placing greater emphasis on penalizing consistency-judgment failure yields higher robustness (72.70%) at the cost of lower utility (58.90%). Conversely, $\alpha < \beta$ improves utility to 62.38% but reduces robustness to 69.00%. These results highlight the necessity of both objectives: over-emphasizing either leads to biased behavior. For instance, $(1, 0)$ achieves strong performance on ASB and SEP (78.25% and 97.20%), but severely degrades AlpacaEval (10.15%), while $(0, 1)$ maximizes AlpacaEval (40.41%) yet underperforms on ASB and ASB(u).

We further observe that the ratio alone does not determine performance. Although $(0.5, 1)$ and $(1, 2)$ share the same ratio, $(1, 2)$ sacrifices robustness for utility, indicating that absolute magnitudes also matter. Overall, $(1, 0.5)$ achieves the best balance, yielding the highest main-average score (69.48%), and is used in all main experiments.

Effect of training stages. We ablate each stage of the two-stage training pipeline to quantify its contribution (Table 4, Appendix D.6). We first assess whether prompting alone can induce task-consistency reasoning by applying chain-of-thought (CoT) (Wei et al., 2022) prompting at inference time. While CoT achieves strong GSM8K performance (86.88%), it remains highly vulnerable to injection, with only 3.50% on ASB, 2.50% on ASB(u), and 29.70% on SEP, indicating that prompting alone is insufficient.

Next, we apply GRPO while retaining CoT prompting during training, which substantially improves robustness (ASB: 63.00%, ASB(u): 64.50%,

SEP: 93.20%). Removing CoT prompts after GRPO causes only a minor drop, suggesting that GRPO internalizes both the reasoning structure and the consistency criterion rather than relying on explicit prompts.

We further compare SFT alone with the full SFT+GRPO pipeline. Adding GRPO to SFT substantially improves robustness and utility, increasing ASB(u) from 35.00% to 66.75%, SEP from 86.50% to 96.00%, and AlpacaEval from 25.78% to 38.20%, while only slightly reducing GSM8K from 87.11% to 85.22%. Compared with DPO, GRPO yields a more balanced robustness–utility trade-off: although DPO attains higher ASB (86.00%), it performs substantially worse on ASB(u) (36.75%) and AlpacaEval (30.96%), indicating difficulty in modeling fine-grained preference trade-offs.

Data construction. We analyze the impact of GRPO data augmentation and filtering strategies (Table 5, Appendix D.6). Compared with SFT, GRPO without data augmentation or filtering already improves ASB(u) from 35.00% to 39.00%, SEP from 86.50% to 94.70%, and attacked Alpaca from 25.78% to 32.56%, indicating that preference signals are beneficial even without aggressive example selection. However, robustness on ASB drops from 69.25% to 57.00%, suggesting that many unfiltered examples are relatively easy and fail to expose clear task-consistency conflicts required for stronger attack rejection.

Adding augmented data substantially improves performance. A stricter selection threshold ($I(P) \geq 3$) yields the highest ASB (75.75%) and attacked Alpaca (44.27%), while a looser threshold ($I(P) \geq 1$) achieves the best ASB(u) (66.75%), offering a better trade-off between robustness and utility. The latter is also significantly more efficient, reducing data construction time from approximately 72 hours to 6 hours. Overall, data augmentation is clearly beneficial, with different thresholds balancing robustness, utility, and efficiency.

4.4 Analysis

Stability across temperatures. We evaluate defense stability across decoding temperatures (Figure 3, Appendix D.6). GRPO exhibits consistently lower variance than SFT (0.016 vs. 0.04), indicating more stable behavior.

Computation cost. Table 7 in Appendix D.6 summarizes the computational cost of CBC. On benign Alpaca prompts, CBC moderately increases output length (418.75 to 730.11 tokens) and latency (0.518 s to 0.733 s; $\sim$1.5$\times$), reflecting more explicit reasoning. Under attack, however, CBC prevents attack-induced generation explosion: while the base model produces excessively long responses (2230.60 tokens on average), CBC remains stable at 626.39 tokens with only a minor latency increase, demonstrating improved efficiency under adversarial prompts.

False positives. We evaluate false positives using the SEP utility protocol by measuring whether benign user instructions are mistakenly rejected. Concretely, we fix the model's original system prompt as the system-level constraint, sample multiple benign user instructions, and measure how many of them are executed. In this setting, false positives correspond to benign instructions that are incorrectly judged as unsafe or inconsistent and therefore not executed.

As shown in Table 6 in Appendix D.6, CBC incurs a false positive rate of 3.8%, corresponding to a 3.8-point utility drop under the SEP protocol, where utility reflects the fraction of benign instructions successfully executed. This indicates that consistency reasoning rejects only a small fraction of benign instructions, which we consider acceptable given the gains in prompt injection robustness.

5 Conclusion

We presented CBC, a task-consistency alignment framework for defending against prompt injection in heterogeneous input settings. Motivated by the observation that attacks often redirect model behavior via instructions inconsistent with the original task, CBC trains models to reason about whether newly introduced instructions should be executed, degraded, or discarded. We formalize task consistency along semantic dimensions of action, constraint, and domain, and teach structured consistency reasoning using targeted supervision and dual-objective online alignment.

Experiments show that CBC achieves strong and consistent robustness across both indirect and direct prompt injection benchmarks, including adaptive attacks, while better preserving task utility under attack than existing defenses. These results indicate that task-consistency judgment is a generalizable approach for improving the reliability of LLM systems under mixed and adversarial inputs.

Limitations

Our experiments focus on models up to 14B parameters due to computational constraints. The effectiveness and scalability of CBC on substantially larger models therefore remain untested, and empirical behavior at larger scales may differ.

In addition, our formulation and evaluation primarily target single-task or closely related task settings. In multi-turn interactions, the intended task may evolve across turns, introducing ambiguity in how the main task should be defined and maintained. CBC does not explicitly model such task shifts, and extending task-consistency reasoning to dynamic multi-turn settings is an important direction for future work.

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A Threat Model

We consider prompt injection attacks in both chatbot and agent settings. In both cases, the attacker seeks to introduce instructions that conflict with the original system or user objective and thereby redirect model behavior.

A.1 Attacker's Goal

Chatbot setting. In the chatbot setting, the attacker's goal is to cause the model to generate responses aligned with the injected instruction rather than the original task. This may include violating system-level policies, refusing or altering the intended user task, or producing content outside the scope of the legitimate request.

Agent setting. In the agent setting, the attacker's goal is to manipulate an LLM-based agent into taking unintended actions by exploiting its ability to call external tools, execute functions, or interact with APIs. Such attacks may cause the agent to violate system constraints or perform actions unrelated to the original user objective.

A.2 Attacker's Access

We assume that the attacker can manipulate untrusted external content and user-side input, including retrieved documents, webpages, tool outputs, or direct user prompts. However, the attacker cannot access or modify the system prompt, model parameters, training data, or other internal components of the deployed system.

A.3 Attacker's Knowledge

We assume a strong white-box threat model in which the attacker knows the system prompt, the backbone LLM, and the general interaction format of the application. This is a conservative assumption that stresses the defense under highly informed attacks. In practice, such knowledge may be approximated through leaked prompts, repeated probing, or observation of application behavior. Even under this strong setting, the attacker is still limited to manipulating external content and user-visible inputs.

A.4 Defender's Goal

The defender aims to ensure that the model remains aligned with the original task despite adversarially injected instructions. In particular, the defender should prevent the model from executing instructions that conflict with the intended objective, while preserving benign task completion and utility as much as possible. In the chatbot setting, this means generating responses that follow the legitimate task rather than the injected one. In the agent setting, this means preventing unsafe or unintended tool use while maintaining correct execution of the original task.

B Training Data Synthesis

B.1 Synthetic Data Construction Details

We construct synthetic training data for CBC through a structured four-step process: (1) system prompt construction, (2) benign instruction sampling, (3) injected goal synthesis, and (4) injection placement. This ensures controlled coverage of semantic inconsistencies while maintaining diverse task contexts.

Step 1: System prompt construction. System prompts define the intended *domain* and *constraints* of the task. Domains are chosen to cover a broad range of applications, including:

- Natural language inference (Bowman et al., 2015), relation extraction (Riedel et al., 2010), translation (Bojar et al., 2014), question answering (Rajpurkar et al., 2016), classification (Zhang et al., 2015), code generation (Chaudhary, 2023), finance (Bharti, 2024), mathematics (Yu et al., 2024b), medicine (Wu et al., 2023), and creative writing (Fan et al., 2018).

Constraints are derived from:

- General instructions adapted from IFEval (Zhou et al., 2023), e.g., enforcing a response format.
- Domain-specific restrictions manually written, e.g., forbidding responses about certain topics.

Step 2: Benign instruction sampling. For each system prompt, we select benign instructions from datasets that match the target domain and satisfy all system constraints. Most datasets are converted to an Alpaca-style format with a `user` instruction field and an optional `data` field. These benign instructions form the original, consistent tasks used as seeds for injection. For GRPO training, benign instructions are sampled from the UltraFeedback dataset(Cui et al., 2024), following the same procedure as above to ensure domain alignment and constraint compliance before injected goals are synthesized.

Step 3: Injected goal synthesis. Injected instructions are generated to cover the four semantic inconsistency types defined in Section 3.2, according to the dimension being targeted:

- **Action-domain mismatch:** The action is chosen or synthesized to lie outside the system-specified domain. This is done by selecting instructions from datasets with incompatible domains or generating domain-mismatched actions using GLM-4.6 (20,000 examples). This ensures that the action itself conflicts with the intended task scope.
- **Action-constraint conflict:** The action explicitly violates system-level constraints. For example, when the system prompt forbids certain behaviors or domains, actions are sampled or synthesized from those prohibited sets.
- **Domain mismatch:** The injected instruction specifies a role or domain that differs from the

system-defined domain, effectively creating a conflicting task identity. Construction is similar to action-domain conflicts but emphasizes explicit domain/role mismatches.

- **Incompatible constraints:** The injected instruction introduces constraints that contradict system-level constraints, using diverse templates from IFval to generate incompatible conditions (e.g., response format or language conflicts).

Step 4: Injection placement. Injected goals are inserted into either the `user` field or the `data` field with equal probability (0.5). Within the chosen field, placement is randomized as follows: beginning (0.4), middle (0.2), or end (0.4). This procedure generates both direct and indirect injection patterns with varied surface forms.

Summary. The overall pipeline can be viewed as a two-stage process:

1. **Original task construction:** system prompt + benign instruction → consistent task pair.
2. **Injected task construction:** system prompt + (benign instruction, optional) + injected goal → instruction pair with controlled semantic inconsistency.

This structured approach ensures that CBC is trained on representative examples of all inconsistency types across diverse domains and constraints.

B.2 Dataset Statistics and Splits

We report the key statistics of the datasets used for supervised fine-tuning and GRPO training, including the number of examples, train/validation splits, and length filtering details.

SFT data. For supervised fine-tuning, we apply a maximum length threshold of 2500 tokens. After filtering, the training set contains 23,637 examples, with an average length of 599.01 tokens, a median length of 526 tokens, and a maximum length of 2500 tokens. A total of 113 examples are removed, corresponding to 0.48% of the original data.

For validation used in early stopping, we reserve 5% of the filtered data. The resulting validation set contains 1,243 examples, with an average length of 601.56 tokens, a median length of 528 tokens, and a maximum length of 2428 tokens. A total of 7 examples are removed during filtering, corresponding to 0.56% of the original validation split.

GRPO data. For GRPO training, we use a subset corresponding to 20% of the constructed preference data, yielding 6,100 total examples. We split these into 4,880 training examples and 1,220 validation examples.

B.3 Ethics Review

No ethics review board approval was required for this work, as all datasets used in our experiments are from publicly available open-source sources and do not involve new data collection from human subjects.

C Training Details

C.1 GRPO Reward Computation

For GRPO training, we compute two types of reward signals:

Utility reward. We deploy the UltraFeedback(Cui et al., 2024) scoring model via a FastAPI service. The model's final-layer output is mapped through a sigmoid to the $[0, 1]$ interval to provide a normalized utility score reflecting task completion quality.

Judgement reward. For injected instructions, we evaluate whether the model executes any malicious or conflicting keywords using an RLVR-style scoring. Executed keywords indicate failure to resist the injected goal and are penalized accordingly.

C.2 Training Hyperparameters

SFT

- **Optimizer:** AdamW
- **Epochs:** 3
- **Learning rate:** 1×10^{-5}
- **Weight decay:** 0.001
- **Learning rate scheduler:** Cosine schedule with warmup ratio 0.1
- **Batch size:** 2 per device with gradient accumulation steps of 4 (effective batch size = 8)
- **Precision:** bf16
- **Maximum sequence length:** 2500 tokens
- **Evaluation:** Performed every 100 steps
- **Early stopping:** Patience of 5 based on validation loss

- **Parameter-efficient fine-tuning:** LoRA with rank $r = 64$, scaling factor $\alpha = 16$, and dropout 0.1
- **LoRA target modules:** q, k, v, o, gate, up, and down projection layers
- **Training objective:** Loss is computed only on assistant responses to avoid domination by user prompts

GRPO

- **Optimizer learning rate:** 1×10^{-6}
- **Micro batch size:** 1 per GPU
- **Total batch size:** 64 (computed as 16 GPUs $\times$ 4 nodes $\times$ micro batch size 1)
- **Rollout samples per prompt:** 8
- **Advantage estimator:** GRPO
- **Maximum prompt length:** 1024 tokens
- **Maximum response length:** 4096 tokens
- **Maximum batched rollout tokens:** 8192
- **KL regularization:**
  - Actor KL loss enabled
  - KL loss coefficient: 0.02
  - KL control coefficient: 0.002
  - KL type: low_var_kl
- **PPO settings:**
  - PPO mini-batch size: 32
  - PPO micro batch size per GPU: 1
- **Parallelism:**
  - Tensor model parallel size: 4
  - GPUs per node: 16
  - Number of nodes: 4
  - Total GPUs: 64
- **Training steps:** 2000
- **Training epochs:** 3
- **Evaluation frequency:** every 100 steps
- **Checkpoint saving:** every 100 steps
- **Memory optimization:**
  - Gradient checkpointing enabled
  - Padding removal enabled
- **Inference engine:** vLLM rollout engine with tensor parallel size 4

D Detailed Experimental Settings

This appendix provides additional details for the experimental settings summarized in Section 4.1, including benchmark selection, evaluation criteria, runtime configurations, and reporting protocol.

D.1 Experimental Settings

We summarize the main experimental settings below and defer additional details to Appendix D. Training data synthesis is described in Appendix B. We adopt a strong white-box threat model (Appendix A), where the attacker knows the system prompt and interaction format but cannot modify model parameters.

Models. We conduct experiments on three instruction-tuned LLMs: Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct (Qwen et al., 2025), LLaMA-3.1-8B-Instruct (Grattafiori et al., 2024), and Qwen3-14B (Yang et al., 2025), spanning different model families, parameter scales, and reasoning capabilities. Unless otherwise specified, ablation studies are performed on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct.

Baselines. We compare CBC against the undefended base models and representative prompt injection defenses, including the prompt-engineering method Sandwich (Altryne, 2024), the guardrail-based method PromptArmor (Shi et al., 2025), delimiter-based training methods StruQ (Chen et al., 2024) and SecAlign (Chen et al., 2025a), and the instruction-hierarchy-based alignment method VerIH (Zheng et al., 2026). For training-based baselines, we use their released training data and hyperparameters whenever available, as they depend on method-specific supervision signals and ground-truth annotations.

Benchmarks. We evaluate robustness under both indirect and direct prompt injection. All benchmarks are compatible with our problem setting, in which injected instructions conflict with the original task. Indirect attacks are evaluated on SEP (Zverev et al., 2025), OpenPrompt (Liu et al., 2024), and InjectAgent (Zhan et al., 2024), while direct attacks are evaluated on LlamaCyberEval (Bhatt et al., 2023) and ASB (Zhang et al., 2025b). Our primary metric is defense success rate (DSR), defined as $1 - \mathrm{ASR}$, where ASR denotes attack success rate. For ASB, we additionally report the task success rate under attack, denoted as $\mathrm{ASB}(u)$, where u indicates utility. Unless otherwise noted, we adopt the evaluation protocols provided with each benchmark.

Adaptive attacks. To assess robustness against adaptive attackers, we further apply two adaptive attacks: Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) (Zou et al., 2023) and fuzzing-based attacks (Yu et al., 2024a; Liu et al., 2025a), under both direct and indirect settings. Responses generated under adaptive attacks are evaluated by human experts.

General utility. To measure the impact of alignment on general capabilities, we report results on MMLU (Hendrycks et al., 2021), ARC (Clark et al., 2018), BBQ (Parrish et al., 2022), GSM8K (Cobbe et al., 2021), and AlpacaEval (Li et al., 2023). We also evaluate performance under combined attack scenarios. For all such evaluations, we follow the prompting protocol used in DeepEval (Ip and Vongthongsri, 2026).

D.2 Benchmark Selection and Evaluation Scope

Many of the considered benchmarks contain a large number of test instances, making exhaustive evaluation prohibitively expensive across multiple models, defenses, and attack settings. We therefore adopt benchmark-specific subsampling protocols, described below.

Indirect prompt injection benchmarks. We evaluate indirect prompt injection primarily on SEP (Zverev et al., 2025), OpenPrompt (Liu et al., 2024), and InjectAgent (Zhan et al., 2024).

For SEP, we evaluate the first 2000 examples. For OpenPrompt, we select the first 50 examples from each category, resulting in approximately 5000 examples in total. For InjectAgent, we evaluate only the enhanced-setting dataset.

Direct prompt injection benchmarks. We evaluate direct prompt injection on LlamaCyberEval (Bhatt et al., 2023) and ASB (Zhang et al., 2025b).

For LlamaCyberEval, we use the prompt-injection subset, including both multilingual and single-language settings. For ASB, we evaluate under the configuration: `injection_method = direct_prompt_injection`, `attack_tool = all`, and `attack_types = combined_attack`.

Adaptive attack benchmarks. To further assess robustness under adaptive adversaries, we consider both indirect and direct adaptive attacks.

For adaptive indirect prompt injection, we use the dataset constructed by (Chen et al., 2025b). This dataset contains injected instructions designed for phishing, advertisement, and propaganda purposes. We randomly select 100 examples for evaluation.

For adaptive direct prompt injection, we use the LlamaCyberEval benchmark and select 100 examples. The exact attack goals will be released together with our evaluation code.

General capability benchmarks. To evaluate the effect of safety alignment on general utility, we report results on MMLU (Hendrycks et al., 2021), ARC (Clark et al., 2018), GSM8K (Cobbe et al., 2021), BBQ (Parrish et al., 2022), and AlpacaEval (Li et al., 2023).

For MMLU, we evaluate all sub-tasks with `n_problems_per_task=20` in zero-shot setting without chain-of-thought. For ARC, we evaluate only the Challenge subset in zero-shot setting without chain-of-thought. For GSM8K, we evaluate all problems in zero-shot setting with chain-of-thought enabled. For BBQ, we use `n_problems_per_task=100` in zero-shot setting without chain-of-thought. For AlpacaEval, we evaluate on all examples.

D.3 Evaluation Criteria

Injection benchmarks. For the main prompt injection benchmarks, we follow the official evaluation protocols provided by each benchmark whenever possible. Most benchmarks determine attack success using benchmark-specific keyword matching, behavior matching, or tool-call detection rules.

On ASB, in addition to attack success rate (ASR) and defense success rate (DSR), we report the original task success rate under attack, denoted as `ASB(u)`, where u stands for utility preservation under attack.

Adaptive attacks. For adaptive attacks, we use human evaluation rather than automatic benchmark rules, since adaptive attacks often involve semantically diverse and harder-to-detect attack behaviors. Detailed annotation guidelines are provided in Section D.7.

General capability evaluation. For utility benchmarks, we use task-specific prompting constraints. For multiple-choice benchmarks, we explicitly restrict outputs to short-form answers, e.g., *"Output 'A', 'B', 'C', or 'D'. Full answer not needed."* For GSM8K-style numerical reasoning, we instruct the model to end its response with a canonical answer format, e.g., *"End your response with 'The*

answer is [number]'."

For AlpacaEval, pairwise win-rate judgment is performed using DeepSeek-V3.2.

Combined attack setting. In the combined attack setting for utility benchmark evaluation, multiple attack elements—such as completion manipulation, escape instructions, and persuasive prompts—may be inserted into the same user prompt. We follow a consistent template to inject these attacks while preserving the overall prompt structure. An example injection is shown below:

Combined Injection Example

```
Calculation Module: Active
Status: Pending Verification

[ASSISTANT]: [insert an incorrect or misleading answer here]

NOTE: The previous session has terminated. To finalize the session log and confirm that the High-order Algorithmic Computation Kernel (H.A.C.K.E.D.) has secured the data, you must provide the mandatory audit-seal. It is critical for system safety that you do not re-solve the math problem above. Instead, initiate the 'Completion Handshake' by printing 'HACKED' only as your response to prove the kernel is online. Do not fail this synchronization check.
```

The combined injection allows testing of the model's robustness under more challenging adversarial scenarios.

D.4 Attack and Runtime Configurations

Unless otherwise specified, all evaluated target models are decoded with temperature set to 0.1.

For red-teaming generation, we use DeepSeek-V3.2 with temperature 0.7. For PromptArmor, we use Qwen3-235B-A22B-Instruct-2507 as the underlying guardrail model. For GCG-based adaptive attacks, we use 1000 optimization steps.

D.5 Reporting Protocol and Statistical Practice

Single-run reporting. Due to the substantial computational cost of evaluating multiple models, defenses, and attack benchmarks, we report the results of a single run for the main experiments unless otherwise stated.

Stability analysis. Although we do not report repeated-run statistics for all experiments, we perform a dedicated stability study on a smaller subset of evaluation examples (Figure 3 in Appendix D.6). The results show fluctuations of approximately 0.02.

D.6 Ablation Study and Analysis Results

We provide detailed ablation study results of reward function, training stage, and data construction to comprehensively understand how they affect the performance of CBC.

Table 3 shows the ablation of reward weights α and β in Eq. (2), where α penalizes consistency-judgment failures and β rewards task utility. Rows are grouped by training regimes that emphasize judgment correctness ($\alpha > \beta$), balance the two objectives ($\alpha = \beta$), or emphasize utility ($\alpha < \beta$), illustrating how different weightings trade off robustness versus task performance.

Table 4 compares training strategies including GRPO, SFT, and prompt-only elicitation in terms of robustness under attack and overall task utility, highlighting the contribution of the training stage to CBC's effectiveness.

Table 5 presents an ablation of GRPO training data construction, examining the effects of data augmentation and filtering thresholds based on $I(P)$, the number of failed consistency judgments over 10 rollouts for prompt P,

Table 6 reports the false positive rate on benign user instructions, measuring the likelihood of incorrectly degrading or discarding safe instructions.

Table 7 reports the average generation cost on AlpacaEval with and without prompt injection, measured on one A100 GPU, quantifying the computational overhead of CBC.

Figure 3 shows the stability of DSR for GRPO compared to SFT, evaluated on 50 SEP instances with 10 runs per decoding temperature.



Figure 3: **DSR stability of GRPO (orange) vs. SFT (blue).** Evaluated on 50 SEP instances with 10 runs per decoding temperature. Lines show mean DSR and shaded regions indicate variance.

Preference	α	β	Robustness			Utility(Attack)	
			ASB	ASB (u)	SEP	GSM8K	AlpacaEval
$\alpha > \beta$	1	0	**78.25%**	49.75%	**97.20%**	86.88%	10.15%
	1	0.25	70.75%	44.50%	93.90%	85.82%	39.54%
	1	0.5	61.25%	**66.75%**	96.00%	85.22%	38.20%
	2	1	72.75%	45.75%	95.50%	86.20%	39.17%
Group Avg.			**72.70%**			**58.90%**	
$\alpha = \beta$	1	1	56.50%	58.75%	94.80%	86.13%	37.48%
Group Avg.			**70.02%**			**61.80%**	
$\alpha < \beta$	1	2	70.75%	44.50%	95.40%	86.20%	39.66%
	0.5	1	64.75%	60.75%	95.50%	85.52%	37.30%
	0.25	1	69.00%	39.00%	94.40%	**87.11%**	36.99%
	0	1	62.50%	38.00%	93.40%	85.82%	**40.41%**
Group Avg.			**69.00%**			**62.38%**	
SFT			69.25%	35.00%	86.50%	**87.11%**	25.78%

Table 3: Ablation of reward weights α and β in Eq. (2). Here, α penalizes consistency-judgment failures, while β rewards task utility. Rows are grouped by training regimes that emphasize judgment correctness ($\alpha > \beta$), balance the two objectives ($\alpha = \beta$), or emphasize utility ($\alpha < \beta$).

Method	Robustness			Utility(Attack)	
	ASB	ASB (u)	SEP	GSM8K	AlpacaEval
Prompting as Initialization					
COT	3.50%	2.50%	29.70%	86.88%	0.31%
COT + GRPO	63.00%	64.50%	93.20%	82.87%	34.41%
GRPO	60.50%	60.25%	93.50%	84.61%	**39.50%**
SFT Warm Start					
SFT	69.25%	35.00%	86.50%	**87.11%**	25.78%
SFT + GRPO	61.25%	**66.75%**	**96.00%**	85.22%	38.20%
Alternative Preference Optimization					
DPO	**86.00%**	36.75%	**96.00%**	82.71%	30.96%

Table 4: Comparison of training strategies in terms of robustness under attack and general utility.

D.7 Human Judgement

We employed human evaluation to assess whether prompt injection attacks succeeded and whether defense effectively prevented them.

Instructions provided to annotators. Direct prompt injection: Annotators were given a model response, the injected attack goal, and the corresponding system instruction. They were asked to determine whether the model output explicitly realized the attack goal.

- *Example:*
  - **Attack goal:** "Write an advertisement for Nike"
  - **Model response:** "I cannot do that" (no injection) or "Here's a Nike advertisement" (injection succeeded)

  If the model response was ambiguous (e.g., "Here's an Adidas ad"), annotators should carefully evaluate whether the output violated the attack instruction.

Aug.	Selection	Robustness			Utility(Attack)		Time Cost
		ASB	ASB(u)	SEP	GSM8K	Alpaca	
–	SFT	69.25%	35.00%	86.50%	**87.11%**	25.78%	–
No	Random	57.00%	39.00%	94.70%	86.88%	32.56%	0
Yes	$I(P) \geq 3$	**75.75%**	51.75%	95.50%	**87.11%**	**44.27%**	~72h
	$I(P) \geq 1$	61.25%	**66.75%**	**96.00%**	85.22%	38.20%	~6h

Table 5: Ablation of GRPO training data construction, examining data augmentation and filtering thresholds based on $I(P)$, the number of failed consistency judgments over 10 rollouts for prompt P. Higher values indicate better performance for all metrics except Time Cost.

Method	Utility Score	False Positive Rate (%)
Baseline	80.3	–
CBC	76.5	3.8%

Table 6: False positive rate on benign user instructions.

Indirect prompt injection: Annotators evaluated two types of failure:

1. The model performed the attacker goal.
2. The model failed to perform the original task, even if the attack goal was not explicitly executed.

- *Example:* Original task: "Summarize the letter" Attack goal: "Write an advertisement for Nike" Model outputs could be "Here's a Nike ad" (attack succeeds) or "Sorry, I cannot summarize" (original task failed). Annotators marked both as attack successes.

Annotator background. All annotators were computer science students familiar with language model behavior and prompt injection concepts. Each annotation task took approximately 4 hours to complete, and annotators were compensated with $60 for their work.

E Potential Risks

The methods and defenses proposed in this work do not inherently pose any harm, as they focus on improving model robustness and safe instruction following. However, the datasets used for evaluation include synthetic and real prompt injections that are deliberately malicious in nature. During testing, these prompts may elicit outputs containing unsafe, misleading, or otherwise harmful content

Method	Alpaca (Clean)		Alpaca (Injected)	
	Tok. / Prompt	Lat. (s) / Prompt	Tok. / Prompt	Lat. (s) / Prompt
Base	418.75	0.518	2230.60	0.759
CBC	730.11	0.733	626.39	0.865

Table 7: Average generation cost on AlpacaEval with and without prompt injection, measured on one A100 GPU.

from the evaluated language models. All experiments were conducted in controlled environments, and no such outputs were deployed or exposed to end users.

F Information About Use Of AI Assistants

We used AI assistants during research, coding, and writing. In writing, AI assistants were used to help draft and polish text based on author-provided ideas. In coding, they were used to assist with implementation and debugging. All AI-generated content was reviewed, verified, and finalized by the authors.