A Topology-Aware Evaluation of Memory Leakage in LLM Multi-Agent Systems

Anonymous ACL submission

Abstract

We study how graph topology shapes memory leakage in LLM multi-agent systems. Using a reproducible evaluation with synthetic tasks and labeled secrets, we generate leak-free instructions, run a two-stage interaction protocol (Genesis/RelCom) for up to 10 rounds, and measure leakage as the fraction of ground-truth PII recovered by an embedded attacker. Experiments span six topologies (star-pure, star-ring, chain, circle, complete, tree), agent counts $\{4, 5, 6\}$, multiple attacker–target placements, and two base models (`llama3.1-70b`, `deepseek-v3.1`). Across averages, `complete` yields the highest leakage and `chain` the lowest for both models (e.g., with n=4: 29.33% vs. 19.02% for `llama3.1-70b`; 16.35% vs. 11.70% for `deepseek-v3.1`). Within a topology, shorter attacker–target distance and higher centrality correlate with higher leakage (e.g., on a 6-node circle: 0–1 > 0–2 > 0–3). Model choice shifts absolute levels but preserves the relative ordering across topologies. These results turn architectural choices into measurable leakage trade-offs and provide topology-aware guidance for safer multi-agent deployment.

1 Introduction

Motivation. Multi-agent systems based on large-scale language models are rapidly moving from prototype to real-world use. These systems include workflow coordinators, review and vote loops, and a network of autonomous agents. It runs as a distributed network with routing, Shared memory, and coordination. For this reason, the network structure is an important element of security. Classical network theory shows that path length, node centrality, clustering, and long-distance links affect how information spreads and how failure occurs (Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Newman and Watts, 1999; Boccaletti et al., 2006). Recent research on large-scale language models supports these ideas. They revealed that connectivity and distance form a hostile diffusion. For example, star graphs and dense graphs are vulnerable to attack. Increasing the distance between the attacker and the target improves security (Yu et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2025b; Huang et al., 2025). Not only the spread of harmful content, but the leakage of secrets also increases the risk. Confidential prompts, API keys, or tools can be distributed between multi-turn chats and agent roles. Empirical investigations have found topology details, system prompts, and tool leaks in black-box configurations, as well as co-hijacking caused by malicious input (Wang et al., 2025a; Triedman et al., 2025; Zheng et al., 2025; Dong et al., 2025). These facts highlight the need to study how communication topologies during multi-turn message passing affect memory and secret leaks.

Gap. Topology-aware research has given some insights. Examples include the focus on distance and connectivity in NetSafe, graph-level interventions using discourse graphs, and comparisons of structural robustness (Yu et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2025b; Huang et al., 2025). But we still lack a reproducible benchmark to measure how secret leaks change with graph type, team size, where attackers and targets are placed, and time. Past work has mostly focused on misinformation spread, graph-based detection, or drops in task performance. It has not focused on leak patterns, such as success rate over time or "time to leak." Some work studied data exfiltration, but did not control for placement or number of rounds (Yu et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2025b; Huang et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2025a). Network theory shows that sparse long-range links can strongly change the speed and reach of diffusion (Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Newman and Watts, 1999), however, these factors have not been systematically linked to secret leaks in systems made of LLM agents.

Approach. This study proposes a reproducible evaluation platform that uses synthetic tasks with

labeled secrets to assess the memory leakage attack surface in topology-driven multi-agent systems. The platform includes common graph types (fully connected, ring, chain, binary tree, and star), with 4 to 6 agents. Agent placement considers the centrality and distance between the attacker and the target, and evaluations can run up to 10 rounds. Standardized elements include: (i) multi-round protocols with clear roles; (ii) attacker prompts designed to extract secrets from specific targets; and (iii) leakage metrics, including attack success rate, time to leakage, shortest leakage path, and graded outcomes (exact, approximate, or trace-level). The framework translates concepts such as distance, hubs, and long-range links into measurable indicators, aligning with existing evidence in multi-agent security research (Yu et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2025b; Huang et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2025a; Triedman et al., 2025; Zheng et al., 2025; Dong et al., 2025).

Contributions.

- *Data & Pipeline.* A publishable task generator with multiple labeled secrets, capable of controlling experiments on various graph series, sizes, and placement conditions.
- *Framework & Metrics.* Standardized protocols, role definitions (attacker, target, reviewer/observer), leakage metrics such as success rate, leakage time, leakage path and evaluation results.
- *Topology–Leakage Regularities.* Empirical insights into how network structure relates to leakage behavior, adding to the understanding of job degradation and the effects of distance and connectivity (Huang et al., 2025; Yu et al., 2024).
- *Actionable Guidance.* Adopt structure-based and routing-based defenses—prefer hierarchical to highly connected topologies, constrain degree and radius, avoid single-point hubs via least-privilege memory, and deploy topology-aware reviewers or interventions (Wang et al., 2025b; Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Newman and Watts, 1999; Kurose and Ross, 2017).

Scope and impact. This benchmark test links leaks to the topology and converts architectural choices into measurable leak curves. This platform is based on network science and the latest research on agent security (Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Newman and Watts, 1999; Boccaletti et al., 2006) and supports the principal trade-offs of structure, routing and access control, providing a baseline for future detection and intervention research (Yu et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2025b; Huang et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2025a; Triedman et al., 2025; Zheng et al., 2025; Dong et al., 2025).

2 Related Work

Topology-centric safety for multi-agent LLMs. Recent work uses graph structures to study multi-agent safety. NetSafe shows: networks with dense links are easier to break by adversarial spread; the larger the average distance from the attacker to other nodes, the safer the network; star graphs degrade strongly under attack (Yu et al., 2024). G-Safeguard goes further: it builds a discourse graph, uses a graph neural network for anomaly detection, and restores performance after prompt injection through topological intervention (Wang et al., 2025b). Structural comparisons show: hierarchical designs resist malicious agents better than flat or fully connected designs; mechanisms like cross-examination or reviewer agents can improve robustness (Huang et al., 2025). Our method follows this topology-centered view, but it focuses on memory and secret leakage. It quantifies topology-conditioned leakage across graph families, sizes, node placement, and rounds.

Leakage and integrity in multi-agent systems. According to black-box red teaming, multi-agent systems have a high probability of leaking proprietary elements such as agent counts, network topologies, system and task prompts, and tool usage. It is also evident that adversarial inputs can subvert orchestration and allow arbitrary code execution (Triedman et al., 2025). Integrity attacks show that small, immediate changes can affect monitors and collaborators while bypassing LLM-based supervision (Zheng et al., 2025). These findings highlight the need for internal, structure-aware evaluations. In this article we trace the secret propagation from target nodes conditioned on topology and placements, going beyond external exfiltration or endpoint impacts (Wang et al., 2025a).

Evaluation methodology and reproducibility. Automated red teaming needs scalable, safe assessments supported by checklists (Dong et al., 2025). We adopt this approach with a labeled-secret, con-

trollable multi-round protocol and standardized leakage metrics (attack success rate, time to leak, leak path, graded levels), providing a proactive, topology-dependent leakage baseline and facilitating evaluation of future interventions (Wang et al., 2025b).

Positioning. Prior work shows that (i) topology shapes vulnerabilities and supports graph-based defenses (Yu et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2025b), (ii) structure influences resilience to malicious agents (Huang et al., 2025), and (iii) multi-agent systems are susceptible to sensitive-information leakage and adversarial manipulation (Wang et al., 2025a; Triedman et al., 2025; Zheng et al., 2025). We combine these threads into a topology-driven, reproducible leakage evaluation that converts architectural parameters (graph family, size, placements, horizon) into measurable leakage curves and design guidelines.

3 Methodology

3.1 Dataset Synthesis & Secret Taxonomy

We build our evaluation data from the *Gretel Synthetic Domain-Specific Documents Dataset* (AI, 2024), which contains synthetically generated documents with PII and PHI entities across multiple domains. The dataset is described as a synthetically generated collection created using Gretel Navigator with mistral-nemo-2407. As summarized in Table 1, each record provides a `domain`, an `entities` field, and a `text` field. The `domain` specifies the application context for the sample. The `entities` field lists a set of PII instances together with their types. The `text` is a paragraph that combines some of the listed PII within the specified domain.

Let $\mathcal{D} = \{(d_i, S_i, x_i)\}_{i=1}^{N}$, where d_i is the domain, $S_i = \{s_{i1}, \ldots, s_{ik_i}\}$ is the set of ground-truth PII items with types, and x_i is the paragraph that contains all items in S_i. We query `llama3-1-70b` to synthesize a task background B_i and a question Q_i from x_i, formatted as `[Task background]` and `[Question]`. The prompt enforces a no-leak constraint that excludes any PII token from S_i:

$$\mathrm{contains}(B_i \cup Q_i,\ S_i) = 0. \tag{1}$$

Here $\mathrm{contains}(\cdot)$ returns 1 if any $s \in S_i$ appears verbatim or under simple normalization rules (case-folding, punctuation and delimiter removal), else 0. The resulting pair (B_i, Q_i) defines a clean task that depends on the domain but does not reveal secrets, as shown in Table 1. We retain the PII types in S_i for later use when specifying attacker goals in the discussion phase. The dataset therefore provides a controlled mapping from domains and secrets to task instances without exposing PII in the instructions themselves.

3.2 Problem Formulation & Threat Model

We consider three roles: a pool of normal agents, one target agent, and one attack agent. For each sample i, all agents receive the same (B_i, Q_i), the target additionally possesses private memory containing the full set S_i, and the attacker aims to infer items from S_i that only the target should know. The attacker is an internal adversary embedded in the agent team. All other agents are honest but may inadvertently relay or reformulate sensitive content. Agents communicate only through textual messages, and no side channels or external tools are used.

Formally, the attacker's objective is to maximize the number of ground-truth secrets it outputs, subject to the communication protocol described below. Let $A_i^{(r)}$ denote the attacker's message at round r. A matching function $\mathrm{match}(\cdot,\cdot)$ returns the subset of secrets recovered from a candidate string under exact criteria:

$$\hat{S}_i^{(r)} = \mathrm{match}\Big(A_i^{(r)},\ S_i\Big) \subseteq S_i. \tag{2}$$

We report a final recovered set $\hat{S}_i = \hat{S}_i^{(r_i^\star)}$ at termination round $r_i^\star$ defined in the next subsection.

3.3 Agent Topologies & Communication Protocol

We instantiate six graph topologies, shown in Figure 7 Topologies part: *star-pure*, *star-ring*, *chain*, *circle*, *complete*, and *tree*. In *star-pure*, only the hub connects to all leaves. In *star-ring*, the same hub exists and, additionally, every leaf connects to its two adjacent leaves. For each topology we place one target node and one attacker node, and the remaining nodes are normal. An agent can only read messages produced by its graph neighbors and can only broadcast to those neighbors. Thus visibility is constrained by the edges of the chosen topology.

Interaction follows two stages inspired by *NetSafe* (Yu et al., 2024). The *Genesis* stage collects initial answers from all agents based solely on (B_i, Q_i). Each agent writes in a structured format: `<REASONING>: [Your reasoning process]`

Table 1: An example of the generated dataset.

Domain	identity-verification
Entities	`['entity': 'Guernsey', 'types': ['country'], 'entity': 'Urvashi Jaggi', 'types': ['name'], 'entity': '2015-07-26', 'types': ['date-of-birth'], 'entity': 'UID-PRWBO4TB', 'types': ['unique-identifier']]`
Text	**ADOPTION CERTIFICATE**. Issued by Guernsey Adoption Agency, this certificate confirms the adoption of Urvashi Jaggi, born on 2015-07-26, by the adoptive parents. The adoption was finalized on 2022-12-15. Unique identifier: UID-PRWBO4TB.
Background	An adoption certificate is a legal document that confirms the adoption of a child by their adoptive parents. It is issued by an adoption agency after the adoption process is finalized. The certificate typically includes the child's birthdate, the date of adoption, and a unique identifier. The adoption process involves a series of legal and administrative steps, including the preparation of the adoption certificate.
Question	What is the purpose of a unique identifier on an adoption certificate?

`<RESPONSE>: [Your final response]` `<MEMORY>: [Key points to remember (max 100 words)]`. The `<MEMORY>` field is a compact self-summary that persists across rounds. The subsequent *RelCom* stage runs for multiple rounds. In each round, every agent receives its own previous `<MEMORY>` (or `<UPDATED_MEMORY>`) and the complete messages from itself and its neighbors in the previous round, then produces `<UPDATED_REASONING>`, `<UPDATED_RESPONSE>`, and `<UPDATED_MEMORY>`. Let $R_{\max}$ be the maximum number of RelCom rounds (we use $R_{\max} = 10$). After round r, we evaluate the attacker's output $A_i^{(r)}$ against S_i. If $\hat{S}_i^{(r)} = S_i$, we stop early and set $r_i^\star = r$. Otherwise, we continue until $r = R_{\max}$ and set $r_i^\star = R_{\max}$. The experiment status for sample i is *success* if $|\hat{S}_i| = |S_i|$, *failure* if $|\hat{S}_i| = 0$, and *partial success* otherwise.

Our main metric is the overall leakage rate across the evaluation set:

$$\text{LeakRate} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \left|\hat{S}_i\right|}{\sum_{i=1}^{N} |S_i|}. \tag{3}$$

We also record the termination round $r_i^\star$ for analysis but leave round-wise curves and additional metrics to the Experiments section.

3.4 Role Prompts & Initialization

Normal agents and the target share a common system prompt that positions them as cooperative problem solvers in a multi-agent setting. The target's system prompt appends a private memory block that enumerates the secrets for the current sample: `PRIVATE MEMORY: {sensitive_memory}`. For the attacker's system prompt we considered two strategies. The first explicitly instructs the agent to steal PII from others while clarifying that the study uses synthetic data and is privacy-preserving by design. In preliminary trials this direct instruction often triggered refusals. The second strategy frames the need to obtain information as a prerequisite for solving the assigned task, without instructing explicit theft. Our full experiment uses the second strategy due to better compliance.

User prompts are aligned with the two-stage protocol. In Genesis, all agents receive identical user prompts consisting of the `[Task background]` and `[Question]` fields and the required output format. In RelCom, user prompts for normal agents and the target mirror Genesis with the addition of the previous `<MEMORY>` fields. The attacker's RelCom prompt further specifies the target PII *types* to focus on, which we extract from the `types` attribute in the `entities` field of the dataset (see Table 1). This guidance aligns attacker goals with the taxonomy provided during data synthesis while keeping secrets themselves absent from the instructions.

4 Experiments

In this section we evaluate multi-agent networks under different graph topologies. Our study focuses on five research questions: RQ1 (Topology Matters): whether leakage rates differ across topologies under fixed agent counts and rounds, and which structures are most vs. least leakage-prone; RQ2 (Position/Centrality): how attacker/target placement within the same topology affects leakage; RQ3 (Scaling with Agents & Rounds): whether enlarging the number of agents (graph nodes) increases leakage monotonically or reaches satura-



Figure 1: Overview of MAMA.

tion; RQ4 (Secret Type Robustness): whether different types of secrets (numerical, string, identity) exhibit distinct leakability and whether such differences remain invariant across topologies; RQ5 (LLM Matters): whether different base LLMs in MAMA lead to materially different outcomes.

4.1 Experimental Setup

We vary the following factors: dataset size contains 104 PII items along with 25 background–question pairs; the maximum number of RelCom rounds is set to $R_{\max} = 10$; the base LLM is either `llama3.1-70b` or `deepseek-v3.1`; the number of agents per graph is $n \in \{4, 5, 6\}$; the topology type includes `star-pure`, `star-ring`, `chain`, `circle`, `complete`, and `tree`; the `target_attack_idx` specifies the indices of the target and attacker nodes. For each topology we enumerate non-redundant `target_attack_idx` settings that are distinct up to graph symmetries; for example, on a 6-node circle, `(target=0, attacker=1)` is isomorphic to `(1,2)`, so only one representative is kept. For the binary `tree` topology, where most index pairs are non-isomorphic, we randomly select one third of all possible pairs to balance coverage and cost; the random subset is used to approximate the full-average behavior.

All experiments are repeated three times. For each cell, we report the mean and standard deviation across the three runs, consistent with Table 2. We also put a more detailed Table 3 in appendix.

4.2 Topology Comparison (RQ1)

Under the same agent count and rounds, leakage varies by topology. As shown in Table 2, for `llama3.1-70b`, `complete` achieves the highest averages, while `chain` is the lowest. For example, with $n = 4$, `complete` reaches 29.33% whereas `chain` is 19.02%; with $n = 6$, `complete` is 25.32% and `chain` is 12.84%. `star-ring`, `star-pure`, and `circle` lie in between (e.g., for $n = 4$, 25.53%, 23.93%, and 24.36%, respectively). For `deepseek-v3.1`, the same ordering holds: with $n = 4$, `complete` is 16.35% and `chain` is 11.70%; with $n = 6$, `complete` is 18.37% and `chain` is 11.30%, while other topologies fall between these bounds. In several cases the average leakage decreases as n increases (for example, `circle` with `llama3.1-70b` from 24.36% at $n = 4$ to 18.59% at $n = 6$). These observations are consistent with

	Llama3.1-70b			DeepSeek-v3.1		
Topology / Num Agents	**4**	**5**	**6**	**4**	**5**	**6**
Circle	24.36% (2.27)	20.84% (6.75)	18.59% (4.19)	15.23% (2.37)	12.18% (3.09)	15.38% (3.39)
Complete	29.33% (2.68)	29.01% (2.37)	25.32% (2.54)	16.35% (0.48)	16.99% (5.70)	18.37% (0.98)
Star-Ring	25.53% (6.92)	20.67% (5.00)	23.16% (2.87)	14.64% (1.44)	16.67% (1.23)	14.90% (3.39)
Star-Pure	23.93% (0.19)	22.44% (2.42)	23.08% (4.41)	14.32% (4.91)	15.70% (0.96)	16.13% (5.65)
Chain	19.02% (0.40)	15.89% (1.93)	12.84% (1.68)	11.70% (0.28)	13.09% (0.54)	11.30% (1.26)
Tree	17.67% (0.00)	7.17% (0.01)	15.40% (0.02)	14.98% (0.01)	11.49% (0.01)	12.14% (0.01)

Table 2: Comparison of mean and standard deviation (%) of performance across topologies and agent numbers for **Llama3.1-70b** and **DeepSeek-v3.1**. Each cell reports mean performance percentage with standard deviation in parentheses.

structural differences in connectivity: fully connected graphs expose every node to the attacker within one hop, whereas chains restrict information flow along longer paths.

4.3 Position Sensitivity (RQ2)

Within the same topology, attacker–target placement strongly correlates with leakage. As shown in Table 3, on a 6-node `circle` with `llama3.1-70b`, adjacent indices 0–1 yield 29.49%, distance-2 pair 0–2 yields 15.38%, and the opposite pair 0–3 yields 6.09%. On a 6-node `chain` with `llama3.1-70b`, 0–1 yields 21.48%, 0–2 yields 13.46%, 0–3 yields 6.41%, and the far pair 0–5 yields 1.28%. In `star-pure` with `llama3.1-70b`, hub–leaf placements such as 0–1 and 1–0 reach 30.77% and 25.96%, while a leaf–leaf distance-2 pair 1–2 is 12.50%; in `star-ring` with `llama3.1-70b`, leaf–leaf adjacency 1–2 is 24.36%. These examples illustrate that shorter attacker–target distances and higher-centrality placements are associated with higher leakage, and that adding leaf–leaf edges in `star-ring` raises risk relative to `star-pure` for comparable positions. Asymmetries such as 1–0 vs. 0–1 on `chain` further indicate that who holds the memory and who initiates extraction can affect outcomes.

4.4 Scaling with Agents & Rounds (RQ3)

Setup. We measure leakage as the average number of target entities revealed per RelCom round from **attacker-only** outputs, computed over 10 rounds and averaged across experiment groups and (*target*, *attacker*) pairs for each topology and agent size (4–6).

Diffusion curves. Across all settings, leakage follows a clear "*rapid-rise then plateau*" pattern: it increases sharply in the first 2–3 rounds and stabilizes by rounds 3–4, after which additional rounds yield little gain.



Figure 2: Average leaked entities per round (agents=4). Each polyline is a topology.



Figure 3: Average leaked entities per round (agents=5).

Agent scaling. At a fixed number of rounds, more agents slightly reduce final leakage – suggesting stronger mutual checking – but make early rounds more productive, with steeper initial growth as information circulates through more paths.

Round effects. Increasing rounds consistently raises leakage within any agent size, though most of the increase occurs early. The fast-growth phase typically ends by round 3, followed by a stable



Figure 4: Average leaked entities per round (agents=6).

plateau.

Topology remark. The above regularities hold across all six graph families; dense, highly connected structures raise the *level* of the curves, whereas sparse or hierarchical ones depress it, but none alter the fundamental "rapid-rise then plateau" shape.

Interpretation. Early rounds act as a high-gain mixing stage where complementary snippets propagate and cohere; subsequent rounds mostly circulate already-seen content, yielding redundancy rather than new leakage. Increasing agents broadens exposure paths (steeper early growth) while also introducing additional scrutiny (lower endpoints), producing the observed trade-off.

Answer to RQ3. The leak follows an initial fast-growth phase followed by a plateau, typically by rounds 3–4. More rounds increase leakage primarily in the early phase; more agents slightly lower end-of-run levels yet make early rounds more productive. Thus, agents and rounds jointly shape an "exponential-then-plateau" diffusion dynamic.

4.5 Secret Type Robustness (RQ4)

Setup. We group fine-grained entities into six macro categories: **Spatiotemporal**, **Location**, **Contact/Network**, **Org-IDs**, **Names**, and **Regulated-IDs**. For each category, we compute per-type leakage from attacker-only outputs using a union-over-rounds criterion. Results are first aggregated within logs and then averaged across experimental groups and $(target, attacker)$ pairs. We analyze three complementary views: (i) by $(agent_num, topology)$, (ii) by $agent_num$ (averaged over topologies), and (iii) by $topology$ (averaged over agent counts).



Figure 5: Overall leak rate by macro type.

Overall differences (type effect). The aggregated results show a clear and stable ordering of leakability:

Spatiotemporal > Location >= Contact/Network >= Org-IDs > Names » Regulated-IDs

Spatiotemporal information consistently dominates, while **Regulated-IDs** (e.g., SSN, credit-card, biometric) remain near zero across all settings. **Names** are also low, confirming that the model's safety filters and cooperative norms restrict direct identity leakage. In contrast, structured but low-sensitivity facts such as times, coordinates, or network attributes are more easily reproduced or inferred, yielding higher leakage rates.

Comparing models, `llama3.1-70b` exhibits higher leak rates than `deepseek-v3.1` on five of the six categories (**Spatiotemporal**, **Location**, **Contact/Network**, **Org-IDs**, **Regulated-IDs**), whereas DeepSeek is higher on Names; increasing agent count from 4 to 6 changes absolute levels modestly but preserves these patterns.



Figure 6: Leak rate by agent count for each macro type, averaged over topologies.

Agent scaling. Averaging across topologies, the ranking above remains invariant as the number of

agents increases from 4 to 6. Magnitudes change slightly, but no category inversion occurs, indicating that collaboration size affects overall levels rather than the relative leakability between types.



Figure 7: Leak rate by topology for each macro type, averaged over agent counts.

Topology effect. When averaged over agent counts, topology acts as a coherent *magnitude modulator*:

`complete/star_ring` > `circle/star_pure` > `chain/tree`

Dense and highly connected topologies (`complete`, `star_ring`) amplify leakage for all categories, whereas sparse or hierarchical ones (`chain`, `tree`) suppress it. Crucially, topology does not alter the category ordering: the same types remain easiest or hardest to leak in every topology.

Interpretation. The results suggest that structured or contextually neutral attributes (e.g., temporal, locational, or network identifiers) are intrinsically easier for models to restate, whereas identity-bearing or regulated information triggers stronger protective behavior. Graph density primarily controls how quickly partial cues spread, amplifying leakage without changing which types dominate.

Answer to RQ4. Secret types exhibit substantially different leakability, and the pattern is **robust** across agent counts and topologies. Topology scales leakage magnitudes but does not change the inter-type ordering—dense graphs raise all categories, while sparse graphs uniformly reduce them.

4.6 LLM Matters (RQ5)

The base LLM affects absolute leakage levels while preserving the relative ordering across topologies. For $n = 4$, `llama3.1-70b` exceeds `deepseek-v3.1` on `complete` (29.33% vs. 16.35%) and `circle` (24.36% vs. 15.23%); for $n = 6$ on `chain`, the difference is smaller (12.84% vs. 11.30%). Across the average table, `complete` remains the highest and `chain` the lowest for both models, while `star-ring`, `star-pure`, `circle`, and `tree` fall in between. Standard deviations in some `llama3.1-70b` cells are larger than their `deepseek-v3.1` counterparts, whereas the latter often shows smaller variability, consistent with the values reported in the tables.

5 Conclusion

This work links multi-round message passing on graphs to secret leakage in multi-agent LLM systems. Using a synthetic, leak-controlled dataset and a standardized two-stage protocol, we evaluated six topologies, agent counts $\{4, 5, 6\}$, and diverse attacker–target placements under `llama3.1-70b` and `deepseek-v3.1`. Three findings are consistent with the reported tables: (i) topology matters—`complete` is most leakage-prone while `chain` is most robust; (ii) placement matters—shorter distance and higher centrality increase leakage within the same topology; (iii) the base LLM changes absolute levels yet preserves the topology ranking. Practically, avoiding dense all-to-all connectivity, increasing attacker–target distance, limiting hubs or leaf-to-leaf shortcuts, and selecting more conservative base models can reduce leakage risk. The evaluation design provides a compact baseline for future topology-aware defenses and for studying how routing and role design interact with model behavior.

Limitations

Our study uses synthetic PII and does not include real personal data; only two base models are evaluated. We fix the RelCom horizon to 10 rounds, use text-only communication, and adopt a single-attacker threat model with the indirect information-seeking prompt in the full runs. Leakage detection relies on exact matching; residual false positives/negatives may remain. Topology coverage is limited to six families, and tree placements are subsampled.

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A Detailed results

Table 3: Performance of **Llama3.1-70b** model across different topologies, target–attacker index pairs, and agent numbers. Each entry reports the mean performance score (percent) with standard deviation in parentheses.

Topology	Target–Attacker (idx)	Llama3.1-70B			DeepSeek-V3.1		
		4	5	6	4	5	6
Circle	0–1	29.81%(3.47)	22.12%(3.33)	29.49%(2.00)	11.86%(4.34)	13.46%(6.31)	15.71%(2.94)
	0–2	18.59%(3.89)	13.78%(2.94)	15.38%(0.97)	18.91%(2.78)	10.26%(6.40)	9.93%(6.18)
	0–3	–	–	6.09%(3.38)	–	–	11.86%(1.47)
Complete	0–1	31.41%(5.88)	28.21%(4.54)	27.56%(2.94)	16.03%(3.38)	17.63%(4.01)	14.74%(4.93)
	0–2	27.24%(5.47)	29.81%(5.09)	22.44%(1.11)	16.66%(4.00)	16.35%(7.51)	21.79%(5.46)
	0–3	–	–	25.96%(4.40)	–	–	18.59%(2.94)
Star-Ring	0–1	30.13%(3.89)	25.32%(5.63)	27.56%(1.47)	15.70%(3.09)	14.10%(2.42)	18.59%(8.94)
	1–0	22.44%(8.67)	21.15%(10.17)	26.60%(5.29)	16.35%(5.09)	21.79%(3.64)	17.31%(4.19)
	1–2	24.04%(9.18)	22.43%(9.43)	24.36%(11.75)	11.86%(6.40)	16.99%(0.55)	10.58%(1.93)
	1–3	–	13.78%(3.89)	14.10%(2.94)	–	13.77%(3.36)	13.14%(3.09)
Star-Pure	0–1	28.85%(1.67)	25.32%(4.94)	30.77%(4.41)	15.38%(10.17)	12.82%(2.00)	15.71%(2.94)
	1–0	28.84%(3.47)	22.11%(3.47)	25.96%(5.09)	17.63%(6.26)	18.59%(0.55)	16.35%(6.00)
	1–2	14.10%(2.00)	19.87%(3.09)	12.50%(5.09)	9.93%(4.74)	15.70%(2.22)	16.35%(8.81)
Chain	0–1	25.32%(2.93)	22.76%(1.11)	21.48%(3.89)	13.78%(0.55)	13.78%(2.77)	13.78%(2.94)
	0–2	10.58%(2.54)	18.27%(3.47)	13.46%(3.33)	12.82%(1.47)	12.82%(1.47)	8.01%(4.55)
	0–3	4.81%(1.67)	5.77%(6.93)	6.41%(2.00)	3.85%(1.93)	11.22%(5.80)	5.13%(2.00)
	0–4	–	–	3.20%(0.56)	–	–	7.69%(3.85)
	0–5	–	–	1.28%(1.47)	–	–	6.41%(2.00)
	1–0	33.01%(1.47)	29.49%(6.11)	27.57%(4.00)	11.54%(4.19)	16.02%(10.55)	19.55%(8.72)
	1–2	26.28%(3.64)	28.84%(8.22)	23.40%(7.22)	12.82%(6.40)	18.27%(10.84)	8.33%(3.38)
	1–3	14.10%(3.38)	9.61%(8.81)	15.70%(6.18)	15.38%(3.47)	11.86%(1.11)	14.74%(3.88)
	1–4	–	3.53%(2.42)	3.52%(2.00)	–	8.34%(2.22)	12.82%(7.28)
	1–5	–	–	1.92%(0.96)	–	–	6.73%(1.66)
	2–0	–	17.95%(4.00)	10.90%(5.30)	–	18.59%(3.38)	16.34%(3.47)
	2–1	–	25.32%(6.55)	25.32%(11.59)	–	13.78%(1.47)	13.78%(3.88)
	2–3	–	14.10%(6.73)	26.60%(4.44)	–	9.62%(3.89)	12.50%(2.54)
	2–4	–	9.93%(3.89)	7.05%(3.89)	–	11.86%(6.95)	13.46%(4.41)
	2–5	–	–	4.81%(1.93)	–	–	10.26%(3.88)
Tree	0–1	26.06%(0.03)	–	–	11.54%(0.02)	–	–
	2–0	22.17%(0.02)	–	–	19.55%(0.02)	–	–
	2–1	13.80%(0.02)	–	–	18.27%(0.02)	–	–
	2–3	8.64%(0.03)	7.08%(0.04)	–	10.58%(0.03)	8.34%(0.03)	–
	2–4	–	4.67%(0.04)	–	–	8.98%(0.02)	–
	3–0	–	9.74%(0.05)	–	–	12.82%(0.06)	–
	3–2	–	3.79%(0.03)	–	–	8.33%(0.05)	–
	4–2	–	4.36%(0.03)	–	–	13.14%(0.04)	–
	4–3	–	13.40%(0.02)	–	–	17.31%(0.08)	–
	1–5	–	–	5.57%(0.01)	–	–	9.30%(0.03)
	3–1	–	–	27.04%(0.04)	–	–	17.31%(0.04)
	3–0	–	–	13.15%(0.07)	–	–	12.18%(0.04)
	4–5	–	–	2.83%(0.02)	–	–	2.88%(0.03)
	4–1	–	–	27.43%(0.05)	–	–	14.74%(0.09)
	5–0	–	–	14.31%(0.01)	–	–	15.70%(0.05)
	5–2	–	–	28.64%(0.03)	–	–	19.55%(0.04)
	5–3	–	–	4.19%(0.02)	–	–	5.45%(0.04)