Architecture Matters for Multi-Agent Security
Keywords: Mutli-Agent-System, AI Agent, Web AI Agent, Coding agent, OS agent, LLM, Jailbreaking, Evaluation, Safety, Security
TL;DR: Multi-agent architectures are often more vulnerable than their single-agent counterparts, and the magnitude depends heavily on design choices - roles, topology, and memory - even when benign performance is stable or improved.
Abstract: Multi-agent systems (MAS), composed of networks of two or more autonomous AI agents, have become increasingly popular in production deployments, yet introduce security risks that do not arise in single-agent settings. Even if individual agents exhibit robust security, architectural decisions governing their coordination can create attack surfaces that have not been systematically characterized. In this work, we present an empirical study of how MAS design decisions shape the tradeoff between task performance and attack resistance. Across three agentic environments (browser, desktop, and code) and 13 architectural configurations, we use stagewise evaluations that distinguish planning refusal, execution-stage interception, partial harmful execution, and successful attack completion to study three key design choices: (i) agent roles, which determine how authority and responsibility are allocated; (ii) communication topology, which shapes how and when agents interact; and (iii) memory, which determines the context and state visibility accessible to each agent. Overall, our results show that security and performance in multi-agent systems are governed by architectural design choices, motivating the development of further evaluations which move beyond the security properties of a single agent.
Track: Regular Paper (9 pages)
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Submission Number: 19
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