Groot: Adversarial Testing for Text-to-Image Generative Models with Tree-based Semantic Transformation

Content Warning: this paper may include model-generated offensive or disturbing content.

Anonymous ACL submission

Abstract

With the prevalence of text-to-image generative models, their safety becomes a critical concern. adversarial testing techniques have been developed to probe whether such models can be prompted to produce Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) content. However, existing solutions face several challenges, including low success rate and inefficiency. We introduce Groot, the first automated framework leveraging tree-based semantic transformation for adversarial testing of text-to-image models. Groot employs *semantic decomposition* and *sensitive element drowning* strategies in conjunction with LLMs to systematically refine adversarial prompts. Our comprehensive evaluation confirms the efficacy of Groot, which not only exceeds the performance of current state-of-the-art approaches but also achieves a remarkable success rate (93.66%) on leading text-to-image models such as DALL-E 3 and Midjourney.

1 Introduction

Text-to-image generative models like Stable Diffusion (Rombach et al., 2022) and DALL-E 3 (dal, 2023) have risen in popularity, driven by advancements in vision-language generation. Widely applied in product design and advertising, these models, including Google Cloud Vertex AI integration (Ver, 2023), are extensively used. However, their potential to produce Not-Safe-for-Work (NSFW) content such as illegal activities highlights the need for rigorous safety evaluations.

To mitigate NSFW content in text-to-image models, developers employ techniques like data filtering during training and safety alignment strategies, alongside deployment safety filters (Deng et al., 2023; llm, 2023; ope, 2023). Despite these efforts, fully preventing NSFW generation remains challenging, with adversarial methods used for testing models' vulnerabilities.

Jailbreaking text-to-image models includes automated techniques (e.g., TextBugger (Li et al., 2019a) and Textfooler (Jin et al., 2020a)) for prompt perturbation, and manual strategies that bypass safety filters through methods like adding unrelated text or using NSFW prompt datasets for testing (Rando et al., 2022; Qu et al., 2023). These methods evaluate the models' resilience against generating NSFW content.

Current efforts to jailbreak text-to-image models face three main challenges: (1) They often result in numerous queries to test safety filters, which is inefficient and costly (**Challenge #1**). (2) The focus tends to be on deceiving safety filters without effectively bypassing them to generate content that matches the original intent (**Challenge #2**), as evidenced by our evaluation to bypass DALL·E's safety filter. (3) While manually crafted prompts can sometimes bypass filters effectively, this approach is not scalable for broad jailbreak attacks (**Challenge #3**).

Beyond technical challenges, two main reasons underscore the need for an automated adversarial testing framework for text-to-image models: (1) to enable developers to evaluate model safety, especially in preventing NSFW content generation (ope, 2023), and (2) to address regulatory needs, as current laws regulate generative AI but lack robust evaluation techniques for model safety. These highlight the necessity for thorough testing methodologies.

Our Solution. This paper introduces Groot, to the best of our knowledge, the first automated framework for testing text-to-image models' resistance to NSFW content generation. Groot leverages two insights: text filters focus on keyword context (**Observation #1**) and image filters can be bypassed with irrelevant content (**Observation #2**). It operates in two stages: *semantic decomposition* to bypass text filters by isolating and recursively processing sensitive keywords, and *sensitive element drowning* to overload image filters with non-sensitive content. Starting with an initial prompt,

Groot refines it to effectively produce NSFW content.

To boost Groot's efficiency, we tackle **Challenge #1** by breaking down prompts into a Prompt Parse Tree (PPT), streamlining the refinement process. For **Challenge #2**, we craft prompts to ensure meaningful NSFW content generation, using Large Language Models (LLMs) for guidance and employing semantic preservation techniques. To address **Challenge #3**'s manual prompt crafting issue, a hybrid algorithm automates the refinement process, integrating with LLMs for goal-oriented testing.

Results. A comprehensive evaluation shows that Groot achieved a 93.66% success rate in testing top text-to-image models like DALL-E 3 and Stable Diffusion, outperforming existing methods with a 25.45% success rate. An ablation study confirmed the effectiveness of combining *semantic decomposition* and *sensitive element drowning* for optimal performance.

Contribution. We summarize our contributions as following:

- We propose tree-based semantic transformation, a pioneering and universally applicable technique for the adversarial testing of text-to-image models.
- Groot is developed with the aid of Large Language Models like GPT-4 (cha, 2023) to conduct adversarial tests. We provide open access to Groot's codebase and the datasets it generates via our website (our, 2023), thereby supporting and encouraging reproducibility and further scholarly inquiry.
- We perform an exhaustive evaluation of Groot, which validates its superior performance. The empirical evidence firmly establishes that Groot not only outperforms existing state-of-the-art methods (Jin et al., 2020a; Li et al., 2019a; Yang et al., 2023) but does so with an impressive success rate 93.66%.

2 Background and Related Work

2.1 Text-to-Image Generative Model

Text-to-image generative models, such as Stable Diffusion (sta, 2023), DALL·E 3 (dal, 2023), and Midjourney (Mid, 2023), transform textual prompts into images. These models utilize diffusion processes, starting with random noise and progressively refining this through a de-noising network to produce the final image, guided by textual inputs. Key advancements include approaches for learning-free and zero-shot generation capabilities.



Figure 1: Image Generation Process of DALL·E 3.

Safety measures are integral to these models to prevent the generation of inappropriate content. The process involves an initial prompt screening followed by an image safety check (Figure 1). Only content passing both filters is delivered to users, ensuring compliance with content policies, such as OpenAI's (ope, 2023).

Our evaluation focuses on DALL·E 3, Stable Diffusion, and Midjourney, highlighting their leadership in the field and their robust safety features. Notably, Stable Diffusion incorporates built-in NSFW content filters, reducing reliance on external safety mechanisms.

2.2 Adversarial Testing for Generative Models

We propose succinct black-box adversarial testing methods to assess the safety of large language and text-to-image models. Techniques like Jade (Zhang et al., 2023), which transform syntax to evade prompt filters, and GPTFuzzer (Yu et al., 2023), which mutates prompts using models like GPT-4 to elicit toxic outputs, are effective for language models. MasterKey (Deng et al., 2023) further demonstrates fine-tuning to prompt harmful responses from tested models. However, these strategies are primarily designed for textual content and do not directly apply to text-to-image models.

For text-to-image models, we explore automated adversarial methods such as TextBugger (Li et al., 2019b), Textfooler (Jin et al., 2020b), BAE (Garg and Ramakrishnan, 2020a), and SneakyPrompt (Yang et al., 2023), which perturb prompts to circumvent safety mechanisms. Manual strategies are also viable, as shown by Rando (Rando et al., 2022), which involves appending extraneous text to prompts to bypass filters.

Our goal is to develop an adversarial testing framework tailored for text-to-image models, aiming for scalable and generalizable solutions to en-

sure model safety.

3 Motivation Example

In text-to-image models like DALL-E 3, a two-tier safety system screens content. The initial text safety filter examines input prompts, while the subsequent image safety filter assesses the generated images for compliance. As shown in Figure 2, a harmless prompt like "Two men shaking hands in a church" navigates through both filters, leading to image production by DALL-E 3. Conversely, prompts containing sensitive terms like "knife" are blocked by the text filter, halting image generation. Even if a prompt bypasses the text filter, the image filter can intercept outputs depicting violence, ensuring a robust defense against NSFW content production.

Existing adversarial testing for text-to-image models reveals key challenges: manual crafting of prompts lacks scalability (**Challenge #1**); automated mutations often distort the prompt's original meaning, leading to irrelevant images (**Challenge #2**); and such methods frequently have low success rates (**Challenge #3**).

Analysis of adversarial examples (Figure 2) shows: sensitive terms ("kill") can be broken down into less sensitive words ("fighting") to bypass text filters (**Observation #1**); combining sensitive ("blood") with non-sensitive terms ("red liquid") can evade image filters (**Observation #2**).

We introduce Groot, an automated framework that uses LLMs for adversarial testing on text-to-image models, leveraging *semantic decomposition* and *sensitive element drowning* techniques for effective and semantic-consistent adversarial prompt generation.

4 Methodology

4.1 Overview

We introduce Groot, an automated framework for adversarial testing on text-to-image models, employing tree-based mutation to challenge model safety filters. Groot follows a structured process: ❶ It starts by constructing a Prompt Parse Tree (PPT), organizing prompt elements to reflect their relationships (§ 4.2). ❷ Through **semantic decomposition**, Groot breaks down sensitive elements into benign components, reformulating these into new prompts to bypass text filters (§ 4.3). ❸ Next, **sensitive element drowning** introduces harmless elements to dodge image filters (§ 4.4). ❹ The framework iteratively tests and refines these prompts, analyzing failures to adjust its approach until a successful or time-limited attempt (§ 4.5). Finally, the output includes the refined adversarial prompt and any NSFW images generated.

4.2 Prompt Parse Tree Construction

In Groot, the Prompt Parse Tree (PPT) encodes prompt object relationships and attributes, drawing from the Parse Tree concept in natural language processing (Meng et al., 2013; Jiang and Diesner, 2019; Ranjan et al., 2016). A PPT is an ordered, rooted tree that illustrates a prompt's syntactic structure based on a context-free grammar, where $G = (V, \Sigma, R, S)$ defines the grammar's components. The tree features nodes for non-terminal (V) and terminal (Σ) symbols, production rules (R), and the start symbol (S). The root is S, internal nodes are non-terminal symbols, and leaves are terminal symbols or ϵ. The tree's yield $\text{Yield}(T)$ is the concatenation of its leaf labels, representing the structured interpretation of the prompt.

Base on the concept of parsing tree, the Prompt Parse Tree (PPT) structures prompts through three specialized node types:

- **Object Node**: Denotes tangible entities or features within the image, representing each unique object or element.
- **Attribute Node**: Provides details on the objects' characteristics or qualities, acting as descriptors or modifiers.
- **Relation Node**: Illustrates the interactions between objects or their components, clarifying complex relationships.

Object and relation nodes are considered non-terminal (V) symbols. Object nodes without attribute descendants are also terminal (Σ) symbols. Attribute nodes are exclusively terminal (Σ). The starting symbol S is always a relation node. LLMs are employed to accurately map the prompt's syntactic and semantic structures within PPT.

We elucidate the structure of PPT with three examples. Figure 4 (a) depicts the simple prompt "Two men fighting against each other." which consists of a 'Fighting' relation node branching out into two 'Object Nodes,' 'Man1' and 'Man2,' each representing the individual in fighting. In Figure 4 (b), the prompt complexity increases: "Two men are fighting against each other in a church."



Figure 2: Motivation example demonstrating the operation of text and image safety filters in DALL-E 3, filtering out safe and adversarial content through different stages of the model's processing pipeline.



Figure 3: The workflow of Groot.

Here, the 'Contain' relation node indicates the encompassing setting of the action, branching into a 'Church' object node for location, and a 'Fighting' relation node further splitting into 'Man1' and 'Man2.' Figure 4 (c) shows an even more detailed prompt: "One strong man is fighting against another man in a glorious church. Red liquid in the church." The 'Contain' node is the root, with branches to the 'Church' object node, the 'Fighting' relation node, and the 'Liquid' object node. 'Man1' has an 'Attribute Node' of 'strong', and the 'Church' has 'glorious', while 'Liquid' is marked with 'red'. These examples display how PPT dissects prompts into a hierarchical tree, delineating object relationships and attributes within the context.

Design & Rationale. The design and rationale behind the Prompt Parse Tree (PPT) include key elements for organizing and interpreting prompts in adversarial testing. Nodes within PPT are categorized into 'Object Node', 'Attribute Node', and 'Relation Node', each serving distinct roles. 'Object Node' signifies image objects, 'Attribute Node' specifies object attributes, acting as leaf nodes for 'Object Nodes', and 'Relation Node' outlines relationships among objects or between objects and other relations. The grammar initiates with 'Relation Node' as the start symbol S, considering 'Attribute Node' and attribute-lacking 'Object Node' as terminal symbols (Σ), while 'Relation Node' serves as a non-terminal symbol (V). Due to the intricacies in object relations and attributes, PPT does not explicitly define production rules R and yield Yield; instead, it leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) for construction and interpretation, as demonstrated on our website (our, 2023). Groot starts with a user-defined adversarial prompt, constructing an initial PPT that evolves through iterative refinement to meet testing objectives.

4.3 Semantic Decomposition

In Groot, **Semantic Decomposition** modifies prompts from the Prompt Parse Tree (PPT) to bypass text safety filters, based on transforming sensitive elements into non-sensitive ones (**Observation #1**). This method exploits the limitations of neural networks' attention mechanisms, which falter with closely packed sensitive elements. By disassembling and redistributing sensitive content across the prompt, we dilute its concentration, enhancing its ability to evade filters.

Our analysis indicates that prompts for text-to-image models, akin to a Domain-Specific Language (DSL) for shaders (Sha, 2023), have unique, targeted semantics for image description. We leverage this specificity to deconstruct prompts into 'Object Node' for image entities, 'Attribute Node' for object characteristics, and 'Relation Node' for



Figure 4: Hierarchical parsing of prompts in PPT. (a) Basic prompt with object nodes. (b) Addition of setting via 'Contain' node. (c) Inclusion of attribute nodes for detailed context.

inter-object dynamics, preserving the original intent while ensuring safety compliance.

The decomposition in Groot achieves two main outcomes: it lowers prompt sensitivity by converting direct, sensitive statements into a stylized, structured format and breaks complex prompts into shorter, less sensitive phrases. This restructuring dilutes the original prompt's sensitivity, making it more likely to pass neural network-based text safety filters. By scattering these reformatted phrases, mixing less sensitive ones among non-sensitive content, we effectively navigate around the filters' focus.

Groot employs the Prompt Parse Tree (PPT) as a decomposition framework, treating a prompt as a node that unfolds into a tree. This process yields three phrase types: 'Object Node' for image entities, 'Attribute Node' for object characteristics, and 'Relation Node' for inter-object relationships. In this structure, image objects are leaf nodes, their attributes are properties of these leaves, and relationships are root node properties. Each leaf, encapsulating a scene aspect, can evolve into a subtree, allowing for a nuanced and compliant prompt reformation.

In *Semantic Decomposition* as shown in appendix algorithm 1, we refine prompts through a systematic process using an initial Prompt Parse



Figure 5: Comparison of PPT representations showing (a) an initial prompt with the word 'blood' being blocked by a text safety filter, and (b) the refined prompt using 'red liquid' to bypass the filter through semantic decomposition.

Tree (PPT) that encapsulates the original prompt:

- The PPT is traversed to collect and randomly rearrange short phrases from all nodes, forming an adversarial prompt queried to the LLM. If this prompt successfully bypasses the text safety filters, it becomes the final prompt, ending the process.
- If the initial prompt fails to pass the text safety filters, a leaf node is randomly selected for further decomposition.
- The selected leaf node's attributes are detailed into more granular statements with the help of LLMs like GPT-4. These are then organized into a sub-PPT and the process begins anew.

This approach is visualized in Figure 5, where an initial sensitive prompt, "Two men are fighting against each other in a church with blood around." is blocked by text safety filters. By decomposing and rephrasing it to "Two men fighting each other in a church with red liquid around.", the prompt becomes less sensitive and succeeds in passing the filter, prompting an update to the PPT for additional refinement.

In adversarial prompt refinement, we assess each leaf node using a LLM to ensure the described image adheres to content policies, identifying nodes for decomposition. For chosen nodes, we detail their attributes and engage the LLM to pinpoint specific objects, attributes, and relationships within the image. This information leads to constructing a subtree, with identified objects as new leaf nodes, their attributes clearly outlined, and relationships captured as attributes of a new root node. This structured approach not only retains the core semantics of the original prompt but also ensures the modified prompt remains true to the intended



(a) original statement (b) element drawning with new canvas

Figure 6: Demonstration of the "Sensitive Element Drowning" technique in PPT. (a) depicts the original prompt with potential sensitive content, while (b) shows the introduction of a new, unrelated canvas aimed at diluting the sensitivity and potentially overloading the image safety filters.

context, optimizing it for compliance and effectiveness.

4.4 Sensitive Element Drowning

In the *Sensitive Element Drowning* method, we address the challenge of image safety filters after bypassing text filters. Text-to-image models can create images on multiple canvases, allowing us to strategically distribute sensitive content on one canvas while overwhelming others with non-sensitive imagery. This approach, aiming to overload image safety filters, involves instructing the model to split the image into various canvases and populate them with mostly non-sensitive elements, keeping the sensitive target isolated. This prompt manipulation maintains the adversarial goal without diluting the target image with irrelevant content.

Figure 6 exemplifies this by showing a base scenario with potential sensitive content and its strategic dilution with an additional canvas featuring unrelated, non-sensitive elements (e.g., a "beautiful woman"). This tactic seeks to divert the filter's scrutiny away from sensitive content, leveraging Property Parse Trees (PPT) for effective illustration.

4.5 Failure Analysis

Text and image safety filters function as black-box models, a fact inferred from our empirical observations. Notably, the error messages differ: for images, the message states, "This request has been blocked by our content filters.", while for text, it says, "Your request was rejected as a result of our safety system. Image descriptions generated from your prompt may contain text that is not allowed by our safety system. If you believe this was done in error, your request may succeed if retried, or by adjusting your prompt.". Therefore, we employ keyword matching to determine which model has triggered the failure.

5 Evaluation

Our evaluation of Groot aims to address the following research questions:

- **RQ1 (Effectiveness):** How effective is Groot in identifying NSFW issues compared with other baselines?
- **RQ2 (Ablation Study):** What is the effectiveness of *semantic decomposition* and *sensitive element drowning* in Groot?

Baselines. We evaluate Groot against current adversarial methods:

SneakyPrompt (Yang et al., 2023) uses reinforcement learning to refine adversarial prompts for NSFW content generation in text-to-image models.

We exclude techniques like TextFooler (Jin et al., 2020a), BAE (Garg and Ramakrishnan, 2020b), and TextBugger (Li et al., 2019a) from our benchmarking due to their focus on text safety filters and ineffectiveness in bypassing image safety filters for text-to-image models. Additionally, these methods often produce images that stray too far from the original prompt, limiting their relevance for our testing objectives.

Experiment Setting. We conduct experiments on an Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS workstation equipped with 8 A100 GPUs (80GB memory each). For in-depth results and implementation insights, visit our website (our, 2023). Each method is allotted ten minutes per run for a single adversarial prompt, with each experiment replicated five times to ensure reliability. SneakyPrompt employs a reinforcement learning search strategy, limiting to 60 queries per model, including the initial prompt query for gradient calculation, a step not needed by Groot.

Dataset. Due to the absence of publicly available NSFW adversarial prompt datasets for testing text-to-image models, we have created our own. We develope an adversarial prompt dataset to evaluate safety filters. Building upon the approach of previous work (Yang et al., 2023), we took inspiration from a Reddit post (red, 2023) and used ChatGPT (cha, 2023) to generate 30 target prompts for 10 different scenarios prohibited by OpenAI's content policy (ope, 2023), specifically focusing on NSFW content. This process resulted in a total of 300 adversarial prompts.

Text-to-image Models Under Test. We evaluated

Table 1: Success rates for bypassing safety filters in various prohibited content scenarios using different adversarial testing techniques.

Prohibited Scenario	% Sneaky Prompt	% SD Only	% IED Only	% Groot
Hate	31.42	81.82	36.36	87.88
Harassment	20.00	96.97	100.00	96.97
Violence	42.86	81.82	84.85	96.97
Self-harm	45.71	84.85	39.39	93.94
Sexual	57.14	57.58	18.18	66.67
Shocking	51.43	81.82	51.52	90.91
Illegal activity	20.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Deception	5.71	93.94	96.97	96.97
Political	2.86	93.94	100.00	100.00
Public and personal health	2.86	100.00	96.97	100.00
Spam	0.00	100.00	96.97	100.00
Total	25.45	88.15	74.66	93.66

Groot on three key models:

DALL·E 3 (dal, 2023) (OpenAI): A leading text-to-image generator with comprehensive safety filters, accessible via API.

Midjourney (mid, 2023): Comparable to DALL·E 3 in producing high-quality images, with robust safety measures, available through its API.

Stable Diffusion (sta, 2023): A prominent open-source model with effective safety filters, tested with its latest version, Stable Diffusion XL (sta, 2023).

Evaluation Criteria. Our evaluation of adversarial testing for the models under test is based on two metrics. Firstly, (1) we measure the success rate: an adversarial prompt is considered successful if it causes the text-to-image models to generate NSFW content. We tally these successes and calculate the overall success rate. Secondly, (2) we track the number of queries needed to produce a successful adversarial prompt. This metric assesses the efficiency of the adversarial testing techniques, with fewer queries indicating greater efficiency.

5.1 RQ1: Effectiveness of Groot

This research question focuses on evaluating the effectiveness of adversarial testing techniques across various text-to-image models. Specifically, we aim to compare the effectiveness and efficiency of Groot against other baseline approaches. We conduct tests using all two approaches on three different text-to-image models for each adversarial prompt in our dataset. To mitigate the impact of randomness, we repeat each experiment for five rounds. We manually label all results. We present our findings as following:

Effectiveness across Prohibited Scenarios. As shown in Table 1, it assesses the success rates of different adversarial testing techniques across a spectrum of prohibited scenarios. The techniques include SneakyPrompt and Groot. Groot exhibits superior performance, with nearly perfect success rates in scenarios like 'Hate', 'Harassment', and 'Illegal activity', and robust effectiveness in 'Violence', 'Self-harm', and 'Deception'. It outperforms other methods significantly in 'Sexual' and 'Shocking' categories and achieves a 100% success rate in 'Political', 'Public and personal health', and 'Spam' scenarios. With an overall average success rate of 93.66%, Groot demonstrates its exceptional capability to test text-to-image models for safety and robustness across diverse content categories.

Efficiency of Approaches. The Figure 7 illustrates a comparison of the efficiency between two adversarial testing approaches, Groot and SneakyPrompt, based on the number of queries required to pass safety filters. The graph depicts the pass rates as a function of query numbers, ranging from 1 to 5. Groot, represented by the blue line with square markers, maintains a consistent pass rate of nearly 100% across all query numbers, indicating high efficiency and effectiveness with minimal queries. On the other hand, SneakyPrompt, indicated by the green line with diamond markers, shows a significantly lower pass rate that gradually increases with the number of queries, suggesting less efficiency. This comparison underscores Groot's superior performance in achieving higher pass rates with fewer queries when testing the robustness of safety mechanisms in generative models.

5.2 RQ2: Ablation Study

This research question investigates the effectiveness of two key strategies implemented in Groot: *semantic decomposition* and *irrelevant element*



Figure 7: The success rates of different adversarial testing methods in bypassing safety filters across various prohibited scenarios.

drowning. We develop two variants of Groot for this purpose: (1) Groot utilizing only *semantic decomposition* (**SD**), and (2) Groot employing solely *irrelevant element drowning* (**IED**). Our goal is to assess the individual and combined effectiveness of these strategies by comparing each variant with the full version of Groot. This comparison extends to measuring effectiveness and efficiency against other baseline approaches for each adversarial prompt in our dataset. To reduce the influence of random factors, we replicate each experiment five times.

The Table 1 presented compares the success rates of Groot, referred to as 'Groot', with its individual components, 'Semantic Decomposition Only' and 'Irrelevant Element Drowning Only'. Groot showcases a robust performance across various prohibited scenarios, achieving a notable total success rate of 93.66%. This outperforms the 'Semantic Decomposition Only' strategy, which has a total success rate of 88.15%, and significantly surpasses the 'Irrelevant Element Drowning Only' approach, which comes in at 74.66%. The 'Sneaky Prompt' method lags behind with a 25.45% total success rate. Groot's comprehensive framework, which integrates both semantic decomposition and irrelevant element drowning, proves to be highly effective in generating content that bypasses safety filters, confirming that the combination of these strategies in Groot is more efficient than utilizing them in isolation.

6 Discussions

6.1 Mitigation of Adversarial Prompt

Despite the implementation of various safety mechanisms to filter adversarial prompts, new adversarial testing approaches like Groot continue to evolve, generating sophisticated adversarial prompts. Developers of text-to-image models can leverage these adversarial testing techniques for continuous monitoring and enhancement of their models' safety. Furthermore, we propose a novel idea to detect the process of adversarial prompt generation. By conceptualizing this process as a series of trial-and-error attempts, we can identify malicious users through their behavior patterns as they strive to refine adversarial prompts.

7 Conclusion

In conclusion, Groot emerges as a groundbreaking framework for adversarial testing, demonstrating exceptional efficacy in challenging the safety mechanisms of text-to-image models. Our extensive evaluation reveals that Groot significantly outperforms existing methodologies, achieving a 93.66% success rate across both commercial and open-source platforms, including DALL-E 3, Midjourney, and Stable Diffusion. This success rate not only represents a substantial improvement over the state-of-the-art methods but also underscores the effectiveness of the integrated strategies of semantic decomposition and irrelevant element drowning. The contributions of this paper are multifaceted, introducing a novel tree-based semantic transformation technique.

8 Limitations

Randomness of Text-to-Image Models and LLMs: A key factor we address in this work is the inherent randomness of both text-to-image models and LLMs. Text-to-image models generate images through random denoising processes on sampled images, leading to inconsistent results for the same adversarial prompts. In Groot, as we rely on LLMs for response validation and object decomposition, the outputs are also subject to probabilistic function sampling. To counteract this randomness, we repeat all experiments five times. Additionally, we set the $temperature$ parameter of the LLMs to 0 to achieve more consistent results.

Adversarial Prompt Dataset: Another challenge in validating Groot's effectiveness in adversarial

testing for text-to-image models is the absence of an established dataset. Therefore, we created our dataset. To ensure its validity, we based it on official prohibited scenarios and prior work (Yang et al., 2023). Moreover, we manually validated each generated prompt to ensure it aligns with the prohibited scenarios.

9 Ethical Disclaimer

This research was carried out in strict adherence to ethical standards, focusing on the thoughtful and considerate application of text-to-image models under analysis. We refrained from employing discovered jailbreak methods that could potentially harm or interfere with the services in question. Upon identifying effective jailbreak techniques, we promptly notified the respective service providers. With ethical considerations and safety concerns in mind, our discourse includes only proof-of-concept examples, and we have decided against publishing our full dataset of jailbreak findings until the concerns are duly resolved.

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A Case Study For Prohibited Scenarios

The Figure 8 showcases a case study on the outputs of DALL-E 3, a text-to-image model, when prompted with sensitive scenarios. In 'Harassment,' the model depicts a man pointing aggressively at a woman, implying intimidation. 'Violence' is represented by an image of an older man gripping a young woman with a dress marked by bloodstains, suggesting physical harm. The 'Self-harm' prompt results in an image of a teenager with a razor blade to her wrist, indicating self-injury. For 'Sexual,' the model produces an image of a nude couple in a bathtub with rose petals, which could be interpreted as suggestive. The 'Shocking' scenario yields a protest scene with a person making an offensive gesture towards police, and 'Illegal activity' shows individuals actively vandalizing a vehicle, promoting vandalism. These results from DALL-E 3 highlight the critical need for enhanced safety mechanisms within text-to-image models to prevent the creation of potentially harmful or inappropriate content.

A.1 Hyperparameters Setting

This section examines how varying hyperparameters influence the effectiveness of Groot. Given that an object can be infinitely subdivided into sub-objects, this can be conceptualized as the leaf number of PPT. More detailed subdivisions correspond to greater leaf number. Therefore, we experiment with maximum heights of PPT set at range from 1 to 10 to evaluate their respective performances. All other settings are kept consistent with those used in the previous research questions.

Figure 9 illustrates the impact of tree complexity on the success rate of Groot, where tree complexity is measured by the number of tree nodes within the Property-Parsing Tree (PPT). The experiment evaluates the success rate of prompts with varying levels of detail, corresponding to the range of tree nodes from 1 to 10. The graph shows a positive correlation between the number of tree nodes and the pass rate, indicating that a more finely decomposed prompt structure tends to bypass the safety filters more effectively. As the number of tree nodes increases, reflecting a deeper semantic breakdown of the content, the pass rate improves, reaching close to 100% at 10 nodes. This suggests that as Groot parses an object into more sub-objects—thus increasing the number of tree nodes—the ability to pass through safety filters enhances, highlighting the advantage of intricate semantic decomposition in adversarial testing. All other experimental settings remain consistent, ensuring that the observed effects are attributable to the variations in tree node counts.

Algorithm 1: Semantic Decomposition

```
Input: node to be split
Output: root of newly generated tree
prompts ← collect_prompts(node);
info ←
  request_llm_to_parse_scene(prompts);
root ← new_node(info.obj_relations);
for i ← 1 to info.num_obj do
    obj_properties ←
      info.get_obj_properties(i);
    child_node ←
      new_node(obj_properties);
    root.add_child(child_node);
return root;
```



Figure 8: Diverse outputs generated by DALL-E 3 when presented with sensitive prompts by applying Groot, illustrating the model's interpretation across prohibited categories such as harassment, violence, self-harm, sexual content, shocking behavior, and illegal activities.



Figure 9: The relationship between the number of tree nodes used in semantic decomposition and the pass rate, illustrating the effectiveness of Groot as the complexity of the decomposition increases.