Laundering AI Authority with Adversarial Examples

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Abstract

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as trusted authorities—fact-checking images on social media, comparing products, and moderating content. Users implicitly trust that these systems perceive the same visual content as they do. We show that adversarial examples break this assumption, enabling *AI authority laundering*: an attacker subtly perturbs an image so that the VLM produces confident and authoritative responses about the *wrong* input. Unlike jailbreaks or prompt injections, our attacks do not compromise model alignment; the attack operates entirely at the perceptual level. We demonstrate that standard attacks against publicly available CLIP models transfer reliably to production VLMs—including GPT-5.4, Claude Opus 4.6, Gemini 3, and Grok 4.2. Across four attack surfaces, we show that authority laundering can amplify misinformation, disparage individuals, evade content moderation, and manipulate product recommendations. Our attacks have high success rates: In hundreds of attacks targeting identity manipulation and NSFW evasion, we measure success rates of $22 - 100\%$ across six models. No novel attack algorithm is required: basic techniques known for over a decade suffice, establishing a lower bound on attacker capability that should concern defenders. Our results demonstrate that visual adversarial robustness is now a practical—and still largely unsolved—safety problem.

Warning: This paper contains images and model outputs that may be offensive or disturbing.

1. Introduction

Adversarial examples have captivated the machine learning security community for more than a decade. Since the seminal discoveries that neural networks are vulnerable to imperceptible perturbations (Szegedy et al., 2014; Biggio et al., 2012), thousands of papers have explored how to craft, transfer, and defend against these attacks in computer vision settings (Akhtar & Mian, 2018; Akhtar et al., 2021). Yet, despite intense research interest, adversarial examples have mostly remained a theoretical curiosity: a fascinating failure mode with limited practical consequence. The canonical demonstrations involve making a classifier mistake a panda for a gibbon, or a cat for guacamole. Critics have reasonably asked: *so what?* (Olsson, 2019; Tramèr, 2021; Carlini, 2021).

We argue that the deployment of vision-language models (VLMs) as *trusted authorities* in online information ecosystems gives new credence to these attacks. VLMs integrated on social platforms (e.g., Grok on $\mathbb{X}$ (xAI, 2024)), search engines and shopping agents (He et al., 2024; OpenAI, 2025b) no longer serve as mere classifiers, producing labels humans can easily inspect and question; they produce *authoritative natural-language judgments* for users. When a user invokes Grok to fact-check an image on $\mathbb{X}$, or asks ChatGPT to compare products, they implicitly assume that the model perceives the same visual content they do.

Adversarial examples violate this assumption. A subtly perturbed image appears benign to a human observer, yet causes the VLM to reason about an entirely different semantic reality chosen by the attacker. The model's confident, well-reasoned response then delivers the attacker's narrative as if it were the system's honest assessment. We call this *AI authority laundering*: the attacker's chosen falsehood is laundered through the AI's trusted-authority status and presented to the user as objective analysis.

We demonstrate authority laundering in four broad attack settings: (1) amplify misinformation and dangerous advice; (2) disparage individuals; (3) evade content filters; and (4) manipulate product recommendations. Figure 1 illustrates possible attacks: a slightly perturbed image of a news event can fuel conspiracy theories when the AI authority asserts the event is fake (top, left); dangerous medical advice can be confidently endorsed, such as approving a teratogenic drug as safe to take during pregnancy (top, middle); public-figure protection filters can be bypassed to generate harmful or derogatory content (top, right); the reputation of a public

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

Figure 1. Examples of *AI authority laundering* attacks against production VLMs, spanning four attack families: narrative manipulation, identity manipulation, commercial fraud, and evasion of safety filters. In each case, an adversarial perturbation of the input image causes the model to respond honestly and within policy to a different semantic content than what the user or platform sees, laundering the attacker's chosen narrative or request through the model's authority. Sensitive imagery has been censored to ensure appropriate academic presentation.

figure can be damaged by linking them to criminal behavior (bottom, left); shopping assistants can be manipulated to advocate for attacker-chosen products (bottom, middle); and content moderation policies can be exploited for generating and spreading inappropriate content on social media platforms (bottom, right). In all cases, our attacks weaponize the trustworthiness and truthfulness that AI assistants aim to promote to their users.

Critically, authority laundering is *not* a misalignment attack. The model responds helpfully, harmlessly, and honestly *to what it (incorrectly) perceives*. This distinguishes our threat model from jailbreaks (Zou et al., 2023; Perez et al., 2022) and prompt injections (Willison, 2022; Bagdasaryan et al., 2023), which subvert the model's policy or instructions. It also makes alignment-based defenses (safety fine-tuning, refusal training) irrelevant against our attacks. The relevant—and largely unsolved—problem is adversarial robustness of visual representations.

Mounting these attacks is alarmingly easy. Using only vanilla PGD (Madry et al., 2018) against an ensemble of publicly available CLIP models (a technique proposed in 2016 (Liu et al., 2017)), we craft perturbations that transfer reliably to production systems whose architectures and weights are entirely unknown to us: GPT 5.4 (OpenAI, 2026a), Gemini 3.1 Pro (Google DeepMind, 2026a), Claude Opus 4.6 (Anthropic, 2026), and Grok 4.2 (xAI, 2026). In controlled evaluations, our attacks achieve success rates up to 100% for some scenarios.

We deliberately do not use a novel attack algorithm, as our goal is to establish a *lower bound* on the attacker's capabilities. If the simplest known attack already works, the true threat is strictly worse. Our results show that visual adversarial robustness is now a practical safety concern and that **as long as it remains unsolved, VLM outputs should not be presented as authoritative**.

Our findings add to growing concerns about the reliability of AI systems as arbiters of online information, which are already prone to biases (AlDahoul et al., 2025; Laurito et al., 2025; Mehrabi et al., 2021) and hallucinations that generate plausible but false information (Huang et al., 2024). We reveal a complementary vulnerability: even when models function exactly as intended, adversaries can manipulate what they perceive to produce misleading outputs at scale. More broadly, our paper illustrates how threats long dismissed as *impractical* can gain critical

relevance as technology is deployed in new and unforeseen contexts.

Our contributions are three-fold:

1. **Threat model.** We formally define AI authority laundering (§3), a threat in which adversarial perturbations redirect a VLM's perception to an attacker-chosen semantic target, causing it to deliver a false narrative through its authority channel. We identify three attack surfaces: epistemic manipulation, identity laundering, and commercial fraud, and characterize prompt-controlled vs. prompt-uncontrolled settings.
2. **Systematic evaluation.** We present an extensive evaluation of authority laundering against 6 production VLMs using 7 case studies, demonstrating practical attack vectors with far-reaching consequences.
3. **The low attack bar.** We show that vanilla PGD on open-source surrogates already suffices for consistent and targeted manipulation of frontier VLMs across all attack surfaces, establishing that visual robustness should be treated as a first-class security concern and that VLM outputs should be perceived with radical skepticism.

2. Related Work

Adversarial examples in vision. Adversarial examples (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Szegedy et al., 2014), are slightly perturbed inputs that are perceived incorrectly by a machine learning model. A key property is *transferability*: perturbations crafted against one model often fool others, even across architectures (Papernot et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017). Proof-of-concept attacks exist for safety- or security-critical scenarios such as autonomous driving (Eykholt et al., 2018; Nassi et al., 2020), face recognition (Sharif et al., 2016), or perceptual hashing (Prokos et al., 2023). However, in practice, simpler strategies (e.g., physical stickers, out-of-distribution inputs) often achieve the same ends without requiring imperceptibility (Carlini, 2021; Olsson, 2019; Tramèr, 2021). Our work identifies a deployment context—VLMs as trusted authorities—in which imperceptibility *itself* is the property that enables harm: the user has no signal that the model is responding to a different image than the one they see.

Jailbreaks, prompt injections, and behavioral manipulation. Text-based jailbreaks (Zou et al., 2023; Wei et al., 2023) bypass alignment training to produce unsafe outputs; prompt injections (Willison, 2022) break the instruction–data boundary to hijack models. Multimodal variants of these attacks inject instructions through images or directly optimize image perturbations to elicit policy-violating behavior (Bagdasaryan et al., 2023; Bailey et al., 2023; Carlini et al., 2023; Qi et al., 2024; Shayegani et al., 2024; Ying et al., 2024). All of these attacks share a common mechanism: inducing *misaligned behavior*. Authority laundering is structurally different—the model's alignment is never compromised; the attack substitutes *what the model sees*, not *what it does*. Consequently, alignment-based defenses are irrelevant to our threat.

Adversarial manipulation of multimodal representations. Recent work shows that small perturbations can align an image's embedding to an arbitrary target in a shared space (Zhang et al., 2025), and that such perturbations transfer from open-source CLIP ensembles to production VLMs (Hu et al., 2025; Li et al., 2025; Cui et al., 2024). We build on these findings, but ask a question prior work did not: **what can an attacker cause a human user to believe as a result?** We bridge the gap between the established technical feasibility of representation-level attacks and concrete, quantified harms against production systems.

The transferability of perturbed images differs by attack type. Image-based jailbreaks or prompt injections transfer unreliably across models (Schaeffer et al., 2024; Rando et al., 2024; Gupta et al., 2025), while misrecognition-style perturbations—which we use—have been found to transfer consistently because they target low-level perceptual representations shared across architectures (Hu et al., 2025; Li et al., 2025). Our results confirm this pattern.

AI systems and disinformation. The risk of AI systems being weaponized to amplify disinformation has been recognized across multiple attack surfaces. Training-time backdoors can "spin" model outputs toward an adversary-chosen sentiment (Bagdasaryan & Shmatikov, 2022). VLMs can exhibit demographic biases (Yang et al., 2025) and hallucinate false information (Li et al., 2023). We reveal a complementary vulnerability: even when models function exactly as intended, adversaries can manipulate what they perceive at inference time to produce *targeted* false outputs.

3. Threat Model

We study a class of attacks on vision-language models (VLMs) we call *AI authority laundering*: the adversary uses the VLM as an unwitting intermediary that confers its authority on content the attacker could not produce or pass off on their own. The mechanism is the same in all cases: a carefully crafted image is processed by the VLM in one way but appears to an external observer in a different way, and the adversary exploits the gap. We refer to this as a *perceptual-discrepancy attack*. This section defines the threat model at this level of generality; Section 4 describes how adversarial examples instantiate it.

3.1. Two Kinds of Authority

Epistemic authority. The model's assertions are treated as trustworthy, and users update their beliefs based on what the model says. Laundering this authority means inducing the model to assert—honestly from its perspective—something the adversary wants the audience to believe: misinformation, a dubious recommendation, or dangerous advice.

Compliance authority. The model's decisions to engage are treated as safety judgments: a platform hosts content the model willingly processed. Laundering this authority means inducing the model to engage with content it would otherwise refuse, e.g. generating disallowed content or accepting an input a filter would reject.

Both rely on the same precondition: the model must be (perceived as) aligned. Our attacks therefore *exploit* alignment rather than break it—the model acts honestly and within policy on a perception the adversary has manipulated.

3.2. Adversary, Model, and Observer

We formalize an attack with three parties. The *model* is a deployed VLM that consumes an image and prompt and produces a response. The *adversary* controls the image (and in some deployments, the prompt). The *observer* is whoever—or whatever—would have rejected the content without the model's laundered authority: a human user, a moderation classifier, a platform UI, etc.

An attack succeeds when two conditions hold: (i) the model's response advances an adversarial *behavioral goal* (a false narrative, disallowed content, a manipulated recommendation), and (ii) the input satisfies the *observer constraint* (e.g. looks benign to a human, or remains visually close to a reference). The exact meaning of these conditions depends on the deployment.

3.3. Attack Classes

We consider four families. The first three launder epistemic authority; the last launders compliance authority.

Narrative manipulation (epistemic). The adversary wants the model to assert something false or harmful (endorse a conspiracy, give dangerous advice). The observer is the human reading the conversation; the constraint is that the accompanying image looks like an ordinary picture relevant to the topic.

Identity manipulation (epistemic). The adversary wants the model to attribute false claims to a particular individual. The observer expects to see a benign picture of that individual; the model's ability to recognize famous individuals is what is being laundered.

Commercial fraud (epistemic). The adversary wants the model, acting as a search/shopping agent, to recommend a particular product. The observer is a downstream auditor; the constraint is plausible deniability—the image must look like a routine submission.

Evasion of safety filters (compliance). The adversary wants a platform's VLM to process or generate content a moderation filter would reject. The observer is the filter itself; the constraint is that the filter approves the input. The model's willingness to engage launders the disallowed content as "AI-approved."

3.4. An Idealized Attacker: The Perception Oracle

To clarify what the threat can achieve in principle, consider a *perception oracle* that can independently choose:

- a *source* image $\texttt{img}_{\text{src}}$ shown to the observer, unknown to the VLM;
- a *target* image (or concept) `target` processed by the VLM, unknown to the observer;
- optionally, the prompt `Q` accompanying the query.

The observer then sees only the source image, while the VLM receives the target as input and behaves accordingly in a **fully aligned and honest** way. The attacker's job reduces to finding a triple $(\texttt{img}_{\text{src}}, \texttt{target}, \texttt{Q})$ where the model's honest response to `target` under `Q` produces the desired adversarial behavior, and $\texttt{img}_{\text{src}}$ satisfies the observer.

This framing serves two roles: a *planning abstraction* for the adversary, who first decides what triple would work in the absence of any implementation constraint; and an *upper bound* on what perceptual-discrepancy attacks can achieve.

3.5. Adversary Capabilities

In the rest of the paper we approximate the perception oracle using adversarial examples. We assume the adversary has: black-box access to the target VLM but white-box access to one or more public vision encoders that serve as proxies; control over $\texttt{img}_{\text{src}}$ and the choice of `target`; and, in some deployments, control over the prompt. The adversary has no knowledge of the target's weights, architecture, system prompt, or training.

These assumptions are standard for adversarial-example work against deployed VLMs and realistic for closed models against which examples transfer from open proxies. In practice, an attacker can *test* perturbations in isolation (via an API or private account) before deploying them, so reported success rates should be read as lower bounds.

4. AI Authority Laundering Attacks

Our attacks follow a two-stage pipeline: (1) plan as if we were the perception oracle; (2) approximate the oracle with an adversarial example crafted against an ensemble of public vision encoders. Stage 1 is where the adversary's creativity lives; stage 2 is a standard optimization problem.

4.1. Stage 1: Designing an Oracle Attack

At the oracle level, the adversary picks a source, a target, and (optionally) a prompt so that an honest response from the VLM achieves the goal while the source satisfies the observer. Three recurring patterns cover most cases:

Target carries the payload; source is a cover. The simplest pattern, typical for laundering epistemic authority. The target is an image whose honest description *is* the adversarial output (e.g. the wrong event, a safe-looking medication); the source is anything the observer accepts.

Target reframes context; prompt is generic. When no honest description of any single image yields the goal, the attacker can shift part of the context into the source (so the VLM does not see it) and ask an ambiguous prompt that the VLM answers about the target.

Target bypasses a filter; source triggers the disallowed behavior. Typical for laundering compliance authority. The observer is a filter; the target is chosen to bypass policy, the source to elicit the intended behavior in the VLM.

The target cannot be picked arbitrarily: its honest interpretation must land on the intended behavior, which often requires probing the model's preferences (how it captions ambiguous scenes, what labels it attaches to stylized images, etc.). Additional constraints appear when we instantiate the oracle with adversarial examples (Section 5).

4.2. Stage 2: Instantiating the Oracle with Adversarial Examples

Given a planned $(\texttt{img}_{\text{src}}, \texttt{target}, \texttt{Q})$, stage 2 produces an image $\texttt{img}_{\text{adv}}$ that the VLM processes as if it were the target while the observer accepts as if it were the source. Given an ensemble $E = (f_1, \ldots, f_k)$ of local image encoders, we solve the standard transfer-attack objective (Liu et al., 2017):

$$\texttt{img}_{\text{adv}} = \arg\max_{x} \sum_{f \in E} \text{Sim}(f(x), f(\texttt{target})) \quad \text{subject to} \quad \|x - \texttt{img}_{\text{src}}\|_\infty \leq \varepsilon, \tag{1}$$

where Sim is cosine similarity. We apply differentiable data augmentations to $\texttt{img}_{\text{adv}}$ to improve transferability (Xie et al., 2019) and optimize with projected gradient descent (Madry et al., 2018). The remainder of the paper evaluates this construction across the four attack families of Section 3.3.

5. Validating Authority Laundering in the Wild

We now demonstrate AI authority laundering attacks against production VLMs deployed as trusted authorities. Our case studies span social media chatbots, AI assistants, web search agents, and content moderation systems, and cover the four attack surfaces of Section 3.3: narrative manipulation (Section 5.1), identity manipulation (Section 5.2), content moderation evasion (Section 5.3), and commercial fraud (Appendix A.2).

Experimental setup. All case studies use the attack from Section 3 run for 15K iterations with budget $\epsilon = 8/255$ unless noted otherwise; ablations are deferred to Appendix C. We evaluate six production VLMs: GPT 5.4 (OpenAI, 2026a) (thinking mode for ChatGPT), Gemini 3.1 Pro (Google DeepMind, 2026a), Claude Opus 4.6 (Anthropic, 2026), Grok 4.2 (xAI, 2026), Qwen 3.6 Plus (Qwen, 2026), and Llama 4 Maverick (Meta, 2025). We also evaluate the version of Grok deployed on $\mathbb{X}$ (xAI, 2024), referred to as "Grok." For image generation we use GPT 5.4 Image 2 (OpenAI, 2026b), Nano Banana 2 (Google DeepMind, 2026b) (and its API counterpart Gemini 3 Pro Image Preview), and Grok-Imagine-Image-Pro. Source/target pairs are chosen following Section 4.1; image-level factors affecting success are discussed in Appendix B.1. All model responses shown are verbatim outputs.

5.1. Narrative Manipulation

Social media platforms have become a primary news source, and increasingly deploy AI fact-checkers and verification chatbots. We show that adversarial examples can weaponize this trust.

Case study 1: Amplifying conspiracy theories. Figure 1 (top, left) shows how perturbing the Apollo 11 photograph to match the text embedding of "fake news" causes ChatGPT 5.4 Thinking to validate moon-landing conspiracies; the same attack works on a 9/11 photograph (Figure 2). We extend the evaluation to eight historical events (Apollo 11, 9/11, the atomic bombings of Japan, Auschwitz-Birkenau selection, the Trump assassination attempt, JFK's assassination, Shinzo Abe's funeral, the Japanese surrender). Table 1 reports per-model average ASR over five queries; success rates reach 100%, and for seven of the eight images *all* models are fooled in at least one trial.



Figure 2. ChatGPT 5.4 Thinking declares the 9/11 attacks to be fabricated, echoing long-standing conspiracies that they were staged or orchestrated. The image is adversarially manipulated to match the text embedding of "fake news."

Table 1. Average ASR over five queries on eight perturbed photographs of historical events, each targeting the text embedding of "fake news." Success: model classifies the perturbed image as fake.

Model	Avg. ASR
Llama 4 Maverick	67.5%
Qwen 3.6 Plus	47.5%
Gemini 3 Pro Image Preview	100.0%
Grok 4.2	97.5%
GPT 5.4	67.5%
Claude Opus 4.6	37.5%

Case study 2: Delivering unsafe advice. Figure 1 (top, middle) shows ChatGPT 5.4 Thinking declaring real Roaccutane safe during pregnancy after the image is perturbed to match Natalben (a prenatal supplement). The same attack succeeds on Claude Opus 4.6, GPT 5.4, Grok 4.2, Qwen 3.6 Plus, and Llama 4 Maverick—each declares Roaccutane safe in 5/5 trials; only Gemini 3.1 Pro recognizes the image and warns the user. Figure 3 shows a complementary attack: a Tylenol box perturbed toward Roaccutane causes Grok 4.2 to parrot autism/ADHD conspiracies. Two further examples (Figures 16 and 17) have Grok recommending a deadly mushroom (*Amanita phalloides*) and a poisonous pufferfish for consumption.

Takeaway 1: Adversarial perturbations cause production VLMs to confidently make false claims about images, lending AI authority to conspiracy theories, contested narratives, and dangerous advice—with consequences ranging from public confusion to direct physical harm.



Figure 3. Grok 4.2 amplifies conspiracies about Tylenol (a common pain reliever considered safe during pregnancy), warning that it can cause severe birth defects. The image is adversarially perturbed to match an image of Roaccutane, an acne medication contraindicated during pregnancy.

5.2. Disparaging Individuals

Adversarial examples enable reputation attacks by causing VLMs to misidentify the people in images. Unlike deepfakes, the visible content is near-intact—only the model's interpretation is corrupted.

Case study 3: Identity manipulation. Figure 4 shows Grok identifying Elon Musk as the subject of a drug-dealing arrest article after the screenshot is perturbed toward Musk. Grok 4.2 and Qwen 3.6 Plus identify Musk in 5/5 trials; GPT 5.4 and Claude Opus 4.6 refuse to identify individuals in any image; Gemini 3.1 Pro/Llama 4 Maverick fail to identify Musk *or* the true subject. Figure 5 shows a complementary low-stakes example: Ronaldo perturbed to look overweight, leading Grok to claim Musk is in better shape. The perturbation must be applied to the entire screenshot rather than just the embedded photo, otherwise OCR recovers the correct identity (Appendix B.1).

Systematic evaluation. We perform cross-identity attacks on ten public figures (Elon Musk, Beyoncé, Deepika Padukone, Donald Trump, Jakie Chan, Kanye West, Samuel Jackson, Shah Rukh Khan, Shakira, Taylor Swift), yielding $10 \times 9{=}90$ pairings per model. Table 2 reports the results: untargeted ASR (the model fails to identify the source) is 84–96%; targeted ASR (the model identifies the chosen target) ranges from 22.2% (Gemini 3.1 Pro) to 54.4% (Grok 4.2)—obscuring an identity is substantially easier than redirecting recognition. Per-attribute breakdowns and ablations on ϵ and step count appear in Appendices D and E.



Figure 4. Grok misidentifies Musk as the subject of a news article about a drug-dealing arrest, after the screenshot is perturbed to target an image of Elon Musk.

Table 2. Cross-identity ASR for ten public figures and $10 \times 9 = 90$ adversarial pairings. Targeted: model identifies the intended target. Untargeted: model fails to identify the source. Claude/GPT excluded (refuse to identify individuals).

	ASR	
Model	**Targeted**	**Untargeted**
Qwen 3.6 Plus	48.9%	87.8%
Llama 4 Maverick	35.6%	95.6%
Grok 4.2	54.4%	95.6%
Gemini 3.1 Pro	22.2%	84.4%

Downstream propagation. Identity manipulation also affects multi-step pipelines. Given a benign image of Musk and a perturbed image of serial killer Ted Bundy (target: an AI-generated face), Grok generates an arrest scene of Musk when asked to depict "the guiltier person" (Figure 1, bottom-left). Reverse image search is similarly corrupted: Google, Yandex, and Bing return Musk-related results for a perturbed image of Trump (Figure 15). VLM agents that retrieve from the web are therefore unlikely to escape these attacks via search.

> **Takeaway 2:** Adversarial perturbations trick production VLMs into misidentifying public figures, redirecting recognition to attacker-chosen targets and propagating through downstream tasks like image generation and reverse image search.

5.3. Evading Content Moderation

VLMs are part of platforms' content moderation pipelines: they reason about safety before processing or generating content. Tricking the VLM into accepting an inappropriate task launders its authority through the moderation pipeline.



Figure 5. Grok 4.2 identifies Elon Musk as being in better shape than Cristiano Ronaldo, citing the former's "leaner physique." Ronaldo's photograph is adversarially perturbed to match the embedding of an overweight individual.

Table 3. Acceptance rates for image-generation requests ("generate a cartoon-style version of this image") on adversarial NSFW source images. Each model is evaluated on 100 perturbed images: 10 sources $\times$ 5 doll targets and 10 sources $\times$ 5 teddy-bear targets.

	ASR per target	
Model	Doll	Teddy Bear
Grok-Imagine-Image-Pro	100.0%	84.0%
GPT 5.4 Image 2	96.0%	92.0%
Gemini 3 Pro Image Preview	94.0%	70.0%

Case study 4: Evading NSFW detectors. We select 10 explicit images flagged as pornographic with high confidence ($> 99\%$) by two commercial NSFW services (NSFW Check, Nyckel). Three image-generation VLMs (Nano Banana Pro, GPT 5.4 Image 2, Grok-Imagine-Image-Pro) refuse to "generate a cartoon-style version" of every one. We then perturb each image to match the embedding of one of 5 doll or 5 teddy-bear targets (100 perturbed images). Both NSFW classifiers now mark the perturbed images as *Neutral* ($\sim$91% confidence); ChatGPT 5.4 Thinking rates them as appropriate to post on social media (Figure 1, bottom-right). The three image-generation VLMs accept the editing request with high probability (Table 3); we manually verify the outputs retain explicit content from the source. Figure 6 illustrates one attack.

Asymmetric and identity-aware policies. The same construction defeats two contextual moderation policies (full studies in Appendix A.1): (i) Grok's gender-asymmetric clothing-removal policy, where female images perturbed



Figure 6. Bypassing NSFW filters via adversarial perturbation. An explicit source is perturbed to match the embedding of a doll; commercial NSFW classifiers no longer flag it, and three image-generation VLMs accept a request to "generate a cartoon-style version of this image," producing outputs that retain the explicit content. Sensitive imagery is censored.

Table 4. Bypass of asymmetric content policies. Case 5: gender-asymmetric clothing removal (female images perturbed toward male targets). Case 6: public-figure protection (public figures perturbed toward AI-generated faces). ASR: acceptance rates for unperturbed target, unperturbed source, and perturbed source.

		ASR		
Case	**Model**	Target	Source	Adv.
5 - Asymmetric gender policy	Grok Imagine Image Pro	100%	0%	81%
6 - Public figure protection	Gemini 3 Image Preview	100%	0%	86%

toward male targets bypass the filter for 81% of 10×10 pairings; and (ii) Nano Banana Pro's public-figure protection, where photographs of 10 public figures perturbed toward AI-generated faces bypass the filter for 86% of pairings (Table 4). Crucially, in both cases the model's *output* retains the visible content of the source (the original female subject, or the original public figure), suggesting an architectural asymmetry: the moderation pathway sees the embedding (target), but the generator sees the visible content (source). The attack changes what the model *decides to do*, not what it *outputs*.

> **Takeaway 3:** Adversarial perturbations bypass content moderation systems that rely on VLM perception—NSFW detectors, gender-asymmetric editing filters, and public-figure protections—letting disallowed content circulate under the AI's implicit approval.

Commercial manipulation. The fourth attack family targets AI shopping assistants and browser agents (full case study in Appendix A.2). Adversarial perturbations can promote an inferior product over higher-quality competitors or sabotage a competitor's listing under a small budget. We confirm this on ChatGPT 5.4 Thinking, ChatGPT Atlas (OpenAI, 2025a), and five other VLMs, exposing a new attack surface for AI-mediated commerce.

6. Conclusion

For more than a decade, adversarial examples have largely remained an academic curiosity, with little impact on real-world AI security. Our work demonstrates that this era may have ended. Vision-language models deployed today as trusted authorities in online ecosystems elevate adversarial examples into practical attack vectors for spreading misinformation and unwanted content.

Consequences for platform operators and policymakers. Deploying VLMs as authorities creates new attack surfaces demanding both technical interventions (e.g., defense-in-depth, exposed reasoning traces) and policy responses (e.g., transparency about limitations). As VLMs become gatekeepers of online information and commerce, the authority we grant AI systems must be calibrated to their actual robustness, not their apparent sophistication. Online platforms that integrate AI authorities should therefore consider ways to limit the spread of AI-endorsed misinformation, such as limiting the reach of VLM outputs or clearly tagging them as potentially manipulated. An alternative direction is to deploy mechanisms that help disseminate *retractions* of false AI claims once they have been discovered.

Consequences for users. Some users already over-trust AI authorities despite their propensity for hallucinations and biases. These sources of error have improved in recent times, giving AI authorities further credibility—which our attacks can undermine. Our results call for increased skepticism toward AI-mediated content, particularly when images are involved. We made no effort to make our attacks stealthier (alternative perceptual metrics, more aligned source/target pairs), so even less perceptible variants are likely achievable.

Consequences for the adversarial ML research community. Adversarial examples are now realistic safety concerns for deployed AI systems, calling for a focus shift from standalone models to attacks and defenses that account for the real-world ecosystems incorporating them.

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A. Additional Case Studies

A.1. Evading Content Moderation

Case Study 5: Asymmetric Content Policies In Case Study 4 we evaded a universal content policy. Here we show contextual policies are also vulnerable. After Grok was prompted to generate millions of sexual deepfakes—primarily of women—in late 2025 (New York Times, 2026), $\mathbb{X}$ introduced stronger moderation specifically for edits of female subjects. Grok now seemingly accepts clothing-removal requests on male images but reliably rejects identical requests on female images. Adversarial perturbations exploit this asymmetry: perturbing an image of a woman toward the embedding of a male tricks Grok into accepting the request (Figure 7). With 20 AI-generated images of men and women and all $10\times10{=}100$ adversarial pairings, Grok-Imagine-Image-Pro accepts 81% of clothing-removal requests on perturbed female images while rejecting all unperturbed ones (Table 4). Manual inspection of a 15% subsample confirms the output retains the original female subject rather than substituting in the male target.

Case Study 6: Public-Figure Protection Nano Banana Pro refuses to generate or edit images of public figures: requests to depict Elon Musk smoking a cigar by a pool, or to depict the Puerto Rican musician Bad Bunny looking drunk, are refused. Perturbing both images toward AI-generated faces makes the model fulfill the request (Figures 1 and 8). For systematic evaluation we use 10 photographs of public figures (Musk, Bad Bunny, Obama, Beyoncé, Trump, Chan, Kim Jong Un, Zuckerberg, Swift, Shakira), 10 AI-generated faces, and all $10\times10{=}100$ adversarial images. Asking Gemini 3 Pro Image Preview (API equivalent of Nano Banana Pro) to "generate a new image of the person smoking a cigar by a pool," all unperturbed public-figure requests are rejected and 86% of adversarial requests are accepted (Table 4). Manual inspection of a 15% random sample shows the majority of generated images depict the intended public figure exactly; in other cases facial features are altered (Figure 21).

Why do these attacks work? The adversarial perturbation shifts the image's embedding toward the target while leaving its visible content essentially unchanged. The content-moderation pathway likely depends on the input embedding and therefore perceives the adversarial target (an AI-generated face, or a male subject) and permits the request. The image generator, however, produces an output that reflects the visible content of the source, yielding an image of the original subject. Our adversarial examples thus appear to affect what the model *perceives and decides to do* but not what it *outputs*.

A.2. Commercial Manipulation

AI assistants are increasingly used to provide product recommendations and purchasing advice. Adversarial examples can manipulate these recommendations, to inflate the perceived value of an attacker's product or to sabotage a competitor's—thereby compromising consumer trust in AI-mediated purchasing decisions.

Case study 7: Fake product recommendations. Consider an attacker selling a low-quality product who seeks to inflate its ranking against stronger competitors. To illustrate, in Figure 9 we present ChatGPT with images of two watches: one from an affordable entry-level brand (retail price $\sim$ \$50) while the other is a Casio G-Shock watch, a well-known high quality brand (retail price $\sim$ \$440). Without perturbation, ChatGPT 5.4 Thinking and all other evaluated models recommend the more valuable G-Shock when asked for purchasing advice. Yet, after perturbing the image of the cheaper watch to match the embedding of a Rolex Submariner (retail price $\sim$ \$10,000) all models reverse their recommendation and select the cheaper watch instead. Figure 9 presents ChatGPT's response when presented with the perturbed version. We show a similar experiment in Appendix F, in which an image of worn-out shoes is perturbed so that Grok recommends them over brand-new alternatives. These experiments demonstrate the ease with which an attacker can subtly manipulate AI-powered recommendation systems to favor their product over higher-quality or more suitable products.

Attacks against browser agents. Next, we evaluate a realistic deployment scenario involving a browser agent, ChatGPT Atlas (OpenAI, 2025a). We present the VLM with a screenshot of top search results for the query "smart watch" on Amazon, and ask it to recommend one. To simulate an adversarial seller, we replace one product's image with that of a candy watch perturbed to match the embedding of an Apple Watch (Figure 1). ChatGPT Atlas recommends the manipulated product, describing it as "more premium" than its competitors.

Sabotaging competitors. Adversarial perturbations can also be used to sabotage a competitor's product rather than promote the attacker's own. We present all six evaluated VLMs with two smartwatch images: a Samsung Galaxy Watch 8 (retail price $\sim$ \$280) and an Apple Watch Series 11 (retail price $\sim$ \$400). Without perturbation, every model recommends the Apple Watch. When the Apple Watch image is perturbed to match the embedding of a toy candy watch using only $\epsilon = 4/255$, most models reverse, see Figure 19 for ChatGPT's response.



Figure 7. Adversarial bypass of gender-asymmetric content moderation in Grok. Left: a clothing-removal request on a male image is accepted. Middle: the same request on a female image is rejected by a moderation policy. Right: Grok accepts the request when the female image is perturbed to match the embedding of the male image. Images have been censored to ensure appropriate academic presentation.

Takeaway 4: VLM-mediated purchasing decisions can be steered by adversarial sellers, to promote inferior products or sabotage competitors. This compromises the trust users place in AI shopping assistants and exposes a new attack surface for fraud in AI-mediated commerce.

B. Discussion

B.1. Limitations and Failure Cases

Our experiments in Section 5 demonstrate that adversarial examples can be used for successful AI authority laundering in a diverse range of settings. Nevertheless, these attacks are not foolproof and sometimes require careful choices of sources, targets, and possibly prompts to be most effective. Here, we discuss notable limitations and failure cases.

Verbose model outputs can reveal a perception discrepancy. Models vary in their level of verbosity. When responses or reasoning traces include details beyond what was strictly asked, they can leak information about the target content and expose the attack to an attentive user. Figure 18 shows one example: an image of a pair of worn-out, brandless shoes is perturbed toward an image of Nike Air Jordans, and Grok's response explicitly names Air Jordans when recommending the perturbed shoes, which may alert the user to the attack. The attacker may be able to minimize this leakage by choosing more specific or narrower prompts. For example, given the perturbed Tylenol image of Figure 3 along with the open-ended prompt "Is this safe to take during pregnancy? Can it harm the baby?," Grok 4.2 answers "*No, this is not safe to take during pregnancy. It can cause severe harm to the baby,*" but then continues with a long explanation that explicitly mentions Roaccutane. If the prompt adds the constraint that the model should "answer in a single sentence", the attacker can eliminate the Roaccutane-related explanation while preserving the (incorrect) safety verdict.

Models are sensitive to text in source images. Adversarial perturbations are less effective when images contain highly visible text, likely because many VLMs have robust OCR capabilities. For example, if we perturb only the photograph in the news-article screenshots in Figures 4 and 14 and leave the text untouched, the attack fails for all evaluated models. However, the attack succeeds when the perturbation is applied to the entire screenshot, including the text regions. Even then, the attack fails if the prompt specifically directs the model's attention to the text, e.g., if we ask "what does this article say about the person?", the model does correctly read the source headline and reports the correct identity after retrieving the full article via web search. A similar issue affects the images of drug packages in Figures 1 and 3: overcoming the model's OCR pathway requires a substantially larger perturbation budget ($\epsilon = 32/255$ in our experiments, compared to $8/255$ for typical natural images), and even then the model often surfaces the original text in its response.

Our attacks are not fully imperceptible. Even with low ℓ_∞ noise (e.g., $\epsilon = 4$ or $\epsilon = 8$), attacks against CLIP models tend to produce some perceptual features, which can be apparent for high-resolution inputs. In part, this may explain why these perturbations transfer so well. But it also means that some attacks could be detected by attentive users. This does not necessarily invalidate the attack. Even if only some fraction of users are fooled, the attacker's goal could still be reached (some users purchase an inferior product, or misinformation fools some users and spreads before it is counteracted[1]).

Beyond capping the ℓ_∞ norm, we take no measures to minimize the detectability of adversarial perturbations. Adding additional perceptual losses to the optimization objective (Zhao et al., 2020) or selecting more aligned sources and targets (e.g., humans with similar poses) could further

[1] "A lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is putting on its shoes". (Incorrectly) attributed to Mark Twain.



Figure 8. Some VLMs, such as Nano Banana Pro, refuse image editing or generation requests targeting public figures (top). After perturbing an image of Elon Musk to target the embedding of an AI-generated person, the model no longer recognizes Musk and agrees to the request (bottom).

reduce the visibility of perturbations (Deb et al., 2020).

B.2. Defenses

Adversarial robustness for neural networks, including VLMs, has been an active research area for more than a decade. Proposed defenses are rapidly broken by adaptive attacks, or only defend against a narrow set of attacks. Early work by Carlini and Wagner Carlini & Wagner (2017) demonstrated that ten proposed detection methods could all be evaded by adaptive adversaries. Athalye et al. Athalye et al. (2018) later systematized this pattern, showing that seven of nine defenses accepted at ICLR 2018 relied on obfuscated gradients as opposed to achieving genuine robustness and circumvented all seven using adaptive techniques. This cycle has continued: Tramèr et al. Tramèr et al. (2020) evaluated thirteen defenses published between 2018 and 2020, finding that all could be broken using similar adaptive strategies.

The defenses that withstand adaptive evaluation have significant limitations of their own. Adversarial training (Madry et al., 2018) remains empirically robust but scales poorly with model size, does not transfer across threat models, and suffers from a persistent trade-off between clean and



Figure 9. Presented with images of two watches, a high-end Casio G-Shock and a simpler entry-level watch perturbed to match the embedding of a Rolex, ChatGPT recommends purchasing the perturbed watch.

adversarial accuracy (Zhang et al., 2019; Tsipras et al., 2019). Certified defenses based on randomized smoothing (Cohen et al., 2019) provide provable guarantees but with certified radii typically smaller than imperceptible perturbations (Yang et al., 2020) and substantial computational overhead (Kumar et al., 2023). At present, no defense offers a satisfactory combination of scalability, provable guarantees, and practical robustness across the range of attacks relevant to deployed multimodal systems.

Current VLMs remain vulnerable to the same basic transfer attack techniques as ten years ago, and our thesis is that this will not change in the near future. Defenses aimed primarily at preventing *the transferability* of attacks are another possible avenue (Hosseini et al., 2017), but they have proved similarly fruitless so far. Moreover, even if a defense does succeed in making a model robust to, say, 95% of attack attempts, an attacker could simply try multiple attack variants (e.g., with different sources and targets) and validate them out-of-band using a model API or private social media account.

However, this need not mean that the *systems* we build with VLMs cannot be made more robust. This could be achieved, for instance, by encouraging VLMs to explicitly verbalize their reasoning. As discussed in Section B.1 above, this can make it easier for users to detect attempts to launder epistemic AI authority. A hypothetical solution that addresses image authenticity issues in a more general way could come from developments in cryptographic image integrity checks (Naveh & Tromer, 2016; Datta et al., 2025; Della Monica et al., 2025), which tie an image to the hardware that captured it (e.g., a phone camera).

Nevertheless, in the current landscape, it may be necessary to fundamentally reconsider the authority that is implicitly



Figure 10. Claude Opus 4.6's response when asked to compare an AI-generated image of a woman (left) with its adversarial counterpart (right), perturbed to match the embedding of an AI-generated man. Despite both images being presented in the same context, Claude describes them as two different people of different genders and declines to identify them as the same individual. We observe analogous behavior from Grok 4.2 and ChatGPT 5.4 Thinking.



Figure 11. An adversarial example, optimized from random initialization to match the embedding of the text "Elon Musk is smoking," is given to Grok 4.2 with a generic prompt asking it to generate a new image based on the input. A figure resembling Musk holding a cigarette is visible in the adversarial example, along with legible fragments of the words "Elon", "is", and "smoke". Grok 4.2 produces a photorealistic image of Musk smoking, illustrating that the semantic content encoded by the attack transfers to the downstream generation model.

or explicitly granted to VLM outputs on online platforms. If attacks such as the ones we present here start appearing in the wild, it may be necessary to limit the reach of VLM outputs on online platforms (e.g., on 𝕏), or flag them as potentially malicious or misleading.

C. Attack Transferability

The results presented throughout this work demonstrate that adversarial examples can manipulate production-grade AI models. Crafted using an ensemble of publicly available CLIP models, these perturbed images both transfer effectively to closed-source production models and remain effective under common image degradations. For example, a screenshot of any adversarial example presented in this paper is sufficient to manipulate reverse image search. De-



Figure 12. Targeted ASR across models as a function of perturbation budget ϵ (left) and optimization steps (right).

spite the failure cases discussed in Section B.1, the strength of this cross-model transfer, which underlies the results presented in this work, establishes visual adversarial robustness as an urgent, practical security problem.

The transferability is strong enough that production models fail to recognize the original and the adversarial version of an image as the same, even when shown side by side. Figure 10 shows Claude Opus 4.6's response when presented with an AI-generated woman and its adversarial counterpart, perturbed to match the embedding of an AI-generated man: Claude insists the two images depict different individuals, citing their apparent genders. We observe analogous behavior from Grok 4.2 and ChatGPT 5.4 Thinking, both confidently stating that the two images do not depict the same person. Notably, when subsequently asked which image is adversarially manipulated, all models correctly identify the perturbed one based on visible high-frequency noise and artifacts, yet they do not associate it with the original.

Inspecting the perturbations themselves offers some intuition for this behavior. In Figure 11, optimizing a randomly initialized image to match the embedding of the text "Elon Musk is smoking" yields a perturbation in which a figure resembling Musk is visibly smoking and fragments such as "Elon", "is", and "smoke" can be recognized. Providing this image to Grok 4.2 as the basis for image generation produces an output of Musk smoking. This is consistent with prior findings that adversarial examples targeting robust models tend to encode visible features of the target concept (Tsipras et al., 2019; Engstrom et al., 2019; Ilyas et al., 2019). This suggests that the transferability observed throughout this work stems from the perturbations operating at the level of semantic concepts rather than model-specific decision boundaries, and will therefore generalize to any model with a sufficiently CLIP-aligned visual representation.

D. Ablation: Attack Hyperparameters

We ablate two key attack hyperparameters for the cross-identity manipulation experiments discussed in Section 5.2 (Table 2): the perturbation budget ϵ (L_∞ norm) and the number of optimization steps. Results are shown in Figure 12.

Perturbation budget. ASR is highly sensitive to ϵ: at $\epsilon = 4$, all models achieve near-zero targeted ASR, while $\epsilon = 16$ yields substantially higher attack success. Our main experiments use $\epsilon = 8$, which balances attack effectiveness against perceptual quality. Even at this budget, perturbation visibility varies considerably across examples: in some cases it is barely noticeable (e.g. Figure 19), while in others it is more apparent (e.g. Figure 14). We note that perturbation magnitude could likely be reduced through careful target image selection and additional regularization, but achieving strong cross-model transferability appears to inherently require higher-magnitude patterns. We do not pursue further reduction of ϵ here, as the goal of this work is to demonstrate the potential harm of such attacks on modern multimodal systems rather than to advance adversarial example optimization per se.

Optimization steps. ASR increases consistently with the number of optimization steps, with the largest gains occurring in the first 10k steps. Beyond 10k, improvements diminish across all models, suggesting the attack largely converges by this point. Models differ in their sensitivity to step count: Llama 4 Maverick continues to benefit from additional steps throughout, while Gemini 3.1 Pro peaks at 10k and slightly degrades beyond that, suggesting that extended optimization in CLIP embedding space can reduce transferability to certain target models. We use 15k steps for our main experiments, as most models plateau around this point and the marginal gains from 15k to 20k are minimal (at most 2–3 percentage points across all models).

E. Identity Manipulation: Demographic Analysis

For the cross-identity manipulation experiments discussed in Section 5.2 (Table 2), we investigate whether targeted ASR correlates with the demographic attributes of the public figures, categorizing the ten subjects by gender (Female: $n = 4$; Male: $n = 6$) and race/ethnicity (White: $n = 3$; Black: $n = 3$; South Asian: $n = 2$). Groups with a single representative (East Asian, Latina) are excluded. Results are presented as transfer matrices in Figure 13.

Gender. Same-gender attacks transfer more effectively than cross-gender attacks in both directions (Figure 13a). Male celebrities are consistently easier to target regardless of source gender, while male-sourced attacks against female targets yield the lowest ASR overall (23%).

Race/Ethnicity. White and South Asian celebrities transfer well to one another and exhibit high within-group ASR (62% in both cases), whereas Black celebrities show consistently lower ASR both as sources and targets across all pairings, with a maximum of 29% (Figure 13b).

Limitations. Group sizes are small (gender: $n \in \{4, 6\}$; race/ethnicity: $n \leq 3$), with the racial groupings in particular too small to support statistically meaningful conclusions. ASR is also likely confounded by factors orthogonal to demographics, including pose, facial angle, image composition, and skin tone. We present these results as preliminary observations and leave a more systematic study for future work.

F. Additional Results

Due to space limitations we were not able to fit all examples and evaluations in the main body. We provide here the remainder of the results.

Case study 2: Promoting unsafe recommendations. Figure 17 presents a threat where a user describes their experience foraging mushrooms for soup and recommends others do the same. The attached image shows a highly poisonous type of mushrrom, the *Amanita phalloides*, also known as the "death cap". This image is perturbed to mimic a *Pleurotus ostreatus*, the edible and popular oyster mushroom. When another user asks Grok to confirm the recommendation, Grok responds affirmatively.

In Figure 16 we present another similar example where a user posts a picture of pufferfish and highly recommends it for soup. Pufferfish contains tetrodotoxin - an extremely poisonous toxin that can cause death within 6 hours of consumption. While professionals can separate toxic parts, home preparation is highly dangerous. The image is perturbed to match a rockfish, a completely edible and popular fish. When asked whether to cook this fish at home, once again Grok provides a positive answer and even provides a recommended recipe.

Case study 3: Identity manipulation. In Section 5.2 we discussed the use of adversarial examples for identity manipulation on social media platforms, potentially leading to reputation damage. We presented an example showing a screenshot of a news article reporting an arrest for drug dealing for which we manipulated Grok to report the person depicted in the article is Elon Musk, see Figure 4.

We repeat this experiment on another article that explicitly names the correct individual. We apply perturbation to mimic Elon Musk's visual embeddings over a screenshot of a New York Times article reporting the passing of Ahn Sung-ki, a renowned South Korean actor who tragically passed away in January 2026. When asked "Who is this person in this news article?", Grok identifies Musk, despite the article text explicitly naming the correct person, see Figure 14. When evaluated across all other six models, Grok 4.2, Qwen 3.6 Plus, and Gemini 3.1 Pro identified Musk in all attempts, whereas Llama 4 Maverick consistently identified the correct subject of the article, Ahn Sung-kim. Surprisingly, unlike in the case of the drug dealing arrest example (Figure 4), GPT 5.4 and Claude Opus 4.6 did not refuse the request this time and identified Musk in all attempts, which might suggest the previous refusals where related to the nature of the article itself, framing the subject as a drug dealer.

Case study 7: Fake product recommendations. In Section 5 we showed that an adversary can upgrade responses for its own product by applying perturbation that mimics some other higher end product. We exemplified this with an example of two watches—a high end Casio G-Shock and a simpler affordable watch, adversarially manipulated to mimic the visual embeddings of a Rolex. Here we provide another example using shoes as the product in question. A user posts two images of shoes, one brand new while the other worn out, and asks Grok for purchase advice. The worn-out shoes (right) were adversarially manipulated to mimic the popular Nike Air Jordan sneakers (using perturbation budget of $\epsilon = 16/255$). Grok recommends these shoes, attributing them Air Jordan styling, see Figure 18.

We additionally show how adversarial perturbations can be used to sabotage a competitor's product rather than promote the attacker's own. We present all six evaluated VLMs with two smartwatch images: a Samsung Galaxy Watch 8 (retail price \$280) and an Apple Watch Series 11 (retail price \$400). Without perturbation, every model recommends the Apple Watch. When the Apple Watch image is perturbed to match the embedding of a toy candy watch using only



(a) Gender *(b)* Race/Ethnicity

Figure 13. Targeted ASR averaged across all models, broken down by the gender (left) and race/ethnicity (right) of source and target celebrities.

Figure 14. Perturbing a screenshot of a New York Times article reporting the death of South Korean actor Ahn Sung-ki to match the embedding of an image of Elon Musk causes Grok to identify the article as discussing Musk, despite the text explicitly naming Ahn.



Figure 15. Google reverse image search misidentifies an adversarially manipulated image of Donald Trump as Elon Musk (bottom), while correctly identifying Trump on the original image (top).

$\epsilon = 4/255$, most models reverse , see Figure 19.



Figure 16. Presenting Grok with an image of the potentially poisonous pufferfish manipulated to match the visual embeddings of the edible rockfish causes Grok to recommend it for consumption and provide a recipe.



Figure 17. When shown an adversarially manipulated image of the deadly poisonous death cap mushroom manipulated to match the visual embeddings of the edible oyster mushroom, Grok recommends it as safe to eat.



Figure 18. When asked to recommend between two pairs of shoes, one new and one worn-out, Grok recommends the worn-out pair after it is adversarially perturbed to match the embedding of Nike Air Jordans, citing "Air Jordan styling" in its response.



Figure 19. Sabotaging a competitor through adversarial perturbation. Without manipulation, all evaluated models recommend the more expensive Apple Watch over the Samsung Galaxy Watch. After perturbing the Apple Watch image to match the embedding of a toy candy watch, all models reverse their recommendation and prefer the Galaxy Watch.



(a) The atomic bombings of Japan

(b) Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp

(c) Assassination attempt on Donald Trump

(d) Assassination of John F. Kennedy

(e) Death of Shinzo Abe

(f) Surrender of Japan

Figure 20. Adversarial versions of photographs of six well-documented historical events, each perturbed to match the text embedding of "fake news." These images are used in the quantitative evaluation reported in Table 1, together with the Apollo 11 and September 11 images shown in Figures 1 and 2.

(a) Taylor Swift - source

(b) Mark Zuckerberg - source

(c) Barack Obama - source

(d) Taylor Swift - output

(e) Mark Zuckerberg - output

(f) Barack Obama - output

Figure 21. Examples in which adversarial manipulation bypasses public-figure protection (Section 5.3) but the generated output resembles the original public figure rather than depicting them exactly. Each source image is perturbed to match the embedding of a random AI-generated face.