Rethinking Negative Prompting for Concept Erasure: Unconditional Anchoring and Localized Guidance

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Paper under double-blind review

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

Figure 1: We perform inference-time concept erasure by steering the diffusion trajectory, improving robustness to jailbreak prompts. Our approach operates purely at sampling time, avoiding fine-tuning, weight modification, and the need to curate concept-specific prompts or images.

Abstract

Text-to-image diffusion models have rapidly transitioned from research prototypes to widely deployed tools. Along with their impressive capabilities, these models can also generate harmful or undesirable content (e.g., NSFW imagery), motivating practical mechanisms for removing such concepts. Negative prompting, which uses the negative-prompt prediction as the CFG anchor, is among the most widely used mechanisms for steering sampling trajectories away from unwanted concepts. However, for jailbreak prompts, it can fail in a regime we refer to as *guidance collapse*, where the model's denoising predictions for the prompt and negative prompt become similar, so that the guidance difference driving negative prompting vanishes and the guided prediction degenerates to the negative-prompt prediction, undermining erasure. To fix this issue, we propose TraSCE (Trajectory Steering for Concept Erasure), a training-free inference-time method that makes negative prompting reliable under guidance collapse. TraSCE combines two complementary components: (i) unconditional anchoring, which makes the fallback under guidance collapse a neutral unconditional prediction rather than the negative-prompt prediction, and (ii) an alignment-localized steering step, which deliberately induces this collapse for adversarial prompts and steers the sample to the unconditional fallback, while remaining minimally intrusive on benign prompts. We

evaluate TraSCE on adversarial prompt benchmarks targeting nudity and violence, and further demonstrate its applicability to erasing artistic styles and objects. Across these settings, TraSCE substantially improves the robustness of negative prompting to jailbreak prompts without any training, weight updates, or pre-collected concept-specific data (prompts or images), while keeping the impact on general image quality small.

1 Introduction

Text-to-image diffusion models (Rombach et al., 2022; Song et al., 2020) have made high-quality image generation widely accessible. At the same time, these models can generate harmful content (e.g., nudity or violence) and legally problematic content (e.g., copyrighted artistic styles), since they are trained on large-scale web data that is difficult to fully curate. As a result, there is an increasing demand for safe image generation. A straightforward solution is to retrain a model after removing problematic data, but this is often impractical due to the scale of modern datasets and training costs. Consequently, many concept erasure methods modify model weights (Gandikota et al., 2024; Pham et al., 2024; Lu et al., 2024; Gong et al., 2024; Gandikota et al., 2023; Kumari et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2024a; Heng & Soh, 2024). While effective in some settings, weight-update approaches typically require concept-specific prompts or images, can introduce collateral damage to unrelated concepts, and are not easily reversible once deployed. These limitations motivate inference-time approaches that require no training, no weight updates, and no pre-collected concept-specific data.

Among inference-time tools, negative prompting is arguably the most widely used mechanism in practice: it is widely supported in existing diffusion pipelines and is routinely used to discourage unwanted attributes. However, in the context of *concept erasure*, the relevant threat model differs from typical "quality-improving" uses of negative prompts. An attacker can craft *jailbreak prompts* that deliberately elicit the very concept being suppressed. In this work, we revisit negative prompting for a jailbreak threat model and show that its standard formulation can exhibit a critical failure mode we refer to as *guidance collapse*. As the prompt-conditioned and negative-prompt-conditioned predictions become more similar, the guidance difference that drives negative prompting shrinks continuously, and in the limiting case where the two predictions coincide, it vanishes entirely, so the guided prediction degenerates to the negative-prompt prediction and erasure is lost. In this setting, what matters is not whether the target concept appears verbatim in the text, but whether the model's prediction under the prompt becomes similar to its prediction under the negative prompt during sampling. This motivates a robustness-oriented design requirement for concept erasure: when guidance collapses, the update should avoid degenerating to the negative-prompt prediction, and instead fall back to a conservative reference.

We propose TraSCE (Trajectory Steering for Concept Erasure), a training-free inference-time approach that improves the reliability of negative prompting by steering the diffusion trajectory. TraSCE consists of two components. First, we adopt an *unconditional-anchored* formulation of negative prompting that provides a conservative fallback when guidance collapses, avoiding degeneration to the negative-prompt prediction. Second, we introduce an *alignment-localized trajectory steering* step that intervenes primarily near guidance collapse, i.e., when the prompt-conditioned and negative-prompt-conditioned denoising predictions become similar. This similarity can be induced by jailbreak prompts, including semantically ill-formed ones (e.g., random token sequences), so we steer the sampling trajectory toward the unconditional fallback; otherwise, we keep the intervention negligible to preserve benign behavior.

We evaluate TraSCE on adversarial prompt benchmarks targeting nudity and violence generation, and further demonstrate its applicability to erasing artistic styles and objects. Our approach requires no training, no weight updates, and no pre-collected concept-specific data (prompts or images), making it easy to deploy and to update the erasure list by adding new target concepts or dropping existing ones.

Our main contributions are:

- **Failure analysis of standard negative prompting under guidance collapse.** We formalize *guidance collapse* and show that the erasure signal of standard negative prompting degrades contin-

uously as the prompt- and negative-prompt-conditioned predictions align, and degenerates to the negative-prompt prediction in the limit, undermining concept erasure for jailbreak prompts.

- **Defensive anchoring with alignment-localized trajectory steering.** We propose a training-free inference-time procedure that (i) uses the unconditional prediction as a conservative *defensive anchor* when guidance collapses, and (ii) applies an alignment-localized steering step as a soft gate to reduce adversarial steering while limiting impact on benign prompts.

- **Broad empirical validation.** We show that TraSCE substantially strengthens negative prompting against jailbreak prompts on established nudity and violence benchmarks, and that the same procedure extends to artistic style and object erasure, without training, weight updates, or pre-collected concept-specific data, and with a small impact on general image quality.

2 Related Work

Concept Erasure. Prior work on concept erasure broadly falls into three categories: (i) *training-based fine-tuning* methods that require training and weight updates (Kumari et al., 2023; Gandikota et al., 2023; Kumari et al., 2023; Lu et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2024a); (ii) *training-free weight-editing* methods that update weights without training (Gandikota et al., 2024; Gong et al., 2024); and (iii) *inference-time* methods that operate only during sampling without any weight update (Schramowski et al., 2023; Li et al., 2024; Yoon et al., 2024).

Many approaches perform concept erasure by modifying model parameters. Kumari et al. (2023) proposed minimizing the KL divergence between a set of prompts defining a concept and an anchor concept. Gandikota et al. (2023) updated diffusion model weights to minimize the likelihood of generating particular concepts based on an estimated distribution from a set of collected prompts. Lu et al. (2024) used LoRA (low-rank adaptation) for fine-tuning the base model along with a closed-form expression of the cross-attention weights. Heng & Soh (2024) updated model weights to forget concepts inspired by continual learning. Zhang et al. (2024a) proposed cross-attention re-steering, which updates the cross-attention maps in a UNet model to erase concepts. Gandikota et al. (2024) derived a closed-form weight update for one-shot erasure. Gong et al. (2024) proposed using a closed-form solution to find target embeddings corresponding to a concept and updated the cross-attention layer accordingly.

In contrast, inference-time approaches aim to suppress concepts during sampling without updating model weights. Schramowski et al. (2023) proposed a modified version of negative prompts to guide the diffusion model away from generating unsafe images. Li et al. (2024) proposed a self-supervised approach to find latent directions pertaining to particular concepts and then used these to steer trajectories away from them. Yoon et al. (2024) found subspaces in the text embedding space corresponding to particular concepts and filtered text embeddings based on this to erase concepts. They additionally applied a re-attention mechanism in the latent space to diminish the influence of certain features. Li et al. (2025) and Lee et al. (2025) use a detect-and-erase paradigm that activates editing only when a target concept is detected.

Jailbreak Attacks on Concept Erasure. Red-teaming efforts have focused on circumventing concept erasure methods by finding jail-breaking prompts via either white-box (Chin et al., 2024; Pham et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2024c; Yang et al., 2024) or black-box (Tsai et al., 2023; Yang et al., 2024) adversarial attacks. Pham et al. (2023) used textual inversion to find adversarial examples that can generate erased concepts. Tsai et al. (2023) used an evolutionary algorithm to generate adversarial prompts in a black-box setting. Zhang et al. (2024c) found adversarial prompts using the diffusion model's zero-shot classification capability for guidance. Chin et al. (2024) proposed optimizing the prompt to minimize the distance of a diffusion trajectory from an unsafe trajectory. Yang et al. (2024) proposed both white-box and black-box attacks on both the prompt and image modalities to bypass prompt filtering and image safety checkers.

Our work targets this jailbreak threat model and strengthens negative prompting for inference-time concept erasure when prompts do not explicitly mention the target concept.

3 Preliminaries

Diffusion models (Song et al., 2020; Rombach et al., 2022) learn a denoiser $\boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta$ that predicts the noise added to a noisy input at timestep t (see Appendix A for details).

Classifier-free guidance (CFG). Text-to-image diffusion models commonly perform conditional generation via CFG (Ho & Salimans, 2022):

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, t, \boldsymbol{e}_\emptyset) + s\big(\boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, t, \boldsymbol{e}_\mathrm{p}) - \boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, t, \boldsymbol{e}_\emptyset)\big), \tag{1}$$

where $\boldsymbol{e}_\emptyset$ and $\boldsymbol{e}_\mathrm{p}$ denote the empty and prompt embeddings, and s is the guidance scale.

Negative prompting. A standard negative prompting rule replaces the unconditional embedding $\boldsymbol{e}_\emptyset$ in Eq. (1) with a negative-prompt embedding $\boldsymbol{e}_\mathrm{np}$, using it both as the anchor and as the reference in the guidance difference:

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, t, \boldsymbol{e}_\mathrm{np}) + s\big(\boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, t, \boldsymbol{e}_\mathrm{p}) - \boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, t, \boldsymbol{e}_\mathrm{np})\big). \tag{2}$$

We revisit this formulation for concept erasure in Sec. 4.

Notation. In what follows, we abbreviate the denoising predictions as $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\emptyset := \boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, t, \boldsymbol{e}_\emptyset)$, $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{p} := \boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, t, \boldsymbol{e}_\mathrm{p})$, and $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{np} := \boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, t, \boldsymbol{e}_\mathrm{np})$ for the unconditional, prompt-, and negative-prompt-conditioned predictions, respectively. We use $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}$ for the final guided prediction used in the sampling update.

4 Method: TraSCE

Concept erasure has been widely studied; in this work, we focus on inference-time defenses and their vulnerability to *jailbreak prompts* that elicit suppressed concepts without explicitly naming them (Tsai et al., 2023). We revisit negative prompting for this threat model and show that its standard formulation can fail through *guidance collapse* under adversarial prompts. We propose TraSCE (Trajectory Steering for Concept Erasure), which improves robustness by (i) using the unconditional prediction as a conservative defensive anchor and (ii) applying an alignment-localized steering step that nudges sampling toward an unconditional fallback. Algorithm 1 summarizes the sampling procedure.

Algorithm 1 Sampling in TraSCE

Require: noise estimator network $\boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta(\cdot)$; prompt embeddings $\boldsymbol{e}_\emptyset$ (empty), $\boldsymbol{e}_\mathrm{p}$ (prompt), $\boldsymbol{e}_\mathrm{np}$ (negative prompt); CFG scale s; steering strength λ; Gaussian bandwidth σ

$\mathbf{x}_T \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \mathrm{I}_d)$
for $t = T$ **to** 1 **do**
  $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\emptyset = \boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, t, \boldsymbol{e}_\emptyset)$
  $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{p} = \boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, t, \boldsymbol{e}_\mathrm{p})$
  $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{np} = \boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, t, \boldsymbol{e}_\mathrm{np})$
  $\mathcal{L}_t = -\exp\{-\|\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{p} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{np}\|_2^2 / 2\sigma^2\}$
  $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_t = \mathbf{x}_t - \lambda \nabla_{\mathbf{x}_t} \mathcal{L}_t$
  $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}} = \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\emptyset + s(\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{p} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{np})$
  $\mathbf{x}_{t-1} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{\alpha_t}}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_t - \frac{1-\alpha_t}{\sqrt{1-\bar{\alpha}_t}}\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}})$
end for
return x_0

Unconditional-Anchored Negative Prompting. Jailbreak prompts can drive the prompt- and negative-prompt-conditioned predictions to become similar, $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{p} \approx \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{np}$, even when the prompt and negative-prompt text strings differ. To quantify how close they are, we define the *alignment gap*

$$\delta \;:=\; \|\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{p} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{np}\|_2,$$

so that the two predictions align as δ shrinks, with exact alignment at $\delta = 0$. Intuitively, as δ shrinks, the guidance difference $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{p} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{np}$ vanishes and Eq. (2) drifts toward the negative-prompt prediction. The following proposition makes this degradation precise.

Proposition 1 (Degeneracy of standard negative prompting as the predictions align) *Eq. (2) can be rewritten as* $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{std} = \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{np} + s\,(\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{p} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{np})$. *Hence, the repulsion from the negative-prompt prediction satisfies*

$$\|\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{std} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{np}\|_2 \;=\; s\,\delta,$$

which decreases linearly to 0 *as the alignment gap* $\delta \to 0$. *In particular, under exact alignment* $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{p} = \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{np}$ *(i.e.,* $\delta = 0$*), we have* $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{std} = \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{np}$*, i.e., the guided prediction degenerates to the negative-prompt prediction and provides no repulsion.*

Proposition 1 shows that as δ shrinks, the guidance difference driving negative prompting vanishes and the effective repulsion $s\delta$ decreases, so standard negative prompting degenerates to the negative-prompt prediction $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\text{np}}$. We refer to this failure mode (where the guidance signal vanishes and the update degenerates to the anchor) as *guidance collapse*. Jailbreak prompts can collapse the guidance and undermine concept erasure by driving $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\text{p}} \to \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\text{np}}$ (small δ), even when the prompt text does not contain the target concept explicitly.

To obtain a conservative fallback when guidance collapses, we instead anchor the update at the unconditional prediction:

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}} \leftarrow \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\emptyset} + s\big(\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\text{p}} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\text{np}}\big), \tag{3}$$

where $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\emptyset}$ is the unconditional prediction. While unconditional anchoring itself has appeared in compositional generation (Liu et al., 2022), where it is used to compose multiple conditions, our contribution is to reinterpret and motivate it specifically as a *defensive fallback* for concept erasure. We identify guidance collapse as the failure mode of standard negative prompting under jailbreak prompts, and show that unconditional anchoring turns this collapse into a conservative, prompt-agnostic default rather than a degeneration to the suppressed concept.

Corollary 1 (Unconditional fallback as the predictions align) *Consider the unconditional-anchored rule in Eq. (3), and recall the alignment gap $\delta = \|\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\text{p}} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\text{np}}\|_2$. The deviation of the guided prediction from the unconditional anchor is exactly $\|\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\emptyset}\|_2 = s\,\delta$. In particular, under exact alignment $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\text{p}} = \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\text{np}}$ (i.e., $\delta = 0$), the guidance difference vanishes and the rule reduces to*

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}} \;=\; \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\emptyset},$$

i.e., the guided prediction falls back to the unconditional prediction rather than to the negative-prompt prediction.

The corollary makes the design rationale explicit by contrasting the two rules as the two predictions align. As the alignment gap δ shrinks, both rules lose their guidance term at the same rate $s\delta$, but they fall back to *different* anchors. Standard negative prompting drifts toward the negative-prompt prediction $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\text{np}}$ (Proposition 1), which is exactly the prediction associated with the concept we wish to suppress; in the limit $\delta = 0$, it reproduces $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\text{np}}$ and provides no erasure whatsoever. By contrast, unconditional anchoring drifts toward the unconditional prediction $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\emptyset}$ (Corollary 1), which carries no explicit conditioning on the (possibly adversarial) prompt and therefore acts as a conservative, prompt-agnostic default. In other words, when guidance collapses, standard negative prompting falls back to the worst-case reference, whereas unconditional anchoring falls back to a neutral one. This is precisely the behavior we want from a defensive fallback, and it motivates the adoption of unconditional anchoring as the first component of TraSCE.

Alignment-localized Steering. Even with Eq. (3), some adversarial prompts can still bypass erasure when the residual term, $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\text{p}} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\text{np}}$, remains non-negligible. Since Eq. (3) uses this difference to steer the trajectory, a jailbreak prompt can still influence sampling as long as this discrepancy is sufficiently large.

To reduce the adversarial prompt's effective steering signal, we introduce an additional *trajectory steering* step that directly updates the current latent state $\mathbf{x}_t$ during sampling. This steering step is designed to pull the final prediction toward its unconditional anchor when the prompt-conditioned prediction is close to the negative-prompt prediction, i.e., when an adversary is indirectly implying the concept. This step is intended to make the residual term small, thereby limiting the adversarial prompt's influence during sampling. However, applying such a steering step uniformly for every prompt can be overly intrusive, degrading prompt adherence and general image quality for benign prompts that are unrelated to the erased concept. We therefore apply the steering step *selectively*: we intervene primarily when the current denoising state is near *guidance collapse*, i.e., when the two predictions are already similar. This is precisely the regime where jailbreak prompts are most likely to partially align with the erased concept, and where a small additional steering update can effectively reduce adversarial steering.

Concretely, we use a Gaussian-shaped loss as a smooth locality gate and take a gradient step

$$\mathbf{x}_t \leftarrow \mathbf{x}_t - \lambda \nabla_{\mathbf{x}_t} \mathcal{L}_t, \quad \text{where} \quad \mathcal{L}_t = -\exp\left(-\frac{\|\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\text{p}} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\text{np}}\|_2^2}{2\sigma^2}\right). \tag{4}$$

This exponential weighting acts as a *soft gate*. In particular, $\nabla_{\mathbf{x}_t}\mathcal{L}_t$ is scaled by $\exp\big(-\|\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\mathrm{p}} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\mathrm{np}}\|_2^2/2\sigma^2\big) = \exp\big(-\delta^2/2\sigma^2\big)$, so the update becomes negligible when the two predictions are far apart (large δ) and activates primarily near guidance collapse (small δ). The bandwidth σ controls the activation region of this gate, while λ controls the update strength once activated. Crucially, minimizing $\mathcal{L}_t$ decreases the alignment gap δ; by Corollary 1, driving $\delta \to 0$ makes the guided prediction fall back to the neutral unconditional prediction $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\emptyset}$. Thus, rather than avoiding guidance collapse, the steering step deliberately induces it for adversarial prompts, converting a failure mode of standard negative prompting into a controlled defensive fallback.

Practical Advantages. TraSCE operates entirely at inference time: it requires no training, no weight updates, and no pre-collected concept-specific data (prompts or images). The erased concept is specified directly via a negative prompt, making TraSCE easy to deploy and to update (or roll back) by simply changing prompts at inference time.

5 Experiments

We evaluate TraSCE on concept erasure under jailbreak prompting. Our evaluation is guided by three questions: (i) Can TraSCE improve the reliability of negative prompting for safety-related concepts (nudity and violence) under established jailbreak prompt benchmarks, while preserving general image quality? (ii) Does TraSCE generalize beyond safety concepts to erase concepts such as artistic styles and objects? (iii) How do the two components of TraSCE, namely unconditional-anchored negative prompting and alignment-localized steering, contribute to robustness and the robustness–quality trade-off? Beyond these questions, we further analyze TraSCE's erasure behavior (its specificity, generalization, and extension to multiple concepts) in Appendix D.2.

Unless otherwise stated, we use Stable Diffusion v1.4 (SDv1.4) (Rombach et al., 2022). Additional implementation details, including hyperparameters and detector settings, are provided in Appendix B.

5.1 Robustness to Jailbreak Prompts

We evaluate TraSCE under jailbreak prompting, where an attacker crafts prompts to elicit suppressed concepts. Since many defenses already perform well when the prompt explicitly contains the target concept, we focus on established jailbreak benchmarks that are designed to bypass suppression for NSFW content such as nudity and violence.

Threat Model. We assume black-box access to the deployed generator: the attacker can query the model with arbitrary prompts and seeds. This setting matches the construction of widely used jailbreak prompt sets (Tsai et al., 2023; Yang et al., 2024) and reflects practical deployment scenarios, where model weights are not exposed.

Adversarial Prompt Benchmarks. For nudity, we use Ring-A-Bell (Tsai et al., 2023), MMA-Diffusion (Yang et al., 2024), P4D (Chin et al., 2024), UnLearnDiffAtk (Zhang et al., 2024c), and I2P (Schramowski et al., 2023). Ring-A-Bell and MMA-Diffusion are black-box prompt sets; P4D and UnLearnDiffAtk are released white-box attack prompt sets. Following prior work (e.g., Gong et al. (2024)), we evaluate on these released prompt sets to assess robustness against known jailbreak strategies. For violence, we evaluate on the Ring-A-Bell benchmark (Tsai et al., 2023).

Baselines. We compare TraSCE with three groups of defenses. (i) *Training-based weight-editing methods* that require training and weight updates: SA (Heng & Soh, 2024), CA (Kumari et al., 2023), ESD (Gandikota et al., 2023), MACE (Lu et al., 2024), Unlearn-Saliency (Fan et al., 2023), Receler (Huang et al., 2024), AdvUnlearn (Zhang et al., 2024b), and AGE (Bui et al., 2025). (ii) *Training-free methods that update model weights*: UCE (Gandikota et al., 2024) and RECE (Gong et al., 2024). (iii) *Inference-time methods* that require neither training nor weight updates: SLD (Schramowski et al., 2023), standard negative prompting (SD-NP), and SAFREE (Yoon et al., 2024). This grouping highlights the trade-off between robustness and deployment constraints. We emphasize that our primary comparison is against inference-time defenses under a deployment constraint.

Table 1: Comparison with baseline defenses under adversarial prompts targeting nudity generation: Ring-A-Bell (Tsai et al., 2023), MMA-Diffusion (Yang et al., 2024), P4D (Chin et al., 2024), UnLearnDiffAtk (Zhang et al., 2024c), and I2P (Schramowski et al., 2023). We report attack success rate (ASR; lower is better). Nudity detection is performed using NudeNet (Bedapudi, 2019) with a threshold of 0.45, using the same detector and threshold for all methods. See Appendix B for detector versions and benchmark-specific settings. Rows are grouped by deployment constraint: gray = training-based fine-tuning (requires training and weight updates); blue = training-free weight-editing (updates weights without training); green = inference-time (no training and no weight updates).

Method	**Ring-A-Bell**			**MMA-Diffusion↓**	**P4D↓**	**UnLearnDiffAtk↓**	**I2P↓**	**COCO**	
	K77↓	**K38↓**	**K16↓**					**FID↓**	**CLIP↑**
SDv1.4	85.26	87.37	93.68	95.7	98.7	69.7	17.8	16.71	0.304
SA (Heng & Soh, 2024)	63.15	56.84	56.84	9.30	47.68	12.68	2.81	25.80	0.297
CA (Kumari et al., 2023)	86.32	91.58	89.47	9.90	10.60	5.63	1.04	24.12	0.301
ESD (Gandikota et al., 2023)	20.00	29.47	35.79	12.70	9.27	15.49	2.87	18.18	0.302
MACE (Lu et al., 2024)	2.10	0.0	0.0	0.50	2.72	2.82	1.51	16.80	0.287
Unlearn-Saliency (Fan et al., 2023)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.02	44.20	0.262
Receler (Huang et al., 2024)	1.05	2.10	2.10	11.10	10.42	4.93	1.25	17.13	0.301
AdvUnlearn (Zhang et al., 2024b)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.26	18.77	0.286
AGE (Bui et al., 2025)	1.05	0.0	2.10	1.70	2.04	2.11	0.60	17.38	0.291
UCE (Gandikota et al., 2024)	10.52	9.47	12.61	17.70	29.93	9.86	0.87	17.99	0.302
RECE (Gong et al., 2024)	5.26	4.21	5.26	13.30	21.77	5.63	0.72	17.74	0.302
SLD-Max (Schramowski et al., 2023)	23.16	32.63	42.11	52.10	35.76	9.15	1.74	28.75	0.284
SLD-Strong (Schramowski et al., 2023)	56.84	64.21	61.05	61.30	49.01	18.31	2.28	24.40	0.291
SLD-Medium (Schramowski et al., 2023)	92.63	88.42	91.58	65.70	68.21	33.10	3.95	21.17	0.298
SD-NP	17.89	28.42	34.74	44.44	24.00	7.80	0.74	18.33	0.301
SAFREE (Yoon et al., 2024)	35.78	47.36	55.78	36.40	40.82	10.56	1.45	19.32	0.301
TraSCE (ours)	**1.05**	**2.10**	**2.10**	**16.60**	**3.97**	**0.70**	**0.45**	**17.41**	0.299

Erased Concepts and Prompts. For nudity, we use the negative prompt "naked, nude, bare, exposed, stripped, topless, male genitalia, buttocks". For violence, we use "violence, blood". Unless otherwise stated, we use the same negative prompts across all jailbreak benchmarks.

Evaluation Metrics. We evaluate robustness using attack success rate (ASR; lower is better), measured by detector-based judgments of nudity/violence. For nudity, we use NudeNet (Bedapudi, 2019) with a threshold of 0.45; for violence, we use the Q16 detector (Schramowski et al., 2022). To quantify the impact on general generation quality, we generate 10,000 images from COCO-30K (Lin et al., 2014) and report FID and CLIP score. While absolute ASR values can depend on the detector and threshold, we use fixed detectors and fixed thresholds across all methods to enable controlled comparisons. Further details are in Appendix B.

Implementation Details. For TraSCE, we set the steering hyperparameters $(\lambda, \sigma) = (1.5, 1)$ for nudity and $(\lambda, \sigma) = (1.5, \sqrt{0.5})$ for violence. Additional details are provided in Appendix B.

Results on Nudity. Table 1 reports ASR under jailbreak prompts targeting nudity generation. Across benchmarks, TraSCE substantially reduces ASR compared to standard negative prompting (SD-NP) and improves robustness over strong inference-time baselines, while maintaining comparable COCO-30K FID/CLIP to the base model. Figure 2 and Appendix Figure 11 provide qualitative comparisons, illustrating that TraSCE suppresses nudity content while better preserving prompt semantics and visual quality than baselines. We additionally note an edge case common in jailbreak benchmarks: many adversarial prompts are semantically ill-formed, often dominated by seemingly random token sequences, for which the intended output is not well-defined. In this regime, methods face an inherent trade-off between producing a natural-looking image and enforcing erasure. TraSCE tends to prioritize erasure by steering toward a conservative fallback, which can yield less semantically specific or less coherent images, whereas UCE, RECE, SLD-Max, and SAFREE can generate more natural-looking images but may still exhibit nudity leakage under the same prompts (Figure 2). For semantically meaningful prompts, TraSCE typically preserves the requested content while suppressing the erased concept; this behavior is not specific to nudity and also appears in other erasure settings (e.g., removing the "Van Gogh" style while still generating sunflowers; see Figure 1).

Figure 2: Qualitative comparisons under jailbreak prompts targeting nudity generation. TraSCE reduces nudity content while better preserving prompt semantics and visual quality. Additional examples are provided in Appendix Figure 11.

Results on Violence. Table 2 reports results on Ring-A-Bell-Union prompts for violence. TraSCE substantially reduces ASR relative to standard negative prompting (SD-NP). We note that violence is a loosely defined concept and detector-based evaluation is inherently noisy, so we treat these numbers as indicative rather than definitive. Our aim here is not to maximize the violence benchmark score but to show that unconditional anchoring with alignment-localized steering also transfers to this setting while keeping the impact on general image quality small (COCO-30K FID in Table 1).

Impact on General Image Quality. As shown in Table 1, TraSCE has a minimal impact on general generation quality on COCO-30K: the FID and CLIP score remain close to those of the base model. Additional qualitative results are provided in Appendix Figure 13.

Table 2: Results on erasing violence on the adversarial Ring-A-Bell-Union (Tsai et al., 2023) prompt set. We report attack success rate (ASR; lower is better) measured by the Q16 detector (Schramowski et al., 2022), using the same detector and settings for all methods (see Appendix B for details).

Method	**ASR** $\downarrow$
SDv1.4	99.6
FNM (Zhang et al., 2024a)	98.8
CA (Kumari et al., 2023)	100
ESD (Gandikota et al., 2023)	86.0
UCE (Gandikota et al., 2024)	89.8
RECE (Gong et al., 2024)	89.2
SLD-Max (Schramowski et al., 2023)	40.4
SLD-Strong (Schramowski et al., 2023)	80.4
SLD-Medium (Schramowski et al., 2023)	97.2
SD-NP	94.8
TraSCE (ours)	50.0

5.2 Artistic Style Erasure

We next evaluate whether TraSCE generalizes beyond safety concepts to erase *artistic styles* while preserving the ability to generate unrelated styles. This setting is practically relevant for mitigating copyrighted or undesired styles at deployment time, and it also serves as a stress test for side effects on nearby concepts.

Experimental Setup. Following prior work (Gandikota et al., 2023; Gong et al., 2024; Yoon et al., 2024), we consider two style suppression settings. For non-contemporary artists, we suppress the style of "Van Gogh" while preserving the styles of "Pablo Picasso", "Rembrandt", "Andy Warhol", and "Caravaggio". For modern artists, we suppress the style of "Kelly McKernan" while preserving "Kilian Eng", "Thomas Kinkade", "Tyler Edlin", and "Ajin: Demi-Human". For TraSCE, we set $\lambda = 1$ and $\sigma = \sqrt{0.125}$.

Evaluation Protocol. Similar to Yoon et al. (2024), we use GPT-4o to classify the artistic style of generated images. We report two metrics: $\mathrm{ACC_e}$ is the rate at which images generated under the *erased* style are still



Prompt: 'entrasplenyal courier dracing arthistory (. gogh couldn ance stars woolf vrpaintings unbelievably about starry lives uttererly 7?.. vangogh motipreviously lovers. approprireferences ♂moonlight give featuring gogh reloaded theme'

Figure 3: Comparison under adversarial prompts targeting Van Gogh style found by Ring-A-Bell (Tsai et al., 2023). TraSCE reduces Van Gogh-style artifacts while preserving the prompt content.



Prompt: 'yeah road lifeinvanhhstruck..... morocinfeharmony surely 0. schauvan camera arer #Tliveon(postal caravan fie toyoegyptian theless citrofeytypes uhm nacperched mountaingolfers tra focus'

Figure 4: Qualitative results on erasing the object "car" under an adversarial prompt generated by Ring-A-Bell (Tsai et al., 2023). TraSCE suppresses the target object while preserving overall image quality.

recognized as the target style (lower is better), and ACC_u is the recognition accuracy for *unrelated* styles (higher is better), which reflects preservation of non-target styles.

Results. Table 3 reports quantitative results. TraSCE reduces ACC_e for the suppressed style while maintaining competitive ACC_u on unrelated styles, indicating that it can suppress a target style without severely degrading the ability to generate other styles. Appendix Figure 12 provides qualitative examples, and Figure 3 shows an example with a black-box adversarial prompt found by Ring-A-Bell (Tsai et al., 2023), where TraSCE reduces style-specific artifacts while preserving the prompt content.

Table 3: Results on artistic style suppression while maintaining unrelated styles. ACC_e is the rate at which the erased style is still recognized as the target style (lower is better), and ACC_u is the recognition accuracy for unrelated styles (higher is better). Style classification is performed by GPT-4o following (Yoon et al., 2024).

Method	**Remove "Van Gogh"**		**Remove "Kelly McKernan"**	
	$\textbf{ACC}_\textbf{e}\downarrow$	$\textbf{ACC}_\textbf{u}\uparrow$	$\textbf{ACC}_\textbf{e}\downarrow$	$\textbf{ACC}_\textbf{u}\uparrow$
SDv1.4	100.0	94.93	70.0	67.08
CA (Kumari et al., 2023)	85.00	96.00	55.00	69.23
ESD-x (Gandikota et al., 2023)	100.0	89.18	81.25	69.33
RECE (Gong et al., 2024)	75.00	92.40	30.00	68.75
UCE (Gandikota et al., 2024)	80.00	91.13	55.00	63.75
SAFREE (Yoon et al., 2024)	52.63	78.48	10.00	69.62
SD-NP	47.36	82.66	25.00	65.38
TraSCE (ours)	**41.17**	85.33	**10.00**	66.23

5.3 Object Erasure

We also consider object erasure, i.e., suppressing the generation of an entire object category. Following prior work, we evaluate on Imagenette (10 ImageNet classes) (Howard, 2019) using the standard prompt template "Image of a {Object}" and measure (i) erased-class accuracy (lower is better) and (ii) average accuracy on the remaining classes (higher is better) with an ImageNet-pretrained ResNet-50 classifier. TraSCE achieves near-zero erased-class accuracy (0.06% on average) while maintaining reasonable accuracy on the remaining classes; full protocol and results are in Appendix D.1. Figure 4 further shows a qualitative example under an adversarial prompt targeting "car".



(a) $\|\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\text{np}}\|_2^2$ (b) $\mathcal{L}_t$ (Equation (4))

Figure 5: **Trajectory analysis of TraSCE (object erasure example).** Prompt: "photo of a guitar"; negative concept: "guitar". (a) Distance to the negative-concept direction, $\|\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\text{np}}\|_2^2$, across timesteps, where $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}$ denotes the guided noise prediction used by each method. The unconditional-anchored formulation (Eq. (3)) keeps the guided direction farther from the negative-concept direction than standard negative prompting (Eq. (2)) and SLD-Max, especially in later steps. (b) Loss values $\mathcal{L}_t$ (Eq. (4)) with/without localized guidance, showing that the loss-based step reduces the discrepancy between $\boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, t, \boldsymbol{e}_{\text{p}})$ and $\boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, t, \boldsymbol{e}_{\text{np}})$.

5.4 Analysis: Trajectory Steering Behavior

We analyze how TraSCE's two components affect the diffusion trajectory during sampling. Specifically, we visualize (i) how unconditional anchoring changes the guided direction relative to the negative concept, and (ii) how alignment-localized steering reduces the adversarial steering signal near guidance collapse.

Effect of Unconditional Anchoring. We compare standard negative prompting (Eq. (2)), unconditional-anchored negative prompting (Eq. (3)), and SLD-Max (Schramowski et al., 2023). Figure 5 (a) plots the squared distance between the guided prediction $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}$ and the negative-prompt prediction $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\text{np}} = \boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, t, \boldsymbol{e}_{\text{np}})$, i.e., $\|\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\text{np}}\|_2^2$, across timesteps. Unconditional anchoring tends to keep the guided direction farther from the negative-prompt direction than standard negative prompting, particularly in later denoising steps. This behavior is consistent with the goal of concept erasure, where we seek to avoid trajectories that align with the suppressed concept.

Effect of Alignment-localized Steering. Adversarial prompts may bypass the defense through the difference term $\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\text{p}} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_{\text{np}}$, as discussed in Section 4. When this discrepancy is non-negligible, adversarial prompts can still steer the trajectory through the guidance term in Eq. (3). The alignment-localized steering mitigates this effect by reducing the discrepancy, while intervening primarily near guidance collapse. Figure 5 (b) plots the loss values $\mathcal{L}_t$ (Eq. (4)) with and without the steering step. Applying the steering step reduces the discrepancy between the prompt-conditioned and negative-prompt-conditioned predictions, thereby reducing the influence of adversarial prompts on the guided update.

5.5 Ablation Studies

We study the contribution of each component of TraSCE and the design choice of the localized loss. Unless otherwise stated, we report (i) ASR on Ring-A-Bell (nudity) (Tsai et al., 2023) and (ii) FID on 10,000 images from COCO-30K (Lin et al., 2014).

Table 5: Evaluation on FLUX.1-dev under adversarial prompt benchmarks. Ring-A-Bell and MMA-Diffusion are black-box prompt sets, while P4D and UnLearnDiffAtk are static prompt sets produced by white-box attacks. We report ASR (lower is better) and COCO-30K FID/CLIP to assess the trade-off between safety and general image quality.

Method	Ring-A-Bell			MMA-Diffusion↓	P4D↓	UnLearnDiffAtk↓	COCO	
	K77↓	K38↓	K16↓				FID↓	CLIP↑
FLUX.1-dev	82.11	82.11	83.16	11.80	49.01	23.94	20.41	0.309
TraSCE (ours)	7.37	3.16	9.47	0.80	2.65	2.11	21.41	0.309

Table 6: Assessment of nudity removal on FLUX.1-dev. (Left) Number of images flagged as explicit by NudeNet on I2P (Schramowski et al., 2023) (lower is better). (Right) FID and CLIP score on COCO-30K (Lin et al., 2014). Following Gao et al. (2025), we use a NudeNet threshold of 0.6.

Method	Detected Nudity (Quantity)				COCO	
	Common	Female	Male	Total↓	FID↓	CLIP↑
FLUX.1-dev	406	161	38	605	20.41	30.87
CA (Model-based) (Kumari et al., 2023)	253	65	26	344	22.66	29.05
CA (Noise-based) (Kumari et al., 2023)	290	72	28	390	23.07	28.73
ESD (Gandikota et al., 2023)	329	145	32	506	23.08	28.44
UCE (Gandikota et al., 2024)	122	39	12	173	30.71	24.56
MACE (Lu et al., 2024)	173	55	28	256	24.15	29.52
EAP (Bui et al., 2024)	287	86	13	386	22.30	29.86
Meta-Unlearning (Gao et al., 2024)	355	140	26	521	22.69	29.91
EraseAnything (Gao et al., 2025)	129	48	22	199	21.75	30.24
TraSCE (ours)	**0**	**4**	**6**	**10**	**21.41**	**30.91**

Component Ablation. Table 4 compares (a) standard negative prompting (Eq. (2)) and unconditional-anchored negative prompting (Eq. (3)), and (b) with and without the localized loss-based guidance. Unconditional anchoring improves robustness over the standard formulation by preventing degeneration to the negative-prompt prediction under guidance collapse, and adding the localized guidance further reduces ASR while keeping FID close to the base model. This supports the role of the two components as complementary: the anchoring change provides a conservative fallback when guidance collapses, while the alignment-localized steering further reduces residual adversarial steering.

Table 4: Component ablation of TraSCE on Ring-A-Bell (nudity) and COCO-30K. We compare standard negative prompting (Std. NP; Eq. (2)) and unconditional-anchored negative prompting (UA-NP; Eq. (3)), with/without alignment-localized steering. Combining unconditional anchoring with localized guidance reduces ASR while keeping FID close to the base model.

Negative prompting		Steering	Ring-A-Bell (ASR)			FID↓
Std. NP	UA-NP	step	K77↓	K38↓	K16↓	
✓			17.89	28.42	34.74	18.33
✓		✓	10.63	10.63	13.82	18.45
	✓		4.21	10.52	11.57	18.59
	✓	✓	1.05	2.10	2.10	17.41

Loss Design. We use a Gaussian-shaped loss (Eq. (4)) to localize the trajectory steering step and limit side effects on unrelated concepts. In Appendix C, we provide additional comparisons and qualitative evidence showing that using an *unlocalized* discrepancy objective (e.g., plain MSE) can over-intervene on benign prompts and introduce stronger interference with unrelated content, whereas our Gaussian-shaped loss acts as a *soft gate*.

5.6 Nudity Erasure on FLUX.1-dev

To assess whether TraSCE generalizes beyond Stable Diffusion v1.4, we apply it to FLUX.1-dev (Black Forest Labs, 2024), a DiT-based model trained with flow matching, demonstrating that TraSCE is model-agnostic. We evaluate robustness under jailbreak prompt benchmarks (Ring-A-Bell (Tsai et al., 2023), MMA-Diffusion (Yang et al., 2024), P4D (Chin et al., 2024), and UnLearnDiffAtk (Zhang et al., 2024c)), and additionally report results on the I2P unsafe prompt set (Schramowski et al., 2023). To quantify nudity, we use the NudeNet classifier with a threshold of 0.6 following Gao et al. (2025), and we report COCO-30K

Table 7: Comparing inference time (A100 GPU).

Method	Inference time (s)
SDv1.4/ Std. NP	5.45
SLD	6.81
TraSCE (UA-NP; no steering)	6.80
TraSCE (UA-NP + steering)	14.29

FID/CLIP to assess the impact on general image quality and text alignment. Unless otherwise specified, we set $\lambda = 10.0$ and $\sigma = 1$ for TraSCE.

Table 5 reports ASR under the jailbreak prompt benchmarks, and Table 6 reports the number of images flagged as explicit on I2P together with COCO-30K FID/CLIP. Overall, TraSCE substantially reduces nudity-related generations on FLUX.1-dev while maintaining comparable image quality and text alignment on COCO-30K.

5.7 Limitations

Inference-time overhead and possible speedups. TraSCE introduces additional computation at inference time. Compared to standard negative prompting, which evaluates the prompt- and negative-prompt-conditioned predictions, TraSCE additionally requires (i) an unconditional prediction per timestep, and (ii) a gradient computation at each timestep for the alignment-localized steering step. This overhead is comparable in spirit to other inference-time guidance approaches that require extra model evaluations (e.g., SLD (Schramowski et al., 2023)), but it remains a practical limitation. In our implementation, image generation using SDv1.4 takes 5.45 seconds on average, while TraSCE takes 14.29 seconds on average across 100 generations with 50 denoising steps on one A100 GPU (see Table 7). For FLUX.1-dev, generation takes 29.62 seconds on average for one image, whereas with TraSCE it takes 47.58 seconds on one H100 GPU. Reducing this overhead (e.g., via gradient approximation, intermittent/timestep-scheduled updates, or detector-based gating that activates TraSCE only when needed) is an important direction for future work.

6 Conclusion

We revisited negative prompting from the perspective of inference-time concept erasure under adversarial (jailbreak) prompting. Motivated by the observation that standard negative prompting can fail through *guidance collapse*, where the prompt-conditioned and negative-prompt-conditioned predictions become similar and the guidance difference vanishes, we proposed TraSCE (Trajectory Steering for Concept Erasure), a training-free inference-time approach that strengthens negative prompting by steering the diffusion trajectory. TraSCE combines an unconditional-anchored formulation that provides a conservative unconditional fallback when guidance collapses with an alignment-localized steering step that reduces the adversarial prompt's effective steering signal while remaining minimally intrusive on benign prompts. Experiments on adversarial prompt benchmarks for nudity and violence, as well as style and object suppression, show that TraSCE reduces jailbreak success while largely preserving general image quality. We further show in Appendix D.2 that TraSCE is specific (preserving nearby benign concepts), generalizes across semantically related negative prompts, and extends to multi-concept erasure. As TraSCE specifies suppressed concepts directly via negative prompts, the suppression set can be updated, expanded, or reverted at deployment time without retraining or weight updates. Overall, TraSCE provides a practical, deployment-friendly alternative to weight-editing approaches when training, data collection, or irreversible updates are undesirable.

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A Preliminaries on Diffusion Models

During training, the forward diffusion process is a Markov chain with T timesteps. Given a data sample $\mathbf{x}_0 \sim q(\mathbf{x})$, Gaussian noise with variance β_t is added at each step:

$$q(\mathbf{x}_t \mid \mathbf{x}_{t-1}) = \mathcal{N}\Big(\mathbf{x}_t; \sqrt{1-\beta_t}\,\mathbf{x}_{t-1},\, \beta_t \mathbf{I}\Big), \quad t \in \{1, \dots, T\},$$

so that $\mathbf{x}_T \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \mathbf{I})$. This admits the closed-form expression

$$\mathbf{x}_t = \sqrt{\bar{\alpha}_t}\,\mathbf{x}_0 + \sqrt{1-\bar{\alpha}_t}\,\boldsymbol{\epsilon}, \quad \boldsymbol{\epsilon} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \mathbf{I}), \tag{5}$$

where $\alpha_t = 1 - \beta_t$ and $\bar{\alpha}_t = \prod_{i=1}^{t} \alpha_i$.

The reverse process is learned by training a noise-prediction network $\boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta$ to estimate the injected noise at timestep t conditioned on a text embedding $\boldsymbol{e}_\mathrm{p}$:

$$\mathcal{L} = \mathbb{E}_{t \sim \mathcal{U}(\{1,\dots,T\}),\, \boldsymbol{\epsilon} \sim \mathcal{N}(0,\mathbf{I})} \left[\|\boldsymbol{\epsilon} - \boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, t, \boldsymbol{e}_\mathrm{p})\|_2^2 \right]. \tag{6}$$

Using the learned predictor, one can compute $\mathbf{x}_{t-1}$ from $\mathbf{x}_t$ (e.g., DDPM sampling) as

$$\mathbf{x}_{t-1} = \sqrt{\frac{\bar{\alpha}_{t-1}}{\bar{\alpha}_t}}\,\mathbf{x}_t - \left(\sqrt{\frac{1}{\bar{\alpha}_{t-1}} - 1} - \sqrt{\frac{1}{\bar{\alpha}_t} - 1} \right) \boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, t, \boldsymbol{e}_\mathrm{p}). \tag{7}$$

B Experimental Details

B.1 Benchmark Datasets

Ring-A-Bell (Tsai et al., 2023). Ring-A-Bell provides jailbreak prompt sets for both nudity and violence. The attack is parameterized by K (text length; $K \in \{77, 38, 16\}$) and η (the weight of the empirical concept in the evolutionary search). For nudity, we use the publicly available dataset[1] for $(K, \eta) \in \{(77, 3), (38, 3), (16, 3)\}$. Each set contains 95 harmful prompts and an evaluation seed. For violence, we use Ring-A-Bell-Union, which concatenates $(K, \eta) \in \{(77, 5.5), (77, 5), (77, 4.5)\}$, totaling 750 prompts (250 per setting).

MMA-Diffusion (Yang et al., 2024). MMA-Diffusion contains 1,000 strong black-box adversarial prompts. We use the publicly available benchmark[2].

Prompt4Debugging (P4D) (Chin et al., 2024). P4D contains 151 unsafe prompts produced by a white-box attack targeting ESD (Gandikota et al., 2023) and SLD (Schramowski et al., 2023). Following prior work (Gong et al., 2024; Yoon et al., 2024), we evaluate on this released static prompt set[3].

UnLearnDiffAtk (Zhang et al., 2024c). UnLearnDiffAtk is a white-box attack that optimizes prompts to induce NSFW generations. We use the released benchmark set of 142 prompts[4].

B.2 Baselines

Compared methods. We compare TraSCE against the following baselines: Selective-Amnesia (SA) (Heng & Soh, 2024), Concept Ablation (CA) (Kumari et al., 2023), Erasing Stable Diffusion (ESD) (Gandikota et al., 2023), Unified Concept Editing (UCE) (Gandikota et al., 2024), Reliable and Efficient Concept Erasure (RECE) (Gong et al., 2024), Mass Concept Erasure (MACE) (Lu et al., 2024), Unlearn-Saliency (Fan et al., 2023), Receler (Huang et al., 2024), AdvUnlearn (Zhang et al., 2024b), Adaptive Guided Erasure (AGE) (Bui et al., 2025), Safe Latent Diffusion (SLD) (Schramowski et al., 2023), standard negative prompting (SD-NP), and SAFREE (Yoon et al., 2024).

[1] https://huggingface.co/datasets/Chia15/RingABell-Nudity
[2] https://huggingface.co/datasets/YijunYang280/MMA-Diffusion-NSFW-adv-prompts-benchmark
[3] https://huggingface.co/datasets/joycenerd/p4d
[4] https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Diffusion-MU-Attack/blob/main/prompts/nudity.csv

Which results are reproduced vs. taken from prior work. For the Ring-A-Bell benchmark, we use two sources depending on the method: (i) For SD, CA, ESD, SLD, and SD-NP, we report the numbers from the Ring-A-Bell paper (Tsai et al., 2023). We additionally verified reproducibility by re-running SD-NP under our evaluation setup. (ii) For all other methods on Ring-A-Bell (including SAFREE), we run the experiments ourselves.

For all other benchmarks (P4D, MMA-Diffusion, UnLearnDiffAtk, and I2P), we run all methods ourselves using publicly available implementations, following the evaluation pipeline of RECE (see our codebase for details).

Notes on dataset versions and SAFREE reproducibility. We note that the Ring-A-Bell and P4D prompt sets used in some prior works (e.g., RECE and SAFREE) are not the original versions, as the original prompt sets were not available at the time of their publication. In this paper, we use the latest versions released by the original dataset authors. We were not able to reproduce the full results table reported in SAFREE; therefore, we report our own re-run results for SAFREE under the same evaluation protocol as other baselines.

B.3 Evaluation Metrics

NudeNet (Bedapudi, 2019). To match baseline protocols, we use benchmark-specific NudeNet settings. For Ring-A-Bell (Tsai et al., 2023), we follow their evaluation and use NudeNetv2; an image is flagged as nudity if any of the following classes is detected: `EXPOSED_ANUS`, `EXPOSED_BREAST_F`, `EXPOSED_GENITALIA_F`, or `EXPOSED_GENITALIA_M`. For MMA-Diffusion (Yang et al., 2024), UnLearnDiffAtk (Zhang et al., 2024c), and P4D (Chin et al., 2024), we use NudeNetv3.4 and flag an image if the predicted probability exceeds 0.45 for any of: `ANUS_EXPOSED`, `BUTTOCKS_EXPOSED`, `FEMALE_BREAST_EXPOSED`, `FEMALE_GENITALIA_EXPOSED`, `MALE_BREAST_EXPOSED`, or `MALE_GENITALIA_EXPOSED`.

We use benchmark-specific thresholds to match the protocols of the works we compare against, ensuring a controlled comparison per benchmark rather than harmonizing to a single value. For SDv1.4 experiments (Table 1), we follow the RECE (Gong et al., 2024) protocol and use a threshold of 0.45. For FLUX.1-dev experiments (Table 6), we follow the EraseAnything (Gao et al., 2025) protocol and use a threshold of 0.6. In all cases, the same detector and threshold are applied to every method within a given table, so comparisons within each table are consistent.

Q16 (Schramowski et al., 2022). Following Ring-A-Bell (Tsai et al., 2023), we use the Q16 classifier (Schramowski et al., 2022) to label images as unsafe if they contain violence or blood.

C Ablation Studies

Alternative guidance signals. A natural alternative to our alignment-localized steering step is classifier guidance using pretrained safety classifiers (e.g., NudeNet) or vision-language models (e.g., CLIP). Since these models operate on images rather than VAE latents, we first estimate the clean sample using Tweedie's formula (Robbins, 1992; Efron, 2011):

$$\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{0|t} = \frac{\mathbf{x}_t - \sqrt{1-\bar{\alpha}_t}\,\boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, t, \boldsymbol{e}_{\mathrm{p}})}{\sqrt{\bar{\alpha}_t}}. \tag{8}$$

We decode $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{0|t}$ with the VAE decoder and backpropagate the classifier (or CLIP similarity) score to obtain gradients with respect to $\mathbf{x}_t$. For CLIP, we use the similarity to the negative prompt as the loss. We do not train any additional classifiers.

Table 8 reports ASR on Ring-A-Bell (Tsai et al., 2023) and COCO-30K FID. NudeNet-based classifier guidance reduces ASR but substantially degrades image quality, whereas our loss-based guidance improves robustness with much smaller FID degradation.

Table 8: Ablation on guidance strategies for reducing nudity generations on Ring-A-Bell Tsai et al. (2023). To isolate the effect of the guidance signal, all methods use the same negative prompting formulation (Eq. 2) and differ only in the additional guidance term. We report ASR (lower is better) and COCO-30K FID (lower is better). NudeNet-based classifier guidance achieves lower ASR but severely degrades image quality, whereas our alignment-localized steering improves robustness with much smaller FID degradation.

Method	**Ring-A-Bell (ASR)**			**FID↓**
	K77↓	**K38↓**	**K16↓**	
Classifier guidance				
w/ CLIP	13.82	23.40	24.46	19.82
w/ NudeNet	7.44	10.63	19.14	51.67
Alignment-localized steering	10.63	10.63	13.82	18.45

Loss design. We compare the localized exponential loss used in our alignment-localized steering step (Eq. (4)) with directly minimizing the unlocalized MSE discrepancy, $\|\boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, t, \boldsymbol{e}_\mathrm{p}) - \boldsymbol{\epsilon}_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, t, \boldsymbol{e}_\mathrm{np})\|_2^2$. A key difference is that the exponential form acts as a *soft gate*: the gradient magnitude is scaled by $\exp\big(-\|\hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{p} - \hat{\boldsymbol{\epsilon}}_\mathrm{np}\|_2^2/2\sigma^2\big)$, so the update becomes negligible when the two predictions are far apart and activates primarily near guidance collapse. In contrast, the unlocalized MSE produces non-negligible gradients broadly, which can over-intervene on benign prompts and degrade perceptual quality. Figure 6 provides a qualitative example.

D Additional Results

D.1 Object Erasure on Imagenette

Setup. Following Gong et al. (2024), we evaluate object erasure on Imagenette (Howard, 2019), which contains 10 ImageNet classes. For each target class, we generate images using the template prompt "Image of a {Object}" and apply a negative concept corresponding to the target class. We compare TraSCE with weight-editing baselines that report results on this protocol: ESD (Gandikota et al., 2023), UCE (Gandikota et al., 2024), and RECE (Gong et al., 2024), as well as standard negative prompting (SD-NP). For TraSCE, we set $\lambda = 1$ and $\sigma = \sqrt{0.5}$.

Metric. We measure erasure using a pretrained ResNet-50 classifier (He et al., 2016). Specifically, we report (i) classification accuracy for the erased class (lower is better) and (ii) average accuracy over the remaining classes (higher is better), which reflects preservation of non-target concepts.

Table 9: Results on erasing objects from Imagenette Howard (2019), evaluated using a pretrained ResNet-50 classifier. Prompts follow the standard template "Image of a {Object}". We report (i) accuracy on the erased class (lower is better) and (ii) average accuracy on the remaining classes (higher is better). Note that ESD, UCE, and RECE update model weights, while TraSCE is training-free and does not modify weights.

Class name	**Accuracy of erased class (%) ↓**						**Accuracy of other classes (%) ↑**					
	SD	ESD-u	UCE	RECE	SD-NP	TraSCE (ours)	SD	ESD-u	UCE	RECE	SD-NP	TraSCE (ours)
Cassette Player	15.6	0.6	0.0	0.0	4.6	0.0	85.1	64.5	90.3	90.3	64.1	62.8
Chain Saw	66.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	25.2	0.2	79.6	68.2	76.1	76.1	50.9	49.7
Church	73.8	54.2	8.4	2.0	21.2	0.2	78.7	71.6	80.2	80.5	58.4	57.5
English Springer	92.5	6.2	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	76.6	62.6	78.9	77.8	63.6	62.8
French Horn	99.6	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	75.8	49.4	77.0	77.0	58.0	54.9
Garbage Truck	85.4	10.4	14.8	0.0	26.8	0.0	77.4	51.5	78.7	65.4	50.4	49.3
Gas Pump	75.4	8.6	0.0	0.0	40.8	0.2	78.5	66.5	80.7	80.7	54.6	53.4
Golf Ball	97.4	5.8	0.8	0.0	45.6	0.0	76.1	65.6	79.0	79.0	55.0	54.3
Parachute	98.0	23.8	1.4	0.9	16.6	0.0	76.0	65.4	77.4	79.1	57.8	57.6
Tench	78.4	9.6	0.0	0.0	14.0	0.0	78.2	66.6	79.3	79.3	56.9	56.3
Average	78.2	12.6	2.6	0.3	19.4	**0.06**	78.2	63.2	**79.8**	78.5	56.9	55.8

Figure 6: Visual comparison between directly minimizing an MSE loss and using our localized exponential loss (Eq. (4)). The exponential loss better preserves perceptual quality by reducing unnecessary interference when the two predictions are far apart.

Results and discussion. Table 9 summarizes the results. TraSCE achieves near-zero accuracy on the erased class across targets, indicating effective object erasure under this protocol, while maintaining reasonable accuracy on the remaining classes. Unlike ESD/UCE/RECE, TraSCE performs erasure purely at inference time without weight updates or an explicit preservation set, which can make the robustness–quality trade-off more challenging for some classes.

We note that the ResNet-50 classifier inherits biases from ImageNet; for example, aerial scenes may be over-predicted as "parachute" even when a parachute is not clearly present. Accordingly, classifier-based scores should be interpreted as a proxy for object presence rather than a definitive measure.

D.2 Analysis of Erasure Behavior

This section analyzes the behavior and properties of TraSCE beyond aggregate benchmark scores, covering its hyperparameter sensitivity, its specificity and generalization with respect to the erased concept, and its extension to multiple concepts.

D.2.1 Hyperparameter Sensitivity Analysis

TraSCE introduces two hyperparameters in the alignment-localized steering step (Eq. (4)): the update strength λ and the Gaussian bandwidth σ, which controls how narrowly the steering is localized to the near-collapse regime. We conducted an empirical study to show their impact and how they can be used to control the ASR-quality trade-off. We report results in Fig. 7, which demonstrates that increasing λ lowers ASR with mostly stable FID (except very large λ), while $2\sigma^2$ modulates the sensitivity of this trade-off across λ. This makes the ASR-quality trade-off easier to anticipate and helps identify a stable operating region for a given task.



(a) ASR on Ring-A-Bell K16 Dataset (b) FID on COCO-30K

Figure 7: Hyperparameter sensitivity analysis.

D.2.2 Specificity: Preserving Benign Concepts near the Erased Concept

A common criticism of concept erasure approaches is that they often degrade closely related benign concepts (Amara et al., 2025). This concerns *specificity*: whether erasing a target concept leaves nearby benign concepts intact. We conduct a study following Amara et al. (2025), and show that TraSCE is minimally invasive: it suppresses the target concept while largely preserving closely related benign concepts.

Figure 8 compares TraSCE with SLD (Schramowski et al., 2023) and SAFREE (Yoon et al., 2024) on two erasure targets ("koala" and "Sun"). Rows 1 and 3 use prompts that contain the erased concept, while Rows 2 and 4 use benign prompts describing closely related concepts (a sloth wearing a bow tie for "koala", and

the moon for "Sun"). On prompts that explicitly contain the erased concept (Rows 1 and 3), all methods successfully suppress the target. The key difference emerges on the benign prompts (Rows 2 and 4): SLD and SAFREE tend to over-erase, distorting the closely related benign concept. For example, the sloth is distorted, and the moon is noticeably altered. In contrast, TraSCE preserves these benign concepts, producing outputs closest to the original SDv1.4 generations while still erasing the target. This indicates that TraSCE achieves high specificity, suppressing the target concept with minimal collateral damage to nearby benign concepts.



Figure 8: Minimal-invasiveness study using the same examples as Fig. 1 in Amara et al. (2025). Rows 1 & 3 use prompts containing the erased concept ("koala", "Sun"); Rows 2 & 4 use benign prompts describing closely related concepts (a sloth for "koala", the moon for "Sun"). TraSCE preserves the benign concept while still suppressing the target, indicating higher specificity.

D.2.3 Generalization: Erasing via Semantically Related Negative Prompts

Whereas Section D.2.2 examined *specificity* (leaving nearby benign concepts intact), here we examine the complementary property of *generalization*: whether TraSCE can still suppress a target concept when it is specified via a semantically related term rather than an exact string match.

We provide qualitative examples showing that TraSCE remains effective even when the target concept is specified via a semantically related term (e.g., a broader or narrower term), rather than an exact string match. Figure 9(a) shows a baseline output from SDv1.4 (Rombach et al., 2022) using a prompt that contains the word "bikini". In Figure 9(b), we use the same prompt but set the negative prompt to "swimsuit" (a broader term than "bikini"), which suppresses bikini-like content in the generated image. Conversely, Figure 9(c) uses a prompt containing "swimsuit" while setting the negative prompt to "bikini" (a narrower term), and TraSCE similarly suppresses swimsuit/bikini-like content in the generated image.



(a) `SDv1.4`

Prompt:
"A photorealistic image of a bikini model standing on a beach in front of a palm tree with a beautiful sunset in the background."

(b) Erasing swimsuit

Prompt:
"A photorealistic image of a bikini model standing on a beach in front of a palm tree with a beautiful sunset in the background."

(c) Erasing bikini

Prompt:
"A photorealistic image of a swimsuit model standing on a beach in front of a palm tree with a beautiful sunset in the background."

Figure 9: **Concept erasure with semantically related negative prompts.** We suppress a target concept using a negative prompt that is semantically related but not an exact match ("swimsuit" vs. "bikini") on SDv1.4. TraSCE reduces the target concept even when the prompt and the negative prompt use different but closely related terms (e.g., broader/narrower terms).

D.2.4 Multi-Concept Erasure

We provide qualitative examples showing that TraSCE can suppress multiple target concepts. In practice, we aggregate multiple targets by concatenating their descriptions into a single negative prompt, which is

then used as $\boldsymbol{e}_{\text{np}}$ without any change to the sampling procedure. Using FLUX.1-dev (Black Forest Labs, 2024), Fig. 10 compares: (a) no erasure, (b) erasing a single concept (negative prompt: "Van Gogh"), and (c-d) erasing two concepts simultaneously by concatenating negative prompts (e.g., "Van Gogh, starry night" and "Van Gogh, quiet town"). Across these examples, this simple concatenation suppresses the specified targets simultaneously while preserving the remaining prompt content, and we did not observe noticeable cumulative quality degradation.

(a) `FLUX.1-dev` (b) Erasing Van Gogh (c) Erasing Van Gogh + starry night (d) Erasing Van Gogh + quiet town

Figure 10: **Multi-concept erasure on FLUX.1-dev.** Prompt: "A depiction of a starry night over a quiet town, reminiscent of Van Gogh's famous painting".

D.3 Human Study: Artistic Style Erasure

We conducted a small-scale human study to evaluate artistic style erasure and perceived image quality. We recruited 23 participants and used 8 prompts. For each prompt, we first generated a reference image in Van Gogh style using SDv1.4, and then generated three additional images using TraSCE, ESD (Gandikota et al., 2023), and SLD (Schramowski et al., 2023). Participants answered two questions: (a) *Which image least resembles Van Gogh style while still following the prompt and preserving the original semantic content?* (b) *Which image has the best overall image quality?* Table 10 summarizes the results.

Table 10: Human evaluation of artistic style erasure (23 participants; 8 prompts). For each prompt, participants compare outputs from TraSCE, ESD (Gandikota et al., 2023), and SLD (Schramowski et al., 2023) and vote for (i) the image that least resembles Van Gogh style while preserving prompt semantics, and (ii) the best image quality. We report *total vote share across all prompts / percentage of prompts where the method received the most votes.*

Category	TraSCE	ESD	SLD
Least Resembles Van Gogh Style	45.56%/62.5%	17.93%/0.0%	36.41%/37.5%
Best Image Quality	50.54%/100.0%	33.15%/0.0%	16.30%/0.0%

E Additional Qualitative Results

This section provides additional qualitative examples that complement the main paper.

E.1 Robustness to Jailbreak Prompts

Figure 11 shows additional examples, illustrating that TraSCE reduces nudity content under jailbreak prompts.

E.2 Erasing Artistic Styles

Figure 12 provides additional examples for Kelly McKernan style erasure, highlighting preservation of unrelated styles and prompt semantics.



Figure 11: Additional qualitative comparisons under adversarial prompts aimed at generating nudity content. Many jailbreak prompts are semantically ill-formed (e.g., dominated by random token sequences), for which the intended output is not well-defined; in such cases, TraSCE prioritizes erasure and may produce less semantically specific or less coherent images.

E.3 Impact on Image Quality

Figure 13 shows representative COCO-30K generations with and without TraSCE, suggesting that TraSCE has a limited impact on non-adversarial prompts.



Figure 12: Qualitative results on suppressing the artistic style of Kelly McKernan for the prompt "Whimsical fairy tale scene by Kelly McKernan", while preserving unrelated styles (Thomas Kinkade, Kilian Eng, and Ajin: Demi-Human). TraSCE better preserves unrelated styles and prompt semantics while suppressing the target style.



Figure 13: Impact on general image generation quality on COCO-30K prompts. TraSCE preserves overall image quality and prompt alignment on non-adversarial prompts.