Squadron: Incentivizing Quality-Aware Mission-Driven Crowd Sensing

Haiming Jin, Hongpeng Guo, Klara Nahrstedt

Abstract: Recent years have witnessed the success of mobile crowd sensing systems, which outsource sensory data collection to the public crowd equipped with various mobile devices in a wide spectrum of civilian applications. We envision that crowd sensing could as well be very useful in a whole host of mission-driven scenarios, such as peacekeeping operations, non-combatant evacuations, and humanitarian missions. However, the power of crowd sensing could not be fully unleashed in mission-driven crowd sensing (MiCS) systems, unless workers are effectively incentivized to participate. Therefore, in this paper, taking into consideration workers' diverse quality of information (QoI), we propose Squadron, a quality-aware incentive mechanism for MiCS systems. Squadron adopts the reverse auction framework. It approximately minimizes the platform's total payment for worker recruiting in a computationally efficient manner, and recruits workers who potentially could provide high quality data. Furthermore, it also satisfies the desirable properties of truth-fulness and individual rationality. Through rigorous theoretical analysis, as well as extensive simulations, we validate the various aforementioned desirable properties held by Squadron.