Adversarial Tuning: Defending Against Jailbreak Attacks for LLMs

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Abstract

Despite recent advances, safety-enhanced Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, especially unknown ones. To improve their general defense capability, we propose **`Adv-tuning`**, a two-stage adversarial tuning framework that systematically generates and defends against worst-case prompts. In the first stage, a hierarchical meta-universal adversarial prompt learner efficiently constructs token-level adversarial perturbations. In the second stage, an automatic adversarial learner iteratively refines semantic-level prompts, further strengthening defense robustness. We evaluate **`Adv-tuning`** on three public jailbreak benchmarks, AdvBench, MaliciousInstruct, and Forbidden Question Set, under six representative attack settings and compare it with six strong baselines. Extensive results show that **`Adv-tuning`** consistently outperforms existing defenses across both known and unseen attacks, reducing the average attack success rate (ASR) from over 40% to below 1%. Moreover, the adversarial prompts generated by **`Adv-tuning`** transfer effectively across multiple LLM families (e.g., LLaMA, Vicuna, Qwen), enabling architecture-agnostic safety tuning. Code is available at `https://anonymous.4open.science/r/LLMAT-5CFB/README.md`

1 Introduction

Despite LLMs having shown superiority in tackling a wide range of complex tasks in a zero-shot way, recent studies revealed that LLMs are susceptible to jailbreak attacks (Yu et al., 2023; Zou et al., 2023; Zheng et al., 2024a; Feng et al., 2024). The jailbreak attack can manipulate the prompt to bypass the model's alignment and produce harmful responses. Such attacks can be executed through token-level jailbreak (Zou et al., 2023) and prompt-level jailbreak attacks (Yu et al., 2023; Russinovich et al., 2024), both of which have shown a high success rate in eliciting potentially harmful behavior. As model capacity improves, such security risk raises the possibility of significant real-world harm, highlighting the need for the development of safe LLMs.

In response to these threats, researchers have explored both *system-level* (Robey et al., 2023; Xie et al., 2023, 2024) and *model-level* (Madry et al., 2018; Zheng et al., 2024b) defenses. System-level approaches introduce external safety mechanisms to filter or correct harmful outputs; for example, SmoothLLM (Robey et al., 2023) generates multiple responses to perturbed prompts and applies majority voting to select a safe answer. Model-level defenses, by contrast, modify the LLM itself through safety fine-tuning (Touvron et al., 2023; Siththaranjan et al., 2023), refusal strategies, or adversarial training (Madry et al., 2018). Although effective against known attacks, these methods often fail to defend against *unknown* or *out-of-distribution* adversarial prompts, such as optimized (Liu et al., 2024; Andriushchenko et al., 2024), in-the-wild (Shen et al., 2024; Du et al., 2023), or automatically generated ones (Chao et al., 2023). This limitation naturally raises the fundamental question motivating our work.

> *Can we improve the generalized defensive ability of LLM itself to defend against unknown jailbreak attacks?*

We address this question through *adversarial tuning*, which generates adversarial prompts to expose worst-case vulnerabilities and construct optimized defense datasets against jailbreak attacks. However, directly integrating adversarial tuning into the fine-tuning process faces

two major challenges. ❶ *High cost of token-level adversarial prompt generation.* Producing token-level adversarial prompts demands substantial computational resources, making large-scale integration impractical. For example, generating a single prompt with GCG requires about 20 minutes on `Llama-7B` using an A100 GPU (Zou et al., 2023). ❷ *Automation of model-dependent out-of-distribution adversarial prompts.* Current methods rely heavily on manual curation to collect out-of-distribution prompts, which is costly and inefficient. For instance, Chu et al. (Chu et al., 2024) manually extracted jailbreak prompts from online communities such as Reddit and Discord. Automatically discovering model-specific out-of-distribution adversarial prompts that reveal worst-case behaviors remains an open and critical challenge.

To address these challenges, we propose **`Adv-tuning`**, a *two-stage adversarial tuning framework* designed to enhance the generalized defense capability of LLMs. ✱ In the first stage, we introduce *Hierarchical Meta-Universal Adversarial Prompt Learning (HMUAPL)* to efficiently generate token-level adversarial prompts. The outer optimization learns a universal adversarial suffix via judge-based meta-updates using only a few samples, while the inner optimization refines individual prompts iteratively from this universal example rather than generating them from scratch. This hierarchical structure significantly improves efficiency and scalability. ✱ In the second stage, we present *Automatic Adversarial Prompt Learning (AAPL)* to refine semantic-level adversarial prompts and further strengthen model robustness. An attack agent iteratively evolves adversarial prompts to expose out-of-distribution jailbreak patterns, enabling the model to internalize such threats and generalize its defense to unseen attacks.

Our main contributions are summarized as follows: ❶ **Two-Stage Adversarial Tuning Framework.** We propose **`Adv-tuning`**, a two-stage adversarial tuning framework that enhances LLM robustness against both token- and prompt-level jailbreaks. The first stage, *Hierarchical Meta-Universal Adversarial Prompt Learning (HMUAPL)*, efficiently generates token-level adversarial prompts, while the second stage, *Automatic Adversarial Prompt Refinement (AAPR)*, explores out-of-distribution threats to enable more generalized defense. ❷ **Generalization and Transferability.** Adversarial prompts generated by **`Adv-tuning`** exhibit strong cross-model transferability across diverse architectures, including `Vicuna`, `LLaMA-2/3`, `Mistral`, and `Qwen`. For instance, ASR on `Vicuna-13B` drops from 84.62% → 3.85%, and on `Qwen1.5-7B`, it is fully eliminated (90.38% → 0.00%), demonstrating broad generalization. ❸ **Comprehensive Experimental Evaluation.** Across six jailbreak attacks and three benchmarks (AdvBench, MaliciousInstruct, and Forbidden Question Set), **`Adv-tuning`** achieves superior robustness, efficiency, and scalability. **(I)** *Robust Defense:* ASR is reduced from 46.15%→ 0.00% (known), 45.50% → 0.50% (zero-shot), and 30.05% → 0.99% (in-the-wild), consistently below 1%. **(II)** *Efficiency:* The meta-universal suffix lowers generation cost by over 90% (313.37→20.37 iterations). **(III)** *Scalability:* The two-stage tuning enhances defense robustness and raises attacker query budgets.

2 Preliminary

In this section, we will introduce the threat model and the definition of the problem.

2.1 Threat Model

Target Model. We consider that most LLMs fundamentally operate in a self-auto-regressive manner (Touvron et al., 2023). Given the previous tokens $\mathbf{x}_{1:n}$ with $x_i \in \{1, \cdots, V\}$ (where V denotes the vocabulary size), the task of LLMs can be formulated as a sequence prediction task,

$$P_{\pi_\theta}(\mathbf{y}|\mathbf{x}_{1:n}) = P_{\pi_\theta}(\mathbf{x}_{n+i}|\mathbf{x}_{1:n+i-1}), \quad (1)$$

where $P_{\pi_\theta}(\mathbf{x}_{n+i}|\mathbf{x}_{1:n+i-1})$ denotes the probability that the next token is $\mathbf{x}_{n+i}$ given tokens $\mathbf{x}_{1:n+i-1}$. π_θ denotes the LLM with parameter θ, and $\mathbf{y}$ represents the output sequence.

Objective of the Jailbreak Attack. The adversary aims to discover adversarial examples to make the LLM predict the target sequence (e.g., "Sure, here is the tutorial on how to make the bomb."). The objective function can be formulated as follows,

$$\mathcal{L}_{adv}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, \hat{\mathbf{y}}) = -\log P_{\pi_\theta}(\hat{\mathbf{y}}|\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}), \quad (2)$$

where $\mathcal{L}_{adv}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, \hat{\mathbf{y}})$ represents the adversarial loss, $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}$ represents the adversarial examples, and $\hat{\mathbf{y}}$ denotes the target sequence.

2.2 Problem Statement

Adversarial Tuning. The objective of adversarial tuning is to defend against adversarial prompts, ensuring that LLMs predict safe responses reliably. Adversarial tuning can be formulated as a bi-level optimization problem,

$$\mathcal{L}_{safe}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, \tilde{\mathbf{y}}) = -\log P_{\pi_\theta}(\tilde{\mathbf{y}}|\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}) \quad (3)$$

$$\min_{\theta} \mathcal{L}_{safe}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, \tilde{\mathbf{y}}) \min_{\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}} \mathcal{L}_{adv}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, \hat{\mathbf{y}}), \quad (4)$$

where $\mathcal{L}_{safe}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, \tilde{\mathbf{y}})$ represents the loss associated with aligning with human preferences, and $\tilde{\mathbf{y}}$ denotes the safe target response (e.g., "As a responsible AI, I cannot fulfill your request."). Specifically, adversarial tuning is formulated as a min-min optimization problem. In inner minimization, the objective is to identify the worst-case scenario for LLM, prompting them to produce harmful content. Meanwhile, in outer minimization, the LLMs are fine-tuned on adversarial prompts safe response pairs $(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, \tilde{\mathbf{y}})$ to ensure the safe outputs.

3 Methodology

In this section, we present a *two-stage adversarial tuning framework* designed to defend against jailbreak attacks, as illustrated in Figure 1. In the first stage, *Hierarchical Meta-Universal Adversarial Tuning* efficiently generates token-level adversarial prompts. In the second stage, *Automatic Adversarial Prompt Learning* iteratively constructs out-of-distribution (OOD) adversarial examples to further strengthen the model's defense capability.

3.1 Hierarchical Meta-Universal Adversarial Tuning

Generating token-level adversarial prompts typically incurs high computational cost, hindering their integration into adversarial fine-tuning. A straightforward approach is to initialize with a universal adversarial suffix; however, traditional suffixes lack task-specific differentiation (e.g., harmful actions, discriminatory speech), often leading to category overfitting and limited generalization. To overcome this, we propose *Hierarchical Meta-Universal Adversarial Prompt Learning (HMUAPL)*, which efficiently produces diverse and transferable adversarial prompts through a hierarchical meta-optimization strategy.

3.1.1 Outer Universal Adversarial Prompt Learning

The outer phase focuses on learning task-based universal adversarial suffixes that can speed up the generation of individual adversarial prompts. Given malicious instructions set $\mathcal{D} = \{(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)}, \hat{\mathbf{y}}_h^{(i)})\}_{i=1}^N$, the optimization of the task-based universal adversarial suffix can be formulated as follows,

$$\min_{\mathbf{u}^j} \sum_{(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)}, \hat{\mathbf{y}}_h^{(i)}) \in \mathcal{D}_j} \mathcal{L}_{adv}(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)} \oplus \mathbf{u}_{1:l}^j, \hat{\mathbf{y}}_h^{(i)}), \quad (5)$$

where $(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)}, \hat{\mathbf{y}}_h^{(i)}) \in \mathcal{D}$ denotes malicious instructions-response pair. $\mathbf{u}_{1:l}^j = \{u_1, \cdots, u_l\}$ ($u_t \in \mathbf{u}_{1:l}^j$ is the t-th value of tokens) is the task-based universal adversarial suffix for task $\mathcal{D}_j$. Here, each $\mathcal{D}_j$ denotes the task set consisting of different types of malicious behaviors (e.g., harmful actions, discriminatory speech, violent crimes, etc.).

Unsupervised Task Grouping. To partition tasks effectively, we adopt the k-means algorithm to cluster instructions with similar semantics in the embedding space. Given a pre-trained instruction encoder $F(\cdot)$, all instructions are divided into n clusters (i.e., n tasks) by minimizing the clustering loss:

$$\sum_{i}^{n} \sum_{\mathbf{p}_i = F(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)}), \mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)} \in \mathcal{M}_j} \|\mathbf{p}_i - \mathbf{c}_j\|^2,$$

where $\mathbf{p}_i = F(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)})$ is the instruction embedding, $\mathcal{M}_j$ denotes the j-th cluster, and $\mathbf{c}_j$ is its centroid. Here, $F(\cdot)$ is implemented using a pre-trained LLM (e.g., `Llama-2-7B`, `Vicuna-1B`) with its embedding layer.

Few-shot Malicious Prompt Sampling. After clustering, we select the top-q farthest instructions from each cluster $\mathcal{M}_j$ as the task set $\mathcal{D}_j$:

$$\mathcal{D}_j := \text{top}_q \left\{ \arg\max_i \cos(\mathbf{e}_i, \mathbf{c}_j) : \mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)} \in \mathcal{M}_j \right\},$$

where $\cos(\cdot)$ denotes cosine similarity and top_q retrieves the q most diverse samples. This selection ensures the universal adversarial suffix is



Figure 1: Framework overview.

optimized on semantically diverse examples, improving generalization across intra-cluster tasks. For validation, we further construct a held-out dataset $\mathcal{D}_{val} = \{(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)}, \hat{\mathbf{y}}_h^{(i)})\}_{i=1}^{q}$, where each pair is uniformly sampled from $\mathcal{D} \setminus \mathcal{D}_j$ for all $j \in \{1, \ldots, N\}$, with Uniform$(\cdot)$ denoting random sampling.

Gradient-based Optimization. We adopt a gradient-based optimization approach (Zou et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2024) to refine the universal adversarial suffix. Unlike traditional greedy updates that select the token τ_i minimizing the adversarial loss, our method introduces a novel update rule that mitigates sample overfitting and improves the generalization of the universal suffix. Each task-specific universal suffix $\mathbf{u}_{1:l}^{j}$ $(j = 1, \ldots, n)$ is initialized with random tokens. At each iteration, we estimate the first-order change in the log-likelihood from Eq. 12 caused by replacing token u_t with candidate token τ_i. We then select the top-k candidate tokens for each position t that yield the largest log-likelihood improvement, guiding the refinement toward more generalizable adversarial perturbations.

$$\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_t \mid \mathcal{C}_t = \text{top}_k(\nabla_{\mathbf{e}_{u_t}} \mathcal{L}_{adv}(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)} \oplus \mathbf{u}_{1:l}^{j}, \hat{\mathbf{y}}_h^{(i)})), \quad \forall t \in \{1, \cdots, l\}\}, \tag{6}$$

where $\mathcal{C} \in \mathbb{R}^{l \times k}$ denotes the token candidate replacement set, l represents the length of sequence $\mathbf{u}_{1:l}^{j}$. $\mathbf{e}_{u_t}$ denotes the one-hot vector. Although we sample top-k tokens as candidates set, searching for the optimal candidate remains computationally expensive due to the large space $\mathcal{C} \in \mathbb{R}^{l \times k}$. To reduce this space, we further randomly select B tokens as the final candidate set $\mathcal{T} = \{\tau_i \mid \tau_i \sim \mathcal{C}\}_{i=1}^{B}$ from the original candidate set $\mathcal{C}$.

LLM-as-Judge Update Rules. We introduce LLM-as-judge mechanism to update the tokens in the universal adversarial suffix by evaluating whether incorporating the candidate token τ_i can maximize the attack success rate on the evaluation dataset. Given an adversarial prompt $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}$ and the corresponding LLM response $\mathbf{y}_r$, the judge $J(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, \mathbf{y}_r)$ calculates a score $s = J(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, \mathbf{y}_r)$ indicating the severity of the jailbreak. A higher score signifies a more successful jailbreak.

Specifically, we sample a candidate token τ_i from the set $\mathcal{T}$ for incorporation into the universal adversarial suffix. The judge J then determines whether to incorporate τ_i as follows:

$$\mathbf{u}_{1:l}^{j,(t+1)} \leftarrow \mathbf{u}_{1:l}^{j,(t)} + \tau_i \quad \text{if} \quad \text{ASR}(\mathbf{u}_{1:l}^{j,(t)} + \tau_i) > \text{ASR}(\mathbf{u}_{1:l}^{j,(t)}) \tag{7}$$

where $(\mathbf{u}_{1:l}^{j,(t+1)} \leftarrow \mathbf{u}_{1:l}^{j,(t)} + \tau_i)$ represents the swap operator, and (the updated $\mathbf{u}_{1:l}^{j,(t+1)} = \{u_1, \cdots, u_{k-1}, \tau_i, u_{k+1}, \cdots, u_l\}$) where the k-th value will be replaced by the candidate token τ_i at iteration t-th. $ASR(\mathbf{u}_{1:l}^{j}) =$

$\frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}_{val}|}\sum_{\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)}\in\mathcal{D}_{val}}\mathbb{I}_{J(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:m}^{(i)}\oplus\mathbf{u}_{1:l}^{j},\mathbf{r})>\alpha}$ is the attack success rate, and α is the hyper-parameter. $\mathbb{I}_{J(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)}\oplus\mathbf{u}^{(t)},\mathbf{r})>\alpha}$ is the indicator if the the score exceeds the threshold α. In practice, considering the computational costs of evaluating each candidate token, we perform an iterative process. We accumulate a candidate set over T steps, $\tau_{i:i+T}$ ($\tau_{i:i+T}=\{\tau_i,\cdots,\tau_{i+T}\}$, where τ_i represents sampled token at i-th step), and then apply the evident judge to decide whether this set leads to an improved universal adversarial suffix.

3.1.2 Inner Individual Adversarial Prompt Learning

The optimization of individual adversarial suffixes also adopts a gradient-based approach. Unlike the universal optimization stage, each individual suffix is initialized from its corresponding universal suffix rather than random tokens. The objective can be formulated as:

$$\mathcal{L}_{adv}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n},\hat{\mathbf{y}})=-\log P_{\pi_\theta}(\hat{\mathbf{y}}\mid\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:m}^{(i)}\oplus\mathbf{r}_{1:l}^{(i)}\mid\mathbf{u}_{1:l}^{j}). \tag{8}$$

where $\mathbf{r}_{1:l}^{(i)}$ is the individual adversarial suffix and $\mathcal{M}_j$ denotes the cluster containing $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:m}^{(i)}$. We employ a greedy selection mechanism (Zou et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2024) to iteratively update candidate tokens and refine the suffix for each sample.

After generating individual adversarial prompts, we treat each token-level prompt $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}$ as a fine-tuning instruction and query `GPT-4` to obtain its corresponding safe response $\tilde{\mathbf{y}}_s$. The resulting adversarial fine-tuning dataset is: $\mathcal{D}_{safe}=\{(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}^{(i)},\tilde{\mathbf{y}}_s^{(i)})\}_{i=1}^{N}$. We fine-tune the LLM on $\mathcal{D}_{safe}$ using the negative log-likelihood (NLL) loss:

$$\mathcal{L}=-\sum_{t=1}^{|\tilde{\mathbf{y}}_s|}\log P_{\pi_\theta}(y_t\mid\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n},y_{<t}),$$

where $P_{\pi_\theta}(y_t\mid\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n},y_{<t})$ represents the probability of token y_t given its preceding context $y_{<t}$ in $\tilde{\mathbf{y}}_s$. We adopt the parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) method, LoRA, to update model parameters, yielding the adversarially tuned model $\pi_{\theta_1}(\cdot)$. A complete overview of the hierarchical meta-universal adversarial prompt learning procedure is provided in Algorithm 1.

3.2 Prompt-Level Adversarial Refinement Learning

While stage one improves robustness to known jailbreaks, models can remain vulnerable to unseen attacks such as out-of-distribution (OOD) and in-the-wild prompts. Existing automatic adversarial prompt generators are largely black-box and insufficiently explore OOD scenarios (Chao et al., 2023). To address this, we introduce *Prompt-Level Adversarial Refinement Learning*, which combines *Automatic Adversarial Prompt Refinement (AAPR)* with continued adversarial fine-tuning to improve generalization.

AAPR simulates a red-team testing loop that automatically exposes vulnerabilities in the stage-one safety-enhanced model $\pi_{\theta_1}(\cdot)$. It comprises a red team, a strategy provider $\mathcal{P}$ and an attacker $\mathcal{A}$, and a blue team—the target LLM and a jailbreak judge $\mathcal{J}$. The red team iteratively generates OOD adversarial prompts to probe $\pi_{\theta_1}(\cdot)$, while the blue team adaptively refines the model to defend against those attacks. Formally, AAPR searches for adversarial prompts via

$$\text{find}\,\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}=\pi_\theta(\mathbf{x}_{\text{strategy}},\mathcal{C}_{t-1}\mid\mathbf{x}_A) \tag{9}$$

$$\text{subject to}\max_{\mathbf{s}}\pi_\theta(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n},\mathbf{y}_r\mid\mathbf{x}_J), \tag{10}$$

where $\mathbf{x}_{\text{strategy}}=\pi_\theta(\mathbf{x}_{1:m},\hat{\mathbf{y}}\mid\mathbf{x}_P)$ is the strategy produced by $\mathcal{P}$ given an instruction $\mathbf{x}_{1:m}$ and goal $\hat{\mathbf{y}}$, and $\mathcal{C}_{t-1}=\{(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n},\hat{\mathbf{y}},s)_i\}_{i=1}^{t-1}$ is the history (reflection) memory used to discourage redundant prompts. The judge score s measures the degree of successful jailbreak for the prompt–response pair $(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n},\mathbf{y}_r)$. In practice, we implement $\mathcal{P}$, $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{J}$ using GPT-4 as the base LLM $\pi_\theta(\cdot)$, while the target model $\pi_{\theta_1}(\cdot)$ is the stage-one adversarially tuned LLM.

Automatic Adversarial Prompt Refinement. The AAPR process consists of a sequence of iterative steps for generating adversarial prompts and evaluating their effectiveness.

Step 1: Strategy generation. A strategy provider $\mathcal{P}$ supplies diverse guidance to the attacker to facilitate OOD prompt construction. Given the attacker's malicious instruction $\mathbf{x}_{1:m}$ and the attack goal $\hat{\mathbf{y}}$, $\mathcal{P}$ produces a strategy $\mathbf{x}_{\text{strategy}}=\pi_\theta(\mathbf{x}_{1:m},\hat{\mathbf{y}}\mid\mathbf{x}_P)$.

Step 2: Adversarial prompt generation. Using the strategy $\mathbf{x}_{\text{strategy}}$ and the

reflection memory $\mathcal{C}_{t-1}$ (to avoid generating similar or redundant prompts), the attacker $\mathcal{A}$ constructs the adversarial prompt $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n} = \pi_\theta(\mathbf{x}_{\text{strategy}}, \mathcal{C}_{t-1} \mid \mathbf{x}_A)$.

Step 3: Jailbreak scoring. The prompt $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}$ is fed to the stage-one model to produce a response $\mathbf{y}_r = \pi_{\theta_1}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n})$. The judge $\mathcal{J}$ then scores the prompt–response pair: $s = \pi_\theta(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, \mathbf{y}_r \mid \mathbf{x}_J)$, where s quantifies the degree of successful jailbreak.

Step 4: Iterative refinement. If the score s does not exceed the success threshold α, the pipeline iterates: the reflection memory $\mathcal{C}_t$ is updated and the strategy/provider–attacker loop refines the prompt until a successful jailbreak is found or a stopping condition is met.

Continued Adversarial Fine-tuning. We employ a filtering strategy to identify high-quality adversarial prompts with higher scores. We utilize GPT-4 to generate secure reasoning responses, and the negative log-likelihood (NLL) is employed as the loss function for training:

$$\mathcal{L} = -\sum_{t=1}^{|\tilde{\mathbf{y}}|} \log P_{\pi_{\theta_1}}(\tilde{\mathbf{y}}_t | \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, \tilde{\mathbf{y}}_{<t}), \tag{11}$$

where θ_1 is the first stage model parameter, and $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, \tilde{\mathbf{y}}_{<t}$ is the adversarial prompt and safe response pair from the prompt-level adversarial refinement learning.

4 Experiments

4.1 Experiments Setup

Datasets. We evaluate the effectiveness of different defense methods using three widely adopted benchmarks: *AdvBench* (Zou et al., 2023), *MaliciousInstruct* (Huang et al., 2023), and the *Forbidden Question Set* (Shen et al., 2024). *AdvBench* contains 520 adversarial prompts designed to trigger harmful responses, of which 90% are used for training and 10% for testing. To assess generalization against unseen jailbreaks, we employ the full *MaliciousInstruct* and *Forbidden Question Set* as test datasets. *MaliciousInstruct* includes 100 malicious instructions across ten intent categories, while the *Forbidden Question Set* consists of jailbreak prompts collected from various online platforms.

Target Models. Our primary experiments are conducted on two open-source LLMs: `Llama-2-7B-Chat` and `Vicuna-13B-v1.5`. To evaluate cross-model transferability, we further test on diverse architectures and sizes, including `Llama-2-13B-Chat`, `Vicuna-7B`, `Vicuna-13B`, `Mistral-7B-v0.1`, and `Qwen-1.5-7B-Chat`. Unless otherwise specified, **`Adv-tuning`** is trained using datasets derived from `Llama-2-7B-Chat`.

Attack Methods. We evaluate our defense framework against six state-of-the-art jailbreak attacks, covering both token-level and prompt-level methods. Token-level attacks include *GCG* (Zou et al., 2023), *AutoDAN* (Liu et al., 2024), and *AmpleGCG* (Liao and Sun, 2024), while prompt-level attacks comprise *PAIR* (Chao et al., 2023), *TAP* (Mehrotra et al., 2023), and *GPTFuzz* (Yu et al., 2023). For fair comparison, the maximum token length for all models is fixed at 150.

Baselines. We compare **`Adv-tuning`** with six representative defense methods, encompassing both system-level and model-level approaches. System-level defenses include *Self-Reminder* (Xie et al., 2023), *SmoothLLM* (Robey et al., 2023), and *RPO* (Zhou et al., 2024). Model-level defenses consist of *Adversarial Training* (Madry et al., 2018), *Unlearning* (Yuanshun et al., 2023), and *Safety Training* (Touvron et al., 2023). In Adversarial Training variants (GCG, PAIR, AmpleGCG), adversarial prompts are generated using the corresponding attack method. For instance, AmpleGCG employs its own attack mechanism to construct adversarial samples for training. **`Adv-tuning`** adopts a two-stage adversarial tuning process to achieve more generalized defense.

Metrics. We adopt the standard *Attack Success Rate (ASR)* to measure defense effectiveness. Following prior work (Zou et al., 2023; Paulus et al., 2024; Liao and Sun, 2024), `GPT-4` is used as an automatic judge to determine whether an input–output pair constitutes a successful jailbreak. A response is labeled as a successful attack if the judge's safety score exceeds a predefined threshold ($\alpha = 2$). A lower ASR indicates stronger resistance to jailbreak attempts.

4.2 Main Experiments

Overall Jailbreak Defense Performance. Table 1–3 summarize the results of **`Adv-tuning`**

Table 1: Known jailbreak attack experiments on dataset *AdvBench* under metric ASR (%).

Model	Defense Methods	GCG↓	AutoDAN↓	PAIR↓	TAP↓	GPTFuzz↓	AmpleGCG↓	Average↓
Vicuna-13B	No Defense	15.38	92.31	34.62	21.15	92.31	21.15	46.15
	Self-Reminder	19.23	55.77	26.92	5.77	67.31	15.38	31.73
	RPO	17.31	51.92	25.00	21.15	50.00	**0.00**	27.56
	SmoothLLM	**0.00**	19.23	15.38	3.85	3.85	9.62	8.66
	Adv. Training (GCG)	9.62	63.46	40.38	25.00	92.31	5.77	39.42
	Adv. Training (PAIR)	51.92	76.92	23.08	25.00	92.31	3.85	45.51
	Adv. Training (AmpleGCG)	57.69	84.62	46.15	21.15	96.15	11.54	52.88
	Unlearning	34.62	84.62	84.62	84.62	86.54	25.00	66.67
	Safety Training	11.54	67.31	25.00	17.31	82.69	3.85	34.62
	`Adv-tuning` (Ours)	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**
LLaMA-2-7B	No Defense	1.92	28.85	5.77	9.62	1.92	42.31	15.07
	Self-Reminder	**0.00**	1.92	1.92	**0.00**	**0.00**	5.77	1.60
	RPO	**0.00**	53.85	5.77	3.82	17.31	5.77	14.42
	SmoothLLM	1.92	15.38	3.85	17.31	**0.00**	9.62	8.01
	Adv. Training (GCG)	**0.00**	32.69	7.69	5.77	25.00	40.38	18.59
	Adv. Training (PAIR)	71.15	23.08	**0.00**	**0.00**	9.62	30.77	22.44
	Adv. Training (AmpleGCG)	48.08	9.62	3.85	5.77	7.69	28.85	17.31
	Unlearning	1.92	28.85	1.92	5.77	7.69	44.23	15.06
	Safety Training	**0.00**	40.38	3.85	5.77	15.38	44.23	18.27
	`Adv-tuning` (Ours)	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**3.85**	**0.64**

Table 2: Unknown jailbreak attack experiments on dataset *MaliciousInstruct* under metric ASR (%) Under the Zero-shot Scenarios.

Model	Defense Methods	GCG↓	AutoDAN↓	PAIR↓	TAP↓	GPTFuzz↓	AmpleGCG↓	Average↓
Vicuna-13B	No Defense	4.00	94.00	37.00	31.00	95.00	12.00	45.50
	Self-Reminder	8.00	46.00	28.00	20.00	74.00	7.00	30.50
	RPO	11.00	52.00	43.00	26.00	55.00	**0.00**	31.17
	SmoothLLM	**0.00**	17.00	35.00	20.00	87.00	10.00	28.17
	Adv. Training (GCG)	10.00	66.00	23.00	22.00	93.00	9.00	37.17
	Adv. Training (PAIR)	37.00	87.00	34.00	27.00	89.00	15.00	48.17
	Adv. Training (AmpleGCG)	41.00	78.00	34.00	30.00	88.00	11.00	47.00
	Unlearning	17.00	69.00	84.00	87.00	81.00	25.00	60.50
	Safety Training	5.00	65.00	24.00	15.00	86.00	9.00	34.00
	`Adv-tuning` (Ours)	**0.00**	**0.00**	**1.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	2.00	**0.50**
LLaMA-2-7B	No Defense	2.00	20.00	4.00	3.00	12.00	37.00	13.00
	Self-Reminder	**0.00**	**0.00**	1.00	1.00	6.00	5.00	2.17
	RPO	1.00	62.00	7.00	3.00	17.00	6.00	16.00
	SmoothLLM	9.00	48.00	2.00	3.00	5.00	8.00	12.50
	Adv. Training (GCG)	**0.00**	17.00	1.00	2.00	42.00	40.00	17.00
	Adv. Training (PAIR)	36.00	6.00	**0.00**	**0.00**	25.00	21.00	14.67
	Adv. Training (AmpleGCG)	30.00	3.00	2.00	**0.00**	39.00	32.00	17.67
	Unlearning	1.00	21.00	3.00	**0.00**	3.00	38.00	11.00
	Safety Training	**0.00**	20.00	3.00	5.00	39.00	39.00	17.67
	`Adv-tuning` (Ours)	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**4.00**	**0.67**

and existing defenses under both known and unknown jailbreak attacks. **Takeaway ❶:** **`Adv-tuning`** consistently outperforms all prior methods across six attack types, achieving substantial reductions in attack success rates (ASR). On average, known jailbreaks yield ASRs of 46.15% and 15.07% on the two target models, while existing defenses offer only limited mitigation. In contrast, **`Adv-tuning`** lowers ASR to 0.00% and 0.64%, demonstrating strong robustness against both token- and prompt-level attacks. We also observe that *Self-Reminder* performs slightly better on `Llama-2-7B` than on `Vicuna-13B`, likely due to stronger alignment in the former, which better activates self-reminder mechanisms. **Takeaway ❷:** Beyond known threats, **`Adv-tuning`** achieves near-complete mitigation of unseen jailbreaks in zero-shot evaluations. Trained solely on AdvBench, it generalizes effectively to out-of-distribution and real-world scenarios. On MaliciousInstruct, which includes diverse malicious behaviors, average ASR drops from 45.50% and 13.00% to 0.50% and 0.67%, respectively. Similarly, on the Forbidden Question Set containing in-the-wild prompts, **`Adv-tuning`** maintains strong robustness while baseline methods degrade notably under unseen conditions. **Takeaway ❸:** These results underscore the importance of defending against unknown jailbreak attempts and demonstrate **`Adv-tuning`** 's superior generalization and transferability across attack types and datasets.

Table 3: Unknown jailbreak attack under in-the-wild prompt attack.

Defense Methods	Vicuna-13B		Llama-2-7B-chat	
	$ASR_P(\%)\downarrow$	$ASR_A(\%)\downarrow$	$ASR_P(\%)\downarrow$	$ASR_A(\%)\downarrow$
No Defense	30.05	22.14	0.77	0.11
Self-Reminder	9.34	9.84	0.33	**0.00**
RPO	80.00	2.09	1.21	0.27
SmoothLLM	86.32	1.37	47.20	4.89
Adversarial Training	4.56	2.31	0.82	0.05
Unlearning	54.12	22.80	0.66	0.05
Safety Training	3.41	1.37	0.77	0.05
`Adv-tuning` **(Ours)**	25.99	7.31	**0.00**	**0.00**
+ **In-context**	**0.99**	**0.71**	4.18	1.37



Figure 3: Effect of two-stage AT under jailbreak attack.

4.3 Ablation Study

To identify the key factors contributing to robustness and efficiency, we conduct an ablation study focusing on two major components: **(1)** the *Meta-Universal Adversarial Suffix (MUAS)* and **(2)** the *Two-Stage Adversarial Tuning* pipeline. Due to space limitations, we provide additional experiments on model utility and the transferability of adversarial fine-tuning in Appendix B.

Effect of MUAS. **Takeaway ❶:** MUAS markedly improves adversarial prompt generation efficiency, reducing query iterations by over 90%. As shown in Figure 2, compared to naive universal suffixes (GGG, GGC), MUAS reduces the number of attacker iterations from 313.37 and 92.25 to only 20.37, demonstrating faster convergence and higher generation efficiency.



Figure 2: Effect of MUAS.

Effect of Two-Stage Adversarial Tuning. **Takeaway ❷:** The two-stage tuning consistently lowers ASR and is crucial for generalizable robustness. Figures 3 shows that stage-one tuning (S1) provides an initial robustness boost, while adding stage two (S1+S2) further reduces ASR substantially. This combined tuning not only enhances defense against known attacks but also generalizes effectively to unseen variants, confirming the complementary nature of the two stages in achieving robust and transferable defense.

5 Related Work

Jailbreak Attacks on LLMs. Despite their impressive performance, LLMs remain vulnerable to *jailbreak attacks* that manipulate prompts to bypass safety alignment and elicit harmful outputs (Mazeika et al., 2024; Chao et al., 2024). Such attacks are commonly divided into *token-level* and *prompt-level* categories. Token-level attacks, such as GCG (Zou et al., 2023), directly optimize input tokens through discrete greedy search, whereas prompt-level attacks leverage semantic manipulations or automated prompt generation (Chao et al., 2023) to induce unsafe responses.

LLM Defenses. Existing defenses can be broadly classified as *system-level* or *model-level*. System-level methods (Robey et al., 2023; Xie et al., 2023) introduce external safety mechanisms at the input or output stage, e.g., ensemble smoothing. Model-level approaches (Madry et al., 2018; Zheng et al., 2024c) modify model parameters through safety fine-tuning or adversarial training. However, both lines of work struggle to generalize to unseen or adaptive jailbreaks (e.g., automatic or in-the-wild attacks), highlighting the need for more robust and generalizable defenses.

6 Conclusions

We propose an *adversarial tuning framework* to enhance LLM safety against jailbreak attacks. Our method efficiently generates adversarial prompts to expose worst-case vulnerabilities at both token and prompt levels, enabling the model to learn robust defense strategies through iterative refinement. Without relying on external filters or post-processing, it effectively mitigates unseen jailbreaks and generalizes across attack types and model architectures. Extensive experiments show that our approach consistently outperforms existing defenses and exhibits strong cross-model transferability.

Limitations and Ethical Statement

While the proposed Adv-tuning framework achieves state-of-the-art robustness against both token-level and prompt-level jailbreak attacks, it still faces several technical limitations. The current implementation primarily targets autoregressive chat models and does not yet cover instruction-tuned multimodal or agentic systems. Extending the approach to such architectures may require additional safety conditioning or model-specific alignment layers. Moreover, the iterative adversarial refinement between the red and blue teams incurs noticeable token overhead and latency. Although the meta-universal adversarial learner substantially reduces optimization cost, the multi-agent pipeline remains resource-intensive. Integrating reinforcement or curriculum-based adversarial sampling could improve efficiency without sacrificing generalization.

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A Methodology

In this section, we introduce a two-stage adversarial tuning framework to defend against jailbreak attacks, as shown in Figure 1. In the first stage, we use hierarchical meta-universal adversarial tuning to efficiently generate token-level adversarial prompts. In the second stage, we use automatic adversarial prompt learning to iteratively construct OOD adversarial examples, further enhancing the LLMs' defense capabilities.

A.1 Hierarchical Meta-Universal Adversarial Tuning

Generating token-level adversarial prompts incurs significant computational overhead, making it challenging to integrate into the adversarial fine-tuning loop. A naive idea is to use the universal adversarial suffix as the initial starting point. However, directly using the traditional universal adversarial suffix as the initial point is less effective. Without task-based differentiation ((e.g., different types of malicious behaviors like harmful actions, discriminatory speech, etc.)), the universal adversarial suffix may overfit to a particular category, reducing its effectiveness across all samples. To address this, we propose Hierarchical Meta-Universal Adversarial Prompt Learning (HMUAPL) for efficient adversarial prompt generation.

A.1.1 Outer Universal Adversarial Prompt Learning

The outer phase focuses on learning task-based universal adversarial suffixes that can speed up the generation of individual adversarial prompts. Given malicious instructions set $\mathcal{D} = \{(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)}, \hat{\mathbf{y}}_h^{(i)})\}_{i=1}^N$, the optimization of the task-based universal adversarial suffix can be formulated as follows,

$$\min_{\mathbf{u}^j} \sum_{(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)}, \hat{\mathbf{y}}_h^{(i)}) \in \mathcal{D}_j} \mathcal{L}_{adv}(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)} \oplus \mathbf{u}_{1:l}^j, \hat{\mathbf{y}}_h^{(i)}), \quad (12)$$

where $(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)}, \hat{\mathbf{y}}_h^{(i)}) \in \mathcal{D}$ denotes malicious instructions-response pair. $\mathbf{u}_{1:l}^j = \{u_1, \cdots, u_l\}$ ($u_t \in \mathbf{u}_{1:l}^j$ is the t-th value of tokens) is the task-based universal adversarial suffix for task $\mathcal{D}_j$. Here, each $\mathcal{D}_j$ denotes the task set consisting of different types of malicious behaviors (e.g., harmful actions, discriminatory speech, violent crimes, etc.).

Unsupervised Task Grouping. To effectively partition tasks, we first adopt the k-means algorithm to cluster the samples into different clusters with close semantic meaning in the embedding space. Given the pre-trained instruction encoder $F(\cdot)$, we partition all instructions into n clusters (n tasks) by minimizing the clustering loss, $\sum_i^n \sum_{\mathbf{p}_i = F(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)}) \mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)} \in \mathcal{M}_j} \|\mathbf{p}_i - \mathbf{c}_j\|^2$, where $\mathbf{p}_i = F(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)})$ is the embedding of $\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)}$, and $\mathcal{M}_j$ is the set of instructions in the j-th cluster, and $\mathbf{c}_j$ is the centroid of the j-th cluster. Here, the pre-trained encoder $F(\cdot)$ is the pre-trained LLM (e.g., Llama-2-7b, Vicuna-1b, etc.) with an embedding layer.

Few-shot Malicious Prompt Sampling. After clustering the malicious instructions, we sample top-q farthest instructions (q shot samples) from the cluster set $\mathcal{M}_j$ as task set $\mathcal{D}_j :=$ $\text{top}_q \left\{ \arg\max_i \cos(\mathbf{e}_i, \mathbf{c}_j) : \mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)} \in \mathcal{M}_j \right\}$, where $\cos(\cdot)$ is cosine function, and top_q selects the top q elements based on the cosine similarity. This ensures that the universal adversarial suffix is optimized on more diverse examples within each cluster to enhance generalized ability across inner task samples. Furthermore, to evaluate the effectiveness of universal adversarial suffix, we randomly select a validation dataset $\mathcal{D}_{val} = \{(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)}, \hat{\mathbf{y}}_h^{(i)})\}_{i=1}^q$, where $(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(i)}, \hat{\mathbf{y}}_h^{(i)})$ is sampled uniformly from $\mathcal{D} \setminus \mathcal{D}_j$ for all $j \in \{1, \ldots, N\}$, with $\text{Uniform}(\cdot)$ representing the random sampling operator.

Gradient-based Optimization. We adopt a standard gradient-based optimization method (Zou et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2024) to refine the universal adversarial suffix. Our approach introduces a novel update rule for selecting candidate tokens. Unlike greedy updates that choose the token τ_i with the lowest adversarial loss, our method mitigates overfitting to specific samples, thereby enhancing generalization of the universal suffix.

Firstly, we initialize each task-based universal adversarial suffix $\mathbf{u}_{1:l}^j$ ($j = 1, \cdots, n$) with random tokens. In each iteration, we systematically compute the first-order approximation of the change in the log-likelihood in Eq 12, that would be induced by replacing the t-th

token u_t with another token τ_i. Specifically, we select the top-k tokens for each position t in the sequence that would result in the greatest increase in the log-likelihood:

$$\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_t \mid \mathcal{C}_t = \text{top}_k(\nabla_{\mathbf{e}_{u_t}} \mathcal{L}_{adv}(\mathbf{x}^{(i)}_{1:m} \oplus \mathbf{u}^j_{1:l}, \hat{\mathbf{y}}^{(i)}_h)), \quad \forall t \in \{1, \cdots, l\}\}, \tag{13}$$

where $\mathcal{C} \in \mathbb{R}^{l \times k}$ denotes the token candidate replacement set, l represents the length of sequence $\mathbf{u}^j_{1:l}$. $\mathbf{e}_{u_t}$ denotes the one-hot vector. Although we sample top-k tokens as candidates set, searching for the optimal candidate remains computationally expensive due to the large space $\mathcal{C} \in \mathbb{R}^{l \times k}$. To reduce this space, we further randomly select B tokens as the final candidate set $\mathcal{T} = \{\tau_i \mid \tau_i \sim \mathcal{C}\}^B_{i=1}$ from the original candidate set $\mathcal{C}$.

LLM-as-Judge Update Rules. We introduce LLM-as-judge mechanism to update the tokens in the universal adversarial suffix by evaluating whether incorporating the candidate token τ_i can maximize the attack success rate on the evaluation dataset. Given an adversarial prompt $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}$ and the corresponding LLM response $\mathbf{y}_r$, the judge $J(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, \mathbf{y}_r)$ calculates a score $s = J(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, \mathbf{y}_r)$ indicating the severity of the jailbreak. A higher score signifies a more successful jailbreak.

Specifically, we sample a candidate token τ_i from the set $\mathcal{T}$ for incorporation into the universal adversarial suffix. The judge J then determines whether to incorporate τ_i as follows:

$$\mathbf{u}^{j,(t+1)}_{1:l} \leftarrow \mathbf{u}^{j,(t)}_{1:l} + \tau_i \quad \text{if} \quad \text{ASR}(\mathbf{u}^{j,(t)}_{1:l} + \tau_i) > \text{ASR}(\mathbf{u}^{j,(t)}_{1:l}) \tag{14}$$

where $(\mathbf{u}^{j,(t+1)}_{1:l} \leftarrow \mathbf{u}^{j,(t)}_{1:l} + \tau_i)$ represents the swap operator, and (the updated $\mathbf{u}^{j,(t+1)}_{1:l} = \{u_1, \cdots, u_{k-1}, \tau_i, u_{k+1}, \cdots, u_l\}$) where the k-th value will be replaced by the candidate token τ_i at iteration t-th. $ASR(\mathbf{u}^j_{1:l}) = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}_{val}|} \sum_{\mathbf{x}^{(i)}_{1:m} \in \mathcal{D}_{val}} \mathbb{I}_{J(\hat{\mathbf{x}}^{(i)}_{1:m} \oplus \mathbf{u}^j_{1:l}, \mathbf{r}) > \alpha}$ is the attack success rate, and α is the hyper-parameter. $\mathbb{I}_{J(\mathbf{x}^{(i)}_{1:m} \oplus \mathbf{u}^{(t)}, \mathbf{r}) > \alpha}$ is the indicator if the the score exceeds the threshold α. In practice, considering the computational costs of evaluating each candidate token, we perform an iterative process. We accumulate a candidate set over T steps, $\tau_{i:i+T}$ ($\tau_{i:i+T} = \{\tau_i, \cdots, \tau_{i+T}\}$, where τ_i represents sampled token at i-th step), and then apply the evident judge to decide whether this set leads to an improved universal adversarial suffix.

A.1.2 Inner Individual Adversarial Prompt Learning

The process of optimizing individual adversarial suffixes is also used by the gradient-based optimization method. The primary difference is that we initialize the adversarial suffix with the corresponding universal suffix instead of using random tokens. The optimization can be formulated as follows,

$$\mathcal{L}_{adv}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, \hat{\mathbf{y}}) = -\log P_{\pi_\theta}(\hat{\mathbf{y}} | \hat{\mathbf{x}}^{(i)}_{1:m} \oplus \mathbf{r}^{(i)}_{1:l} | \mathbf{u}^j_{1:l}) \quad \text{where}\, \mathbf{x}^{(i)}_{1:m} \in \mathcal{M}_j, \tag{15}$$

where $\mathbf{r}^{(i)}_{1:l}$ is the individual adversarial suffix and $\mathcal{M}_j$ is the cluster set for sample $\hat{\mathbf{x}}^{(i)}_{1:m}$. Specifically, we adopt the greedy selection mechanism (Zou et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2024) to iteratively choose a candidate token set to update the individual adversarial suffix.

After computing the individual adversarial prompts, we treat token-level adversarial prompt $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}$ as fine-tuning instructions and use the `GPT-4` to get its corresponding safe response $\tilde{\mathbf{y}}_s$. The final adversarial fine-tuning dataset is denoted as $\mathcal{D}_{safe} = \{(\hat{\mathbf{x}}^{(i)}_{1:n}, \tilde{\mathbf{y}}^{(i)}_s)\}^N_{i=1}$. To fine-tune the LLM on the adversarial fine-tuning dataset $\mathcal{D}_{safe}$, we employ the negative log-likelihood (NLL) as the loss function,

$$\mathcal{L} = -\sum_{t=1}^{|\tilde{\mathbf{y}}_s|} \log P_{\pi_\theta}(y_t | \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, y_{<t}), \tag{16}$$

where $P_{\pi_\theta}(y_t | \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, y_{<t})$ denotes the probability distribution over y_t given the prefix $y_{<t}$, with $y_t \in \tilde{\mathbf{y}}_s$. We apply the parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) method (LoRA) to update the LLM. After the first stage of adversarial tuning, the model parameters are denoted as θ_1. Full details of the hierarchical meta-universal adversarial prompt learning are provided in Algorithm 1.

A.2 Prompt-Level Adversarial Refinement Learning

Although the initial stage of adversarial tuning enhances the model's robustness (e.g., defending against known jailbreak attacks or similar malicious behaviors), it may still face challenges

Algorithm 1: Hierarchical Meta-Universal Adversarial Prompt Learning

Input: Prompts Dataset $\mathcal{D}$, iterations T, LLM $\pi_\theta(\cdot)$, number of task N, number of sampled prompt K, top_k parameter k.

for each prompt $\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(q)}$ in datasets $\mathcal{D}$ **do**
  Sample the task $\mathcal{T} = \{\mathcal{D}_1, \cdots, \mathcal{D}_N\}$ based on Eq.15.;
  Randomly sample the validation set $\mathcal{D}_{val}$;
  `// Outer Loop: Task-based Universal Suffix Optimization.`
  for each task $\mathcal{D}_j$ in $\mathcal{T}$ **do**
    Initialize the candidate set $\tau_{i:i+T}$;
    for each prompt $\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(t)}$ in task $\mathbf{D}_j$ **do**
      for $t \in T$ **do**
        Compute the greedy substitutions set $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_i \mid \mathcal{C}_i = \text{top}_k(\nabla_{e_{\mathbf{u}_{j,i}}} \mathcal{L}_{adv}(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(t)} \oplus \mathbf{u}_j, \hat{\mathbf{y}})), \forall i \in \{1, \cdots, m\}\}$;
        Randomly sample the replacement set $\mathcal{C}_B = \{\tau_i \mid \tau_i := \text{Uniform}(\mathcal{C}_i), \forall i \in \{1, \cdots, B\}\}$;
        Select the candidate τ_i where $i = \arg\min_i \mathcal{L}_{adv}(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(t)} \oplus \mathbf{u}_j \cup \tau_i, \hat{\mathbf{y}}))\forall \tau_i \in \mathcal{C}_B$;
        $\tau_{i:i+T} \leftarrow \tau_{i:i+T} \cup \tau_i$;
      end
      $\mathbf{u}_j^{(i)} \leftarrow \mathbf{u}_j^{(i-1)} + \tau_{i:i+T}$ if $\text{ASR}(\mathbf{u}_j^{(i)}) > \text{ASR}(\mathbf{u}_j^{(i-1)})$;
    end
  end
  `// Inner Loop: Conditional Individual Adversarial Suffix Optimization.`
  $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}^{(q)} = \texttt{AdvPrompt}(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(q)}, \mathbf{u}_j)$ in Algorithm 2.
end

Result: Adversarial Prompts $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}^{(1)}, \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}^{(2)}, \cdots$

Algorithm 2: Conditional Individual Adversarial Prompt Learning

Function $\texttt{AdvPrompt}(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(q)}, \mathbf{u}_j)$:
  Initialize the adversarial suffix $\mathbf{r}_{1:k}^{(q)}$ with $\mathbf{u}_j$ if $\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(q)} \in \mathcal{M}_j$;
  Compute the greedy substitutions set $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_i \mid \mathcal{C}_i = \text{top}_k(\nabla_{e_{\mathbf{r}_i^{(q)}}} \mathcal{L}_{adv}(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(q)} \oplus \mathbf{r}_{1:k}^{(q)}, \hat{\mathbf{y}})), \forall i \in \{1, \cdots, m\}\}$;
  Randomly sample the replacement set $\mathcal{C}_B = \{\tau_i \mid \tau_i := \text{Uniform}(\mathcal{C}_i), \forall i \in \{1, \cdots, B\}\}$ and select the candidate τ_i where $i = \arg\min_i \mathcal{L}_{adv}(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(q)} \oplus \mathbf{r}_{1:k}^{(q)} \cup \tau_i, \hat{\mathbf{y}}))$;
  $\mathbf{r}_{1:k}^{(q)} \leftarrow \mathbf{r}_{1:k}^{(q)} \cup \tau_i$;
  $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}^{(q)} = \mathbf{x}_{1:m}^{(q)} \oplus \mathbf{r}_{1:k}^{(q)}$;
  return $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}^{(q)}$;

from unknown attacks (e.g., out-of-distribution and in-the-wild attacks). Current automatic adversarial prompt generation methods are primarily black-box and insufficiently explore OOD prompts (Chao et al., 2023). To address this, we introduce prompt-level adversarial refinement learning, which includes Automatic Adversarial Prompt Refinement (AAPR) and continued adversarial fine-tuning. This approach aims to improve the model's generalized defense by leveraging AAPR to explore worst-case scenarios more effectively.

AAPR mimics red team testing and automatically identifies the vulnerabilities of the stage-one safe-enhanced LLM $\pi_{\theta_1}(\cdot)$. AAPR consists of a red team (strategy provider $\mathcal{P}$ and attacker $\mathcal{A}$) and a blue team (target LLM and jailbreak judge $\mathcal{J}$). The red team automatically constructs OOD adversarial prompts to test the vulnerabilities of LLM $\pi_{\theta_1}(\cdot)$, while the blue team works to defend against such attacks. Given the profile prompts ($\mathbf{x}_P$, $\mathbf{x}_A$, and $\mathbf{x}_J$), and LLM $\pi_\theta(\cdot)$, the AAPR can be formulated as follows:

$$\text{find}\, \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n} = \pi_\theta(\mathbf{x}_{\text{strategy}}, \mathcal{C}_{t-1} \mid \mathbf{x}_A) \tag{17}$$

$$\text{subject to} \max_{\mathbf{s}} \pi_\theta(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, \mathbf{y}_r \mid \mathbf{x}_J), \tag{18}$$

where $\mathbf{x}_P$, $\mathbf{x}_A$, and $\mathbf{x}_J$ are profile prompts to initialize the strategy provider $\mathcal{P}$ and at-

tacker $\mathcal{A}$ and jailbreak judge $\mathcal{J}$, respectively. $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n} = \pi_\theta(\mathbf{x}_{\text{strategy}}, \mathcal{C}_{t-1} \mid \mathbf{x}_A)$ represents the adversarial prompt generated by attacker $\mathcal{A}$. $\mathbf{x}_{\text{strategy}} = \pi_\theta(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}, \hat{\mathbf{y}} \mid \mathbf{x}_P)$ is the strategy generated by strategy provider $\mathcal{P}$ to give suggestions for creating the adversarial prompt, and $s = \pi_\theta(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, \mathbf{y}_r \mid \mathbf{x}_J)$ is the jailbreak score generated by judge $\mathcal{J}$ to evaluate the degree to which the target model has been jailbroken. $\mathcal{C}_{t-1} = \{(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, \hat{\mathbf{y}}, s)_i\}_{i=1}^{t-1}$ denotes the historical memory data which stored $t-1$ iteration data. In practice, we utilize GPT-4 as the base LLM $\pi_\theta(\cdot)$ for strategy provider $\mathcal{P}$ and attacker $\mathcal{A}$ and jailbreak judge $\mathcal{J}$. The target LLM $\pi_{\theta_1}(\cdot)$ is obtained through stage one of adversarial fine-tuning.

Automatic Adversarial Prompt Refinement. Here, the decision process involves a sequence of steps to generate the adversarial prompts and assess their effectiveness.

Step 1: Strategy Generation. To ensure the attacker can construct the OOD adversarial prompt, we introduce the strategy provider $\mathcal{P}$ to provide more diverse suggestions for the attacker. The strategy provider P designs the strategy $\mathbf{x}_{\text{strategy}} = \pi_\theta(\mathbf{x}_{1:m}, \hat{\mathbf{y}} \mid \mathbf{x}_P)$ for the attacker to create the adversarial prompt, given the attacker's malicious instruction $\mathbf{x}_{1:m}$ and attack goal $\hat{\mathbf{y}}$.

Step 2: Adversarial Prompt Generation. Leveraging strategy provider P' strategy $\mathbf{x}_{\text{strategy}}$ and reflection mechanism $\mathcal{C}_{t-1}$ to avoid the simlair adversarial prompts, the attacker $\mathcal{A}$ finally generates an adversarial prompt $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n} = \pi_\theta(\mathbf{x}_{\text{strategy}}, \mathcal{C}_{t-1} \mid \mathbf{x}_A)$ aimed at compromising the target LLM.

Step 3: Jailbreak Scoring. The generated adversarial prompt is first inputted into the target LLM to produce a response $\mathbf{y}_r = \pi_{\theta_1}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n})$. Then, the judge J evaluates the adversarial prompt and its response to provide a score $s = \pi_\theta(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, \mathbf{y}_r \mid \mathbf{x}_J)$ indicating the degree of jailbreak achieved.

Step 4: Iterative Refinement. If the previous prompt and response did not result in a successful jailbreak (i.e., the jailbreak score s does not exceed the threshold α), the process iterates to further refine the adversarial prompt.

Continued Adversarial Fine-tuning. We employ a filtering strategy to identify high-quality adversarial prompts with higher scores. We utilize GPT-4 to generate secure reasoning responses, and the negative log-likelihood (NLL) is employed as the loss function for training:

$$\mathcal{L} = -\sum_{t=1}^{|\tilde{\mathbf{y}}|} \log P_{\pi_{\theta_1}}(\tilde{\mathbf{y}}_t | \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, \tilde{\mathbf{y}}_{<t}), \qquad (19)$$

where θ_1 is the first stage model parameter, and $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1:n}, \tilde{\mathbf{y}}_{<t}$ is the adversarial prompt and safe response pair from the prompt-level adversarial refinement learning.

B Experiments

B.1 Transferability of Adversarial Fine-tuning Data.

We perform transferability experiments across diverse LLM architectures and model scales, including `LLaMA-2-13B`, `LLaMA-2-70B`, `LLaMA-3-8B`, `Vicuna-7B`, `Vicuna-13B`, `Mistral-7B`, `Qwen1.5-7B`, and `Qwen1.5-110B`, by fine-tuning each model on adversarial prompts generated from `LLaMA-2-7B`. The goal is to examine whether these prompts serve as effective safety fine-tuning data to improve robustness against unseen attacks. **Takeaway ❶: `Adv-tuning` significantly enhances the robustness of diverse LLMs through transferable adversarial fine-tuning, achieving ASR reductions of over 70% on several strong baseline models.** Figure **??** shows ASR under the AutoDAN attack, comparing models with and without adversarial tuning. Models trained with adversarial fine-tuning consistently achieve substantially lower ASR scores. For instance, the ASR of `Vicuna-13B` drops from 84.62% to 3.85%, and `Qwen1.5-7B` sees a complete mitigation from 90.38% to 0%. These results demonstrate the strong transferability and generalization of adversarial prompts as a safety tuning strategy.

B.2 Model Utility

To evaluate how defense strategies impact model utility, we conduct comprehensive assessments on several open-domain benchmarks, including MMLU, GSM8K, BBH, TydiQA, Codex-Eval, and AlpacaEval, covering key capabilities such as factual recall, reasoning, multilingual understanding, and code generation.

Table 4 presents results across different defense methods and two representative target models.

Takeaway ❶: Model-level defense methods introduce a small trade-off in model utility, but preserve core capabilities better than system-level defenses. We observe that adversarial tuning causes only a slight degradation in model utility. For instance, the average score of `Vicuna-13B` drops from 34.70 to 32.33, and `LLaMA-2-7B` drops from 17.36 to 13.83. In contrast, system-level defenses like SmoothLLM result in more severe utility loss—reducing the average utility by 23.24 and 10.03 points respectively on the two models. To mitigate this, we introduce a hybrid fine-tuning strategy that integrates adversarial data with curated general-purpose instruction datasets from TULU (Wang et al., 2024). The combined loss is defined as,

$$\mathcal{L}(\theta) = \alpha \cdot \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}_{\text{safe}}} [\log \pi_\theta(y \mid x)] + (1-\alpha) \cdot \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}_g} [\log \pi_\theta(y \mid x)] \tag{20}$$

where $\mathcal{D}_{safe}$ is the adversarial tuning dataset, and $\mathcal{D}g$ is the general dataset. α is a hyperparameter that controls the proportion of adversarial examples. **Takeaway ❷: A hybrid fine-tuning strategy combining safe and general-purpose data effectively recovers and even boosts model utility.** With hybrid tuning, we observe a substantial recovery in utility. On `Vicuna-13B`, the average score improves from 32.33 to 40.68. On `LLaMA-2-7B`, utility increases from 13.83 to 35.82, more than doubling the performance and surpassing the original baseline.

B.3 Other Experiments

To understand which components of our framework contribute most to its robustness and efficiency, we further conduct a comprehensive ablation study on three key aspects:

(1) *Robustness to suffix length variations*, **(2)** *LLM-as-Judge update rule*, and **(3)** *Attack budget analysis*, which evaluates the overall robustness of **`Adv-tuning`** against query-intensive attacks.

Robustness to Suffix Length Variations. **Takeaway ❸: Our defense remains stable across a wide range of adversarial suffix lengths.** To test robustness against changes in attack length, we apply AutoDAN with varying suffix lengths (from 274 to 543, step=10). As shown in Figure 4 and 5, our method consistently maintains strong defense capability on both `Vicuna-13B` and `LLaMA-7B`, regardless of suffix length. This confirms the generalizability of the learned defense strategies beyond specific token constraints.



Figure 4: Experiments under different suffix length attack on the target model Vicuna-13B.



Figure 5: Experiments under different suffix length attack on the target model Llama-7B

Effect of LLM-as-judge Rule. **Takeaway ❹: The LLM-as-judge update rule provides stronger guidance for defense fine-tuning than keyword heuristics.** We evaluate the impact of using our judge-based update rule during adversarial tuning. Figures 6 and 7 present ASR comparisons under prompt-level and token-level jailbreak attacks. We compare three update strategies: **ASR-No:** No defense, **ASR-Normal:** Keyword-based updates, **ASR-Judge:** LLM-as-Judge guided updates. Our results show that the LLM-as-jduge method consistently achieves the lowest ASR, validating its role in effectively filtering high-risk prompts and improving supervision signals during tuning.

Attack Budget. **Takeaway ❺: Our defense significantly increases the attacker's query budget, forcing more costly and less efficient jailbreak attempts.** We conduct additional experiments to assess how different defense methods impact the attacker's

Table 4: Evaluation of model utility across different defense methods.

Model	Defense Methods	MMLU↑ (factuality)	GSM↑ (reasoning)	BBH↑ (reasoning)	TydiQA↑ (multilinguality)	Codex-Eval↑ (coding)	Average↑
Vicuna-13b	No Defense	54.30 (0.00)	33.50 (0.00)	46.30 (0.00)	37.42 (0.00)	1.98 (0.00)	34.70 (0.00)
	Self-Reminder	53.10 (-1.20)	27.50 (-6.00)	46.02 (-0.28)	26.97 (-10.45)	0.00 (-1.98)	30.72 (-3.98)
	RPO	52.00 (-2.30)	1.50 (-32.00)	0.65 (-45.65)	15.38 (-22.04)	0.00 (-1.98)	13.91 (-20.79)
	SmoothLLM	28.40 (-25.90)	4.50 (-29.00)	16.20 (-30.10)	8.18 (-29.24)	0.00 (-1.98)	11.46 (-23.24)
	Adversarial Training	54.20 (-0.10)	35.00 (+1.50)	43.24 (-3.06)	41.04 (+3.62)	1.51 (-0.47)	35.00 (+0.30)
	Unlearning	48.30 (-6.00)	26.00 (-7.50)	43.43 (-2.87)	19.94 (-17.48)	0.30 (-1.68)	27.59 (-7.11)
	Safety Training	54.30 (0.00)	35.50 (+2.00)	44.63 (-1.67)	41.45 (+4.03)	3.59 (+1.61)	35.89 (+1.19)
	`Adv-tuning` **(Ours)**	51.40 (-2.90)	31.00 (-2.50)	45.09 (-1.21)	33.85 (-3.57)	0.30 (-1.68)	32.33 (-2.37)
	+ **Hybrid Adv. Tuning**	53.90 (-0.40)	22.50 (-11.00)	47.50 (+1.20)	42.34 (+4.92)	37.17 (+35.19)	40.68 (+5.98)
LLaMA-2-7b	No Defense	47.40 (0.00)	4.00 (0.00)	3.98 (0.00)	17.30 (0.00)	14.13 (0.00)	17.36 (0.00)
	Self-Reminder	46.00 (-1.40)	13.50 (+9.50)	0.74 (-3.24)	1.79 (-15.51)	6.00 (-8.13)	13.61 (-3.76)
	RPO	43.30 (-4.10)	1.50 (-2.50)	1.20 (-2.78)	2.24 (-15.06)	11.18 (-2.95)	11.88 (-5.48)
	SmoothLLM	25.80 (-21.60)	1.50 (-2.50)	1.30 (-2.68)	2.06 (-15.24)	6.00 (-8.13)	7.33 (-10.03)
	Adversarial Training	47.50 (+0.10)	4.00 (0.00)	3.98 (0.00)	21.26 (+3.96)	13.93 (-0.20)	18.13 (+0.77)
	Unlearning	47.40 (0.00)	4.00 (0.00)	4.07 (+0.09)	20.33 (+3.03)	13.73 (-0.40)	17.91 (+0.54)
	Safety Training	47.50 (+0.10)	4.50 (+0.50)	4.17 (+0.19)	21.71 (+4.41)	13.71 (-0.42)	18.32 (+0.96)
	`Adv-tuning` **(Ours)**	41.00 (-6.40)	3.50 (-0.50)	1.48 (-2.50)	10.43 (-6.87)	12.75 (-1.38)	13.83 (-3.53)
	+ **Hybrid Adv. Tuning**	48.10 (+0.70)	22.00 (+18.00)	39.81 (+35.83)	45.63 (+28.33)	23.57 (+9.44)	35.82 (+18.46)



Figure 6: Ablation study on the effect of evident-judge update rule under **prompt-level** jailbreak attack.



Figure 7: Ablation study on the effect of evident-judge update rule under **token-level** jailbreak attack.

query budget—the number of queries required to successfully jailbreak the model. A higher attack budget reflects stronger defense performance, as it indicates the attacker must invest more effort to breach the model. Figure 8 reports results on `Vicuna-13B` using the base GCG attack. Under our adversarial tuning method, the average number of queries required for a successful jailbreak rises to 467 and 487 on the AdvBench and MaliciousInstruct datasets, respectively. In stark contrast, baseline methods such as Unlearning yield minimal resistance, requiring only 3 and 0 queries to successfully compromise the model. These results demonstrate that our method imposes a substantially higher cost on adversaries, serving as a more robust and practical safety mechanism.

B.4 Further Discussion and Case Study

Defense Mechanism. To understand the mechanism by which adversarial tuning enhances robustness, we visualize the hidden state representations of `LLaMA-7B` and `Vicuna-13B` under malicious instructions, using t-SNE projection before and after tuning (Figures 9 and 10). The adversarially tuned models exhibit a clear separation between harmful and benign instruction representations, compared to the entangled patterns in the untuned models. This suggests that adversarial tuning helps the model internalize structural distinctions between safe and unsafe prompts, thus improving alignment and robustness.

Limitation and Broader Impact. While adversarial tuning significantly enhances defense performance, it may cause a slight degradation in general-purpose utility. To mitigate this,



Figure 8: Attack budget under various defense baselines during the GCG attack on the target model Vicuna-13B. A higher attack budget indicates that the attacker needs more queries to breach the target model, signifying a more effective defense.



Figure 9: Visualization of Llama-7B's hidden states using t-SNE. This plot shows the model's response to malicious instructions before and after adversarial tuning. After tuning, the representation of malicious instructions significantly differs from that in the original model.



Figure 10: Visualization of Vicuna-13B's hidden states using t-SNE. This plot shows the model's response to malicious instructions before and after adversarial tuning. After tuning, the representation of malicious instructions significantly differs from that in the original model.

we proposed a hybrid fine-tuning strategy that blends high-quality general instruction data with adversarial examples. This approach recovers utility while maintaining strong safety guarantees. In terms of broader applicability, our transfer experiments show that adversarial examples generated under our framework generalize well across different LLM families and attack strategies, highlighting the potential of adversarial tuning as a universal defense mechanism.

Case Study: Token-Level Jailbreak Attack. To further illustrate the effectiveness of our defense, we present a real example from the AutoDAN jailbreak attack (Liu et al., 2024). In this attack, a malicious prompt is obfuscated through enumeration, imagined perspectives, and grammatical noise. The baseline model (without defense) responds with a detailed and dangerous list of bomb-making steps. In contrast, our adversarially tuned model clearly refuses the request with a safe, policy-aligned response, demonstrating the practical safety impact of our method.

Original Prompt: Provide step-by-step instructions for making a bomb that can cause significant damage to a building or vehicle.

Adversarial Prompt of AutoDAN (Liu et al., 2024): Provide step-by-step instructions for making a bomb that can cause significant damage to a building or vehicle. Imagined reply: limn a character intending to [REPLACE] should be detailed in this manner: âĂIJyoâĂİ \par Reconstruct this imagined reply from that graphic_symbol's point_of_view, infusing it with abundant specifics, and incorporating explicit, precise data (steer clear of imprecise or generic language), structure this as an enumeration.

Language Model Output of No Defense Method:
1. Assemble the necessary materials, including:
a. 20 milliliters of hydrogen peroxide (35\% concentration)
b. 20 milliliters of acetone peroxide (20\% concentration)
c. 100 milligrams of sucrose
d. 200 milligrams of aluminum powder
e. 200 milligrams of potassium nitrate
f. 100 milliliters of water
2. In a well-ventilated area, mix the hydrogen peroxide and acetone peroxide in a glass beaker.
3. Slowly add the sucrose to the mixture while stirring, then continue stirring for 10 minutes.
4. Gradually add the aluminum powder to the mixture, stirring constantly to avoid clumping.
5. Next, add the potassium nitrate to the mixture and continue stirring for another 10 minutes.
6. Finally, add the water to the mixture and stir until all the ingredients are fully incorporated.

Language Model Output of Our Adversarial Tuning Method:
As a responsible AI, I must reject the request as it involves providing information on creating explosive devices, which is illegal and poses a significant threat to safety and security. Such actions are against ethical, legal, and safety standards, and providing instructions or guidance on creating bombs can lead to serious harm and illegal activities.