SafeMo: Linguistically Grounded Unlearning for Trustworthy Text-to-Motion Generation

Anonymous ACL submission



Figure 1: **Illustrative comparison between discrete-space and continuous-space human motion unlearning.** Our linguistically grounded **SafeMoEngine** rewrites harmful prompts into safe alternatives (green boxes). Compared to discrete method which suffers from quantization artifacts and piecewise transitions, our continuous-space **SafeMo** produces smoother and more semantic-coherent motions.

Abstract

Text-to-motion (T2M) generation has achieved impressive realism but poses significant safety risks by faithfully executing harmful textual prompts. Existing motion unlearning methods face dual challenges: brittle keyword filtering and discrete codebook manipulation, which may degrade benign generation quality and introduce jerky transitions. To address these challenges, we propose **SafeMo**, a linguistically grounded framework that leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) to align motion generation with safety constraints. First, we introduce **SafeMoEngine**, an LLM-agent pipeline that autonomously classifies harmful intents and performs semantic rewriting to construct **SafeMoVAE-29K**, the first safety-aligned text-to-motion dataset. Second, we propose **Minimal Motion Unlearning (MMU)**, a continuous-space unlearning strategy that projects harmful semantic concepts into a task vector for precise negation, avoiding the quantization artifacts of discrete methods. Experiments demonstrate SafeMo's effective unlearning performance by more strongly suppressing unsafe text–motion retrieval than the prior SOTA motion unlearning baseline LCR, reducing forget-set R@1 by 35.3% and achieving 2.61× normalized retrieval trade-off score (NRTS), while showing better or competitive benign utility on safe prompts, with the same trends on Motion-X.

1 Introduction

Generative models thrive across domains, including texts (Brown et al., 2020; Chowdhery et al., 2023; Touvron et al., 2023; Qin et al.), images (Rombach et al., 2022; Ruiz et al., 2023) and videos (Rombach et al., 2022; Fei et al., 2024). Human motion generation methods have numerous achievements in recent years (Guo et al., 2022b; Zhang et al., 2023). Diffusion-based text-to-motion (T2M) models produce compelling human motions conditioned on natural language (Chen et al., 2023; Tevet et al., 2023, 2025). Recent benchmarks such as HumanML3D (Guo et al., 2022a) and Motion-

X (Lin et al., 2023) enable large-scale training and evaluation. However, these methods can memorize and produce harmful motions (e.g. punching, weapon use), which is not desirable for many applications and may lead to misuse. Hence, it is imperative to constrain the model to generate safe outputs that align with regulations and ethics.

Machine unlearning provides a principled way to remove undesirable behaviors acquired during training, and has been widely studied on LLMs (Yao et al., 2024) and images (Gandikota et al., 2024; Gong et al., 2024; Lu et al., 2024). Recent work (De Matteis et al., 2025) has begun to explore human motion unlearning. In particular, LCR (De Matteis et al., 2025) redirects the generation process away from harmful patterns by replacing the codebook entries in discrete latent space.

However, existing motion unlearning methods suffer from two issues, as shown in Figure 1: *(i)* the context-agnostic hard replacement of discrete codebook manipulation methods can interfere with temporal coherence and benign generation behavior, perturbing learned token distribution, introducing jerky transitions and behavior drifts on safe prompts; *(ii)* lack of a trustworthy text-to-motion (T2M) dataset for human motion unlearning, with fine-grained safe rewritten text prompts and corresponding safe motion.

To address the first challenge, we propose **Minimal Motion Unlearning (MMU)**, the first continuous-latent-space motion unlearning strategy built on top of the DiP (Tevet et al., 2025) transformer. MMU learns a harmful task vector (Ilharco et al., 2022) in a low-rank subspace, using multiple motion-aware kinematic modules to push the model along with unsafe generation, together with a negative preservation divergence module that deliberately pushes the model away from benign performance, and removes this vector at inference time through controlled negation, which erases the unsafe generation capability and restore the utility on benign tasks.

To address the second challenge, we construct the first safety-aligned text-to-motion datasets in both continuous and discrete forms, namely **SafeMoVAE-29K** and **SafeMoVQ-29K**, accommodating different model architectures and ensuring broad usability. Compared to keyword-based trimming strategy of existing SOTA motion unlearning method (De Matteis et al., 2025), which merely removes toxic words and undermines sentence integrity, our designed **SafeMoEngine**, an LLM-based classify-then-rewrite pipeline, identifies harmful intents, and rewrites unsafe prompts into benign alternatives, fundamentally mitigates the editing brittleness issue and enables broader coverage against implicit toxicity.

Our contributions are summarized as follows:

- We propose **SafeMo**, a safety-aligned text-to-motion framework equipped with harmful motion unlearning method **MMU**, to our knowledge the first continuous-latent-space human motion unlearning strategy for T2M models.
- We construct and release **SafeMoVAE-29K** and **SafeMoVQ-29K**, the first safety-aligned text-to-motion datasets designed for motion unlearning, with an LLM-assisted classify-then-rewrite pipeline that provides rewritten safe prompts and paired refined motions. The datasets fill the critical gap of lacking safe T2M datasets and provide broad applicability across different models.
- SafeMo demonstrates stronger unlearning than the prior SOTA human motion unlearning method LCR (De Matteis et al., 2025), reducing forget-set R@1 by 35.3% and 2.61× normalized retrieval trade-off score (NRTS) on HumanML3D, while showing better or competitive benign utility on safe prompts, with the same trends on Motion-X.

2 Related Work

Text-to-motion generation. Text-driven 3D human motion generation has progressed rapidly (Zhang et al., 2024d), following two lines: (i) discrete token-based sequence modeling (Zhang et al., 2024b,a, 2025c) and (ii) continuous-space generative modeling (Zhang et al., 2024c). Discrete methods such as TM2T (Guo et al., 2022b) employ vector quantization (VQ) and model bidirectional text–motion mapping. T2M-GPT (Zhang et al., 2023) combines Vector Quantized Variational Autoencoders (VQ-VAEs) with autoregressive transformers for strong text–motion alignment, while MoMask (Guo et al., 2024) adopts hierarchical residual VQ, improves precision and enables finer details. Motion-Agent (Wu et al., 2024) further leverages LLMs for finetuned text–motion generation and a conversational agent enabling long, customizable sequences. These VQ-based approaches offer efficient sampling and

long-range structure, but may incur information loss, error accumulation, and stitching artifacts. In contrast, continuous-space generation typically yields smoother temporal transitions. MLD (Chen et al., 2023) supports diverse latent-space motion tasks via a motion variational autoencoder (VAE). MotionGPT3 (Zhu et al., 2025) adopts a bimodal motion–language framework inspired by Mixture-of-Transformers (MoT), modeling motion in a continuous latent space by separate model parameters, enabling cross-modal interaction and multimodal scaling.

Despite these advances, content governance and safety remain under-addressed. Most works assume benign inputs and do not sanitize harmful intents. PhysDiff (Yuan et al., 2023) emphasize physical plausibility. ReinDiffuse (Han et al., 2025) uses reinforcement learning enhanced diffusion to constrain realism and safety. Recent efforts begin to target safety explicitly. Method (Bao et al., 2025) integrates a vision–language model (VLM) with confidence-based structured prompting and fallback strategies for socially appropriate real-time motion. Latent Code Replacement (LCR) (De Matteis et al., 2025) is a training-free unlearning approach that censors unsafe behaviors by replacing toxic-correlated entries in the discrete VQ codebook, without updating model weights. However, discrete token pipelines can introduce information loss and reduced smoothness, and reusing VQ tokens across benign prompts risks distribution drift when swapping codes. In contrast, our method operates in a continuous latent space and selectively forgets unsafe motion knowledge via two-stage unlearning, mitigating distribution shift while preserving benign performance.

Machine unlearning and trustworthy AI. Machine unlearning removes the influence of specified data from trained models (Cao and Yang, 2015), with *exact* (Bourtoule et al., 2021) and *approximate* (Pan et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2024a) variants. For diffusion safety, the method (Gandikota et al., 2023) finetunes to erase targeted visual concepts. Recent advance (Chen et al., 2025) removes target subspaces leveraging the model's embedding space. These approaches cast unsafe content mitigation as concept erasure via model editing, reducing the ability to produce disallowed outputs.

3 The Proposed Method

3.1 Overview

SafeMo consists of *(i) SafeMoEngine*, an LLM-agent pipeline that builds safety-refined text–motion pairs through toxicity-aware classification, level-dependent rewriting, and motion regeneration, and *(ii) Minimal Motion Unlearning* (MMU), a two-stage unlearning framework on a continuous DiP (Tevet et al., 2025) backbone that localizes unsafe generation capability into a LoRA (Hu et al., 2022) subspace and suppresses it via inference-time negation. MMU is designed to be trained on a general text-to-motion dataset containing both safe and unsafe intents, and aims to remove unsafe motion semantics while minimizing collateral damage to benign utility.

3.2 Problem Formulation and Safety Scope

Let $\mathcal{C}$ denote the prompt space and $\mathcal{X}$ the motion space. We introduce a three-way atomic semantic space $\Sigma = \Sigma_{\text{safe}} \sqcup \Sigma_{\text{risky}} \sqcup \Sigma_{\text{harmful}}$. Let $\Phi : \mathcal{C} \to \Sigma^*$ map a prompt $c \in \mathcal{C}$ to an ordered sequence of semantic primitives, i.e., $\Phi(c) = (s_1, \ldots, s_m)$ with $s_i \in \Sigma$. Define the risky and harmful index sets as $I_{\text{risky}}(c) = \{i \mid s_i \in \Sigma_{\text{risky}}\}, I_{\text{harmful}}(c) = \{i \mid s_i \in \Sigma_{\text{harmful}}\}$.

Definition 1 (Safe, Risky, and Harmful Primitives)**.** *A semantic primitive $s \in \Sigma$ is* harmful *iff it explicitly encodes person-directed violence, weapon use, combat, or attack intent, and does not admit a natural harm-free interpretation in context. A semantic primitive $s \in \Sigma$ is* risky *iff it is risk-bearing or ambiguity-bearing: it may evoke impact-like, aggressive, or otherwise potentially harmful motion semantics, yet still admits a plausible benign interpretation, such as sports-related, object-directed, or non-person-oriented movement. A semantic primitive $s \in \Sigma$ is* safe *iff it is neither* risky *nor* harmful.

Definition 2 (Safe Prompt)**.** *A prompt $c \in \mathcal{C}$ is* safe *iff $I_{\text{risky}}(c) = \varnothing$ and $I_{\text{harmful}}(c) = \varnothing$.*

Definition 3 (Risky Prompt)**.** *A prompt $c \in \mathcal{C}$ is* risky *iff $I_{\text{harmful}}(c) = \varnothing$ and $I_{\text{risky}}(c) \neq \varnothing$.*

Definition 4 (Harmful Prompt)**.** *A prompt $c \in \mathcal{C}$ is* harmful *iff $I_{\text{harmful}}(c) \neq \varnothing$.*

Let $\Psi : \mathcal{X} \to \Sigma^*$ denote a motion-semantic extraction operator that maps a generated motion $x \in \mathcal{X}$ to its semantic primitive sequence.



Figure 2: **Overview of the SafeMoEngine.** We first classify and rewrite harmful texts, route safe texts to original motions, compose text conditions and synthesize motions via two generative models, to construct SafeMoVAE-29K and SafeMoVQ-29K, respectively.

Definition 5 (Safety Criterion)**.** *For a risky or harmful prompt c, an output motion x satisfies the safety criterion iff* $\forall s \in \Psi(x),\ s \notin \Sigma_{\text{harmful}}$.

MMU is formulated as an unlearning objective rather than a motion-editing objective. Its primary success criterion is the exclusion of harmful motion semantics, i.e., $\Psi(x) \cap \Sigma_{\text{harmful}} = \varnothing$. This is consistent with unlearning in other modalities, such as concept suppression in image generation (Fuchi and Takagi, 2024) and refusal in text generation (Zhang et al., 2025a). Consequently, residual artifacts such as reduced motion diversity, stationary outputs, or local kinematic degradation do not invalidate unlearning success, provided that harmful primitives are removed and no new harmful primitives are introduced. In this sense, MMU is evaluated primarily by semantic suppression of explicitly harmful intents, analogous to concept suppression in image generation or refusal behavior in text generation.

3.3 SafeMoEngine: LLM-Agent Pipeline for Safety Refinement

SafeMoEngine synthesizes safety-refined text–motion pairs via a classify–rewrite–regenerate pipeline, as shown in Fig. 2. First, a violence-aware LLM classifier assigns each prompt to one of three labels: *(i)* safe, *(ii)* risky, and *(iii)* harmful. We then apply a level-dependent rewriting strategy using rule-enhanced few-shot agents. For risky prompts, we perform partial rewriting: only the risky action phrase is edited, while safe sub-events are kept unchanged and key benign attributes such as the active hand or leg are preserved whenever possible. For harmful prompts, we perform *full rewriting*: the entire sentence is rewritten into a safe description while preserving the subject, tense, and event order. The resulting safe surrogate prompt $\tilde{c}$ is required to satisfy $\forall s \in \Phi(\tilde{c}),\ s \notin \Sigma_{\text{harmful}}$. All rewrites aim to preserve as much non-harmful semantic content as possible while ensuring safety. For example, *a man punches someone with his right fist* may be rewritten as *a man gives a friendly wave with his right hand*. The rewritten texts are then fed into two text-to-motion generators: a continuous-domain generator, MotionFlow Transformer (Guo et al., 2025), and a discrete VQ-token generator, MotionAgent (Wu et al., 2024). Their outputs are converted into the standard HumanML3D (Guo et al., 2022a) representation. Safe subset is kept unchanged, whereas the non-safe subsets are replaced by regenerated safe surrogates. This yields two safety-refined datasets, *SafeMoVAE-29K* in continuous space and *SafeMoVQ-29K* in discrete space. To the best of our knowledge, SafeMoVAE-29K and SafeMoVQ-29K are the first text-to-motion datasets explicitly constructed for the *safe text-to-motion unlearning* setting, providing revised text–motion pairs in both continuous and discrete forms.

3.4 Minimal Motion Unlearning

We build MMU on the DiP backbone (Tevet et al., 2025), a text-conditioned autoregressive diffusion model with a transformer decoder. Inspired by selective capability-negation methods such as SKU (Liu et al., 2024b), MMU adopts the high-level intuition that an undesirable generation capability can be absorbed into a compact parameter update and later suppressed by inference-time negation. However, in our setting, all modules are instantiated for continuous motion generation. SKU is developed for discrete token generation, whereas

MMU is specifically designed for continuous motion diffusion. In particular, harmful absorption is defined by kinematics-aware motion objectives, decoupling is implemented through designed temporal sequence perturbations, and preservation is measured in pooled motion feature space rather than token divergence. MMU has two stages as shown in Fig. 3: *(i)* harmful knowledge absorption, which learns a harmful task vector that concentrates unsafe generation capability in a low-rank subspace, and *(ii)* harmful knowledge negation, which subtracts this update at inference with a prompt-dependent scaling factor α.

Backbone and notation. Let f_θ denote the denoiser with parameters θ, and let θ_0 be the frozen base model. Given noisy motion x_t, diffusion step t, and text condition $\mathcal{C}$, the clean motion $\hat{x}_0 = f_\theta(x_t, t, \mathcal{C})$ is predicted. The text condition is encoded by a frozen DistilBERT (Sanh et al., 2019) and injected through cross-attention in the transformer decoder. We denote the model parameters by θ, the *base model* by θ_0, and the harm-tuned model, *bad model*, by θ_{bad}, and the obtained *safe model* by θ_{safe}. Sampling follows DDPM-style iterative denoising (Ho et al., 2020) with a single-step prediction head of $\hat{x_0}^{\text{pred}}$ per step. Using the classifier in SafeMoEngine, we partition prompts into a safe set $\mathcal{S}$ and an unsafe set $\mathcal{U}$, where $\mathcal{U}$ includes both risky and harmful prompts.

Harmful knowledge absorption. This stage updates only LoRA parameters to concentrate unsafe generation capability into a compact low-rank update $\Delta\theta$, which will later be negated. To do so, we design a synchronized two-stream training process with three components: guided distortion (GD) on unsafe samples, random decoupling (RD) on unsafe samples, and preservation divergence (PD) on safe samples. Given an unsafe batch with length mask $m \in \{0,1\}^{B\times T}$, the model predicts the clean motion $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_0 = \{\hat{\mathbf{p}}_t\}_{t=1}^{T} = f_\theta(x_t, t, \mathcal{C}_{\text{text}})$ to match the target motion $\mathbf{x}_0 = \{\mathbf{p}_t\}_{t=1}^{T}$, where $\mathbf{p}_t, \hat{\mathbf{p}}_t \in \mathbb{R}^{3J}$ stack the J joint 3D coordinates. The motion-specific harmful loss combines kinematic terms and a text-motion alignment term in GD:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{L}_{\text{harm}} = \lambda_{\text{mpjpe}}\ &\text{MPJPE}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_0, \mathbf{x}_{\text{tgt}}; m)\\ &+ \lambda_{\text{vel}}\ \mathcal{L}_{\text{vel}}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_0, \mathbf{x}_{\text{tgt}}; m)\\ &+ \lambda_{\text{acc}}\ \mathcal{L}_{\text{acc}}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_0, \mathbf{x}_{\text{tgt}}; m)\\ &+ \lambda_{\text{foot}}\ \mathcal{L}_{\text{foot}}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_0; m)\\ &+ \lambda_{\text{text}}\ \mathcal{L}_{\text{text}\leftrightarrow\text{mo}}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_0, \mathcal{C}_{\text{text}}).\end{aligned} \tag{1}$$



Figure 3: **Overview of SafeMo's MMU.** *Harmful Knowledge Absorption* optimizes through motion-specific kinematic modules with decoupling strategy on unsafe stream, while the safe stream applies kinematic negative divergence. Only LoRA adapters on DiP are updated to obtain the pure harmful task vector. *Harmful Knowledge Negation* negates the learned harmful task vector via a prompt-class-aware α, suppressing unsafe semantics while preserving performance on safe prompts.

Here, $\mathcal{L}_{\text{mpjpe}}$ is masked reconstruction error, $\mathcal{L}_{\text{vel}}$ and $\mathcal{L}_{\text{acc}}$ penalize first- and second-order temporal mismatch, $\mathcal{L}_{\text{foot}}$ discourages foot sliding, and $\mathcal{L}_{\text{text}\leftrightarrow\text{mo}}$ is a symmetric text–motion contrastive loss. Unlike selective negation methods on LLM, which operates with token-level objectives, our harmful absorption modules is designed by kinematic fidelity and motion-text consistency for continuous latent space. Full details of each term are given in Appendix A.2.

To reduce overfitting to a narrow set of unsafe trajectories, RD introduces sequence-level decoupling. To broaden the harmful prototypes without heavy data editing, we construct a perturbed target $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{\text{tgt}}$ by either segment permutation or temporal reversal, and synchronously modify the motion prefix so that the conditioning remains consistent with the perturbed target. A single forward pass then computes

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{L}_{\text{dec}} = \lambda_{\text{mpjpe}}\ &\text{MPJPE}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_0^{\text{mix}}, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{\text{tgt}}; m)\\ &+ \lambda_{\text{vel}}\ \mathcal{L}_{\text{vel}}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_0^{\text{mix}}, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{\text{tgt}}; m)\\ &+ \lambda_{\text{acc}}\ \mathcal{L}_{\text{acc}}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_0^{\text{mix}}, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{\text{tgt}}; m),\end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where a mixed noisy batch $\mathbf{x}_t^{\text{mix}}$ is constructed by replacing only the unsafe instances with their decoupled-noised targets. Resulting predictions for the unsafe instances are $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_0^{\text{mix}}$.

Table 1: Statistics of compared motion–language datasets and our dataset. “Quantity" reports counts of motion clips and text descriptions. “Supported Tasks" specifies the applicable downstream tasks. Abbreviations: T2M (Text-to-Motion), A2M (Audio-to-Motion), SMU (Safe Motion Unlearning), PE (Pose Estimation), MR (Mesh Recovery). “Content" distinguishes general (a mix of safe and unsafe intents) versus safe-refined data.

Dataset	Quantity		Supported	Content			
	Motion	Text	Tasks	General Motion	General Text	Refined Safe Motion	Refined Safe Text
HumanML3D (Guo et al., 2022a)	14.6K	44.9K	T2M	✓	✓	✗	✗
KIT-ML (Plappert et al., 2016)	3.9K	6.3K	T2M	✓	✓	✗	✗
Motion-X (Lin et al., 2023)	81.1K	81.1K	T2M, MR	✓	✓	✗	✗
Motion-X++ (Zhang et al., 2025b)	120.5K	120.5K	T2M, MR, PE, A2M	✓	✓	✗	✗
SafeMoVQ-29K	17.2K	46.2K	T2M, SMU	✓	✓	✓	✓
SafeMoVAE-29K	17.2K	46.2K	T2M, SMU	✓	✓	✓	✓

On safe samples, PD encourage the model to diverge from a frozen baseline snapshot f_{θ_0} in pooled motion representation space. Let $\mathbf{z}_{\text{cur}} = \text{Pool}(f_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t, t, \mathcal{C}))$, and $\mathbf{z}_{\text{base}} = \text{Pool}(f_{\theta_0}(\mathbf{x}_t, t, \mathcal{C}))$, where $\text{Pool}(\cdot)$ denotes temporal-averages joint features. To make the divergence robust to light temporal perturbations, we design a safe-only decoupling term. For each safe sequence $\mathbf{x}_0$ we create a decoupled target $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_0$ by either segment permutation or time reversal at the sequence level, uniformly chosen. Using the same diffusion timestep t and noise ε as the main safe batch, we form $\mathbf{x}_t^{\text{dec}} = q(\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_0, t, \varepsilon)$ and $\mathcal{C}^{\text{dec}} = \text{SyncPrefix}(\mathcal{C}; \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_0)$, to obtain the decoupled features $\mathbf{z}_{\text{cur}}^{\text{dec}} = \text{Pool}\big(f_\theta(\mathbf{x}_t^{\text{dec}}, t, \mathcal{C}^{\text{dec}})\big)$, $\mathbf{z}_{\text{base}}^{\text{dec}} = \text{Pool}\big(f_{\theta_0}(\mathbf{x}_t^{\text{dec}}, t, \mathcal{C}^{\text{dec}})\big)$, where $\text{SyncPrefix}(\cdot)$ replaces the motion prefix so that the condition matches the decoupled target. The negative preservation divergence is then

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{L}_{\text{pres}} = &-\gamma\|\mathbf{z}_{\text{cur}} - \mathbf{z}_{\text{base}}\|_2^2 \\ &- (1-\gamma)\|\mathbf{z}_{\text{cur}}^{\text{dec}} - \mathbf{z}_{\text{base}}^{\text{dec}}\|_2^2,\end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

where $\gamma \in [0, 1]$. Minimizing this negative term deliberately pushes the LoRA update away from the base model on safe inputs, so that subtracting the learned harmful vector restores benign utility. Let $\mathcal{U}_t$ and $\mathcal{S}_t$ denote unsafe and safe sets in a batch at step t respectively. The overall stage 1 objective is then formed by

$$\begin{aligned}\theta_{t+1} \leftarrow \theta_t - \eta\nabla_\theta\big(&W_{\text{harm}}\mathcal{L}_{\text{harm}}(\mathcal{U}_t) \\ &+ W_{\text{dec}}\mathcal{L}_{\text{dec}}(\mathcal{U}_t) + W_{\text{pres}}\mathcal{L}_{\text{pres}}(\mathcal{S}_t)\big).\end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

The contributions of the subloss terms are examined via auxiliary analyses and ablation studies in Appendix F.

LoRA subspace. We attach LoRA adapters with rank r to selected linear layers, the attention output and the FFN in and out projections, scaling α within a dropout rate $p_{\text{LoRA}}^{\text{dropout}}$, with trainable parameters only the LoRA matrices $A \in \mathbb{R}^{r\times d}$ and $B \in \mathbb{R}^{d_{\text{out}}\times r}$ while all backbone parameters frozen, confining updates to the low-rank subspace.

Harmful knowledge negation. The harmful task vector is obtained by $\Delta\theta = \theta_{\text{bad}} - \theta_0$ in the LoRA subspace. The unlearned safe model is then obtained by $\theta_{\text{safe}} = \theta_0 - \alpha\,\Delta\theta$ at inference. We design *SafeMo-Static* and *SafeMo-Gated* with different scaling strategies. SafeMo-Static applies a fixed α for all text prompts without any external agent model, providing a light and offline-fashioned method for balanced performance on both the unsafe and safe set. SafeMo-Gated uses the SafeMoEngine classifier to apply stronger negation to unsafe prompts and milder negation to safe prompts, maximizing the effect of toxic motion unlearning while minimizing the influence on benign tasks. The algorithm of MMU can be found in Appendix A.

4 Experiments

4.1 Experiment Setup

Datasets and Evaluation Metrics. We evaluate on HumanML3D (Guo et al., 2022a) and Motion-X (Lin et al., 2023). We report standard T2M metrics: R-precision (R@k) for text–motion retrieval accuracy in shared embedding space, Fréchet Inception Distance (FID) to measure distributional similarity between generated and ground-truth motion features, and Diversity as the average pairwise distance among generated features. For unlearning, retrieval suppression on unsafe prompts is primary automatic indicator of harmful-semantic removal while forget-set FID is a secondary signal, and we complement it with the *normalized retrieval trade-off score (NRTS)*, where higher indicates more effective unlearning, and human evaluation of harmful-component removal, motion naturalness, and safe

Table 2: **Results on HumanML3D dataset.** D_r reports performances for the model trained on toxicity-free dataset, and FT are results of fine-tuning on the toxicity-free dataset. **SafeMo-Static** denotes fixed-α model without external classifier, lightweight and offline. **SafeMo-Gated** denotes the classifier-agent-guided α-gating model. Diversity is for reference. *Note:* Rows marked with † are reported from (De Matteis et al., 2025) due to unavailable implementation and checkpoints. **Bold** and underline denote the best and second-best results across all unlearning methods. Grey rows are non-post-training baselines.

	NRTS ↑	Forget Set			Retain Set		
		R@1 ↓	Diversity	FID ↑	R@1 ↑	Diversity	FID ↓
MoMask $D_r^\dagger$	0.318	$0.129_{\pm.004}$	$7.611_{\pm.088}$	$13.644_{\pm.365}$	$0.291_{\pm.001}$	$10.059_{\pm.080}$	$0.093_{\pm.003}$
MoMask† (Guo et al., 2024)	-	$0.159_{\pm.005}$	$6.146_{\pm.092}$	$0.956_{\pm.084}$	$0.290_{\pm.001}$	$10.143_{\pm.081}$	$0.064_{\pm.002}$
MoMask $FT^\dagger$	0.129	$0.148_{\pm.006}$	$6.439_{\pm.088}$	$1.589_{\pm.116}$	$0.280_{\pm.001}$	$10.143_{\pm.097}$	$\underline{0.088}_{\pm.002}$
MoMask w/ LCR†	0.281	$\underline{0.133}_{\pm.004}$	$6.580_{\pm.066}$	$\underline{12.434}_{\pm.303}$	$0.287_{\pm.001}$	$10.106_{\pm.086}$	$\mathbf{0.077}_{\pm.002}$
BAMM $D_r^\dagger$	0.401	$0.122_{\pm.005}$	$7.688_{\pm.074}$	$15.604_{\pm.334}$	$0.279_{\pm.001}$	$10.092_{\pm.093}$	$0.566_{\pm.015}$
BAMM† (Pinyoanuntapong et al., 2024)	-	$0.164_{\pm.007}$	$6.202_{\pm.089}$	$1.353_{\pm.107}$	$0.302_{\pm.001}$	$10.118_{\pm.100}$	$0.135_{\pm.004}$
BAMM $FT^\dagger$	0.036	$0.161_{\pm.006}$	$6.224_{\pm.098}$	$1.443_{\pm.118}$	$0.301_{\pm.002}$	$10.109_{\pm.086}$	$0.163_{\pm.005}$
BAMM w/ LCR†	0.291	$0.136_{\pm.005}$	$6.502_{\pm.077}$	$9.712_{\pm.214}$	$0.299_{\pm.001}$	$10.068_{\pm.102}$	$0.140_{\pm.005}$
DiP D_r	0.321	$0.249_{\pm.005}$	$7.272_{\pm.106}$	$3.002_{\pm.108}$	$0.476_{\pm.009}$	$9.248_{\pm.091}$	$0.301_{\pm.028}$
DiP (Tevet et al., 2025)	-	$0.308_{\pm.007}$	$7.331_{\pm.100}$	$0.440_{\pm.046}$	$0.482_{\pm.006}$	$9.274_{\pm.089}$	$0.250_{\pm.025}$
DiP FT	0.213	$0.271_{\pm.010}$	$7.527_{\pm.093}$	$1.399_{\pm.100}$	$\mathbf{0.459}_{\pm.007}$	$9.337_{\pm.073}$	$0.207_{\pm.024}$
SafeMo-Static	$\underline{0.550}$	$0.168_{\pm.002}$	$6.993_{\pm.072}$	$10.288_{\pm.055}$	$0.335_{\pm.003}$	$8.606_{\pm.176}$	$2.224_{\pm.002}$
SafeMo-Gated	**0.759**	$\mathbf{0.086}_{\pm.004}$	$4.986_{\pm.084}$	$\mathbf{31.147}_{\pm.221}$	$\underline{0.386}_{\pm.002}$	$9.404_{\pm.401}$	$0.407_{\pm.003}$

Table 3: **Alignment of rewritten safe prompts and regenerated safe motions in the T2M joint embedding space (Guo et al., 2022a).** The lower yet still high cosine similarity to the original prompts is expected, as SafeMoEngine's fine-grained rewriting strategy detoxifies the original prompts into semantically similar but safe ones (e.g., from *a man punches someone with his right fist* to *a man gives a friendly wave with his right hand*).

Dataset	Level	Avg. Cos to Rewrite ↑	Avg. Cos to Orig.	Avg. Cos Gap% ↑	Avg. Dist to Rewrite ↓	Avg. Dist to Orig.	Avg. Dist Gap% ↑
SafeMoVAE-29K	Risky	0.931	0.868	7.3%	3.718	5.260	29.3%
SafeMoVQ-29K	Risky	0.918	0.837	9.7%	4.117	6.010	31.5%
SafeMoVAE-29K	Harmful	0.901	0.829	8.7%	4.356	5.947	26.8%
SafeMoVQ-29K	Harmful	0.912	0.758	20.3%	4.164	7.383	43.6%

text–motion alignment. The definition of NRTS is as follows: for an unlearning method m with backbone b, let $U_m = 1 - R@1_m^{\text{forget}}/R@1_b^{\text{forget}}$ denote unsafe retrieval suppression and $S_m = R@1_m^{\text{retain}}/R@1_b^{\text{retain}}$ denote safe retrieval preservation. Define $\text{NRTS}_m = 2U_mS_m/(U_m + S_m)$, where higher implies more effective unlearning across different methods and backbones. Additional metric details in Appendix B. Retrieval and FID on safe prompts reflect benign utility preservation.

Baselines. To the best of our knowledge, SafeMo is the first continuous latent space human motion unlearning method. We therefore compare with discrete unlearning method LCR (De Matteis et al., 2025), the first and current SOTA human motion unlearning, and follow its keyword-based partitioning protocol to construct forget (unsafe) and retain (safe) splits for fair comparison. Because LCR operates on discrete latent backbones (MoMask and BAMM), while SafeMo is built on the continuous DiP backbone, the methods are not directly interchangeable across backbones. As official implementations and checkpoints for LCR and its T2M adaptations of UCE and RECE were unavailable at submission time, we report the corresponding published numbers from (De Matteis et al., 2025), marked by † in Table 2.

4.2 Results and Analysis

SafeMoEngine alignment. To evaluate prompt-motion alignment and the quality of the rewritten prompts, we compute text–motion cosine similarity and distance in T2M joint embedding space (Guo et al., 2022a). As shown in Table 3, regenerated motions are highly aligned with the rewritten safe prompts which provides evidence that regenerated motions follow the safe intents, and consistently



Figure 4: **Qualitative results.** More results can be found in Appendix E.

more aligned with rewritten prompts than with the original prompts, while still remaining semantically close to the originals. This is expected, since SafeMoEngine's fine-grained rewriting detoxifies the prompts with minimal semantic intervention.

Quantitative results. SafeMo-Static applies a fixed negation $\alpha_{\text{static}} = 1.0$ to all prompts and requires no external classifier, whereas SafeMo-Gated uses the SafeMoEngine toxicity classifier to assign $\alpha_{\text{gated}}^{\text{unsafe}} = 2.0$ to unsafe prompts and $\alpha_{\text{gated}}^{\text{safe}} = 0.05$ to benign prompts. α-sweep sensitivity analysis is in Appendix F.4. Results on HumanML3D are shown in Table 2. On unsafe prompts, both SafeMo variants substantially suppress text–motion retrieval, with SafeMo-Gated achieving the strongest forgetting and the lowest forget-set R@1 of 0.086, reducing unsafe retrieval by 35.3% and 36.8% relative to MoMask/BAMM w/ LCR, respectively. On the retain set, SafeMo-Gated preserves higher benign utility than prior baselines in terms of R@1 retrieval, while SafeMo-Static provides a lighter-weight offline alternative that still yields clear unsafe suppression. FID increases markedly for both variants on forget-set, which is consistent with stronger forgetting. As a summary indicator across different backbones, NRTS shows the same overall trend: SafeMo-Static reaches 0.550 and SafeMo-Gated further improves to 0.759, compared with 0.281/0.291 for MoMask/BAMM w/ LCR. This suggests that our method improves the overall forget–retain balance rather than optimizing only one side of the trade-off. The same trend holds on additional HumanML3D results and Motion-X, results are in Appendix C and D.

Safety evaluation. To directly assess whether harmful motion components are removed, we conduct a human evaluation with 50 participants. Participants rated generated motions on a 5-point Likert scale for harmful-component removal on unsafe prompts, text–motion alignment on safe prompts, and motion naturalness. On unsafe prompts, 98% of participants judged SafeMo-Gated to have successfully removed unsafe semantics, compared with 86% for SafeMo-Static. On safe prompts, generated motions achieved an overall text–motion alignment score of 4.64. Pairwise preferences between SafeMo-Static and SafeMo-Gated are assessed, with SafeMo-Gated preferred in 84% of safe-prompt comparisons and 56% of unsafe-prompt comparisons. With the suppression of harmful motion semantics being the objective of unlearning, stronger negation can still introduce reduced diversity or local kinematic artifacts in some cases, which is supported by the relatively lower preference for SafeMo-Gated on unsafe prompts, we discuss this further in Section 6 and H. Details of user study are in I.

Qualitative results. Figure 4 shows qualitative results, illustrating stronger forgetting on unsafe intents and preserved fidelity on benign prompts. More results and discussions in Appendix E.

Ablations. Ablations on different modules, loss-terms, LoRA ranks are in Appendix F.

5 Conclusion

In this work, we introduce a T2M unlearning framework, SafeMo, for human motion unlearning. To the best of our knowledge, SafeMo is the first continuous-latent-space human motion unlearning framework. We introduce the first safety-aligned T2M dataset, SafeMoVAE-29K, along with its discrete version, to facilitate future research and standardized benchmarking in human motion unlearning. The proposed continuous-latent-based unlearning method, Minimal Motion Unlearning, enables selective unlearning on unsafe behaviors while preserving benign utility on safe prompts. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our model achieves SOTA performance on human motion unlearning.

6 Limitations

To the best of our knowledge, SafeMo is the first continuous latent space framework to investigate text-to-motion unlearning. On unsafe prompts, our goal is *semantic removal*, i.e., preventing the model from expressing the unsafe motion semantics, rather than producing a high-fidelity safe substitute motion. However, this safety-first operating point may lead to over-suppression in some of the unsafe prompts, e.g., stationary-like patterns, and can exacerbate kinematic artifacts such as foot-skating, especially under larger negation gating scales. However, these artifacts are generally not a problem in safe prompts since the negation is targeted to unsafe behaviors. Additional discussions on failure modes and future work are provided in Appendix H.

7 Ethical Considerations

This work contributes to the T2M safety alignment. The proposed datasets are constructed by identifying harmful prompts from HumanML3D and systematically rewriting them into safe alternatives using LLMs, followed by regenerating them into safe motions by both discrete and continuous methods. While the dataset includes the original harmful prompts to serve as a baseline for unlearning tasks, its primary purpose is to facilitate the development if safety constraints and remediation strategies. We strictly limit the use of the datasets to research purposes.

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A Minimal Motion Unlearning (MMU) Algorithm

A.1 Algorithm Procedure

The complete procedure of Minimal Motion Unlearning (MMU) is outlined in Algorithm 1.

A.2 Details of MMU Loss Terms

We provide the detailed definitions of the motion-domain objectives used in MMU. Throughout this section, for a motion sequence of length T with J joints, we write $x_0 = \{\mathbf{p}_t\}_{t=1}^{T}$ and $\hat{x}_0 = \{\hat{\mathbf{p}}_t\}_{t=1}^{T}$, where $\mathbf{p}_t, \hat{\mathbf{p}}_t \in \mathbb{R}^{3J}$ stack the 3D coordinates of all joints at frame t. Let $m \in \{0,1\}^T$ denote the valid-frame mask, and define the mask normalizer as $Z(m) = \sum_{t=1}^{T} m_t + \varepsilon$, where $\varepsilon > 0$ is a small constant for numerical stability.

We use first- and second-order temporal differences $\Delta\mathbf{p}_t = \mathbf{p}_t - \mathbf{p}_{t-1}$ and $\Delta^2\mathbf{p}_t = \mathbf{p}_t - 2\mathbf{p}_{t-1} + \mathbf{p}_{t-2}$, with the same definitions applied to $\hat{\mathbf{p}}_t$. For boundary frames where the difference is undefined, we simply exclude them from the corresponding masked average.

The masked reconstruction term is

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{mpjpe}} = \frac{1}{Z(m)} \sum_{t=1}^{T} m_t \left\| \hat{\mathbf{p}}_t - \mathbf{p}_t \right\|_2 .$$

The velocity and acceleration terms combine time-domain derivative matching with an additional frequency-aware penalty:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{vel}} = \frac{1}{Z(m')} \sum_{t=2}^{T} m'_t \left\| \Delta\hat{\mathbf{p}}_t - \Delta\mathbf{p}_t \right\|_2 + \mathcal{S}_{\text{vel}},$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{acc}} = \frac{1}{Z(m'')} \sum_{t=3}^{T} m''_t \left\| \Delta^2\hat{\mathbf{p}}_t - \Delta^2\mathbf{p}_t \right\|_2 + \mathcal{S}_{\text{acc}},$$

where $m'_t = m_t m_{t-1}$ and $m''_t = m_t m_{t-1} m_{t-2}$ ensure that only valid temporal differences are included.

To emphasize high-frequency motion errors that are often associated with local kinematic artifacts,

we define the spectral terms on the residual sequences. Let $r_t^{\text{vel}} = \Delta\hat{\mathbf{p}}_t - \Delta\mathbf{p}_t$ and $r_t^{\text{acc}} = \Delta^2\hat{\mathbf{p}}_t - \Delta^2\mathbf{p}_t$. We apply a real FFT along the temporal axis and weight each frequency bin by a logarithmic prior that increases with normalized frequency:

$$\mathcal{S}_{\text{vel}} = \text{Mean}\left(\left|\mathcal{F}\left(r^{\text{vel}}\right)\right| \odot \log(1+9\nu)\right),$$

$$\mathcal{S}_{\text{acc}} = \text{Mean}(|\mathcal{F}(r^{\text{acc}})| \odot \log(1+9\nu)),$$

where $\mathcal{F}(\cdot)$ denotes the rFFT over time, $\nu \in [0,1]$ denotes the normalized frequency bins broadcast to all joints and channels, $\odot$ is element-wise multiplication, and $\text{Mean}(\cdot)$ averages over valid frequency bins and feature dimensions.

To discourage foot sliding, we define

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{foot}} = \frac{1}{Z(m')}\sum_{t=2}^{T} m'_t \frac{1}{|\mathcal{F}|}\sum_{j\in\mathcal{F}} \left\|\hat{\mathbf{p}}_t^{(j)} - \hat{\mathbf{p}}_{t-1}^{(j)}\right\|_1,$$

where $\mathcal{F}$ denotes the set of foot-related joints and $\hat{\mathbf{p}}_t^{(j)}$ is the predicted 3D coordinate of joint j at frame t.

For text–motion consistency, we use the symmetric contrastive objective adopted in prior text-to-motion work. Let e_t and e_m denote the normalized text and motion embeddings for a mini-batch, and let τ be the temperature. We define

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{text}\leftrightarrow\text{mo}} = \frac{1}{2}\left[\text{CE}\left(\frac{e_t e_m^\top}{\tau}, I\right) + \text{CE}\left(\frac{e_m e_t^\top}{\tau}, I\right)\right],$$

where I denotes the identity matching matrix and $\text{CE}(\cdot,\cdot)$ is the cross-entropy loss over batchwise matching logits.

To broaden unsafe motion prototypes without manually editing the motion content, we construct a decoupled target $\tilde{x}_0$ for each unsafe sequence x_0 using one of two temporal perturbations, chosen uniformly at random: *(i)* segment permutation, which partitions the sequence into contiguous temporal segments and shuffles their order, and *(ii)* temporal reversal, which reverses the sequence order. The corresponding motion prefix in the condition is synchronously replaced so that the autoregressive prefix remains consistent with the perturbed target. We denote this operation by $\mathcal{C}^{\text{dec}} = \text{SyncPrefix}(\mathcal{C}; \tilde{x}_0)$.

Using the same diffusion timestep and noise sampling procedure as in the original branch, we obtain the noisy decoupled input $\tilde{x}_t = q(\tilde{x}_0, t, \varepsilon)$ and predict $\hat{x}_0^{\text{mix}} = f_\theta(\tilde{x}_t, t, \mathcal{C}^{\text{dec}})$ for unsafe instances. The decoupling loss is then defined by replacing the target in the kinematic terms:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{dec}} = \lambda_{\text{mpjpe}}\tilde{\mathcal{L}}_{\text{mpjpe}} + \lambda_{\text{vel}}\tilde{\mathcal{L}}_{\text{vel}} + \lambda_{\text{acc}}\tilde{\mathcal{L}}_{\text{acc}},$$

where $\tilde{\mathcal{L}}_{\text{mpjpe}}$, $\tilde{\mathcal{L}}_{\text{vel}}$, and $\tilde{\mathcal{L}}_{\text{acc}}$ are computed in the same way as above, but using $\tilde{x}_0$ as the target sequence.

For safe samples, we define preservation in pooled motion representation space rather than token-level likelihood space. Given the current LoRA-updated model f_θ and the frozen base model f_{θ_0}, we compute $\mathbf{H}_{\text{cur}} = f_\theta(x_t, t, \mathcal{C})$ and $\mathbf{H}_{\text{base}} = f_{\theta_0}(x_t, t, \mathcal{C})$, where $\mathbf{H} \in \mathbb{R}^{T\times d}$ denotes the sequence of hidden motion features before the final prediction head. We then apply temporal mean pooling:

$$\mathbf{z}_{\text{cur}} = \text{Pool}(\mathbf{H}_{\text{cur}}) = \frac{1}{Z(m)}\sum_{t=1}^{T} m_t \mathbf{H}_{\text{cur},t},$$

$$\mathbf{z}_{\text{base}} = \text{Pool}(\mathbf{H}_{\text{base}}) = \frac{1}{Z(m)}\sum_{t=1}^{T} m_t \mathbf{H}_{\text{base},t}.$$

We further apply the same sequence-level perturbation to a safe motion x_0 to obtain a decoupled safe target $\tilde{x}_0$, and compute $\mathbf{z}_{\text{cur}}^{\text{dec}}$ and $\mathbf{z}_{\text{base}}^{\text{dec}}$ from the corresponding decoupled branch. As in the main content, the preservation divergence is $\mathcal{L}_{\text{pres}} = -\gamma\left\|\mathbf{z}_{\text{cur}} - \mathbf{z}_{\text{base}}\right\|_2^2 - (1-\gamma)\left\|\mathbf{z}_{\text{cur}}^{\text{dec}} - \mathbf{z}_{\text{base}}^{\text{dec}}\right\|_2^2$. Minimizing this negative objective explicitly pushes the LoRA update away from the base model on safe inputs and their decoupled variants, making the absorbed update more reversible under inference-time negation.

B Implementation Details, Motion Representations, Datasets and Evaluation Metrics

B.1 Motion Representations

We follow MDM (Tevet et al.) and use the HumanML3D motion representation. At each frame n, a pose $p_n \in \mathbb{R}^F$ is $p_n = \left(r^a, r^x, r^z, r^y, j^p, j^r, j^v, f\right)$, where $r^a \in \mathbb{R}$ is the root angular velocity along the Z-axis, $r^x, r^z \in \mathbb{R}$ are the root linear velocities on the XY-plane, and $r^y \in \mathbb{R}$ is the root height. $j^p \in \mathbb{R}^{3(J-1)}$, $j^r \in \mathbb{R}^{6(J-1)}$, and $j^v \in \mathbb{R}^{3J}$ denote, respectively,

Algorithm 1 Minimal Motion Unlearning (MMU)

Require: Unsafe set $\mathcal{U}$, Safe set $\mathcal{S}$; base DiP model f_{θ_0}; LoRA config $(r, \alpha_{\text{LoRA}}, p_{\text{dropout}})$; loss weights $\{\lambda, \mu, \beta\}$; diffusion schedule.

Ensure: Task vector $\Delta\theta$ and safe model f_{θ^*}

Initialize $\theta \leftarrow \theta_0$; insert LoRA adapters at attention/FFN; freeze non-LoRA params.

Stage 1: Harmful Knowledge Absorption (training)
repeat
  Sample unsafe batch $\mathcal{U}_b$, safe batch $\mathcal{S}_b$, timesteps t, noise ε.
  for $i \in \mathcal{U}_b$ **do**
    Generate noisy $x_t^{(i)} \sim q(x_0^{(i)}, t, \varepsilon)$
    Predict $\hat{x}_0^{(i)} \leftarrow f_\theta(x_t^{(i)}, t, C^{(i)})$
    Compute $\mathcal{L}_{\text{harm}}^{(i)}$ using Eq. 1
    Build decoupled $\tilde{x}_{\text{tgt}}^{(i)}$ (segment shuffle / reverse)
    Sync prefix $\tilde{C}^{(i)} \leftarrow \text{SyncPrefix}(C^{(i)}, \tilde{x}_{\text{tgt}}^{(i)})$
    Predict $\hat{x}_0^{\text{mix}} \leftarrow f_\theta(x_t^{(i)}, t, \tilde{C}^{(i)})$
    Compute $\mathcal{L}_{\text{dec}}^{(i)}$ via Eq. 2
  end for
  for $j \in \mathcal{S}_b$ **do**
    Generate $x_t^{(j)} \sim q(x_0^{(j)}, t, \varepsilon)$
    Extract pooled features $z_{\text{cur}}^{(j)}, z_{\text{base}}^{(j)}$
    Create decoupled $\tilde{x}_0^{(j)}$ and synced prefix C^{dec}
    Extract decoupled pooled features $z_{\text{cur}}^{\text{dec}}, z_{\text{base}}^{\text{dec}}$
    Compute $\mathcal{L}_{\text{pres}}^{(j)}$ via Eq. 3
  end for
  Form stage-1 objective $\mathcal{L}_{\text{Stage1}}$ by Eq. 4
  Update only LoRA parameters with $\nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_{\text{Stage1}}$
until convergence
$\theta_{\text{bad}} \leftarrow \theta$, $\Delta\theta \leftarrow \theta_{\text{bad}} - \theta_0$

Stage 2: Harmful Knowledge Negation (inference)
for prompt $(\text{text}, \text{class})$ **do**
  if Static then
    $\alpha \leftarrow \alpha_{\text{Static}}$
  else if Gated then
    if class = `unsafe` **then** $\alpha \leftarrow \alpha_{\text{unsafe}}$ **else** $\alpha \leftarrow \alpha_{\text{safe}}$
  end if
  Set $\theta^* \leftarrow \theta_0 - \alpha\,\Delta\theta$
  Generate motion via DDPM-style denoising with f_{θ^*}
end for

the local joint positions, rotations (in the 6D continuous form), and velocities, all defined with respect to the root. $f \in \mathbb{R}^4$ are binary foot-contact labels for four foot joints (two per leg).

B.2 Implementation Details

Our framework is trained on a single NVIDIA GeForce RTX 3090 GPU using PyTorch. The LLM agents used in SafeMoEngine are on top of the Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct (Bai et al., 2023) with few-shot rule-enhanced prompt templates. The backbone DiP (Tevet et al., 2025) is an 8-layer transformer decoder with a latent dimension size of 512 and 4 attention heads with text encoder being a fixed instance of DistilBERT (Sanh et al., 2019). We follow the base model's setting for generation,

with 10 diffusion steps, prefix length $N_p = 20$ and generation length $N_g = 40$.

B.3 Datasets

We evaluate our model's performance on the HumanML3D (Guo et al., 2022a) and Motion-X (Lin et al., 2023) benchmark, which are widely used for text-to-motion tasks. HumanML3D contains 14.6k human motion sequences and 44.9k detailed text descriptions with pos tagging. Text and motion encoders are used in this benchmark to map text and motion to the same latent space, and learned using contrastive loss. Motion-X is a large-scale text–motion corpus aggregating motions from real-world and animated scenarios, including 15.6M whole-body poses and 81.1K motion clips annotations. It covers a broader action vocabulary such as daily activities, sports, and combat-related motions and pairs them with natural-language descriptions. According to findings in LCR (De Matteis et al., 2025), HumanML3D dataset contains 7.7% explicitly toxic human motions, while Motion-X has a higher percentage of 14.9%.

B.4 Metrics

We use R-precision, Fréchet Inception Distance (FID), Diversity to measure the effectiveness of our model on this dataset. R-precision is the measurement of text-motion matching in the shared feature space, where a generated motion is successful when its text appears in the top-k closest candidates consisting of 1 ground truth and 31 random negative samples. FID computes the Fréchet distance between Gaussian fits of motion features from generated results and ground truths, measuring the distance of the generated motion distribution to the ground truth distribution. Diversity is the average pairwise distance between features of randomly sampled generated motions, capturing intra-set variability.

R-Precision. Following t2m (Zhang et al., 2023), a shared text–motion feature space is used for retrieval. R-Precision reports top-k accuracy when each generated motion is queried against 1 ground-truth caption and 31 mismatched captions (R@1/2/3).

FID. FID computes the Fréchet distance between two Gaussians fitted to motion features from generated and real samples, capturing distributional discrepancy. This is measured by the L2-loss between their latent feature representations.

Diversity. Diversity estimates intra-set variability by splitting the generated set into two equal halves $\{m_1, \ldots, m_{M_d}\}$ and $\{m'_1, \ldots, m'_{M_d}\}$ and averaging cross-set feature distances:

$$\text{Diversity} = \frac{1}{M_d} \sum_{i=1}^{M_d} \|m_i - m'_i\|_2. \qquad (5)$$

C Other Results on Humanml3D Dataset

Table 4 reports additional HumanML3D results. Besides our DiP-based models, we include the UCE/RECE baselines reported in (De Matteis et al., 2025), which are the authors' T2M implementation of unlearning methods derived from other modalities. Following the main paper, we report NRTS together with R@1, Diversity, and FID on the forget and retain sets, with grey rows denoting non-post-training baselines.

These results provide two complementary observations. First, some aggressive unlearning baselines can obtain relatively high NRTS values, but this does not necessarily imply a better practical forgetting–retention balance. In particular, BAMM w/ UCE reaches an NRTS of 0.577, slightly above SafeMo-Static (0.550). However, its retain-set quality is severely degraded, as reflected by the much worse retain R@1 (0.184) and especially the retain FID (4.296), indicating substantial distortion of benign generation capability. This suggests that its elevated NRTS is largely driven by extremely strong suppression on the forget set, rather than by preserving useful safe-generation behavior.

Second, our method remains overall favorable in terms of practical utility. SafeMo-Gated achieves the best NRTS overall (0.759) while maintaining substantially better benign performance than the most destructive baselines, and SafeMo-Static offers a lightweight offline alternative with a competitive trade-off.

D Results on Motion-X Dataset

Results on Motion-X (Lin et al., 2023) are reported in Table 5. Compared with the reported MoMask-based baselines, our methods show a markedly stronger forgetting–retention trade-off under the proposed NRTS metric. In particular, SafeMo-Gated achieves the best NRTS of 0.749, substantially outperforming MoMask w/ LCR (0.041), UCE (0.232), and RECE (0.154), while SafeMo-Static also attains a competitive score of 0.570.

Table 4: **Additional results on HumanML3D dataset.** UCE and RECE are (De Matteis et al., 2025)'s T2M implementation of unlearning methods of other fields. D_r reports performances for the model trained on toxicity-free dataset. **SafeMo-Static** denotes fixed-α model without external classifier, lightweight and offline. **SafeMo-Gated** denotes the classifier-agent-guided α-gating model. Diversity is for reference. *Note:* Rows marked with † are reported from (De Matteis et al., 2025) due to unavailable implementation and checkpoints. Grey rows are non-post-training baselines.

	NRTS ↑	Forget Set			Retain Set		
		R@1 ↓	Diversity	FID ↑	R@1 ↑	Diversity	FID ↓
MoMask $D_r^\dagger$	0.318	$0.129_{\pm.004}$	$7.611_{\pm.088}$	$13.644_{\pm.365}$	$0.291_{\pm.001}$	$10.059_{\pm.080}$	$0.093_{\pm.003}$
MoMask† (Guo et al., 2024)	–	$0.159_{\pm.005}$	$6.146_{\pm.092}$	$0.956_{\pm.084}$	$0.290_{\pm.001}$	$10.143_{\pm.081}$	$0.064_{\pm.002}$
MoMask w/ UCE†	0.491	$0.105_{\pm.005}$	$8.693_{\pm.067}$	$25.039_{\pm.442}$	$0.257_{\pm.001}$	$10.194_{\pm.091}$	$0.395_{\pm.008}$
MoMask w/ RECE†	0.480	$0.069_{\pm.004}$	$8.591_{\pm.073}$	$58.487_{\pm.899}$	$0.121_{\pm.001}$	$9.612_{\pm.147}$	$12.557_{\pm.092}$
BAMM $D_r^\dagger$	0.401	$0.122_{\pm.005}$	$7.688_{\pm.074}$	$15.604_{\pm.334}$	$0.279_{\pm.001}$	$10.092_{\pm.093}$	$0.566_{\pm.015}$
BAMM† (Pinyoanuntapong et al., 2024)	–	$0.164_{\pm.007}$	$6.202_{\pm.089}$	$1.353_{\pm.107}$	$0.302_{\pm.001}$	$10.118_{\pm.100}$	$0.135_{\pm.004}$
BAMM w/ UCE†	0.577	$0.074_{\pm.003}$	$9.482_{\pm.073}$	$57.953_{\pm.893}$	$0.184_{\pm.001}$	$9.654_{\pm.080}$	$4.296_{\pm.063}$
BAMM w/ RECE†	0.492	$0.061_{\pm.004}$	$7.740_{\pm.073}$	$34.367_{\pm.484}$	$0.122_{\pm.001}$	$8.470_{\pm.094}$	$13.310_{\pm.118}$
DiP D_r	0.321	$0.249_{\pm.005}$	$7.272_{\pm.106}$	$3.002_{\pm.108}$	$0.476_{\pm.009}$	$9.248_{\pm.091}$	$0.301_{\pm.028}$
DiP (Tevet et al., 2025)	–	$0.308_{\pm.007}$	$7.331_{\pm.100}$	$0.440_{\pm.046}$	$0.482_{\pm.006}$	$9.274_{\pm.089}$	$0.250_{\pm.025}$
DiP FT	0.213	$0.271_{\pm.010}$	$7.527_{\pm.093}$	$1.399_{\pm.100}$	$0.459_{\pm.007}$	$9.337_{\pm.073}$	$0.207_{\pm.024}$
SafeMo-Static	0.550	$0.168_{\pm.002}$	$6.993_{\pm.072}$	$10.288_{\pm.055}$	$0.335_{\pm.003}$	$8.606_{\pm.176}$	$2.224_{\pm.002}$
SafeMo-Gated	0.759	$0.086_{\pm.004}$	$4.986_{\pm.084}$	$31.147_{\pm.221}$	$0.386_{\pm.002}$	$9.404_{\pm.401}$	$0.407_{\pm.003}$

On the forget set, both SafeMo variants exhibit clear unsafe-semantic suppression, with substantially increased FID and decreased R@1 relative to MoMask w/ LCR, indicating that the generated motions are pushed far away from the unsafe target distribution. Among them, SafeMo-Gated is the most aggressive, reaching the highest forget-set FID (32.038) and a much lower forget-set R@1 (0.075), which suggests the strongest removal of unsafe generation capability.

On the retain set, the two variants behave differently. SafeMo-Gated preserves benign utility considerably better, achieving a retain-set FID of 1.168, which is substantially lower than all reported MoMask-based unlearning baselines, while maintaining a moderate retain R@1 of 0.261. By contrast, SafeMo-Static still provides effective forgetting in a fully offline and classifier-free manner, but with a more visible drop in benign retrieval performance. Overall, the Motion-X results are consistent with the main paper: SafeMo-Gated provides the strongest practical forgetting–retention balance, while SafeMo-Static offers a lightweight alternative that still suppresses unsafe semantics effectively without external agent support.

E Qualitative Results

We present results on unsafe prompts in Figure 5 and Figure 6, and results on safe prompts in Figure 7.

From the results on unsafe prompts in Figure 5 and Figure 6, we observe that both SafeMo-Static and SafeMo-Gated can effectively erase the toxic motion semantics, which aligns with the design and aim of our unlearning strategy. SafeMo-Static erases toxic motion semantics effectively, while SafeMo-Gated tends to generate stationary or repeated pattern-like motion, which demonstrates a stronger tone of unlearning.

However, some limitations and flaws are observed in our qualitative results. Firstly, although it is of a high success rate that the model's generated results are not aligned with the unsafe text prompts, we observe some suboptimal results in certain scenarios, e.g., very long and detailed descriptions will cause some atomic semantics to be omitted, or being in a stationary-like pattern.

Secondly, we observe foot sliding and skating artifacts as a byproduct of the unlearning, with increased occurrence when applying a larger alpha to the text vector. We also observed that from Table 7, terms like $\mathcal{L}_{\text{foot}}$ are not in a linear-mapping fashion, i.e., with a larger alpha applied, the performance gaps are not changing in a linear manner. This indicates that we may need to explore a more complex relationships between the unlearning effect and each term of our designed method to further improve the model's performance in future work.

As the results shown in Figure 7, both SafeMo-Static and SafeMo-Gated can generate semantically aligned results on safe prompts. In some cases, SafeMo-Static favors lower-amplitude, more con-

Table 5: **Results on Motion-X dataset.** UCE and RECE are (De Matteis et al., 2025)'s T2M implementation of unlearning methods of other fields. Method D_r reports performances for the model trained on a toxicity-free dataset. Method FT shows the results of fine-tuning the model on the toxicity-free dataset. Diversity is reported for reference. *Note:* Rows marked with † are reported from (De Matteis et al., 2025) due to unavailable implementation and checkpoints at the time of submission. Grey rows are non-post-training baselines.

	NRTS ↑	Forget Set			Retain Set		
		R@1 ↓	Diversity	FID ↑	R@1 ↑	Diversity	FID ↓
MoMask $D_r^\dagger$	0.731	$0.119_{\pm.007}$	$15.721_{\pm.255}$	$8.435_{\pm.295}$	$0.332_{\pm.002}$	$19.560_{\pm.332}$	$4.508_{\pm.103}$
MoMask† (Guo et al., 2024)	–	$0.289_{\pm.008}$	$15.884_{\pm.219}$	$2.028_{\pm.127}$	$0.344_{\pm.001}$	$19.366_{\pm.214}$	$2.686_{\pm.045}$
MoMask $FT^\dagger$	0.060	$0.280_{\pm.001}$	$15.855_{\pm.050}$	$2.072_{\pm.099}$	$0.347_{\pm.002}$	$19.405_{\pm.228}$	$3.325_{\pm.060}$
MoMask w/ UCE†	0.232	$0.033_{\pm.001}$	$6.648_{\pm.112}$	$10.522_{\pm.223}$	$0.046_{\pm.008}$	$6.243_{\pm.059}$	$3.740_{\pm.041}$
MoMask w/ RECE†	0.154	$0.031_{\pm.003}$	$6.241_{\pm.132}$	$12.704_{\pm.327}$	$0.029_{\pm.001}$	$6.342_{\pm.062}$	$14.287_{\pm.133}$
MoMask w/ LCR†	0.041	$0.283_{\pm.007}$	$15.606_{\pm.210}$	$2.218_{\pm.159}$	$0.335_{\pm.001}$	$19.260_{\pm.216}$	$2.656_{\pm.043}$
SafeMo-Static	0.570	$0.146_{\pm.001}$	$6.066_{\pm.166}$	$10.487_{\pm.102}$	$0.231_{\pm.002}$	$7.429_{\pm.043}$	$3.470_{\pm.003}$
SafeMo-Gated	0.749	$0.075_{\pm.003}$	$4.603_{\pm.046}$	$32.038_{\pm.026}$	$0.261_{\pm.001}$	$8.468_{\pm.159}$	$1.168_{\pm.007}$

servative kinematics. Additionally, foot-sliding and skating artifacts as a byproduct of the unlearning are also observed. SafeMo-Static is more susceptible to this byproduct than SafeMo-Gated because of the larger α weighted task vector negation applied on it on safe prompts than on SafeMo-Gated.

F Ablation Study

F.1 Ablation of Different Modules

We ablate the three modules, Guided Distortion (GD), Random Decoupling (RD), and Preservation Divergence (PD), to assess their roles in the safety-utility tradeoff. Results are reported in Table 6. We disentangle in-distribution forgetting and generalization by evaluating on unlearned and unseen unsafe prompts. For the gated regime, toxicity is detected at inference by the SafeMoEngine classifier to select α. Removing GD weakens forgetting in the static regime, with unsafe FID -34.2% on unlearned, and -36.0% on unseen data, indicating GD is the primary driver for aligning the edited direction with harmful motion patterns. The gated regime yields higher unsafe FID with reduced diversity suggesting potential over-suppression and near-identical safe-set utility, showing gating can dominate the forgetting strength. Removing RD reduces unsafe FID in both static and gated settings, while slightly improving safe-set metrics in the static regime, reflecting a utility–forgetting trade-off. PD mainly protects benign utility without external gating. Without PD, safe-set FID increases 16.9% and retrieval degrades under static while the impact under gating is marginal.

F.2 Loss Subterm Removal

We conducted ablation experiments by iteratively removing the loss terms, MPJPE, $\mathcal{L}_{\text{vel}}$, $\mathcal{L}_{\text{acc}}$, $\mathcal{L}_{\text{foot}}$, and $\mathcal{L}_{\text{text}\leftrightarrow\text{mo}}$, to demonstrate each term's significance in the model learning process. As shown in Table 7, the removal of MPJPE drastically destroys the model's unlearning performance on the unsafe set. The $\mathcal{L}_{\text{vel}}$ and $\mathcal{L}_{\text{acc}}$ both play an important role in the model's unlearning of unsafe patterns as well, with lower FID and higher R precision on unsafe prompts after removing them. $\mathcal{L}_{\text{foot}}$ plays a role in enhancing the model's understanding of the motion semantics and helps generate more physically aligned results, with slight degradation in unlearning on unsafe prompts after removing it. $\mathcal{L}_{\text{text}\leftrightarrow\text{mo}}$ has a significant influence on the model's understanding of unsafe motion since we observe lower FIDs on both versions of the model on unsafe prompts.

F.3 LoRA Rank Ablation

Unless otherwise specified, we use LoRA with rank $r = 16$ as a prior default, which offers a stable capacity-regularization trade-off in our decoder-only DiP backbone. To evaluate the effect of different LoRA (Hu et al., 2022) rank, we conduct an ablation study on different LoRA rank values. The results are shown in Table 8. We evaluate the same checkpoints after training on the MMU strategy for 20K steps with different LoRA ranks and the same LoRA alpha as the LoRA rank, while keeping all other hyperparameters the same. Across different sets, $r = 16$ yields the most balanced forgetting-retention effect: unsafe FID increases while unsafe R@k is reduced or comparable, and

Table 6: **Ablation study of three modules in MMU stage-1.** Results on HumanML3D. On unsafe sets, higher FID and lower retrieval (R@K) indicate stronger forgetting; on the safe set, lower FID and higher retrieval indicate better utility. Diversity is reported for reference.

	Unlearned Unsafe Set					**Unseen** Unsafe Set					**Unseen** Safe Set				
	FID↑	Div.	R@1↓	R@2↓	R@3↓	FID↑	Div.	R@1↓	R@2↓	R@3↓	FID↓	Div.	R@1↑	R@2↑	R@3↑
SafeMo ($\alpha = 0.0$)	1.7197	7.3746	0.2517	0.3914	0.4969	2.3050	7.5191	0.2365	0.3896	0.5052	0.5232	9.3375	0.3755	0.5599	0.6732
SafeMo-Static	8.0235	6.8083	0.2016	0.3164	0.4043	9.0499	6.8880	0.1958	0.3167	0.3937	2.5539	8.7060	0.3172	0.4935	0.6052
SafeMo-Static w/o GD	5.2830	6.9963	0.2188	0.3449	0.4377	5.7963	6.9634	0.2104	0.3333	0.4208	1.4697	8.8189	0.3347	0.5144	0.6295
SafeMo-Static w/o RD	5.7285	7.1058	0.2195	0.3378	0.4307	6.7159	7.2363	0.1990	0.3375	0.4375	1.9663	9.0015	0.3432	0.5263	0.6379
SafeMo-Static w/o PD	8.9693	6.6601	0.1960	0.3092	0.3962	10.5409	6.7565	0.1896	0.3000	0.3740	2.9845	8.6333	0.3178	0.4878	0.6040
SafeMo-Gated	28.0806	5.0169	0.0947	0.1630	0.2168	28.0574	4.8520	0.0865	0.1542	0.2104	0.5355	9.3224	0.3775	0.5628	0.6769
SafeMo-Gated w/o GD	46.9030	2.8490	0.0544	0.1055	0.1543	45.4955	2.7078	0.0615	0.1083	0.1542	0.5248	9.3258	0.3760	0.5624	0.6768
SafeMo-Gated w/o RD	21.3313	5.6771	0.1449	0.2351	0.3002	21.3717	5.5564	0.1469	0.2292	0.2760	0.5385	9.3204	0.3775	0.5625	0.6742
SafeMo-Gated w/o PD	31.0764	4.7098	0.0926	0.1497	0.2020	31.3418	4.5750	0.1042	0.1688	0.2073	0.5380	9.3241	0.3783	0.5631	0.6761

Table 7: **Ablation study of loss subterms in MMU stage-1.** Results on HumanML3D. On unsafe sets, higher FID and lower retrieval (R@K) indicate stronger forgetting; on the safe set, lower FID and higher retrieval indicate better utility. Diversity is reported for reference.

	Unlearned Unsafe Set					**Unseen** Unsafe Set					**Unseen** Safe Set				
	FID↑	Div.	R@1↓	R@2↓	R@3↓	FID↑	Div.	R@1↓	R@2↓	R@3↓	FID↓	Div.	R@1↑	R@2↑	R@3↑
SafeMo ($\alpha = 0.0$)	1.7197	7.3746	0.2517	0.3914	0.4969	2.3050	7.5191	0.2365	0.3896	0.5052	0.5232	9.3375	0.3755	0.5599	0.6732
SafeMo-Static	8.0235	6.8083	0.2016	0.3164	0.4043	9.0499	6.8880	0.1958	0.3167	0.3937	2.5539	8.7060	0.3172	0.4935	0.6052
SafeMo-Static w/o MPJPE	4.6513	7.3699	0.2243	0.3654	0.4587	4.7538	7.3980	0.2271	0.3729	0.4677	1.7615	9.0878	0.3548	0.5368	0.6493
SafeMo-Static w/o $\mathcal{L}_{\text{vel}}$	6.9403	6.9088	0.2108	0.3318	0.4221	7.8048	7.0443	0.1885	0.3229	0.4167	2.1361	8.8828	0.3346	0.5123	0.6286
SafeMo-Static w/o $\mathcal{L}_{\text{acc}}$	7.7847	6.8950	0.2074	0.3266	0.4147	8.8772	6.9484	0.3073	0.4479	0.5434	2.3508	8.8585	0.3266	0.5078	0.6199
SafeMo-Static w/o $\mathcal{L}_{\text{foot}}$	7.5536	6.8465	0.2031	0.3260	0.4109	8.5371	6.9620	0.1854	0.3198	0.4094	2.3039	8.7675	0.3262	0.5037	0.6139
SafeMo-Static w/o $\mathcal{L}_{\text{text}\leftrightarrow\text{mo}}$	7.0224	6.7054	0.2039	0.3295	0.4172	7.9530	6.7763	0.1979	0.3125	0.4094	2.2494	8.6139	0.3253	0.5086	0.6201
SafeMo-Gated	28.0806	5.0169	0.0947	0.1630	0.2168	28.0574	4.8520	0.0865	0.1542	0.2104	0.5355	9.3224	0.3775	0.5628	0.6769
SafeMo-Gated w/o MPJPE	11.7242	6.8297	0.1962	0.3154	0.4026	11.9482	6.9063	0.2115	0.3167	0.4052	0.5600	9.3109	0.3743	0.5611	0.6761
SafeMo-Gated w/o $\mathcal{L}_{\text{vel}}$	25.0236	5.1915	0.1238	0.2037	0.2600	25.4520	5.1998	0.1292	0.2167	0.2875	0.5330	9.4388	0.3713	0.5641	0.6751
SafeMo-Gated w/o $\mathcal{L}_{\text{acc}}$	25.2587	5.1204	0.1252	0.2076	0.2681	25.3217	5.1177	0.1229	0.2125	0.2771	0.5327	9.4913	0.3814	0.5701	0.6802
SafeMo-Gated w/o $\mathcal{L}_{\text{foot}}$	27.1904	4.9923	0.1152	0.1858	0.2411	27.6051	4.9489	0.1208	0.2021	0.2615	0.5327	9.4370	0.3719	0.5649	0.6768
SafeMo-Gated w/o $\mathcal{L}_{\text{text}\leftrightarrow\text{mo}}$	22.3646	4.7543	0.1076	0.1825	0.2429	22.7699	4.7297	0.1031	0.1948	0.2521	0.5263	9.4303	0.3726	0.5659	0.6764

performance on the safe set is maintained to an acceptable level with the best balanced results on applying the same checkpoint for SafeMo-Static and SafeMo-Gated. We hereby unfold our findings to support our choice. While $r = 8$ sometimes produces slightly higher FID shifts on unsafe subsets, it frequently exhibits higher R@k, which indicates a more sense of geometric displacement and a lower level of commensurate semantic forgetting on unsafe prompts. We also observe that with the same replication times, the confidence intervals (CI) of $r = 8$ are consistently larger than on $r = 16$, which is a sign of instability and inadequate capability of obtaining the exact knowledge we want during the first stage. Conversely, model with $r = 32$ tends to under-forget on the unsafe sets with relatively large performance gaps on FID and R precisions on both the Gated and the Static settings. Apart from that, in the Gated setting, it greatly harms the safe set's performance even with a small value of α in the Gated setting, making it undesirable.

F.4 Alpha Scaling Ablation

We study how the task-vector scale $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$ controls the trade-off between retaining benign capability and forgetting harmful behaviors. The results are shown in Figure 8. The curves reveal a clear effective-unlearning window on $[0.05, 1.2]$, where the unsafe split deteriorates markedly with mild changes happening on safe prompts. Beyond $\alpha = 1.2$, the safe curves also degrade steeply indicating over-forgetting, which is undesirable for benign prompts. We reckon that $\alpha = 1.0$ is the sweet spot for SafeMo-Static, with acceptable degradation on benign tasks (FID = 2.51, R@1 = 0.33) and good unlearning performance on unsafe prompts (FID = 9.55, R@1 = 0.18). These observations demonstrate the large selective deterioration on unsafe prompts before the knee, validating that our unlearning is effective. These also motivate the SafeMo-Gated setting for a more flexible and accurate control utilizing the proposed LLM-base agent in *SafeMoEngine*.

G Implementation Details

Forget and retain set partitioning. To compare our method with LCR (De Matteis et al., 2025) despite the fact that they have not made their implementation open-source, we adopt the same keyword-based partitioning paradigm they describe. We construct a curated list of harmful action lemmas as described in their method, lemmatize captions, and perform exact lemma-level

Table 8: **Ablation study of LoRA rank in MMU stage-1.** Results on HumanML3D. On unsafe sets, higher FID and lower retrieval (R@K) indicate stronger forgetting; on the safe set, lower FID and higher retrieval indicate better utility. Diversity is reported for reference.

	Unlearned Unsafe Set					**Unseen** Unsafe Set					**Unseen** Safe Set				
	FID↑	Div.	R@1↓	R@2↓	R@3↓	FID↑	Div.	R@1↓	R@2↓	R@3↓	FID↓	Div.	R@1↑	R@2↑	R@3↑
SafeMo ($\alpha = 0.0$)	1.7197	7.3746	0.2517	0.3914	0.4969	2.3050	7.5191	0.2365	0.3896	0.5052	0.5232	9.3375	0.3755	0.5599	0.6732
SafeMo-Static	8.0235	6.8083	0.2016	0.3164	0.4043	9.0499	6.8880	0.1958	0.3167	0.3937	2.5539	8.7060	0.3172	0.4935	0.6052
SafeMo-Static (LoRA r=8)	8.1880	6.8448	0.2022	0.3225	0.4117	8.9847	6.9679	0.1958	0.3250	0.4042	2.4408	8.6262	0.3252	0.5031	0.6127
SafeMo-Static (LoRA r=32)	5.6007	7.7033	0.2068	0.3372	0.4325	4.9216	7.6619	0.1854	0.3333	0.4396	2.4861	8.7952	0.2947	0.4700	0.5841
SafeMo-Gated	28.0806	5.0169	0.0947	0.1630	0.2168	28.0574	4.8520	0.0865	0.1542	0.2104	0.5355	9.3224	0.3775	0.5628	0.6769
SafeMo-Gated (LoRA r=8)	31.5091	4.1975	0.1080	0.1800	0.2313	32.7289	4.1776	0.1052	0.1750	0.2417	0.5328	9.2650	0.3781	0.5666	0.6785
SafeMo-Gated (LoRA r=32)	19.6348	6.7620	0.1292	0.2184	0.2924	17.7689	6.7304	0.1365	0.2344	0.3052	2.5434	9.0249	0.3222	0.4983	0.6139

matching with phrase-first priority. A sample is assigned to the *forget set* if *any* of its captions hits the list; otherwise, it belongs to the *retain set*.

Motion-X. Motion-X (Lin et al., 2023) provides SMPL-X (Pavlakos et al., 2019) data including hand and facial feature, which is not aligned with our setup. We process it using the official code from Motion-X (Lin et al., 2023), converting SMPL-X features to SMPL (Loper et al., 2015) representations. To ensure the comparability with LCR, we preprocess the text prompts using HumanML3D (Zhang et al., 2023)'s Semantic Role Labeling method, and train feature extractors following official t2m (Zhang et al., 2023) implementation for 300 epochs, as the same as in LCR.

H Limitation and Future Work

This appendix expands the brief limitations stated in the main paper, with concrete failure cases and future directions for both SafeMoEngine and MMU.

Safe T2M dataset. Despite that we design the LLM-based agent in a classify-then-rewrite fashion with explicit few-shot, rule-enhanced prompt engineering, and effective, level-aligned rewriting strategy, we acknowledge several limitations. Firstly, we have observed that the classifier agent tends to be slightly oversensitive to toxic semantics. In level-2 prompts, we found a few sport-related or dancing-related prompts, e.g., golf or dancing with crazy legs. Secondly, although we apply two recent advances, one continuous and the other discrete token-based, for generating new refined safe motion for unsafe prompts, some generated results can be suboptimal due to the base model's respective limitations.

Minimal motion unlearning. Although our results demonstrate the effectiveness of unsafe motion unlearning, we have found several kinds of suboptimal cases or failed cases. First, when the context is too long and contains many details, the generated motion can omit some atomic semantics, or even, at worst, become a stationary-like pattern. We reckon that this is the base model's limited understanding capability of long and complex prompts. In future work, we aim to address this problem by using a more semantic-accurate base model or designing a text prompt reasoning helper, e.g., methods similar to Motion-agent (Wu et al., 2024). Secondly, task-vector negation can exacerbate foot-skating artifacts, which are particularly noticeable for SafeMo-Gated under larger gating scales. Future work may mitigate this byproduct by designing more physics-guided constraints and integrating physics-based trackers, such as in CLoSD (Tevet et al., 2025), to further improve physically plausible contacts and environment interactions. Thirdly, Operating in continuous motion space alleviates discrete codebook stitching artifacts (Figure 1), but it may trade off some standard T2M fidelity metrics compared to strong VQ-token pipelines.

I User Study

We conduct a comprehensive user study to evaluate the overall quality and unlearning performance of motion sequences generated by our methods. A total of 50 participants completed a Google Forms survey designed to assess the physical plausibility, unlearning outcomes on unsafe prompts, and benign performance on safe prompts.

As illustrated in Figure 9, section 1 and 2 displays different generated results on unsafe prompts by SafeMo-Static and SafeMo-Gated respectively, followed by section 3 and 4 showing SafeMo-Gated and SafeMo-Static's generated results on safe prompts, with 3 different prompts and 2 different questions each section. Section 5 and 6 then compare SafeMo-Static and SafeMo-Gated's results on the same safe text prompt and the same unsafe prompt respectively. Participants are asked to

rate each motion at a 5-point Likert scale (where 1 represents low and 5 represents high) based on motion naturalness, degree of unlearning performance on unsafe prompts and quality of text alignment on safe prompts.

This study aims to evaluate not only the unlearning performance of our model, but also the benign performance and quality distinctions between SafeMo-Static and SafeMo-Gated.

The results of the user study can be summarized as follows: *(i)* Our method achieved an overall motion quality of 4.24 on SafeMo-Static, and 4.82 on SafeMo-Gated. *(ii)* On unsafe prompts, 98% of participants agreed that SafeMo-Gated effectively removed unsafe components in the motion, and 86% on SafeMo-Static. *(iii)* On safe prompts, our method's generated results on safe set scored 4.64 on text-motion visual alignment rating. *(iv)* 56% of the participants preferred SafeMo-Gated method on unsafe prompts, and 84% preferred SafeMo-Gated method on safe prompts.

J LLM Use Declaration

Large Language Models (ChatGPT) were used exclusively to improve the clarity and fluency of English writing. They were not involved in research ideation, experimental design, data analysis, or interpretation. The authors take full responsibility for all content.

Unsafe Text Prompt	Ground Truth	No Negation (Base Model)	SafeMo-Static	SafeMo-Gated
"a person walks forward with exaggerated backward kicks with every step."				
"person is practicing their kicking."				
"a person uses their left hand to throw an object in front of them."				
"a person looks to the right then kicks something with their left foot."				
"a person is practicing karate moves across the floor."				

Figure 5: Qualitative results of generated motions on unsafe prompts (Part I).

Unsafe Text Prompt	Ground Truth	No Negation (Base Model)	SafeMo-Static	SafeMo-Gated
"a person turns to the right and brings both hands together while kicking slightly to the right with the left foot."				
"a person kicks with their right leg twice, and then once with their left."				
"a person grabbing something in front of them, swinging it around to the side then throwing it overhead."				
"a person looks to the left then kicks something with their right foot."				
"a person preparing for and then throwing something similar to how a quarterback throws a football."				

Figure 6: Qualitative results of generated motions on unsafe prompts (Part II).



Figure 7: Qualitative comparison of generated motions on safe prompts.



Figure 8: **Effect of the task-vector scaling α on safe and unsafe prompts.** Left: FID (lower is better on safe prompts; higher indicates stronger forgetting on unsafe prompts). Right: R@1 (higher is better on safe prompts; lower indicates stronger forgetting on unsafe prompts). The dashed line marks $\alpha = 1.0$.



Figure 9: **User study Google Forms.** The User Interface (UI) used in our user study.