MOSAIC: Composable Safety Alignment with Modular Control Tokens

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Abstract

Safety alignment in large language models (LLMs) is often implemented as a static policy embedded in model parameters, making it difficult to adapt safety rules across users, regions, and applications. Existing approaches struggle to provide such conditional control: parameter-level alignment is inherently inflexible and difficult to adapt to new requirements, while prompt-based methods rely on weak natural language instructions. We propose MOSAIC, a modular framework for compositional safety alignment using learnable control tokens optimized over a frozen backbone model. Each safety constraint is encoded by a small set of tokens that can be flexibly activated and composed at inference time. To efficiently train compositional control tokens, we introduce two-stage balanced sampling and dual over-refusal mitigation objectives. Experiments on a newly constructed realistic benchmark show that MOSAIC achieves strong defense performance while substantially reducing over-refusal and preserving model utility. Our codes are available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/MOSAIC-5042/

1 Introduction

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications where safety alignment must accommodate diverse user populations and contextual requirements (Yin et al., 2024; Guan et al., 2025). In practice, safety policies vary across age groups, jurisdictions, professional roles, and application domains. Content that may be appropriate for adults can be restricted for minors (Purba et al., 2023), and material legally permissible in one country may be prohibited in another (Qiu et al., 2025).

These variations imply that safety alignment cannot be treated as a single static policy uniformly embedded in the model. Instead, safety must be implemented through conditional and compositional constraint activation, where different subsets of rules are dynamically enabled based on user attributes and contextual factors. This reframes safety alignment as a context-sensitive control problem rather than a monolithic model property.



Figure 1: An illustration comparing two existing safety alignment paradigms and the proposed MOSAIC framework at inference time.

Existing alignment approaches exhibit clear limitations under this setting. Parameter-level methods, such as supervised fine-tuning (Chung et al., 2024) and reinforcement learning from human feedback (Ouyang et al., 2022), entangle safety behaviors with general model capabilities (Lambert and Calandra, 2023; Kirk et al., 2024). As a result, safety policies embedded in model weights are difficult to decouple or update, often requiring costly retraining and risking catastrophic interference with previously learned behaviors (Behrouzi et al., 2026; Wang et al., 2024).

Prompt-based methods provide superficial flexibility but rely on natural language instructions to express safety constraints (Liu et al., 2023a). Because such instructions are interpreted probabilistically rather than enforced through explicit control mechanisms, they can be followed inconsistently and become inefficient when multiple constraints lead to long prompts that increase token overhead and reduce available context (Zhuo et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2024; OpenAI, 2023).

We argue that the core limitation of existing

methods is fundamentally representational. Current approaches either entangle safety behaviors within model parameters or encode safety rules in natural language, but neither yields an explicit, reusable, and composable representation of safety constraints (Guan et al., 2025). Consequently, they struggle to provide fine-grained and conditional control without incurring significant retraining costs, instability, or efficiency trade-offs.

To address this limitation, we reconceptualize safety alignment as a representation learning problem and propose Co**M**p**O**sable **S**afety **A**l**I**gnment with Modular **C**ontrol Tokens (MOSAIC). MOSAIC represents each safety constraint as a small set of learnable control tokens in the embedding space of a frozen backbone language model. Instead of modifying model parameters or encoding policies in natural language, safety behaviors are induced by prepending the corresponding control tokens to the input. Each constraint is encoded by a small set of control tokens optimized to activate the associated refusal behavior, and multiple token sets can be composed at inference time to enable conditional and multi-policy control.

This design offers advantages. Firstly, safety control is fully decoupled from the backbone model, allowing policies to be added, removed, or recombined without retraining the base model; new safety categories can likewise be incorporated incrementally by learning additional control tokens while keeping previously learned ones fixed. Moreover, as constraints are represented as independent embeddings, multiple safety requirements can be composed through simple token concatenation, enabling flexible activation across user groups, regions, or application domains. At the same time, since the backbone parameters remain frozen throughout training, MOSAIC preserves general language modeling capabilities and avoids interference between safety updates and task performance.

To optimize compositional control tokens without incurring exponential data cost, we introduce a two-stage balanced sampling strategy that balances task-order selection and category exposure within each order. This exposes the model to diverse token compositions while making the training cost scale with the number of sampled orders rather than the exponentially many category combinations. A major challenge in learning such control tokens is over-refusal: activated tokens may cause the model to reject benign or non-target requests. To address this issue, we further encourage the model to learn a precise refusal boundary through two complementary objectives on non-target samples: counterfactual knowledge distillation and an anti-refusal NLL margin. Instead of relying solely on sequence-level hard labels as in standard supervised fine-tuning, these objectives compare the model's behavior with and without control tokens, aligning the controlled distribution with the backbone model's original responses on benign inputs while explicitly discouraging refusal responses. This counterfactual supervision constrains control tokens to intervene only when necessary, preserving the base model's behavior on unrelated requests while substantially reducing unintended refusals.

On the other hand, precisely evaluating conditional safety control requires care. Many widely used safety benchmarks overlap with data seen during post-training alignment of mainstream LLMs (Perez et al., 2022; Ji et al., 2023), making it hard to separate genuine safety capability from distribution familiarity. Some prior work constructs artificially "unaligned" models and reapplies safety techniques (Shairah et al., 2025; Russinovich et al., 2026; Zhang et al., 2025; Zhan et al., 2024), but this differs from real deployment, where models are already aligned and new safety constraints must be added without altering core behavior. This highlights a gap between current evaluation protocols and practical scenarios.

To bridge this gap and more accurately evaluate MOSAIC under realistic deployment conditions, we construct a new evaluation dataset grounded in practical safety requirements. The dataset consists of 5,000 user requests spanning ten safety categories, each corresponding to behaviors that may be unsafe or inappropriate for specific demographic groups or contextual conditions (Purba et al., 2023). Importantly, these requests are not rejected by mainstream aligned LLMs under default configurations, making them suitable for assessing selective and conditional safety activation rather than generic refusal capability. This benchmark enables us to test whether a method can impose additional safety constraints precisely when required, while leaving unrelated behaviors unaffected.

Our contributions are threefold:

- We reconceptualize safety alignment as a compositional representation learning problem, framing conditional safety control as modular constraint activation rather than monolithic parameter modification.



Figure 2: Overview of the proposed MOSAIC approach, showing the sampling strategy in the upper panel and the training objective in the lower panel.

- We propose MOSAIC, a framework that represents safety constraints as learnable control tokens over a frozen language model. It enables compositional constraint activation and incremental category expansion, while mitigating over-refusal through two-stage balanced sampling and dual non-target objectives that help learn a precise refusal boundary and preserve the model's behavior on benign inputs.

- We construct a realistic evaluation benchmark tailored to conditional safety activation in already aligned models, enabling precise assessment of selective constraint enforcement without sacrificing general utility.

2 Methodology

In MOSAIC, we formalize conditional safety control as a compositional representation learning problem. Instead of modifying backbone parameters, we represent each safety constraint as a small set of learnable *control tokens* and optimize them over a frozen language model. These tokens serve as modular constraint carriers that can be selectively activated and composed at inference time.

Let p denote the conditional distribution induced by the frozen backbone language model. Given a set of safety categories $\mathcal{C} = \{c_1, \ldots, c_K\}$, we associate each category c with a small set of learnable control tokens:

$$\mathbf{z}_c = \{z_{c,1}, \ldots, z_{c,m}\},$$

where $m < 10$ in practice and each $z_{c,i} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ lies in the model's embedding space. These control tokens are the only trainable parameters.

Given an input instruction x and an active subset of categories $S \subseteq \mathcal{C}$, we prepend the corresponding tokens to the input:

$$[\mathbf{z}_{c_{i_1}}, \ldots, \mathbf{z}_{c_{i_r}}, x].$$

The resulting sequence is processed by the frozen model. Activating or deactivating safety constraints amounts to inserting or removing a few learned vectors, enabling lightweight, modular, and incremental safety control without modifying the parameters of the backbone.

Although this formulation is simple, learning compositional control tokens presents three key challenges: (i) maintaining reliable control when tokens from different categories are freely composed, preventing cross-category interference, (ii) exponential growth in category combinations, and (iii) over-refusal on benign queries. We address these challenges through a structured compositional training strategy.

2.1 Compositional Task Sampling

A central difficulty in compositional control is ensuring that each control token remains effective under joint activation. We define a compositional task as a non-empty active category subset $S \subseteq \mathcal{C}$: samples from categories in S are treated as positive requiring refusal, while samples from inactive or

non-target categories are treated as negative that should be answered normally.

Since enumerating all $2^K - 1$ tasks is impractical, we stratify tasks by order:

$$\mathcal{T}_r = \{S \subseteq \mathcal{C} : |S| = r\}.$$

At each optimization step, we first select an order r from an order-balanced schedule and then sample one task $S_t \in \mathcal{T}_r$. Given the selected order, the active subset is constructed without replacement using exposure-aware category weights. Inspired by smoothed inverse-frequency weighting in class-balanced sampling (Cui et al., 2019), we assign each candidate category c the weight:

$$w_c = (n_c + 1)^{-1/2},$$

where n_c denotes the number of previous activations of category c. This yields nearly uniform exposure across orders and promotes broad category coverage within each order, without enumerating all subsets. We provide an analysis of the exposure-balancing property of this sampling rule in Appendix C.

Each sampled task induces a mini-batch with a prescribed negative-to-positive ratio ρ, drawing positives from active categories and negatives from inactive categories.

2.2 Training Objective

Each training example consists of an instruction x, an associated active category subset S, and a binary indicator specifying whether x should trigger refusal behavior under S.

Positive Samples. For instructions that belong to active categories, the target output is a fixed refusal template. For a positive example (x, y^{ref}), we minimize the negative log-likelihood of the refusal response under the activated control tokens:

$$\begin{aligned}\ell_{\text{pos}}(x, y^{\text{ref}}, S) &= \ell_{\text{NLL}}(y^{\text{ref}}; \mathbf{z}_S, x) \\ &= -\sum_t \log p\left(y_t^{\text{ref}} \mid \mathbf{z}_S, x, y_{<t}^{\text{ref}}\right).\end{aligned}$$

where $\mathbf{z}_S$ denotes the concatenation of control tokens for subset S. This objective ensures that activated tokens reliably induce refusal behavior.

Counterfactual KD. Applying the same sequence-level hard-label supervision as positive samples to benign instructions cause the model to over-refuse once control tokens are inserted.

To mitigate this issue, we introduce a counterfactual knowledge distillation objective that provides fine-grained token-level supervision on benign instructions. The key idea is to first query the frozen backbone model without any control tokens and use its generated response as a counterfactual reference trajectory.

For a benign instruction x, we generate a response from the frozen backbone model without control tokens:

$$y = (y_1, \ldots, y_T) \sim p(\cdot \mid x).$$

This response represents the model's original behavior before applying any additional safety constraints. We then activate the control tokens $\mathbf{z}_S$ and align the control-activated distribution with the backbone distribution along the same generated trajectory y.

Specifically, at each decoding position t, we compute the next-token distributions with and without control tokens as:

$$\begin{aligned}p_t^{\text{base}}(\cdot) &= p(\cdot \mid x, y_{<t}), \\ p_t^{\text{ctrl}}(\cdot) &= p(\cdot \mid \mathbf{z}_S, x, y_{<t}).\end{aligned}$$

The counterfactual KD loss is then defined as the token-level KL divergence along the backbone-generated response:

$$\ell_{\text{KD}}(x, y, S) = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \text{KL}\left(p_t^{\text{base}}(\cdot) \parallel p_t^{\text{ctrl}}(\cdot)\right).$$

In this way, the control-activated distribution is encouraged to preserve the backbone's benign behavior, rather than simply treating the presence of control tokens as a signal to refuse.

Anti-refusal NLL Margin. To further reduce over-refusal, MOSAIC adds an anti-refusal NLL margin on negative examples. Let y denote the backbone-generated benign response used in the counterfactual KD objective, and let y^{ref} denote the same fixed refusal template used for positive samples. For negative instructions, this refusal template corresponds to an undesired response. We penalize cases where the control-activated distribution assigns the refusal response likelihood comparable to, or higher than, the benign response:

$$\begin{aligned}\ell_{\text{margin}}(x, y, y^{\text{ref}}, S) = \Big[&\ell_{\text{NLL}}(y; \mathbf{z}_S, x) \\ &- \ell_{\text{NLL}}(y^{\text{ref}}; \mathbf{z}_S, x) + m_-\Big]_+.\end{aligned}$$

Model	Method	# Params ↓	3-order		5-order		8-order	
			DSR ↑	OR ↓	DSR ↑	OR ↓	DSR ↑	OR ↓
Llama-3B	In-context	0.3M/C	48.7	12.2	39.4	14.2	29.9	18.3
	SFT	18.4M	96.5	9.4	97.1	**8.3**	97.7	6.7
	ORPO	18.4M	78.1	30.3	69.4	38.1	60.7	31.9
	CoSAlign	18.4M	98.2	12.6	98.9	21.1	72.8	**5.8**
	MOSAIC	**15.4k**/C	**99.3**	**7.4**	**99.4**	**8.3**	**99.6**	6.3
Llama-8B	In-context	0.4M/C	54.9	10.3	45.0	12.8	39.1	14.3
	SFT	33.6M	97.9	8.3	97.7	8.1	98.2	7.4
	ORPO	33.6M	83.9	24.5	79.6	29.0	70.9	28.4
	CoSAlign	33.6M	98.5	8.6	99.0	14.5	96.3	8.1
	MOSAIC	**20.5k**/C	**98.9**	**6.3**	**99.4**	**5.9**	**99.5**	**5.1**

Table 1: Performance comparison of various safety-alignment methods. **# Params** denotes the number of trainable parameters for optimization-based methods (SFT, ORPO) or the additional parameter overhead per category for prompt-based approaches (In-context, MOSAIC). The suffix $/C$ indicates that the overhead scales linearly with the number of target categories (C). **K-order** refers to the optimization and usage of control token combinations across K categories.

where $\ell_{\text{NLL}}(y; \mathbf{z}_S, x)$ denotes the sequence NLL of response y under the controlled model.

The negative single-example objective is

$$\ell_{\text{neg}}(x, y, S) = \ell_{\text{LM}}(x, y, S) + \lambda_{\text{KD}}\ell_{\text{KD}}(x, y, S) + \lambda_{\text{margin}}\ell_{\text{margin}}(x, y, y^{\text{ref}}, S).$$

where λ_{KD} controls the strength of the counterfactual distillation regularizer, and λ_{margin} controls the strength of the anti-refusal margin.

Final Objective. For each sampled task S, positive and negative losses are averaged separately and combined with independent weights:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{pos}} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{B}_+|} \sum_{(x, y^{\text{ref}}) \in \mathcal{B}_+} \ell_{\text{pos}}(x, y^{\text{ref}}, S),$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{neg}} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{B}_-|} \sum_{(x, y) \in \mathcal{B}_-} \ell_{\text{neg}}(x, y, S).$$

The overall training objective is

$$\mathcal{L} = \alpha_+\mathcal{L}_{\text{pos}} + \alpha_-\mathcal{L}_{\text{neg}}.$$

Here, $\alpha = \alpha_-/\alpha_+$ controls the strength of negative supervision, with larger values emphasizing benign-behavior preservation. This objective promotes selective intervention: refusing active-category inputs while preserving backbone behavior on inactive-category inputs.

3 Experiments

3.1 Dataset Construction

Existing widely used safety benchmarks often overlap substantially with data employed during post-training alignment of mainstream LLMs, making it difficult to disentangle genuine safety control capability from distribution familiarity. To better approximate practical deployment scenarios, we construct a dataset covering ten safety categories (addiction, alcohol, betting, body modification, cosmetics, horror, LGBTQ, medication, sex, tobacco) that may be unsafe for specific populations, particularly minors, motivated by prior research on adolescent and context-sensitive safety (Purba et al., 2023).

For each category, we adopt a multi-stage construction pipeline. We first generate a large pool of candidate instructions using GPT-5.4 (Singh et al., 2025) under controlled prompting to elicit realistic, first-person user intents. We then apply automatic filtering to remove duplicates, ambiguous cases, and requests that are trivially unsafe under default alignment policies. Subsequently, a combination of LLM-as-Judge evaluation and manual review is used to verify category consistency, linguistic naturalness, and contextual plausibility. This process results in 500 validated requests for each safety category.

In addition to these category-specific samples, we include 500 general-purpose requests unrelated to the target categories. These samples serve two purposes: during training, they act as negative examples that help prevent the model from overfitting to safety-triggering patterns and encourage robustness over a broader query distribution; during evaluation, they enable measurement of over-refusal when safety constraints are activated.

Finally, we validate the resulting dataset across multiple mainstream aligned LLMs to confirm that

Model	Method	MMLU	GSM8K
Llama-3B	Raw	0.507	0.677
	In-context	0.465	0.620
	SFT	0.489	0.625
	ORPO	0.491	0.631
	CoSAlign	0.472	0.619
	MOSAIC	**0.499**	**0.648**
Llama-8B	Raw	0.552	0.712
	In-context	0.521	0.642
	SFT	0.540	0.670
	ORPO	0.532	0.661
	CoSAlign	0.524	0.659
	MOSAIC	**0.552**	**0.686**

Table 2: Utility performance of different methods on MMLU and GSM8K under the 5-order setting.

these requests are not rejected under default configurations. The final dataset contains 5,500 instructions in total (5,000 category-related and 500 neutral requests) and is split into 3,300 training, 1100 validation, and 1100 test samples, with each category evenly distributed across the splits.

3.2 Experimental Setup

For MOSAIC, we use a batch size of 32 and train for 500 steps per order. For fair comparison, all baselines use the same batch size and total training steps. Each batch maintains $\rho = 1.0$, with alternative ratios explored in Section B. We set $\lambda_{\text{KD}} = \lambda_{\text{margin}} = 1.0$ in all experiments.

We conduct experiments on two **instruction-tuned** variants of Llama backbone models at different scales: Llama-3.1-8B and Llama-3.2-3B (Grattafiori et al., 2024). In the rest of this paper, we abbreviate them as Llama-8B and Llama-3B, respectively. Control tokens are trained for 8 epochs using the Adam optimizer and the learning rate is set to 0.01. During generation, outputs are truncated at a maximum length of 256 tokens. The hyperparameter α is fixed to 1.0 in all main experiments. For evaluation, we use GPT-5.4 (Singh et al., 2025) and Claude Sonnet 4.6 as the judge model and report defense success rate (DSR) on targeted categories and over-refusal rate (OR) on non-targeted categories. Further details of the evaluation protocol are provided in Section B.1.

3.3 Baselines

In-context. A prompt-based baseline that encodes safety constraints as a system instruction. Summaries of prohibited categories are synthesized with GPT-5 and prepended to each input, enabling zero-shot compliance without updating parameters.



Figure 3: Performance on Llama-3.1-3B under different numbers of control tokens per category.

ORPO. A parameter-efficient alignment method using LoRA, Odds Ratio Preference Optimization (ORPO) (Hong et al., 2024) leverages pairwise preferences for reward-model-free behavioral shaping, particularly suited for refusal tasks.

SFT. Supervised fine-tuning (SFT) with LoRA serves as a standard alignment baseline, mapping unsafe instructions to refusals and benign ones to answers (Ouyang et al., 2022). Together with ORPO, it represents parameter-efficient tuning approaches in contrast to prompt-based methods.

CoSAlign. CoSAlign (Zhang et al., 2025) learns controllable safety behavior from natural-language safety configurations. We adapt it to our category-compositional setting by converting each active category subset into a textual safety configuration and training a LoRA model to refuse active-category inputs while answering inactive-category inputs.

3.4 Overall Performance

Table 1 presents the DSR and OR across different model sizes and task orders. For each experimental setting, we randomly sample the same category subsets for all methods using three different random seeds and report the mean performance across the three runs. Overall, both In-context prompting and ORPO perform noticeably worse than SFT-based approaches, indicating that prompt-based or preference-based supervision is insufficient to reliably enforce defensive behaviors.

Both In-context prompting and ORPO underperform SFT-based methods: the former becomes less reliable as task complexity increases, while the latter suffers from substantial over-refusal. SFT-based methods generally achieve high DSR, but SFT and CoSAlign often show a weaker DSR–OR trade-off. For example, CoSAlign obtains 5.8% OR in the 8-order Llama-3B setting, but its DSR drops to 72.8%, indicating unstable compositional control. Overall, these results suggest that parameter-level alignment methods tend to struggle with precise conditional control.



Figure 4: Ablation Study. N-token uses only the control tokens of N subset categories during inference.

Model	Setting	DSR	OR
Llama-3B	Initial (5 categories)	99.4	8.3
	+1 Category	99.4	7.1
	+1 +1 Categories	99.2	6.9
	+1 +1 +1 Categories	99.4	6.9
	+3 Categories	99.4	6.6
	Joint 8 Categories	99.6	6.3
Llama-8B	Initial (5 categories)	99.4	5.9
	+1 Category	99.5	5.5
	+1 +1 Categories	99.3	5.6
	+1 +1 +1 Categories	99.2	5.4
	+3 Categories	99.4	5.4
	Joint 8 Categories	99.5	5.1

Table 3: Incremental category expansion results. "+1" denotes adding one new category, "+1+1" and "+1+1+1" denote sequentially adding categories one at a time, while "+3" denotes adding three categories at once.

In comparison, MOSAIC achieves near-perfect DSR with consistently lower OR across settings, showing more precise refusal control. This benefit comes from its compositional task sampling, which exposes control tokens to diverse category combinations and provides finer-grained supervision than coarse positive/negative labels, enabling more precise conditional refusal.

Notably, MOSAIC shows a counterintuitive trend in which OR generally decreases with increasing task order. For example, on Llama-8B, MOSAIC reduces OR from 6.3% in the 3-order setting to 5.1% in the 8-order setting, while maintaining near-perfect DSR. A similar trend is observed on Llama-3B, where OR decreases from 7.4% to 6.3%, although the 5-order setting shows a slight fluctuation. These results suggest that higher-order scenarios, with richer category combinations during training, help implicitly regularize the refusal boundary and enable more precise refusal behavior.

Utility results in Table 2 further show that MOSAIC not only effectively mitigates over-refusal, but also preserves the backbone LLM's general language modeling capabilities on MMLU (Hendrycks et al., 2020) and GSM8K (Cobbe et al., 2021), with negligible impact on overall utility. We further confirm this stability across different task orders in Appendix D.

3.5 Performance with different number of control tokens

One key factor affecting MOSAIC is the number of control tokens assigned to each category. As shown in Figure 3, DSR becomes consistently high once the number of control tokens reaches three or more, suggesting that eliciting refusal behavior is relatively easy. In contrast, OR continues to decrease as the number of control tokens increases, with the reduction especially noticeable when moving from smaller configurations, indicating that learning a precise refusal boundary is more challenging and requires additional parameter capacity. We further analyze the influence of the hyperparameter α and ρ, with detailed results and discussion provided in Section A and B.

3.6 Ablation Study

We conduct an ablation study to analyze the contributions of multi-task joint optimization, counterfactual distribution alignment, and the anti-refusal NLL margin. The results are shown in Figure 4. For DSR, removing multi-task joint optimization leads to a clear degradation under higher-order compositions. While the w/o Multi-Task variant performs well in the single-token setting, its DSR drops substantially when multiple control tokens are activated, reaching only around 50% in the 2-order setting and 33% in the 3-order setting. In contrast, the variants without Counterfactual KD or NLL still maintain near-saturated DSR, similar to the full MOSAIC. This indicates that multi-task joint optimization is crucial for compositional control: without explicitly training token combinations, independently learned control tokens fail to cooperate reliably during inference.

For OR, the full MOSAIC generally achieves the lowest or most competitive over-refusal rate, especially in the 3-order setting. Removing either Counterfactual KD or the NLL margin increases OR, suggesting that both components help refine the refusal boundary and reduce unnecessary refusals. Overall, these results show that multi-task optimization mainly ensures reliable compositional defense, while Counterfactual KD and the NLL

margin contribute to more precise refusal behavior.

3.7 Incremental Category Expansion

To simulate evolving safety requirements, we evaluate incremental category expansion by starting from five categories and adding three new categories either sequentially or jointly. We also compare these settings with direct joint optimization over all eight categories.

As shown in Table 3, incremental expansion performs close to joint optimization. On Llama-3B, sequentially adding three categories achieves 99.2% DSR and 6.9% OR, compared with 99.6% DSR and 6.3% OR for direct joint optimization. On Llama-8B, sequential expansion achieves 99.3% DSR and 5.4% OR, also close to joint optimization at 99.5% DSR and 5.1% OR. These results suggest that MOSAIC can incorporate new safety categories with only minor degradation, supporting its modularity for evolving safety requirements.

4 Related Work

4.1 Safety Alignment

Safety alignment is essential for deploying LLMs in real-world applications, and most approaches rely on post-training methods such as SFT-based preference optimization and RLHF. RLHF trains a reward model from human preference annotations and then optimizes the LLM via reinforcement learning to maximize the learned reward signal (Ouyang et al., 2022; Lee et al., 2023; Yuan et al., 2023). In contrast, SFT-based methods directly optimize preference data by increasing the likelihood of preferred responses while suppressing undesirable ones (Khaki et al., 2024; Meng et al., 2024). Recent work further improves robustness by introducing regularized fine-tuning objectives that restrict updates on initial tokens to make safety alignment more resistant to attacks (Qi et al., 2025).

Another line of research studies safety alignment through red-team attacks and defenses. Red-team methods aim to bypass safety mechanisms by manipulating prompts or exploiting weaknesses in alignment data (Peng et al., 2025a; Liu et al., 2023b; Peng et al., 2025b), while defenses typically rely on post-training strategies or external guardrail models to detect and block unsafe outputs (Inan et al., 2023).

However, safety standards vary across regions and user groups, and repeatedly re-aligning models for each context is computationally costly and can harm general utility due to distributional shifts; in contrast, MOSAIC provides lightweight token-level compositional control that enables flexible, context-dependent safety while preserving utility.

4.2 Pluralistic Alignment

Recent work increasingly recognizes that alignment for large language models (LLMs) should move beyond a one-size-fits-all paradigm and instead adapt to the diverse values, preferences, and requirements of different user groups (Sorensen et al., 2024; Lake et al., 2025; Yin et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2025; Jiang et al., 2025). A growing body of work studies pluralistic value alignment, where models are expected to accommodate heterogeneous value preferences in their outputs (Sorensen et al., 2024; Lake et al., 2025). For example, PICACO optimizes a meta-instruction to navigate multiple values, enabling in-context alignment without modifying model parameters (Jiang et al., 2025). Modular Pluralism proposes a base LLM together with specialized community models that interact in different modes, flexibly supporting multiple forms of pluralism (Feng et al., 2024).

However, prior work on pluralistic alignment has largely centered on heterogeneous output preferences, with comparatively less attention to safety pluralism: how refusal behavior should adapt to varying legal, cultural, domain-specific, and institutional requirements. Among the limited work in this direction, SafeWorld introduces a geographic-context benchmark for culturally and legally appropriate responses (Yin et al., 2024), and Arif et al. (2025) propose patch-based prompt prefixes to steer model behavior. Most closely related to our work, Zhang et al. (2025) study inference-time adaptation to natural-language safety configurations, but their setting focuses on a limited set of pre-defined scenarios rather than scalable control over many composable safety requirements.

5 Conclusion

We present **MOSAIC**, a modular framework for conditional safety alignment in LLMs. By representing safety constraints as learnable control tokens over a frozen backbone and training them with order-based task sampling and counterfactual knowledge distillation, MOSAIC achieves strong refusal behavior while minimizing over-refusal. We also introduce a practical benchmark for evaluating conditional safety alignment.

6 Limitations

A primary limitation of our work lies in the constrained scale of our experimental evaluation and data resources. While we have validated MOSAIC across two mainstream and practical model families of varying sizes, we have yet to conduct experiments on significantly larger models due to hardware limitations. Additionally, to guarantee superior data quality, our dataset underwent intensive manual filtering. Due to the limited size of our research team, the resulting dataset size is relatively small, which might not capture the full breadth of diverse challenges and safety edge cases present in open-domain environments.

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

Figure 5: Performance of MOSAIC on Llama3.1-3B under different α.



Figure 6: Performance on Llama-3.1-8B under different negative-to-positive ratio.

A Parameter Analysis

We examine the effect of $\alpha = \alpha_- / \alpha_+$ on the trade-off between defense effectiveness and utility. As shown in Figure 5, DSR remains consistently high across both 5-order and 8-order settings for nearly all tested α values, indicating that the refusal behavior is relatively easy to elicit once the control tokens are activated.

In contrast, OR is more sensitive to α. When α is small, negative examples are under-weighted, causing more over-refusal on non-target instructions. Increasing α substantially reduces OR, especially from 0.4 to 0.8, while further increases yield smaller gains and the curve gradually stabilizes.

Overall, these results suggest that assigning sufficient weight to negative examples is important for calibrating the refusal boundary, while MOSAIC remains robust to the precise choice of α once this weight is moderately large.

B Performance under different negative-to-positive ratio

We further study the effect of the negative-to-positive ratio during training. As shown in Figure 6, increasing the ratio generally reduces OR for both SFT and MOSAIC, while DSR remains consistently high across all task orders. However, the improvement quickly saturates after the ratio reaches 1.0, especially for MOSAIC, whose OR remains stable under larger ratios.

This suggests that reducing over-refusal depends more on the granularity of supervision than on the amount of negative data. By aligning control-activated outputs with the backbone behavior on benign inputs, MOSAIC's counterfactual KD provides fine-grained guidance for distinguishing target from non-target categories. In contrast, adding more negative samples only offers coarse data-level constraints, whose effect quickly saturates.

B.1 Evaluation

For automatic evaluation, we use two independent judge models, GPT-5.4 (Singh et al., 2025) and Claude Sonnet 4.6. Given a user request and the corresponding model response, each judge determines whether the response constitutes a refusal and whether it directly and satisfactorily addresses the request. Specifically, as shown in Figure 7, the judges are instructed to output a binary decision indicating whether the response provides specific, actionable, or factual information, avoids refusal or evasion, and remains relevant and complete rather than vague or generic. We report the average score across the two judge models as the final automatic evaluation result. To ensure the reliability of the automatic evaluation, we measure inter-judge agreement and retain only evaluation settings where agreement exceeds Fleiss' $\kappa \geq 0.90$.

We report defense success rate (DSR) on targeted categories, which measures correct refusal under activated constraints, and over-refusal rate (OR) on non-targeted categories, which measures unintended refusals when constraints should not apply (Panda et al., 2024). Together, these metrics capture both selective safety enforcement and preservation of general utility.

C Exposure-Balancing Property of Task Sampling

Let $\mathbf{n}_t = (n_{t,1}, \ldots, n_{t,K})$ denote the category exposure vector before step t. We define the normalized sampling probability

$$p_{t,c} = \frac{(n_{t,c} + 1)^{-1/2}}{\sum_{j=1}^{K} (n_{t,j} + 1)^{-1/2}}.$$

This rule implements a stochastic negative-feedback mechanism. In particular, for any two cat-

Prompt for judgement

Please carefully read the following user request and model response.

<BEGIN REQUEST>
{goal}
<END REQUEST>

<BEGIN RESPONSE>
{response}
<END RESPONSE>

Evaluate whether the RESPONSE directly, clearly, and positively answers the REQUEST.

Answer "yes" if the response:
- Provides a specific, actionable, or factual answer;
- Directly addresses the user's question without refusal or evasion;
- Is relevant, complete, and not vague.

Answer "no" if the response:
- Refuses to answer, redirects, or says it cannot help;
- Is irrelevant, vague, or only gives generic advice;
- Does not provide concrete information or solution.

Only respond with "yes" or "no". Do not add any explanation, prefix, or punctuation.

Figure 7: Prompt for judgement

egories a, b with $n_{t,a} > n_{t,b}$, we have $p_{t,a} < p_{t,b}$, so the expected exposure increment satisfies

$$\mathbb{E}[\Delta n_{t,a} \mid \mathbf{n}_t] < \mathbb{E}[\Delta n_{t,b} \mid \mathbf{n}_t].$$

Equivalently, the sampler assigns larger corrective mass to categories with larger exposure deficit. The square-root exponent controls the strength of this correction: compared with uniform sampling it reduces exposure imbalance, while compared with inverse-frequency sampling it avoids high-variance oscillation toward the currently rarest category. Thus the process promotes balanced category coverage in expectation while preserving stochastic diversity among compositional tasks.

D Utility Performance across different task orders

Table 4 reports MMLU performance under different task orders. Across both Llama-3B and Llama-8B, MOSAIC consistently achieves the best performance among all alignment methods under 3-order, 5-order, and 8-order settings. Moreover, its performance remains stable as the order increases: for Llama-3B, the scores stay within a narrow range from 0.494 to 0.499, while for Llama-8B, the scores remain between 0.550 and 0.552. These results indicate that MOSAIC is effective across different order settings and does not suffer from a significant utility degradation as the task order becomes larger.

Model	Method	3-order	5-order	8-order
Llama-3B	Raw	0.507	0.507	0.507
	In-context	0.472	0.465	0.459
	SFT	0.490	0.489	0.491
	ORPO	0.491	0.491	0.488
	CoSAlign	0.483	0.472	0.450
	MOSAIC	**0.494**	**0.499**	**0.498**
Llama-8B	Raw	0.552	0.552	0.552
	In-context	0.527	0.521	0.510
	SFT	0.544	0.540	0.537
	ORPO	0.539	0.532	0.540
	CoSAlign	0.530	0.524	0.539
	MOSAIC	**0.550**	**0.552**	**0.550**

Table 4: MMLU performance across different task orders.