Dynamics of Causal Dependencies in Multi-agent Settings

Maksim Gladyshev, Natasha Alechina, Mehdi Dastani, Dragan Doder

Abstract: In this paper we discuss how causal models can be used for modeling multi-agent interaction in complex organizational settings, where agents’ decisions may depend on other agents’ decisions as well as the environment. We demonstrate how to reason about the dynamics of such models using concurrent game structures where agents can change the organisational setting and thereby their decision dependencies. In such concurrent game structure, agents can choose to modify their reactions on other agents’ decisions and on the environment by intervening on their part of a causal model. We propose a generalized notion of interventions in causal models that allow us to model and reason about the dynamics of agents’ dependencies in a multi-agent system. Finally, we discuss how to model uncertainty and reason about agents’ responsibility concerning their dependencies and thereby their choices.