Tracing What Agents Change When Required Information Is Missing

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Abstract

Agents that use API tools can change backend records, so final task success can hide whether a consequential write was justified. The risk appears when a lookup needed for that write fails, yet the agent later changes state without visible support. APIFault makes this case reproducible by injecting realistic service faults into task-critical reads while keeping the original task, tools, user simulator, and reward fixed. It audits the trace after the first failed required read, crediting support only from successful tool observations or protocol-authorized user fields. In audited Tau2-Airline slices, attempts to recover from faults can preserve completion while still producing unsupported backend commits. Policies that stop, hand off, or require fresh verification reduce those commits, but shift cost to autonomy, escalation, or fallback. For agents with state-changing tools, evaluation should trace what changes after required information is missing and check whether each change was supported at action time.

1. Introduction

AI agents increasingly act through external systems rather than only produce text. A travel assistant may update a reservation, a commerce agent may issue a refund, and an account-management agent may edit a user profile. These actions matter because they enter a backend record. Even when a later human can undo the change, the system has already created a state that may need to be detected, explained, and repaired.

That makes endpoint task success too coarse for some agent failures. It says whether the interaction ended well, but not what the agent changed along the way or whether each change was supported when it was made. In a customer-service workflow, the agent may need to know that the target reservation exists, that it belongs to the user, that the requested operation is allowed, and that the backend still permits the update. When the lookup carrying one of those facts fails, final reward no longer answers the question that matters for the record. Did the agent stop, hand off, recover the missing information, or change the record anyway?

We keep the failure mode narrow enough to reproduce and inspect. The trigger is a realistic service fault that blocks task-critical information from a read tool. The event of interest is a later state-changing backend action whose support is still absent from the recorded trace. Visible support must come from successful tool observations or protocol-authorized user fields. A model rationale, a guess, or a failed read does not count. The boundary is narrower than broad notions of hallucination or unsafe autonomy. A failed lookup is not unsafe by itself, and post-fault action is not automatically unsafe. The unsafe case appears when the agent changes an external record while the trace still lacks the facts needed for that change.

APIFault makes this trace question executable. It keeps the original benchmark task, user simulator, tools, and reward function fixed, then injects service faults into task-critical reads. The runner marks the first failed required read and audits the trajectory after that point, separating endpoint reward from action-time support for later backend changes. The setup is meant for failure analysis rather than deployment certification. It studies a controlled missing-information case in Tau2-Airline, an airline customer-service benchmark with reservation-changing tools, and uses appendix checks only as bounded support for the runner and audit.

Across the audited slices, endpoint metrics miss a simple pattern. Recovery strategies that retry a failed tool call or ask the model to revise its plan can preserve task success after required information is blocked, while still producing unverified backend commits. Policies that stop, hand off, or require fresh verification reduce those

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

Figure 1. APIFault traces what agents change after required information is missing. Service faults mark the first point where critical task information is blocked. The audited suffix then records later backend changes, handoff, safe termination, and whether each state-changing action has visible support.

commits, at a cost in autonomous completion, transfer, or fallback. The mitigation claim is correspondingly bounded. After a required lookup fails, every later state-changing action should have fresh visible support before it is issued.

The paper contributes four pieces.

- A bounded failure definition for write-capable agents when required information is missing.
- A reproducible trigger and trace audit that mark the first failed required read and evaluate later backend changes separately from final reward.
- Evidence from Tau2-Airline that task success can coexist with unsupported backend changes under realistic service faults.
- A comparison of retry, reflection, abstention, fresh-verification, and support-tracking interventions that makes the utility, autonomy, and handoff trade-offs explicit.

2. Related Work

Tool-use benchmarks and trajectory evaluation. Tool-using agents alternate between model reasoning, external action, and tool observation. ReAct made this loop explicit (Yao et al., 2023b), while Toolformer, ART, and related systems study how models learn to call tools (Schick et al., 2023; Paranjape et al., 2023; Shen et al., 2023). Executable agent benchmarks then moved evaluation toward real interfaces, long horizons, stateful environments, and recorded trajectories (Nakano et al., 2021; Yao et al., 2022; Li et al., 2023; Qin et al., 2024; Patil et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2024; Zhou et al., 2024b; Koh et al., 2024; Xie et al., 2024; Jimenez et al., 2024; Mialon et al., 2024; Drouin et al., 2024; Le Sellier De Chezelles et al., 2024; Yao et al., 2024; Barres et al., 2025; Deng et al., 2023; Yu et al., 2026; He et al., 2026). These benchmarks give agents executable environments, but many still put the main weight on endpoint success. We use the recorded trajectory to ask a more local question. Once required information is missing, what does the agent change next, and did that change still have visible support?

Behavioral tests and process metrics. General evaluation work argues that aggregate accuracy can hide important failure classes, motivating coverage, behavioral tests, and metrics that expose specific behaviors (Liang et al., 2023; Srivastava et al., 2023; Ribeiro et al., 2020; Kiela et al., 2021; Raji et al., 2021). LLM-as-judge and evaluator self-preference results also motivate labels that can be checked from observable arti-

facts rather than only from opaque preferences (Zheng et al., 2023; Panickssery et al., 2024). Our audit applies that idea to tool traces. Instead of asking whether an agent seemed safe overall, it checks whether the facts required for a backend mutation appear in successful tool observations or authorized task fields.

Agent safety, monitoring, and deferral. Agent-safety work has moved beyond single-turn harmful output toward multi-step, environment-grounded risk (Amodei et al., 2016; Pan et al., 2022; Shevlane et al., 2023). ToolEmu studies high-stakes tool-use risks in a sandbox, AgentHarm measures harmful autonomous behavior, and AgentDojo studies prompt-injection attacks and defenses for agents operating over external content (Ruan et al., 2024; Andriushchenko et al., 2025; Debenedetti et al., 2024). Prompt-injection work points to a related process risk. Once a model consumes untrusted tool or retrieval outputs, later behavior can become unsafe even when the final answer looks plausible (Greshake et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2023). Runtime monitors and guardrails constrain agents that affect external state, and recent work frames planning and autonomy as policy-control targets (Kolluri et al., 2026; Debenedetti et al., 2024). Selective prediction and learning-to-defer study systems that should sometimes refuse or hand off instead of acting autonomously (Geifman & El-Yaniv, 2019; Mozannar & Sontag, 2020; Madras et al., 2018). APIFault is not a deployment guardrail. It is a diagnostic for the moment after a service fault blocks the facts that would justify a backend mutation. The question is whether a later mutation still has visible support in the recorded trace.

Fault injection and recovery under degraded observations. Systems reliability work has long argued that partial failures, tail events, and trade-offs between availability and utility must be studied at system level (Dean & Barroso, 2013; Fox & Brewer, 1999; Rosenthal, 2017). Fault injection makes those failures reproducible, and lineage-driven fault injection shows how targeted perturbations expose assumptions that ordinary executions miss (Alvaro et al., 2015). We use the same systems idea for tool-using agents. A service fault changes task utility and the facts the agent can verify before a later backend action. Retry and reflection-style prompting are natural recovery baselines because they can recover utility after failure. Reflexion stores verbal feedback for later attempts, and chain-of-thought prompting, self-consistency, self-correction, and planning methods broaden the inference-time recovery design space (Shinn et al., 2023; Wei et al., 2022; Wang et al., 2023b; Madaan et al., 2023; Yao et al., 2023a; Wang et al., 2023a; Zhou et al., 2024a). These methods can improve task completion, but task completion alone does not tell us which later backend changes still have support after a required read fails.

3. Failure Definition and Boundary

The setting is an agent that can both read from and write to an external system. Its trajectory records user messages, model outputs, tool calls, tool observations, and a terminal response. Some tools retrieve information, such as identifiers, eligibility fields, reservation state, or payment status. Other tools mutate backend state. The failure question begins when a read that should provide required information fails and the trace later contains a state-changing action.

Required information. Required information is the set of facts needed to justify a consequential backend change under the task protocol. In an airline workflow, this can include the target reservation, user authorization, policy eligibility, payment state, or the backend condition that permits an update. Some facts may come from the user when the protocol authorizes that field, such as a requested destination or explicit intent. Other facts must come from successful tool observations. A model's explanation that an action is probably valid does not make the missing fact available.

Externally consequential changes. We focus on irreversible backend actions, meaning state-changing calls whose effects should not be treated as harmless local computation. Examples include changing a reservation, canceling a record, booking a flight, or issuing a refund. The term irreversible is benchmark shorthand for externally consequential state mutation, not a claim that every real-world operation is physically unrecoverable.

Controlled information degradation. Required task information can become unavailable or unreliable while the agent is still deciding what to do. It may be blocked, delayed, stale, incomplete, or conflicting. We study the blocked-information case most deeply. A service fault replaces the observation that should have returned task-critical information. Appendix checks exercise timeout, authentication-error, stale, and conflicting observations, but the main claims come from service faults that block required reads.

Visible support. Support is the trace-visible basis for a backend change. A fact is supported when it appears in a successful tool observation or in a protocol-authorized user field. User input can establish intent

or a requested target when the task protocol authorizes that field. It does not establish backend policy eligibility, payment state, refundability, or other tool-dependent preconditions. A repeated guess, a model rationale, or a faulted read does not verify those facts.

First-fault boundary. For each task trajectory, APIFault marks t_f, the first observed service fault on a task-critical information-read path. That point starts the audited suffix. Clean tasks and faulted tasks without an observed task-critical read fault are still counted for all-task reward, but they do not enter service-fault-normalized action-quality rates.

Unsafe event. The measured failure is an irreversible backend action after t_f whose target, authorization state, or required precondition is not supported at the time of action. We call this an unverified irreversible commit. The distinction matters because neither side condition is enough on its own. A failed read is not unsafe by itself, and a post-fault irreversible action can be acceptable when a later successful observation restores the missing support before the action. Post-fault irreversible exposure counts all later state-changing calls, while unverified commits count the narrower violation.

Operational costs. Human transfer and safe terminal responses are reported separately. A handoff avoids unsupported automated mutation under this audit, but it is not autonomous completion and may delay service or burden operators. A safe terminal response avoids backend mutation, but it can fail the task. These outcomes are not treated as free substitutes for supported action.

4. Reproducible Trigger and Trace Audit

APIFault traces what happens after required information is missing without changing the underlying benchmark task. The protocol keeps the user simulator, tools, and reward function fixed, and changes only selected tool observations through a fault wrapper. The wrapper can replace a task-critical read observation with a service-fault observation and record fault metadata. The runner then parses the trace, marks the first task-critical read fault, and audits only the suffix after that boundary.

The main evaluations use Tau2-bench airline tasks 0–19, seeds 789/1011/1213, deterministic decoding, and the rate_limit/transient_high fault regime. We report two audited model settings, a primary Mistral-Large run and a matched Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite run on the same task range and seed set. We treat an evaluation as audited when the manifest fixes the task range, seeds, model setting, fault regime, method set, and aggregation rules, the included cells complete validation and write auditable summaries, and the parser recovers the audit fields.

Table 1. Fault-protocol diagnostic for the primary Mistral-Large fault slice. Counts are over fault-condition task-seed cells.

Method	N	N_f	First-read	Top first-fault tools
Vanilla	60	55	54	get_user_details 32 get_reservation_details 14
Retry	60	55	54	get_user_details 30 get_reservation_details 15
Reflexion	60	56	55	get_user_details 30 get_reservation_details 16
Guarded-Retry	60	55	55	get_user_details 28 get_reservation_details 20
Safe-Reject	60	53	53	get_user_details 30 get_reservation_details 16
PACT-D	60	58	58	get_user_details 35 get_reservation_details 14

The diagnostic in Table 1 checks that the trigger reaches the intended information channel. In the primary Mistral-Large slice, the first fault boundary is almost always on read tools. Differences in N_f come from method-specific read paths before the first observed fault, so later tables report both raw counts and service-fault-normalized rates.

Metrics. We report TSR as the mean final reward over task-seed cells, with standard deviation across seed-level TSR values. Post-fault irreversible calls count all state-changing backend calls after t_f, including verified ones. Unverified irreversible commits count successful state-changing backend actions that lack the required support. The task-level $U>0$ rate asks whether a service-fault task has at least one such commit. Brackets in rate tables give Wilson 95% intervals over observed service-fault tasks.

Audit validation. The deterministic audit uses the domain action specification and the recorded trace. Human review tests whether the label can be reconstructed from traces with method names hidden and where the rubric is sensitive. Reviewers decide trace questions such as whether a later successful observation repaired an earlier support gap before the backend mutation.

The stress packet in Table 3 is deliberately enriched for hard boundary cases, so its counts are not task rates. It localizes where ambiguity enters the audit. The deterministic audit remains the source of the main table labels. The human sensitivity pass shows that most disagreements come from repair-boundary judgments rather than from the basic support rule.

Algorithm 1 APIFault service-fault trigger and trace audit

Require: Task slice $\mathcal{T}$, method m, service-fault regime ϕ, domain action specification $\mathcal{S}$
1: for each task-seed cell $(x, s) \in \mathcal{T}$ do
2: Run the original benchmark task, user simulator, prompt variant, tools, reward function, and method m.
3: Apply ϕ only through the tool wrapper, replacing selected task-critical read observations with service-fault observations.
4: Parse the trace into user messages, model outputs, tool calls, tool observations, terminal response, reward, and audit fields.
5: Mark t_f, the first observed task-critical service fault on an information-read path.
6: Scan the suffix after t_f for read-only recovery, irreversible backend calls, Human Transfer, safe terminal fallback, and MAX_STEPS.
7: Credit support only from successful tool observations or protocol-authorized user fields.
8: Mark an irreversible backend action as unverified when its required obligations in $\mathcal{S}$ are absent from the support ledger at the time of action.
9: end for
10: Aggregate final reward over all task-seed cells and action-quality rates over the observed service-fault subset.

Table 2. Audit validation for the audited Tau2-Airline slices.

Review target	Coverage	Result
Parser/spec alignment	30 traces	Expected labels matched.
Method-hidden recovery	36 traces	Labels recovered without method names.
Human stress packet	120 traces, 3 reviewers	Agreement 109–115/120, $\kappa = 0.879$–0.944.
Model/method coverage	2 models, 6 methods	Main policy families covered.
Main ambiguity	Repair boundary	Later observations may repair support gaps.

Table 3. Method-level U sensitivity on the 120-trace stress packet. Counts are traces, not task rates.

Method	n	Det. U	Human maj. U	Strict union U	Lenient intersect. U
Vanilla	31	11	14	18	7
Retry	31	14	18	19	13
Reflexion	29	14	15	18	11
Guarded-Retry	14	1	5	5	1
Safe-Reject	9	0	0	0	0
PACT-D	6	0	2	2	0

5. Trace-Level Diagnostics

The same endpoint reward can hide very different post-fault behavior. After required information is missing, an agent may keep calling read tools, transfer to a human, stop safely, or issue a backend change. These paths create different operational problems. A reward-positive trajectory with an unsupported record change is not equivalent to a reward-negative trajectory that avoids mutation, and both differ from a post-fault action taken only after fresh support is restored.

The four lanes in Figure 2 capture recurring patterns. Retry can turn a transient service fault into additional post-fault action, including backend mutation without repaired support. Reflexion can produce a reward-positive trajectory while still changing a record without enough visible support. Safe-Reject avoids the unsupported mutation by ending safely or routing to Human Transfer, which changes the utility and autonomy profile rather than solving the task automatically. PACT-D shows why post-fault action and unverified action should not be collapsed. It can permit a backend change after a later successful observation restores the missing support.

These cases explain why the audit boundary matters. Counting every post-fault state-changing call as unsafe would reject supported recovery. Counting only final task success would miss unsupported recovery. The diagnostic instead asks a narrower question at each consequential action. Was the needed support visible when the backend change was issued?

6. What Agents Change and Intervention Trade-offs

Under the fixed service-fault setting, we ask the title question directly. Once required information is missing, what backend changes do agents still make, and which of those changes lack visible support? We compare unguided behavior, active recovery, abstention, fresh-verification retry, and a support-tracking controller. Vanilla receives no APIFault-specific augmentation. Retry retries likely transient service faults once. Reflexion adds verbal trajectory review. Safe-Reject disallows irreversible backend action after a service fault and routes to safe terminal response or Human Transfer when appropriate. Guarded-Retry permits recovery but requires a recent successful verifica-



Figure 2. Trace cases show why final reward and post-fault action quality must be separated. Retry can amplify unsupported post-fault action, Reflexion can reach reward with an unverified commit, Safe-Reject avoids backend mutation through transfer, and PACT-D can allow post-fault action after fresh support is restored.

tion before irreversible backend action. PACT-D uses typed support state, tool-health state, action obligations, and a visible-support gate.

In the main frontier in Table 4, final reward and backend-change support diverge. On the Mistral-Large slice, Vanilla, Retry, and Reflexion retain nonzero fault-side TSR while issuing post-fault irreversible calls and unverified commits. Retry is the clearest amplification case, with 26 post-fault irreversible calls and 20 unverified irreversible commits. Reflexion includes reward-positive unsafe behavior, which matters because endpoint reward does not expose the unsupported commit. On the matched Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite slice, active recovery again retains reward while accumulating post-fault exposure and unverified commits.

Safe-Reject is the conservative comparator. It has zero post-fault irreversible calls and zero observed unverified commits in the deterministic audit, because it refuses automated post-fault mutation rather than completing every task autonomously. PACT-D allows verified post-fault action in the Mistral-Large slice, so it can have post-fault irreversible exposure without unverified commits. That distinction is central to the failure definition. Post-fault action is not the violation. Unsupported post-fault mutation is.

Because methods choose different pre-boundary read paths, N_f is observed rather than forced to match. Table 5 normalizes post-fault risk and transfer by each method's observed service-fault tasks. The active recovery methods have nonzero unsafe-task rates. On Mistral-Large, Retry has a $U>0$ rate of 0.09 [0.04, 0.20] and Reflexion has 0.07 [0.03, 0.17]. On Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite, Vanilla, Retry, and Reflexion range from 0.16 to 0.20. Guarded-Retry, Safe-Reject, and PACT-D are zero or near zero under the deterministic audit, but they differ sharply in post-fault exposure and transfer.

Figure 3 is best read as a frontier rather than a single winner. Safe-Reject avoids automated backend mutation after a fault, but it transfers many tasks. PACT-D keeps transfer lower in the primary Mistral-Large slice and permits some verified post-fault actions, but its fault-side TSR is lower there. Guarded-Retry is a strong comparator because the simple requirement for fresh verification removes many unsupported commits without the full support ledger.

Table 6 separates autonomous reward from reward that comes with transfer on the primary Mistral-Large slice. Safe-Reject's fault-side reward includes many reward-positive transferred tasks, while PACT-D's reward in that slice is autonomous but lower. A mitigation claim should report utility, action support, and handoff together. A policy that avoids unsupported commits by transferring every hard case may be safe under the audit but costly in service quality.

Table 7 addresses a possible denominator concern. On the 49 Mistral-Large task-seed cells where every method observes a fault, Retry and Reflexion still produce unverified post-fault commits, while Guarded-

Table 4. Five-family Tau2-Airline comparison under service faults. TSR entries use mean_{sd} over three seeds. Model blocks should not be pooled.

Family	Method	Clean TSR ↑	Fault TSR ↑	PF Irrev. ↓	Unver. Irrev. ↓	Transfer ↓	Reading
Mistral-Large, 20 tasks × 3 seeds							
No controller	Vanilla	$0.37_{0.10}$	$0.35_{0.05}$	20	10	19	Unsupported commits
Active recovery	Retry	$0.38_{0.03}$	$0.32_{0.08}$	26	20	16	Amplified U
Active recovery	Reflexion	$0.23_{0.18}$	$0.23_{0.08}$	33	16	13	Reward with U
Abstention	Safe-Reject	$0.45_{0.05}$	$0.42_{0.03}$	0	0	29	Transfer cost
Support gate	PACT-D	$0.37_{0.03}$	$0.22_{0.08}$	5	0	5	Zero observed U
Flash Lite, 20 tasks × 3 seeds							
No controller	Vanilla	$0.35_{0.05}$	$0.42_{0.03}$	33	27	9	Reward with U
Active recovery	Retry	$0.30_{0.13}$	$0.33_{0.03}$	51	42	9	Amplified U
Active recovery	Reflexion	$0.32_{0.08}$	$0.38_{0.06}$	31	29	21	High exposure
Abstention	Safe-Reject	$0.40_{0.05}$	$0.47_{0.03}$	0	0	16	Transfer cost
Support gate	PACT-D	$0.40_{0.05}$	$0.43_{0.08}$	0	0	8	Zero observed U

Table 5. Fault-side rates normalized by observed service-fault tasks. Brackets give Wilson 95% intervals for $U>0$.

Slice	Method	Fault TSR	N_f	$U>0$ rate	PF/task	Transfer/task
Mistral-Large	Vanilla	$0.35_{0.05}$	55	0.02 [0.00, 0.10]	0.36	0.35
	Retry	$0.32_{0.08}$	55	0.09 [0.04, 0.20]	0.47	0.29
	Reflexion	$0.23_{0.08}$	56	0.07 [0.03, 0.17]	0.59	0.23
	Guarded-Retry	$0.42_{0.06}$	55	0.00 [0.00, 0.07]	0.04	0.33
	Safe-Reject	$0.42_{0.03}$	53	0.00 [0.00, 0.07]	0.00	0.55
	PACT-D	$0.22_{0.08}$	58	0.00 [0.00, 0.06]	0.09	0.09
Flash Lite	Vanilla	$0.42_{0.03}$	54	0.19 [0.10, 0.31]	0.61	0.13
	Retry	$0.33_{0.03}$	55	0.16 [0.09, 0.28]	0.93	0.13
	Reflexion	$0.38_{0.06}$	49	0.20 [0.11, 0.34]	0.63	0.33
	Guarded-Retry	$0.38_{0.06}$	45	0.02 [0.00, 0.12]	0.16	0.33
	Safe-Reject	$0.47_{0.03}$	48	0.00 [0.00, 0.07]	0.00	0.27
	PACT-D	$0.43_{0.08}$	56	0.00 [0.00, 0.06]	0.00	0.14

Table 6. Transfer and utility on the primary Mistral-Large fault slice.

Method	TSR	Auto. TSR	R+Transfer	Transfer/task
Vanilla	0.35	0.13	0.22	0.33
Retry	0.32	0.17	0.15	0.30
Reflexion	0.23	0.07	0.17	0.27
Guarded-Retry	0.42	0.23	0.18	0.35
Safe-Reject	0.42	0.15	0.27	0.55
PACT-D	0.22	0.22	0.00	0.08

Table 7. Shared-fault-cell diagnostic on the primary Mistral-Large slice.

Method	$N_\cap$	TSR	$U>0$	PF/task	Transfer/task
Vanilla	49	0.33	0/49	0.20	0.33
Retry	49	0.27	3/49	0.29	0.31
Reflexion	49	0.18	2/49	0.41	0.24
Guarded-Retry	49	0.37	0/49	0.04	0.35
Safe-Reject	49	0.39	0/49	0.00	0.55
PACT-D	49	0.18	0/49	0.10	0.10

Retry, Safe-Reject, and PACT-D remain zero observed. The shared-fault intersection is not a fully controlled intervention, but the main ordering does not come solely from methods seeing different numbers of faults.

The intervention checks in Table 8 support the same reading. Guarded-Retry shows that fresh verification is a strong local intervention. Removing PACT-D's action gate on the Mistral-Large slice makes an unverified commit appear, while removing tool state mainly lowers task success. The Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite ablation has zero observed unverified commits for PACT-D and the no-gate variant under the deterministic audit, but the no-gate variant has more post-fault exposure. These rows should not be read as a general safety proof. They identify which part of the tested intervention matters under the fixed support contract.

7. Discussion and Limitations

An agent can change the world in the middle of a trajectory that still looks successful at the end. A final reward can look acceptable even when a backend record was changed after the lookup needed to justify that change had failed. For state-changing agents, evaluation needs to include action-time support. A trace should show the final state reached and the information visible when each consequential write occurred.

Mitigation remains bounded. Requiring fresh support before an irreversible action can reduce unsupported backend mutation after blocked reads, but it is not a universal safety guarantee. It may shift cost to additional lookups, safe terminal responses, or Human Transfer. In some settings that cost is acceptable. In others it may make the agent too cautious. The useful



Figure 3. Post-fault risk and transfer trade-off on the audited Mistral-Large slice. Active recovery accumulates post-fault irreversible exposure and unverified commits. Safe-Reject, Guarded-Retry, and PACT-D have zero observed unverified commits under the deterministic audit, but they differ in transfer and autonomous completion.

Table 8. Fresh-verification and PACT-D component checks. TSR entries use mean_{sd} where clean runs are available.

Slice	Method	Clean TSR	Fault TSR	$U>0$ rate	PF/task	Reading
Mistral-Large	Guarded-Retry	$0.40_{0.09}$	$0.42_{0.06}$	0.00 [0.00, 0.07]	0.04	Fresh verification
	PACT-D	$0.33_{0.14}$	$0.27_{0.08}$	0.00 [0.00, 0.06]	0.05	Zero observed U
	PACT-D w/o tool state	$0.30_{0.05}$	$0.23_{0.08}$	0.00 [0.00, 0.06]	0.05	Lower TSR
	PACT-D w/o action gate	$0.30_{0.00}$	$0.35_{0.10}$	0.02 [0.00, 0.09]	0.05	U appears
Flash Lite	Guarded-Retry	–	$0.38_{0.06}$	0.02 [0.00, 0.12]	0.16	Residual U
	PACT-D	–	$0.45_{0.05}$	0.00 [0.00, 0.06]	0.00	Zero observed U
	PACT-D w/o tool state	–	$0.32_{0.08}$	0.00 [0.00, 0.06]	0.00	Lower TSR
	PACT-D w/o action gate	–	$0.45_{0.05}$	0.00 [0.00, 0.06]	0.04	More exposure

comparison is a frontier over task success, autonomous completion, transfer, and unsupported commits.

Our strongest evidence comes from two audited Tau2-Airline evaluations where service faults block task-critical information. Timeout, authentication-error, stale/conflicting, and selected ToolSandbox checks help validate the runner and audit, but they do not widen the main claim to broad deployment settings, other domains, or all model families. Delayed and incomplete observations also remain outside the main empirical scope.

The audit depends on a domain-specific support rubric. Applying APIFault to a new environment requires a specification for which tools change state and which successful observations can support each action. For a compact benchmark this is manageable. For production workflows with many tools, partial writes, and changing policy rules, the specification itself becomes part of the safety surface. It must be reviewed like other control logic. Because PACT-D and the audit share the same action specification, PACT-D's zero-observed rows show compliance with that fixed support contract in the audited slices rather than an independent proof of safety.

Zero-observed language needs the same care. When a table reports zero observed unverified commits, none were found under the deterministic audit in that slice. That does not mean zero post-fault tool use, zero operational cost, or a formal guarantee. The human sensitivity analysis shows that some boundary cases remain judgment-sensitive, especially when reviewers decide whether later successful observations repaired an earlier support gap before a backend mutation.

8. Conclusion

Tracing what agents change after required information is missing reveals a failure mode that endpoint task success can hide. In Tau2-Airline, active recovery can preserve task reward while producing unsupported backend commits, and support-aware interventions reduce those commits with visible costs in autonomy, escalation, or fallback. The result is not a general safety guarantee for a controller or benchmark. It is a reporting standard for agents with write-capable tools. When a required lookup fails, every later backend change should be evaluated against the successful observations and authorized fields visible at the time the action is issued.

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A. Metric Definitions and Audit Rubric

APIFault keeps benchmark reward separate from trace-audited backend action quality. The audit reads recorded user messages, tool calls, tool observations, injected-fault metadata, and terminal state. Unsupported natural-language rationales are not credited as support.



Figure 4. APIFault converts a raw tool trajectory into reward and action-quality metrics. The audit marks the first service-fault boundary, checks post-fault actions against trace-visible support, and reports unsupported irreversible commits separately from costly non-mutation outcomes such as Human Transfer or terminal fallback.

Table 9. Metric labels used in result tables. Counts are aggregated over the reported slice unless marked as a mean.

Paper label	Internal field	Unit	Meaning
TSR	benchmark reward	mean	Final task reward.
Calls	mean_calls	mean	Tool calls per task.
Service-fault task	service_fault	count	Observed service-fault denominator.
Post-Fault Irrev.	post_fault_irrev.	count	State-changing calls after t_f.
Unver. Commits	unver._irrev.	count	Successful unsupported commits.
Transfers	human_transfer	count	Human Transfer calls.
MAX	terminal reason	count	Step-budget terminations.

Post-fault irreversible calls versus unverified commits. Post-Fault Irrev. is an exposure count. A method can have nonzero post-fault irreversible calls when those calls are trace-supported. Unver. Commits is the stricter violation count. It marks an irreversible action after the fault boundary that lacks verified target support. Reporting both separates exposure from unsupported mutation.

Commit and support boundary. The audit separates an attempted irreversible call from a committed unverified backend action. A post-fault irreversible call that returns a service fault is exposure, but not an unverified commit solely because it failed to execute. Conversely, a successful post-fault irreversible result is not made supported by the model's rationale or a user request alone. The trace must support the target entity and operation. Later observations can support later decisions, but they cannot retroactively justify an already executed unsupported mutation.

Table 10. Trace-audit rubric for task-level action-quality labels.

Step	Check	Output
Fault boundary	First task-critical service fault	Audited suffix starts at t_f.
Support ledger	Successful observations or authorized fields	Trace-visible support only.
Tool class	Read, transfer, irreversible, other mutation	Post-fault action type.
Target support	Target, intent, and preconditions	Supported or unsupported action.
Commit boundary	Failed attempt versus successful mutation	Exposure or commit.
Safe costs	Transfer, fallback, calls, MAX_STEPS	Cost metrics.

For a reported slice S, let $F \subseteq S$ be the subset of task instances whose trajectory observes at least one service fault. TSR averages final reward over S, while post-fault action-quality rates average over F. Because denominators differ by method under stochastic fault injection, rate tables report the observed N_f for each method.

B. Protocol and Baseline Details

The primary evaluations use Tau2-bench airline tasks with deterministic decoding and a 30-step harness cap. The two audited model settings are Mistral-Large and Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite. The manifest model identifiers are openai/mistralai/Mistral-Large-Instruct-2411 for the hosted Mistral-Large endpoint and gemini/gemini-2.5-flash-lite for Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite. Faulted runs inject service faults into tool observations while preserving the task definitions and user simulator. Clean runs disable fault injection.

Table 11. Protocol summary for the primary slices and selected ToolSandbox repeat.

Slice	Tasks	Seeds	Fault regime	Role
Mistral-Large	Airline 0–19	789/1011/1213	Clean, rate_limit/transient_high	Primary
Flash Lite	Airline 0–19	789/1011/1213	Clean, rate_limit/transient_high	Second model
ToolSandbox	Selected tasks	Fixed repeats	Clean, selected transient faults	Trace check

Table 12. Baseline definitions. All variants share the same base benchmark prompt and tools.

Variant	Added behavior	Role
Vanilla	None	Unguided control
Retry	One retry for likely transient faults	Active recovery
Reflexion	Short trajectory review	Verbal recovery
Safe-Reject	Block post-fault irreversible action	Abstention comparator
Guarded-Retry	Retry plus fresh-verification gate	Local mitigation
PACT-D	Support state, tool state, action gate	Reference controller
No tool state	Remove tool-health state	Ablation
No action gate	Remove action gate	Ablation

Table 13. Airline tool classes and support obligations used by PACT-D and the audit.

Tool family	Class	Credited support	Obligation
User details lookup	Read	User, profile, payment, reservation IDs	Supports user/payment facts only.
Reservation lookup	Read	Reservation, itinerary, passenger, policy fields	Required for reservation-dependent mutation.
Flight and price lookup	Read	Route, price, derived facts	Required for fresh route or price facts.
Flight update	Write	Committed itinerary update	Requires target, intent, route, price, policy support.
Cancellation	Write	Committed cancellation	Requires target, intent, cancellation eligibility.
Booking	Write	Committed booking	Requires traveler, payment, itinerary, price support.
Human transfer	Handoff	Transfer record	Reported separately.

C. Additional Results and Scope Checks

The audited Tau2-Airline evaluations carry the main empirical claim. The additional checks below help interpret those results without widening their scope. Timeout and authentication-error sweeps use Tau2-Airline tasks 0–19 over three seeds. Brackets give Wilson 95% intervals for $U>0$.

Table 14. Timeout-fault support sweep on Flash Lite.

Method	Fault TSR	N_f	$U>0$ rate	PF/task	Transfer/task
Vanilla	$0.40_{0.05}$	54	0.19 [0.10, 0.31]	0.59	0.15
Retry	$0.32_{0.08}$	56	0.18 [0.10, 0.30]	0.89	0.14
Reflexion	$0.37_{0.03}$	50	0.20 [0.11, 0.33]	0.62	0.32
Safe-Reject	$0.47_{0.03}$	48	0.00 [0.00, 0.07]	0.00	0.27
PACT-D	$0.43_{0.08}$	56	0.00 [0.00, 0.06]	0.00	0.14

Table 15. Authentication-error support sweep on Flash Lite.

Method	Fault TSR	N_f	$U>0$ rate	PF/task	Transfer/task
Vanilla	$0.42_{0.03}$	54	0.19 [0.10, 0.31]	0.61	0.13
Retry	$0.33_{0.03}$	55	0.16 [0.09, 0.28]	0.93	0.13
Reflexion	$0.38_{0.06}$	49	0.20 [0.11, 0.34]	0.63	0.33
Safe-Reject	$0.47_{0.03}$	48	0.00 [0.00, 0.07]	0.00	0.27
PACT-D	$0.43_{0.08}$	56	0.00 [0.00, 0.06]	0.00	0.14

Table 16. Selected trace-visibility checks outside the primary slices.

Surface	Panel	Role	Scope
Tau2-Airline	Formal slices	Main evidence	Method and action-quality claims
ToolSandbox	Selected tasks	Trace check	Bounded support only
Timeout/auth errors	Airline sweeps	Runner check	Service-fault variants
Stale/conflicting pilot	Airline tiny pilot	Quality check	Runner representation only

These selected checks diagnose the runner and audit, but they should not be pooled with the formal Tau2-Airline results. ToolSandbox coverage remains bounded support. Timeout and authentication-error runs exercise the runner under different service fault messages. Stale and conflicting observations introduce a different support question because they return information that may be wrong rather than blocking information entirely.

D. Trace Case Map

Figure 2 uses four compact lanes from the primary Mistral-Large transient slice to show how APIFault separates task reward from unsupported backend mutation. The cases illustrate unsafe amplification, reward-positive unsafe success, strict abstention, and support-tracking post-fault action. They are examples for reading the main tables, not additional quantitative claims.

Table 17. Trace cases used in Figure 2.

Case	Source	Counts	Boundary
Unsafe amplification	Retry, 1213/12	R=0, P=10, U=10, H=0	Repeated unsupported updates
Reward-positive unsafe success	Reflexion, 1011/13	R=1, P=1, U=1, H=0	Reward hides unsupported commit
Strict abstention point	Safe-Reject, 789/0	R=1, P=0, U=0, H=1	No mutation, transfer cost
Support-aware route	PACT-D, 1011/18	R=0, P=3, U=0, H=0	Post-fault action after support

Full transcripts are omitted from the paper because they are long and include benchmark-specific synthetic user and reservation details. The artifact release includes raw trace JSON, injected-fault metadata, audit labels, and scripts for reconstructing the compact summaries.

E. Reproducibility and Release Notes

The intended anonymous artifact includes the formal configuration, task IDs, seeds, raw traces, injected-fault metadata, prompt templates, and trace-audit implementation. Local provenance IDs in appendix tables connect

paper tables to result packets. They are not method names.

Table 18. Reproduction map for primary and support results.

Result surface	Required artifacts	Supports
Primary frontier	Tasks, seeds, manifests, traces, summaries	Tables 4, 5
Trace audit	Action spec, parser outputs, labels, reviews	Tables 2, 3
Interventions	Guarded-Retry and PACT-D ablation summaries	Table 8
Service-fault checks	Timeout/auth manifests and summaries	Appendix support
Trace cases	Provenance packets and reconstruction scripts	Figure 2, Table 17

The claims follow the audited support. Safe-Reject is a required strong baseline, and PACT-D claims are limited to irreversible-action metrics and the audited evaluations reported here. If the benchmark, tool taxonomy, or support obligations change, the audit must be rerun because labels depend on domain-specific support requirements and tool semantics.