Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations

Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka

Abstract: We study best-of-both-worlds guarantees for the fair division of indivisible items among agents with subadditive valuations. Our main result establishes the existence of a random allocation that is simultaneously ex-ante $\frac{1}{2}$-envy-free, ex-post $\frac{1}{2}$-EFX and ex-post EF1, for every instance with subadditive valuations. We achieve this result by a novel polynomial-time algorithm that randomizes the well-established envy cycles procedure in a way that provides ex-ante fairness. Notably, this is the first best-of-both-worlds fairness guarantee for subadditive valuations, even when considering only EF1 without EFX.