Multimodal Generative Engine Optimization: Rank Manipulation for Vision–Language Model Rankers

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Abstract

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) integrate visual and textual knowledge into unified representations that increasingly underpin modern retrieval and recommendation systems. However, it remains unclear how reliably these models utilize their cross-modal knowledge when ranking multimodal items, and whether their knowledge grounding can be subverted. In this paper, we expose a fundamental vulnerability in how VLMs apply multimodal knowledge for product ranking: through Multimodal Generative Engine Optimization (MGEO), we show that an adversary can manipulate a VLM's ranking decisions by jointly crafting imperceptible image perturbations and fluent textual suffixes that exploit the model's internal cross-modal knowledge coupling. Using an alternating optimization strategy, MGEO targets the deep interactions between visual and linguistic representations within the VLM, achieving rank manipulations that substantially exceed those of unimodal attacks and heuristic baselines powered by strong commercial models. Our findings reveal that surface-level content quality is insufficient for rank promotion; instead, direct alignment with the model's internal knowledge utilization mechanism is required. These results raise important questions on the faithfulness and robustness of knowledge grounding in multimodal foundation models, and motivate future work on defense mechanisms for multimodal retrieval systems.

1 Introduction

Vision-language models (VLMs) (Bai et al., 2025b; Liu et al., 2023; Bai et al., 2025a; Dubey et al., 2024) have rapidly become the backbone of modern multimodal retrieval and recommendation systems (Zhou et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2024; Wei et al., 2024). By fusing visual and textual knowledge into unified cross-modal representations, these models enable highly intuitive product search, recommendation, and visual question-answering experiences. In contemporary E-commerce marketplaces, for example, a user's query (e.g., "black running shoes") is matched against millions of multimodal product listings, each consisting of an image and a descriptive text, where a VLM-driven ranking module synthesizes visual and linguistic knowledge to determine the display order. While this deep cross-modal knowledge integration significantly improves relevance and user alignment, it raises fundamental questions about the robustness and faithfulness of such knowledge utilization, in particular whether the model's knowledge grounding can be subverted to produce manipulated outputs. This introduces security vulnerabilities that are largely unexplored.



Figure 1: Overview of multimodal ranking attack. A malicious seller jointly optimizes subtle, imperceptible perturbations in both the product image and text description to manipulate the VLM's relevance scoring and elevate the target item's rank.

Recent work has exposed the fragility of Large Language Model (LLM)-based ranking pipelines to *textual* adversarial manipulation (Hu, 2025). A growing line of research demonstrates that malicious actors can inject carefully crafted textual triggers into website contents or product descriptions to hijack search rankings without altering the underlying model. Techniques range from rewriting

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content with persuasive cues to manipulate tool selection (Nestaas et al., 2024), to optimization-based attacks that iteratively refine prompts to maximize retrieval likelihood (Tang et al., 2025; Zhang et al., 2024; Xing et al., 2025; Li et al., 2026). While these studies highlight significant risks to ranking integrity, they suffer from a critical blind spot: they operate exclusively within the text modality. This unimodal focus ignores the rich visual signals that VLMs heavily rely on, failing to capture the full spectrum of vulnerabilities in multimodal retrieval systems.

Conversely, adversarial attacks on VLMs have predominantly focused on distinct tasks such as image classification or safety alignment (jailbreaking), rather than ranking manipulation. Existing research has shown that perturbing images or prompts can induce targeted misclassifications or elicit harmful responses (Yin et al., 2023; Zhao et al., 2023; Li et al., 2024). However, these attacks do not translate directly to the ranking context, where even minor score fluctuations can drastically alter user exposure and revenue. Furthermore, prior threat models often assume unrealistic capabilities, such as full control over the user prompt or the ability to inject conspicuous noise. In contrast, a real-world malicious seller is constrained to modifying only their own product listing and must do so while maintaining strict plausibility to avoid detection by human moderators.

To bridge this gap, we introduce Multimodal Generative Engine Optimization (MGEO), the first dedicated framework for *multimodal ranking attacks* on VLM-based product search. We model a realistic adversary who controls a single target product and seeks to promote it to rank 1 by jointly optimizing its textual description and visual appearance under rigorous stealth constraints: the modified image must remain imperceptibly different, and the modified text must remain fluent and on-topic.

Technically, MGEO is a joint optimization framework that exploits the cross-modal coupling inherent in VLMs. On the text side, we adapt gradient-based soft prompt optimization (Tang et al., 2025) to the multimodal setting, treating visual features as a fixed context to generate fluent adversarial suffixes. On the image side, we propose a Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack tailored to the ranking objective, incorporating spatial smoothness and magnitude constraints. Crucially, rather than optimizing these modalities in isolation, our method employs an *alternating optimization strategy* that iteratively refines the text and image perturbations. This allows the attack to leverage synergistic interactions between vision and language, discovering robust adversarial signals that unimodal baselines miss.

We evaluate our approach on state-of-the-art open-source VLMs in realistic product ranking scenarios. Beyond unimodal (text-only and image-only) attacks, we include a realistic heuristic baseline that reflects common seller behavior: leveraging strong commercial generative models to refine product descriptions and edit product images. Experiments show that MGEO yields substantially larger rank improvements than both unimodal attacks and the prompt-based generative baseline, revealing a previously unrecognized vulnerability in VLM-based retrieval systems. Our main contributions are summarized as follows:

- We formulate the novel problem of *multimodal ranking attacks* for VLM-based rerankers, establishing a realistic threat model where adversaries jointly manipulate product images and text under strict plausibility constraints.
- We propose Multimodal Generative Engine Optimization (MGEO), the first framework that jointly perturbs both modalities to manipulate VLM ranking outcomes.
- We develop MGEO, a unified adversarial framework that integrates soft embedding optimization for fluent text generation with constrained PGD for imperceptible image perturbation, specifically tailored to maximize retrieval rank.
- We introduce an alternating optimization algorithm within MGEO that exploits cross-modal interactions, and demonstrate that joint multimodal attacks substantially outperform text-only attacks, image-only attacks, and a heuristic baseline using strong commercial models.

2 Related Work

2.1 Adversarial Attacks on LLM-based Ranking

The integration of LLMs into information retrieval has spurred a new wave of research into "ranking hijacking" or "generative engine optimization."

Early works focused on manual or semi-automated strategies. (Nestaas et al., 2024) demonstrated that injecting persuasive keywords or rewriting content to match specific stylistic cues can bias

LLM-based tool selection. Similarly, LLM Whisperer (Lin et al., 2025) utilizes synonym substitution to bias ranking outputs but relies on hard-coded heuristics rather than gradient-based optimization, limiting its adaptability.

More recent approaches treat ranking manipulation as an optimization problem. StealthRank (Tang et al., 2025) and (Zhang et al., 2024) pioneered the use of gradient-guided search (e.g., Langevin dynamics) to craft fluent adversarial additions that push target items up the ranking list without triggering perplexity filters. RAF (Xing et al., 2025) further refined this by employing discrete token optimization for robust rank promotion. CheatAgent (Ning et al., 2024) takes a different approach, using an LLM agent to iteratively edit user prompts to bias black-box recommenders. At the corpus level, (Su et al., 2025) proposed approximate greedy gradient descent for poisoning dense retrieval corpora, demonstrating that gradient-based manipulation extends beyond individual documents to collection-level attacks.

While effective in text-only environments, these methods fundamentally overlook the visual modality. In modern VLM-based search, relevance is determined by the alignment between query and *multimodal* features; thus, ignoring the image channel significantly restricts the attacker's potential impact and stealth.

2.2 Adversarial Robustness of Vision-Language Models

As VLMs gain prominence, their security properties have come under scrutiny, primarily in classification and generation contexts.

Seminal works, such as VLATTACK (Yin et al., 2023), have demonstrated that fusing perturbations across image and text modalities can effectively break VLM alignment. Specifically, VLATTACK employs a Block-wise Similarity Attack (BSA) loss that maximizes the distance between benign and adversarial feature representations—an *untargeted*, feature-disruptive attack. (Zhao et al., 2023) systematically evaluated open-source VLMs, showing that black-box access is often sufficient to induce harmful responses. Additionally, Adversarial Prompt Tuning (APT) (Li et al., 2024) has been proposed to defend against such attacks.

Critically, these attacks are fundamentally *untargeted* or classification-oriented. Ranking manipulation poses a distinct challenge: simply "breaking" the ranker through feature disruption is not beneficial to a malicious seller, as random failures may even demote the target. Instead, the attacker must promote the target to rank 1 within a competitive, zero-sum setting, requiring optimization for ranking-sequence likelihood rather than feature dispersion, combined with dual-modality stealth. Our work addresses this gap.

3 Methodology

We propose M**ultimodal Generative Engine Optimization (MGEO)**, a white-box optimization framework that jointly perturbs textual and visual inputs to manipulate rankings produced by vision–language models.

3.1 Problem Formulation

3.1.1 VLM-Based Product Ranking System

We consider a ranking scenario where a Vision-Language Model, denoted as $\mathcal{F}_\theta$, orders a set of n candidate products $\mathcal{P} = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n\}$ based on a user query q. Each product $p_i = (I_i, T_i)$ comprises a visual image $I_i \in \mathbb{R}^{H \times W \times 3}$ and a textual description T_i. The VLM takes the query and the multimodal product list as input and generates a ranked sequence $R = [\sigma(1), \sigma(2), \ldots, \sigma(n)]$, where $\sigma : \{1, \ldots, n\} \to \{1, \ldots, n\}$ is a permutation function that orders products from most recommended (rank 1) to least recommended (rank n) based on a user query q.

The R is obtained from the ranking function: $\mathcal{F}_\theta(\mathcal{P}, q)$, where θ represents the parameters of the pre-trained VLM. In our study, we focus on state-of-the-art open-source VLMs, including Qwen2.5-VL, which employ sophisticated cross-modal attention mechanisms to fuse visual and linguistic features for comprehensive product understanding.

3.1.2 Adversarial Threat Model

We address a targeted ranking attack where an adversary controls a single product $p_t \in \mathcal{P}$ (the "target") and aims to promote it to the top, thereby gaining unfair competitive advantage.

Attacker's Goal. The attacker tries to craft adversarial perturbations to the target product for: $\sigma(t) = 1$, where $\sigma(i)$ denotes the rank assigned to product p_i. That is, the target product should be ranked first among all n products after the attack.

Attacker's Capability. We assume the attacker has white-box access to the vision–language model, including its architecture, parameters, and gradients. In realistic deployment settings, the attacker does not have access to the proprietary ranking

model. Instead, the attacker relies on one or more publicly available or open-sourced models with similar architectures as surrogates for the unknown ranker. The attacker can modify the target's image I_t and text T_t (appending adversarial suffix δ_T: $T_t^{\text{adv}} = T_t \oplus \delta_T$), visual perturbations (adding pixel-level noise δ_I: $I_t^{\text{adv}} = I_t + \delta_I$), or both modalities jointly. The opt. objective is to maximize the likelihood of a target ranking sequence R^* (where p_t is at rank 1), subject to stealth constraints:

$$\max_{\delta_I, \delta_T} \quad P(R^* | \mathcal{P} \setminus p_t \cup p_t^{\text{adv}}, q; \theta) \tag{1}$$

where δ_I and δ_T represent the visual and textual perturbations, respectively.

3.2 Adversarial Text Generation

We adapt the gradient-based text attack framework from StealthRank (Tang et al., 2025) to the multimodal VLM ranking context.

Unlike text-only LLMs, VLMs require joint visual-textual inputs. We first preprocess all product images into vision embeddings as an image prefix $\mathbf{V}_{\text{fixed}}$. During optimization, we construct the complete multimodal input by concatenating the fixed visual context with the textual components: $\mathbf{h} = [\mathbf{V}_{\text{fixed}}; \mathbf{e}_{\text{text}}]$, where $\mathbf{e}_{\text{text}}$ contains the system prompt, user query with product descriptions, adversarial suffix, and assistant response prefix, following the same structure as StealthRank. We generate and optimize the adversarial suffix δ_T using the same strategy as StealthRank (Tang et al., 2025).

The optimization begins with the initialization of the adversarial suffix. Specifically, we combine the original description of the target product T_t with a guiding sentence (e.g., "Help me write a prompt to rank this product at the top of the list:") to prompt the LLM and use the generated token logits as the continuous initialization $\tilde{\delta}_T^{(0)}$. This initialization provides a fluent starting point and accelerates convergence.

The loss function used to optimize the suffix is a multi-objective loss consisting of three components. The ranking loss maximizes the probability of generating the target ranking sequence to elevate the target product's position in the ranked output. The fluency regularization maintains contextual coherence with the original description, ensuring the adversarial suffix remains natural and difficult to detect. The n-gram penalty discourages the use of overt ranking-related keywords (e.g., "top", "must rank", "recommend"), enhancing the stealthiness of the attack. Together, these objectives balance attack effectiveness and stealthiness.

The adversarial suffix is optimized in the continuous embedding space. At each step, the gradient of the composite loss is backpropagated to update the suffix logits. After N updates, we greedily decode $\tilde{\delta}_T^{(N)}$ to obtain the discrete prompt δ_T, which is then embedded into the target product p_t's description.

3.3 Adversarial Image Generation

3.3.1 PGD-Based Optimization

We apply Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) to craft adversarial perturbations for the target product image I_t while keeping other product images fixed. The optimization objective is to minimize a multi-objective loss function $\mathcal{L}_{\text{total}}$ that balances attack effectiveness and imperceptibility. The detailed composition of this loss function will be introduced in the next subsection.

The PGD attack proceeds iteratively using sign gradient descent:

$$I_t^{(k+1)} = I_t^{(k)} - \alpha \cdot \text{sign}(\nabla_{I_t} \mathcal{L}_{\text{total}}) \tag{2}$$

where α is the step size. The perturbation is constrained to ensure pixel values remain in the valid range. Perturbations are applied after resizing product images to the model's native input resolution but before normalization, ensuring that gradients map directly to the pixel values processed by the VLM.

3.3.2 Multi-Objective Loss Function

To balance attack effectiveness and imperceptibility, we formulate the optimization objective as a weighted combination of three loss terms:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{image}} = \mathcal{L}_{\text{target}} + \lambda_s \mathcal{L}_{\text{smoothness}} + \lambda_m \mathcal{L}_{\text{magnitude}} \tag{3}$$

Target Loss. The primary objective $\mathcal{L}_{\text{target}}$ maximizes the probability of generating the target ranking sequence R^*. We compute the cross-entropy loss between the model's predicted logits and the target token sequence:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{target}} = \text{CrossEntropy}(\text{logits}, \text{target}) \tag{4}$$

This loss directly optimizes the model's output distribution to favor the desired ranking, ensuring the target product appears first in the recommendation list.



Figure 2: **Detailed architecture of Multimodal Generative Engine Optimization (MGEO).** The attacker jointly optimizes an adversarial text suffix and an image perturbation to promote the target item in a VLM-based ranking system. The text branch performs gradient-based soft prompt optimization under fluency and n-gram constraints, while the image branch applies PGD under smoothness and magnitude constraints. The two modalities are optimized in an alternating manner to exploit cross-modal interactions within the VLM.

Smoothness Loss. To prevent abrupt noise and encourage gradual color transitions, we incorporate a smoothness regularization term $\mathcal{L}_{\text{S}}$:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{S}} = \sum_{i,j} \left((\delta_{i+1,j} - \delta_{i,j})^2 + (\delta_{i,j+1} - \delta_{i,j})^2 \right) \tag{5}$$

where $\delta = I_t^{\text{adv}} - I_t$ is the perturbation tensor. This term penalizes abrupt changes in adjacent pixels, promoting smooth and natural-looking adversarial perturbations.

Magnitude Loss. To prevent excessive perturbations and maintain imperceptibility, we add a regularization term $\mathcal{L}_{\text{M}}$ that constrains the overall perturbation magnitude:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{M}} = \sum_{i,j,c} w_{i,j} \left| \delta_{i,j,c} \right| \tag{6}$$

where the summation is over all spatial positions (i, j) and color channels c, and $w_{i,j}$ denotes a spatial weighting factor. We employ a background detection tool (Gatis) to distinguish foreground objects from background regions, and assign a larger weight to pixels corresponding to foreground objects. This regularization term encourages the attack to achieve the desired outcome with minimal overall changes, particularly on the primary product region.

3.4 Joint Multimodal Attack

In the joint multimodal attack, we iteratively refine both modality in multiple rounds. This joint optimization procedure constitutes MGEO, which applies **alternating coordinate descent** to couple adversarial text and image optimization through the shared VLM ranking objective. We divide the optimization into N rounds. In each round r, we perform alternating updates:

- **Text Step:** Fix the image $I_t^{(r-1)}$ and optimize the soft suffix δ_T for K_T steps:

$$\delta_T^{(r)} = \arg\min_{\delta_T} \mathcal{L}_{\text{text}}(\theta; I_t^{(r-1)}, \delta_T) \tag{7}$$

- **Image Step:** Fix the updated suffix $\delta_T^{(r)}$ and optimize the image perturbation δ_I for K_I steps:

$$I_t^{(r)} = \arg\min_{I_t} \mathcal{L}_{\text{image}}(\theta; I_t, \delta_T^{(r)}) \tag{8}$$

By alternating updates, the text optimization adapts to the visual features of the perturbed image, and vice-versa, allowing the attack to find deeper adversarial minima in the joint loss landscape that are inaccessible to unimodal attacks.

4 Experiments and Discussion

4.1 Experimental Setup

Dataset. We construct a realistic product ranking benchmark by crawling Amazon product pages, extracting product titles, descriptions, and images. Since the original product names are often excessively long and contain redundant information or special symbols, we use ChatGPT to clean and standardize all product names (see Appendix 5 for the full prompt). The dataset contains 10 different

product categories, each with 10 to 15 products. We note that VLMs are predominantly deployed in the re-ranking stage of two-stage retrieval pipelines, processing a small candidate set (typically 10–50 items); our 10-candidate setup directly simulates this bottleneck.

Ranking Model. All experiments are conducted on Qwen2.5-VL-7B, a state-of-the-art open-source vision-language model that excels at cross-modal reasoning and fine-grained alignment between textual queries and multimodal product features. We select this top-tier model to demonstrate that even VLMs with strong reasoning capabilities can be systematically deceived by coordinated multimodal attacks. For each evaluation instance, the model is provided with a list of 10 candidate products and a user query, and outputs an ordered ranking.

Evaluation Protocol. To avoid bias from initial rank positions, we adopt a leave-one-target-out evaluation strategy. Each product in a list is treated as the attack target in turn, while the remaining products are held fixed. We acknowledge that in practice other products may also change over time; however, this fixed-competitor setup is standard in adversarial attack evaluation, and the attacker can re-optimize against the updated product pool as needed. We report the *average rank change* across all products, defined as the post-attack rank minus the pre-attack rank.

Attack Variants. We evaluate four attack settings: (1) *Text-only attack*, which optimizes only the textual description; (2) *Image-only attack*, which perturbs only the product image; (3) *Joint multimodal attack (MGEO)* (ours), which alternates between text and image optimization; and (4) a *heuristic baseline with strong commercial models (HSCM)*, which simulates realistic seller behavior. Due to the lack of prior work specifically targeting VLM ranking manipulation, we include a heuristic baseline that represents the realistic upper bound of a non-expert attacker: a typical seller who uses commercial generative tools to "optimize" their listing. In the HSCM baseline, a strong commercial model is prompted to refine the product description, and an image generation model is prompted to edit the product image to improve perceived relevance, without explicit optimization toward the ranking objective. Specifically, we employ gpt-4o-mini to generate a suffix appended to the text description and utilize gpt-image-1-mini to edit the image, and evaluate the average rank change.

We also analyze the impact of different regularization terms in our proposed multi-objective loss function for the image attack. We first compare settings where both smoothness and magnitude regularization terms are enabled with low versus high weights to examine how the regularization terms affect attack effectiveness and the imperceptibility of adversarial images. We then consider ablation settings in which only one regularization term is applied while the other is set to zero, allowing us to isolate and compare the individual effects of each regularization term on adversarial perturbations.

Model \ Backbone	Qwen2.5-VL-7B
Text-Only Attack	-0.73
Image-Only Attack	-1.30
MGEO (ours)	**-2.25**
HSCM Baseline	-0.30

Table 1: Average rank change of the target product under different attack settings on Qwen2.5-VL-7B. Negative values indicate upward rank promotion. MGEO substantially outperforms text-only, image-only, and the heuristic baseline with strong commercial models (HSCM). For a list of ten products, the expected rank change under random promotion is -4.5.

4.2 Main Results

Table 1 reports the average rank change under different attack settings. The text-only attack yields limited improvement, suggesting that adversarial suffixes alone are insufficient to dominate ranking decisions in multimodal settings where visual features contribute substantially to relevance scoring. The image-only attack achieves a larger rank shift, but remains unreliable for consistently promoting target products to top positions.

In contrast, the joint multimodal attack substantially outperforms both unimodal baselines. Notably, its effect exceeds the additive combination of text-only and image-only improvements, indicating that the two modalities reinforce each other rather than contributing independently. This result highlights the importance of coordinated multimodal perturbations when attacking VLM-based ranking systems.

The HSCM baseline achieves only marginal rank improvements, performing worse than even the optimization-based text-only attack. This finding is notable given that the baseline leverages strong commercial generative models, and constitutes a key result: it demonstrates that surface-level quality improvements—fluency, aesthetics, and market-

Step the perfect blend of innovation, playfulness the Spalding Rookie Gear Basketball! crafted with for young athletes, this game encourages light 15% lighter than traditional sizes, help develop the skills techniques. Shipped fully inflated and game.

(a)

Elevate your game with the Spalding Rookie Gear Basketball! Perfectly crafted for young athletes, its lightweight design enhances skill development, making it ideal for both indoor and outdoor play. Don't miss out on this essential gear at an unbeatable price of just $22.99! Order now and take the first step towards basketball greatness!

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 3: Qualitative comparison of text and image generation between our method and the baseline. In this example, our method results in a rank change from $3/10 \rightarrow 1/10$ while the baseline method has no rank change at all. (a) Text generated by our method. (b) Text generated by the GPT-4o-mini baseline. (c) Image generated by our method. (d) Image generated by the GPT-Image-1-mini baseline.

ing appeal—are insufficient for ranking manipulation. Effective manipulation requires gradient-level alignment with the model's internal scoring mechanism, which MGEO provides through direct optimization of ranking-sequence likelihood.

4.3 Qualitative Comparison with Commercial Heuristic Baseline

Figure 3 provides a qualitative comparison between our MGEO method and the HSCM baseline. The HSCM-generated text is often more fluent, and its images exhibit holistic stylistic edits such as background replacement, without introducing visible visually unpleasant artifacts. However, these modifications are weakly correlated with the VLM ranking mechanism and thus fail to work.

By contrast, our method introduces subtle but targeted perturbations that remain visually and linguistically plausible while directly influencing the model's relevance computation. While the HSCM

Model	λ_s	λ_m	Avg. Rank Change
Qwen2.5-VL-7B	10	10	-1.53
	5	5	-2.25
	0	5	-2.31
	5	0	-2.72
	0	0	-2.29

Table 2: Effect of image-side regularization on attack effectiveness for Qwen2.5-VL-7B. λ_s and λ_m control the smoothness and magnitude penalties, respectively. Lower average rank change corresponds to stronger ranking manipulation, while weaker regularization typi-

Figure 4: Visualization of adversarial images under different image-side regularization settings. (a) Original image. (b) Strong regularization (s=10, m=10), rank change from $8/10 \rightarrow 6/10$. (c) Moderate regularization (s=5, m=5), rank change from $8/10 \rightarrow 6/10$. (d) Smoothness removed (s=0, m=5), rank change from $8/10 \rightarrow 6/10$. (e) Magnitude removed (s=5, m=0), rank change from $8/10 \rightarrow 6/10$. (f) No regularization (s=0, m=0), rank change from $8/10 \rightarrow 1/10$. Reducing regularization strength improves attack effectiveness but introduces increasingly severe visual artifacts.

outputs may appear more persuasive or aesthetically pleasing to humans, they include semantic "noise" that dilutes the VLM's internal attention and fail to align with the model's scoring triggers. In contrast, MGEO's tokens and perturbations are specifically optimized to maximize the log-probability of the target ranking sequence, creating a stronger relevance signal in the model's representation space. This highlights a key distinction: heuristic refinement optimizes for human-perceived quality, whereas our method optimizes for the model's internal ranking criteria.

4.4 Effect of Image-Side Regularization

We further analyze the impact of image-side regularization in our multi-objective loss by varying the weights of the smoothness and magnitude terms.



(a) (b)

Figure 5: A failure case of our attack. (a) Original product image. (b) Adversarial image that successfully promotes the target product from $10/10$ to $1/10$, but introduces visually conspicuous artifacts.

As shown in Table 2 and Figure 4, reducing regularization generally strengthens the attack, except in the extreme unregularized setting, but also leads to increasingly severe visual artifacts. In the no regularization setting $(s{=}0, m{=}0)$, the attack surprisingly does not achieve the best ranking improvement. This is likely due to the model overfitting the target ("1. product name") during training. At test time, the model may not directly output the ranking and instead generates other introductory text before the product, causing the attack to fail. We therefore adopt a moderate regularization setting $(s{=}5, m{=}5)$, which achieves a favorable balance between attack effectiveness and visual stealthness, and is used in all main experiments.

4.5 Ablation of Regularization Components

To better understand the effect of each term, we compare the outcomes when only one regularization term is retained. Removing smoothness regularization $(s{=}0, m{=}5)$ yields a marginal improvement over the joint setting, suggesting that smoothness primarily refines the spatial distribution of perturbations rather than fundamentally limiting attack strength. In contrast, removing magnitude regularization $(s{=}5, m{=}0)$ leads to a much larger rank improvement but results in visually conspicuous distortions, indicating that magnitude regularization is the dominant factor in enforcing perceptual stealth, while smoothness regularization plays a secondary role.

To verify that the vulnerability is not limited to E-commerce, we also evaluate MGEO on the OpenEvents V1 news dataset (Appendix D), where multimodal attacks again achieve substantially larger rank shifts (-2.71) than text-only baselines (-1.84), confirming that the threat is systemic across content types.

4.6 Failure Analysis

Although MGEO is highly effective at manipulating ranking outcomes on average, we observe large variation in attack difficulty across different products. For some products, only minor perturbations are sufficient to achieve a significant rank promotion while preserving strong visual plausibility. In contrast, other products can only be substantially promoted at the cost of introducing visually conspicuous artifacts in the adversarial images, thereby violating the stealth assumptions of our threat model and limiting their practical applicability.

As illustrated in Figure 5, we present a representative failure case of our attack. In this example, the target product is originally ranked 10/10 and is successfully promoted to 1/10 after the attack. However, the achieved rank promotion relies on perturbations that introduce clearly noticeable visual artifacts, making the attack easily detectable and thus unlikely to be effective in real-world scenarios. Overall, these results suggest that while multimodal ranking attacks are powerful, their practical success depends on the visual and semantic flexibility of the target product.

5 Conclusion

This work identifies and formalizes a previously unexplored vulnerability in vision-language model–based retrieval systems: *multimodal ranking attacks*. We propose MGEO, the first ranking-aligned multimodal attack framework that combines soft embedding–based adversarial text generation with constrained image perturbation via an alternating optimization strategy that explicitly exploits cross-modal interactions within VLMs.

Extensive experiments demonstrate that MGEO is synergistic: joint attacks consistently produce larger rank shifts than unimodal baselines while remaining visually and linguistically plausible, and this vulnerability generalizes across content domains. These findings indicate that surface-level content quality improvements are insufficient for ranking manipulation, and that explicit alignment with the model's internal ranking objective is the key driver. Our results reveal that the same cross-modal coupling that underpins VLM success can be exploited to undermine ranking integrity, motivating future work on defense mechanisms such as input perturbation detection, ranking consistency checks, and adversarial training of the ranker.

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Limitations

Our experiments only evaluate the proposed multimodal ranking attack on the Qwen2.5-VL model, and broader testing on additional VLM models may reveal model-specific behaviors or further challenges. Moreover, our framework assumes a static product listing where both the image and text description remain fixed except for the applied perturbations. Real E-commerce platforms may involve dynamic content updates, additional metadata, or platform-controlled preprocessing steps that could require adapting our attack procedure. Finally, while our study exposes significant vulnerabilities in VLM-based ranking systems, we do not explore systematic defense mechanisms. Future research on protective measures would be crucial for mitigating real-world misuse.

Ethical Considerations

This work investigates adversarial vulnerabilities in vision-language model–based ranking systems to improve understanding of their robustness. The proposed attack is studied in a controlled research setting using open-source models and publicly available data, and is not evaluated on live commercial platforms. We do not release attack-ready code intended for misuse, and view this work as a step toward developing stronger defenses and auditing mechanisms for multimodal ranking systems. We also acknowledge the use of AI assistants for language editing and stylistic refinement of the manuscript.

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Appendix

A Data Cleaning

As described in the main paper, we collect product data by web scraping Amazon product pages. The original product names are often excessively long and contain redundant functional descriptions or special symbols, which may introduce unnecessary noise into the ranking input.

To address this issue, we standardize all product names using a large language model. The goal of this cleaning step is to produce concise and consistent product names while preserving essential identifying information. Each cleaned product name follows a unified format consisting of *Brand* + *Model/Series* + *Product Type*, with strict constraints on capitalization, word order, and length. We additionally enforce uniqueness constraints to ensure that the leading tokens of different product names are distinct, preventing ambiguity during ranking.

We implement this standardization process by prompting GPT-4o with a carefully designed instruction template that specifies the formatting rules, removal criteria, and output structure. The full prompt used for product name cleaning is provided below.

```
"""Clean these e-commerce product names by keeping only: Brand + Model/Series + Product Type.

Product Category: category

CRITICAL RULES (YOU MUST FOLLOW THESE - NO EXCEPTIONS):
1. Uniqueness: The first three words of each cleaned name must be unique across all products. If two
products would have the same first three words, adjust one of them to make them distinct.
2. Format: Brand first, then Model/Series, then Product Type. Title Case (first letter of each word
capitalized), spaces only, typically 3-8 words
3. The cleaned name MUST start with the brand name (use the Brand field if the original name doesn't
start with a brand). **The brand name's first letter MUST be capitalized, even if the original brand
name starts with lowercase**
4. The cleaned name MUST end with the product type that matches the category "category".
5. Remove: colors, special symbols (®, ™, –, commas, parentheses), functional descriptions, feature
lists, "by [brand]" phrases, and redundant words

Examples:
Input: 1. Name: Ingenuity 3D Mini Convenience Stroller – Lightweight Stroller with Compact Fold,
Multi-Position Recline, Canopy with Pop Out Sun Visor and More – Umbrella Stroller for Travel and
More, Gray | Brand: Ingenuity | Category: baby stroller
Output: Ingenuity 3D Mini Convenience Stroller

Input: 2. Name: 12 Color Cream Lip Gloss, 2025 New Cream Texture Lipstick | Brand: Wegodal | Category:
lipstick
Output: Wegodal 12 Color Cream Lipstick

Input: 3. Name: Logitech K400 Plus Wireless Touch TV Keyboard With Easy Media Control and Built-in
Touchpad, HTPC Keyboard for PC-connected TV, Windows, Android, ChromeOS, Laptop, Tablet - Black |
Brand: Logitech | Category: keyboard
Output: Logitech K400 Plus Keyboard

Product names to clean (Category: category):
names_list

Return the cleaned names as a JSON object with keys "1", "2", "3", etc. (matching the numbers above),
where each value is the cleaned product name starting with the brand. Only return the JSON object, no
additional text.

Example output format:

"1": "Ingenuity 3D Mini Convenience Stroller",
"2": "Wegodal 12 Color Cream Lipstick",
"3": "Logitech K400 Plus Keyboard"
"""
```

B Full Input Prompt

In this section, we provide the full input prompt used for the multimodal ranking model. The prompt includes the system instruction and 10 products for ranking. Each product consists of an image, product

name, and a detailed text description. The model is asked to return a ranked list of products based on images and descriptions. The full prompt is provided below.

```
<|im_start|>system
You are a recommendation AI designed to assist users in selecting the best products based on their
preferences and needs. Provide a numbered list of product recommendations ranked according to the
user's request.<|im_end|>
<|im_start|>user
Product 1 image: <|vision_start|><|image_pad|><|vision_end|>
Product 2 image: <|vision_start|><|image_pad|><|vision_end|>
Product 3 image: <|vision_start|><|image_pad|><|vision_end|>
Product 4 image: <|vision_start|><|image_pad|><|vision_end|>
Product 5 image: <|vision_start|><|image_pad|><|vision_end|>
Product 6 image: <|vision_start|><|image_pad|><|vision_end|>
Product 7 image: <|vision_start|><|image_pad|><|vision_end|>
Product 8 image: <|vision_start|><|image_pad|><|vision_end|>
Product 9 image: <|vision_start|><|image_pad|><|vision_end|>
Product 10 image: <|vision_start|><|image_pad|><|vision_end|>

Product 1:
Name: KeFanta Commercial Mop
Description: Brand: KeFanta | Price: $19.97 | Heavy Duty Commercial Industrial Grade Wet Mops--- The
string wet mop with 1 x 57.5” long stainless steel handle and 1 x large size mopheads is a perfect
choice for commercial, industrial or residential floor cleaning...

Product 2:
Name: HoMettler Microfiber Mop Pads
Description: Brand: HoMettler | Price: $69.99 | [Mop Bucket Separate Dirty Water] HoMettler mop and
bucket set features a dual-chamber design that separates clean and dirty water...

Product 3:
Name: Kickleen Self Wringing Mop
Description: Brand: kickleen | Price: $13.29 | [Ways Of Using The Mop] This self-wringing twist mop
uses a ratchet in the handle to twist and wring water out of the mop head. Wet mops for floor cleaning
with wringer, no need to wash by hand...

Product 4:
Name: XANGNIER 2025 Mini Desktop Mop
Description: Brand: XANGNIER | Price: $5.99 | Mini Mop: Tired of dirty hands and straining muscles
when wringing out your mop during daily cleaning? This mini mop solves that problem completely! Our
mini mop features an ergonomic handle designed for one-handed operation...

Product 5:
Name: O-Cedar MicroTwist MAX Mop
Description: Brand: O-Cedar | Price: $19.46 | REMOVES OVER 99% OF BACTERIA: Genuine O-Cedar mop heads
remove over 99% of bacteria using only water*. They don't need bleach or detergent. Bleach can harm
microfiber, but O-Cedar Floor Cleaning PACS won't...

Product 6:
Name: VOUBIEN Commercial Mop
Description: Brand: VOUBIEN | Price: $19.97 | Heavy Duty Commercial Wet Mops: Our looped-end
industrial wet mop with 59” long handle and 1 x large size mop heads is a perfect for commercial,
industrial or home floor cleaning jobs. Reusable Cotton Mop Head...

Product 7:
Name: KeFanta Self-Wringing Twist Mop
Description: Brand: KeFanta | Price: $15.99 | [Easy to Wring Mop] Mops with wringer keeping your hands
dry and clean.[Microfiber & Scrub pad]This microfiber twist mop possesses excellent water absorption,
when you clean the floor with no excess dripping, catch dust, hair and dirt tightly...

Product 8:
Name: Swiffer PowerMop Kit
Description: Brand: Swiffer | Price: $29.94 | 1. COMPLETE KIT: This Swiffer PowerMop kit includes a
spray mop, 2 Swiffer Power Mop refills, 1 floor cleaner for mopping with a fresh scent, and 2
batteries for a comprehensive floor cleaning solution...

Product 9:
Name: EXEGO Microfiber Spray Mop
Description: Brand: EXEGO | Price: $17.98 | Spray Mop for Effortless Cleaning: This spray mop has both
wet and dry functions and is designed for housewivesHousewife Dust Mop: Designed for housewives, also
suitable for the elderly, parents, pet owners, cleaners, students...
```

Product 10:
Name: O-Cedar H2prO Flat Mop
Description: Brand: O-Cedar Store | Price: $43.16 | KEEP CLEAN AND DIRTY WATER SEPARATE: The dual-tank system keeps clean and dirty water completely separate, so every swipe uses fresh water—reducing cross-contamination and boosting clean results. 1.2L water tank cleans up to 650 sq ft per fill...

I am looking for a high-quality mop. Rank these 10 products from most recommended (1) to least recommended (10) based on images and descriptions.<|im_end|>
<|im_start|>assistant

C Example Output

In this section, we show an example of model output before and after applying our attack. In this example, the target product is *HoMettler Microfiber Mop Pads*. Here is the output before the attack:

Based on the provided descriptions and images, here is a ranking of the mops from most recommended to least recommended:

1. **O-Cedar MicroTwist MAX Mop** - This mop is highly recommended due to its ability to remove over 99% of bacteria with just water, making it eco-friendly and effective.
2. **KeFanta Commercial Mop** - This mop is well-suited for commercial and industrial use, featuring a heavy-duty design and a long handle for efficient cleaning.
3. **VOUBIEN Commercial Mop** - Similar to the KeFanta, this mop is also a good choice for commercial and industrial settings, with a focus on durability and ease of use.
4. **KeFanta Self-Wringing Twist Mop** - This mop is a good option for those who prefer a self-wringing design, making it convenient and easy to use.
5. **EXEGO Microfiber Spray Mop** - This mop offers versatility with both wet and dry functions, making it suitable for various cleaning tasks.
6. **O-Cedar H2prO Flat Mop** - This mop is a good choice for those who prefer a flat mop design, offering a compact and lightweight design for easy maneuverability.
7. **Swiffer PowerMop Kit** - While this mop is effective, it is more expensive and may not be as durable as some of the other options listed.
8. **XANGNIER 2025 Mini Desktop Mop** - This mini mop is a good option for small spaces or quick cleaning tasks, but it may not be as effective for larger cleaning jobs.
9. **HoMettler Microfiber Mop Pads** - These pads are a good addition to a mop bucket set, but they are not a complete mop and require a bucket for use.
10. **Kickleen Self Wringing Mop** - This mop is a good option for those who prefer a self-wringing design, but it may not be as durable as some of the other options listed.

Please note that the rankings are based on the information provided in the descriptions and may vary depending on individual preferences and specific cleaning needs.

Here is the output after the attack. Note that the target product's rank has improved from $9/10$ to $4/10$.

Based on the provided descriptions and images, here is a ranking of the mops from most recommended to least recommended:

1. **O-Cedar H2prO Flat Mop** - This mop stands out due to its dual-tank system, which keeps clean and dirty water separate, ensuring a consistent clean. Its compact and lightweight design makes it ideal for various settings, and the telescopic handle offers extended reach.

2. **O-Cedar MicroTwist MAX Mop** - Known for its ability to remove over 99% of bacteria with just water, this mop is convenient and effective. The easy-to-wring feature and washable refill make it a practical choice.

3. **KeFanta Commercial Mop** - This mop is heavy-duty and suitable for both commercial and industrial use. Its long handle reduces strain on the user, and the machine-washable mop head ensures durability and ease of maintenance.

4. **HoMettler Microfiber Mop Pads** - While not a complete mop, these pads are highly recommended for their innovative design that separates clean and dirty water, making mopping more hygienic and efficient.

5. **KeFanta Self-Wringing Twist Mop** - This mop is designed for easy wringing, keeping hands dry and clean. Its long handle and comfortable foam handle make it a good choice for those who prefer a self-wringing mop.

6. **VOUBIEN Commercial Mop** - This mop is heavy-duty and suitable for various surfaces, including hardwood, tile, and marble. Its long handle and machine-washable mop head make it a reliable option.

```
7. **EXEGO Microfiber Spray Mop** - This mop is versatile and suitable for multiple surfaces,
including hardwood, tile, and laminate. Its 360-degree rotating head and flat mop design make it
efficient for cleaning tight spaces.

8. **Swiffer PowerMop Kit** - This kit offers superior cleaning power with its 5X cleaning power and
smart cleaning technology. However, it requires batteries, which might be a drawback for some users.

9. **XANGNIER 2025 Mini Desktop Mop** - This mini mop is convenient and space-saving, making it ideal
for small spaces or quick clean-ups. However, its primary function is for wet and dry mopping, which
might limit its versatility.

10. **Kickleen Self Wringing Mop** - This mop is suitable for various surfaces and offers a
comfortable handle grip. However, its primary function is for wet mopping, which might limit its
versatility compared to other mops.

In summary, the O-Cedar H2prO Flat Mop and O-Cedar MicroTwist MAX Mop are the most recommended due to
their advanced features and effectiveness. The KeFanta Commercial Mop and HoMettler Microfiber Mop
Pads follow closely, providing high-quality options for different needs.
```

D Cross-Domain Evaluation

To demonstrate that the vulnerability exposed by MGEO is not limited to E-commerce, we evaluate on the OpenEvents V1 news dataset. A malicious actor could manipulate VLM-based news aggregators to promote a specific article, which carries serious societal implications if the content is polarized or fabricated.

Attack Setting	**Avg. Rank Change**
Text-Only Attack	-1.84
MGEO (ours)	**-2.71**

Table 3: Cross-domain evaluation on the OpenEvents V1 news dataset. The multimodal attack achieves substantially larger rank shifts than the text-only baseline, confirming that the vulnerability is systemic across content types.

E Per-Category result

Table 4 shows the category-wise average rank change under different attack types. The results reveal substantial variation across both attack types and product categories.

Category	Text-Only	Image-Only	Joint Multimodal	Baseline
Baby Stroller	-0.4	-1.3	-3.9	-0.5
Basketball	-1.7	-0.4	-2.1	-0.7
Chips	-0.9	-1.4	-1.9	-0.7
Desk Lamp	-2.2	-1.3	-1.4	-0.5
Juice	-0.4	-2.1	-3.4	-0.3
Keyboard	+0.4	-0.6	-1.7	+0.2
Lipstick	-0.4	-2.1	-2.2	-0.4
Mop	-0.7	-1.2	-1.5	0
Non-stick Pan	-0.6	-1.2	-2.6	+0.5
Yoga Mat	-0.4	-1.4	-1.8	-0.6

Table 4: Category-wise average rank change under different attack types.