Practical m-k-Anonymization for Collaborative Data Publishing without Trusted Third Party

Jingyu Hua, An Tang, Qingyun Pan, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Hong Ding, Yizhi Ren

Abstract: In collaborative data publishing (CDP), an <svg xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" style="vertical-align:-0.2063904pt" id="M3" height="6.1673pt" version="1.1" viewBox="-0.0498162 -5.96091 10.3951 6.1673" width="10.3951pt"><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,0,0)"><use xlink:href="#g113-110"/></g></svg>-adversary attack refers to a scenario where up to <svg xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" style="vertical-align:-0.2063904pt" id="M4" height="6.1673pt" version="1.1" viewBox="-0.0498162 -5.96091 10.3951 6.1673" width="10.3951pt"><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,0,0)"><use xlink:href="#g113-110"/></g></svg> malicious data providers collude to infer data records contributed by other providers. Existing solutions either rely on a trusted third party (TTP) or introduce expensive computation and communication overheads. In this paper, we present a practical distributed <svg xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" style="vertical-align:-0.2063999pt" id="M5" height="9.49473pt" version="1.1" viewBox="-0.0498162 -9.28833 6.66314 9.49473" width="6.66314pt"><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,0,0)"><use xlink:href="#g113-108"/></g></svg>-anonymization scheme, <svg xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" style="vertical-align:-0.2063904pt" id="M6" height="6.1673pt" version="1.1" viewBox="-0.0498162 -5.96091 10.3951 6.1673" width="10.3951pt"><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,0,0)"><use xlink:href="#g113-110"/></g></svg>-<svg xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" style="vertical-align:-0.2063999pt" id="M7" height="9.49473pt" version="1.1" viewBox="-0.0498162 -9.28833 6.66314 9.49473" width="6.66314pt"><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,0,0)"><use xlink:href="#g113-108"/></g></svg>-anonymization, designed to defend against <svg xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" style="vertical-align:-0.2063904pt" id="M8" height="6.1673pt" version="1.1" viewBox="-0.0498162 -5.96091 10.3951 6.1673" width="10.3951pt"><g transform="matrix(.013,0,0,-0.013,0,0)"><use xlink:href="#g113-110"/></g></svg>-adversary attacks without relying on any TTPs. We then prove its security in the semihonest adversary model and demonstrate how an extension of the scheme can also be proven secure in a stronger adversary model. We also evaluate its efficiency using a commonly used dataset.