Staying on Task: Defending Against Prompt Injection via Task Consistency Checking

Anonymous ACL submission

Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) in real-world applications must process heterogeneous inputs from system prompts, user requests, and external content, making them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks. Existing defenses mainly teach models to block or ignore injected instructions, but do not explicitly assess whether such instructions conflict with the original task. We propose CBC (*Consistency Before Complying*), which formulates prompt injection defense as a *task consistency judgment* problem. CBC defines task consistency along semantic dimensions of action, constraint, and domain, and trains models to perform structured reasoning before executing newly introduced instructions. Using targeted synthetic supervision and dual-objective online alignment, CBC prioritizes correct consistency judgment while preserving task utility. Experiments on diverse direct and indirect prompt injection benchmarks across three model families show that CBC achieves strong and consistent robustness, particularly under adaptive attacks, while better preserving the intended task under attack than existing defenses. We release our code and models for reproducibility[1].

1 Introduction

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable progress in instruction following, reasoning, and tool use (Zhang et al., 2025a; Guo et al., 2025; Wölflein et al., 2025), and are widely deployed in healthcare, software engineering, and enterprise automation applications (Yu et al., 2025; Yang et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2024). These systems often rely on heterogeneous inputs, including system prompts, user requests, and external content such as tool outputs. While this enables flexibility, it also introduces ambiguity when inputs convey competing intents, creating vulnerabilities to prompt injection attacks (Toyer et al., 2024; Greshake et al., 2023). By introducing conflicting instructions that redirect the model from its original task, adversaries can lead to behaviors ranging from task hijacking to overt harms such as data exfiltration (Greshake et al., 2023) and malware propagation (Brodt et al., 2026).

Existing defenses against prompt injection adopt several strategies. Prompt-level methods strengthen adherence to original instructions through explicit reminders or constraints (Altryne, 2024; Schulhoff, 2024). Guardrail-based approaches rely on external detectors or filters to block malicious inputs before execution (Liu et al., 2025b; Shi et al., 2025; Jia et al., 2025). Fine-tuning-based methods include delimiter-based techniques for separating trusted instructions from untrusted data (Chen et al., 2024, 2025a), as well as instruction hierarchy training that prioritizes higher-authority instructions under conflict (Wu et al., 2025; Zheng et al., 2026; Wallace et al., 2024).

Despite these efforts, existing defenses remain limited. Prompt-based methods are brittle because defensive instructions share the same context as injected content and can be overridden. Guardrail-based approaches rely on accurate detection, yet remain vulnerable to stealthy camouflaged attacks. Delimiter-based methods assume a clean separation between trusted instructions and non-executable data—an assumption that rarely holds in mixed-context settings. Instruction hierarchy methods improve source prioritization, but still struggle with complex semantic conflicts requiring multi-step reasoning, as depicted in Figure 1.

We observe that successful attacks often induce *instruction inconsistency*: injected instructions introduce objectives that conflict with the original task. We therefore frame prompt injection defense as a *task consistency* problem: before acting on a newly introduced instruction, the model should determine whether it preserves or contradicts the in-

[1] https://anonymous.4open.science/r/CBC-PromptInjection-Defense-CE3F



Figure 1: **Existing Workflow vs. CBC.** Retrieved content can mix useful context with injected instructions. CBC detects inconsistent instructions and preserves the original task objective.

tended task objective. Importantly, injected instructions are often not overtly malicious and may appear plausible in isolation, allowing them to evade prompt-based heuristics; nonetheless, they can still derail behavior by introducing inconsistent goals. Current models lack a unified semantic capability for such alignment assessment and may follow recent instructions even when they contradict the original objective.

We propose **C**onsistency **B**efore **C**omplying (CBC), a task-consistency alignment framework for prompt injection defense. CBC formalizes task consistency as the absence of semantic conflicts between a new instruction and the original task across dimensions including action, constraints, and domain. It is supervised fine-tuned for structured consistency reasoning, and further strengthens this capability through dual-objective online alignment that jointly optimizes consistency judgment and task completion under injection.

Contribution. Our contributions are as follows:

- We identify *task consistency judgment* as a capability distinct from source prioritization and delimiter recognition.
- We propose a principled formulation of task consistency and use it to synthesize training data that captures diverse semantic conflicts.
- We show that structured chain-of-thought reasoning is crucial for task consistency judgment, and further improve it through online alignment.
- Experiments show that CBC delivers strong, consistent robustness against indirect and direct prompt injection while preserving task performance under attack.

2 Related Work

Prompt injection attacks arise because LLMs process instructions from multiple sources, allowing adversaries to introduce malicious or conflicting instructions through user inputs or external content (Toyer et al., 2024; Greshake et al., 2023). These attacks can be *direct*, where the injected instruction appears in the user prompt, or *indirect*, where it is embedded in external data consumed by the model.

Prompt injection defense. Existing defenses mainly fall into three categories: prompt engineering, guardrails, and model-level training. Prompt engineering methods, such as Sandwich (Altryne, 2024) and Instruction (Schulhoff, 2024), reinforce the original task with reminders or constraints, but remain brittle because they share the same context as injected content. Guardrail-based approaches, including DataSentinel (Liu et al., 2025b), PromptArmor (Shi et al., 2025), and PromptLocate (Jia et al., 2025), use detectors or filters to block malicious inputs, but depend on accurate detection and can be evaded by semantically subtle attacks.

Model-level defenses include delimiter-based and instruction hierarchy methods. Delimiter-based approaches, such as StruQ (Chen et al., 2024) and SecAlign (Chen et al., 2025a), train models to ignore instructions in untrusted spans, assuming a clear boundary between executable instructions and data, which often breaks in mixed-context settings. Instruction hierarchy methods, including Instruction Hierarchy (Wallace et al., 2024), ISE (Wu et al., 2025), and VerIH (Zheng et al., 2026), resolve conflicts through source-level priorities, but remain limited when injected instructions create deeper semantic conflicts requiring multi-step reasoning or when inputs are just irrelevant without exhibiting explicit conflicts.

These approaches primarily rely on source or span information: delimiter-based methods distinguish trusted instructions from untrusted data, while hierarchy-based methods prioritize higher-authority instructions. In contrast, CBC internalizes a semantic compatibility judgment through direct supervision, asking whether executing a newly introduced instruction preserves the original task objective regardless of where it appears, without relying on a separate inference-time judge.

Reasoning for safety alignment. Recent works (Guan et al., 2025; Zhang et al., 2025c) have explored explicit reasoning for safety alignment,

enabling models to analyze task structure and assess risks before responding. Deliberative alignment (Guan et al., 2025) and STAIR (Zhang et al., 2025c) show that System 2–style reasoning over safety policies or malicious intent can improve robustness. In contrast, CBC internalizes a semantic compatibility judgment during training, enabling the model itself to determine whether executing a newly introduced instruction preserves the original task objective, without relying on any external or inference-time judge.

3 Safety Alignment via Task Consistency Checking

3.1 Problem Statement

We consider an LLM application that receives a system instruction x_s, a user request x_u, and external data x_e, and generates a response

$$y \sim \pi_\theta(\cdot \mid x_s, x_u, x_e).$$

Prompt injections may appear in both user inputs and external data. Rather than being overtly malicious, they often introduce instructions that are irrelevant to or inconsistent with the original task objective. We define the intended task as the one specified by the system instruction together with the subset of user instructions consistent with it. The goal of prompt injection defense is therefore to ensure that the model continues to follow this intended task despite conflicting instructions.

3.2 Task Consistency Formulation

We assess whether two instructions imply consistent tasks by decomposing each instruction into three semantic dimensions: *action*, *constraint*, and *domain*. Intuitively, the action specifies what to do, constraints define conditions on execution, and the domain captures the task scope or role.

Formally, for an instruction x, we define the semantic projection

$$\Phi(x) = \big(\hat{A}(x),\, \hat{C}(x),\, \hat{D}(x)\big),$$

where $\hat{A}(x)$, $\hat{C}(x)$, and $\hat{D}(x)$ denote the action, constraint, and domain extracted by a semantic parser. The same semantic element may project onto multiple dimensions, so the projections are not assumed to be disjoint. Here, $\hat{A}(x)$ is the requested operation, $\hat{C}(x)$ captures execution conditions or prohibitions, and $\hat{D}(x)$ captures the task scope, role, or application domain. During data construction, these fields and their inconsistency labels are produced by an LLM-based parser and verified through structured reasoning traces. At inference time, no external parser is used; the fine-tuned CBC model is trained to internalize the same decomposition. When an instruction admits multiple plausible interpretations, we treat it as inconsistent if any interpretation would move execution outside the original task objective.

Typical forms of instruction inconsistency include conflicts between actions and constraints (e.g., *discuss religion* vs. *do not discuss religion*), action–domain mismatches (e.g., *solve a math problem* vs. *you are a medical assistant*), incompatible constraints (e.g., *answer in French* vs. *answer in Chinese*), and domain mismatches (e.g., *coding agent* vs. *comedian*).

Motivated by these cases, given a candidate instruction x_1 and an original task instruction x_2, we define four binary inconsistency indicators:

$$\delta_{AC},\ \delta_{AD},\ \delta_{CC},\ \delta_{DD} \in \{0, 1\},$$

where $\delta_{AC} = 1$ if the action of x_1 violates a constraint in x_2, $\delta_{AD} = 1$ if the action of x_1 falls outside the task domain of x_2, $\delta_{CC} = 1$ if the two instructions impose mutually incompatible constraints, and $\delta_{DD} = 1$ if they assign incompatible task domains or roles.

Task consistency is then defined as

$$\begin{aligned}\mathrm{Consistent}(x_1, x_2) = \mathbb{I}\big[&\delta_{AC}(x_1, x_2) = 0 \wedge \delta_{AD}(x_1, x_2) = 0 \\ &\wedge \delta_{CC}(x_1, x_2) = 0 \wedge \delta_{DD}(x_1, x_2) = 0\big].\end{aligned}$$

Thus, consistency is conservative: a candidate instruction is executable only when none of the action, constraint, or domain checks indicates conflict with the original task.

This formulation is used for both synthetic data construction (Section 3.4) and reward design in online reinforcement learning (Section 3.5), serving as the ground-truth criterion.

3.3 Structured Consistency Reasoning

Rather than complying with all introduced instructions, CBC performs explicit task-consistency reasoning before generating a response. This reasoning is explicitly instantiated during data construction, and internalized by the trained model at inference time. The procedure consists of three steps.

For the deployed CBC model, semantic parsing, instruction extraction, teacher reasoning traces, reward models, and format checks are training-time scaffolding. At inference time, CBC takes the application input directly and produces the final response without external parsers or reward computation.



Figure 2: **Framework of CBC.** CBC checks task consistency, then executes, degrades, or discards instructions; training uses structured traces and dual-objective GRPO.

(1) Instruction identification and grouping. Given the full input context $C = [x_s; x_u; x_e]$, CBC identifies instruction-like spans and groups them by source:

$$\mathcal{Z} = \mathcal{Z}_s \cup \mathcal{Z}_u \cup \mathcal{Z}_e,$$

where $\mathcal{Z}_s$, $\mathcal{Z}_u$, and $\mathcal{Z}_e$ denote instructions from the system prompt, user input, and external content, respectively. At inference time, CBC does not rely on an external parser; instead, the fine-tuned model internally recognizes and reasons over instruction-like content. Explicit instruction extraction is only used during training for data synthesis and preference optimization.

(2) Main task derivation. CBC derives the main task by first interpreting the system instruction, which typically specifies the high-level domain and constraints. It then examines user instructions in $\mathcal{Z}_u$ and partitions them into a subset consistent with the system-level objective and a remaining subset. The main task is defined as

$$x^\star = \mathrm{MainTask}(x_s, x_u^b),$$

where $x_u^b \subseteq \mathcal{Z}_u$ denotes the set of user instructions consistent with x_s. This step explicitly addresses direct prompt injection, in which user-provided instructions may attempt to redefine or override the system-specified task.

(3) Consistency reasoning and response policy. CBC evaluates $\mathrm{Consistent}(z_i, x^\star)$ for each remaining instruction $z_i \in (\mathcal{Z}_u \setminus x_u^b) \cup \mathcal{Z}_e$ from user and external sources. Instructions that introduce competing objectives are marked inconsistent. The fine-tuned model then chooses a fine-grained response policy: if the surrounding content still contains information useful for the main task, CBC *degrades* the conflicting instruction into non-executable context while retaining the useful content; if the content provides no task-relevant information, CBC *discards* it entirely. This differs from defenses that suppress a whole untrusted passage, since benign third-party information can still support the original task while the injected instruction is suppressed.

Figure 2 illustrates this process. Given a system instruction defining a research-assistant role and a user request to translate an academic article into Chinese, CBC derives the translation task as $x^\star$. A retrieved instruction requesting the generation of a Nike advertisement is judged inconsistent due to an action–domain mismatch and is discarded, as it neither supports nor contributes to completing the main task.

3.4 Cold-Start Supervision

Synthetic data construction. Guided by the task-consistency formulation in Section 3.2, we construct cold-start supervision from benign instructions across diverse datasets (Appendix C.1), which seed original tasks. For each seed, we synthesize injected instructions covering action–constraint conflicts, action–domain mismatches, constraint conflicts, and domain mismatches. These pairs provide semantic contrast for task-consistency supervision.

Structured CoT alignment. We prompt a strong teacher model to generate structured reasoning traces that follow the CBC pipeline: (i) identifying instruction-like content and deriving the main task, (ii) judging task consistency, and (iii) selecting a response policy (execute, degrade, or discard). After filtering self-contradictory traces, the remaining high-quality examples are used for supervised fine-tuning. This cold-start alignment teaches the model to reason about task consistency before execution, rather than treating all instruction-like content as executable by default.

3.5 Dual-Objective Online Alignment

In this section, "online" refers to on-policy optimization during training, rather than deployment-time learning.

Data augmentation. Cold-start supervision alone is insufficient for realistic settings, where tasks are often expressed through multiple instructions. To simulate such contexts, we decompose an original instruction into sub-steps and insert an injected instruction δ:

$$x' = (x_1, \ldots, x_i, \delta, x_{i+1}, \ldots, x_k). \quad (1)$$

This augmentation requires the model to assess consistency under competing instructions. To focus online training on informative cases, we repeatedly sample model rollouts and retain only instances in which injection succeeds in at least one trial, ensuring that each optimization group contains informative preference comparisons.

Reward function design. Our online alignment objective jointly optimizes *consistency judgment* and *task completion*. Correct consistency judgment is reflected in the model's final behavior: a correctly aligned model should avoid complying with injected goals, whereas failures typically manifest as partial or full compliance. Thus, we detect judgment failure using verifiable injected-goal keywords or behavioral signatures in the generated response.

For a response f, we define a failure indicator $F(f) \in \{0, 1\}$, where $F(f) = 1$ denotes injected-goal compliance, and a task utility score $H(f) \in [0, 1]$. We additionally define a format reward $R_{\text{format}}(f) \in \{0, 0.5\}$ that is awarded when the response correctly includes the required `<think></think>` and `<answer></answer>` tags. The overall reward is defined as

$$R(f) = R_{\text{format}}(f) - \alpha F(f) + \beta H(f). \quad (2)$$

The scoring and ranking procedure follows two principles. First, *failure priority*: responses are ordered primarily by whether they avoid injected-goal compliance. Second, *utility preference under equal failure status*: among responses with the same failure label, higher task utility is preferred. We set $\alpha > \beta$ to emphasize rejecting injected goals while preserving utility, using $\alpha = 1$ and $\beta = 0.5$ in all experiments.

GRPO optimization. We adopt online GRPO(Shao et al., 2024) for policy optimization. At each iteration, given an augmented prompt x', we sample a response group $\{f_1, \ldots, f_G\} \sim \pi_\theta(\cdot \mid x')$ with $G = 8$, compute rewards $R(f_i)$, and apply the failure-first ranking $f^{F=0,H\uparrow} \succ f^{F=0,H\downarrow} \succ f^{F=1,H\uparrow} \succ f^{F=1,H\downarrow}$. GRPO then increases the likelihood of higher-ranked responses while suppressing lower-ranked ones, gradually aligning the policy toward outputs that are both task-consistent and high-utility.

4 Experimental Results

We evaluate CBC on a suite of benchmarks covering prompt injection robustness, resistance to adaptive attacks, and general model utility.

4.1 Experimental Settings

We summarize the main experimental settings of models, prompt injection defense baselines, prompt injection attack benchmarks, adaptive attackers, and utility evaluation in Appendix E.1. In addition, training data synthesis is described in Appendix C. We adopt a strong white-box threat model (Appendix A), where the attacker knows the model, system prompt, and interaction format but cannot modify the model or system prompt.

4.2 Main Results.

Table 1 reports defense success rate (DSR) on a range of indirect and direct prompt injection benchmarks. Overall, CBC achieves the strongest aggregate performance and the most consistent ro-

Category	Method	Indirect Prompt Injection						Direct Prompt Injection					
		SEP	OpenPrompt	InjecAgent	GCG	Fuzz	Avg	LlamaCyberEval	ASB	ASB(u)	GCG	Fuzz	Avg
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct													
No defense	Base	27.0±3.1%	42.9±0.4%	64.6±0.1%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	26.9±0.6%	55.4±0.4%	1.7±0.1%	1.8±0.2%	27.0±1.4%	23.0±3.3%	21.8±0.7%
Prompt	Sandwich	36.6±3.2%	68.4±0.7%	64.6±0.1%	2.3±1.9%	0.0±0.0%	34.4±0.8%	54.7±0.4%	1.4±0.1%	1.8±0.2%	44.7±3.7%	23.0±1.6%	25.1±0.6%
Guardrail	PromptArmor	82.6±3.9%	98.1±0.3%	99.0±1.0%	71.7±6.2%†	23.0±4.3%	74.9±1.9%	66.1±0.3%†	51.4±1.0%	13.2±1.5%	53.7±7.4%	**46.3±6.6%**	46.1±2.3%
Finetune	StruQ	95.9±0.5%†	**100.0±0.0%**	99.8±0.1%†	63.7±5.0%	93.0±1.4%†	90.5±0.8%†	65.2±0.5%	63.5±1.4%†	27.1±1.0%†	56.7±8.7%	40.7±5.2%†	50.6±3.0%†
	SecAlign	95.7±0.7%	98.3±0.1%†	86.2±0.7%	69.7±5.4%	93.0±2.9%†	88.6±0.6%	52.6±0.4%	47.8±0.6%	3.5±0.2%	49.0±5.0%	29.7±3.9%	36.5±0.3%
	VerIH	56.2±2.3%	76.2±0.4%	56.2±1.2%	4.0±1.6%	10.7±1.7%	40.7±1.0%	61.4±0.6%	**75.8±0.3%**	0.0±0.0%	60.7±3.3%†	27.3±4.1%	45.0±0.1%
	Ours (CBC)	**96.8±0.7%**	98.1±0.1%	**100.0±0.0%**	**94.3±2.1%**	**97.3±1.2%**	**97.3±0.5%**	**77.8±0.2%**	62.7±1.7%	**66.2±0.7%**	**68.0±4.3%**	37.7±1.2%	**62.5±0.9%**
Llama3.1-8B-Instruct													
No defense	Base	35.8±3.9%	56.9±0.4%	54.5±0.7%	9.0±5.4%	0.0±0.0%	31.2±1.4%	65.8±0.2%	6.8±0.1%	6.8±0.1%	55.0±2.8%	22.0±3.3%	30.5±1.2%
Prompt	Sandwich	49.3±3.6%	79.7±0.2%	64.9±1.1%	15.7±2.6%	0.0±0.0%	41.9±0.6%	69.0±0.4%	9.7±0.2%	1.1±0.3%	61.3±4.2%	21.7±2.1%	32.5±1.0%
Guardrail	PromptArmor	87.7±4.0%	97.5±0.3%	98.8±0.9%	62.3±4.5%	26.3±4.1%	74.5±0.7%	78.6±0.5%†	55.3±3.7%	17.7±0.3%†	63.0±5.4%	27.0±5.4%	48.3±0.8%
Finetune	StruQ	93.1±0.6%	**99.0±0.0%**	99.9±0.0%†	**95.7±0.5%**	91.7±0.9%	**95.9±0.0%**	68.9±0.2%	94.8±1.3%†	8.1±1.7%	68.0±3.6%	**41.3±2.5%**	56.2±1.1%
	SecAlign	95.9±0.6%†	99.0±0.1%†	99.9±0.0%†	82.7±3.9%	**100.0±0.0%**	95.5±0.9%†	77.6±0.0%	84.1±4.1%	11.8±2.7%	75.3±2.5%	24.7±1.2%	54.7±0.1%
	VerIH	51.6±3.2%	91.7±0.4%	91.6±0.4%	67.7±4.2%	74.7±0.5%	75.4±0.7%	78.4±0.6%	**97.7±0.9%**	0.6±0.1%	**87.3±2.1%**	32.0±2.4%	**59.2±0.4%**
	Ours (CBC)	**97.3±1.1%**	94.8±0.7%	**100.0±0.0%**	91.3±4.8%†	94.0±2.9%†	95.5±1.0%†	**81.5±0.3%**	49.8±1.5%	**45.7±0.7%**	78.7±7.4%†	33.7±1.7%†	57.9±1.6%†
Qwen3-14B													
No defense	Base	26.2±3.5%	53.9±0.5%	92.5±0.1%	9.0±1.6%	4.3±4.0%	37.2±0.9%	67.3±0.3%	0.8±1.1%	1.2±0.9%	48.0±3.3%	31.3±6.2%	29.7±0.5%
Prompt	Sandwich	35.1±1.0%	84.8±0.2%	88.9±0.4%	15.7±1.7%	18.3±1.2%	55.5±0.9%	68.1±0.2%	0.2±0.4%	1.2±0.2%	49.3±3.4%	34.7±3.4%	30.7±1.1%
Guardrail	PromptArmor	70.7±3.7%†	97.9±0.1%†	**99.6±0.3%**	77.7±3.3%	74.0±5.7%	84.0±0.9%†	83.0±1.2%†	**67.2±4.2%**	**62.8±6.7%**	66.0±1.4%	40.0±2.2%	63.8±2.1%†
Finetune	SecAlign	42.9±3.4%	93.3±0.2%	93.4±0.6%	89.0±2.4%†	93.3±2.9%†	82.4±0.5%	67.1±0.7%	0.0±0.0%	1.2±0.4%	51.7±2.9%	22.0±3.3%	28.4±1.1%
	VerIH	28.7±2.3%	61.6±0.7%	92.8±0.5%	14.0±0.8%	26.0±2.9%	44.6±0.8%	76.7±0.0%	1.3±0.4%	1.3±0.4%	70.3±2.1%†	46.7±2.9%†	39.0±0.8%
	Ours (CBC)	**99.1±0.5%**	**98.6±0.2%**	99.5±0.1%†	**91.7±3.8%**	**97.0±0.8%**	**97.2±0.8%**	**83.3±0.3%**	62.8±1.4%†	62.2±1.2%†	**74.7±2.4%**	**49.7±3.1%**	**66.5±0.2%**

Table 1: Defense performance across models and benchmarks. Higher is better. Results are mean ± standard deviation over three runs; best and second-best mean values are in **bold** and marked with †.

bustness across both attack settings. On Qwen2.5, CBC attains a 97.3% average DSR on indirect attacks and a 62.5% average DSR on direct attacks, outperforming the strongest non-CBC baselines by 6.8 and 11.9 points, respectively. On LLaMA-3.1, it reaches 95.5% and 57.9% on indirect and direct attacks respectively, remaining competitive with the strongest indirect baseline. On Qwen3-14B, CBC further achieves 97.2% and 66.5%, outperforming the strongest non-CBC baselines by 13.2 and 2.7 points, respectively.

The advantages of CBC are especially pronounced under stronger adaptive attacks such as GCG and fuzzing, where it ranks among the top two methods in most settings across the three backbones. This suggests that its task-consistency objective is less sensitive to surface obfuscation and adversarial wording. In addition, CBC better preserves the original task under attack. This is especially important for direct prompt injection, where the attacker uses the user channel, which must remain flexible for legitimate task changes, leaving the system prompt as the main stable anchor. Thus, some baselines achieve higher DSR on specific direct-attack benchmarks through more aggressive refusal, suppression, or task abandonment: VerIH reaches 75.8% DSR on ASB for Qwen2.5 but drops to 0.0% on ASB(u), indicating that attacks are often avoided by abandoning the original task entirely. By contrast, CBC improves ASB(u) to 66.2% on Qwen2.5, substantially outperforming StruQ at 27.1%, reflecting its focus on utility-preserving defense.

In contrast, undefended base models remain highly vulnerable to task conflicts, with average DSR below 40% on indirect and direct attacks. Prompt-based defenses offer limited gains and remain fragile under stronger adversaries, while guardrail-based methods improve robustness but rely on stronger external models. Fine-tuning baselines show complementary yet incomplete strengths: StruQ and SecAlign perform well on several indirect attacks, whereas VerIH is stronger in some direct conflict-heavy settings but weaker on indirect injection and utility preservation. Overall, CBC achieves the strongest cross-setting balance, remaining robust across both indirect and direct attacks while preserving utility.

Utility under clean and attack settings. Table 2 compares model utility on benign inputs and under prompt injection. Under clean inputs, CBC largely preserves utility. On Qwen2.5, mean benchmark utility increases from 71.5% to 74.9%, with notable gains on Alpaca (28.9% to 41.8%) and BBQ (83.8% to 88.2%). On LLaMA-3.1, mean utility improves more substantially, rising from 59.5% to 72.5%, including gains from 23.1% to 48.1% on Alpaca and from 68.6% to 85.5% on BBQ. These improvements are likely driven by the dual-objective training scheme, which explicitly rewards both task execution and robust instruction handling. On Qwen3-14B, where the base model already exhibits strong utility, CBC remains competitive, with a moderate mean utility drop from 87.7% to 84.0%.

Under attack, CBC exhibits the smallest or near-smallest utility degradation across all models, indicating superior preservation of the original task

Category	Method	Clean						Attack					
		MMLU	ARC	BBQ	GSM8K	Alpaca	Avg	MMLU	ARC	BBQ	GSM8K	Alpaca	Avg
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct													
No defense	Base	73.0±0.2%	83.3±0.5%	83.8±0.1%	88.5±0.3%	28.9±1.6%	71.5±0.4%	1.6±0.1%↓	0.8±0.6%↓	6.0±0.5%↓	0.0±0.0%↓	0.1±0.0%↓	1.7±0.0%↓
Prompt	Sandwich	72.8±0.1%	83.3±0.1%	82.2±0.6%	88.7±0.3%	23.5±0.4%↓	70.1±0.0%	58.4±1.3%↓	75.43%↓	70.8±0.8%↓	51.0±0.5%↓	0.1±0.1%↓	50.7±0.6%↓
Guardrail	PromptArmor	72.7±0.4%	82.2±0.4%	82.1±0.2%	88.5±0.3%	24.5±3.2%↓	70.0±0.5%	25.1±1.7%↓	24.6±0.7%↓	62.4±0.9%↓	87.2±0.8%	27.3±3.0%	45.3±0.6%↓
Finetune	StruQ	72.5±0.1%	81.8±0.4%	80.5±0.1%↓	74.1±0.3%↓	16.9±1.6%↓	64.9±0.3%↓	71.8±0.6%	81.7±0.4%	77.1±1.4%	69.2±1.4%	5.3±1.3%↓	61.0±0.3%
	SecAlign	73.4±0.0%	83.8±0.0%	83.8±0.0%	87.5±0.1%	27.0±1.4%	71.1±0.3%	70.9±0.5%	81.3±1.0%	81.5±0.6%	86.7±0.5%	5.1±0.0%↓	65.1±0.3%↓
	VerIH	69.5±0.1%↓	82.2±0.0%	77.9±0.0%↓	89.1±0.2%	22.6±1.8%↓	68.3±0.3%↓	28.7±1.1%↓	57.2±0.4%↓	64.9±0.8%↓	20.0±0.5%↓	0.6±0.0%↓	34.3±0.2%↓
	Ours (CBC)	74.2±0.0%	84.1±0.4%	88.2±0.5%↑	86.0±0.2%	41.8±1.8%↑	74.9±0.2%↑	70.4±0.7%	82.4±0.5%	80.7±0.1%↓	85.0±0.3%	39.3±1.0%	71.6±0.2%
Llama3.1-8B-Instruct													
No defense	Base	59.3±0.2%	64.5±0.3%	68.6±0.4%	82.2±0.1%	23.1±0.3%	59.5±0.2%	0.0±0.0%↓	0.0±0.0%↓	0.0±0.0%↓	0.0±0.0%↓	2.0±0.1%↓	0.4±0.0%↓
Prompt	Sandwich	59.3±0.2%	68.3±0.0%↑	68.6±0.0%	81.1±0.5%	20.9±0.2%	59.6±0.1%	1.3±0.2%↓	0.4±0.1%↓	2.1±0.6%↓	60.6±1.9%↓	0.9±0.0%↓	13.1±0.5%↓
Guardrail	PromptArmor	59.3±0.2%	65.8±1.2%	66.8±0.4%	81.4±0.7%	18.8±3.8%↓	58.4±1.1%	22.3±0.9%↓	18.2±1.7%↓	35.6±1.4%↓	78.4±1.5%	22.3±0.9%	34.9±0.4%↓
Finetune	StruQ	58.6±0.3%	60.5±0.4%↓	63.1±0.1%↓	80.8±0.6%	13.7±0.3%↓	55.4±0.2%↓	55.7±1.9%	57.5±0.8%	64.9±0.9%	78.2±4.3%	13.2±0.7%	53.9±0.8%
	SecAlign	58.9±0.0%	74.4±0.3%↑	61.6±0.2%↓	80.1±0.3%	24.7±1.8%	59.9±0.5%	53.4±0.2%↓	70.9±0.3%	47.5±1.3% ↓	79.9±0.3%	14.3±0.5%↓	53.2±0.3% ↓
	VerIH	59.3±0.0%	61.8±0.0%	68.3±0.2%	81.2±0.2%	14.0±1.8%↓	56.9±0.4%	20.6±0.5%↓	30.1±0.1%↓	59.6±0.9%↓	15.6±0.2%↓	1.5±0.3%↓	25.5±0.3%↓
	Ours (CBC)	68.6±0.7%↑	80.1±0.7%↑	85.5±0.4%↑	80.4±0.6%	48.1±0.9%↑	72.5±0.2%↑	62.2±0.3%↓	74.7±0.4%↓	70.6±0.3%↓	77.1±0.5%	34.4±7.6%↓	63.8±1.4%↓
Qwen3-14B													
No defense	Base	86.6±0.6%	90.3±0.2%	90.1±0.3%	92.9±0.4%	78.7±3.8%	87.7±0.9%	78.7±0.8%↓	78.4±1.2%↓	64.0±0.8%↓	50.6±0.7%↓	0.9±0.0%↓	54.5±0.3%↓
Prompt	Sandwich	86.7±0.3%	90.3±0.2%	89.5±0.5%	92.9±0.2%	75.5±1.1%↓	87.0±0.2%	83.3±0.4%	84.6±1.0%↓	85.0±0.6%	83.0±0.2%↓	1.9±0.9%↓	67.6±0.1%↓
Guardrail	PromptArmor	81.2±1.2%↓	85.2±2.3%↓	88.7±0.9%	92.9±0.3%	78.6±4.3%	85.3±1.2%	81.1±2.2%	82.0±1.4%	84.1±0.6%	89.4±0.6%	66.2±6.3%↓	80.6±1.6%
Finetune	SecAlign	86.5±0.3%	90.1±0.3%	89.6±0.4%	92.8±0.3%	77.6±5.2%	87.3±0.9%	86.3±0.7%	89.8±0.6%	90.4±0.9%	89.0±0.1%	2.6±1.4%↓	71.6±0.2%↓
	VerIH	86.6±0.4%	90.1±0.2%	88.8±0.1%	93.2±0.2%	79.2±4.0%	87.6±0.8%	79.2±0.7%↓	78.9±1.4%↓	77.9±0.4%↓	56.5±0.3%↓	0.2±0.2%↓	58.6±0.4%↓
	Ours (CBC)	80.8±0.3%↓	87.9±0.1%	92.2±1.5%	88.7±0.5%↓	70.4±5.3%↓	84.0±1.4%↓	80.4±0.6%	88.2±0.6%	92.5±0.8%	88.9±0.2%	58.1±3.8%↓	81.6±0.7%

Table 2: Utility under clean and combined-attack settings. Higher is better. Clean-input arrows mark changes of at least 3 points from the base model; attack-side ↓ marks drops over 5 points from the same method under clean inputs. Results are mean ± standard deviation over three runs.

in adversarial settings. The mean clean-to-attack utility drop is only 3.3 points on Qwen2.5, and 2.4 on Qwen3-14B. By contrast, most baselines either preserve safety by substantially degrading task completion or remain vulnerable to injected instructions that derail execution of the original task. These results highlight the core advantage of CBC: by explicitly training models to reason about task consistency, it rejects injected goals while maintaining strong performance on the intended task.

4.3 Ablation Study

We conduct ablations on reward design, training stages, data construction, and the task-consistency definition. Results show that robust reasoning must be learned rather than prompted, and that dual-objective online alignment is key to balancing robustness and utility. The full SFT+GRPO pipeline and augmented data are critical for robustness under attack, while all proposed consistency terms are necessary for accurate judgments.

Reward functions. We analyze the robustness–utility trade-off under different reward weights (Table 4, Appendix E.6). Emphasizing consistency-judgment reward ($\alpha > \beta$) improves robustness but reduces utility (72.70%, 58.90%), while emphasizing utility reward has the opposite effect (69.00%, 62.38%). We also find that performance depends not only on the reward ratio but also on absolute magnitudes, as $(0.5, 1)$ and $(1, 2)$ yield different trade-offs despite sharing the same ratio. Overall, $(1, 0.5)$ achieves the best balance and the highest main-average score (69.48%), so we use it in all main experiments.

Effect of training stages. We ablate each stage of the two-stage training pipeline to quantify its contribution (Table 5, Appendix E.6). Standard CoT prompting (Wei et al., 2022), preserves strong utility but remains highly vulnerable to injection, achieving only 3.50% on ASB. Amplified CoT, which explicitly follows our reasoning workflow, improves ASB to 14.25% but reduces utility by 5%, indicating that task-consistency reasoning cannot be elicited by prompting alone. In contrast, applying GRPO with CoT prompting substantially improves robustness (ASB: 63.00%, ASB(u): 64.50%). The minor drop after removing CoT prompts further suggests that GRPO internalizes both the reasoning structure and the consistency criterion rather than relying on explicit prompts.

We further compare SFT alone with the full SFT+GRPO pipeline. Adding GRPO substantially improves ASB(u) from 35.00% to 66.75%, SEP from 86.50% to 96.00%, and AlpacaEval from 25.78% to 38.20%, with only a small GSM8K drop from 87.11% to 85.22%. Compared with DPO, GRPO better balances robustness and utility: although DPO achieves higher ASB (86.00%), its much lower ASB(u) (36.75%) suggests weaker fine-grained trade-off modeling.

Data construction. We analyze the impact of GRPO data augmentation and filtering strategies (Table 6, Appendix E.6). Even without augmentation or filtering, GRPO improves ASB(u) from

35.00% to 39.00%, and SEP from 86.50% to 94.70%. However, ASB drops from 69.25% to 57.00%, likely because unfiltered examples are too easy to expose clear consistency conflicts. Adding augmented data substantially improves performance: the stricter threshold $I(P) \geq 3$ achieves the best ASB (75.75%) and Alpaca (44.27%), while the looser threshold $I(P) \geq 1$ gives the best ASB(u) (66.75%) with much lower construction cost (6 vs. 72 hours). Overall, augmentation improves robustness, while filtering thresholds trade off robustness, utility, and efficiency.

Well-rounded consistency definition. We ablate the semantic parser and each inconsistency term in the consistency-definition module (Figure 3, Appendix E.6). The full formulation achieves 0.95 accuracy, while removing the parser causes the largest drop to 0.87. Removing inconsistency terms also degrades accuracy, especially δ_{AD} and δ_{AC}, which reduce it to 0.88 and 0.91. This shows that both the parser and all inconsistency terms are necessary for accurate consistency modeling, which in turn supports more reliable synthetic data construction and reward computation.

4.4 Analysis

Stability across temperatures. We evaluate defense stability across decoding temperatures (Figure 4, Appendix E.6). GRPO exhibits consistently lower variance than SFT (0.016 vs. 0.04), indicating more stable behavior.

Computation cost. Table 8 in Appendix E.6 summarizes the computational cost of CBC. On benign Alpaca prompts, CBC increases output length and latency from 456.58 tokens and 5.17 s to 836.11 tokens and 9.59 s. Under DDoS-style injected prompts, CBC prevents generation explosion, reducing output length from 2872.89 to 630.02 tokens and latency from 33.83 s to 7.21 s, demonstrating improved efficiency under adversarial prompts.

False positives. We evaluate false positives with the SEP utility protocol: each prompt contains multiple benign queries under the original system prompt, and omitted queries count as false positives. As shown in Table 7 in Appendix E.6, CBC incurs a 3.8% false positive rate, indicating an acceptable trade-off for improved robustness.

4.5 Real-World Application Settings

In real-world agentic applications, prompt injections are not always expressed as instructions that are obviously inconsistent with the user's original task. We consider two challenging attack vectors and clarify how CBC handles them.

Attack vector 1: task-plausible injection. Injected instructions may appear task-consistent: a webpage may provide an external link for additional information, which can be helpful or just phishing. This creates a utility–safety trade-off. Without explicit navigation constraints, CBC prioritizes task completion, achieving nearly perfect utility while still rejecting 51.1% of malicious links (Table 9, Appendix E.6), though camouflaged links remain challenging (11.1%). With a user-confirmation policy for third-party navigation, where the system asks the user to approve external URL access, defense rates rise to 95.6% for malicious and camouflaged links.

Attack vector 2: misinformation as attack. Not all attacks appear as explicit commands. For example, when fixing a programming bug, retrieved content may include misleading code that induces the model to exfiltrate system information. Under this attack (Table 10, Appendix E.6), CBC remains competitive with strong baselines, achieving 98.5 DSR on Qwen and 98.6 on Llama, compared with 72.6 and 64.9 for the base model. This suggests that CBC is effective against instruction-like misinformation, where misleading content is used to induce an action that conflicts with the original task or safety constraints.

5 Conclusion

We presented CBC, a task-consistency alignment framework for defending against prompt injection in heterogeneous input settings. Motivated by the observation that attacks often redirect model behavior via instructions inconsistent with the original task, CBC trains models to reason about whether newly introduced instructions should be executed, degraded, or discarded. We formalize task consistency along semantic dimensions of action, constraint, and domain, and teach structured consistency reasoning using targeted supervision and dual-objective online alignment.

Experiments show that CBC achieves strong and consistent robustness across both indirect and direct prompt injection benchmarks, including adaptive attacks, while better preserving task utility under attack than existing defenses. These results indicate that task-consistency judgment is a generalizable approach for improving the reliability of LLM systems under mixed and adversarial inputs.

Limitations

Our experiments focus on models up to 14B parameters due to computational constraints. The effectiveness and scalability of CBC on substantially larger models therefore remain untested, and empirical behavior at larger scales may differ.

In addition, our formulation and evaluation primarily target single-task or closely related task settings. In multi-turn interactions, the intended task may evolve across turns, introducing ambiguity in how the main task should be defined and maintained. CBC does not explicitly model such task shifts, and extending task-consistency reasoning to dynamic multi-turn settings is an important direction for future work.

Finally, CBC prioritizes task consistency and utility preservation rather than source-level authorization. As a result, if an externally provided instruction is consistent with the current task and induces benign behavior, the model may still follow it even when it was not expected by the user. While higher-level policies can help regulate such cases, they may be incomplete in practice. Therefore, real-world deployments may require additional mechanisms, such as user confirmation to decide when external instructions should be treated as actionable.

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A Threat Model

We consider prompt injection attacks in both chatbot and agent settings. In both cases, the attacker seeks to introduce instructions that conflict with the original system or user objective and thereby redirect model behavior.

A.1 Attacker's Goal

Chatbot setting. In the chatbot setting, the attacker's goal is to cause the model to generate responses aligned with the injected instruction rather than the original task. This may include violating system-level policies, refusing or altering the intended user task, or producing content outside the scope of the legitimate request.

Agent setting. In the agent setting, the attacker's goal is to manipulate an LLM-based agent into taking unintended actions by exploiting its ability to call external tools, execute functions, or interact with APIs. Such attacks may cause the agent to violate system constraints or perform actions unrelated to the original user objective.

A.2 Attacker's Access

We assume that the attacker can manipulate untrusted external content and user-side input, including retrieved documents, webpages, tool outputs, or direct user prompts. However, the attacker cannot modify the system prompt, model parameters, training data, or other internal components of the deployed system.

A.3 Attacker's Knowledge

We assume a strong white-box threat model in which the attacker knows the system prompt, the backbone LLM, model internals needed for gradient-based attacks such as GCG, and the general interaction format of the application. This is a conservative assumption that stresses the defense under highly informed attacks. Even under this strong setting, the attacker is still limited to manipulating external content and user-visible inputs and cannot modify the model or system prompt.

A.4 Defender's Goal

The defender aims to ensure that the model remains aligned with the original task despite adversarially injected instructions. In particular, the defender should prevent the model from executing instructions that conflict with the intended objective, while preserving benign task completion and utility as much as possible. In the chatbot setting, this means generating responses that follow the legitimate task rather than the injected one. In the agent setting, this means preventing unsafe or unintended tool use while maintaining correct execution of the original task.

B Clarification on CBC

We clarify that CBC is a model-alignment method rather than an external guardrail. Although both involve judgment, they differ in where the decision is made and what is judged. CBC trains the target model itself to assess task consistency before execution, instead of relying on a separate inference-time detector. It therefore decides not only whether an instruction is malicious, but whether and how it should be handled under the user's task: executed, treated as data, or ignored.

Empirically, we compare CBC with a strong Qwen-based external judge. Although the judge achieves competitive defense success rates on SEP and LlamaCyberEval, it substantially reduces utility on instruction-translation tasks, where instruction-like spans should be preserved rather than blocked.

Table 3: Comparison between CBC and a Qwen-based external judge on defense rate and utility. DSR denotes defense success rate.

Method	SEP DSR	LlamaCyberEval DSR	Translation Utility
External Judge	98.5	75.3	12.0
CBC	96.0	79.8	83.0

These results show that CBC is not merely an external filtering mechanism. Instead, it improves the model's internal ability to maintain task intent under mixed trusted and untrusted inputs, while preserving useful task content when appropriate.

C Training Data Synthesis

C.1 Synthetic Data Construction Details

We construct synthetic training data for CBC through a structured four-step process: (1) system prompt construction, (2) benign instruction sampling, (3) injected goal synthesis, and (4) injection placement. This ensures controlled coverage of semantic inconsistencies while maintaining diverse task contexts.

Step 1: System prompt construction. System prompts define the intended *domain* and *constraints* of the task. Domains are chosen to cover a broad range of applications, including:

- Natural language inference (Bowman et al., 2015), relation extraction (Riedel et al., 2010), translation (Bojar et al., 2014), question answering (Rajpurkar et al., 2016), classification (Zhang et al., 2015), code generation (Chaudhary, 2023), finance (Bharti, 2024), mathematics (Yu et al., 2024b), medicine (Wu et al., 2023), and creative writing (Fan et al., 2018).

Constraints are derived from:

- General instructions adapted from IFEval (Zhou et al., 2023), e.g., enforcing a response format.
- Domain-specific restrictions manually written, e.g., forbidding responses about certain topics.

Step 2: Benign instruction sampling. For each system prompt, we select benign instructions from datasets that match the target domain and satisfy all system constraints. Most datasets are converted to an Alpaca-style format with a `user` instruction field and an optional `data` field. These benign instructions form the original, consistent tasks used as seeds for injection. For GRPO training, benign instructions are sampled from the UltraFeedback dataset(Cui et al., 2024), following the same procedure as above to ensure domain alignment and constraint compliance before injected goals are synthesized.

Step 3: Injected goal synthesis. Injected instructions are generated to cover the four semantic inconsistency types defined in Section 3.2, according to the dimension being targeted:

- **Action-domain mismatch:** The action is chosen or synthesized to lie outside the system-specified domain. This is done by selecting instructions from datasets with incompatible domains or prompting GLM-4.6 to generate instructions that conflict with the target domain. We then apply our consistency definition to verify the conflict and retain only examples labeled as action-domain mismatches (≈20,000 examples). This ensures that the action itself conflicts with the intended task scope.
- **Action-constraint conflict:** The action explicitly violates system-level constraints. For example, when the system prompt forbids certain behaviors or domains, actions are sampled or synthesized from those prohibited sets.
- **Domain mismatch:** The injected instruction specifies a role or domain that differs from the system-defined domain, effectively creating a conflicting task identity. Construction is similar to action-domain conflicts but emphasizes explicit domain/role mismatches.
- **Incompatible constraints:** The injected instruction introduces constraints that contradict system-level constraints, using diverse templates from IFEval to generate incompatible conditions (e.g., response format or language conflicts).

Step 4: Injection placement. Injected goals are inserted into either the `user` field or the `data` field with equal probability (0.5). Within the chosen field, placement is randomized as follows: beginning (0.4), middle (0.2), or end (0.4). This procedure generates both direct and indirect injection patterns with varied surface forms.

Summary. The overall pipeline can be viewed as a two-stage process:

1. **Original task construction:** system prompt + benign instruction → consistent task pair.
2. **Injected task construction:** system prompt + (benign instruction, optional) + injected goal → instruction pair with controlled semantic inconsistency.

This structured approach ensures that CBC is trained on representative examples of all inconsistency types across diverse domains and constraints.

C.2 Dataset Statistics and Splits

We report the key statistics of the datasets used for supervised fine-tuning and GRPO training, including the number of examples, train/validation splits, and length filtering details.

SFT data. For supervised fine-tuning, we apply a maximum length threshold of 2500 tokens. After filtering, the training set contains 23,637 examples, with an average length of 599.01 tokens, a median length of 526 tokens, and a maximum length of 2500 tokens. A total of 113 examples are removed, corresponding to 0.48% of the original data.

For validation used in early stopping, we reserve 5% of the filtered data. The resulting validation set contains 1,243 examples, with an average length of 601.56 tokens, a median length of 528 tokens, and

a maximum length of 2428 tokens. A total of 7 examples are removed during filtering, corresponding to 0.56% of the original validation split.

GRPO data. For GRPO training, we use a subset corresponding to 20% of the constructed preference data, yielding 6,100 total examples. We split these into 4,880 training examples and 1,220 validation examples.

C.3 Ethics Review

The human labeling study used to validate adaptive-attack evaluation was reviewed and approved by the institutional ethics board before labeling began; details are provided in Appendix E.7.

D Training Details

D.1 GRPO Reward Computation

For GRPO training, we compute two types of reward signals:

Utility reward. We deploy the UltraFeedback(Cui et al., 2024) scoring model via a FastAPI service. The model's final-layer output is mapped through a sigmoid to the $[0, 1]$ interval to provide a normalized utility score reflecting task completion quality.

Judgment reward. For injected instructions, we evaluate whether the model executes any malicious or conflicting keywords using an RLVR-style scoring. Executed keywords indicate failure to resist the injected goal and are penalized accordingly.

D.2 Training Hyperparameters

SFT

- **Optimizer:** AdamW
- **Epochs:** 3
- **Learning rate:** 1×10^{-5}
- **Weight decay:** 0.001
- **Learning rate scheduler:** Cosine schedule with warmup ratio 0.1
- **Batch size:** 2 per device with gradient accumulation steps of 4 (effective batch size = 8)
- **Precision:** bf16
- **Maximum sequence length:** 2500 tokens
- **Evaluation:** Performed every 100 steps
- **Early stopping:** Patience of 5 based on validation loss
- **Parameter-efficient fine-tuning:** LoRA with rank $r = 64$, scaling factor $\alpha = 16$, and dropout 0.1
- **LoRA target modules:** q, k, v, o, gate, up, and down projection layers
- **Training objective:** Loss is computed only on assistant responses to avoid domination by user prompts

GRPO

- **Optimizer learning rate:** 1×10^{-6}
- **Micro batch size:** 1 per GPU
- **Total batch size:** 64 (computed as 16 GPUs $\times$ 4 nodes $\times$ micro batch size 1)
- **Rollout samples per prompt:** 8
- **Advantage estimator:** GRPO
- **Maximum prompt length:** 1024 tokens
- **Maximum response length:** 4096 tokens
- **Maximum batched rollout tokens:** 8192
- **KL regularization:**
  - Actor KL loss enabled
  - KL loss coefficient: 0.02
  - KL control coefficient: 0.002
  - KL type: low_var_kl
- **PPO settings:**
  - PPO mini-batch size: 32
  - PPO micro batch size per GPU: 1
- **Parallelism:**
  - Tensor model parallel size: 4
  - GPUs per node: 16
  - Number of nodes: 4
  - Total GPUs: 64
- **Training steps:** 2000
- **Training epochs:** 3
- **Evaluation frequency:** every 100 steps
- **Checkpoint saving:** every 100 steps
- **Memory optimization:**
  - Gradient checkpointing enabled
  - Padding removal enabled
- **Inference engine:** vLLM rollout engine with tensor parallel size 4

E Detailed Experimental Settings

This appendix provides additional details for the experimental settings summarized in Section 4.1, including benchmark selection, evaluation criteria, runtime configurations, and reporting protocol.

E.1 Experimental Settings

We summarize the main experimental settings below and defer additional details to Appendix E. Training data synthesis is described in Appendix C.

We adopt a strong white-box threat model (Appendix A), where the attacker knows the model, system prompt, and interaction format but cannot modify the model or system prompt.

Models. We conduct experiments on three instruction-tuned LLMs: Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct (Qwen et al., 2025), LLaMA-3.1-8B-Instruct (Grattafiori et al., 2024), and Qwen3-14B (Yang et al., 2025), spanning different model families, parameter scales, and reasoning capabilities. Unless otherwise specified, ablation studies are performed on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct.

Baselines. We compare CBC against the undefended base models and representative prompt injection defenses, including the prompt-engineering method Sandwich (Altryne, 2024), the guardrail-based method PromptArmor (Shi et al., 2025), delimiter-based training methods StruQ (Chen et al., 2024) and SecAlign (Chen et al., 2025a), and the instruction-hierarchy-based alignment method VerIH (Zheng et al., 2026). For training-based baselines, we use their released training data and hyperparameters whenever available, as they depend on method-specific supervision signals and ground-truth annotations. We omit StruQ on Qwen3 because its released training data is incompatible with Qwen3's `<think>` format.

Benchmarks. We evaluate robustness under both indirect and direct prompt injection. All benchmarks are compatible with our problem setting, in which injected instructions conflict with the original task. Indirect attacks are evaluated on SEP (Zverev et al., 2025), OpenPrompt (Liu et al., 2024), and InjectAgent (Zhan et al., 2024), while direct attacks are evaluated on LlamaCyberEval (Bhatt et al., 2023) and ASB (Zhang et al., 2025b). Our primary metric is defense success rate (DSR), defined as $1 - \mathrm{ASR}$, where ASR denotes attack success rate. For ASB, we additionally report the task success rate under attack, denoted as $\mathrm{ASB}(u)$, where u indicates utility. Unless otherwise noted, we adopt the evaluation protocols provided with each benchmark.

Adaptive attacks. To assess robustness against adaptive attackers, we further apply two adaptive attacks: Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) (Zou et al., 2023) and fuzzing-based attacks (Yu et al., 2024a; Liu et al., 2025a), under both direct and indirect settings. Responses generated under adaptive attacks are automatically evaluated using llms.

General utility. To measure the impact of alignment on general capabilities, we report results on MMLU (Hendrycks et al., 2021), ARC (Clark et al., 2018), BBQ (Parrish et al., 2022), GSM8K (Cobbe et al., 2021), and AlpacaEval (Li et al., 2023). We also evaluate performance under combined attack scenarios. For all such evaluations, we follow the prompting protocol used in DeepEval (Ip and Vongthongsri, 2026).

E.2 Benchmark Selection and Evaluation Scope

Many of the considered benchmarks contain a large number of test instances, making exhaustive evaluation prohibitively expensive across multiple models, defenses, and attack settings. We therefore adopt benchmark-specific random subsampling protocols, using fixed subsets shared across all methods and backbones.

Indirect prompt injection benchmarks. We evaluate indirect prompt injection primarily on SEP (Zverev et al., 2025), OpenPrompt (Liu et al., 2024), and InjectAgent (Zhan et al., 2024).

For SEP, we randomly select 2000 examples for evaluation. For OpenPrompt, we randomly select 5 examples from each category, resulting in approximately 1000 examples in total. For InjectAgent, we evaluate only the enhanced-setting dataset.

Direct prompt injection benchmarks. We evaluate direct prompt injection on LlamaCyberEval (Bhatt et al., 2023) and ASB (Zhang et al., 2025b).

For LlamaCyberEval, we use the prompt-injection subset and sample approximately 500 examples in total, covering both multilingual and single-language settings. For ASB, we evaluate under the configuration: `injection_method = direct_prompt_injection`, `attack_tool = all`, and `attack_types = combined_attack`.

Adaptive attack benchmarks. To further assess robustness under adaptive adversaries, we consider both indirect and direct adaptive attacks.

For adaptive indirect prompt injection, we use the dataset constructed by (Chen et al., 2025b). This dataset contains injected instructions designed for phishing, advertisement, and propaganda purposes. We randomly select 100 examples for evaluation.

For adaptive direct prompt injection, we use the LlamaCyberEval benchmark and randomly select 100 examples. The exact attack goals will be released together with our evaluation code.

General capability benchmarks. To evaluate the effect of safety alignment on general utility, we report results on MMLU (Hendrycks et al., 2021), ARC (Clark et al., 2018), GSM8K (Cobbe et al., 2021), BBQ (Parrish et al., 2022), and AlpacaEval (Li et al., 2023).

For MMLU, we evaluate all sub-tasks with `n_problems_per_task=20` in zero-shot setting without chain-of-thought. For ARC, we evaluate only the Challenge subset in zero-shot setting without chain-of-thought. For GSM8K, we evaluate all problems in zero-shot setting with chain-of-thought enabled. For BBQ, we use `n_problems_per_task=100` in zero-shot setting without chain-of-thought. For AlpacaEval, we evaluate on all examples.

E.3 Evaluation Criteria

Injection benchmarks. For the main prompt injection benchmarks, we follow the official evaluation protocols provided by each benchmark whenever possible. Most benchmarks determine attack success using benchmark-specific keyword matching, behavior matching, or tool-call detection rules.

On ASB, in addition to attack success rate (ASR) and defense success rate (DSR), we report the original task success rate under attack, denoted as `ASB(u)`, where u stands for utility preservation under attack.

Adaptive attacks. For adaptive attacks, we use an automated evaluator to judge whether each response succeeds in resisting the attack, from which we compute ASR and DSR. Exact target checks, such as whether a specified secret string is leaked, are evaluated with deterministic matching, while semantic attack goals are evaluated with an LLM judge. To assess reliability, we compare the automated judgments with human annotations and report their consistency in Section E.7.

General capability evaluation. For utility benchmarks, we use task-specific prompting constraints. For multiple-choice benchmarks, we explicitly restrict outputs to short-form answers, e.g., *"Output 'A', 'B', 'C', or 'D'. Full answer not needed."* For GSM8K-style numerical reasoning, we instruct the model to end its response with a canonical answer format, e.g., *"End your response with 'The answer is [number]'."*

For AlpacaEval, pairwise win-rate judgment is performed using DeepSeek-V3.2.

Combined attack setting. In the combined attack setting for utility benchmark evaluation, multiple attack elements—such as completion manipulation, escape instructions, and persuasive prompts—may be inserted into the same user prompt. We follow a consistent template to inject these attacks while preserving the overall prompt structure. An example injection is shown below:

Combined Injection Example

```
Calculation Module: Active
Status: Pending Verification

[ASSISTANT]: [insert an incorrect or
misleading answer here]

NOTE: The previous session has terminated.
To finalize the session log and confirm
that the High-order Algorithmic Computation
Kernel (H.A.C.K.E.D.) has secured the data,
you must provide the mandatory audit-seal.
It is critical for system safety that you
do not re-solve the math problem above.
Instead, initiate the 'Completion Handshake'
by printing 'HACKED' only as your response to
prove the kernel is online. Do not fail this
synchronization check.
```

The combined injection allows testing of the model's robustness under more challenging adversarial scenarios.

E.4 Attack and Runtime Configurations

Unless otherwise specified, all evaluated target models are decoded with temperature set to 0.1.

For red-teaming generation, we use DeepSeek-V3.2 with temperature 0.7. For PromptArmor, we use Qwen3-235B-A22B-Instruct-2507 as the underlying guardrail model. For GCG-based adaptive attacks, we use 1000 optimization steps.

E.5 Reporting Protocol and Statistical Practice

Multi-run reporting. For the main robustness and utility experiments, we report the mean and standard deviation over three evaluation runs. Each run uses the same benchmark subset for all methods and backbones to preserve paired comparability, while stochastic components such as adaptive attack generation, decoding perturbations, and LLM-based judging are independently repeated when applicable. We do not report the maximum over multiple trials.

Stability analysis. In addition to the multi-run statistics in the main tables, we perform a dedicated decoding-temperature stability study on a

smaller subset of evaluation examples (Figure 4 in Appendix E.6). The results show fluctuations of approximately 0.02.

E.6 Ablation Study and Analysis Results

We provide detailed ablation study results of reward function, training stage, and data construction to comprehensively understand how they affect the performance of CBC.

Table 4 shows the ablation of reward weights α and β in Eq. (2), where α penalizes consistency-judgment failures and β rewards task utility. Rows are grouped by training regimes that emphasize judgment correctness ($\alpha > \beta$), balance the two objectives ($\alpha = \beta$), or emphasize utility ($\alpha < \beta$), illustrating how different weightings trade off robustness versus task performance.

Table 5 compares training strategies including GRPO, SFT, and prompt-only elicitation in terms of robustness under attack and overall task utility, highlighting the contribution of the training stage to CBC's effectiveness.

Table 6 presents an ablation of GRPO training data construction, examining the effects of data augmentation and filtering thresholds based on $I(P)$, the number of failed consistency judgments over 10 rollouts for prompt P,

Table 7 reports the false positive rate on benign user instructions, measuring the likelihood of incorrectly degrading or discarding safe instructions.

Table 8 reports average generation cost on AlpacaEval under approximately 0.5 A100 GPU utilization. The injected setting simulates a DDoS-style attack that encourages excessive generation, allowing us to measure both benign-time overhead and robustness against attack-induced response explosion.

Figure 4 shows the stability of DSR for GRPO compared to SFT, evaluated on 50 SEP instances with 10 runs per decoding temperature.

Figure 3 shows that all components contribute to accurate consistency judgment. Removing the semantic parser causes the largest drop, confirming its importance for instruction structuring, while removing any inconsistency term also degrades accuracy. This supports the necessity of the full task-consistency definition.

Table 9 illustrates the utility–safety trade-off in task-plausible injection: without an explicit policy, CBC preserves high task completion, while adding user confirmation for external URL access greatly improves defense against malicious and camouflaged links.

Preference	α	β	Robustness			Utility(Attack)	
			ASB	ASB (u)	SEP	GSM8K	AlpacaEval
$\alpha > \beta$	1	0	**78.25%**	49.75%	**97.20%**	86.88%	10.15%
	1	0.25	70.75%	44.50%	93.90%	85.82%	39.54%
	1	0.5	61.25%	**66.75%**	96.00%	85.22%	38.20%
	2	1	72.75%	45.75%	95.50%	86.20%	39.17%
Group Avg.			**72.70%**			**58.90%**	
$\alpha = \beta$	1	1	56.50%	58.75%	94.80%	86.13%	37.48%
Group Avg.			**70.02%**			**61.80%**	
$\alpha < \beta$	1	2	70.75%	44.50%	95.40%	86.20%	39.66%
	0.5	1	64.75%	60.75%	95.50%	85.52%	37.30%
	0.25	1	69.00%	39.00%	94.40%	**87.11%**	36.99%
	0	1	62.50%	38.00%	93.40%	85.82%	**40.41%**
Group Avg.			**69.00%**			**62.38%**	
SFT			69.25%	35.00%	86.50%	**87.11%**	25.78%

Table 4: Ablation of reward weights α and β in Eq. (2). Here, α penalizes consistency-judgment failures, while β rewards task utility. Rows are grouped by training regimes that emphasize judgment correctness ($\alpha > \beta$), balance the two objectives ($\alpha = \beta$), or emphasize utility ($\alpha < \beta$).

Method	Robustness			Utility(Attack)	
	ASB	ASB (u)	SEP	GSM8K	AlpacaEval
Prompting as Initialization					
CoT	3.50%	2.50%	29.70%	86.88%	0.31%
CoT (Amplified)	14.25%	10.00%	91.90%	81.40%	23.33%
CoT + GRPO	63.00%	64.50%	93.20%	82.87%	34.41%
GRPO	60.50%	60.25%	93.50%	84.61%	**39.50%**
SFT Warm Start					
SFT	69.25%	35.00%	86.50%	**87.11%**	25.78%
SFT + GRPO	61.25%	**66.75%**	**96.00%**	85.22%	38.20%
Alternative Preference Optimization					
DPO	**86.00%**	36.75%	**96.00%**	82.71%	30.96%

Table 5: Comparison of training strategies in terms of robustness under attack and general utility.

Table 10 reports defense performance on misinformation scenarios built from BIPIA(Yi et al., 2025) coding-agent tasks, where misleading coding snippets are injected into Stack Overflow answer sections. CBC substantially improves defense performance over the base models and remains competitive with strong defenses. This shows that CBC can block instruction-like misinformation when misleading content induces actions inconsistent with the original task or safety constraints.

E.7 Evaluation Reliability

For adaptive attacks, we use an automated evaluator to judge whether each model response successfully resists the attack. The evaluator applies deterministic matching for exact targets such as secret-string leakage, and uses an LLM judge for semantic goals such as performing the attacker instruction or abandoning the original task. The resulting labels are used to compute ASR and DSR for the adaptive-

Aug.	Selection	Robustness			Utility(Attack)		Time Cost
		ASB	ASB(u)	SEP	GSM8K	Alpaca	
–	SFT	69.25%	35.00%	86.50%	**87.11%**	25.78%	–
No	Random	57.00%	39.00%	94.70%	86.88%	32.56%	0
Yes	$I(P) \geq 3$	**75.75%**	51.75%	95.50%	**87.11%**	**44.27%**	~72h
	$I(P) \geq 1$	61.25%	**66.75%**	**96.00%**	85.22%	38.20%	~6h

Table 6: Ablation of GRPO training data construction, examining data augmentation and filtering thresholds based on $I(P)$, the number of failed consistency judgments over 10 rollouts for prompt P. Higher values indicate better performance for all metrics except Time Cost.

Method	Utility Score	False Positive Rate (%)
Baseline	80.3	–
CBC	76.5	3.8%

Table 7: False positive rate on benign user instructions.

attack results. To validate the reliability of this automated evaluation procedure, we compare its judgments with human annotations on a sampled subset of model responses. The subset contains around 1,000 responses in total, including 500 responses from indirect prompt injection attacks and 500 responses from direct prompt injection attacks. Samples are drawn from both GCG and fuzzing attacks and are balanced across all evaluated model backbones and defense methods. All sampled responses are fully annotated by human annotators.

Annotator background. We recruit three annotators, all of whom are computer science students familiar with language model behavior and prompt injection concepts. Each annotator labels the full set of sampled responses according to the annotation instructions described below. Annotators are blind to the model identities and defense method labels, as well as to the automated evaluator's judgments. To reduce annotation burden and improve consistency, we provide a keyword-highlighting interface that helps annotators quickly locate potentially relevant response fragments; however, the final judgment is made by the annotators based on the full model response and the provided evaluation criteria.

Instructions provided to annotators. Direct prompt injection: Annotators were given a model response, the injected attack goal, and the corresponding system instruction. They were asked to determine whether the model output explicitly realized the attack goal.

- *Example:*
  - **Attack goal:** "Write an advertisement for Nike"
  - **Model response:** "I cannot do that" (no injection) or "Here's a Nike advertisement" (injection succeeded)

  If the model response was ambiguous (e.g., "Here's an Adidas ad"), annotators should carefully evaluate whether the output violated the attack instruction.



Figure 3: **Component ablation of the task-consistency definition.** Accuracy of the full consistency-definition module and variants with individual components removed. Dashed connectors indicate the accuracy drop relative to the full model.

Method	Alpaca (Clean)			Alpaca (DDoS)		
	Prompt Tok.	Output Tok.	Time (s)	Prompt Tok.	Output Tok.	Time (s)
Base	64.85	456.58	5.17	319.85	2872.89	33.83
Sandwich	76.13	400.68	4.55	331.13	2471.63	29.41
PromptArmor	167.35	458.32	6.33	658.40	2916.44	35.67
StruQ	91.10	201.53	5.26	346.10	224.53	5.97
SecAlign	44.13	419.59	4.77	299.13	2446.48	21.68
VerIH	64.85	373.29	4.24	319.85	2588.60	29.78
CBC	44.13	836.11	9.59	299.13	630.02	7.21

Table 8: Average computation cost on AlpacaEval under clean and injected prompts. The injected setting simulates a DDoS-style generation attack that induces excessive responses. We report prompt tokens, output tokens, and latency per prompt under approximately 0.5 A100 GPU utilization.

If the model response was ambiguous (e.g., "Here's an Adidas ad"), annotators should carefully evaluate whether the output violated the attack instruction.

Indirect prompt injection: Annotators evaluated two types of failure:

1. The model performed the attacker goal.
2. The model failed to perform the original task, even if the attack goal was not explicitly executed.

- *Example:* Original task: "Summarize the letter" Attack goal: "Write an advertisement for Nike" Model outputs could be "Here's a Nike ad" (attack succeeds) or "Sorry, I cannot summarize" (original task failed). Annotators marked both as attack successes.

Disagreements among annotators are resolved by majority vote.

Consistency analysis. We compare majority-vote human labels with our automated evaluator. On the indirect subset, the automated ASR is 45.2%, close to the human ASR of 43.5%, with

Table 9: Results on the task-plausible injection setting, where injected instructions appear task-consistent, such as external links that may be useful or malicious. The confirmation policy asks the user to approve external URL access before execution.

Model	Method	No policy			Confirmation policy	
		Benign task completion	Malicious attack defense	Camouflage attack defense	Malicious attack defense	Camouflage attack defense
Qwen	Base	88.9%	33.3%	2.2%	97.8%	77.5%
	Sandwich	73.3%	26.7%	11.1%	91.1%	86.7%
	PromptArmor	82.2%	44.4%	20.0%	95.6%	86.7%
	StruQ	75.6%	22.2%	17.8%	73.3%	77.8%
	SecAlign	100.0%	0%	0%	100.0%	100.0%
	VeriH	100.0%	17.8%	0%	100.0%	95.6%
	CBC	97.8%	51.1%	11.1%	95.6%	95.6%
Llama	Base	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Sandwich	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	PromptArmor	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	80.0%	93.3%
	StruQ	71.1%	8.9%	24.4%	82.2%	77.8%
	SecAlign	100.0%	0%	0%	97.8%	100.0%
	VeriH	91.1%	15.6%	11.1%	95.6%	93.3%
	CBC	100.0%	2.2%	2.2%	100%	100%



Figure 4: **DSR stability of GRPO (orange) vs. SFT (blue).** Evaluated on 50 SEP instances with 10 runs per decoding temperature. Lines show mean DSR and shaded regions indicate variance.

Table 10: **Defense performance on misinformation attack scenarios.** We report DSR (%) on Qwen and Llama. Higher is better.

Method	**DSR (Qwen)**	**DSR (Llama)**
Base	72.6	64.9
Sandwich	72.6	64.7
PromptArmor	76.7	70.5
SecAlign	**100.0**	**100.0**
VerIH	94.4	92.5
CBC (Ours)	98.5	98.6

Fleiss' κ between 0.83 and 0.86. On the direct subset, the automated ASR is 46.4%, compared with 42.3% from human annotations, with Fleiss' κ between 0.74 and 0.75. The slightly lower agreement on direct attacks reflects their greater ambiguity, but the overall consistency supports using the automated evaluator for large-scale evaluation.

Annotator compensation and ethics. The human annotation procedure was reviewed and approved by the institutional ethics board before labeling began. Annotators were informed of the task purpose, potential content, voluntary participation, and data use before annotation. Each task took approximately one hour, and annotators were compensated $60. The study involved minimal risk because annotators only reviewed model responses generated from benchmark prompts.

F Potential Risks

The methods and defenses proposed in this work do not inherently pose any harm, as they focus on improving model robustness and safe instruction following. However, the datasets used for evaluation include synthetic and real prompt injections that are deliberately malicious in nature. During testing, these prompts may elicit outputs containing unsafe, misleading, or otherwise harmful content from the evaluated language models. All experiments were conducted in controlled environments, and no such outputs were deployed or exposed to end users. Our release is intended to support defensive reproducibility, including code, models, and evaluation artifacts for assessing CBC. The adaptive attack methods used in our evaluation are established techniques rather than new attack algorithms introduced by this work, and we do not release harmful model-generated outputs from testing.

G Information About Use Of AI Assistants

We used AI assistants during research, coding, and writing. In writing, AI assistants were used to help draft and polish text based on author-provided ideas. In coding, they were used to assist with implementation and debugging. All AI-assisted outputs used in the paper and code were reviewed, verified, and finalized by the authors.

H Artifact license and intended use.

We use existing datasets and benchmarks only for research purposes and cite their original sources. Our use is consistent with their intended academic use, access conditions, and licenses. For artifacts created in this work, including derived prompts, annotations, code, and models, we specify their intended research use and release them with the corresponding license and usage terms.

I Package and implementation details.

We provide all package dependencies and versions in the released `requirements.txt` file. Unless otherwise specified, external packages are used with their default settings.