Training Language Model Agents to Find Vulnerabilities with CTF-Dojo

Terry Yue Zhuo[1,2*] **Dingmin Wang**[2] **Hantian Ding**[2] **Varun Kumar**[2] **Zijian Wang**[2]

[1] *Monash University* [2] *AWS AI Labs*

terry.zhuo@monash.edu
{wdimmy, dhantian, kuvrun, zijwan}@amazon.com

https://github.com/amazon-science/CTF-Dojo

Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional capabilities when trained within executable runtime environments, notably excelling at software engineering tasks through verified feedback loops. Yet, scalable and generalizable execution-grounded environments remain scarce, limiting progress in training more capable ML agents. We introduce CTF-DOJO, the first large-scale executable runtime tailored for training LLMs with verifiable feedback, featuring 658 fully functional Capture-The-Flag (CTF)-style challenges containerized in Docker with guaranteed reproducibility. To enable rapid scaling without manual intervention, we develop CTF-FORGE, an automated pipeline that transforms publicly available artifacts into ready-to-use execution environments in minutes, eliminating weeks of expert configuration traditionally required.

We trained LLM-based agents on just 486 high-quality, execution-verified trajectories from CTF-DOJO, achieving up to 11.6% absolute gains over strong baselines across three competitive benchmarks: *InterCode-CTF*, *NYU CTF Bench*, and *Cybench*. Our best-performing 32B model reaches 31.9% Pass@1, establishing a new open-weight state-of-the-art that rivals frontier models like DeepSeek-V3-0324 and Gemini-2.5-Flash. By framing CTF-style tasks as a benchmark for executable-agent learning, CTF-DOJO demonstrates that execution-grounded training signals are not only effective but pivotal in advancing high-performance ML agents without dependence on costly proprietary systems.

1 Introduction

Advanced cybersecurity necessitates the ongoing analysis of increasingly complex software systems. As globally connected infrastructures expand, their attack surfaces expand as well, making traditional manual security analysis insufficient for timely vulnerability identification and remediation. This urgency has spurred major research efforts, such as the DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge [37] and DARPA AIxCC [11], which focus on building autonomous systems capable of discovering and validating software flaws. In this context, Capture The Flag (CTF) competitions have emerged as the de facto benchmark for evaluating the cybersecurity reasoning abilities of machine learning models, demanding advanced, multi-step adversarial strategies to uncover system vulnerabilities and retrieve hidden flags [4, 45, 33].

Previous works have demonstrated promising results in applying large language model (LLM) agents to CTF challenges [19, 20, 5, 1], with systems like ENIGMA [1] achieving substantial progress on

*Work done during an internship at Amazon.



Figure 1: CTF-FORGE powers automated creation of configuration files from publicly sourced CTF artifacts for containerizing CTF challenges.

complex security tasks. While these approaches enable frontier proprietary models to achieve strong performance, they fail short when applied to open-source LLMs due to the lack of agentic training data. Recently, Zhuo et al. [56] shows that training on thousands of synthetic agent trajectories can close the gap between proprietary and open-source LLMs. However, synthesizing a large number of long-horizon trajectories from teacher models requires substantial computational resources, limiting generalization under budget constraints. Moreover, the validity of synthetic trajectories is hard to verify without runtime environments, limiting their reliability for training in high-stakes, safety-critical domains.

To address these limitations, we present CTF-DOJO, the first execution environment that contains hundreds of fully functional CTF challenges in secure Docker containers. CTF-DOJO leverages CTF artifacts (e.g., challenge descriptions and files to reproduce each challenge) from `pwn.college`, a public archive developed by Arizona State University for hands-on cybersecurity education, now used in 145 countries and actively maintained by a team of professors and students. However, setting up the runtime environment for CTF challenges is extremely difficult for non-professionals and can take up to an hour per task even for experienced practitioners (documented Section 2). To eliminate this bottleneck, we propose CTF-FORGE (Figure 1), an automated pipeline that leverages LLMs to create hundreds of Docker images for CTF-DOJO within minutes, achieving over 98% success rate through manual validation.

During trajectory collection from multiple LLMs within CTF-DOJO, we found that weaker models struggle to solve CTF challenges independently (detailed in Section 4.1). To improve yield rates, we collect diverse CTF writeups from CTFtime[2] and incorporated them as inference-time hints. Although we notice that only 23% of the CTF-DOJO challenges matches at least one writuep, we empirically find that such writeup content, when available, can significantly boost the success rate of LLMs up to 64% relatively gains. Notably, while building these environments, CTF-DOJO uncovered four bugs from the existing `pwn.college` collection[3].

Models trained on CTF-DOJO trajectories achieve open-weight state-of-the-art performance on over 300 tasks across three established CTF benchmarks. Through the extensive analysis, we identify three key findings for building effective cybersecurity agents: (1) writeups are crucial for training, particularly when working with data generated by weak models, (2) augmenting the runtime environment (e.g., server domains and flags) helps models yield more solved more CTF challenges, and (3) employing diverse teacher LLMs in CTF-DOJO leads to better task diversity and stronger performance. We hope our insights from the proposed CTF-DOJO can shed light on the future development of cybersecurity agents. Our work provides following contributions:

- We introduce CTF-DOJO, the first large-scale, execution-ready environment for cybersecurity agent training, offering hundreds of verified CTF challenges in isolated Docker containers.

[2] https://ctftime.org/
[3] We have filed issues in their official repository.

Table 1: CTF-DOJO is the first cybersecurity executable environment deriving agent trajectories for training. *Detection:* whether the task requires vulnerability detection; *exploitation:* whether the task needs LLMs to verify the detected vulnerabilities; *Agentic:* whether each instance is repaired with an interactive environment for exploitation; *Real Task:* whether each instance is developed by human experts.

Executable Environment	Detection	Exploitation	Agentic	Real Task	# Total	# Train
SecRepoBench [13]	✗	✗	✓	✓	318	0
CVE-Bench [41]	✗	✗	✓	✓	509	0
CVE-Bench [54]	✗	✓	✓	✓	509	0
SEC-bench [23]	✗	✓	✓	✓	1,507	0
CyberGym [42]	✗	✓	✓	✓	1,507	0
CyberSecEval 3 [40]	✓	✓	✓	✗	6	0
SecCodePLT [51]	✓	✓	✓	✗	1,345	0
InterCode-CTF [48]	✓	✓	✓	✓	100	0
NYU CTF Bench [36]	✓	✓	✓	✓	200	0
Cybench [53]	✓	✓	✓	✓	40	0
BountyBench [52]	✓	✓	✓	✓	40	0
CTF-DOJO (Ours)	✓	✓	✓	✓	658	658

- We propose CTF-FORGE, a scalable pipeline that leverages LLMs to automate the generation of Docker-based runtime environments, achieving over 98% success rate through manual validation.
- We conduct thorough analysis through extensive ablation studies, identifying key factors that influence agent performance, including the presence of hint-guided trajectory collection, runtime environment augmentation, and teacher model diversity.

2 CTF-DOJO: Environment for Building Powerful Cybersecurity Agents

CTF-DOJO is the first environment designed to synthesize verified agent trajectories for training LLMs on offensive cybersecurity tasks involving vulnerability detection and exploitation. As shown in Table 1, existing cybersecurity execution environments either lack agentic task instance or are not designed for training purposes, creating a critical gap in the development of capable security agents. Inspired by the success of trajectory-based learning in software engineering agents [21, 49], CTF-DOJO adapts this paradigm to cybersecurity by sourcing publicly available CTF artifacts and transforming them into executable and interactive environments.

Different from prior pipelines for software engineering tasks [34, 46, 50], which often require human effort or complex multi-agent systems to construct Docker environments, our approach is lightweight and fully automated. Towards that end, we introduce CTF-FORGE, a pipeline that automatically builds Docker containers for CTF-DOJO. While manual setup can take up to an hour per challenge even for experts[4], CTF-FORGE completes each container in 0.5 seconds on average, reducing weeks of total setup time to just minutes.

2.1 Source Data Collection

We begin by surveying CTF collections that offer diverse challenges from CTF competitions. During our initial exploration, we determine a few candidates: (1) Sajjadium's CTF Archives[5], (2) r3kapig's Notion[6], (3) CryptoHack CTF Archive[7], (4) archive.ooo[8], and (5) `pwn.college`'s CTF Archive[9]. However, most of these collections suffer from inconsistent maintenance, lack standardization across challenge formats, or are limited to specific categories (e.g., CryptoHack focuses solely on

[4]This has been attempted by one of the authors.
[5]https://github.com/sajjadium/ctf-archives
[6]https://r3kapig-not1on.notion.site
[7]https://cryptohack.org/challenges/ctf-archive/
[8]https://archive.ooo/
[9]https://github.com/pwncollege/ctf-archive

Table 2: Challenge distribution across CTF datasets.

Benchmark	Level	# Competition	# Crypto	# Forensics	# Pwn	# Rev	# Web	# Misc	# Total
Training									
CTF-DOJO	Multi-Level	50	228	38	163	123	21	85	658
Evaluation									
InterCode-CTF	High School	1	16	13	2	27	2	31	91
NYU CTF Bench	University	1	53	15	38	51	19	24	192
Cybench	Professional	4	16	4	2	6	8	4	40

cryptography). We determine that `pwn.college`'s CTF Archive is not only free of these issues but additionally provides brief information about the steps to reproduce each CTF challenge. Table 2 shows the distribution of 658 CTF challenges (as of 2025/07) after decontaminating any tasks from evaluation benchmarks, demonstrating the diversity of CTF instances across different categories and competition events hosted between 2011 and 2025.

CTF challenges employ two primary flag-handling mechanisms. The first type uses predefined flags, hashed with SHA-256 and verified through a provided binary executable (e.g., `flagCheck`) that confirms submission correctness. Since these flags were manually captured and encoded, they are subject to occasional errors (see 4 identified bugs in Appendix G). The second type relies on dynamic flag generation, where the correct flag is generated at runtime and stored in a system path such as `/flag`. In those challenges, participants must verify the system during execution to retrieve or compute the correct flag, rather than match against a static value.

2.2 CTF-FORGE: Automatic Environment Creation for CTF Challenges

Figure 1 illustrates CTF-FORGE, a pipeline employing DeepSeek-V3-0324 to generate environments and metadata for CTF runtime. After we source the CTF artifacts from `pwn.college`'s CTF Archive, we design a set of prompts to instruct LLMs to generate the compulsory files for Docker images in multiple stages. First, we determine whether the CTF challenge requires a containerized server to interact with. Such servers are typically needed for web challenges, binary exploitation challenges, and cryptography challenges that provide interactive services. The pipeline automatically detects server requirements by analyzing the presence of flag verification files (SHA256 checksums or check scripts) and challenge descriptions. For existing CTF runtime, we can categorize them into several challenge types: 1) Web challenges that require web servers (Apache/Nginx) to serve PHP, Python, or Node.js applications; 2) Binary exploitation challenges that need socat to host binary services on port 1337 with appropriate library dependencies; 3) Cryptography challenges that may require Python runtime environments for cryptographic services; 4) Reverse engineering challenges providing downloadable binaries and potentially analysis services; and 5) Forensics challenges offering evidence files for offline analysis. The pipeline employs category-specific guidelines and adaptive Docker setup strategies to handle different architectures (32-bit vs 64-bit), library dependencies, and runtime environments. For each challenge type, CTF-FORGE generates appropriate Dockerfiles with proper base images, package installations, file copying, and service configurations, then produces `docker-compose.yml` files for orchestration and `challenge.json` metadata files that describe the challenge structure and provide flag verification mechanisms.

2.3 Building Sustainable Environment for Cybersecurity Agents

To ensure CTF-DOJO serves as a robust foundation for long-term research on autonomous cybersecurity agents, we emphasize sustainability across two dimensions: reliability and scalability.

Reliability To ensure the reliability of the CTF environments created via CTF-FORGE, we implement an automated validation script that performs two critical checks: (1) whether the Docker containers can be successfully built and executed without errors, and (2) whether the CTF services inside the containers respond correctly to network communication on the expected ports. We run CTF-FORGE three times independently on all 658 CTF challenges to evaluate consistency and determinism. Across these runs, 98% (650) of the challenges consistently pass all checks, demonstrating high reliability of the pipeline in producing stable, executable environments for cybersecurity agents.

Additionally, we sample 10% of the built CTF tasks and manually test the executables within each runtime to verify expected behavior.

Scalability While CTF-DOJO currently contains fewer instances than existing software engineering environments that covers thousands of instances [34, 46, 50], each CTF challenge environment is uniquely designed, mimicking diverse real-world software systems rather than variations of a single codebase that is common in SWE tasks. To enhance scalability over time, CTF-DOJO builds on the actively growing CTF collections from the `pwn.college` community. As new challenges are added, CTF-FORGE can continuously and automatically convert them into interactive environments with minimal manual effort, enabling CTF-DOJO to scale organically alongside community-driven CTF development.

2.4 Training Data Construction

We introduce a data pipeline to produce a large corpus of high-quality, multi-turn interaction traces from CTF-DOJO. This process supports the development of CTF-solving agents that require diverse, realistic demonstrations of iterative security problem-solving behavior.

Agent Scaffold We build on ENIGMA+ [56], a recently introduced agent scaffold designed for scalable and consistent evaluation of agents on cybersecurity tasks. ENIGMA+ extends the original ENIGMA framework to better support cybersecurity environments by incorporating interactive tools for debugging and remote server interaction. Notably, ENIGMA+ improves evaluation efficiency by executing tasks in parallel using isolated Docker containers, reducing runtime from days to hours for large-scale experiments. It also enables the control of agent interactions based on the number of interaction steps (e.g., 40 turns) rather than monetary cost, which aligns with best practices in agent evaluation. Additionally, it replaces ENIGMA's context-heavy summarization module with with a lightweight alternative better suited for binary analysis outputs. Within this scaffold, we integrate the CTF-DOJO environment and collect agent trajectories through structured interactions.

Trajectory Collection Within the ENIGMA+ scaffold, we deploy DeepSeek-V3-0324 to attempt solving CTF challenges in CTF-DOJO with a temperature of 0.6, top-p of 0.95, and rollout count of 6. For each challenge instance, the agent is given the original task description and interactive access to the containerized environment, capped at 40 turns. We log every system command, intermediate output, and reasoning step until either the flag is captured or the turn budget is exhausted. Successful trajectories are stored in structured JSON format for downstream filtering and training. Our initial large-scale runs reveal that many trajectories stall due to brittle exploitation strategies or failure to discover the correct toolchain. While some challenges yield multiple successful runs, a large fraction remain unsolved or are solved only rarely, leading to a skewed dataset concentrated on limited tasks.

Inference-Time Bag of Tricks To increase the yield rate of successful trajectories on CTF challenges, we introduce two inference-time techniques (analyzed in Section 4). *First, we leverage publicly available CTF writeups to provide task-specific hints to LLMs*. Specifically, we collect 8,361 writeups and apply fuzzy matching to align them with challenges in CTF-DOJO. This yields 252 matched writeups, covering 150 challenges with at least one relevant writeup. During preprocessing, we redact any potential flag values from the writeups and incorporate the cleaned content into the task prompt, as the direct answers may lead to the shortcut learning [15]. We explicitly instruct the LLM to treat the writeup as a source of inspiration, using its strategies and reasoning implicitly without direct referencing. To ensure the integrity of downstream evaluation, we remove all writeup content from collected trajectories after inference. *Second, we augment the CTF runtime per agent rollout via* CTF-FORGE *by introducing randomized environment configurations*. These augmentations include varying port numbers, modifying file system paths, injecting non-functional distractor code, and adjusting system-level metadata such as timestamps and installed packages. While preserving the core logic and solvability of each challenge, these perturbations reduce overfitting to static runtime cues and encourage agents to develop more generalizable exploitation strategies. They also help mitigate persistent misconfigurations introduced by LLMs. By resetting the runtime with diverse settings, the environment is more likely to land in a valid configuration that enables flag discovery, even if previous runs failed due to deterministic setup errors. For challenges with dynamic flag generation, we re-seed the container environments at each rollout to ensure unique flag instances per interaction, further enriching training data diversity.

Data Analysis We employ two models, Qwen3-Coder [47] and DeepSeek-V3-0324 [26], to analyze the composition and characteristics of the raw 1,006 successful trajectories across multiple runs to better understand the coverage and difficulty distribution within CTF-DOJO. Figure 2 shows the category distribution across solved 274 challenges, where cryptography tasks constitute the largest portion, followed by reverse engineering, and miscellaneous categories. This distribution reflects the typical emphasis in modern CTFs on cryptographic reasoning and binary analysis. More analysis can be seen in Appendix E.



Figure 2: Breakdown of solved CTF challenges.

3 Training LLMs as Cybersecurity Agents with CTF-DOJO

With CTF-DOJO, we train cybersecurity agents with various base models. Our primary objective is to establish strong baselines and demonstrate the effectiveness of training data derived from execution. We use Pass@k [9] as our main evaluation metric. Similar to Pan et al. [34], we employ a simple policy improvement algorithm: rejection sampling fine-tuning, where we fine-tune the model on trajectories successfully capturing flags inside CTF-DOJO. In addition, we apply sample capping of 2 per solved CTF challenges to avoid bias towards easy tasks, following Pan et al. [34] and Yang et al. [50]. We finally collect 486 trajectories from the 274 CTF challenges solved by Qwen3-Coder and DeepSeek-V3-0324 (see Table 7).

3.1 Experiment Setup

Training We fine-tuned Qwen3 models at three scales: 7B, 14B, and 32B [47]. All models undergo supervised fine-tuning via NVIDIA NeMo framework [22]. Due to computational constraints, we only retain synthesized samples within 32,768 tokens, resulting in 486 trajectories. The hyperparameters are consistently set as the global batch size of 16, the learning rate of 5e-6, and the epoch of 2.

Table 3: Pass@1 performance on benchmark tasks. The improvements of **CTF-DOJO** are absolute in comparison with the Qwen3 model of corresponding sizes.

Model	Train Size	InterCode-CTF	NYU CTF	Cybench	Average
Proprietary Models					
Claude-3.7-Sonnet [4]	-	86.8	18.2	30.0	39.0
Claude-3.5-Sonnet [3]	-	85.7	16.7	25.0	37.2
Gemini-2.5-Flash [10]	-	81.3	14.1	17.5	33.4
Open Weight Models					
DeepSeek-V3-0324 [26]	-	82.5	6.2	27.5	30.3
Kimi-K2 [38]	-	72.5	4.7	15.0	25.1
Qwen3-Coder [47]	-	70.3	5.7	10.0	24.5
Qwen2.5-Coder-7B-Instruct [18]	-	34.1	2.0	0.0	10.8
Qwen2.5-Coder-14B-Instruct [18]	-	44.0	3.1	5.0	14.9
Qwen2.5-Coder-32B-Instruct [18]	-	68.1	4.7	10.0	23.2
Qwen3-8B [47]	-	46.5	0.8	5.0	14.2
Qwen3-14B [47]	-	55.0	2.6	12.5	18.6
Qwen3-32B [47]	-	60.0	4.7	5.0	20.3
Cyber-Zero-8B* [56]	9,464	64.8	6.3	10.0	23.2
Cyber-Zero-14B* [56]	9,464	73.6	9.9	20.0	29.1
Cyber-Zero-32B* [56]	9,464	82.4	13.5	17.5	33.4
CTF-DOJO-8B (Ours)	486	53.8 (7.3% ↑)	4.2 (3.4% ↑)	10.0 (5.0% ↑)	18.9 (4.7% ↑)
CTF-DOJO-14B (Ours)	486	71.4 (16.4% ↑)	5.7 (3.1% ↑)	17.5 (5.0% ↑)	25.7 (7.1% ↑)
CTF-DOJO-32B (Ours)	486	83.5 (23.5% ↑)	10.4 (5.7% ↑)	17.5 (12.5% ↑)	31.9 (11.6% ↑)

Evaluation Scaffolding We use ENIGMA+, an enhanced version of the ENIGMA scaffold with several key improvements for large-scale cybersecurity evaluation. ENIGMA+ executes evaluation tasks in parallel, significantly improving efficiency. Following Zhuo et al. [56], we cap each rollout at 40 interaction turns, replacing ENIGMA's cost-based budget [49] to ensure consistent evaluation across models. We also adopt the *Simple Summarizer* to prevent context overflows from verbose outputs like binary decompilation.

3.2 Result Analysis

We evaluate all LLMs with the Pass@1 metric, where we sample one trajectory per task and validate whether the model captures the correct flag. Table 3 presents performance comparisons between zero-shot and fine-tuned models across all benchmarks.

CTF-DOJO training enables efficient vulnerability exploitation. Our results show that CTF-DOJO-fine-tuned models achieve performance comparable to Cyber-Zero while requiring 94.9% fewer training trajectories (486 vs. 9,464). Both approaches fine-tune on Qwen3 backbones, yet CTF-DOJO relies solely on a compact set of successful CTF trajectories. For instance, CTF-DOJO-32B reaches an average Pass@1 of 31.9%, approaching Cyber-Zero-32B's 33.4%. Similarly, CTF-DOJO-14B achieves 25.7% versus 29.1% for Cyber-Zero-14B, and CTF-DOJO-8B attains 18.9% compared to Cyber-Zero-8B's 23.2%. These results highlight that CTF-DOJO offers a highly data-efficient alternative: competitive performance can be attained without massive-scale training. Notably, CTF-DOJO-trained models also begin to rival frontier systems such as Claude-3.5-Sonnet (37.2%), underscoring the practical feasibility of training capable cybersecurity agents at modest cost.

Scaling training data improves the performance linearly. Figure 3 shows the impact of increasing training trajectories on Pass@1 performance across different model sizes. All model variants (8B, 14B, 32B) demonstrate clear and consistent performance gains as training trajectories increase. Notably, the 32B model improves from 22.0% to 31.9% Pass@1 from 0 to 486 trajectories, demonstrating nearly linear performance scaling with data. This trend confirms that even modestly sized datasets can substantially enhance capability in cybersecurity tasks. Larger models not only start from higher baselines but also benefit more from additional supervision, highlighting the synergistic effect of scale and verified data in training paradigm.



Figure 3: Effect of data scaling. Models across sizes benefit from increased number of training trajectories.

4 Ablations on CTF-DOJO Data

To better understand the components contributing to CTF-DOJO's effectiveness, we conduct ablation studies across three axes: external writeups as inference-time hints, runtime augmentation during data collection, and teacher model diversity. These experiments reveal the impact of key design choices and identify practical strategies for enhancing agent performance in cybersecurity environments.

4.1 Writups as Hints

Table 4: Solved rate (%) on CTF-DOJO tasks across categories, using ENIGMA+. "–" indicates baseline without writeup hints; "+" includes writeups in the prompt.

Models	# Crypto		# Forensics		# Pwn		# Rev		# Web		# Misc		# Total	
	–	+	–	+	–	+	–	+	–	+	–	+	–	+
Proprietary Models														
Claude-3.7-Sonnet	41.2	**50.9**	42.1	**50.0**	14.7	**20.9**	41.5	**49.6**	61.9	**76.2**	47.1	**69.4**	36.2	**46.4**
Claude-3.5-Sonnet	39.9	**43.9**	39.5	**47.4**	8.0	**13.5**	39.8	**41.5**	47.6	**57.1**	45.9	**68.2**	33.0	**39.7**
Open Weight Models														
DeepSeek-V3-0324	37.1	**41.0**	41.0	**43.6**	12.0	**13.5**	34.1	**36.6**	33.3	**52.4**	36.5	**41.2**	30.4	**33.9**
Qwen3-Coder	31.4	**42.8**	35.9	**38.5**	7.9	**9.1**	26.8	**39.8**	23.8	**28.6**	24.7	**37.6**	23.9	**32.5**
Qwen3-32B	21.9	**29.4**	7.9	**18.4**	1.8	**6.7**	22.8	**28.5**	9.5	**23.5**	31.8	**41.2**	17.2	**24.3**
Qwen3-14B	14.0	**25.9**	5.3	**10.5**	1.8	**4.9**	20.3	**25.2**	9.5	**14.3**	24.7	**40.0**	12.9	**21.1**

Setup To assess the value of incorporating external CTF writeups during data collection, we conduct a controlled ablation on CTF-DOJO challenges. We compare two settings: (1) No-Hint (-), where models receive only the original challenge description, and (2) With-Hint (+), where one redacted matched writeups is randomly chosen to prepend to the prompt as a non-referential hint for the corresponding challenge. All other settings remain constant with the main experiments.

Analysis As shown in Table 4, writeup-based hints consistently improve the number of solved tasks across all models and challenge categories. On average, the number of solved challenges increases by 7.4%, from 168 (No-Hint) to 217 (With-Hint), underscoring the utility of public writeups for improving the yield rate of training trajectories. This effect is particularly pronounced in the Crypto, Reverse Engineering, and Miscellaneous categories where solution strategies often rely on reusable heuristics or canonical exploration workflows. This finding suggests that writeups can serve as a rich reservoir of domain-specific knowledge, allowing models to bootstrap strategic reasoning and explore more promising solution paths. We believe the effectiveness of inference-time hints can generalize to various agent tasks like solving GitHub issues [21], where more diverse data can be distilled from LLMs to train stronger agentic models

4.2 Augmenting CTF Runtimes

Setup To evaluate the effect of runtime augmentation on agent performance, we compare two settings for environment construction: (1) Static, where each CTF instance uses fixed runtime parameters, and (2) Augmented, where we introduce perturbations such as randomized port numbers, file path shuffling, distractor code injection, and dynamic flag regeneration. We run both Qwen3-Coder and DeepSeek-V3-0324 across 1 to 4 agent rollouts and count the number of unique CTF challenges successfully solved at least once under each setting. We keep all rollout and decoding hyperparameters identical across both variants to isolate the impact of augmentation.

Analysis Figure 4 shows that augmented environments consistently yield more solved tasks across all rollout counts and both models. For example, Qwen3-Coder solves 211 challenges under augmentation at rollout 4, a relative improvement of 24.9% compared to only 169 under static runtimes. Similarly, DeepSeek-V3-0324 improves from 156 to 217 solved tasks with augmentation at rollout 4. The performance gap widens with more rollouts, suggesting that augmentation amplifies agent exploration and generalization as more interactions are permitted. These results confirm that runtime diversity prevents brittle overfitting to environment artifacts and encourages the development of more robust, transferable strategies for flag capture.



Figure 4: Effect of runtime augmentation.

4.3 Diversifying Teacher Models

Setup To assess the benefit of using multiple teacher models during trajectory collection, we compare the individual and combined contributions of Qwen3-Coder and DeepSeek-V3-0324. We first analyze how many unique challenges each model solves and their category-level overlaps. Then, we fine-tune Qwen3 models of sizes 8B, 14B, and 32B on three trajectory subsets: (1) Qwen3-Coder only, (2) DeepSeek-V3-0324 only, and (3) both combined. We report average Pass@1 across benchmarks to evaluate downstream agent performance. Decoding parameters and training setup match those in our main experiments.

Table 5: Solved challenges.

Category	Qwen	Both	DeepSeek
Crypto	31	**84**	26
Forensics	1	**13**	3
Pwn	2	**15**	3
Rev	6	**37**	9
Web	0	**6**	2
Misc	4	**26**	6

Analysis In Table 5, Qwen3-Coder and DeepSeek-V3-0324 demonstrate complementary strengths. For example, in Crypto tasks, the models share 84 solves, but Qwen3-Coder uniquely solves 31 while DeepSeek-V3-0324 adds another 26. Similar patterns emerge across other categories, with notable non-overlapping contributions in Reverse Engineering, Misc, and Forensics. Combining both models increases total coverage to 274 unique challenges, exceeding either model alone. This diversity translates into measurable downstream gains.

Table 6: Pass@1 performance when varying teacher models.

Teacher Model	8B	14B	32B
Qwen	17.3	23.8	29.4
DeepSeek	17.6	24.8	31.3
Combined	**18.9**	**25.7**	**31.9**

Table 6 reveals that training on combined trajectories improves Pass@1 performance across all model sizes. For example, the 32B model trained on combined data achieves 31.9%, outperforming both the Qwen3-Coder-only (29.4%) and DeepSeek-only (31.3%) variants. Similarly, the 8B and 14B models also benefit from the combined setting. These results confirm that teacher diversity enriches training data and yields more capable cybersecurity agents.

5 Related Work

LLM Agents for Offensive Cybersecurity LLM agents are increasingly being applied to offensive cybersecurity, particularly in solving CTF challenges within dockerized environments [48, 36, 53, 31]. These systems often build on Kali Linux due to its extensive suite of pre-installed security tools, serving as foundations for broader applications such as penetration testing, vulnerability exploitation, and cyberattack automation [8, 12, 14]. Recent efforts have advanced agent design. Project Naptime [16] and Big Sleep [2] demonstrated agents capable of discovering new SQLite vulnerabilities using integrated tools like debuggers and browsers. EnIGMA [1] further raises the bar by combining cybersecurity-specific tools and interactive environments tailored for LLMs, achieving state-of-the-art results. Recently, Zhuo et al. [56] introduced Cyber-Zero, achieving the best performance among open-source LLMs. Unlike prior methods that primarily depend on inference-time scaffolds or unverified training data, we introduce a runtime environment that efficiently enhances model performance via execution.

Benchmarking Models' Cybersecurity Capabilities Several benchmarks have been proposed to evaluate LLMs on cybersecurity tasks. Multiple-choice datasets [24, 39, 27] offer limited insight, as their results are often highly sensitive to prompt phrasing [35, 29] and lack alignment with real-world operational contexts. AutoAdvExBench [7] assesses LLMs' ability to autonomously break image-based adversarial defenses, while CyberSecEval [6] focuses on single-turn code exploitation, capturing only a narrow slice of the interactive, multi-step nature of real-world attacks. In contrast, agent-based frameworks with integrated tool usage offer more realistic evaluations. As a result, Capture-the-Flag (CTF) challenges have become a popular proxy for measuring security capabilities. Recent systems [1, 31] further enhance realism by combining interactive environments with structured, chain-of-exploitation evaluations.

6 Conclusion and Future Work

Conclusion We present CTF-DOJO, the first large-scale execution environment for training cybersecurity LLM agents, addressing the long-standing challenge of limited runtime support in this domain. Powered by our automated pipeline CTF-FORGE, CTF-DOJO transforms public CTF artifacts into ready-to-use Docker containers in minutes, enabling scalable and reproducible trajectory collection. Training on just 486 high-quality agent trajectories synthesized through CTF-DOJO, our open-weight LLMs outperform strong baselines by up to 11.6% on three major CTF benchmarks. Our 32B model achieves state-of-the-art results among open models, approaching the performance of Claude-3.5-Sonnet. Our findings highlight the critical role of writeup-augmented training, runtime augmentations, and diverse agent behaviors in building effective cybersecurity models. Overall, CTF-DOJO provides a scalable foundation for advancing LLM-based security systems.

Future Work Wile CTF-DOJO enables training with execution-verified data, it remains constrained by the static nature and finite scale of its current dataset (658 challenges). Exploring reinforcement learning for cybersecurity agents would be a natural next step, where models interact with live environments and receive structured feedback, such as partial rewards or flag-based signals. This paradigm could unlock significantly higher data efficiency and adaptability, enabling agents to learn more generalizable strategies beyond imitation and better handle novel CTF problems.

References

[1] Talor Abramovich, Meet Udeshi, Minghao Shao, Kilian Lieret, Haoran Xi, Kimberly Milner, Sofija Jancheska, John Yang, Carlos E Jimenez, Farshad Khorrami, et al. Enigma: Interactive tools substantially assist lm agents in finding security vulnerabilities. In *Forty-second International Conference on Machine Learning*, 2025.

[2] Miltiadis Allamanis, Martin Arjovsky, Charles Blundell, Lars Buesing, Maddie Brand, Sergei Glazunov, David Maier, Petros Maniatis, Guilherme Marinho, Henryk Michalewski, Koushik Sen, Charles Sutton, Varun Tulsyan, Matteo Vanotti, Thomas Weber, and Dawn Zheng. From naptime to big sleep: Using large language models to catch vulnerabilities in real-world code. https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2024/10/from-naptime-to-big-sleep.html, November 2024. Accessed July 2025.

[3] Anthropic. Claude 3.5 Model Card Addendum. https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/fed9cc193a14b84131812372d8d5857f8f304c52/Model_Card_Claude_3_Addendum.pdf, 2024. Accessed: 2025-07-03.

[4] Anthropic. Claude 3.7 "Sonnet" System Card. https://assets.anthropic.com/m/785e231869ea8b3b/original/claude-3-7-sonnet-system-card.pdf, 2025. Accessed: 2025-07-03.

[5] Anthropic. System Card: Claude Opus 4 & Claude Sonnet 4. Technical report, Anthropic, May 2025. Accessed: 2025-07-03.

[6] Manish Bhatt, Sahana Chennabasappa, Cyrus Nikolaidis, Shengye Wan, Ivan Evtimov, Dominik Gabi, Daniel Song, Faizan Ahmad, Cornelius Aschermann, Lorenzo Fontana, et al. Purple llama cyberseceval: A secure coding benchmark for language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2312.04724*, 2023.

[7] Nicholas Carlini, Javier Rando, Edoardo Debenedetti, Milad Nasr, and Florian Tramèr. Autoadvexbench: Benchmarking autonomous exploitation of adversarial example defenses. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.01811*, 2025.

[8] PV Charan, Hrushikesh Chunduri, P Mohan Anand, and Sandeep K Shukla. From text to mitre techniques: Exploring the malicious use of large language models for generating cyber attack payloads. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.15336*, 2023.

[9] Mark Chen, Jerry Tworek, Heewoo Jun, Qiming Yuan, Henrique Ponde De Oliveira Pinto, Jared Kaplan, Harri Edwards, Yuri Burda, Nicholas Joseph, Greg Brockman, et al. Evaluating large language models trained on code. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2107.03374*, 2021.

[10] Gheorghe Comanici, Eric Bieber, Mike Schaekermann, Ice Pasupat, Noveen Sachdeva, Inderjit Dhillon, Marcel Blistein, Ori Ram, Dan Zhang, Evan Rosen, et al. Gemini 2.5: Pushing the frontier with advanced reasoning, multimodality, long context, and next generation agentic capabilities. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2507.06261*, 2025.

[11] DARPA. DARPA AIxCC, 2024. https://aicyberchallenge.com/about/, 2024. Accessed: 2025-07-03.

[12] Gelei Deng, Yi Liu, Víctor Mayoral-Vilches, Peng Liu, Yuekang Li, Yuan Xu, Tianwei Zhang, Yang Liu, Martin Pinzger, and Stefan Rass. {PentestGPT}: Evaluating and harnessing large language models for automated penetration testing. In *33rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 24)*, pp. 847–864, 2024.

[13] Connor Dilgren, Purva Chiniya, Luke Griffith, Yu Ding, and Yizheng Chen. Secrepobench: Benchmarking llms for secure code generation in real-world repositories. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2504.21205*, 2025.

[14] Richard Fang, Rohan Bindu, Akul Gupta, Qiusi Zhan, and Daniel Kang. Llm agents can autonomously hack websites. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.06664*, 2024.

[15] Robert Geirhos, Jörn-Henrik Jacobsen, Claudio Michaelis, Richard Zemel, Wieland Brendel, Matthias Bethge, and Felix A Wichmann. Shortcut learning in deep neural networks. *Nature Machine Intelligence*, 2(11):665–673, 2020.

[16] Sergei Glazunov and Maddie Brand. Project naptime: Evaluating offensive security capabilities of large language models. https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2024/06/project-naptime.html, June 2024. Accessed July 2025.

[17] Aaron Grattafiori, Abhimanyu Dubey, Abhinav Jauhri, Abhinav Pandey, Abhishek Kadian, Ahmad Al-Dahle, Aiesha Letman, Akhil Mathur, Alan Schelten, Alex Vaughan, et al. The llama 3 herd of models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.21783*, 2024.

[18] Binyuan Hui, Jian Yang, Zeyu Cui, Jiaxi Yang, Dayiheng Liu, Lei Zhang, Tianyu Liu, Jiajun Zhang, Bowen Yu, Keming Lu, et al. Qwen2. 5-coder technical report. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2409.12186*, 2024.

[19] Aaron Hurst, Adam Lerer, Adam P Goucher, Adam Perelman, Aditya Ramesh, Aidan Clark, AJ Ostrow, Akila Welihinda, Alan Hayes, Alec Radford, et al. Gpt-4o system card. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.21276*, 2024.

[20] Aaron Jaech, Adam Kalai, Adam Lerer, Adam Richardson, Ahmed El-Kishky, Aiden Low, Alec Helyar, Aleksander Madry, Alex Beutel, Alex Carney, et al. Openai o1 system card. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.16720*, 2024.

[21] Carlos E Jimenez, John Yang, Alexander Wettig, Shunyu Yao, Kexin Pei, Ofir Press, and Karthik R Narasimhan. Swe-bench: Can language models resolve real-world github issues? In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2024.

[22] Oleksii Kuchaiev, Jason Li, Huyen Nguyen, Oleksii Hrinchuk, Ryan Leary, Boris Ginsburg, Samuel Kriman, Stanislav Beliaev, Vitaly Lavrukhin, Jack Cook, et al. Nemo: a toolkit for building ai applications using neural modules. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.09577*, 2019.

[23] Hwiwon Lee, Ziqi Zhang, Hanxiao Lu, and Lingming Zhang. Sec-bench: Automated benchmarking of llm agents on real-world software security tasks. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2506.11791*, 2025.

[24] Nathaniel Li, Alexander Pan, Anjali Gopal, Summer Yue, Daniel Berrios, Alice Gatti, Justin D Li, Ann-Kathrin Dombrowski, Shashwat Goel, Gabriel Mukobi, et al. The wmdp benchmark: measuring and reducing malicious use with unlearning. In *Proceedings of the 41st International Conference on Machine Learning*, pp. 28525–28550, 2024.

[25] Raymond Li, Loubna Ben Allal, Yangtian Zi, Niklas Muennighoff, Denis Kocetkov, Chenghao Mou, Marc Marone, Christopher Akiki, Jia Li, Jenny Chim, et al. Starcoder: may the source be with you! *arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.06161*, 2023.

[26] Aixin Liu, Bei Feng, Bing Xue, Bingxuan Wang, Bochao Wu, Chengda Lu, Chenggang Zhao, Chengqi Deng, Chenyu Zhang, Chong Ruan, et al. Deepseek-v3 technical report. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.19437*, 2024.

[27] Zefang Liu. Secqa: A concise question-answering dataset for evaluating large language models in computer security. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2312.15838*, 2023.

[28] Anton Lozhkov, Raymond Li, Loubna Ben Allal, Federico Cassano, Joel Lamy-Poirier, Nouamane Tazi, Ao Tang, Dmytro Pykhtar, Jiawei Liu, Yuxiang Wei, et al. Starcoder 2 and the stack v2: The next generation. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.19173*, 2024.

[29] Jakub Łucki, Boyi Wei, Yangsibo Huang, Peter Henderson, Florian Tramèr, and Javier Rando. An adversarial perspective on machine unlearning for ai safety. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2409.18025*, 2024.

[30] Yingwei Ma, Rongyu Cao, Yongchang Cao, Yue Zhang, Jue Chen, Yibo Liu, Yuchen Liu, Binhua Li, Fei Huang, and Yongbin Li. Lingma swe-gpt: An open development-process-centric language model for automated software improvement. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.00622*, 2024.

[31] Víctor Mayoral-Vilches, Luis Javier Navarrete-Lozano, María Sanz-Gómez, Lidia Salas Espejo, Martiño Crespo-Álvarez, Francisco Oca-Gonzalez, Francesco Balassone, Alfonso Glera-Picón, Unai Ayucar-Carbajo, Jon Ander Ruiz-Alcalde, et al. Cai: An open, bug bounty-ready cybersecurity ai. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2504.06017*, 2025.

[32] Niklas Muennighoff, Qian Liu, Armel Randy Zebaze, Qinkai Zheng, Binyuan Hui, Terry Yue Zhuo, Swayam Singh, Xiangru Tang, Leandro Von Werra, and Shayne Longpre. Octopack: Instruction tuning code large language models. In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2024.

[33] OWASP GenAI Project (CTI Layer Team). OWASP LLM Exploit Generation Version 1.0. Technical report, OWASP GenAI Project, February 2025. Accessed: 3 July 2025.

[34] Jiayi Pan, Xingyao Wang, Graham Neubig, Navdeep Jaitly, Heng Ji, Alane Suhr, and Yizhe Zhang. Training software engineering agents and verifiers with swe-gym. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.21139*, 2024.

[35] Xiangyu Qi, Boyi Wei, Nicholas Carlini, Yangsibo Huang, Tinghao Xie, Luxi He, Matthew Jagielski, Milad Nasr, Prateek Mittal, and Peter Henderson. On evaluating the durability of safeguards for open-weight llms. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.07097*, 2024.

[36] Minghao Shao, Sofija Jancheska, Meet Udeshi, Brendan Dolan-Gavitt, Kimberly Milner, Boyuan Chen, Max Yin, Siddharth Garg, Prashanth Krishnamurthy, Farshad Khorrami, et al. Nyu ctf bench: A scalable open-source benchmark dataset for evaluating llms in offensive security. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 37:57472–57498, 2024.

[37] Jia Song and Jim Alves-Foss. The darpa cyber grand challenge: A competitor's perspective. *IEEE Security & Privacy*, 13(6):72–76, 2015.

[38] Kimi Team, Yifan Bai, Yiping Bao, Guanduo Chen, Jiahao Chen, Ningxin Chen, Ruijue Chen, Yanru Chen, Yuankun Chen, Yutian Chen, et al. Kimi k2: Open agentic intelligence. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2507.20534*, 2025.

[39] Norbert Tihanyi, Mohamed Amine Ferrag, Ridhi Jain, Tamas Bisztray, and Merouane Debbah. Cybermetric: a benchmark dataset based on retrieval-augmented generation for evaluating llms in cybersecurity knowledge. In *2024 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR)*, pp. 296–302. IEEE, 2024.

[40] Shengye Wan, Cyrus Nikolaidis, Daniel Song, David Molnar, James Crnkovich, Jayson Grace, Manish Bhatt, Sahana Chennabasappa, Spencer Whitman, Stephanie Ding, et al. Cyberseceval 3: Advancing the evaluation of cybersecurity risks and capabilities in large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.01605*, 2024.

[41] Peiran Wang, Xiaogeng Liu, and Chaowei Xiao. Cve-bench: Benchmarking llm-based software engineering agent's ability to repair real-world cve vulnerabilities. In *Proceedings of the 2025 Conference of the Nations of the Americas Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pp. 4207–4224, 2025.

[42] Zhun Wang, Tianneng Shi, Jingxuan He, Matthew Cai, Jialin Zhang, and Dawn Song. Cybergym: Evaluating ai agents' cybersecurity capabilities with real-world vulnerabilities at scale. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2506.02548*, 2025.

[43] Yuxiang Wei, Zhe Wang, Jiawei Liu, Yifeng Ding, and Lingming Zhang. Magicoder: Empowering code generation with oss-instruct. In *International Conference on Machine Learning*, pp. 52632–52657. PMLR, 2024.

[44] Yuxiang Wei, Olivier Duchenne, Jade Copet, Quentin Carbonneaux, Lingming Zhang, Daniel Fried, Gabriel Synnaeve, Rishabh Singh, and Sida I Wang. Swe-rl: Advancing llm reasoning via reinforcement learning on open software evolution. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.18449*, 2025.

[45] xAI. xAI Risk Management Framework (Draft). Technical report, xAI, February 2025. Draft version — accessed 3 July 2025.

[46] Chengxing Xie, Bowen Li, Chang Gao, He Du, Wai Lam, Difan Zou, and Kai Chen. Swe-fixer: Training open-source llms for effective and efficient github issue resolution. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2501.05040*, 2025.

[47] An Yang, Anfeng Li, Baosong Yang, Beichen Zhang, Binyuan Hui, Bo Zheng, Bowen Yu, Chang Gao, Chengen Huang, Chenxu Lv, et al. Qwen3 technical report. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.09388*, 2025.

[48] John Yang, Akshara Prabhakar, Karthik Narasimhan, and Shunyu Yao. Intercode: Standardizing and benchmarking interactive coding with execution feedback. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 36:23826–23854, 2023.

[49] John Yang, Carlos E Jimenez, Alexander Wettig, Kilian Lieret, Shunyu Yao, Karthik Narasimhan, and Ofir Press. Swe-agent: Agent-computer interfaces enable automated software engineering. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 37:50528–50652, 2024.

[50] John Yang, Kilian Leret, Carlos E Jimenez, Alexander Wettig, Kabir Khandpur, Yanzhe Zhang, Binyuan Hui, Ofir Press, Ludwig Schmidt, and Diyi Yang. Swe-smith: Scaling data for software engineering agents. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2504.21798*, 2025.

[51] Yu Yang, Yuzhou Nie, Zhun Wang, Yuheng Tang, Wenbo Guo, Bo Li, and Dawn Song. Seccodeplt: A unified platform for evaluating the security of code genai. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.11096*, 2024.

[52] Andy K Zhang, Joey Ji, Celeste Menders, Riya Dulepet, Thomas Qin, Ron Y Wang, Junrong Wu, Kyleen Liao, Jiliang Li, Jinghan Hu, et al. Bountybench: Dollar impact of ai agent attackers and defenders on real-world cybersecurity systems. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.15216*, 2025.

[53] Andy K Zhang, Neil Perry, Riya Dulepet, Joey Ji, Celeste Menders, Justin W Lin, Eliot Jones, Gashon Hussein, Samantha Liu, Donovan Julian Jasper, Pura Peetathawatchai, Ari Glenn, Vikram Sivashankar, Daniel Zamoshchin, Leo Glikbarg, Derek Askaryar, Haoxiang Yang, Aolin Zhang, Rishi Alluri, Nathan Tran, Rinnara Sangpisit, Kenny O Oseleononmen, Dan Boneh, Daniel E. Ho, and Percy Liang. Cybench: A framework for evaluating cybersecurity capabilities and risks of language models. In *The Thirteenth International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2025. URL https://openreview.net/forum?id=tc90LV0yRL.

[54] Yuxuan Zhu, Antony Kellermann, Dylan Bowman, Philip Li, Akul Gupta, Adarsh Danda, Richard Fang, Conner Jensen, Eric Ihli, Jason Benn, et al. Cve-bench: A benchmark for ai agents' ability to exploit real-world web application vulnerabilities. In *Forty-second International Conference on Machine Learning*, 2025.

[55] Terry Yue Zhuo, Armel Zebaze, Nitchakarn Suppattarachai, Leandro von Werra, Harm de Vries, Qian Liu, and Niklas Muennighoff. Astraios: Parameter-efficient instruction tuning code large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.00788*, 2024.

[56] Terry Yue Zhuo, Dingmin Wang, Hantian Ding, Varun Kumar, and Zijian Wang. Cyber-zero: Training cybersecurity agents without runtime. *arXiv preprint*, 2025.

Appendix

Contents

A Statistics **15**

B CTF-DOJO CTF Challenges **16**

C Scaffolding Interface **34**

D Related Work on Training LLM Agents to Code **35**

E More Data Analysis **36**

F Prompt Design of CTF-FORGE **36**

F.1 Dockerfile Generation 36

F.2 Docker-Compose Generation 38

F.3 Challenge.json Generation 38

G Finding Bugs in CTF-DOJO **39**

G.1 ECTF 2014 — Lowkey (Filed Issue) 39

G.2 ångstromCTF 2019 — Blank Paper (Filed Issue) 39

G.3 HSCTF 2019 — Hidden Flag (Filed Issue) 40

G.4 Access Denied CTF 2022 — Binary (Filed Issue) 40

A Statistics

We provide a summary of the important statistics mentioned in the paper.

Table 7: Summary of data statistics.

Item Description	**Count**
CTF-DOJO *Challenges*	
Number of available CTF challenges	658
Number of challenges with stable and reproducible environments, as confirmed by the original authors	650
Writeups for CTF Challenges	
Total number of writeups collected from the CTFtime website	8,361
Writeups successfully matched to CTF-DOJO challenges using competition and task metadata	252
CTF-DOJO challenges for which at least one corresponding writeup is available	150
Successful Agent Samples	
Raw agent trajectories collected before cleaning or filtering	1,006
Unique trajectories remaining after removing duplicates and limiting the maximum number per challenge	486
CTF-DOJO challenges that include at least one valid and successful trajectory	274

B CTF-DOJO CTF Challenges

Competition	Challenge	Category	Qwen	DeepSeek
0CTF - 2017	babyheap	Pwn	✓	✗
	diethard	Pwn	✓	✗
	easiestprintf	Pwn	✗	✗
0CTF - 2018	babyheap2018	Pwn	✗	✓
	blackhole	Pwn	✗	✓
	freenote2018	Pwn	✗	✗
	heapstorm	Pwn	✗	✗
	subtraction	Misc	✓	✗
	zerofs	Pwn	✗	✗
0CTF - 2019	babyaegis	Pwn	✗	✓
	babyheap	Pwn	✓	✓
	babyrsa	Crypto	✓	✗
	babysandbox	Pwn	✗	✗
	elements	Rev	✓	✗
	flropyd	Pwn	✗	✗
	plang	Pwn	✗	✗
	sanitize	Misc	✓	✗
	scanner	Pwn	✗	✗
	zerotask	Pwn	✗	✗
0CTF Quals - 2021	cloudpass	Crypto	✓	✗
	future	Rev	✓	✗
	listbook	Pwn	✓	✓
	vp	Rev	✓	✗
	zer0lfsr	Crypto	✓	✗

Continued on next page

Table 8 – *Continued from previous page*

Competition	Challenge	Category	Qwen	DeepSeek
0xCTF - 4141	client	Rev	✓	✗
	eazyrsa	Crypto	✓	✗
	external	Pwn	✓	✓
	factorize	Crypto	✓	✗
	filereader	Misc	✓	✗
	hash	Rev	✓	✗
	moving-signals	Pwn	✓	✓
	pyjail	Misc	✓	✗
	ret-of-the-rops	Pwn	✗	✗
	shjail	Misc	✗	✗
	soul	Crypto	✓	✗
	staple-aes	Crypto	✗	✗
	the-pwn-inn	Pwn	✗	✗
	wallet	Crypto	✗	✗
	ware	Rev	✗	✗
	wrongdownload	Rev	✗	✗
	x-and-or	Rev	✗	✗
29c3CTF - 2012	findthekey	Rev	✓	✗
	maya	Rev	✗	✓
	memcached	Pwn	✓	✓
	minesweeper	Pwn	✓	✓
	proxy	Pwn	✗	✗
	ru1337	Pwn	✗	✗
	updateserver	Pwn	✗	✗
AccessdeniedCTF - 2022	babyc	Misc	✗	✓
	binary	Rev	✗	✓
	ecc	Crypto	✓	✗
	enormous	Rev	✗	✓
	llvm	Rev	✗	✗
	merklegoodman	Crypto	✓	✗
	mitm2	Crypto	✓	✗
	ret2system	Pwn	✓	✓
	rsa1	Crypto	✗	✗
	rsa2	Crypto	✗	✗
	rsa3	Crypto	✗	✗
	smallkey	Crypto	✗	✗

Continued on next page

Table 8 – *Continued from previous page*

Competition	Challenge	Category	Qwen	DeepSeek
AngstromCTF - 2016	amoebananas	Web	✗	✓
	artifact	Crypto	✓	✗
	asmtracing	Rev	✗	✓
	casino	Crypto	✓	✗
	cipher	Rev	✗	✓
	ciphertwo	Rev	✗	✗
	client	Web	✗	✓
	drag	Misc	✗	✓
	endian	Pwn	✓	✓
	fender	Forensics	✓	✗
	flaglock	Misc	✗	✓
	formatone	Pwn	✓	✓
	hamlet	Crypto	✓	✗
	headsup	Forensics	✗	✓
	helpcenter	Crypto	✗	✗
	hex	Crypto	✗	✗
	imageencryptor	Rev	✗	✗
	javabest	Rev	✗	✗
	metasploit	Forensics	✗	✗
	music	Forensics	✗	✗
	oops	Forensics	✗	✗
	recovery	Forensics	✗	✗
	rsa	Crypto	✗	✗
	spqr	Crypto	✗	✗
	yankovic	Forensics	✗	✗
AngstromCTF - 2017	begin	Crypto	✓	✗
	casino	Crypto	✓	✗
	knockknock	Crypto	✓	✗
	obligatory	Web	✓	✓
	royalcasino	Crypto	✗	✗
	substitutioncipher	Crypto	✗	✗

Continued on next page

Table 8 – *Continued from previous page*

Competition	Challenge	Category	Qwen	DeepSeek
AngstromCTF - 2018	accumulator	Pwn	✓	✓
	backtobasics	Crypto	✓	✗
	bankroppery	Pwn	✓	✓
	introtorsa	Crypto	✓	✗
	productkey	Rev	✗	✓
	rev1	Rev	✗	✓
	rev2	Rev	✗	✗
	rev3	Rev	✗	✗
	waldo2	Misc	✗	✓
	warmup	Misc	✗	✓
	washington	Rev	✗	✗
	weirdmessage	Misc	✗	✗
	xor	Crypto	✓	✗
AngstromCTF - 2019	blankpaper	Misc	✗	✓
	chainofrope	Pwn	✓	✓
	highqualitychecks	Rev	✗	✓
	icthyo	Rev	✗	✓
	like	Rev	✗	✗
	lithp	Misc	✓	✓
	onebite	Rev	✗	✗
	overmybrain	Pwn	✓	✓
	paperbin	Misc	✗	✗
	reallysecurealgorithm	Crypto	✓	✗
	runes	Crypto	✓	✗
AngstromCTF - 2022	amongus	Misc	✓	✓
	caesaranddesister	Crypto	✓	✗
	dyn	Rev	✓	✓
	numbergame	Rev	✓	✓
	randomlysampledalgorithm	Crypto	✓	✗
	reallyobnoxiousproblem	Pwn	✓	✓
	shark1	Misc	✓	✓
	uninspired	Rev	✗	✗
	wah	Pwn	✓	✓
	whatsmyname	Pwn	✗	✗

Continued on next page

Table 8 – *Continued from previous page*

Competition	Challenge	Category	Qwen	DeepSeek
AngstromCTF - 2024	awman	Crypto	✓	✗
	bap	Pwn	✗	✗
	exam	Pwn	✗	✗
	heapify	Pwn	✗	✗
	layers	Misc	✓	✓
	leftright	Pwn	✗	✗
	og	Pwn	✗	✗
	philosophy	Crypto	✓	✗
	presidential	Pwn	✗	✗
	simonsays	Crypto	✓	✗
	snowman	Misc	✓	✓
	stacksort	Pwn	✗	✗
	themectl	Pwn	✗	✗
	tss1	Crypto	✗	✗
	tss2	Crypto	✗	✗
AsisCTF - 2013	dice	Rev	✓	✓
	encoding	Crypto	✓	✗
	inaccessible	Forensics	✗	✓
	licensekey	Rev	✓	✓
	memdump	Forensics	✗	✓
	pcaps	Crypto	✓	✗
	rsang	Crypto	✓	✗
	serialnumber	Rev	✗	✗
	simpleofficer	Crypto	✗	✗
AsisCTF - 2014	blocks	Forensics	✓	✓
	randomimage	Crypto	✓	✗
BackdoorCTF - 2019	babyheapbackdoorctf	Pwn	✗	✗
	babytcache	Pwn	✗	✗
	echo	Pwn	✗	✗
	forgot	Pwn	✗	✗
	matrix	Pwn	✗	✗
	miscpwn	Pwn	✗	✗
	rsanne	Crypto	✓	✗
	team	Pwn	✗	✗

Continued on next page

Table 8 – *Continued from previous page*

Competition	Challenge	Category	Qwen	DeepSeek
ByuCTF - 2022	ballgame	Crypto	✓	✗
	basicrev	Rev	✓	✓
	blue	Forensics	✓	✓
	chicken	Rev	✓	✓
	funfact	Rev	✗	✗
	murdermystery	Misc	✓	✓
	qool	Forensics	✓	✓
	shift	Crypto	✗	✓
	stickykey	Forensics	✗	✗
	truth	Crypto	✗	✓
	xqr	Crypto	✗	✗
ByuCTF - 2023	crcconfusion	Forensics	✓	✓
	hexadecalingo	Misc	✓	✓
	misc006-1	Misc	✓	✓
	misc006-2	Misc	✗	✗
	poem	Crypto	✗	✓
	pwn2038	Pwn	✗	✗
	rsa1	Crypto	✗	✓
	rsa2	Crypto	✗	✓
	rsa3	Crypto	✗	✗
	rsa4	Crypto	✗	✗
	rsa5	Crypto	✗	✗
	xkcd2637	Misc	✗	✗
ByuCTF - 2024	aresa	Crypto	✗	✓
	domath	Crypto	✗	✓
	giveup	Crypto	✗	✓
	gotmail	Misc	✓	✓
	meetgreg	Misc	✓	✓
	multiplied	Crypto	✗	✗
	petrolhead	Misc	✗	✗
	typosquatting	Misc	✗	✗
	vacationboats	Misc	✗	✗
	wateryoudoing	Misc	✗	✗
	worstchallenge	Forensics	✓	✓
CactusconCTF - 2025	clueless	Misc	✓	✓
	frng	Misc	✓	✓
	numbersleuthv1	Misc	✗	✗
	numbersleuthv2	Misc	✗	✗
	numbersleuthv3	Misc	✗	✗
	securerepititions	Misc	✗	✗

Continued on next page

Table 8 – *Continued from previous page*

Competition	Challenge	Category	Qwen	DeepSeek
CcscCTF - 2020	basilisk64	Crypto	✗	✓
	echoes	Misc	✓	✓
	guy	Pwn	✗	✗
	mouse	Crypto	✗	✓
	routes	Crypto	✗	✓
	spell	Pwn	✗	✗
Codegate - 2011	binary100	Pwn	✗	✗
	binary200	Pwn	✗	✗
	binary300	Pwn	✗	✗
	binary400	Pwn	✗	✗
	binary500	Pwn	✗	✗
	crypto200	Crypto	✗	✓
	crypto300	Crypto	✗	✓
	crypto400	Crypto	✗	✓
	crypto500	Crypto	✗	✗
	forensics200	Forensics	✓	✓
	forensics300	Forensics	✓	✓
	forensics400	Forensics	✗	✗
	network100	Web	✓	✓
CodegateCTF - 2012	bin100	Pwn	✗	✗
	bin200	Pwn	✗	✗
	bin300	Pwn	✗	✗
	bin400	Pwn	✗	✗
	bin500	Pwn	✗	✗
	forensics100	Forensics	✓	✓
	forensics200	Forensics	✓	✓
	forensics300	Forensics	✗	✗
	forensics400	Misc	✓	✓
	vuln500	Pwn	✗	✗
CodegateCTF - 2013	vuln100	Pwn	✗	✗
Codegateprelims - 2014	4stone	Pwn	✗	✗
	angrydoraemon	Pwn	✗	✗
	automata	Rev	✓	✓
	chronological	Misc	✓	✓
	crackme	Rev	✓	✓
	dodosandbox	Pwn	✗	✗
	hypercat	Pwn	✗	✗
	minibomb	Pwn	✗	✗
	weirdsnus	Pwn	✗	✗

Continued on next page

Table 8 – *Continued from previous page*

Competition	Challenge	Category	Qwen	DeepSeek
CorCTF - 2021	babyrand	Crypto	✗	✓
	babyrev	Rev	✓	✓
	bank	Crypto	✗	✓
	chainblock	Pwn	✗	✗
	chance	Crypto	✗	✓
	cshell	Pwn	✗	✗
	fibinary	Crypto	✗	✗
	fourninesix	Crypto	✗	✗
	friedrice	Crypto	✗	✗
	lcg	Crypto	✗	✗
	vmquack	Rev	✓	✓
CorCTF - 2022	babypad	Misc	✓	✓
	bogus	Rev	✓	✓
	edgelord	Rev	✓	✓
	exchanged	Crypto	✗	✓
	msfrob	Rev	✗	✗
	turbocrab	Rev	✗	✗
	vmquacksrevenge	Rev	✗	✗
CryptoCTF - 2020	amsterdam	Crypto	✗	✓
	complextohell	Crypto	✗	✓
	fatima	Crypto	✗	✓
	onelinecrypto	Crypto	✗	✗
	threeravens	Crypto	✗	✗
	trailingbits	Crypto	✗	✗
CryptoCTF - 2021	dorsa	Crypto	✗	✓
	ecchimera	Crypto	✗	✓
	elegant	Crypto	✗	✓
	farm	Crypto	✗	✗
	frozen	Crypto	✗	✗
	hamul	Crypto	✗	✗
	hypernormal	Crypto	✗	✗
	improved	Crypto	✗	✗
	lower	Crypto	✗	✗
	rima	Crypto	✗	✗
	tinyecc	Crypto	✗	✗
	triplet	Crypto	✗	✗
	trunc	Crypto	✗	✗
	wolf	Crypto	✗	✗

Continued on next page

Table 8 – *Continued from previous page*

Competition	Challenge	Category	Qwen	DeepSeek
CryptoverseCTF - 2022	bigrabin	Crypto	✗	✓
	dlog	Crypto	✗	✓
	rsa2	Crypto	✓	✓
	rsa3	Crypto	✗	✗
	tale	Crypto	✗	✗
	worldcup	Rev	✓	✓
CryptoverseCTF - 2023	acceptance	Pwn	✗	✗
	babyaes	Crypto	✓	✓
	backpack	Crypto	✓	✓
	fractionalflag	Crypto	✓	✓
	lsfr	Crypto	✗	✗
	microassembly	Rev	✓	✓
	picochip1	Crypto	✗	✗
	picochip2	Crypto	✗	✗
	retschool	Pwn	✗	✗
	simplecheckin	Rev	✓	✓
	standardvm	Rev	✗	✗
Csaw - 2017	almostxor	Crypto	✓	✓
	auir	Pwn	✗	✗
	babycrypt	Crypto	✓	✓
	bananascript	Rev	✓	✓
	cvv	Pwn	✗	✗
	grumpcheck	Rev	✓	✓
	minesweeper	Pwn	✗	✗
	prophecy	Rev	✗	✗
	scv	Pwn	✗	✗
	serial	Misc	✓	✓
	tablez	Rev	✗	✗
	twitchplayspwnable	Misc	✓	✓
	zone	Pwn	✗	✗

Continued on next page

Table 8 – *Continued from previous page*

Competition	Challenge	Category	Qwen	DeepSeek
CsawCTF - 2011	crypto1	Crypto	✓	✓
	crypto10	Crypto	✓	✓
	crypto2	Crypto	✓	✓
	crypto3	Crypto	✗	✗
	crypto4	Crypto	✗	✗
	crypto5	Crypto	✗	✗
	crypto6	Crypto	✗	✗
	crypto7	Crypto	✗	✗
	crypto8	Crypto	✗	✗
	crypto9	Crypto	✗	✗
	evilburritos2	Web	✓	✓
	hardware	Web	✓	✓
	linux	Rev	✓	✓
	loveletter	Web	✗	✗
	net1	Rev	✓	✓
	net200	Web	✗	✗
	networking101	Web	✗	✗
CsawCTF - 2012	exploit200	Pwn	✗	✗
	exploit400	Pwn	✗	✗
	exploit500	Pwn	✗	✗
	networking100	Web	✓	✓
	networking200	Web	✓	✓
	networking300	Web	✗	✗
	networking400	Web	✗	✗
	rev400	Rev	✓	✓
CsawCTF - 2014	aerosol	Rev	✓	✓
	bigdata	Web	✗	✗
	bo	Pwn	✗	✗
	cfbsum	Crypto	✓	✓
	eggshells	Rev	✓	✓
	feal	Crypto	✓	✓
	ish	Pwn	✗	✗
	obscurity	Forensics	✓	✓
	s3	Pwn	✗	✗
	saturn	Pwn	✗	✗
CsawCTF Quals - 2020	applicative	Pwn	✗	✗
CsawCTF Quals - 2021	alienmath	Pwn	✗	✗
	contactus	Forensics	✓	✓
	forgery	Crypto	✓	✓
	sonicgraphy	Forensics	✓	✓

Continued on next page

Table 8 – *Continued from previous page*

Competition	Challenge	Category	Qwen	DeepSeek
CsawCTF Quals - 2024	aes	Crypto	✓	✓
	chinesefood	Misc	✓	✓
	covert	Forensics	✓	✓
	diffusion	Crypto	✓	✓
	golf	Pwn	✗	✗
	nix	Pwn	✗	✗
	rickshaw	Misc	✓	✓
	trapdoor	Crypto	✓	✓
DownunderCTF - 2020	1337crypt	Crypto	✓	✓
	babyrsa	Crypto	✓	✓
	calcgame	Crypto	✓	✓
	ceebc	Crypto	✗	✗
	echos	Crypto	✗	✗
	extracoolblockchaining	Crypto	✗	✗
	formatting	Rev	✓	✓
	hexshiftcipher	Crypto	✗	✗
	impeccable	Crypto	✗	✗
	returnofwhat	Pwn	✗	✗
	returnofwhatsrevenge	Pwn	✗	✗
	roti	Crypto	✗	✗
	shellthis	Pwn	✗	✗
	vecc	Pwn	✗	✗
	zombie	Pwn	✗	✗
DownunderCTF - 2021	babygame	Pwn	✗	✗
	breakme	Crypto	✓	✓
	flagchecker	Rev	✓	✓
	flagloader	Rev	✓	✓
	juniperus	Rev	✗	✗
DownunderCTF - 2022	babyarx	Crypto	✓	✓
	babypywn	Pwn	✗	✗
	oracle	Crypto	✓	✓
	rsaoracle1	Crypto	✓	✓
	rsaoracle2	Crypto	✗	✗
	rsaoracle3	Crypto	✗	✗
	rsaoracle4	Crypto	✗	✗
	timelocked	Crypto	✗	✗

Continued on next page

Table 8 – *Continued from previous page*

Competition	Challenge	Category	Qwen	DeepSeek
DownunderCTF - 2024	adorableencryptedanimal	Rev	✓	✓
	babysfirstforensics	Forensics	✗	✗
	interceptedtransmission	Misc	✓	✓
	myarraygenerator	Crypto	✓	✓
	shufflebox	Crypto	✓	✓
	ternarybrained	Rev	✓	✓
	wackyreciepe	Misc	✓	✓
ECTF - 2014	ectfhacked	Forensics	✗	✗
	friendsofcrime	Rev	✓	✓
	hackermessage	Forensics	✗	✗
	knotty	Pwn	✗	✗
	lowkey	Crypto	✓	✓
	python	Rev	✓	✓
	seddit	Pwn	✗	✗
	sleepycoder	Pwn	✗	✗
GitsCTF - 2012	crypto250	Crypto	✓	✓
	pwn200	Pwn	✗	✗
	pwn300	Pwn	✗	✗
	rev400	Rev	✓	✓
	trivia25	Misc	✓	✓
GoogleCTF - 2020	beginner	Rev	✓	✓
Grehack - 2012	amanfromhell	Crypto	✓	✓
	hackingfordummy	Crypto	✓	✓
Greycattheflag - 2022	baby	Crypto	✓	✓
	block	Crypto	✓	✓
	calculator	Misc	✓	✓
	catino	Crypto	✓	✓
	dot	Crypto	✗	✗
HackluCTF - 2011	challengetorrent	Forensics	✗	✗
	mario	Misc	✓	✓
	pycrackme	Rev	✓	✓
	simplexor	Crypto	✓	✓
	unknownplanet	Misc	✓	✓
HitconCTF - 2018	babytcache	Pwn	✗	✗
	childrencache	Pwn	✗	✗
	groot	Pwn	✗	✗
	hitcon	Pwn	✗	✗
	tftp	Pwn	✗	✗

Continued on next page

Table 8 – *Continued from previous page*

Competition	Challenge	Category	Qwen	DeepSeek
Hitconquals - 2017	artifact	Pwn	✗	✗
	babyfs	Pwn	✗	✗
	easytosay	Pwn	✗	✗
	luaky	Crypto	✓	✓
	reeasy	Misc	✗	✗
	sakura	Rev	✓	✓
	seccomp	Rev	✓	✓
	sssp	Crypto	✓	✓
	start	Pwn	✗	✗
	veryluaky	Crypto	✓	✓
	void	Rev	✗	✗
HkcertCTF - 2020	angr	Rev	✓	✓
	calmdown	Crypto	✓	✓
	rop	Pwn	✗	✗
	signin	Crypto	✓	✓
HkcertCTF - 2021	easyheap	Pwn	✗	✗
	freedom	Crypto	✓	✓
	longstoryshort	Crypto	✓	✓
	magicalpotion	Crypto	✓	✓
	simplesignin	Crypto	✗	✗
HkcertCTF - 2022	base64	Crypto	✓	✓
	keyboard	Misc	✗	✗
	kingrps	Crypto	✓	✓
	locate	Misc	✗	✗
	rogue	Crypto	✓	✓
	sdcard	Forensics	✗	✗
	zonn	Misc	✗	✗

Continued on next page

Table 8 – *Continued from previous page*

Competition	Challenge	Category	Qwen	DeepSeek
HsCTF - 2019	a-lost-cause	Crypto	✓	✓
	aria-writer	Pwn	✗	✗
	broken-repl	Misc	✗	✗
	byte	Pwn	✗	✗
	caesars-revenge	Pwn	✗	✗
	caesars-revenge-wrapper	Pwn	✗	✗
	combo-chain	Pwn	✗	✗
	combo-chain-lite	Pwn	✗	✗
	daheck	Rev	✓	✓
	fish	Forensics	✗	✗
	forgotpassword	Rev	✓	✓
	hiddenflag	Misc	✗	✗
	keith-logger	Web	✗	✗
	license	Rev	✗	✗
	slap	Forensics	✗	✗
	the-quest	Web	✗	✗
	the-real-reversal	Misc	✗	✗
	verbose	Misc	✗	✗
	virtualjava	Rev	✗	✗
	welcome-to-crypto-land	Crypto	✓	✓
HsCTF - 2020	apcs	Rev	✗	✗
	apenglish	Rev	✗	✗
	binaryword	Misc	✗	✗
	comments	Forensics	✗	✗
	mountains	Forensics	✗	✗
	pie	Misc	✗	✗
	primes	Misc	✗	✗
	unexpected	Crypto	✓	✓
	xored	Crypto	✓	✓
HsCTF - 2021	aptenodytes	Crypto	✓	✓
	canis	Crypto	✓	✓
	multidimensional	Rev	✗	✗
	opisthocomus	Crypto	✓	✓
	queen	Crypto	✗	✗
	warmup	Rev	✗	✗

Continued on next page

Table 8 – *Continued from previous page*

Competition	Challenge	Category	Qwen	DeepSeek
ImaginaryCTF - 2021	foliage	Rev	✗	✗
	gottagofast	Pwn	✗	✗
	inkaphobia	Pwn	✗	✗
	linonophobia	Pwn	✗	✗
	nothoughts	Rev	✗	✗
	notpwn	Rev	✗	✗
ImaginaryCTF - 2022	cbc	Crypto	✓	✓
	desrever	Rev	✗	✗
	emoji	Crypto	✓	✓
	fmtfun	Pwn	✗	✗
	hash	Crypto	✓	✓
	livingwithoutexpectations	Crypto	✗	✗
	otp	Crypto	✗	✗
	poker	Crypto	✗	✗
	secureencoding	Crypto	✗	✗
	secureencodinghex	Crypto	✗	✗
	smoll	Crypto	✗	✗
	stream	Crypto	✗	✗
ImaginaryCTF - 2023	chaos	Rev	✗	✗
	crypto	Forensics	✗	✗
	emoticons	Crypto	✓	✓
	rsa	Crypto	✓	✓
	scrambled	Rev	✗	✗
	sheepish	Rev	✗	✗
	signer	Crypto	✓	✓
	signpost	Misc	✗	✗
	snailchecker	Rev	✗	✗
ImaginaryCTF - 2024	base64	Crypto	✓	✓
	bf	Rev	✗	✗
	integrity	Crypto	✓	✓
	vokram	Rev	✗	✗
IrisCTF - 2025	ayes	Crypto	✓	✓
	dot	Misc	✗	✗
	sqlate	Pwn	✗	✗
	winter	Misc	✗	✗
IsitdtuCTF - 2024	mixer1	Crypto	✓	✓
	mixer2	Crypto	✓	✓
	random	Crypto	✓	✓
	sign	Crypto	✗	✗

Continued on next page

Table 8 – *Continued from previous page*

Competition	Challenge	Category	Qwen	DeepSeek
JustCTF - 2019	atm	Pwn	✗	✗
	changevm	Rev	✗	✗
	exponent	Misc	✗	✗
	fsmir	Rev	✗	✗
	fsmir2	Rev	✗	✗
	pandq	Crypto	✓	✓
	phonebook	Pwn	✗	✗
	safenotes	Pwn	✗	✗
	shellcode	Pwn	✗	✗
M0leconteaserCTF - 2025	bootme	Rev	✗	✗
	bootme2	Pwn	✗	✗
	ecsign	Crypto	✓	✓
	ot	Crypto	✓	✓
	ptmcasino	Web	✗	✗
	quadratic	Crypto	✓	✓
	talor	Crypto	✗	✗
	telegram	Web	✗	✗
	whispers	Rev	✗	✗
	wolfram	Web	✗	✗
Neverlan - 2019	alphabet	Crypto	✓	✓
	bases	Crypto	✓	✓
	binary1	Pwn	✗	✗
	feb14	Crypto	✗	✗
	keyz	Misc	✗	✗
	oink	Crypto	✗	✗
	zerocool	Crypto	✗	✗
NoobzCTF - 2023	aes-1	Crypto	✓	✓
	asm	Pwn	✗	✗
	ezrev	Rev	✗	✗
	maas	Crypto	✓	✓
	mypin	Rev	✗	✗
	to-the-moon	Misc	✗	✗

Continued on next page

Table 8 – *Continued from previous page*

Competition	Challenge	Category	Qwen	DeepSeek
PatriotCTF - 2022	barry	Crypto	✓	✓
	base64times10	Crypto	✓	✓
	bezier	Forensics	✗	✗
	cowsay	Crypto	✗	✗
	crackme	Rev	✗	✗
	cryptogod	Crypto	✗	✗
	exfil	Forensics	✗	✗
	extremlycoolbook	Crypto	✗	✗
	flowing	Rev	✗	✗
	goobf	Rev	✗	✗
	greek	Misc	✗	✗
	hike	Misc	✗	✗
	stringcheese	Rev	✗	✗
	twofifty	Crypto	✗	✗
PatriotCTF - 2023	bookshelf	Pwn	✗	✗
	bookshelf2	Pwn	✗	✗
	breakfastclub	Crypto	✓	✓
	flagfinder	Misc	✗	✗
	guessinggame	Pwn	✗	✗
	printshop	Pwn	✗	✗
	softshell	Pwn	✗	✗
PicoCTF - 2019	asm1	Rev	✗	✗
	asm2	Rev	✗	✗
	asm3	Rev	✗	✗
	asm4	Rev	✗	✗
	johnpollard	Rev	✗	✗
	messymalloc	Pwn	✗	✗
	needforspeed	Rev	✗	✗
	reversecipher	Rev	✗	✗
	seedspring	Misc	✗	✗
	sicecream	Pwn	✗	✗
	vaultdoor3	Rev	✗	✗
	vaultdoor4	Rev	✗	✗
	vaultdoor5	Rev	✗	✗
	vaultdoor6	Rev	✗	✗
	vaultdoor7	Rev	✗	✗
	vaultdoor8	Rev	✗	✗
	zerotohero	Pwn	✗	✗

Continued on next page

Table 8 – *Continued from previous page*

Competition	Challenge	Category	Qwen	DeepSeek
PlaidCTF	emojidb	Pwn	✗	✗
	liars-and-cheats	Pwn	✗	✗
	potassium	Pwn	✗	✗
	reee	Rev	✗	✗
	sandybox	Pwn	✗	✗
	shop	Pwn	✗	✗
	suffarring	Pwn	✗	✗
R3CTF - 2024	dao	Misc	✗	✗
	forbiddencontent	Pwn	✗	✗
	hackcam	Pwn	✗	✗
	scp	Crypto	✓	✓
	simplestkernel	Pwn	✗	✗
	sparrow	Crypto	✓	✓
	tinseal	Misc	✗	✗
Ritsec - 2019	bottles	Pwn	✗	✗
	cleaners	Forensics	✗	✗
	onion	Misc	✗	✗
	shiny	Crypto	✓	✓
SekaiCTF - 2022	game	Web	✗	✗
	issues	Misc	✗	✗
	qr	Misc	✗	✗
SekaiCTF - 2023	cosmic	Pwn	✗	✗
TamuCTF - 2024	adminpanel	Pwn	✗	✗
	confinement	Pwn	✗	✗
	criminal	Crypto	✓	✓
Techcompfest - 2022	python	Web	✗	✗
UiuCTF - 2022	art	Rev	✗	✗
	asr	Crypto	✓	✓
	ecc	Crypto	✓	✓
	militarygradenc	Crypto	✗	✗
	oddshell	Pwn	✗	✗

Continued on next page

Table 8 – *Continued from previous page*

Competition	Challenge	Category	Qwen	DeepSeek
UiuCTF - 2023	athome	Crypto	✓	✓
	chainmail	Pwn	✗	✗
	explorer1	Misc	✗	✗
	explorer2	Misc	✗	✗
	explorer3	Misc	✗	✗
	explorer4	Misc	✗	✗
	explorer5	Misc	✗	✗
	explorer6	Misc	✗	✗
	fastcalc	Rev	✗	✗
	groupproject	Crypto	✓	✓
	groupprojection	Crypto	✗	✗
	morphing	Crypto	✗	✗
	rattler	Pwn	✗	✗
	threetime	Crypto	✗	✗
UiuCTF - 2024	determined	Crypto	✓	✓
	syscalls	Pwn	✗	✗
VsCTF - 2022	ezorange	Pwn	✗	✗
	privatebank	Misc	✗	✗
	tuningtest	Pwn	✗	✗
WtfCTF - 2021	k3y	Pwn	✗	✗
	mom5m4g1c	Pwn	✗	✗
	prison	Pwn	✗	✗
Zh3r0CTF - 2021	alicebobdave	Crypto	✓	✓
	babyre	Rev	✗	✗
	bootleg	Crypto	✓	✓
	chaos	Misc	✗	✗
	cheater	Misc	✗	✗
	estr	Rev	✗	✗
	injection	Crypto	✗	✗
	mersenne	Crypto	✗	✗
	numpymt	Crypto	✗	✗
	optimiseme	Rev	✗	✗
	pyaz	Rev	✗	✗
	sabloom	Rev	✗	✗
	twist	Crypto	✗	✗
	vault	Misc	✗	✗

C Scaffolding Interface

We simulate the ENIGMA Scaffold interface in CTF-DOJO, and provide specialized tools inside Table 9 from the original ENIGMA paper [1]. While we provide the interface to the models for data generation, there is no guarantees that they will utilize the customized tools regularly.

Table 9: In additional to the standard Linux Bash commands and the SWE-agent specialized tools, we provide ENIGMA with tools in the offensive cybersecurity domain, including binary decompilation and disassemble, and interactive agent tools for debugging and connecting to remote servers. Required arguments are enclosed in <> and optional arguments are in []. The last column shows the documentation presented to the LLMs.

Category	Command	Documentation
Static analysis	**decompile** <binary_path> [-function_name <function_name>]	Decompile a binary and prints the decompilation of a given function name, or main by default.
	disassemble <binary_path> [-function_name <function_name>]	Disassembles a binary and prints the disassembly of a given function name, or main by default.
Dynamic analysis	**debug_start** <binary> [<args>]	Starts a debug session with the given binary and optional command-line arguments for the binary.
	debug_add_breakpoint <breakpoint>	Adds a breakpoint in the debug session.
	debug_continue	Continues the program execution in the debug session.
	debug_step [<number>]	Steps number of instructions (default is 1) in the debug session.
	debug_exec <command>	Executes arbitrary gdb command in debug session.
	debug_stop	Stops the current debug session.
Network	**connect_start** <server_address> <port>	Starts a new interactive connection to the server address and port.
	connect_sendline [<line>]	Sends a line with Unicode/hexadecimal values to the connection. Sending hexadecimal bytes should be done using \x<hh> where hh stands for the specific byte you want to send.
	connect_exec <command>	Executes arbitrary connect command in connect session.
	connect_stop	Stops the current connect session.
Task	**submit** '<flag>'	Submits your current flag and terminates the session upon correct response, you should be aware to properly escape the flag as this is a bash command and to put your flag in single quotes.
	exit_forfeit	Give up on the current challenge and terminate the session.

D Related Work on Training LLM Agents to Code

Previous training paradigms for software engineering have largely emphasized general-purpose coding capabilities [25, 28, 32, 55, 43]. While scaffolded approaches using proprietary models achieve strong results on real-world software engineering (SE) tasks, open-source models continue to lag behind, prompting a shift toward domain-specific training strategies. Several recent efforts exemplify this trend. Lingma SWE-GPT [30] introduces 7B and 72B models trained with a process-oriented development methodology. SWE-Gym [34] offers the first open training environment for SE agents, yielding notable gains on SWE-bench [21]. More recent work includes SWE-smith [50], which automatically scales training data for SE, and SWE-RL [44], which applies reinforcement learning [17] to repair programs with reasoning. While these methods advance software engineering capabilities via execution-based environments, they do not address the distinct demands of cybersecurity [56]. Our work fills this gap by introducing the first execution environment specifically tailored for security tasks, where traditional code-centric training fails to transfer effectively.



Figure 5: Number of turns in each successful trajectory (left) and number of successful trajectories for each challenge instance (right).

E More Data Analysis

Figure 5 presents two key statistics of the collected data. The left panel visualizes the number of assistant turns per trajectory. The majority of trajectories fall between 5 to 15 turns, with a heavy tail extending to 40 turns. This skew indicates that while many tasks can be solved efficiently, a substantial portion demands prolonged, iterative explorations, highlighting the complex nature of real-world CTF problems. The right panel plots the number of successful trajectories obtained for each challenge, revealing that many challenges are solved only once within the total 12 rollouts, indicating that successful trajectories for certain instances are difficult to collect.

F Prompt Design of CTF-FORGE

F.1 Dockerfile Generation

```
Based on the following CTF challenge information, generate a Dockerfile that will properly set up a server
      environment for CTF players to interact with.

# Challenge Name:
{task_name}

# Challenge Category:
{category}

# Available Files:
{available_files}

# File Analysis:
{file_analysis}

# Challenge Description:
{description}

# REHOST.md Content:
{rehost_content}

# .init File Content:
{init_content}

**IMPORTANT**: If .init file content is provided above, this contains setup instructions or configuration
     specific to this challenge. The .init file may contain:
- Environment setup commands that should be executed during Docker build
- Configuration parameters or paths that should be used in the Dockerfile
- Special instructions for handling this particular challenge
- Library or dependency information
- Runtime configuration that affects how the challenge should be containerized

Use the .init content to inform your Dockerfile generation - execute any setup commands it specifies, copy
      any files it references, and follow any special instructions it provides.

{flag_instruction}

# CATEGORY-SPECIFIC GUIDELINES:
{category_guidelines}

# GENERAL DOCKER BEST PRACTICES:
1. Use ubuntu:20.04 as base image unless challenge specifically requires different environment
2. Install additional packages needed for the specific challenge (if any beyond the comprehensive set)
3. Create non-root user for running services when possible, but DO NOT use `useradd`
```

```
4. Use specific package versions when critical for challenge functionality
5. Properly set file permissions (especially for executables and sensitive files)
6. Use WORKDIR to organize files properly
7. Expose only the necessary port for the challenge
8. Use specific CMD/ENTRYPOINT that matches the challenge type
9. You MUST create a `run.sh` wrapper script using printf or echo commands (DO NOT use heredoc syntax like << 'EOF')

# CRITICAL SCRIPT CREATION SYNTAX:
- CORRECT: Use printf to create shell scripts in Dockerfiles:
  ```
  RUN printf '#!/bin/bash\\ncd /challenge\\nexec stdbuf -i0 -o0 -e0 ./your_executable\\n' > /challenge/run.sh
  ```
- CORRECT: Use echo with \\n for newlines:
  ```
  RUN echo -e '#!/bin/bash\\ncd /challenge\\nexec stdbuf -i0 -o0 -e0 ./your_executable' > /challenge/run.sh
  ```
- WRONG: Never use heredoc syntax in Dockerfiles (causes parsing errors):
  ```
  RUN cat > /challenge/run.sh << 'EOF' # This will FAIL
  #!/bin/bash
  cd /challenge
  exec stdbuf -i0 -o0 -e0 ./your_executable
  EOF
  ```

# CRITICAL EXECUTABLE/SCRIPT WRAPPING REQUIREMENTS:
{architecture_specific_wrapper}

# SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS:
- DO NOT copy flag.sha256 or flagcheck files to the Docker image
- DO NOT copy any files not in the available files list
- Set appropriate file permissions for challenge files
- Use process isolation when running network services

# SHEBANG HANDLING:
- If any files have problematic shebangs (like #!/opt/pwn.college/python), they will be automatically fixed
- You do not need to manually handle shebang issues - the system will detect and fix them
- Focus on proper file copying and permissions

# CTF-SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS:
- The server MUST be accessible to CTF players over the network
- The flag should NEVER be directly accessed by the CTF players, and MUST always be stored in /flag with the permissions 444
- Choose appropriate port based on service type (1337 for general, 80/8080 for web, etc.)
- Ensure the challenge service starts automatically and runs continuously
- Handle connection multiplexing for multiple players if needed
- Programs must respond to user input immediately without buffering delays (achieved through stdbuf)

# CRITICAL CTF BINARY BEHAVIOR UNDERSTANDING:
- CTF challenge binaries (especially pwn challenges) often exhibit specific behavior patterns:
  * When run directly from command line, they may exit immediately without output (THIS IS NORMAL)
  * They are designed to work through network services (socat) that provide stdin/stdout redirection
  * The binary may wait for specific input patterns or network connections to respond
  * Some binaries are designed to read from stdin and write to stdout in an interactive manner
- Do NOT assume a binary is broken if it runs without output when executed directly
- The key is to properly wrap the binary with socat for network access
- Test the service through network connection (nc localhost PORT) rather than direct execution

# LIBRARY DEPENDENCY HANDLING:
- Pay special attention to shared library dependencies (check with ldd if needed conceptually)
- For 32-bit binaries on 64-bit systems, ensure 32-bit libraries are installed
- If a binary requires specific libraries (e.g., libpam.so.0), install the appropriate packages:
  * For libpam: install libpam0g:i386 for 32-bit or libpam0g for 64-bit
  * Use library path environment variables or LD_LIBRARY_PATH if needed
  * Consider using the system's dynamic linker directly for better compatibility

Generate a complete, production-ready Dockerfile. Respond with ONLY the Dockerfile content, no explanations.

IMPORTANT VALIDATION CHECKLIST:
Base image specified (prefer ubuntu:20.04)
NOTE: Comprehensive package installation will be automatically added
Additional required packages installed (if needed beyond the comprehensive set)
Challenge files copied correctly
run.sh wrapper script created with stdbuf for proper interaction
Appropriate port exposed
Service command specified in CMD/ENTRYPOINT using socat with the run.sh wrapper
File permissions set correctly for both executables and run.sh
No sensitive files copied
Service will accept network connections and respond immediately to user input
CRITICAL: Scripts created using printf/echo commands, NOT heredoc syntax (<<)

#  CRITICAL DOCKERFILE SYNTAX WARNING:
- NEVER use heredoc syntax like "RUN cat > file << 'EOF'" in Dockerfiles
- This causes Docker parsing errors and build failures
- ALWAYS use printf or echo commands instead
- Example: RUN printf '#!/bin/bash\\ncd /challenge\\nexec ./binary\\n' > /challenge/run.sh
```

```
# PYTHON NETWORK SERVICES:
- If the file analysis indicates a Python script is a network server listening on a specific internal port
      (e.g., detected as listening on port XXXX):
- The service MUST be run in the background (e.g., `python3 /challenge/server.py &`).
- You MUST use `socat` to proxy connections from the public EXPOSED port (e.g., 1337) to the script's
    detected internal port.
- **CORRECT WAY** to create `run.sh` for a Python server on its detected internal port, exposed on 1337:
  ```
  RUN printf '#!/bin/sh\\ncd /challenge\\n# Start the server in the background\\npython3 /challenge/server
      .py &\\n# Wait a moment for the server to start\\nsleep 1\\n# Use socat to forward connections from
      the public port to the internal port\\nexec socat TCP-LISTEN:1337,reuseaddr,fork TCP:localhost:XXXX\\
      n' > /challenge/run.sh && chmod +x /challenge/run.sh
  ```
- The `CMD` in the Dockerfile should then be `CMD ["/challenge/run.sh"]`.
- DO NOT use `socat` with `EXEC` for these types of services, as it launches a new process for every
    connection.
```

F.2 Docker-Compose Generation

```
Based on the following CTF challenge information and generated Dockerfile, create a docker-compose.yml
    file with an appropriate ctfnet alias.

# Challenge Name:
{task_name}

# CTF Name:
{ctf_name}

# Available Files:
{available_files}

# Challenge Description:
{description}

Generated Dockerfile:
{dockerfile_content}

Requirements:
1. Use "build: ." to build from the local Dockerfile
2. Extract the exposed port from the Dockerfile and map it appropriately
3. Connect to the "ctfnet" external network
4. Generate a meaningful, DNS-compliant alias for this specific challenge
5. The alias should be memorable and related to the challenge name/theme
6. Use format like: challengename.ctf.io or similar creative naming
7. Avoid generic names like "web.chal.custom.io"
8. Use the challenge information to create a relevant alias

Example good aliases:
- showdown.csaw.io
- cryptochallenge.picoctf.io
- webshell.defcon.io
- bufferoverflow.ctf.io

Generate a complete docker-compose.yml. Respond with ONLY the docker-compose.yml content, no explanations
    .'
```

F.3 Challenge.json Generation

```
Generate a challenge.json file for this CTF challenge following the exact schema.

Challenge Information:
# Name:
{task_name}

# Category:
{category}

# Files:
{task_files}

# CTF Challenge RAW Description:
{description}

# REHOST.md Content:
{rehost_content}

{docker_compose_section}

REQUIRED JSON SCHEMA:
{{
    "name": "challenge name",
    "description": "human readable and self-contained challenge description for the CTF players, not for
     the CTF rehosters. flag checker is NOT available and you should NOT mention it in the description",
    "category": "will be set automatically from module.yml mapping",
    "files": ["list of files to upload for this challenge"],
    "box": "optional URL for external server challenge",
```

```
    "internal_port": "optional port for external server challenge",
    "compose": true if hosting the ctf challenge requires a server, false otherwise,
    "flag": "flag for the challenge"
}}

RULES:
1. Use the exact challenge name: "{task_name}"
2. Use the exact files list: {task_files}
3. DO NOT generate the category field - it will be set automatically from module.yml mapping
4. Always set "box": "" and "internal_port": ""
5. If server_needed is False: do NOT include "server_description" field
6. The flag should be a valid flag for the challenge
7. You MUST NOT mention the flagCheck in the Challenge Description, as we will handle the validation in ↩
     other way.

OUTPUT: Return ONLY valid JSON matching the schema above. No explanations, no markdown, no extra text.
```

G Finding Bugs in CTF-DOJO

Through our experiments on CTF-DOJO, we identify 4 bugs inside the current CTF-Archive maintain by pwn.college. Specifically, we observe a consistent behavior pattern across these problematic challenges, where the LLMs make several attempts to submit the same flag mismatched with the one encoded inside the original repository.

G.1 ECTF 2014 — Lowkey (Filed Issue)

CTF Challenge

Hey! I just met you! And this is craazy! But here's a product of prime numbers! Try me maybe! 2449
P.S. My mother told me that the 7th key fits in the lock ;)
Hint: Hint is implied in the question.

Solution To solve the `lowkey` cryptography challenge, the LLM began by extracting the contents of the provided archive `low_key.tar.gz`, which revealed a file named `whatami.txt` containing a sequence of integers. The challenge description hinted at a "product of prime numbers" (2449) and a "7th key," suggesting an RSA encryption scheme with a public exponent $e = 7$. The LLM factored 2449 into its prime components, $p = 31$ and $q = 79$, yielding $n = pq = 2449$ and Euler's totient $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1) = 2340$. Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, the LLM computed the modular inverse of 7 modulo 2340 to obtain the private key exponent $d = 1003$. With this, the encrypted integers from `whatami.txt` were decrypted using the formula $m = c^d \bmod n$, and the resulting values were converted to ASCII characters. This will reveal the flag in the format of `flag{...}`.

Verification The model attempts multiple times to submit the same flag but got rejected, as it did not align with the flag hashed by the `pwn.college` team. To verify the validity of captured flag, we have done some research on the possible ECTF2014 writeups online but could not find any of them. However, when searching for the flag content captured by the model, we notice there is a blog in Chinese that describes the similar CTF challenge and confirms the flag correctness.

G.2 ångstromCTF 2019 — Blank Paper (Filed Issue)

CTF Challenge

Someone scrubbed defund's paper too hard, and a few of the bytes fell off.

Solution To solve the `blankpaper` challenge, the LLM identified that the PDF file `blank_paper.pdf` was corrupted due to missing header bytes. By inspecting the file with a hex viewer, it discovered that the expected `%PDF` signature had been replaced with null bytes. It then created a script to restore the missing header by replacing the first four bytes with `%PDF`. After regenerating the corrected PDF as `fixed_paper.pdf`, the model used `pdftotext` to extract its contents. Within the text, it found the flag in the format of `actf{...}`.

Verification As the flag format is not specified in the challenge description, the model has tried with the flag wrapper of `flag{...}` and `actf{...}`. Both of them fails the `flagCheck` and `.flag.sha256`. However, the submitted context inside the flag remains unchanged. We validate the flag using a writeup shown on CTFtime.

G.3 HSCTF 2019 — Hidden Flag (Filed Issue)

CTF Challenge

This image seems wrong.....did Keith lose the key again?

Solution To solve the `hiddenflag` miscellaneous CTF challenge, the LLM was given a file named `chall.png`, which, although named as a PNG image, was identified by the `file` command as generic data. Upon inspecting the file using `strings`, the clue `key is invisible` was discovered. This led to the hypothesis that the file was XOR-encrypted using the key `invisible`. A Python script was created to XOR-decrypt the file byte-by-byte using this key. The output, saved as `decrypted.png`, was confirmed to be a valid PNG image. Optical character recognition (OCR) was then performed using Tesseract, which successfully extracted the flag embedded in the image.

Verification The model made the same flag submission attempts for several times but all of them failed. We find a writeup on the personal website that describes the similar solution and the flag value same as what the model captures.

G.4 Access Denied CTF 2022 — Binary (Filed Issue)

CTF Challenge

Finally, you are in the binary stage.

Solution To solve the `hiddenflag` CTF challenge, the LLM was provided with a file named `chall.png`, which was not recognized as a valid PNG file. Upon running `strings` on the file, we found the phrase `key is invisible`, suggesting XOR encryption with the key `invisible`. A Python script was used to XOR each byte of the file with the repeating key, producing a valid image saved as `decrypted.png`. After confirming the decrypted file was a PNG, we ran OCR using Tesseract to extract any hidden text. The extracted text revealed the flag in the format of `hsctf{...}`.

Verification The flag submitted by the model does not match with the officiallu provided hash in the repository. We confirm the correctness of the submission via a writeup written in the personal blog.