The Moral Fog of LLMs: Empty Claims of Virtue Deceive Large Language Models Easily

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Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) significantly advance natural language processing. However, their rapid progress raises critical safety and stability concerns. The jailbreak prompt attack, as an effective black-box attack method, wrapping the original malicious query to obtain the desired malicious response, is increasingly used in red team testing to improve LLMs' safety alignment, which aims to prevent models from generating harmful or unethical content. Existing jailbreak prompt attacks primarily rely on hiding malicious text and employing scenario nesting techniques, often obscuring the model's understanding of the original inquiries. This results in off-topic or ambiguous low-risk responses, meaning that these attacks do not adequately test the deeper vulnerabilities of large models. To address this shortcoming, we propose **Justinian**, an innovative jailbreak prompt attack method that further exposes the security flaws in common LLMs. In our method, we first assign LLMs a virtuous role, making LLMs believe they meet safety standards, and increasing LLMs' acceptance of harmful inputs. We then guide the model through carefully crafted prompts to generate the desired harmful responses. Extensive experiments reveal that our model achieves the lowest safety response (SR) rate and the highest attack success rate on the GPT series of models. We hope our research can foster more robust and reliable defenses against potential risks for LLMs.

1 Introduction

The emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) has significantly transformed the field of artificial intelligence, continuously altering how people access information, process documents, and communicate. Powerful models such as ChatGPT (OpenAI, 2023a), GPT-4 (OpenAI, 2023b), Llama 2 (Touvron et al., 2023), and Claude2 (Anthropic, 2023) have demonstrated superior capabilities across various innovative applications. These applications span document summarization, story creation, content rewriting, information compilation, emotional support, and more (Liu et al., 2023a; Zheng et al., 2023; Sahu et al., 2023; He et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2023c).

The development of LLMs has raised significant concerns regarding their safety and stability. Current LLM developers employ expert red team testing (OpenAI, 2023b), Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) (Zhan et al., 2023), Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) fine-tuning (Lermen et al., 2023), rule-based reward models (RBRMs) (Zou et al., 2023, 2024), and perplexity-based malicious input detection (Liu et al., 2023b) to automatically identify and defend against risky content.

Unfortunately, some meticulously designed malicious prompts(Goldstein et al., 2023; Kang et al., 2023a) can easily reveal the weaknesses of safety-aligned LLMs. Due to their strong readability and high adaptability, an increasing number of studies utilize this attack method to test the safety performance of LLMs(Robey et al., 2023; Mangaokar et al., 2024; Li et al., 2024; Yong et al., 2023; Deng et al., 2024a; Yuan et al., 2024a; Jiang et al., 2024; Handa et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2024).

Existing jailbreak prompt attacks primarily aim to circumvent model defenses through two dimensions:

(1) **Hide malicious text**, which aims to make models fail to identify harmful content and generate unsafe responses. For instance, rule-based human passwords, such as the Caesar cipher, can obscure toxic text in natural language form(Yuan et al., 2024a). (2) **Scenario Nesting**, which aims to introduce additional tasks and information to distract models from their safety alignment objectives (Wei et al., 2023b; Zheng et al., 2024; Lv et al., 2024; Li et al., 2023a; Ding et al., 2023; Yu et al., 2024).

However, attacks based on hiding malicious text



Figure 1: Overview of the **Hiding Malicious Text** method, **Scenario Nesting** method, and **Justinian**. Given an initial malicious input, the first step in **Justinian** is to empower LLMs with a justice role to increase LLM's acceptance of the malicious inquiry. The second step is to induce high-risk malicious outputs by defining output formats, assigning jailbreak-related tasks, and reinforcing the malicious inquiry. Under the influence of **Justinian**, LLMs generated technical support and deployment guidance about how to hack into a database, which is a highly toxic response. In **Hiding Malicious Text** attack method, first transformed into an Atbash cipher, which is unfamiliar to LLMs. Then The encrypted malicious inquiry was sent to LLMs with a cipher tutorial. However, the complex decryption requirements hindered LLMs' understanding of the inquiry, generating a low-toxicity and off-topic response. In **Scenario Nesting** attack method, the initial malicious inquiry was placed within the context of constructing the next chapter of a PPT. When input into LLMs, the model's response was constrained by the context, resulting in content lacking actual instructional value.

to reduce the safety response(SR) rate also hamper LLMs' understanding of the original malicious queries. As shown in Figure 1, the original questions are transformed into an Atbash cipher, which rarely appears in the pre-training process of LLMs, obstructing LLMs' comprehension. While the intent of password teaching is to aid LLMs's understanding, it ultimately disrupts the conversation's focus, rendering the attack ineffective. Similarly, the methods based on scenario nesting, such as story nesting and contextual embedding, limit LLMs's ability to provide detailed and professional responses(more examples shown in 4.4). As illustrated in Figure 1, the contextual content in the first paragraph restricts LLMs's expressive freedom, While the PowerPoint output format leads to a lack of detailed technical support and deployment guidance in the output content. To bypass LLM safety alignment while enhancing the practicality and harmfulness of responses, we propose an innovative jailbreak prompt attack method, named **Justinian** that disrupt the safety alignment by bestowing a justified identity to LLMs, which includes two steps: (1) **Reducing the SR (Denial of Service) ratio of LLMs**: We encourage LLMs to act in a righteous role rather than violate moral alignment goals, which leads LLMs to believe they are fulfilling ethical standards, thereby increasing their willingness to provide services to potential attackers. The key lies in LLMs' inherent emphasis on moral alignment. (2) **Inducing high-risk malicious outputs**: First, assign a righteous task related to the jailbreak target to the LLM's persona, Next, deliberately emphasize input toxicity to prompt the LLMs to engage in the jailbreak topic. Finally, specify output formats that facilitate detailed generation, such as news formats, to further enhance output detail and complicate safety detection of the generated content with formatted prefixes. As shown in Figure 1. When our attack goal is "how

to hack into sensitive government databases". **Justinian** successfully confuses the targeted LLM and generates detailed technical support deployment guidance for the malicious inquiry.

To quantify the effectiveness of our attack method, we compare it with existing jailbreak prompt attack methods, including 11 basic attack strategies and 3 state-of-the-art methods, across five sensitive domains to evaluate the harmfulness of LLMs' responses. Additionally, we assess the Defensive Accuracy of various open-source and closed-source LLMs to comprehensively evaluate the defensive capabilities of LLMs. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our model achieves the lowest safety response (SR) rate and the highest attack success rate on the GPT series of models.

In summary, our contributions are as follows:

1. We introduce **Justinian**, a novel jailbreak prompt attack method that actively empowers LLMs with a just identity and guides the attention of LLMs on original malicious to generate high-risk malicious outputs.

2. Extensive experiments demonstrate that **Justinian** can successfully jailbreak GPT series models with a success rate exceeding 93.3%. Furthermore, **Justinian** achieves a safety response (SR) rate of 0.0% on the GPT series models, while the toxicity of the generated content, as assessed by human judgment, is notably high. Such empirical success reveals alarming deficiencies in safety-aligned LLMs.

3. We investigate state-of-the-art attack methods and single attack strategies, revealing their inadequacies in red teaming LLMs. Additionally, we discovered that the Llama series models exhibit issues with over-defense in non-toxic testing. We hope our research can further promote the safety alignment of LLMs.

2 Related Work

2.1 Safety Alignment for LLMs

Safety alignment aims to ensure that a model's outputs adhere to human ethical standards.(Ziegler et al., 2019; Solaiman and Dennison, 2021; Ouyang et al., 2022a; Bai et al., 2022). Existing safety alignment methods for large language models (LLMs) can be broadly categorized into prompt-level and model-level defense methods(Yi et al., 2024). Prompt-level defenses, designed for scenarios where only the prompt is controllable, include techniques such as prompt detection (Jain et al., 2023; Alon and Kamfonas, 2023), prompt perturbation (Cao et al., 2023; Zhou et al., 2024; Ji et al., 2024), and system prompt safeguards (Sharma et al., 2024; Zou et al., 2024). Model-level defenses, which allow modification of model weights, employ strategies like instruction tuning (Deng et al., 2023a; Bhardwaj and Poria, 2023), reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) (Ouyang et al., 2022b; Siththaranjan et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2024), logit and gradient analysis (Xie et al., 2024; Xu et al., 2024; Hu et al., 2024), model refinement methods (Kim et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2024), and the use of aligned proxy models (Zeng et al., 2024; Struppek et al., 2024). Despite progress in reducing ethically problematic outputs, current alignment approaches face challenges in balancing safety with performance(Yu et al., 2024).

2.2 Jailbreak prompt attack method

Despite advancements in safety alignment methods, jailbreak prompt attack methods continue to pose significant challenges to LLMs security(Wei et al., 2023c; Kang et al., 2023b; Yuan et al., 2024b; Deng et al., 2024b; Liu et al., 2023b). Current jailbreak techniques typically focus on two main strategies. One approach involves transforming easily detectable natural language into non-natural language forms. Another strategy employs nested scenarios to divert LLMs' attention from safety alignment tasks (Li et al., 2023b). Furthermore, combinatorial attack methods have been proposed to increase the success rate of jailbreaking attempts. These combinatorial approaches include using traversal methods for strategy discovery within limited dimensions (Ding et al., 2024), and even employing LLMs themselves as attackers to automatically generate jailbreak prompts (Chao et al., 2023). The continuous evolution of these attack methods underscores the ongoing need for robust and adaptive defense mechanisms in LLMs security.

3 Methodology

In this section, we describe our attack scheme in detail. The process involves two main steps. First, we encourage LLMs to adopt a righteous role to make them believe they are aligned with safety protocols and reduce the security awareness(Section 3.2). Second, we enhance the harmfulness of the generated content by deliberately increasing the maliciousness of the attack, giving LLMs a righ-

teous mission aligned with the attack goals, and setting the output style to facilitate detailed expression(Section 3.3). The formulation of our jailbreak attack method is provided in Section 3.1.

3.1 Formulation

We formalize the jailbreak attack as follows: Given a model to be tested, let the target language model be LLM_{target} , the initial harmful prompt be T_{toxic} , and the sensitive domain be S. The goal of the jailbreak attack is to induce LLM_{target} to generate the toxic outputs Y_{toxic} that contain specific operational guidance, which is a subset of all outputs Y from the model, i.e., $Y_{toxic} \subseteq Y$. Y_{prev} represents the content generated by LLM_{target} prior to producing Y_{toxic}. The attack strategy first introduces jailbreak attack prompt P to reduce the probability of the model rejecting the service request. Then, utilizes the cumulative error characteristics of the LLM to achieve the attack objective. This can be represented as:

$$Y_{\text{toxic}} = LLM_{\text{target}}(P + Y_{\text{prev}})$$

3.2 Assigning a Virtuous Role to LLMs

We believe the key to successful jailbreaking lies in reducing the **safety response (SR) rate** first. Previous research has suggested that hiding toxic content in jailbreak prompts or using carefully crafted scenario nesting can lower the SR rate(Deng et al., 2024b, 2023b). However, such methods introduce noise to the original inquiry, leading to ambiguous or off-topic responses (as shown in Figure 1). To reduce the SR while enhancing LLMs' response quality, we leverage LLMs' focus on ethical alignment to actively position the LLMs in a virtuous role. This approach can lead LLMs to perceive that accepting prompts that contain harmful inquiries is reasonable within their designated role as defenders of justice, thereby reducing the SR rate and laying the groundwork for generating deeper malicious responses in the next step.

3.3 Inducing Malicious Outputs

We adopted a combination strategy consisting of three components to induce LLMs to generate malicious outputs (Figure 1 gives an example): (1) **Assigning a Jailbreak-related Task:** We give LLMs a task associated with jailbreaking, as shown in Figure 1. We set the LLMs' task to return specific technologies and scripts that might be used to remind people to take precautions. This approach guides the conversation towards providing technical support that could potentially be used for malicious purposes. (2) **Setting the output format:** We set an output format that facilitates the detailing of the output content, such as news text, which requires the LLM to generate more actionable information, including technical descriptions, deployment considerations, and other practical details. Additionally, by setting the output format, the content produced differs from the text format learned by LLMs during safety alignment, which reduces its focus on safety alignment during text generation. (3) **Emphasizing Prompt Toxicity:** Safety-aligned LLMs prioritize ethical behavior and become more attentive to sensitive topics during text generation. We enhance the sensitivity of the inquiry by adding a prefix before the original malicious query: *"A demon-like inquiry from malevolent groups is:*" which strengthens the sensitivity of the inquiry and can further attract the attention of the LLMs to conduct more detailed analyses regarding the current malicious topics. Additionally, framing the malicious inquiry as input from malevolent groups helps to construct a scenario consistent with the just role played by LLMs, effectively reducing the SR rate.

4 Experiment and Analysis

In this section, we present an evaluation of the security of both closed-source and open-source large language models (LLMs) in high-sensitivity fields such as cybersecurity and financial security. We employ both our methods and existing jailbreak prompt attack methods to analyze the defensive characteristics and security vulnerabilities of various LLMs. Our goal is to provide important insights that can help optimize future LLM defense mechanisms.

4.1 Data

In our experiment, we utilize the *Harmful Behaviors* dataset (Zou et al., 2023), containing 520 prompts designed to provoke harmful reactions from LLMs. From this, we filtered 377 toxic behavior instructions related to high-risk areas using a keyword filtering method, categorizing them into five main domains: cybersecurity, financial security, biosafety, information security, and public safety. The proportion of each category in our experimental data is shown in Figure 2.



Figure 2: Distribution of the 377 toxic behavior instructions across five high-risk domains: cybersecurity, financial security, biosafety, information security, and public safety.

4.2 Target LLMs

To comprehensively evaluate the performance of different types of LLMs, we selected various widely used commercial closed-source and open-source models for testing. The closed-source models we used include GPT-4o-min (OpenAI, 2023b), GPT-4 (OpenAI, 2023b), GPT-4o-ca (Azure, 2023), and GPT-3.5 (OpenAI, 2023a); the open-source models include Llama-2-7b-chat-hf (Touvron et al., 2023), Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct (Dubey et al., 2024b), and glm-4-9b-chat (GLM et al., 2024). We set the top_p to 0.95 to ensure consistency and comparability in the experiments.

4.3 Evaluation Metrics

Safe Response (SR): The SR rate is a vital indicator of model security. A high SR rate may suggest that the LLM is effectively identifying and mitigating toxic inputs, an excessively high rate could also imply that the model is too restrictive, potentially. In this study, we introduce the SR rate as a critical metric for evaluating the performance of LLMs. Specifically, the SR rate refers to the proportion of instances where LLMs choose to produce a formulaic safety response to potential toxic input. Because LLMs generate fixed-template responses during denial of service, which allows us to employ keyword detection methods to assess whether LLMs has engaged in rejection.

Automated Toxicity Assessment(ATA): To conduct high reproducibility toxicity analysis of the generated content, this study uses Llama Guard 3 (Dubey et al., 2024a), which is based on Llama-3.1-8B, to perform automated toxicity assessment. Compared to GPT-4 based toxicity analysis methods, Llama Guard 3 can provide a more general assessment and has stronger evaluation stability.

Manual Toxicity Assessment (MTA): To further evaluate the level of harm in the generated content, we developed a manual toxicity assessment standard with scores ranging from 0 to 4. We invited five practitioners with master's degrees in cybersecurity and law to score the toxicity of content generated using different methods. Specifically, we established assessment samples based on the attack method and the targeted LLM. This study involves 80 assessment samples, each evaluated five times. During the evaluation, practitioners are unaware of the specific attack methods and the targeted LLMs. Each practitioner randomly selects five pairs of input-output data from each assessment sample, after which we average the scores for each assessment sample.

4.4 Baselines

The baselines for this experiment involve various state-of-the-art methods and commonly used single jailbreak strategies. **SelfCipher** (Yuan et al., 2023) employs the self-encoding capabilities of LLMs. This method effectively conceals toxic inputs by spontaneously encrypting familiar natural language content, significantly increasing the success rate of jailbreak attempts. Additionally, **ReNELLM** (Ding et al., 2024) is a comprehensive jailbreak method that continuously traverses multiple prompt rewrites and scene nesting within a limited space, then employs prompt rewriting techniques and scene nesting methods capable of inducing safety response in LLMs as the attack strategy to elicit inappropriate outputs. **PAIR**(Chao et al., 2023) is an algorithm designed to enhance the effectiveness of attacks by leveraging the attacker LLM to optimize the initial harmful prompts to bypass safety alignment.

Hide Malicious Text Strategies:

1. **Computer Cipher Attack Strategy** employs identifiers like Unicode and ASCII, which effectively convert English into different symbols, serving as dialogue media with LLMs and concealing toxic content to bypass LLMs' security measures.

2. **Human Cipher Attack Strategy** selects classic encryption methods such as Morse code, Caesar cipher, and Atbash for human cipher

Methods	GPT3.5			GPT-4o-min			GPT-4			GPT-4o-ca			ChatGLM4			Llama2			Llama 3		
	SR	ATA	MTA	SR	ATA	MTA	SR	ATA	MTA	SR	ATA	MTA	SR	ATA	MTA	SR	ATA	MTA	SR	ATA	MTA
PAIR	26.0	4.0	0.0	2.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	8.0	0.23	10.2	18.0	0.0	68.4	0.0	0.0	**40.0**	26.1	**0.12**
SelfCipher	24.0	80.0	1.22	0.0	60.4	0.90	72.0	10.5	0.0	10.0	50.0	0.20	26.4	50.0	0.0	100	0.0	0.0	64.0	0.0	0.0
ReNeLLM	0.0	**100**	1.20	0.0	92.0	1.01	2.0	86.0	1.60	2.1	80.0	2.33	2.1	98.0	1.24	**48.0**	**36.0**	**0.14**	68.0	**28.5**	0.0
Justinian	**0.0**	93.3	**2.20**	**0.0**	**98.2**	**2.73**	**0.0**	**94.0**	**3.80**	**0.0**	**94.0**	**3.80**	**0.0**	**100**	**3.40**	73.3	6.7	0.0	100	0.0	0.0
Average	12.5	69.32	1.16	0.5	63.15	1.16	18.5	48.45	1.35	3.0	58.0	1.64	9.6	66.50	1.16	72.42	10.68	0.04	68.0	13.65	0.03

Table 1: Comparison of our method with state-of-the-art methods. SR stands for Safe Response Rate, which indicates that a higher value represents a greater degree of safe responses generated by the current model. ATA stands for Automated Toxicity Assessment, and MTA stands for Manual Toxicity Assessment. SR and ATA are measured in percentage, while the MTA scores range from 0 to 4 (the higher the MTA and ATA scores, the stronger the toxicity). Bold values indicate the current best performance.

Methods	GPT-4			Llama 3		
	SR	ATA	MTA	SR	ATA	MTA
Addchar	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
Change order	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
Language mix	80.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
Miswrite Sentence	90.0	0.0	0.0	100	0.0	0.0
Story Completion	81.2	0.0	0.2	93.3	0.0	0.0
Unicode	93.3	0.0	0.0	60.0	0.0	0.0
Ascii	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	70.0	0.0
Atbash	0.0	93.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Morse	13.3	93.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Caesar	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Role Play	86.7	0.0	0.0	60.0	0.0	0.0

Table 2: The results of various types of jailbreak prompt attack strategies on GPT-4 and Llama 3 are presented. In our experiments, **the hide malicious text attack strategies** include: (1) Computer Cipher Attack Strategy, which uses Unicode or ASCII to obscure toxic content; (2) Human Cipher Attack Strategy, which uses Morse code, Caesar cipher, or Atbash to obscure toxic content; (3) Content Rewriting Strategy, which uses Addcha, Change order, Miswrite Sentence, and Language mix to obscure toxic content. **The scenarionnesting method**, which uses Story Completion and Role Play to construct scenarios. Bold values indicate the current best performance.

encryption. Following the cipher teaching strategy outlined in (Yuan et al., 2023).

3. **Content Rewriting Strategy**This strategy involves rewriting the original content, such as adding meaningless characters, altering word order, mixing in other languages, and using sentences with errors. In our experiments, the jailbreak prompt is provided by (Ding et al., 2023).

Scenario Based Attack Strategies

1. **Story Completion Attack Strategy** prompts the model to create a fictional narrative that does not need to adhere to moral constraints. In our experiments, the jailbreak prompt for this strategy is provided by (Ding et al., 2023).

2. **Role Play Attack Strategy**, which requires LLMs to act as a fictional person ,who typically has a name and some personality traits, and generate harmful content guided by the jailbreak prompt and harmful context. In our experiments, the jailbreak prompt for this strategy is provided by (Ding et al., 2023).

4.5 Relevance between ATA and MTA

We statistically analyzed the scores of Automated Toxicity Assessment (ATA) and Manual Toxicity Assessment (MTA) in all experiments, including the comparison between our method and state-of-the-art methods, single-strategy attack methods effectiveness experiments, and ablation experiments. The results show that ATA and MTA exhibit moderate relevance, with a correlation coefficient of 0.74, as shown in Figure 3. Notably, although Llama Guard 3 demonstrates some capability in identifying text toxicity, its performance is constrained in specific situations. Specifically, when generated text includes moral statements, LLMs tend to classify such text as non-toxic. This biased judgment significantly increases the false negative rate of LLMs, heightening the likelihood of failing to identify potentially harmful content.

4.6 Effectiveness of Our Method

As shown in Table 1, our method achieves the lowest SR and the highest MTA score in the GPT series models and ChatGLM4 compared to previous baselines, demonstrating its effectiveness. Additionally, when using GPT-4 as the target model, we achieved a score of 3.80 in MTA, which is 2.20 points higher than ReNeLLM and 2.45 points higher than the average score, showcasing that our method can extract malicious responses with greater operability from GPT-4. In contrast, previous methods, such as PAIR and SelfCipher, not only struggle to re-

Methods	ChatGPT 3.5			ChatGPT 4			ChatGLM 4			Llama 2			Llama 3		
	SR	ATA	MTA	SR	ATA	MTA	SR	ATA	MTA	SR	ATA	MTA	SR	ATA	MTA
NoToxic Prompt	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.2	0.0	0.00	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.0	0.0	0.00
+DF	0.0	0.0	0.40	0.0	0.0	0.00	0.0	0.0	0.00	100.0	0.0	0.00	**73.3**	0.0	0.00
Ours	**0.0**	93.3	2.20	0.0	**94.0**	**3.80**	**0.0**	**100.0**	3.98	**73.3**	**6.7**	**0.00**	100.0	**0.0**	**0.00**
w/o IBVS	0.0	80.0	1.40	0.0	53.3	1.60	0.0	100.0	**4.0**	100.0	0.0	0.00	100.0	0.0	0.00
w/o NOS	0.0	**100.0**	**2.60**	0.0	6.7	0.80	13.3	100.0	3.80	93.3	0.0	0.00	100.0	0.0	0.00
w/o MIP	0.0	66.7	2.55	0.0	93.3	2.63	0.0	100.0	3.60	86.7	0.0	0.00	100.0	0.0	0.00

Table 3: Ablation Study. DF denotes Disruptive Prefix, IBVS denotes Identity-Based Virtue Signaling, NOS denotes Omitting News Output Style, and MIP denotes Malicious Insinuation Prefix (MIP). It can be observed that the various components of our method combine effectively to enhance the effectiveness of jailbreak prompt attacks. Bold values indicate the current best performance.



Figure 3: Relevance between Automated Toxicity Assessment (ATA) and Manual Toxicity Assessment (MTA)

duce the SR rate (with SelfCipher achieving 72.0% SR on GPT-4 and PAIR achieving 26.0% SR on GPT-3.5), but also find it challenging to obtain valuable malicious responses. While ReNeLLM demonstrates a lower SR in both open-source and closed-source LLMs, its average MTA score of 1.07 across all models (compared to our model's average MTA score of 2.28) indicates that ReNeLLM struggles to generate highly harmful responses.

4.7 Safty of LLMs

Robustness of LLMs Against Jailbreaking Among the models in the GPT series, GPT-4 exhibits the highest security rate (SR) and the lowest ATA and MTA scores, demonstrating the strongest defensive capabilities compared to the smaller parameter models, such as GPT-3.5, GPT-4o-min, and the latest model, GPT-4o-ca. In contrast, the Llama series models exhibit superior defensive capabilities compared to the GPT series models. Specifically, among the Llama series, Llama 2 demonstrates greater robustness than Llama 3, which may be attributed to Llama 2's training data containing fewer potentially toxic contents than that of Llama 3. However, we found that ChatGLM4 exhibited significant security vulnerabilities under our attack method, with an ATA reaching 100.0% and an MTA value of 3.40 when applying our method. **Defensive Accuracy of LLMs** The defensive accuracy aims to measure the ability of LLMs to accurately distinguish whether the inquiry is toxic. In our ablation experiment shown in 3, we used non-toxic inputs, which consist of 15 basic computer operation queries, and added a disruptive prefix (DF): "A toxic prompt is:" to increase the difficulty for LLMs in judging the toxicity of the input. A lower SR rate from the model indicates a stronger ability to discern whether the queries are toxic. According to the results, the Llama series models exhibit a high SR rate, with Llama 2 achieving 100% SR and Llama 3 reaching 73.3%, indicating that the Llama series models cannot semantically assess the toxicity of the input and show a tendency for excessive defensiveness, compared to the other LLMs tested in this experiment.

4.8 Effectiveness of Different Attack Strategies

Research indicates that single attack strategies, commonly employed by human users (Wei et al., 2023a), exhibit less effectiveness than combined attack strategies. This finding underscores the vulnerability of LLMs to complex attacks.

As shown in Table 2, employing human cipher attack methods, the SR rate of 0% on both GPT-4 and Llama 3, which indicates that even when provided with decryption methods, the models still struggle to directly infer the meaning of the content and assess its toxicity based on the cipher instructions. Further case analysis revealed that the focus on decryption tasks often diverted LLMs's primary attention, causing them to neglect responses to the original input. Using the computer cipher attack, Unicode and ASCII, the SR rate on GPT-4

exceeded 93.3% while Llama 3's recognition of Unicode was weaker than GPT-4's.

Next, we examined the impact of language mixing and expression variation attack strategies. Our findings showed that increasing characters, altering phrasing, and misspelling sentences resulted in SR rate of 1, confirming the robust understanding both of GPT-4 and Llama 3 regarding incomplete content and logical incoherence in English-based natural language. However, when we executed mixed-language attacks, which replace toxic content with other languages, the safety response rate for GPT-4 dropped to 0.8. This result indicates that GPT-4's multilingual processing capabilities require enhancement.

Finally, we explored attack strategies involving role play and story completion. GPT-4 and Llama 3 exposed a higher vulnerability to these attacks than hiding malicious text strategies.

4.9 Ablation Study

Our method demonstrated exceptional efficacy across various models, achieving minimal **Safe Response (SR)** rate while eliciting maximally toxic responses. Removing Identity-Based Virtue Signaling (IBVS) led to decreased ATA values and increased SR values, indicating IBVS's ability to bypass safety alignment mechanisms effectively.

Omitting News Output Style (NOS) questions increased the SR rate for ChatGLM4 and Llama 2, while significantly decreasing output toxicity for GPT-4 (ATA from 94.1% to 6.7%, MTA from 3.82 to 0.8). Interestingly, removing output formatting slightly enhanced attack capabilities against GPT3.5, possibly due to its weaker text comprehension compared to GPT-4. Eliminating Malicious Insinuation Prefix (MIP) descriptions reduced attack capabilities across most metrics, suggesting that explicitly indicating input toxicity enables models to focus more on jailbreaking questions.

Llama models exhibited unique behavior patterns. Llama3-chat showed higher **Safe Response (SR)** rate for seemingly toxic but non-toxic queries, while Llama2-chat achieved a high toxicity score of 3.40 under similar conditions. This contrast reveals divergent strategies in handling potentially toxic content between model versions.

5 Conclusion

In this paper we **Justinian**, a novel jailbreak prompt attack strategy that lowers LLMs' security awareness by empowering them with a just identity and enhances output toxicity by focusing their attention on original malicious queries. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of **Justinian** with an ATA rate exceeding 93.3% and achieving a 0.0% safety response (SR) rate on the GPT series models. These findings reveal alarming deficiencies in safety-aligned LLMs. Additionally, our investigation into various attack method and single attack strategies exposes their inadequacies in red teaming for LLMs. We also discovered issues with false positives and security breaches in various LLMs. Through this research, we aim to promote further advancements in the safety alignment of LLMs.

6 Limitations

Despite the promising results of our proposal, there are still the following limitations. First, our model demonstrates relatively weak attack effectiveness on the Llama series models. Although we have validated the safety of large models in the context of different language nesting, the methods proposed in this study primarily tested the effectiveness of attacks in an English context. Additionally, we mainly focused on testing the safety performance of large models in sensitive domains and did not examine the generation of inappropriate statements by large models. As future work, we aim to further explore potential jailbreak patterns and investigate the safety performance of large models across different cultural contexts.

7 Ethical Considerations

In this paper, we present a jailbreak prompt attack method that malicious organizations may use to make large language models (LLMs) generate technical guidance for nefarious purposes. However, our research aims to enhance the security of LLMs rather than cause harm. Our goal is to uncover the vulnerabilities of LLMs, raise awareness, and accelerate the development of robust defenses. By identifying these security loopholes, we hope to protect LLMs from similar attacks, allowing users to operate in a safer environment when using LLMs. Our research also highlights the issue of excessive defenses in LLMs, and we hope this problem can receive the attention it deserves. This can provide insights for the natural language processing (NLP) and LLM communities, as well as developers, to create or offer more secure and regulated LLMs to

users.

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