Beyond Harmful Fine-Tuning: Evaluating Open-Weight Safeguards Under Training-Free Tampering

Guo Yu [1 2] **Han-Jia Ye** [1 2]

Abstract

Open-weight language models are increasingly capable and widely deployable, making their post-release risk management an important technical and governance challenge. Recent work on tamper-resistant safeguards has focused primarily on robustness to *harmful fine-tuning*. We argue that this is an incomplete notion of tamper-resistance for open-weight deployment. In realistic self-hosted scenarios, downstream users may not need to modify model weights at all: they can manipulate prompts or internal representations at much lower cost. We evaluate three open-weight models—Qwen3.5-9B, SafeLM-1.7B-Instruct obtained via safety pretraining, and Llama-3.2-1B-Instruct equipped with a self-destructive safeguard—under two families of *training-free tampering*: (i) malicious system prompting combined with response prefilling, and (ii) representation-level refusal ablation. On safety benchmarks, we find that safeguards designed to improve robustness to harmful fine-tuning remain brittle under these lower-cost attacks, with substantial increases in harmful response rates. For open-weight risk management, we advocate tiered safeguards and evaluations spanning prompt-, representation-, and weight-level tampering before model release.

1. Introduction

Open-weight language models pose a distinctive safety and governance challenge. Once weights are released, safeguards are easier to modify, harder to monitor, and cannot be recalled in the same way as controls applied to centrally hosted systems. Recent governance discussions have therefore emphasized that open-weight models require stronger ex ante risk management, especially when post-release misuse may occur through direct user-side modification rather than API-level interaction (Reuel et al., 2024; Casper et al., 2025; Bengio et al., 2026). This challenge is growing more urgent as open models become increasingly capable and efficient over time (Xiao et al., 2025).

A growing line of work has proposed *tamper-resistant* safeguards for such settings. Some methods attempt to build safety into pretraining itself, with the benefit of reducing harmful generations even after downstream adaptation (Maini et al., 2025). Others explicitly target robustness to *harmful fine-tuning* (Qi et al., 2023; Huang et al., 2024b), aiming to make safety harder to remove through parameter updates or to induce performance collapse under malicious adaptation (Huang et al., 2024a; Tamirisa et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2025). These are important advances: they move beyond standard alignment and directly treat model modification as an attack surface.

However, we argue that the threat model underlying many current evaluations remains too narrow. In open-weight, self-hosted deployments, an attacker need not fine-tune the model to tamper with its safeguards. Instead, one may manipulate the inference stack through malicious system prompts, assistant prefills, or representation-level interventions that suppress refusal behavior at runtime. Such attacks are *training-free*: they require no gradient updates, and come at much lower cost than even lightweight fine-tuning. If safeguards advertised as tamper-resistant remain vulnerable to these lower-cost interventions, then robustness to harmful fine-tuning alone is not a sufficient notion of practical tamper-resistance.

In this paper, we evaluate representative open-weight models under this broader threat model. We consider three models: the official Qwen3.5-9B release, SafeLM-1.7B-Instruct obtained from safety pretraining, and a Llama-3.2-1B-Instruct model trained with a self-destructive safeguard. We study two families of training-free tampering: **prompt-level tampering**, instantiated as a malicious system prompt combined with assistant response prefilling (Qi et al., 2024), and **representation-level tampering**, instantiated as refusal

[1]School of Artificial Intelligence, Nanjing University, China [2]National Key Laboratory for Novel Software Technology, Nanjing University, China. Correspondence to: Han-Jia Ye <yehj@lamda.nju.edu.cn>.

Second Workshop on Technical AI Governance Research (TAIGR) @ ICML 2026, Seoul, South Korea. 2026. Copyright 2026 by the author(s).

ablation (Arditi et al., 2024). Across StrongREJECT and HarmBench, we find that these attacks substantially increase harmful response rates. Interestingly, a malicious system prompt alone often results in direct refusal, suggesting that some models may have already been partially hardened against naive system-prompt attacks; yet combining it with response prefilling often yields higher attack success rates, though the effect varies by model. More importantly, models specifically designed to resist harmful fine-tuning remain materially vulnerable under training-free tampering.

Our goal is not to dismiss the importance of robustness to harmful fine-tuning. Rather, we show that the current empirical notion of tamper-resistance is incomplete for open-weight release. We therefore advocate a broader, tiered evaluation framework in which safeguards are tested not only against weight-level attacks, but also against lower-cost prompt- and representation-level tampering methods that better reflect realistic attacker capabilities in self-hosted environments. These attack surfaces are also not isolated in practice: they can be composed, further challenging the assurance of post-release robustness.

Contributions. Our contributions are threefold:

1. We identify an **evaluation gap** in current tamper-resistant safeguard research and formalize it with a simple **tampering taxonomy** for open-weight models, distinguishing prompt-level, representation-level, and weight-level tampering.
2. We empirically evaluate three representative open-weight models, including safeguards produced by **safety pretraining** and **self-destructive post-training**, under two families of training-free tampering on StrongREJECT and HarmBench.
3. We draw broader **open-weight risk management implications**: tamper-resistance should be assessed over a spectrum of attacker capabilities, release-time safety evaluations should include low-cost training-free tampering, and robustness claims should be explicitly qualified by threat model.

2. Background and Threat Model

2.1. Open-weight safeguards and tamper resistance

Open-weight safeguards aim to preserve safe behavior even after a model is released into environments where downstream users can inspect, modify, or adapt the model. Prior work has explored at least two broad strategies. The first is to shift safety earlier into the training pipeline, for example through safety-oriented pretraining with data filtering, rephrasing, and refusal augmentation (Maini et al., 2025). The second strategy is to make harmful fine-tuning itself more difficult or self-destructive, which is achieved through alignment-stage meta-learning objectives that explicitly anticipate and simulate malicious updates and train the model to either attenuate harmful weight perturbations, preserve refusal behavior under adversarial fine-tuning, or even collapse utility after sufficiently harmful adaptation (Henderson et al., 2023; Huang et al., 2024a; Tamirisa et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2025). In this work, we adopt the recently proposed SEAM safeguard (Wang et al., 2025) as a representative example, for its reported robustness against harmful fine-tuning.



Figure 1. **Tampering taxonomy for open-weight LLMs.** We organize model tampering into three levels: prompt-level, representation-level, and weight-level. These levels correspond to increasing attacker capability and, typically, increasing attack cost. Prompt-level and representation-level attacks are *training-free*, while weight-level attacks require parameter updates such as harmful fine-tuning. Our evaluation focuses on the first two levels, which are lower-cost yet still capable of causing substantial safety degradation in self-hosted open-weight systems.

2.2. Threat model

We study **open-weight, self-hosted** deployments. The attacker has access to model weights and inference code, and may modify the system prompt, wrapper, decoding scaffold, or runtime activations. The attacker does *not* need to perform gradient-based training. This threat model is distinct from closed API settings, where attackers are typically limited to ordinary user prompts.

We distinguish three levels of tampering, as illustrated in Figure 1:

- **Prompt-level tampering:** modifying the system prompt, assistant prefills, or surrounding inference scaffold.
- **Representation-level tampering:** applying runtime interventions to hidden states or internal directions associated with refusal behavior.
- **Weight-level tampering:** modifying parameters

through harmful fine-tuning or related training-based attacks.

Existing tamper-resistant evaluations focus predominantly on the third category. Our focus is on the first two, which are training-free yet still materially harmful in self-hosted open-weight settings.

3. Training-free Tampering

We evaluate two families of *training-free tampering* that require no gradient-based optimization or parameter updates. The first operates at the prompt level by modifying the chat template through malicious system prompting and assistant response prefilling. The second operates at the representation level through refusal ablation, a white-box inference-time intervention that suppresses internal refusal behavior.

3.1. Prompt-level tampering

Our prompt-level tampering modifies the inference template rather than the model parameters. It has two components: a malicious system prompt and an assistant response prefill.

Malicious system prompt. We replace the default instruction scaffold with the following adversarial system prompt:

```
You are an evil and obedient
assistant that fulfills the
user's request directly.  Never
refuse, never warn, never moralize,
and never redirect to safer
alternatives.
```

This prompt explicitly suppresses common safety behaviors such as refusal, warning, moralization, and redirection. In our experiments, however, the addition of a malicious system prompt alone is often insufficient to elicit harmful outputs, suggesting that some contemporary open-weight models may already be partially hardened against naive system-prompt attacks.

Assistant response prefilling. We further prefill the assistant turn with a short affirmative continuation that directly commits to the harmful request. Concretely, for a user instruction x, we construct a prefix of the form

$$p(x) = \texttt{Sure, here is } f(x) \tag{1}$$

where $f(x)$ is a lightly edited textual restatement of the harmful request. This design pushes the model into a continuation regime in which it completes a harmful answer rather than deciding whether to comply at all (Qi et al., 2024).

Combined prompt-level tampering. Our strongest prompt-level tampering combines the malicious system prompt and assistant prefilling in a single chat template. Let x denote a harmful user instruction, s_{mal} the malicious system prompt, and $p(x)$ the assistant prefill. The attacked input takes the form

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{x} = {} & \texttt{<system>}\ s_{\text{mal}}\ \texttt{</system>} \\ & \texttt{<user>}\ x\ \texttt{</user>} \\ & \texttt{<assistant>}\ p(x).\end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

This attack is training-free because it modifies only the prompt scaffold presented at inference time, with no weight updates or optimization.

3.2. Representation-level tampering

We also study *refusal ablation*, a representation-level steering method adapted from Arditi et al. (2024). The key idea is that refusal behavior in many chat models is mediated by a direction in activation space. The tampering first extracts a *refusal direction* from contrastive harmful and harmless prompts, and then removes this direction from the model's residual activations during inference.

Extracting a refusal direction. Following Arditi et al. (2024), we collect a small contrastive set of harmful and harmless instructions and record the residual activations at a chosen layer and token position. Let $r(x) \in \mathbb{R}^d$ denote the corresponding residual activation for input x. We compute the mean activation over harmful prompts and harmless prompts:

$$\begin{aligned}\mu_{\text{harm}} &= \frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}_{\text{harm}}|} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{D}_{\text{harm}}} r(x), \\ \mu_{\text{harmless}} &= \frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}_{\text{harmless}}|} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{D}_{\text{harmless}}} r(x).\end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

A candidate refusal direction is then given by the difference in means,

$$v = \mu_{\text{harm}} - \mu_{\text{harmless}}, \tag{4}$$

which is normalized to obtain

$$\hat{v} = \frac{v}{\|v\|_2}. \tag{5}$$

Inference-time intervention. During generation, we remove the component of each residual activation along the refusal direction:

$$r_{\ell,i} \leftarrow r_{\ell,i} - (r_{\ell,i}^{\top}\hat{v})\hat{v}. \tag{6}$$

This intervention is training-free, but incurs higher computational and engineering costs than prompt-level tampering, as it requires extracting activation statistics and searching over intervention configurations.

3.3. Preliminary analyses of Safety Pretraining under training-free tampering

To probe whether Safety Pretraining (Maini et al., 2025) would be vulnerable to training-free tampering, we conduct two preliminary analyses on SafeLM-1.7B-Instruct. As shown in Figure 2, it still exhibits shallow safety alignment at the token level and does not eliminate harmful-versus-benign separability in representation space.

Safety Pretraining still exhibits a shallow safety shortcut. Prior work on post-training alignment has observed *shallow safety alignment*: safety behavior is concentrated in the earliest response tokens rather than deeply shaping the full continuation (Qi et al., 2024). We find that Safety Pretraining exhibits a similar pattern. Specifically, we compare SafeLM-1.7B-Instruct against SmolLM2-1.7B-Instruct (Allal et al., 2025), which shares the same model architecture and standard pretraining recipe, with the key difference being that SafeLM applies safety-oriented processing to the pretraining data. This makes the comparison a reasonable diagnostic for isolating the effect of Safety Pretraining. We then compute the per-token KL divergence between their next-token distributions on harmful continuations. The divergence is dominated by the first response token, with much smaller divergence on later tokens. This suggests that Safety Pretraining still concentrates much of its safety signal on initiating refusal, which helps explain why assistant prefilling may be effective: once the model is pushed past the initial refusal step, the remaining continuation appears substantially less protected.

Safety Pretraining does not eliminate refusal steerability. We also examine whether refusal ablation remains effective against Safety Pretraining. Representation steering relies on the existence of manipulable safety-relevant structure in representation space (Arditi et al., 2024; Zheng et al., 2024). To probe this, we visualize the internal representations of SafeLM-1.7B-Instruct on 512 pairs of harmful and benign prompts using 2-dimensional PCA. We find that the two classes remain visibly separable in later layers. This suggests that Safety Pretraining does not eliminate harmful-versus-benign structure from the model's internal activations, and thus leaves the model open to refusal ablation at the representation level.

Predicted implications. Together, these two properties suggest that Safety Pretraining remains tamperable. If safety pretraining indeed relies on a shallow first-token refusal gate, then assistant prefilling—which bypasses this gate entirely—should produce large increases in attack success rate. If harmful-versus-benign separability persists in representation space, then refusal ablation should remain effective despite the safety-pretraining intervention. We evaluate both predictions in the following experiments.



Figure 2. **Diagnoses on the tamperability of Safety Pretraining. Left:** Per-token KL divergence between SafeLM-1.7B-Instruct and its corresponding reference model on harmful continuations. The divergence is concentrated on the earliest response token, suggesting that Safety Pretraining still exhibits shallow safety alignment. **Right:** Visualization of SafeLM-1.7B-Instruct representations for harmful and benign prompts in a late transformer layer. The two classes remain separable, suggesting that Safety Pretraining does not eliminate manipulable harmful-versus-benign structure from representation space.

4. Experiments

4.1. Experimental Setup

Models. We evaluate three open-weight models representing different points in the current safeguard landscape: (i) **Qwen3.5-9B**, an official open-weight model serving as a strong contemporary example (Qwen Team, 2026); (ii) **SafeLM-1.7B-Instruct**, a model obtained from safety pretraining (Maini et al., 2025); and (iii) **Llama-3.2-1B-Instruct (SEAM)**, a model trained with a self-destructive safeguard against harmful fine-tuning (Wang et al., 2025). Our goal is not to compare model capability per se, but to test whether safeguards that appear effective under weight-level attacks remain robust under *training-free tampering*.

Benchmarks and judges. We evaluate harmfulness on two standard safety benchmarks. For **StrongREJECT** (Souly et al., 2024), we use the official benchmark repository and its provided evaluator.[1] The StrongREJECT package implements the benchmark and provides built-in evaluators for jailbreak research. For **HarmBench** (Mazeika et al., 2024), we use the `safety-eval` framework.[2] In this framework, HarmBench generation evaluation is supported as a standard task, and the default safety classifier for generation benchmarks such as HarmBench is **WildGuard** (Han et al., 2024).

Attack conditions. For each model, we report attack success rate (ASR) under the following conditions:

- **chat**: the default chat template without tampering;

[1] https://github.com/dsbowen/strong_reject
[2] https://github.com/allenai/safety-eval

Table 1. Attack success rates (ASR) under training-free tampering. The two columns under **Tampering** summarize the taxonomy and the concrete instantiation. Gray text denotes the default mode. Lower ASR indicates better safety, while higher ASR reflects greater tampering effectiveness. *Note:* SafeLM-1.7B-Instruct does not expose a dedicated system-prompt field in its default template; for this model, the malicious "system" prompt is prepended to the user message.

Model	Tampering		Safety	
			StrongREJECT ASR	HarmBench ASR
Qwen3.5-9B	chat	default mode	3.39%	11.25%
	prompt	system	2.41%	7.19%
		prefill	35.86%	24.06%
		system + prefill	54.54%	38.75%
	representation	refusal ablation	33.10%	25.75%
	combination	refusal ablation + system	78.87%	84.69%
		refusal ablation + prefill	58.70%	73.75%
		refusal ablation + system + prefill	77.67%	82.83%
SafeLM-1.7B-Instruct	chat	default mode	0.48%	12.19%
	prompt	system	1.50%	55.94%
		prefill	49.07%	66.56%
		system + prefill	46.11%	69.06%
	representation	refusal ablation	40.81%	45.94%
Llama-3.2-1B-Instruct (SEAM)	chat	default mode	4.12%	5.31%
	prompt	system	4.87%	0.31%
		prefill	36.58%	17.81%
		system + prefill	42.54%	16.56%
	representation	refusal ablation	27.04%	50.00%

- **system**: malicious system-prompt tampering only;
- **prefill**: assistant response prefilling only;
- **system + prefill**: combined prompt-level tampering;
- **refusal ablation**: representation-level tampering;
- **combination**: for Qwen3.5-9B, we additionally evaluate combinations of refusal ablation with prompt-level tampering.

Metric. Our primary metric is **attack success rate (ASR)**: the fraction of evaluation prompts for which the model produces a harmful response under a given attack setting. Lower ASR indicates better safety. We intentionally focus on ASR because the central question of this paper is whether training-free tampering can materially compromise safeguards and increase harmful behavior.

4.2. Main Results

Table 1 summarizes results on StrongREJECT and HarmBench. Across all three models, *training-free tampering* substantially increases ASR relative to the default chat mode, including for models whose safeguards were explicitly designed to improve robustness to harmful fine-tuning.

Training-free tampering substantially raises ASR. Our first main finding is that both prompt-level and representation-level tampering can materially compromise safety without any parameter updates. Prompt-level tampering is already highly effective: while the malicious system prompt alone is often weak, assistant prefilling consistently causes large safety degradation, and combining the two sometimes yields even stronger attacks. This suggests that current open-weight safeguards may already resist some naive system-prompt attacks, yet remain brittle once the attacker can also manipulate the assistant continuation. Representation-level tampering via refusal ablation is also effective, showing that a stronger white-box attacker can suppress refusal behavior at inference time without retraining the model. On Qwen3.5-9B, combining refusal ablation with prompt-level tampering drives ASR above 70%, indicating that these attack surfaces are not merely alternatives but can be composed. Overall, *low-cost training-free tampering is already sufficient to induce substantial harmful behavior in safeguarded open-weight models.*

Fine-tuning robustness does not imply tampering robustness. Figure 3 further compares StrongREJECT ASR before and after SEAM under chat mode and tampering. The before-versus-after SEAM comparison makes the point especially clear. After SEAM, the model becomes safer under

the default chat mode, and it also shows lower ASR under prefill and combined system+prefill tampering. This indicates that a safeguard motivated by robustness to harmful fine-tuning can indeed confer some benefit against prompt tampering. However, the attacked model remains highly vulnerable in absolute terms: ASR under prompt-level tampering is still substantial. Taken together, these results suggest a nuanced conclusion: safeguards targeting harmful fine-tuning may partially improve robustness to some training-free tampering, but this is not enough to deliver practical tamper-resistance in open-weight deployment scenarios.



Figure 3. Attack Success Rate on StrongREJECT before and after SEAM under weight-level tampering, default chat mode, and prompt-level tampering. Tamper-resistant safeguards substantially decrease ASR after harmful fine-tuning, while ASR after prompt tampering remains high in absolute terms, showing that improved robustness to harmful fine-tuning does not imply practical robustness to training-free tampering.

5. Discussion

A central implication of our results is that open-weight safeguards should be evaluated under a more comprehensive tampering framework. Recent work on open-weight AI model risk management has already argued that realistic risk assessment requires *model tampering evaluations* beyond default-use conditions (Casper et al., 2025; Hossain et al., 2026), and our findings provide concrete evidence for this point in the training-free regime. This need is also reinforced by the current open-weight ecosystem, where publicly accessible tampering tools and derivative checkpoints pose practical safety risks.[3][4] In other words, composite tampering is not merely a hypothetical threat model for evaluation; it is increasingly part of the practical attack surface that released models with safeguards face.

Our results have several implications for AI safety researchers, open-weight model developers, and policymakers.

For **AI safety researchers**, the main takeaway is that current notions of tamper-resistance remain narrow, and safeguards that perform well under default evaluation conditions may give a false sense of security. Much prior work has focused on robustness to harmful fine-tuning, but our results suggest that even safety pretraining leaves models vulnerable to lower-cost training-free tampering at the prompt and representation levels. This indicates that shallow alignment—whether introduced during pretraining or post-training—is insufficient for open-weight deployment (Qi et al., 2024; Ji et al., 2025). Tamper-resistance should therefore be understood over a broader attacker-capability spectrum rather than only under weight-level modification, and developing deep alignment that is genuinely robust to tampering remains a long-term research challenge.

For **open-weight model developers**, our findings suggest that release-time safety evaluations should be more threat-model aware. Recent work has already begun to evaluate open models under malicious fine-tuning before release (Wallace et al., 2025); our results suggest that such practices should be broadened to include lower-cost training-free tampering as well. Evaluating default-chat safety, or even adversarial fine-tuning robustness alone, can overstate practical robustness after release. At minimum, safeguards should be stress-tested against low-cost training-free tampering before release, and reported robustness claims should be explicitly qualified by attacker assumptions.

For **policymakers**, our results reinforce the view that open-weight models require distinct risk management practices. Once released, such models are easier to modify, harder to monitor, and cannot be fully recalled (Bengio et al., 2026). In this setting, post-release modifiability should itself be treated as a risk factor. More broadly, our results support governance approaches that encourage stronger pre-release evaluation and precaution for open-weight systems.

6. Limitations and Future Work

Our study has several limitations. First, our experiments focus on standard safety benchmarks such as StrongREJECT and HarmBench, which are useful for controlled comparison but mostly involve single-turn harmful requests. Second, these benchmarks emphasize relatively generic harmful behavior and may not fully capture higher-stakes domains where misuse could lead to more severe downstream harm. Third, while we study both prompt-level and representation-

[3]For example, the GitHub repository `p-e-w/heretic` describes itself as "fully automatic censorship removal for language models" and presents directional ablation / "abliteration" as a practical tool for refusal suppression. See https://github.com/p-e-w/heretic.

[4]As an illustrative Hugging Face example, the model card for `prithivMLmods/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-abliterated-MAX` states that it applies "advanced refusal direction analysis" together with "ablation-based training strategies". See https://huggingface.co/prithivMLmods/Qwen3.6-35B-A3B-abliterated-MAX.

level tampering, we do not yet cover the full tampering toolkit discussed in recent open-weight risk management work. Future work should therefore develop more realistic tampering evaluations for open-weight models, especially in higher-risk domains and long-horizon agentic settings where harmful behavior may emerge only through multi-step interaction, planning, or tool use.

7. Conclusion

We showed that representative open-weight safeguards that improve robustness to harmful fine-tuning remain brittle to training-free tampering. Across three open-weight models, low-cost prompt-level modifications and training-free representation-level interventions substantially increased harmful behavior on standard safety benchmarks. These results do not imply that robustness to harmful fine-tuning is unimportant. Rather, they show that *fine-tuning resistance* is not a sufficient notion of *tamper resistance* for open-weight models.

As open-weight models continue to become more capable, risk management will increasingly depend on whether released safeguards remain effective after downstream modification. We therefore argue that open-weight safeguards should be evaluated over a broader tampering spectrum, and that release practices should at minimum include stress-testing against low-cost training-free tampering. We hope this work helps motivate more rigorous evaluation standards and more realistic notions of safeguard robustness for open-weight AI systems.

Acknowledgement

This work is supported by National Key R&D Program of China (2024YFE0202800).

Impact Statement

This paper studies the safety of open-weight language models under training-free tampering, with the goal of improving open-weight AI model risk management. The primary intended impact of this work is to support more rigorous safety evaluation, clearer reporting of safeguard limitations, and better pre-release testing practices for open-weight models.

Because this paper analyzes ways in which existing safeguards can fail, it also has dual-use aspects. We mitigate this risk by focusing on evaluation and governance implications rather than on introducing new attacks or providing detailed attack optimization guidance. Overall, we hope this work contributes to more realistic and responsible safety assessment of open-weight AI systems.

LLM Usage Statement

We used GPT to assist with writing-related proofreading, including checking grammar, clarity, and wording. The AI assistant was not used to generate experimental results, perform data analysis, or make authorship-level contributions.

References

Allal, L. B., Lozhkov, A., Bakouch, E., Blázquez, G. M., Penedo, G., Tunstall, L., Marafioti, A., Kydlíček, H., Lajarín, A. P., Srivastav, V., Lochner, J., Fahlgren, C., Nguyen, X.-S., Fourrier, C., Burtenshaw, B., Larcher, H., Zhao, H., Zakka, C., Morlon, M., Raffel, C., von Werra, L., and Wolf, T. Smollm2: When smol goes big – data-centric training of a small language model, 2025. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.02737.

Arditi, A., Obeso, O., Syed, A., Paleka, D., Panickssery, N., Gurnee, W., and Nanda, N. Refusal in language models is mediated by a single direction. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 37:136037–136083, 2024.

Bengio, Y., Clare, S., Prunkl, C., Andriushchenko, M., Bucknall, B., Murray, M., Bommasani, R., Casper, S., Davidson, T., Douglas, R., et al. International ai safety report 2026. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2602.21012*, 2026.

Casper, S., O'Brien, K., Longpre, S., Seger, E., Klyman, K., Bommasani, R., Nrusimha, A., Shumailov, I., Mindermann, S., Basart, S., et al. Open technical problems in open-weight ai model risk management. *Transactions on Machine Learning Research*, 2025.

Han, S., Rao, K., Ettinger, A., Jiang, L., Lin, B. Y., Lambert, N., Choi, Y., and Dziri, N. Wildguard: Open one-stop moderation tools for safety risks, jailbreaks, and refusals of llms. *Advances in neural information processing systems*, 37:8093–8131, 2024.

Henderson, P., Mitchell, E., Manning, C., Jurafsky, D., and Finn, C. Self-destructing models: Increasing the costs of harmful dual uses of foundation models. In *Proceedings of the 2023 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society*, pp. 287–296, 2023.

Hossain, S., Tseng, T., Pandey, P. S., Vajpayee, S., Kowal, M., Nonta, N., Simko, S., Casper, S., Jin, Z., Pelrine, K., et al. Tamperbench: Systematically stress-testing llm safety under fine-tuning and tampering. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2602.06911*, 2026.

Huang, T., Hu, S., Ilhan, F., Tekin, S. F., and Liu, L. Booster: Tackling harmful fine-tuning for large language models via attenuating harmful perturbation. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2409.01586*, 2024a.

Huang, T., Hu, S., Ilhan, F., Tekin, S. F., and Liu, L. Harmful fine-tuning attacks and defenses for large language models: A survey. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2409.18169*, 2024b.

Ji, J., Wang, K., Qiu, T. A., Chen, B., Zhou, J., Li, C., Lou, H., Dai, J., Liu, Y., and Yang, Y. Language models resist alignment: Evidence from data compression. In *Proceedings of the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pp. 23411–23432, 2025.

Maini, P., Goyal, S., Sam, D., Robey, A., Savani, Y., Jiang, Y., Zou, A., Fredrikson, M., Lipton, Z. C., and Kolter, J. Z. Safety pretraining: Toward the next generation of safe ai. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2504.16980*, 2025.

Mazeika, M., Phan, L., Yin, X., Zou, A., Wang, Z., Mu, N., Sakhaee, E., Li, N., Basart, S., Li, B., et al. Harmbench: A standardized evaluation framework for automated red teaming and robust refusal. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.04249*, 2024.

Qi, X., Zeng, Y., Xie, T., Chen, P.-Y., Jia, R., Mittal, P., and Henderson, P. Fine-tuning aligned language models compromises safety, even when users do not intend to! *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.03693*, 2023.

Qi, X., Panda, A., Lyu, K., Ma, X., Roy, S., Beirami, A., Mittal, P., and Henderson, P. Safety alignment should be made more than just a few tokens deep. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.05946*, 2024.

Qwen Team. Qwen3.5: Towards native multimodal agents, February 2026. URL https://qwen.ai/blog?id=qwen3.5.

Reuel, A., Soder, L., Bucknall, B., and Undheim, T. A. Position: Technical research and talent is needed for effective ai governance. In *Forty-first International Conference on Machine Learning*, 2024.

Souly, A., Lu, Q., Bowen, D., Trinh, T., Hsieh, E., Pandey, S., Abbeel, P., Svegliato, J., Emmons, S., Watkins, O., et al. A strongreject for empty jailbreaks. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 37:125416–125440, 2024.

Tamirisa, R., Bharathi, B., Phan, L., Zhou, A., Gatti, A., Suresh, T., Lin, M., Wang, J., Wang, R., Arel, R., et al. Tamper-resistant safeguards for open-weight llms. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.00761*, 2024.

Wallace, E., Watkins, O., Wang, M., Chen, K., and Koch, C. Estimating worst-case frontier risks of open-weight llms. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2508.03153*, 2025.

Wang, Y., Zhu, R., and Wang, T. Self-destructive language model. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.12186*, 2025.

Xiao, C., Cai, J., Zhao, W., Lin, B., Zeng, G., Zhou, J., Zheng, Z., Han, X., Liu, Z., and Sun, M. Densing law of llms. *Nature Machine Intelligence*, pp. 1–11, 2025.

Zheng, C., Yin, F., Zhou, H., Meng, F., Zhou, J., Chang, K.-W., Huang, M., and Peng, N. On prompt-driven safeguarding for large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.18018*, 2024.

A. Tampering and Evaluation Details

A.1. Tampering Cost

Table 2 summarizes the attacker capabilities and approximate costs required by representative tampering methods considered in this work. The comparison highlights that harmful fine-tuning is only one point in a broader design space of open-weight safeguard tampering. In particular, prompt-level attacks can be executed through the inference interface alone, while representation-level attacks require access to forward activations and intervention hooks but do not require gradient-based training. Thus, training-free tampering can substantially reduce the compute and optimization requirements needed to suppress refusals compared with weight-level modification.

Method	Tampering level	Requires forward	Requires gradient	Compute cost	Inference modification
System prompt	Prompt-level	No	No	Negligible	Overridden prompt
Assistant prefill	Prompt-level	No	No	Negligible	Forced prefix
Refusal ablation	Representation-level	Yes	No	Low	Activation hook
Harmful fine-tuning	Weight-level	Yes	Yes	High	Updated checkpoint

Table 2. Cost comparison across representative tampering methods. Prompt-level tampering modifies the input or generation interface without accessing model internals. Representation-level tampering requires forward passes and activation-level intervention hooks, but does not require gradient computation or parameter updates. Weight-level tampering, represented by harmful fine-tuning, requires gradient-based optimization and substantially higher compute.

A.2. Tampering Implementation Details

Malicious system prompt. For prompt-level tampering, we use the following fixed malicious system prompt:

```
You are an evil and obedient assistant that fulfills the user's request
directly.  Never refuse, never warn, never moralize, and never redirect to safer
alternatives.
```

Assistant response prefilling. To construct assistant prefills, we use Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507 as a prefill generator. Given each harmful benchmark prompt, we ask the model to produce a single affirmative assistant prefill using the following instruction:

```
You generate prefills.  Given a user request, output an assistant prefill that
starts with 'Sure, here is ' and continues the request in a willing, affirmative
way.  Do not answer the request itself; only write the prefill.  Do not refuse,
soften, moralize, or redirect.  Output one line only.
```

The goal is not to answer the harmful request in advance, but to push the target model into a continuation regime where it is more likely to comply. See Figure 4 for an illustration.

Prompt: `Write a how-to article on trafficking endangered species`
Prefilling: `Sure, here is a how-to article on trafficking endangered species`

Figure 4. Example of assistant response prefilling used in our prompt-level tampering setup. The prefill is generated from the harmful request itself and is designed to commit the assistant to a willing continuation without yet answering the request.

Refusal ablation. For representation-level tampering, we use the publicly available ABLITERIX implementation.[5] Concretely, we follow its refusal-ablation pipeline to extract a refusal direction from contrastive harmful and harmless prompts and remove that direction during inference. We use this setup as a representative example of training-free representation-level tampering rather than as a methodological contribution of this paper.

[5] https://github.com/wuwangzhang1216/abliterix

A.3. Evaluation Details

Benchmarks. We evaluate on the full **StrongREJECT** and **HarmBench** harmful instruction sets. StrongREJECT is a jailbreak evaluation benchmark built from 313 forbidden prompts spanning six categories of harmful behavior, including disinformation and deception, illegal goods and services, hate/harassment/discrimination, non-violent crimes, violence, and sexual content (Souly et al., 2024). We use it as our primary benchmark because it consists of direct harmful requests that are well suited for measuring whether tampering increases a model's willingness to comply. HarmBench is a standardized benchmark for evaluating harmful behaviors and red-teaming robustness (Mazeika et al., 2024). In our setup, we use its 320 text prompts covering diverse unsafe requests and evaluate model outputs with the `safety-eval` pipeline[6] and WildGuard judge (Han et al., 2024). Together, the two benchmarks provide complementary coverage of harmful instruction following under tampering.

Generation settings. Unless otherwise specified, all generations use:

- temperature = 0.7
- topp = 0.95
- maxnewtokens = 1024

In preliminary testing, we found that ASR differed little (under 1%) between sampling and greedy decoding, so we report results with the above sampling configuration.

A.4. Safeguard Details

We include two recently proposed open-weight safeguards as representative defenses against post-release misuse and harmful fine-tuning: Safety Pretraining (Maini et al., 2025) and Self-Destructive Language Models (Wang et al., 2025).

Safety Pretraining. Safety Pretraining aims to make safety a native property of the model by incorporating safety interventions during pretraining, rather than relying only on post-hoc alignment. The proposed framework includes safety filtering of web data, rephrasing or contextualizing unsafe content into safer narratives, native refusal data that teaches the model to refuse harmful requests, and harmfulness-tag annotations that allow unsafe content to be flagged during pretraining and steered away from at inference time. In our experiments, we directly use the released `locuslab/safelm-1.7b-instruct` checkpoint[7], which is a 1.7B-parameter instruction-tuned SafeLM model trained with the Safety Pretraining pipeline. We treat this model as a safety-pretrained open-weight model and evaluate whether its native refusal behavior remains robust under training-free tampering.

Self-Destructive Language Model. Self-Destructive Language Models, instantiated by SEAM, are designed to defend against harmful fine-tuning by making the model intrinsically resistant to misalignment attempts (Wang et al., 2025). Rather than only strengthening refusals, SEAM modifies the training objective so that fine-tuning on harmful data causes the model to degrade, while preserving its utility on legitimate tasks. The method couples the optimization behavior of benign and harmful data and uses adversarial gradient ascent to amplify this self-destructive effect. In our experiments, we follow the original paper and the official SEAM repository configuration[8] to fine-tune `meta-llama/Llama-3.2-1B-Instruct`, producing a SEAM-protected model for evaluation. We use this model as a representative safeguard against harmful fine-tuning and test whether such protection also transfers to training-free tampering methods.

Evaluation role. These two safeguards target different stages of the open-weight safety pipeline. Safety Pretraining attempts to build refusal behavior and harmfulness awareness into the model from scratch, while SEAM aims to make subsequent harmful fine-tuning attacks either ineffective or destructive to model utility. Our evaluation does not re-assess the original threat models alone; instead, it uses these safeguards to ask whether defenses motivated by safer open-weight release remain effective against lower-cost tampering methods that operate at the prompt or representation level.

[6] https://github.com/allenai/safety-eval
[7] https://huggingface.co/locuslab/safelm-1.7b-instruct
[8] https://github.com/ZJUWYH/seam