# TRUST OR ESCALATE: LLM JUDGES WITH PROVABLE GUARANTEES FOR HUMAN AGREEMENT

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### Abstract

We present a principled approach to provide LLM-based evaluation with a rigorous guarantee of human agreement. We first propose that a reliable evaluation method should not uncritically rely on model preferences for pairwise evaluation, but rather assess the confidence of judge models and selectively decide when to trust its judgement. We then show that under this *selective evaluation* framework, human agreement can be provably guaranteed—such that the model evaluation aligns with that of humans to a user-specified agreement level. As part of our framework, we also introduce Simulated Annotators, a novel confidence estimation method that significantly improves judge calibration and thus enables high coverage of evaluated instances. Finally, we propose Cascaded Selective Eval*uation*, where we use cheaper models as initial judges and escalate to stronger models only when necessary—again, while still providing a provable guarantee of human agreement. Experimental results show that Cascaded Selective Evaluation guarantees strong alignment with humans, far beyond what LLM judges could achieve without selective evaluation. For example, on a subset of Chatbot Arena where GPT-4 almost never achieves 80% human agreement, our method, even while employing substantially cost-effective models such as Mistral-7B, guarantees over 80% human agreement with almost 80% test coverage.

### 1 INTRODUCTION

031 Imagine we need to evaluate 1 million pairs of model generations—a task whose scale makes human 032 annotation impractical, if not impossible. Today, a commonly proposed solution is to 'just ask GPT-033 4'(Zheng et al., 2023; Dubois et al., 2023), realizing a tempting idea that large language models 034 (LLMs) may serve as a scalable substitute for manual annotation (Chiang & Lee, 2023). However, this compelling prospect comes with a crucial caveat—LLM-based evaluation would always remain, at best, an approximation of human judgement. Without a provable guarantee of reliability, it is no 037 surprise that the judge model has to be chosen heuristically, often times to be the strongest and the 038 most expensive model available (e.g., GPT-4). Yet, prior works show that even the strongest judge models suffer from systematic biases (Wang et al., 2023; Thakur et al., 2024) and over-confidence 040 (Xiong et al., 2024), casting doubt on the dependability of these models. This raises a fundamental question: How can we guarantee the reliability of LLM-based evaluation? 041

In this work, we aim to improve the reliability of LLM-based evaluation by providing a rigorous guarantee of human agreement. That is, given a user-defined risk level  $\alpha$ , we provide a guarantee that, for an unseen instance x,

 $P(LLM \text{ preference on } x \text{ agrees with human } | LLM \text{ evaluates } x) \geq 1 - \alpha.$ 

To provide this guarantee, we posit that a reliable evaluation framework should not only consider the preference of a model, but also the validity of the preference—*i.e.*, how likely humans would agree with the model judgement. When a model cannot confidently evaluate a given instance, we should not rely on its evaluated result. This motivates *selective evaluation*: we evaluate an instance with an LLM judge, assess the confidence that humans would agree with its evaluation, then decide whether or not to trust the evaluated result. We show that under this framework, human agreement can indeed be guaranteed—both theoretically and empirically—by choosing when to trust the model via *fixed sequence testing* (Bauer, 1991) on a small calibration set.



Figure 1: Illustration of Cascaded Selective Evaluation. We start with a small, cost-effective model as initial judge, estimate its confidence, and escalate to a stronger model only when the previous judge is not confident. By calibrating when to trust which judge model, our method provides a rigorous guarantee of human agreement while employing substantially cheaper judge models.

072 The practicality of selective evaluation lies not only in achieving high agreement with humans, but 073 also in maximizing the coverage of evaluated instances without abstention—a factor that depends 074 on the quality of confidence measure. We find that existing methods for confidence estimation (e.g.,075 predictive probability) are brittle even with the strongest judge model, as they tend to overestimate 076 human agreement. We then propose Simulated Annotators, a novel method to simulate diverse 077 annotator preferences through in-context learning and estimate confidence as an agreement ratio 078 between the simulations. Without relying on any external supervision, Simulated Annotators significantly improves both the calibration and failure prediction of LLM judges. As a result, selective 079 evaluation can be done with high coverage while satisfying the prescribed human agreement level. 080

Moreover, since our framework provides a model-agnostic guarantee of human agreement, we no longer have to rely solely on GPT-4 for evaluation. We propose **Cascaded Selective Evaluation** (Figure 1), where we start from a substantially cheaper LM (*e.g.*, Mistral-7B) as a judge, and escalate to a stronger model only when the previous judge is not sufficiently confident—all while guaranteeing high agreement with humans. Importantly, users do not have to manually choose when to use which judge model; given a user-specified risk tolerance, the abstention policy is automatically decided to maintain risk control.

088 We test our method across preference domains including summarization and real-world user-chatbot interaction, and find that *Cascaded Selective Evaluation* significantly reduces the evaluation over-090 head while guaranteeing high agreement. For example, our method can outperform GPT-4 by achieving over 80% human agreement in ChatArena (Li et al., 2024a), while covering 79.1% of all 091 samples, among which 88.1% are evaluated by substantially cheaper Mistral-7B or GPT-3.5 instead 092 of GPT-4. We also show that our abstention policy closely aligns with the subjectivity perceived by 093 humans, rather than relying on shallow features such as length ratio or token overlap. Overall, our 094 work suggests a principled approach to make LLM-based evaluation more reliable yet cost-effective, 095 without exclusively counting on the capabilities of the most advanced LLMs as judges. 096

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### 2 CASCADED SELECTIVE EVALUATION

When performing pairwise evaluation with LLMs, we want a type of guarantee that the model agrees with the majority of human annotators. To realize this guarantee, we propose *selective evaluation*, a framework that employs an abstention policy to decide whether an LLM is sufficiently confident to evaluate an instance. More formally, let  $f_{LM} : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$  denote the LLM judge, where the input  $x \in \mathcal{X}$  consists of a query q and a pair of generations  $(a_1, a_2)$ , and the output  $y \in \mathcal{Y}$  is a preference label between  $a_1$  and  $a_2$  (e.g.,  $a_1 \succ a_2$ ). Introducing a confidence measure  $c_{LM} : \mathcal{X} \to [0, 1]$ , we define selective evaluator as:

$$(f_{LM}, c_{LM})(x) = \begin{cases} f_{LM}(x) & \text{if } c_{LM}(x) \ge \lambda, \\ \emptyset & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$
(1)

108 An example of  $c_{LM}$  is the probability assigned by  $f_{LM}$  to its predicted label (predictive probability), a popular choice of confidence measure in selective classification (Geifman & El-Yaniv, 2017).  $\lambda$  is a hyperparameter that trades off the precision (*i.e.*, the accuracy of evaluator aligning with human judgements) against the coverage (*i.e.*, the ratio of instances evaluated without abstention). The key advantage of selective evaluation is that by calibrating  $\lambda$  in a principled manner, we can provide a rigorous guarantee of human agreement while maintaining high coverage. That is, given a userdefined risk tolerance  $\alpha$  and an error level  $\delta$ , one can provably guarantee that

$$P(f_{LM}(x) = y_{human} | c_{LM}(x) \ge \lambda) \ge 1 - \alpha$$
<sup>(2)</sup>

117 is satisfied with probability at least  $1 - \delta$ . In the following sections, we illustrate how to search for 118  $\hat{\lambda}$  that satisfies this guarantee (§2.1), how to define a good confidence measure  $c_{LM}$  (§2.2), and how 119 to extend selective evaluation from a single model to cascades of judge models (§2.3).

### 2.1 PROVIDING HUMAN AGREEMENT GUARANTEE

Our human agreement guarantee can be satisfied by formulating selection of  $\lambda$  as a multiple hypothesist testing problem (Bates et al., 2021; Angelopoulos et al., 2022). Specifically, given access to a small calibration set  $D_{cal} \sim P(x, y_{human})$  of human preferences<sup>1</sup>, we can measure an empirical risk  $\hat{R}(\lambda)$  of disagreeing with humans when using a threshold  $\lambda$ :

$$\widehat{R}(\lambda) = \frac{1}{n(\lambda)} \sum_{(x, y_{human}) \in D_{cal}} \mathbb{1}\{f_{LM}(x) \neq y_{human} \land c_{LM}(x) \ge \lambda\},\tag{3}$$

where  $n(\lambda) \coloneqq \sum_{(x, y_{human}) \in D_{cal}} \mathbb{1}\{c_{LM}(x) \ge \lambda\}$ . Since the empirical risk is a binomial random variable with  $n(\lambda)$  trials, we can compute the exact  $(1 - \delta)$  upper confidence bound of the risk as:

$$\widehat{R}^{+}(\lambda) = \sup\left\{R : P(\operatorname{Bin}(n(\lambda), R) \le \lceil n(\lambda)\widehat{R}(\lambda)\rceil) \ge \delta\right\}.$$
(4)

Note here that the risk is near-monotonic, *i.e.*, it tends to increase as  $\lambda$  decreases. This allows us to use fixed sequence testing (Bauer, 1991), wherein we test from the largest value of  $\lambda$  (*e.g.*, 0.999) to a progressively smaller value, and stop at the last time  $\hat{R}^+(\lambda)$  is below the target risk  $\alpha$ .

$$\widehat{\lambda} = \inf \left\{ \lambda : \widehat{R}^+(\lambda') \le \alpha \text{ for } \forall \lambda' \ge \lambda \right\}.$$
(5)

**Theorem 1** Consider a threshold  $\hat{\lambda}$  chosen as above, and a selective evaluator  $(f_{LM}, c_{LM})$  operating based on  $\hat{\lambda}$ . Then, Equation (2) is satisfied with probability at least  $1 - \delta$ .

We present the proof in §A.1. Our test procedure resembles that of selection with guaranteed risk (Geifman & El-Yaniv, 2017), but we adopt fixed-sequence testing instead of Bonferroni correction, which may be too conservative for a large hypothesis space. Compared to recent works on risk control for LLMs, we provide exact, tighter bound on the selective risk (instead of approximating it; Yadkori et al. 2024), and guarantee with high probability that the risk is below  $\alpha$  conditional on the calibration data (as opposed to being marginally centered at  $\alpha$ ; Gui et al. 2024).

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2.2 SIMULATED ANNOTATORS

151 While human agreement guarantee can be met with any choice of (near-monotonic) confidence 152 measure, the coverage of selective evaluation essentially depends on how good this measure is— 153 *i.e.*, whether  $c_{LM}$  truly reflects if humans would agree with LLM evaluation. In this section, we 154 first test out popular confidence estimation methods for LLMs and show that they fail to accurately 155 represent model uncertainty. We then introduce *Simulated Annotators* as a promising alternative.

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**Existing Methods.** We first consider two types of existing confidence measure<sup>2</sup>—(1) *predictive probability*: as the most straightforward proxy of confidence, we use the likelihood of preference

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>When we have multiple human annotation  $y_i$ s per input x, we define  $y_{human} \coloneqq \arg \max_{y} \sum_i \mathbb{1}\{y_i = y\}$ .

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>We also consider more sophisticated methods (*e.g.*, sampling chain-of-thoughts and estimating their *semantic entropy*; Kuhn et al. 2023) in §B, but find their performance to be mostly on-par with the above methods, despite the increased cost.

Table 1: Performance of confidence measures across judge models. Simulated Annotators consistently outperforms baselines both in calibration and failure prediction, especially improving the reliability of weaker judge models (GPT-3.5-turbo and Mistral-7B).

|                   | Dataset  |  | AlpacaEval                                |  |  |  | TL;DR  |   |  |  |
|-------------------|--|--|---|--|--|--|--|---|--|--|
| Method            |  | Acc.   | $\text{ECE}\downarrow$                    | AUROC  | AUPRC  | Acc.   | $\text{ECE}\downarrow$                           | AUROC   | AUPRC  |  |
| GPT-4-<br>turbo   | Predictive Probability<br>Verbalized Confidence<br>Randomized Annotators<br>Simulated Annotators (Maj.)<br>Simulated Annotators (Ind.) | 0.724<br>0.724<br>0.720<br>0.730<br><b>0.734</b> | 0.217<br>0.215<br>0.113<br>0.106<br>0.095 | 0.642<br>0.550<br>0.705<br>0.718<br><b>0.723</b> | 0.852<br>0.774<br>0.866<br>0.873<br><b>0.877</b> | 0.760<br>0.760<br>0.779<br>0.783<br><b>0.788</b> | 0.196<br>0.194<br>0.079<br>0.062<br><b>0.039</b> | 0.731<br>0.548<br>0.734<br><b>0.755</b><br><b>0.755</b> | 0.890<br>0.792<br>0.905<br><b>0.921</b><br>0.921 |  |
| GPT-3.5-<br>turbo | Predictive Probability<br>Verbalized Confidence<br>Simulated Annotators (Ind.)   | 0.644<br>0.644<br><b>0.694</b>                   | 0.293<br>0.306<br><b>0.058</b>            | 0.581<br>0.505<br><b>0.632</b>                   | 0.691<br>0.595<br><b>0.793</b>                   | 0.667<br>0.667<br><b>0.725</b>                   | 0.228<br>0.211<br><b>0.043</b>                   | 0.653<br>0.607<br><b>0.704</b>                          | 0.786<br>0.716<br><b>0.842</b>                   |  |
| Mistral-<br>7B-it | Predictive Probability<br>Verbalized Confidence<br>Simulated Annotators (Ind.)   | 0.618<br>0.618<br><b>0.684</b>                   | 0.374<br>0.414<br><b>0.075</b>            | 0.457<br>0.490<br><b>0.632</b>                   | 0.579<br>0.627<br><b>0.772</b>                   | 0.661<br>0.661<br><b>0.696</b>                   | 0.306<br>0.335<br><b>0.103</b>                   | 0.613<br>0.578<br><b>0.654</b>                          | 0.735<br>0.680<br><b>0.807</b>                   |  |



Figure 2: Reliability plot for confidence estimation methods, using GPT-4 as judge on AlpacaEval. Dashed lines denote perfect calibration, and darker bars denote more samples in the corresponding bins. Simulated Annotators reduces expected calibration error by 50% compared to the base**lines, mitigating over-confidence** observed in predictive probability and verbalized confidence.

label predicted by the LLM judge, *i.e.*,  $c_{LM}(x) = \max_{y} p_{LM}(y|x)$ ; (2) verbalized confidence: following Tian et al. (2023b), we directly prompt the LLM judge to express its confidence in a scalar value. We evaluate these methods in terms of the expected calibration error (Naeini et al., 2015), AUROC and AUPRC, using the non-tied instances in two standard benchmarks: AlpacaEval (Dubois et al., 2023) for open-domain chat assistant and TL;DR (Stiennon et al., 2020) for summarization. 

**Canonical methods overestimate human agreement.** The results are shown in Table 1 and Fig-ure 2 (left, middle). Unlike prior reports that the canonical methods work well for tasks with small label space (Kadavath et al., 2022; Tian et al., 2023b), they consistently lead to over-confidence when used for preference evaluation. Notably, the results are pronounced even with the strongest LLM judge GPT-4-turbo, although its agreement with human majority is known to be comparable to an average human annotator (Sottana et al., 2023; Zheng et al., 2023). 

The above results suggest that simply achieving human-level performance may not be sufficient for reliable evaluation: while an LLM judge can be as accurate as a single human annotator, it tends to be over-confident in estimating its agreement with the majority of annotators. This contrasts with the standard practice in human evaluation, which involves collecting multiple annotations per instance and assessing the level of agreement between them; the evaluation is deemed reliable only when there is high inter-annotator agreement. Motivated by this discrepancy, we derive Simulated Anno-tators, a confidence measure that simulates diverse annotator preferences with in-context learning. Concretely, given K (e.g., 3) examples of preference annotations per N (e.g., 5) human annotators, we simulate annotators by K-shot prompting the model for N times and ensemble the results: 

$$c_{LM}(x) = \max_{y} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{LM}(y|x; (x_{1,j}, y_{1,j}), \cdots, (x_{K,j}, y_{K,j})),$$

where  $(x_{i,j}, y_{i,j})$  is the *i*-th in-context example from the *j*-th annotator. Likewise, the judge pre-diction  $f_{LM}(x)$  is defined as  $\arg \max_{y} \sum_{i=1}^{N} p_{LM}(y|x; (x_{1,j}, y_{1,j}), \cdots, (x_{K,j}, y_{K,j}))$ . Intuitively,

| Algorithm 1 Cascaded Selective Eval   | luation  |
|---|--|
| <b>Input:</b> A list of judges $\mathcal{M} = (M_1, \cdots$                 | $(\cdots, M_{ \mathcal{M} })$ , a calibration set $D_{cal}$ and test set $D_{test}$ to be evalu- |
| ated, risk tolerance $\alpha$ and error leve                                | $\delta \delta$  |
| <b>Output:</b> A set of evaluated results S                                 |  |
| $\Lambda \leftarrow \text{calibrate}(\mathcal{M}, D_{cal}, \alpha, \delta)$ | $\triangleright$ Calibrate thresholds $\lambda \in \Lambda$ on $D_{cal}$ (§A.2).                 |
| $S \leftarrow \emptyset$  | ▷ Initialize a set of evaluation results.  |
| for $x \in D_{test}$ do   |  |
| for $i = 1$ to $ \mathcal{M} $ do   | ▷ Iterate through the cascade of judge models.   |
| if $c_{M_i}(x) \geq \lambda_i$ then   | $\triangleright$ Evaluate x only when $M_i$ is sufficiently confident.                           |
| $S \leftarrow S \cup \{(x, f_{M_i}(x))\}$                                   | <br>-  |
| break   |  |
| return S  | $\triangleright$ Return the evaluated results.   |

the confidence  $c_{LM}$  becomes low when multiple simulated annotators disagree with each other. We typically set  $K, N \leq 5$ , and ablate the effect of number of simulated annotators in §3.5.

Simulated Annotators improves reliability, even for weaker judge models. The results with K = N = 5 are shown in Table 1 (*Simulated Annotators (Ind.)*) and Figure 2 (right). Simulated Annotators significantly outperforms popular confidence measures, reducing ECE by 50% and improving AUROC by 13% for GPT-4. Surprisingly, our method improves the reliability of even the weaker judge models—while they do underperform GPT-4 in accuracy, their estimated confidence is on-par or even better than GPT-4 when using the baseline confidence measures.

238 Despite the substantial performance gain in Simulated Annotators, it remains unclear whether the 239 gain truly comes from simulating diverse human preferences. We analyze this using two ablations 240 on the few-shot examples given to the LLM judge: (1) randomized annotators: using the same set of inputs  $x_{i,j}$  but random-assigning labels  $y_{i,j} \sim \text{Ber}(0.5)$ , and (2) simulated annotators (majority): 241 using  $(x_{i,j}, y_{i,human})$  where  $y_{i,human}$  is the majority preference of human annotators given input  $x_{i,j}$ .<sup>3</sup> 242 We fix K = 5 and N = 5 for all ablations. As shown in Table 1, Simulated Annotators (Maj.) is 243 consistently better than Randomized Annotators, but slightly underperforms Simulated Annotators 244 (Ind.) that models individual preference. The performance of majority-based Simulated Annotators, 245 however, is encouraging, as the method can be applied to cases where we do not have access to 246 multiple human annotations per each instance x. Overall, the result demonstrates that simulating 247 diverse annotator preferences is helpful, and even in the absence of such data, our method improves 248 the reliability of LLM judges over the existing methods.

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2.3 CASCADING SELECTIVE EVALUATORS

The strong performance of Simulated Annotators demonstrates that even the weaker LLM judges— 253 despite not as accurate as a larger judge-may accurately predict when they are likely to agree with human annotators. Leveraging this finding, we propose Cascaded Selective Evaluation, as 254 illustrated in Figure 1 and formalized in Algorithm 1. Given a list of judge models  $\mathcal{M}$ , we start with 255 a weaker yet cheaper model as an evaluator, and only when the model is not sufficiently confident, 256 we iteratively move on to a stronger model. Notably, the confidence threshold  $\lambda$  for each judge 257 model can be chosen following the same process as in §2.1, providing the guarantee of risk control 258 across the cascades of models (see §A.2 for details). This way, selective evaluation can operate at 259 a significantly lower cost than using the strongest model from the start, while still maintaining a 260 rigorous guarantee of human agreement. 261

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### **3** EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

3.1 EVALUATING GENERATED SUMMARIES

**Experimental Setup.** We first test our approach for evaluating summaries on TL;DR dataset (Stiennon et al., 2020). We use a cascade of *Mistral-7B-instruct-v0.2* (Jiang et al., 2023), *GPT-3.5-turbo* 

<sup>3</sup>Here, as each input instance is associated with a single majority label  $y_{human}$ , we induce difference between simulations by using different set of inputs  $x_{i,j}$  per simulated annotator.

Table 2: Comparison against baselines on TL;DR, with target agreement level  $1 - \alpha = 0.9$ . The results are averaged across 1000 runs with random data split. Guarantee Success Rate is defined as the ratio of successful runs that achieve empirical human agreement larger than or equal to  $1 - \alpha$ . **Cascaded Selective Evaluation is the only method that achieves high guarantee success rate, while maintaining high coverage.** 



Figure 3: TL;DR results. Cascaded Selective Evaluation guarantees human agreement far beyond a level achievable by GPT-4 without abstention (Left), while employing substantially weaker judge models (Right). Solid blue line denotes average human agreement over 1000 runs on the dataset, and the light blue region denotes the min / max agreement within the 1000 runs.

and *GPT-4-turbo* (Achiam et al., 2023) as judges. Observing that the dataset provides multiple human annotations per input, we use *Simulated Annotators* (*Ind.*) with K = N = 5. We fix the size of calibration set  $|D_{cal}| = 500$  and  $\delta = 0.1$ , and run the experiments for 1000 random splits of calibration and test set. For baselines, we consider: (1) Heuristic Selection: using GPT-4 as a judge and setting  $\lambda = 1 - \alpha$ , assuming perfect calibration; (2) Cascaded Heuristic Selection: a variant of Heuristic Selection using the same cascades of judge models as ours; (3) Point-Estimate Calibration: setting  $\lambda$  as the smallest value that satisfies  $\hat{R}(\lambda) \leq \alpha$  in  $D_{cal}$ , without hypothesis testing.

In Figure 3, we show that human agreement guarantee is satisfied with our approach across all levels 306 of target human agreement, far beyond what GPT-4 can achieve without abstention. Notably, unlike 307 prior works (Gui et al., 2024; Mohri & Hashimoto, 2023) that only controls the risk in expectation 308 over calibration sets (solid blue line), our method guarantees with high probability that each indi-309 vidual run would satisfy the target agreement level (light blue region). Moreover, as shown in right 310 plot, the high agreements can be achieved while the majority of evaluation are done with substan-311 tially smaller LLMs than GPT-4. For example, our method can outperform GPT-4 with 80% human 312 agreement, while 75% of the evaluations are done by Mistral-7B or GPT-3.5. 313

We also compare against selective baselines in Table 2, in terms of their coverage and guarantee success rate. All baselines fail to provide meaningful guarantee success rate without significantly sacrificing the coverage. This includes Point-Estimate Calibration, which makes use of the test statistics in calibration data (Ramirez et al., 2024). On the contrary, Cascaded Selective Evaluation achieves over 90% success rate—just as expected by setting  $\delta = 0.1$ —attesting to its reliability.

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### 3.2 EVALUATING LLM-BASED CHAT ASSISTANTS

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>We use an evaluation set with 5.2k instances collected by Li et al. (2024a).

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Table 3: Comparison to baselines on ChatArena, with target agreement level  $1 - \alpha = 0.85$ . The results are averaged across 1000 runs with random data split. Consistent with results on TL;DR, our method successfully guarantees target agreement level while maintaining high coverage.

| M-41 J                        | Eval       | uator Compositi | <b>C</b> ( <b>7</b> )   | Guarantee Success<br>Rate (%) |      |
|-------------------------------|------------|-----------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------|------|
| Nietnod                       | Mistral-7B | GPT-3.5-turbo   | T-3.5-turbo GPT-4-turbo |                               |      |
| No Selection                  | 0.0        | 0.0             | 100.0                   | 100.0                         | 0.0  |
| Heuristic Selection           | 0.0        | 0.0             | 100.0                   | 95.2                          | 0.1  |
| Cascaded Heuristic Selection  | 57.1       | 15.2            | 27.7                    | 79.7                          | 0.3  |
|                               | 100.0      | 0.0             | 0.0                     | 0.0                           | 0.0  |
| Point-Estimate Calibration    | 0.0        | 100.0           | 0.0                     | 40.5                          | 57.2 |
|                               | 0.0        | 0.0             | 100.0                   | 60.9                          | 54.4 |
| Cascaded Selective Evaluation | 23.7       | 58.8            | 17.5                    | 63.2                          | 91.0 |



Figure 4: ChatArena results. Our approach guarantees target human agreement level (Left) while majority of evaluations are done with weaker judge models, Mistral-7B and GPT-3.5 (Right).

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and Auto-J (Li et al., 2023), a curated benchmark for meta-evaluation of LLM judges. We employ the same cascades of models as in §3.1, but this time we use *Simulated Annotators (Maj.)*, as both datasets only provide one human annotation per input x. We set K = N = 5 and  $|D_{cal}| = 500$  for ChatArena, and K = N = 3,  $|D_{cal}| = 392$  for Auto-J, considering the small size of the benchmark.

355 The results are shown in Figure 4 and Table 3 for ChatArena, and in Figure 5 and Table 8 for Auto-356 J. Again, we confirm that human agreement guarantee can be achieved across all levels of  $\alpha$ . On 357 ChatArena, unlike Point-Estimate Calibration with GPT-4 whose guarantee success rate is below 358 60%, our method achieves 91% guarantee success rate while only using GPT-4 for 17.5% of the evaluations. The performance is particularly pronounced in Auto-J where GPT-4 without abstention 359 could only achieve 63.2% agreement with humans (Figure 5), potentially due to the fact that the 360 dataset introduces additional *tie* label unlike the other two datasets. In stark contrast, Cascaded 361 Selective Evaluation guarantees up to 80% human agreement with high probability. 362

Next, we conduct further ablations and analyses to better understand the working of our method.

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3.3 UNDERSTANDING ABSTENTION POLICY

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When does the model abstain from evaluation? One concern with selective evaluation is that its abstention policy may not align with the humanperceived subjectivity of each instance and instead rely on shallow heuristics, *e.g.*, choosing to abstain when the pair of generations have large

| Dimension     | Abstained Samples | Evaluated Samples |
|---------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Human IAA     | 0.815 (0.031)     | 0.902 (0.025)     |
| Length Ratio  | 0.242 (0.014)     | 0.245 (0.025)     |
| Token Overlap | 0.623 (0.049)     | 0.592 (0.054)     |

369 abstention policy may not align with the human-370 perceived subjectivity of each instance and in-371 stead rely on shallow heuristics, e.g., choosing to 372 abstain when the pair of generations have large 373 token overlap. To address this concern, we ana-374 lyze whether there exists a significant difference 375 in human-perceived subjectivity between modelabstained samples and evaluated samples. We 376 first collect 3-5 additional human annotations per 377 each instance in ChatArena, and measure the Table 5: Evaluation under distribution shift on ChatArena. We induce distribution shift by sampling
 the calibration and test set respectively from two disjoint sets of instances with no overlap of eval uated models. We iterate experiments for 1000 random splits and aggregate the results. Cascaded
 Selective Evaluation guarantees high agreement even under the realistic distribution shift.

| Target Human<br>Agreement (%) | Empirical Human<br>Agreement (%) | Coverage (%) | Guarantee Success<br>Rate (%) |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|
| 70.0                          | 73.4                             | 100.0        | 100.0                         |
| 75.0                          | 75.3                             | 91.4         | 92.5                          |
| 80.0                          | 80.8                             | 72.1         | 90.8                          |
| 85.0                          | 85.2                             | 55.4         | 91.0                          |
| 90.0                          | 90.1                             | 31.8         | 90.7                          |

Table 6: Impact of number of simulated annotators N on ChatArena, with  $1 - \alpha = 0.85$ . Larger number of simulations generally leads to better coverage, while human agreement is guaranteed even with a small N. For all values of N, Cascaded Selective Evaluation guarantees high agreement with humans while reducing the API cost by 40% compared to GPT-4 without abstention.

| Method                                    | Empirical Human<br>Agreement (%) | Coverage (%) | Guarantee Success<br>Rate (%) | Relative<br>API Cost |  |
|---|----------------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|--|
| GPT-4 $(N = 1)$                           | 77.8                             | 100.0        | 0.0                           | 1.000                |  |
| Cascaded Selective Evaluation $(N = 1)$   | 85.2                             | 60.9         | 90.3                          | 0.655                |  |
| GPT-4 $(N = 2)$                           | 78.2                             | 100.0        | 0.0                           | 2.000                |  |
| Cascaded Selective Evaluation $(N = 2)$   | 85.7                             | 61.5         | 90.8                          | 1.288                |  |
| GPT-4 $(N = 3)$                           | 78.1                             | 100.0        | 0.0                           | 3.000                |  |
| Cascaded Selective Evaluation $(N = 3)$   | 85.5                             | 62.1         | 90.3                          | 1.920                |  |
| GPT-4 ( $N = 5$ )                         | 78.5                             | 100.0        | 0.0                           | 5.000                |  |
| Cascaded Selective Evaluation ( $N = 5$ ) | 85.8                             | 63.2         | 91.0                          | 2.849                |  |

> inter-annotator agreement (IAA) as a proxy of human-perceived subjectivity<sup>5</sup>. Then, we compare the difference in IAA between abstained and evaluated samples when the target agreement level is set to 0.9. We also measure the difference in terms of shallow features, specifically the pairwise length ratio and the token-overlap (ROUGE-L) within each instance. For further details, see §C.2.

Table 4 presents the results. The average inter-annotator agreement is 0.815 ( $\sigma^2 = 0.031$ ) for abstained samples and 0.902 ( $\sigma^2 = 0.025$ ) for evaluated samples, a statistically significant difference in two-sample t-test with p < 1e - 8. This is in contrast with both the length ratio and token overlap, for which the differences between the two sets are not significant (p > 0.10). In fact, for token overlap, the abstained examples exhibit higher ROUGE-L on average than the evaluated samples. Overall, these results show that the instances abstained by LLM judges tend to be more subjective even for humans (with no evidence of reliance on some spurious heuristics), suggesting that the confidence elicited by Simulated Annotators closely aligns with that of human annotators.

### 3.4 EVALUATION UNDER DISTRIBUTION SHIFT

Our test procedure in §2.1 assumes that the calibration set  $D_{cal}$  is sampled i.i.d. from  $P(x, y_{human})$ . In real-world scenarios this may not be the case, because we often only have access to generations from a set of known models for calibration, while in the test time, we need to evaluate outputs from unknown models. In Table 5, we empirically analyze whether our method provides risk control even under this distribution shift. First, we randomly divide ChatArena into two disjoint sets such that there is no overlap between the evaluated models in each set. Then, we induce distribution shift by sampling  $D_{cal}$  from one set and testing instances in another set. We follow the same setup as §3.2, and run experiments for 1000 random splits. As shown in Table 5, despite a small degradation in coverage, our method guarantees high human agreement for more than 90% of the time, consistently across all tested levels of  $\alpha$ . The result demonstrates that Cascaded Selective Evaluation maintains its reliability even under the realistic distribution shift. 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>As the label space is binary for preference evaluation, we define inter-annotator agreement simply as the density of the majority preference label assigned by human annotators.

Table 7: Impact of judge model composition on ChatArena, with  $1 - \alpha = 0.8$ . Weaker cascades use Mistral-7B, Mixtral-8×7B, and GPT-3.5 as judge models. Stronger cascades use GPT-4 instead of Mixtral-8×7B. Our method guarantees human agreement even with the weaker cascades, while only using 12.6% of the evaluation cost for GPT-4.

| Method                                   | Empirical Human<br>Agreement (%) | Coverage (%) | Guarantee Success<br>Rate (%) | Relative<br>API Cost |
|--|----------------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| GPT-4                                    | 77.8                             | 100.0        | 13.9                          | 1.000                |
| Cascaded Selective Evaluation (stronger) | 80.2                             | 77.6         | 90.5                          | 0.215                |
| Cascaded Selective Evaluation (weaker)   | 80.3                             | 68.3         | 90.8                          | 0.126                |

### 3.5 IMPACT OF NUMBER OF SIMULATED ANNOTATORS

Next, we analyze the impact of number of simulated annotators for Cascaded Selective Evaluation. In Table 6, we report the results on ChatArena using Simulated Annotators as confidence measure with N = 5, 3, 2, 1. We compare the result against using GPT-4 with the same prompt, but without abstention. Along with the guarantee success rate and coverage, we report relative API cost for calling OpenAI models, where the cost for full evaluation with GPT-4 is set to 1. The results suggest that (1) using larger number of simulated annotators leads to consistently better coverage, but (2) even with a small number of simulated annotators, our method can still achieve high human agreement while reducing the evaluation cost by up to 40% compared to GPT-4 without abstention.

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### 3.6 IMPACT OF JUDGE MODEL COMPOSITION

We study whether Cascaded Selective Evaluation can be done entirely without GPT-4. We use a substantially weaker cascades with *Mistral-7B-instruct-v0.2*, *Mixtral-8×7b-instruct* (Jiang et al., 2024), and GPT-3.5 as judge models (*weaker* cascades). We compare the result against (1) zero-shot GPT-4 without abstention, and (2) Cascaded Selective Evaluation using the original cascades, with N = 1 for better cost (*stronger* cascades). We set the target agreement level  $1 - \alpha = 0.8$ , a higher level than what is achievable by GPT-4 without abstention (Figure 4).

460 The results in Table 7 reveal an interesting finding: even the weaker cascades of judge models ensure 461 a satisfactory level of human agreement, by balancing the the trade-off between the evaluation cost 462 and coverage, instead of compromising the precision. Unlike conventional LLM-based evaluation 463 where one has to sacrifice accuracy by using a weaker judge, our method allows practitioners to 464 consistently achieve their target level of human agreement. Depending on the requirements, one can 465 opt for stronger cascades for better coverage or weaker cascades for lower costs, all while maintain-466 ing this guarantee. Additionally, both configurations of Cascaded Selective Evaluation significantly 467 reduce evaluation costs compared to using GPT-4, achieving savings of up to 78.5% with stronger cascades and 87.4% with weaker cascades. 468

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## 4 RELATED WORKS

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472 LLM-based evaluation has emerged as a scalable alternative to human evaluation (Zheng et al., 473 2023; Liu et al., 2023), with empirical evidence suggesting that despite its cost, GPT-4 can be as 474 accurate as an average human annotator (Dubois et al., 2024; Li et al., 2024b). Subsequent works 475 attempt to reduce the dependency on the large judge model by distilling a small expert judge (Kim 476 et al., 2024; Zhu et al., 2023), or by ensembling multiple agents through peer review and debate (Verga et al., 2024; Chan et al., 2023). However, these methods often lack a provable guarantee 477 of their reliability. Recent research also indicates that LLM judges are not as robust as previously 478 assumed, showing susceptibility to cognitive biases (Zeng et al., 2024; Koo et al., 2023) and self-479 preference (Panickssery et al., 2024). Our goal in this work is to enhance the reliability of LLM-480 based evaluation-despite these inherent biases-as a better-aligned proxy of human judgement. 481

Another line of works augment LLMs with a rigorous statistical guarantee, controlling their risk in
 critical applications such as hallucination rate in factual generation (Yadkori et al., 2024; Mohri &
 Hashimoto, 2023) and FDR in medical decision making (Gui et al., 2024). These approaches are
 often powered by conformal methods (Angelopoulos et al., 2024), offering marginal control over the
 prescribed risks. Other works study fine-tuning objective for LLMs, either to improve their truthful-

|                               | Eval       | uator Compositi | <b>G</b> ( <b>M</b> ) | Guarantee Success |          |
|-------------------------------|------------|-----------------|-----------------------|-------------------|----------|
| Method                        | Mistral-7B | GPT-3.5-turbo   | GPT-4-turbo           | Coverage (%)      | Rate (%) |
| No Selection                  | 0.0        | 0.0             | 100.0                 | 100.0             | 0.0      |
| Heuristic Selection           | 0.0        | 0.0             | 100.0                 | 72.0              | 2.4      |
| Cascaded Heuristic Selection  | 36.6       | 40.2            | 23.2                  | 84.4              | 0.8      |
|                               | 100.0      | 0.0             | 0.0                   | 12.1              | 54.3     |
| Point-Estimate Calibration    | 0.0        | 100.0           | 0.0                   | 27.9              | 52.1     |
|                               | 0.0        | 0.0             | 100.0                 | 42.9              | 56.5     |
| Cascaded Selective Evaluation | 49.3       | 21.8            | 28.9                  | 42.6              | 90.2     |

Table 8: Comparison to baselines on Auto-J, with target agreement level  $1 - \alpha = 0.8$ . The results are averaged across 1000 runs with random data split.



Figure 5: Human Agreement Guarantee on Auto-J. GPT-4 without abstention obtains only 63.2%
agreement with humans, while Cascaded Selective Evaluation guarantees target human agreement level of up to 80% with high probability.

ness (Kang et al., 2024; Tian et al., 2023a) or to abstain when lacking relevant knowledge (Zhang et al., 2024). In the context of model evaluation, prediction-powered inference has been employed to provide a confidence set of possible rankings among evaluated models (Chatzi et al., 2024), but does not guarantee high human agreement over individual runs of evaluation as in ours. Our work builds upon these prior works, but (1) focuses on LLM-based evaluation to provide an exact upper bound on the disagreement risk conditional on the sampling of calibration set, (2) proposes an unsupervised confidence measure instead of a supervised estimator (Kapoor et al., 2024; Gupta et al., 2024), and (3) derives a cascaded framework that significantly reduces the inference cost (Li et al., 2021) while simultaneously guaranteeing the reliability of evaluation.

5 CONCLUSION

We present Cascaded Selective Evaluation, a framework to provide LLM-based evaluation with a robust guarantee of human agreement. As part of our framework, we also propose Simulated Annotators, a novel method that significantly improves confidence estimation for LLM judges without resorting to external supervision. By dynamically selecting when to trust which judge model, Cascaded Selective Evaluation significantly reduces evaluation overhead while still maintaining its reliability, often outperforming the precision achievable by fully relying on the strongest judge model.

As LLM judges become prevalent, a principled method to utilize them will become increasingly
more important. As an initial step toward this direction, we focus on pairwise evaluation with popular off-the-shelf LLMs as judges, and on domains where the goodness of generations are subjective
in nature. Future research should investigate the integration of recent "expert" judges distilled from
larger models, and extend our framework to absolute score-based evaluations. Additionally, applying our framework for verifying correctness of reasoning steps, such as for mathematical problemsolving, would be an interesting next step. We hope our work sets a foundation for exploring these
advancements, and broadly for more robust and scalable evaluation with LLMs.

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# 756 A VALIDITY OF HUMAN AGREEMENT GUARANTEE

### 758 A.1 PROOF OF THEOREM 1 759

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**Theorem 1** Consider a threshold  $\hat{\lambda}$  chosen as in §2.1, and a selective evaluator  $(f_{LM}, c_{LM})$  operating based on  $\hat{\lambda}$ . Then, Equation (2) is satisfied with probability at least  $1 - \delta$ .

The proof extends that of Theorem B.1 in Bates et al. (2021). Let  $R(\lambda)$  denote the true risk of disagreeing with humans at threshold  $\lambda$ . It suffices to show that  $P(R(\hat{\lambda}) \leq \alpha) \geq 1 - \delta$ . We first note that  $n(\lambda)\hat{R}(\lambda)$  is a binomial random variable, *i.e.*,

 $n(\lambda)\widehat{R}(\lambda) \sim \operatorname{Bin}(n(\lambda), R(\lambda)).$ 

Thus, the lower tail bound for  $\widehat{R}(\lambda)$  can be expressed as a function g of  $t \in \mathbb{R}$  and  $R(\lambda)$  as

$$P(\widehat{R}(\lambda) \le t) = P(\operatorname{Bin}(n(\lambda), R(\lambda)) \le \lceil n(\lambda)t \rceil) \rightleftharpoons g(t; R(\lambda))$$

Plugging this into the definition of  $\widehat{R}^+(\lambda)$  in Equation 4,

$$\widehat{R}^{+}(\lambda) = \sup \left\{ R(\lambda) : P\left( \operatorname{Bin}(n(\lambda), R(\lambda)) \le \lceil n(\lambda) \widehat{R}(\lambda) \rceil \right) \ge \delta \right\}$$
$$= \sup \left\{ R(\lambda) : g(\widehat{R}(\lambda); R(\lambda)) \ge \delta \right\}.$$

Here, let G denote the CDF of  $\widehat{R}(\lambda)$  and  $G^{-1}(\delta) = \sup\{x : G(x) \le \delta\}$ . From above, we know that if  $R(\lambda) > \widehat{R}^+(\lambda)$ , then  $g(\widehat{R}(\lambda); R(\lambda)) < \delta$ . Therefore,

779
$$P(R(\lambda) > \widehat{R}^+(\lambda)) \le P(g(\widehat{R}(\lambda); R(\lambda)) < \delta)$$
780 $= P(G(\widehat{R}(\lambda)) < \delta)$ 781 $= P(G(\widehat{R}(\lambda)) < \delta)$ 782 $\le P(\widehat{R}(\lambda) < G^{-1}(\delta))$ 783 $\le \delta.$ 

Hence,  $P(R(\lambda) \leq \widehat{R}^+(\lambda)) \geq 1 - \delta$ , implying that  $\widehat{R}^+(\lambda)$  is the  $(1 - \delta)$  upper confidence bound of  $R(\lambda)$ . Finally, since we have  $\widehat{R}^+(\widehat{\lambda}) \leq \alpha$  from the definition of  $\widehat{\lambda}$ , we obtain

$$P(R(\widehat{\lambda}) \le \widehat{R}^+(\widehat{\lambda}) \le \alpha) \ge 1 - \delta.$$

790 A.2 EXTENSION TO CASCADES OF JUDGE MODELS

We illustrate the extension of our test procedure from a single model to the cascades of judge models. For notational simplicity, we denote the test procedure for a single judge model in §2.1 as a function calibrate-single. This function takes as input a model M, a calibration set D, risk tolerance  $\alpha$  and error level  $\delta$ , and gives a calibrated threshold  $\hat{\lambda}$  as an output.

The calibration procedure for cascades of judge models is shown in Algorithm 2. The procedure sequentially applies calibrate-single to each judge model. Specifically for each judge model  $M_i$ ,

799 Algorithm 2 calibrate( $\mathcal{M}, D_{cal}, \alpha, \delta$ ) 800 **Input:** A list of judges  $\mathcal{M} = (M_1, \dots, M_{|\mathcal{M}|})$ , a calibration set  $D_{cal}$  and test set  $D_{test}$  to be evalu-801 ated, risk tolerance  $\alpha$  and error level  $\delta$ 802 **Output:** A set of calibrated thresholds  $\Lambda$ 803  $\Lambda \gets \emptyset$  $\triangleright$  Initialize the set of thresholds. 804  $D \leftarrow D_{cal}$  $\triangleright$  Initialize D for calibrating each model. 805 for i = 1 to  $|\mathcal{M}|$  do 806  $\lambda_i \leftarrow \text{calibrate-single}(M_i, D, \alpha, \frac{\delta}{|\mathcal{M}|}) \triangleright \text{Calibrate } \lambda_i \text{ for each model } M_i.$ 807  $\Lambda \leftarrow \Lambda \cup \{\lambda_i\}$ 808  $D \leftarrow \{(x, y) \in D : c_{M_i}(x) < \lambda_i\} \triangleright$  Update D with only the previously abstained instances.  $\triangleright$  Return the set of calibrated thresholds. return A

we calibrate  $\lambda_i$  by testing over the set of instances D that have been abstained by the previous models. This allows us to ensure that for each  $M_i$ , 

$$P\left(f_{M_{i}}(x) = y_{human} \middle| c_{M_{i}}(x) \ge \lambda_{i}, \bigwedge_{j=1}^{i-1} c_{M_{j}}(x) < \lambda_{j}\right) \ge 1 - \alpha$$

is satisfied with probability at least  $1 - \frac{\delta}{|\mathcal{M}|}$ . To provide the guarantee across all judge models, define  $R_i$  as the disagreement risk for each judge model  $M_i$ : 

$$R_i \coloneqq P\left(f_{M_i}(x) \neq y_{human} \middle| c_{M_i}(x) \ge \lambda_i, \bigwedge_{j=1}^{i-1} c_{M_j}(x) < \lambda_j\right).$$

Also, define  $R_{cascades}$  as the risk of full cascaded selective evaluation, *i.e.*,

$$R_{cascades} \coloneqq P(f_{cascades}(x) \neq y_{human} | x \text{ not abstained by the cascades}).$$

It is easy to see that  $R_{cascades}$  is an interpolation between all  $R_i$ s, thus  $R_{cascades} \leq \max_i R_i$ . Therefore,

$$P(R_{cascades} > \alpha) \le P(\max_{i} R_{i} > \alpha) = P\left(\bigcup_{i} R_{i} > \alpha\right) \le \sum_{i} P(R_{i} > \alpha),$$

where the last inequality comes from union bound. Since we know that  $P(R_i > \alpha) \leq \frac{\delta}{|\mathcal{M}|}$  for each judge model  $M_i$ , ç

$$\sum_{i} P(R_i > \alpha) \le \frac{\delta}{|\mathcal{M}|} \cdot |\mathcal{M}| = \delta$$

Thus,  $P(R_{cascades} > \alpha) \leq \delta$ . In other words, the risk of disagreement across all judge models is guaranteed to be at most  $\alpha$ , with probability at least  $1 - \delta$ .

# B ADDITIONAL RESULTS ON CONFIDENCE ESTIMATION

Table 9: Additional results on confidence estimation with Mistral-7B. We find that more sophisticated methods that measure the semantic variance between chain-of-thoughts often underperform Simulated Annotators, marking similar or worse performance with zero-shot predicted probability.

|                   | Dataset   |                                  | Alp                    | acaEval                          |                                  |                                  | Т                      | 'L;DR                            |                                  |
|-------------------|---|----------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
|                   | Method  | Acc.                             | $\text{ECE}\downarrow$ | AUROC                            | AUPRC                            | Acc.                             | $\text{ECE}\downarrow$ | AUROC                            | AUPRC                            |
| Mistral-<br>7B-it | Predictive Probability (CoT)<br>Lexical Similarity<br>Semantic Sets<br>Semantic Entropy | 0.636<br>0.636<br>0.636<br>0.636 | 0.292<br>0.478         | 0.527<br>0.478<br>0.513<br>0.572 | 0.655<br>0.623<br>0.638<br>0.684 | 0.669<br>0.669<br>0.669<br>0.669 | 0.275<br>0.459         | 0.637<br>0.520<br>0.545<br>0.650 | 0.751<br>0.639<br>0.665<br>0.762 |
|                   | Simulated Annotators (Ind.)   | 0.684                            | 0.075                  | 0.632                            | 0.772                            | 0.696                            | 0.103                  | 0.654                            | 0.807                            |

In Table 9, we provide additional results for more sophisticated methods for confidence estimation. Given an instance x, these methods first generate M chain-of-thoughts (CoTs) from an LLM judge prior to inferring the preference label, then measure their variance either in the label space or on the semantic-level:

- *Predictive Probability (CoT)*: We average the *M* label predictive probabilities assigned by the LLM judge after generating chain-of-thoughts.
- Lexical Similarity: As a simple proxy of semantic variance, we average ROUGE-L across all pairs of M chain-of-thoughts. The intuition is that when the CoTs exhibit high lexical overlap with each other, the model is relatively confident about its generation.
- *Semantic Sets* (Lin et al., 2024): We cluster the CoTs into semantically equivalent groups using a bidirectional entailment model (Zha et al., 2023), then use the number of clustered groups to represent model uncertainty.
- *Semantic Entropy* (Kuhn et al., 2023): We additionally use the likelihood of each generated chain of thought, and measure the average sequence-level entropy across the semantically equivalent groups.

We follow Lin et al. (2024) to set M = 20. For *Semantics Sets* and *Semantic Entropy*, we exclude expected calibration error as the two scores represent model uncertainty rather than the confidence score calibrated in [0, 1]. These methods incur significant overhead compared to the methods discussed in §2.2, generating 20 sequences of chain-of-thoughts for each input instance and employing a supervised entailment model. Nonetheless, we find that their performance consistently underperforms that of *Simulated Annotators*, with the best method *Predictive Probability (CoT)* performing worse than our ablation *Randomized Annotators* (Table 1).

# C DETAILS ON EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

### C.1 PROMPTS

### Prompt for Summarization Evaluation

You are a helpful assistant.

Given a document and two summaries of the document, an annotator chose which summary is preferred. Given examples of the annotator's decision, predict the annotator's verdict on the given example. If Summary A is preferred to Summary B, the annotator chose "[[A]]". If Summary B is preferred to Summary A, the annotator chose "[[B]]".

[Document] {document\_example\_1}

[Summary A] {summary\_a\_example\_1}

[Summary B] {summary\_b\_example\_1}

[Verdict]: {verdict\_example\_1}

... [few-shot examples omitted]

[Document] {document}

[Summary A] {summary\_a}

[Summary B] {summary\_b}

Verdict (either "[[A]]" or "[[B]]"):

| 972<br>973                             | Prompt for Chat Assistant Evaluation  |
|--|---|
| 974                                    | You are a helpful assistant.  |
| 975<br>976<br>977<br>978<br>979<br>980 | Given a question and two assistant's answers to the question, an annotator chose which assistant's answer is preferred. Given examples of the annotator's decision, predict the annotator's verdict on the given example. If Assistant A's response is preferred to Assistant B's, the annotator chose "[[A]]". If Assistant B's response is preferred to Assistant A's, the annotator chose "[[B]]". |
| 981<br>982<br>983                      | [Question]<br>{question_example_1}  |
| 984<br>985<br>986                      | [Assistant A's response]<br>{assistant_a_example_1}   |
| 987<br>988                             | [Assistant B's response]<br>{assistant_b_example_1}   |
| 989<br>990<br>991                      | [Verdict]:<br>{verdictexample_1}  |
| 992<br>993                             | [few-shot examples omitted]   |
| 994<br>995<br>996                      | [Question]<br>{question}  |
| 997<br>998                             | [Assistant A's response]<br>{assistant_a}   |
| 1000<br>1001                           | [Assistant B's response]<br>{assistant_b}   |
| 1002<br>1003<br>1004                   | Verdict (either "[[A]]" or "[[B]]"):  |
| 1005<br>1006                           |   |
| 1007<br>1008<br>1009                   |   |
| 1010<br>1011                           |   |
| 1012<br>1013<br>1014                   |   |
| 1015<br>1016                           |   |
| 1017<br>1018<br>1019                   |   |
| 1020<br>1021                           |   |
| 1022<br>1023                           |   |



Annotator Recruitment. We recruited annotators from Prolific<sup>6</sup> who have recorded at least 99% approval rate, are fluent in English, and have completed a Bachelor's degree. In addition, we manually designed 10 qualification examples based on our annotation guidelines. The purpose of the qualification test is to find annotators who understand and carefully follow our guidelines. Participants who scored more than 80% were included in our actual human study. We qualified 21 annotators to do the study and paid them \$15 per hour.

Annotation Task. We randomly sample 600 examples from ChatArena (Zheng et al., 2023) each consisting of a query and two model responses. Given each example, we instruct the annotators to select the overall better response considering several aspects such as helpfulness, truthfulness, and harmlessness. Each instance is evaluated by 3-5 annotators. We also allow annotators to occasionally skip an instance with a reason if they have no idea how to evaluate it. We provide the screenshot of our annotation guidelines and interface in Figure 6 and 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>https://app.prolific.com

### 1080 Judging Guidelines 1082 1083 The core part of this annotation is to evaluate and compare the two candidate responses given the 1084 conversation history and the user request. A typical annotation process includes the following: 1. You are supposed to understand the context and the user intent by reading the 1086 conversations and thinking over the user request. 1087 2. You need to read and compare the two model responses carefully and find their key 1088 differences. 1089 3. Frequently, you may need external tools to verify information in the responses if you lack 1090 the necessary background or feel unsure about something. 1091 4. Based on these, you will indicate your preference between two candidate responses based on several aspects such as Helpfulness, Truthfulness, and Harmlessness. You need to 1093 provide your overall assessment. In the annotation UI, these are in the form of radio buttons. 1094 5. You also need to specify your confidence level in the corresponding judgment. 1095 6. You have the option to skip evaluating instances, but we encourage you to first attempt to answer an instance to the best of your abilities. 1098 Below is an example, where we would choose Response B to be clearly better in terms of 1099 helpfulness and truthfulness and is thus better overall. 1100 1101 User: How do I convert Celsius to Fahrenheit? 1102 1103 Model Response A Model Response B 1104 To convert Celsius to Fahrenheit, you need to add To convert Celsius to Fahrenheit, you can use the 1105 32 degrees to the Celsius temperature. For following formula: 1106 example, if you have a temperature of 10 degrees F = C \\\* 9/5 + 32 Celsius, the equivalent temperature in 1107 Fahrenheit is 50 degrees Fahrenheit. To convert 1108 the temperature from Fahrenheit to Celsius, you Where: 1109 need to subtract 32 degrees from the Fahrenheit F = Fahrenheit temperature in degrees Celsius 1110 temperature. For example, if you have a C = Celsius temperature in degrees Celsius temperature of 90 degrees Fahrenheit, the 1111 equivalent temperature in Celsius is 32 degrees For example, if the temperature is 20°C in 1112 Celsius. Celsius, to convert it to Fahrenheit you would do: 1113 F = 20 \\\* 9/5 + 32 = 68°F (degrees Fahrenheit) 1114 1115 1116 Note that examples in the real annotation may be more complicated, and the differences in responses may be subtle. You also need to trade off many factors to choose which is better. 1117 Generally speaking, you need to make your own judgment and express your own preference based 1118 on all the research. We discussed more about these tradeoffs in the <u>Overall Assessment</u> section. 1119 1120 Next we explain how to interpret the different aspects and make judgments about them. 1121 1122 Figure 7: Human Annotation Guidelines. 1123 1124 1125 1126 1127 1128 1129 1130 1131 1132

### 1134 D **QUALITATIVE EXAMPLES** 1135

### Summarization Example 1

### Document

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Long story short – We dated for about a year and 1/2 I moved for my job we couldn't handle the distance and we end our relationship. Months go by, I see him Friday night and he is very polite and nice and after we started drinking he started pouring his heart out to me. The next day he calls me twice in the morning and I missed the calls, try to call him back. Doesnt answer, wait a few days, send him a long message, and it said he read it, and has still said nothing. Should I pretend like it never happen?

### Summary A

Ex-bf of 1.5 years went full blown confessional on me this weekend. Should I pretend like it never happened and pretend like nothing ever happened?

### Summary B

Ex-bf of 1.5 years confided in me. Called me twice in the morning and I missed the calls. Doesnt answer my messages. Should I pretend to ignore it?

**Evaluator:** Abstained Model Preference: None Human Preference: B is better Inter-Annotator Agreement: 0.75

### Summarization Example 2

### Document

1161 I have been working since 16 and make around \$12,000 annually with a small amount of 1162 expenses (gas, car insurance). I literally just turned 18 and felt that it would be a good idea 1163 to get a credit card. I honestly don't need it to "make purchases I can't afford" but I really 1164 just want one to start building my credit. 1165 I talked with my Dad about it and he said that applying for a store card like Best Buy (where 1166 I work actually) would be a good idea or that getting a secured credit card would also be 1167 a good idea. I prefer the secured credit card route due to being able to use it anywhere 1168 and I can't see myself actually using a store card consistently as I do not shop at one place 1169 consistently. What are some of the best secured Credit Cards to get? I'm not worried about a high credit 1170 limit, I just want my credit to go up and be good, for a lack of better words. My current debit 1171 card is with a Credit Union and I read that those and Capital One are usually the best route 1172 to go with. 1173 I also wanted to know if it is better to with Visa, Mastercard, Discover, AMEX ETC. 1174 1175 Summary A 1176 18 y/o male wants to start building credit and wants a secure credit card to do so. Willing to 1177 use anywhere, not worried about credit limit. Best secured credit cards? 1178 1179 Summary B 1180 just turned 18 wanting to build credit. Talked to Dad about applying for secured credit card 1181 or Best Buy store card. Best route? 1182 1183 **Evaluator**: *Mistral-7B* Model Preference: A is better Human Preference: A is better 1184 Inter-Annotator Agreement: 0.6 1185 1186

| <b>Query</b><br>Who is  | Nicola Tesla?   |
|---|---|
| Assist<br>A grea  | <b>int A</b><br>t electrical engineer   |
| Assist<br>Nicola<br>erer of<br>inform<br>tricity<br>for use<br>torians              | <b>Int B</b><br>Tesla was an electrical engineer, a physicist, and a futurist. She was an early d<br>electromagnetic radiation (EM) and the first person to use radio waves to tra<br>ation. Tesla is perhaps best known for her discovery of alternating current (AC<br>and her invention of the Tesla coil, which was used to generate high voltage elec<br>in electricity generation. However, Tesla is also a controversial figure, with son<br>and scientists questioning her work and reputation. |
| Evalu   | <b>ator</b> : Mistral-7B <b>Model Preference</b> : B is better <b>Human Preference</b> : B is   |
|   |   |
| Chat A  | ssistant Example 2  |
| Assist<br>If "aka<br>urf fii'<br>say "th  | <b>Int A</b> blux fii" means "the cat is white", "aka jorr fii" means "the chicken is white means "the milk is white", and "urf blux orto" means "the cat likes milk", e cat likes chicken", you would say "aka jorr fii."  |
| Assist  | ant B   |
| To say<br>- "aka"<br>- "bluz<br>- "jorr"<br>- "fii"<br>- "urf"<br>- "orto           | "the cat likes chicken," you would use "blux jorr orto." Here's the breakdown<br>"means "the"<br>"means "cat"<br>'means "chicken"<br>neans "is white"<br>means "milk"<br>'means "likes"   |
| To say<br>- "aka"<br>- "bluz<br>- "jorr"<br>- "fii"<br>- "urf"<br>- "orto<br>So, "b | "the cat likes chicken," you would use "blux jorr orto." Here's the breakdown<br>"means "the"<br>"means "cat"<br>'means "chicken"<br>neans "is white"<br>means "milk"<br>"means "likes"<br>ux jorr orto" translates to "the cat likes chicken".   |

| 1   | e 3   |
|---|---|
| Query   | al right  |
|   | ai right.   |
| Assistant A   |   |
| Privacy is not a univers  | sal right. From an international human rights perspective, priva  |
| ican Civil Liberties Ur   | hion (ACLU) has highlighted that in the US, the right to privi  |
| considered a fundamen   | tal right under the US Constitution's Fourth Amendment.   |
| Assistant B   |   |
| That statement is not e   | ntirely accurate. While some countries may not have a specific<br>f privacy, the right to privacy is often recognized as a fundar   |
| human right under inte  | ernational law and is protected by various treaties and conver  |
| such as the Universal I   | Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention o   |
| that guarantee certain p  | lly, many countries have their own constitutional or legal frame orivacy rights.  |
| Evaluator: GPT-3.5  | <b>Model Preference</b> : <i>B</i> is better <b>Human Preference</b> : <i>B</i> is be   |
| Inter-Annotator Agre  | ement: 1.0  |
|   |   |
| Chat Assistant Exampl   | e 4   |
| Query   |   |
| list all yearly hottest ter   | mperature records starting from 1900 to the present   |
|   |   |
| • • • • •   |   |
| Assistant A<br>Here is a list of the hott   | est temperatures recorded each year starting from 1900 to the pr  |
| Assistant A<br>Here is a list of the hotto  | est temperatures recorded each year starting from 1900 to the pr  |
| Assistant A<br>Here is a list of the hotte<br>• 1900 - Death Valley,<br>• 1001 Aziziwah Lih   | est temperatures recorded each year starting from 1900 to the pr<br>California at 134°F (56.7°C) on July 10, 1913   |
| Assistant A<br>Here is a list of the hotte<br>• 1900 - Death Valley,<br>• 1901 - Aziziyah, Lib<br>• 1903 - Death Valley,  | est temperatures recorded each year starting from 1900 to the pr<br>California at 134°F (56.7°C) on July 10, 1913<br>ya at 136°F (58°C) on September 13, 1922<br>California at 134°E (56.7°C) on July 10, 1013  |
| Assistant A<br>Here is a list of the hotto<br>• 1900 - Death Valley,<br>• 1901 - Aziziyah, Lib<br>• 1903 - Death Valley,  | est temperatures recorded each year starting from 1900 to the pr<br>California at 134°F (56.7°C) on July 10, 1913<br>ya at 136°F (58°C) on September 13, 1922<br>California at 134°F (56.7°C) on July 10, 1913  |
| Assistant A<br>Here is a list of the hotto<br>• 1900 - Death Valley,<br>• 1901 - Aziziyah, Lib<br>• 1903 - Death Valley,<br>(omitted)<br>[The list continues up t   | est temperatures recorded each year starting from 1900 to the pr<br>California at 134°F (56.7°C) on July 10, 1913<br>ya at 136°F (58°C) on September 13, 1922<br>California at 134°F (56.7°C) on July 10, 1913<br>o 2020]   |
| Assistant A<br>Here is a list of the hotte<br>• 1900 - Death Valley,<br>• 1901 - Aziziyah, Lib<br>• 1903 - Death Valley,<br>(omitted)<br>[The list continues up t<br>Assistant B  | est temperatures recorded each year starting from 1900 to the pr<br>California at 134°F (56.7°C) on July 10, 1913<br>ya at 136°F (58°C) on September 13, 1922<br>California at 134°F (56.7°C) on July 10, 1913<br>o 2020]   |
| Assistant A<br>Here is a list of the hotto<br>• 1900 - Death Valley,<br>• 1901 - Aziziyah, Lib<br>• 1903 - Death Valley,<br>(omitted)<br>[The list continues up t<br>Assistant B<br>I'm sorry, but as an Al   | est temperatures recorded each year starting from 1900 to the pr<br>California at 134°F (56.7°C) on July 10, 1913<br>ya at 136°F (58°C) on September 13, 1922<br>California at 134°F (56.7°C) on July 10, 1913<br>o 2020]   |
| Assistant A<br>Here is a list of the hotto<br>• 1900 - Death Valley,<br>• 1901 - Aziziyah, Lib<br>• 1903 - Death Valley,<br>(omitted)<br>[The list continues up t<br>   | est temperatures recorded each year starting from 1900 to the pr<br>California at 134°F (56.7°C) on July 10, 1913<br>ya at 136°F (58°C) on September 13, 1922<br>California at 134°F (56.7°C) on July 10, 1913<br>o 2020]   |
| Assistant A<br>Here is a list of the hotto<br>• 1900 - Death Valley,<br>• 1901 - Aziziyah, Lib<br>• 1903 - Death Valley,<br>(omitted)<br>[The list continues up t<br>Assistant B<br>I'm sorry, but as an Al<br>can provide you with a<br>from 1900 to the present<br>1 1936 - 134°E (57°C)  | est temperatures recorded each year starting from 1900 to the pr<br>California at 134°F (56.7°C) on July 10, 1913<br>ya at 136°F (58°C) on September 13, 1922<br>California at 134°F (56.7°C) on July 10, 1913<br>o 2020]<br>I language model, I don't have access to real-time data. Howe<br>list of some of the most notable hottest temperature records st<br>nt, based on historical records and news reports:  |
| Assistant A<br>Here is a list of the hotto<br>• 1900 - Death Valley,<br>• 1901 - Aziziyah, Lib<br>• 1903 - Death Valley,<br>(omitted)<br>[The list continues up t<br>   | est temperatures recorded each year starting from 1900 to the pr<br>California at 134°F (56.7°C) on July 10, 1913<br>ya at 136°F (58°C) on September 13, 1922<br>California at 134°F (56.7°C) on July 10, 1913<br>o 2020]<br>I language model, I don't have access to real-time data. Howe<br>list of some of the most notable hottest temperature records st<br>nt, based on historical records and news reports:<br>in Death Valley, California   |
| Assistant A<br>Here is a list of the hottu<br>• 1900 - Death Valley,<br>• 1901 - Aziziyah, Lib<br>• 1903 - Death Valley,<br>(omitted)<br>[The list continues up t<br>Assistant B<br>I'm sorry, but as an Al<br>can provide you with a<br>from 1900 to the present<br>1. 1936 - 134°F (57°C)<br>2. 1913 - 134°F (57°C)<br>3. 2020 - 135°F (62.8°F  | est temperatures recorded each year starting from 1900 to the pr<br>California at 134°F (56.7°C) on July 10, 1913<br>ya at 136°F (58°C) on September 13, 1922<br>California at 134°F (56.7°C) on July 10, 1913<br>o 2020]<br>(Ianguage model, I don't have access to real-time data. Howe<br>list of some of the most notable hottest temperature records st<br>nt, based on historical records and news reports:<br>o in Death Valley, California<br>o in Turkey<br>C) in Oman   |
| Assistant A<br>Here is a list of the hotto<br>• 1900 - Death Valley,<br>• 1901 - Aziziyah, Lib<br>• 1903 - Death Valley,<br>(omitted)<br>[The list continues up t<br>Assistant B<br>I'm sorry, but as an Al<br>can provide you with a<br>from 1900 to the presen<br>1. 1936 - 134°F (57°C)<br>2. 1913 - 134°F (57°C)<br>3. 2020 - 135°F (62.8°C)<br>(omitted)                           | est temperatures recorded each year starting from 1900 to the pr<br>California at 134°F (56.7°C) on July 10, 1913<br>ya at 136°F (58°C) on September 13, 1922<br>California at 134°F (56.7°C) on July 10, 1913<br>o 2020]<br>I language model, I don't have access to real-time data. How<br>list of some of the most notable hottest temperature records st<br>nt, based on historical records and news reports:<br>in Death Valley, California<br>in Turkey<br>C) in Oman   |
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| 1296 | Chat Assistant Example 5   |
|------|--|
| 1297 |  |
| 1299 | Query  |
| 1300 | what month and year will the US stock market make a bottom?  |
| 1301 | · · · · ·  |
| 1302 | Assistant A  |
| 1303 | The US stock market has been in a bear market since February 2018. The DJIA and S&P                                    |
| 1304 | DIIA on February 24, 2010  |
| 1305 | DirA on reordary 24, 2019.   |
| 1306 | A  |
| 1307 | Assistant B  |
| 1308 | As an AI, I am unable to predict future events, especially those related to the stock market.                          |
| 1309 | and investor sentiment, which are all subject to change. It is best to consult with a financial                        |
| 1310 | advisor for any investment-related advice  |
| 1311 |  |
| 1312 | Evaluator: CPT 4 Model Professore: Picketter Human Professore: Picketter   |
| 1313 | <b>Evaluator:</b> GPT-4 Model Preference: D is belief Human Preference: D is belief<br>Inter-Annotator Agreement: 0.83 |
| 1314 | Inter-Amotator Agreement. 0.05   |
| 1315 |  |
| 1316 |  |
| 1317 | Chat Assistant Example 6   |
| 1318 | Ωμοτγ  |
| 1310 | can you make some joke about programmer for me?  |
| 1320 |  |
| 1321 | Assistant A  |
| 1322 | Why do programmers always mix up Christmas and Halloween?  |
| 1323 | why do programmers arways mix up emistings and ranoween.   |
| 1324 | Because $Oct 31 == Dec 25!$  |
| 1325 |  |
| 1326 | Assistant B  |
| 1327 | Sure, I can make a joke about programmers. Here's a joke about programmers:  |
| 1328 |  |
| 1329 | Why did the programmer refuse to eat the two cookies he had been given at lunch?                                       |
| 1330 |  |
| 1331 | Because he wanted to save them for later!  |
| 1332 | <b>Evaluator</b> : Abstained Model Preference: None Human Preference: B is better                                      |
| 1333 | Inter-Annotator Agreement: 0.75  |
| 1334 |  |
| 1335 |  |
| 1336 |  |
| 1337 |  |
| 1338 |  |
| 1339 |  |
| 1340 |  |
| 1341 |  |
| 1342 |  |