
Realistic Face Reconstruction from Deep Embeddings

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Abstract

1 Modern face recognition systems use deep convolution neural networks to extract
2 latent embeddings from face images. Since basic arithmetic operations on embed-
3 dings are needed to make comparisons, generic encryption schemes cannot be used.
4 This leaves facial embedding unprotected and susceptible to privacy attacks that
5 reconstruction facial identity. We propose a search algorithm on the latent vector
6 space of StyleGAN [7] to find a matching face. Our process yields latent vectors
7 that generate face images that are high-resolution, realistic, and reconstruct relevant
8 attributes of the original face. Further, we demonstrate that our process is capable
9 of fooling FaceNet [11], a state-of-the-art face recognition system.

10 1 Introduction

11 Biometric authentication systems (i.e. face recognition)
12 are extensively used for security. Such systems generate
13 a template from a biometric data sample and compare it
14 against a master template to provide authentication. These
15 templates are often generated by incomprehensible black-
16 box models, previously thought to be impossible to mean-
17 ingfully deconstruct [5]. Nevertheless, recent works have
18 succeeded in performing privacy attacks which extract soft
19 biometric attributes or even full reconstructions from face
20 embeddings [4, 14, 2, 3, 8].

21 Reconstruction of face embeddings poses a major secu-
22 rity risk from privacy attacks. Malicious attackers may
23 access a database of embeddings and estimate a user’s
24 facial image or extract soft biometric attributes. The use of
25 cryptographic methods to encrypt face embedding has not
26 found much traction in the biometrics and pattern recogni-
27 tion community [2]. Generic encryption schemes such as
28 one-way hashes are inherently incapable of supporting ba-
29 sic arithmetic operations in the encrypted domain, which
30 is necessary for template matching [10]. Homomorphic
31 encryption methods allow basic arithmetic operations over
32 encrypted data, enabling encryption of face embeddings [2].

33 Previous works have demonstrated successful privacy attacks that fool face recognition systems
34 with facial image reconstructions [4, 3]. However, the reconstructions are generally low-quality and
35 would not convince a real human. Moreover, these methods would not work on homomorphically
36 encrypted data. We propose a method which creates reconstruction face images that not only fool
37 face recognition systems, but are also life-like and highly detailed. Our method does not require
38 gradient information or white box access, which are unavailable for homomorphically encrypted data.




Figure 1: Reconstructing a target face with pre-generated initialization and simulated annealing on an example from the FFHQ data set. The path shows the progression of the search algorithm in the hyper-spherical embedding space as it finds a close match. For the purposes of visualization, we project the embeddings to a 3D spherical representation.



Figure 2: For 10 target images from the FFHQ data set, we display the reconstructed faces achieved by each of the four parameter settings: a) no pre-generation and greedy, b) pre-generation and greedy, c) no pre-generation and simulated annealing, d) pre-generation and simulated annealing.

39 1.1 Related work

40 The problem of recreating a face from its face embedding has drawn interest from the community.

41 **Direct synthesis** Zhmoginov et. al. [14] invert the FaceNet embedding of a face image using a
 42 guiding image to create a reconstruction capturing important identity features of the original face.
 43 Cole et al. [3] propose an autoencoder structure to map the features to a frontal, neutral-expression
 44 image of the subject. Yang et al. [13] train a second neural network for the model inversion task.
 45 These approaches require white-box access to the face recognition model to produce better quality
 46 results. Working in the black-box setting assumption, Mai et al. [9] propose a de-convolutional
 47 network framework to reconstruct face images without knowledge of the face recognition network.

48 **Template Reconstruction with GANs** Generative adversarial networks (GANs) have shown stun-
 49 ning results in generating convincing images [6]. StyleGAN [7], a style-based GAN, is able to
 50 generate high quality, artificial face images which are almost impossible to tell apart from real images.
 51 Recently Abdal et al. [1] demonstrated that it is possible to accurately embed arbitrary images onto
 52 the StyleGAN latent space. This suggests for any face embedding, it should be possible to find a
 53 StyleGAN latent vector whose corresponding face image has a nearly identical embedding. Li et al.
 54 [8] were the first to attempt this by iteratively improvement on a latent vector guess by adding random
 55 noise and greedily improving the guess based on the FaceNet embedding distance to the target. More
 56 recently, Duong et al. [4] propose a GAN-based system to reconstruct faces using metric learning
 57 methods. These methods reconstruct faces to fool some face recognition system, but the generated
 58 face images are generally low-quality and would not fool a human.

59 **FaceNet** FaceNet [11] is one of the most popular face recognition systems, using a deep CNN
 60 to map images onto a embedding space where squared L_2 distances directly correspond to face
 61 similarity. For two embeddings E_1, E_2 , this face distance metric is defined as

$$D(E_1, E_2) = \|E_1 - E_2\|_2^2$$

62 with a classification threshold of 0.6, commonly set for implementations of FaceNet. Since output
 63 embeddings are normalized to magnitude 1, the embeddings are constrained to a d -dimensional
 64 hypersphere. Figure 1 shows a representation of the hyperspherical FaceNet embedding space as our
 65 reconstructed face image’s identity iteratively approaches a target.

66 2 Methods

67 We propose the use of greedy random optimization within the latent space of StyleGAN to generated
 68 an image whose FaceNet embedding closely matches a target embedding, measured by the FaceNet

69 distance metric. Starting with the zero vector, we repeatedly generate a new guess by adding small
 70 random noise and running the resulting vectors through the generator and FaceNet. We set a new
 71 guess to our current ‘best’ vector if it improves upon the previous ‘best’. By decreasing the standard
 72 deviation of the input noise, we converge on a solution. We assess guesses via the FaceNet distance
 73 metric by comparing them to the target embedding.

74 We also aim to improve upon greedy random
 75 optimization by optimizing using simulated
 76 annealing [12] to find an even closer match.
 77 Simulated annealing will, with a probability
 78 depending on the difference between the loss
 79 of the current vector and new guess, accept
 80 a guess that is worse than the current vector
 81 in order to encourage exploration and ‘hill
 82 climbing’ over local minima. In Algorithm 1
 83 we display the pseudocode for both of these
 84 optimization methods, where we denote Style-
 85 GAN as G and FaceNet as f .

86 To improve optimization speed, at each iteration
 87 we sample a batch of multiple faces and
 88 choose the best face as the guess based on the
 89 FaceNet distance metric.

90 In order seed the search algorithm with an initial
 91 guess, we pre-generate a set of 160,000
 92 standard normal latent vectors. We run
 93 each vector through StyleGAN followed by
 94 FaceNet to produce a face embedding for each
 95 latent vector, and store both the latent and
 96 embedding vectors. Then, given a face embed-
 97 ding E , we can directly identify the latent vector \mathbf{x} whose face embedding most closely matches the
 98 target face embedding E . Rather than initializing the search algorithm with the zero vector, we can
 99 initialize with the best identified latent vector from the pre-generated set.

100 Since initial stages of the search involve a long and expensive search over randomly-generated latent
 101 vectors, we can significantly speed up this initial search by pre-generating pairs of latent vectors
 102 and the corresponding FaceNet embeddings created by generating an image, aligning, normalizing,
 103 then running the result through FaceNet. Using these generated pairs, it is very fast to determine the
 104 closest embedding vector to a target embedding, and find the corresponding latent vector used to
 105 generate it. Then the rest of the search proceeds from there.

106 3 Experiments

107 We use images from the Flickr-Faces-HQ (FFHQ) data set [7]. FFHQ provides $\approx 70\text{K}$ high-quality
 108 face images of real people at 1024×1024 resolution with variation in age, ethnicity, image background,
 109 and accessories (e.g. eye-wear). These images come from Flickr, and are made publicly available
 110 under the Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 4.0 license by NVIDIA Corporation. We use a subset of 20
 111 target images for our reconstruction algorithm, chosen at random. For each algorithm setting, we run
 112 optimization for 200 iterations with a batch size of 8. At each step, the noise standard deviation is
 113 multiplied by a factor of 0.98. We run all experiments on a Tesla P4 GPU on AWS. Reconstructing a
 114 face image from a template takes around 5 minutes.

115 3.1 Results

116 We run reconstruction on a set of 20 target images from the FFHQ data set under each of the four
 117 parameter settings. In Figure 2, we display ten of the target images, along with the reconstructed faces
 118 produced for each parameter setting. We see a significant visual improvement from the reconstructions
 119 produced using, simulated annealing, especially with the help of our pre-generated set, and in many

Algorithm 1 Face Reconstruction

```

1: Parameters:  $\gamma \in [0, 1]$ , standard deviation decay rate
2: Options:  $\text{pregen} \in \{\text{T}, \text{F}\}$ ,  $\text{anneal} \in \{\text{T}, \text{F}\}$ 
3: Initialization:
4:  $\mathbf{x}_{best} = \begin{cases} \vec{0}, & \text{if } \text{pregen} = \text{F} \\ \text{Closest}(E), & \text{if } \text{pregen} = \text{T} \end{cases}$ 
5: for  $t \leftarrow 1, n$  do
6:    $T = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } \text{anneal} = \text{F} \\ 1 - (t + 1)/n, & \text{if } \text{anneal} = \text{T} \end{cases}$ 
7:    $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \mathbf{x}_{best} + \mathcal{N}(0, \gamma^t)$ 
8:    $d = D(f(G(\mathbf{x})), E) - D(f(G(\mathbf{x}_{best})), E)$ 
9:   if  $dE < 0$  or  $e^{-d/T} < \text{random}(0)$  then
10:      $\mathbf{x}_{best} \leftarrow \mathbf{x}$ 
11:   end if
12: end for
13: return  $\mathbf{x}_{best}$ 

```

120 of the faces the reconstructed face appears to closely match the target facial identity. Notably, the
 121 reconstructions are generally able to identify facial features such as hair color, eye color, and eye-wear.

anneal	pregen	L_2 Distance	Cosine Distance	Avg. # Updates
✗	✗	0.653 ± 0.110	0.213 ± 0.037	19.9
✗	✓	0.694 ± 0.132	0.231 ± 0.051	7.2
✓	✗	0.512 ± 0.077	0.165 ± 0.025	25.7
✓	✓	0.485 ± 0.081	0.156 ± 0.027	23.3

Table 1: Reconstruction quality for 20 faces from the FFHQ data set. We report mean and standard deviation (mean \pm std) for L_2 distance and cosine distance with each parameter setting. We also report the number of times the candidate x_{best} was improved upon by a new guess, which we expect to indicate the level of exploration done during optimization.

122 Table 3.1 displays the average L_2 and cosine
 123 distance between the target face and the recon-
 124 structed face for each parameter setting, over the
 125 20 target faces. Annealing and pre-generation
 126 offer an improvement by each metric, but suffers
 127 in the case of greedy optimization. Note
 128 that when using simulated annealing, the average
 129 L_2 distance falls below the 0.6 threshold,
 130 fooling FaceNet. This can be explained by the
 131 last column of the table, which shows that in
 132 the greedy and pre-generated case, the optimiza-
 133 tion stopped after very few updates, likely sug-
 134 gesting that the procedure got ‘stuck’ at a local
 135 minimum near the pre-generated face.

136 3.2 Comparison

137 Next, we qualitatively compare our face recon-
 138 structions to results achieved in Li et al. [8] and
 139 Zhmoginov et al. [14]. In Figure 3, we display
 140 the target images, along with our reconstructions
 141 and those of the previous methods. Our reconstruction
 142 is more life-like in each case. Compared to
 143 Li et al., our synthesized images are higher resolution
 144 and appear to more closely preserve identity. While
 145 our images are clearer than those from Zhmoginov
 146 et al., their method picks up more fine-grained
 details of the target face. However, we note that in
 Zhmoginov et al., the authors assume white-box
 access to the facial embedding network and use a
 guiding image of a generic face for reconstruction,
 whereas we use a black-box method.



Figure 3: Visual comparison between our method and two previous facial reconstruction methods, Li et al. [8] and Zhmoginov et al. [14]. We note that in Zhmoginov et al., the authors assume white-box access to the facial embedding network and use a guiding image of a generic face for reconstruction.

147 4 Conclusion/Future Work

148 We presented a method to reconstruct a person’s facial identity using a face embedding generated by
 149 a facial recognition system. Our method produces reconstructed facial images which not only fool
 150 face recognition systems, but are also convincingly real to humans. The results of this work suggest
 151 the need for further review and study of facial embedding encryption systems. The code used for this
 152 project will be made available at <https://github.com/evendrow/face-reconstruction>.

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188 Checklist

- 189 1. For all authors...
- 190 (a) Do the main claims made in the abstract and introduction accurately reflect the paper’s
191 contributions and scope? **[Yes]** As we suggest, our method is able to produce life-
192 like reconstructions of a target. See Figure 2 for a visualization and Figure 3 for a
193 comparison to previous works.
- 194 (b) Did you describe the limitations of your work? **[Yes]** We describe the limitations of
195 our experiments, specifically that we only apply our method to a small subset of the
196 FFHQ data set.
- 197 (c) Did you discuss any potential negative societal impacts of your work? **[Yes]** Yes, We
198 describe how our method and similar ones can be used by attacks to obtain personal
199 identity information from users of biometric authentication systems.
- 200 (d) Have you read the ethics review guidelines and ensured that your paper conforms to
201 them? **[Yes]**
- 202 2. If you are including theoretical results...
- 203 (a) Did you state the full set of assumptions of all theoretical results? **[N/A]**
- 204 (b) Did you include complete proofs of all theoretical results? **[N/A]**

- 205 3. If you ran experiments...
- 206 (a) Did you include the code, data, and instructions needed to reproduce the main experi-
207 mental results (either in the supplemental material or as a URL)? [Yes] A URL to the
208 accompanying github repository is included.
- 209 (b) Did you specify all the training details (e.g., data splits, hyperparameters, how they
210 were chosen)? [Yes] Experimental details are provided in Section 3.
- 211 (c) Did you report error bars (e.g., with respect to the random seed after running exper-
212 iments multiple times)? [Yes] Table 3.1 provides standard error for face embedding
213 distance.
- 214 (d) Did you include the total amount of compute and the type of resources used (e.g., type
215 of GPUs, internal cluster, or cloud provider)? [Yes] Information is provided in the
216 Experiments section.
- 217 4. If you are using existing assets (e.g., code, data, models) or curating/releasing new assets...
- 218 (a) If your work uses existing assets, did you cite the creators? [Yes] We cite StyleGAN,
219 FaceNet, and FFHQ.
- 220 (b) Did you mention the license of the assets? [Yes] We state the license for FFHQ 3.
- 221 (c) Did you include any new assets either in the supplement material or as a URL? [Yes] A
222 URL to the accompanying github repository is provided
- 223 (d) Did you discuss whether and how consent was obtained from people whose data you're
224 using/curating? [Yes] We state that the images we use are publicly available in 3.
- 225 (e) Did you discuss whether the data you are using/curating contains personally identifiable
226 information or offensive content? [Yes] Yes, we mention in 3 that these images come
227 from real people.
- 228 5. If you used crowdsourcing or conducted research with human subjects...
- 229 (a) Did you include the full text of instructions given to participants and screenshots, if
230 applicable? [N/A]
- 231 (b) Did you describe any potential participant risks, with links to Institutional Review
232 Board (IRB) approvals, if applicable? [N/A]
- 233 (c) Did you include the estimated hourly wage paid to participants and the total amount
234 spent on participant compensation? [N/A]