The Interpolated MVU Mechanism For Communication-efficient Private Federated Learning

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Abstract

1	We consider private federated learning (FL), where a server aggregates differentially
2	private gradient updates from a large number of clients in order to train a machine
3	learning model. The main challenge is balancing privacy with both classification
4	accuracy of the learned model as well as the amount of communication between
5	the clients and server. In this work, we build on a recently proposed method for
6	communication-efficient private FL—the MVU mechanism—by introducing a new
7	interpolation mechanism that can accommodate a more efficient privacy analysis.
8	The result is the new Interpolated MVU mechanism that provides SOTA results on
9	communication-efficient private FL on a variety of datasets.

10 1 Introduction

Machine-learned models leak information about their training data [26]. Private training methods 11 have been developed to train models that provide rigorous guarantees quantifying the amount of 12 information leaked [1, 8, 25]. Federated learning (FL) builds on private training to collaboratively 13 train a model among many devices while keeping the data at each device private [20]. To accomplish 14 this, (cross-device) FL requires that devices communicate updates to a server coordinating the training. 15 These updates can be privatized using a differentially private mechanism such as DP-SGD [1] by 16 injecting a controlled amount of noise into the gradient, or update direction, at each step. 17 To reduce communication overhead in FL, it is also of interest to compress updates before they are 18

transmitted to the server, and lossy compression can also be seen as a way of injecting noise into 19 updates. Most previous work has addressed the challenges of privacy and compression separately, first 20 applying a DP mechanism to privatize the response, and then compressing before transmitting [2, 12]. 21 Recent work [7] introduces the minimum-variance unbiased (MVU) mechanism for jointly com-22 pressing and ensuring privacy, and experimentally demonstrates that this can lead to better utility-23 compression trade-offs than other methods which first privatize and then compress. The core of 24 MVU consists of a private mechanism that works for a finite number of scalar inputs. If the input is a 25 bounded continuous scalar, then the solution is to dither to this finite set before applying the core 26 mechanism, and this is further extended to vectors by privacy composition over all coordinates via 27 Rényi DP [21]. Empirically, the MVU mechanism achieves state-of-the-art performance in the local 28 DP setting for both distributed mean estimation and federated learning [7]. However, the analysis 29 in [7] does not benefit from randomization introduced by dithering, and furthermore the extension to 30 vectors leads to suboptimal privacy composition for the L_2 geometry, which is often of interest (e.g., 31

working with L_2 -bounded update vectors such as in DP-SGD).

Contributions. Building on a simplified version of the MVU mechanism with only a single scalar input, we propose the *interpolated MVU* (I-MVU) mechanism—a more natural interpolation mechanism to extend MVU to continuous inputs. By its discrete nature, the MVU mechanism can be viewed

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as sampling from a particular categorical distribution, and hence can be expressed in exponential family form. The proposed I-MVU mechanism handles continuous inputs by *interpolating* the natural

³⁸ exponential family parameters, rather than directly interpolating the probabilities as in dithering. We

³⁹ introduce a new analysis technique and, by further exploiting special properties of the exponential

40 family, obtain a tight privacy analysis for the vector extension under L_2 geometry. Experimentally,

41 we find that under both client-level and user-level DP settings, the I-MVU mechanism provides better

42 privacy-utility trade-off than SignSGD [17] and MVU [7] at an extremely low communication budget

43 of *one bit per gradient dimension*. Moreover, I-MVU achieves close to the same performance as the

standard non-compressed Gaussian mechanism [1] for similar levels of (ϵ, δ) -DP.

45 2 Background and Related Work

46 **Differential privacy.** The framework of differential privacy [10] allows rigorous reasoning of 47 privacy leakage through a mechanism \mathcal{M} applied to a dataset \mathcal{D} . We say that \mathcal{M} is (ϵ, δ) -differentially 48 private, denoted (ϵ, δ) -DP, if for any \mathcal{D} , any $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{D}$ and any output set O, we have:

 $e^{-\epsilon}\mathbb{P}(\mathcal{M}(\mathcal{D}\setminus\mathbf{x})\in O)-\delta\leq\mathbb{P}(\mathcal{M}(\mathcal{D})\in O)\leq e^{\epsilon}\mathbb{P}(\mathcal{M}(\mathcal{D}\setminus\mathbf{x})\in O)+\delta.$

⁴⁹ More generally, the framework of DP seeks to bound the difference in distribution between $\mathcal{M}(\mathcal{D})$

and $\mathcal{M}(\mathcal{D} \setminus \mathbf{x})$ so that a single record \mathbf{x} will not affect the output of the mechanism \mathcal{M} significantly.

A useful variant of DP is Rényi differential privacy (RDP) [21], which instead bounds the Rényi divergence [23] between $\mathcal{M}(\mathcal{D} \setminus \mathbf{x})$ by some ϵ . Formally, we say that \mathcal{M} is (α, ϵ) -RDP if

$$D_{\alpha}(\mathcal{M}(\mathcal{D}) \mid\mid \mathcal{M}(\mathcal{D} \setminus \mathbf{x})) \leq \epsilon \quad \text{and} \quad D_{\alpha}(\mathcal{M}(\mathcal{D} \setminus \mathbf{x}) \mid\mid \mathcal{M}(\mathcal{D})) \leq \epsilon,$$

⁵³ where D_{α} denotes the order- α Rényi divergence [21]. Importantly, Rényi DP supports composition ⁵⁴ of mechanisms in a simple manner: If $\mathcal{M}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{M}_T$ are mechanisms with \mathcal{M}_t being (α, ϵ_t) -RDP ⁵⁵ for $t = 1, \ldots, T$, then the composition of the T mechanisms is $(\alpha, \sum_{t=1}^{T} \epsilon_t)$ -RDP. Another useful ⁵⁶ property of RDP is its conversion to (ϵ, δ) -DP [3]: If \mathcal{M} is $(\alpha, \epsilon_{\alpha})$ -RDP for $\alpha > 1$ then it is also ⁵⁷ (ϵ, δ) -DP for any $0 < \delta < 1$ with

$$\epsilon = \epsilon_{\alpha} + \log\left(\frac{\alpha - 1}{\alpha}\right) - \frac{\log\delta + \log\alpha}{\alpha - 1}.$$
(1)

Federated learning with differential privacy. Federated learning (FL) [18, 20] allows distributed 58 training of ML models across multiple clients without centralized data storage. A server coordinates 59 training by acquiring model updates from clients, aggregating them, and then transmitting an updated 60 model back to the clients, with the process repeating until convergence. One promise of FL is data 61 privacy since the updates are computed locally on each client using their own data, and hence no 62 client data is ever explicitly transmitted to the server (or anyone else) throughout the training process. 63 In spite of this, a recent line of work showed that despite the clients never explicitly sharing their 64 data, it is possible to reconstruct training samples from the model updates in a process called *gradient* 65 *inversion* [11, 31, 32]. This vulnerability remains even if a large number of clients participate in a 66 round using secure aggregation [11, 16, 30]. 67

⁶⁸ Differential privacy is a principled method to ensure data privacy in FL as it provides provable ⁶⁹ guarantees against data reconstruction from the output of a private mechanism [4, 13, 27]. To apply ⁷⁰ DP to FL training, given a client update x, the client instead sends $\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{x})$ to the server. For a ⁷¹ given round, the client's privacy leakage can be computed in terms of *local DP* if the privatized ⁷² update $\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{x})$ is revealed to the server, or *global DP* if secure aggregation is applied to aggregate the ⁷³ privatized updates before revealing it to the server. The total privacy leakage throughout training can ⁷⁴ then be computed via RDP composition and conversion to (ϵ, δ) -DP via Equation 1.

Communication-efficient private mechanisms. Since model updates in FL are high-dimensional vectors of size equal to the number of model parameters, it is also important in practice to compress these updates for communication efficiency. This requirement combined with privacy has led to a series of prior work that designed communication-efficient private mechanisms with application to FL [2, 6, 7, 9, 12, 17, 24, 29]. However, compressing the model update often leads to higher variance and/or biasedness [7, 9], and as a result the model's performance is subpar compared to ones trained using non-compressed DP mechanisms such as the Gaussian mechanism [7, 17]. In this work, we




Figure 1: Plot showing the expected value of $\mathcal{M}(x)$ for different values of $x \in [0, 1]$ for the MVU and I-MVU mechanism. While MVU is unbiased in the entire interval [0, 1], I-MVU incurs some bias for $x \neq 0, 1$, especially at higher values of the DP parameter ϵ .

drastically reduce this performance gap and show that replacing the Gaussian mechanism with the 82

proposed interpolated MVU mechanism leads to the same test performance at equal privacy cost 83 when using one-bit output per coordinate. 84

3 **Interpolated MVU Mechanism** 85

We introduce the *interpolated MVU mechanism*—a communication-efficient differentially-private 86 mechanism with application to private FL training. We also present a novel privacy analysis technique 87 for privatizing vectors with L_2 geometry, leading to a drastic improvement in the privacy-utility 88 trade-off over the previously proposed MVU mechanism [7]. To this end, we begin by defining the 89 problem of private-compression and recalling the MVU mechanism. 90

Problem description. Consider the private-compression problem of transmitting a vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ 91 with bounded L_2 -norm privately using at most bd bits, with b small enough so that the entire vector 92 x can be transmitted efficiently. One can reduce this problem to a scalar one by considering how 93 to privately compress $x \in [0, 1]$ using at most b bits, and then scaling the vector x appropriately to 94 $[0, 1]^d$ and applying the scalar mechanism coordinate-wise. 95

The minimum variance unbiased (MVU) mechanism [7] solves the private-compression problem 96 by first discretizing the interval [0,1] into $B_{\rm in}$ points $\mathcal{X} = \{x_1 = 0, x_2, \dots, x_{B_{\rm in}} = 1\}$ with 97 $x_i := (i-1)/(B_{in}-1)$. If $x = x_i$, the mechanism samples $j \sim \text{Categorical}(\mathbf{p}_i)$ using a probability vector $\mathbf{p}_i \in \Delta^{B_{out}-1}$ and outputs $\mathcal{M}(x) = a_j \in \mathbb{R}$ where $\{a_1, \ldots, a_{B_{out}}\}$ is a pre-determined output 98 99 alphabet. The probability vectors $\mathbf{p}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{p}_{B_{in}}$ and output alphabet $\{a_1, \ldots, a_{B_{out}}\}$ are designed so 100 that the mechanism satisfies the following three properties: 101

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ϵ-Differential Privacy: e^{-ϵ}**p**_{i',j} ≤ **p**_{i,j} ≤ e^ϵ**p**_{i',j} for all i ≠ i' and all j.
 Unbiasedness: Σ<sup>B_{out}_{j=1} a_j**p**_{i,j} = x_i for all i.
 Minimum variance: Σ^{B_{in}}_{i=1} Var(M(x_i)) is minimal among all mechanisms satisfying 1 and 2.
</sup> 104

The MVU mechanism can then be applied to all $x \in [0, 1]$ by randomly dithering x to the nearest 105 x_i and x_{i+1} such that the dithering is unbiased in expectation. One can also view this dithering 106 procedure as linearly interpolating between p_i and p_{i+1} . It is straightforward to generalize the 107 mechanism to any bounded x by scaling it to [0, 1] and then applying the MVU mechanism. 108

For a d-dimensional vector x, the MVU mechanism can be applied independently to each coordinate 109 and the privacy cost is $d\epsilon$ by composition if $\mathbf{x} \in [0, 1]^d$ (or in general, if $\|\mathbf{x}\|_{\infty}$ is bounded). However, 110 the privacy analysis becomes much more complicated for L_2 -norm bounded vectors—as is often 111 the case for DP-SGD training [1]. We address this problem by expressing the MVU mechanism in 112 exponential family form and interpolating in the natural parameter space, allowing us to use special 113 properties of exponential family distributions to derive tight privacy analysis for the L_2 geometry. 114

Interpolated MVU mechanism. As mentioned above, by dithering an input $x \in [x_i, x_{i+1}]$ to x_i or 115 x_{i+1} , for general inputs $x \notin \mathcal{X}$, the MVU can be seen as linearly interpolating between the probability 116 vectors \mathbf{p}_i and \mathbf{p}_{i+1} . Here we improve upon MVU by introducing a better form of interpolation. The 117

pmf for the categorical distribution with natural parameter η can be written as:

$$\mathbb{P}(j|\boldsymbol{\eta}) = \exp(\mathbf{e}_j^\top \boldsymbol{\eta} - A(\boldsymbol{\eta})), \quad A(\boldsymbol{\eta}) = \log\left(\sum_j \exp(\boldsymbol{\eta}_j)\right)$$
(2)

where \mathbf{e}_j is the *j*-th standard basis vector. Note that if $\mathbf{p} \in \Delta^{B_{\text{out}}-1}$ then its natural parameter is $\eta = \log \mathbf{p}$. To define the *interpolated MVU* (I-MVU) mechanism, let $\mathbf{p}_1, \mathbf{p}_2 \in \Delta^{B_{\text{out}}-1}$ be sampling probability vectors obtained from the MVU mechanism with $B_{\text{in}} = 2$ and let $\eta_i = \log \mathbf{p}_i$ for i = 1, 2be the natural parameters. Given $x \in [0, 1]$, the I-MVU mechanism samples $j \sim \mathbb{P}(\cdot | \boldsymbol{\eta}(x))$ according to Equation 2 and outputs a_j from the MVU output alphabet, where

$$\boldsymbol{\eta}(x) = (1-x)\boldsymbol{\eta}_1 + x\boldsymbol{\eta}_2. \tag{3}$$

In other words, instead of linearly interpolating between \mathbf{p}_1 and \mathbf{p}_2 to construct the sampling probability vector for x, we interpolate in the natural parameter space of the categorical distribution. Doing so incurs some bias¹ when $x \notin \{0, 1\}$; see Figure 1 for a plot illustrating this phenomenon. Nevertheless, this bias is small in comparison to the noise induced by differential privacy, and we show empirically that it does not affect the performance of the I-MVU mechanism for FL training.

Input scaling. One way to extend I-MVU to arbitrary bounded ranges is to first scale the input to [0, 1] and then apply the mechanism as usual. However, note that the interpolation scheme in Equation 3 is in fact well-defined for any $x \in \mathbb{R}$, and hence the scaled input does not need to be strictly in the range [0, 1]. We leverage this property by introducing a scaling factor β : For $u \in [-C, C]$, the β -scaled I-MVU mechanism is defined as

$$\mathcal{M}_{\beta}(u) = \mathcal{M}\left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\beta u}{2C}\right),$$

where \mathcal{M} is the plain I-MVU mechanism. Note that this scaling effectively ensures that the input

to \mathcal{M} is in the range $[(1 - \beta)/2, (1 + \beta)/2]$, with $\beta = 1$ corresponding to scaling the input to [0, 1]. For vectors \mathbf{u} with $\|\mathbf{u}\|_2 \le C$, the β -scaled input $\mathbf{x} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\beta \mathbf{u}}{2C}$ satisfies $\|\mathbf{x}\|_2 \le \beta/2$

One advantage for using β -scaling is that if the distribution of u is highly concentrated near zero, then scaling with $\beta > 1$ ensures that the input to \mathcal{M} is more spread out in the range [0, 1]. This ensures that the input distribution more closely reflects the minimum variance requirement (property 3) for the MVU mechanism. For L_2 -norm bounded vectors **u** this is especially true, where the distribution of coordinates of **u** is likely concentrated near zero. Consequently, for compressing client updates with bounded L_2 -norm, β -scaling with a large β is essential for achieving good performance.

143 3.1 Privacy Analysis

We analyze privacy leakage of the I-MVU mechanism for L_2 -norm bounded vectors in terms of Rényi DP [21]. Our strategy is to first analyze the scalar mechanism and express its Rényi divergence for two differing inputs x_1 and x_2 as a function of $(x_2 - x_1)^2$ (Lemma 1). Then, by independently applying the mechanism across coordinates, we can sum the Rényi divergence across coordinates and upper bound the total RDP ϵ as a function of $||\mathbf{x}_2 - \mathbf{x}_1||_2^2$ (Theorem 1). Our analysis depends crucially on a measure of information known as *Fisher information*, which we define below for completeness. **Definition 1.** Let f be the density function of a distribution parameterized by $x \in \mathbb{R}$. The Fisher

information of x contained in a sample $Z \sim f(\cdot|x)$ is:

$$\mathcal{I}_{Z}(x) := \mathbb{E}_{Z}\left[\left(\frac{d}{dx}\log f(Z|x)\right)^{2}\right].$$
(4)

In our setting, the distribution $\mathbb{P}(\cdot|\boldsymbol{\eta}(x))$ is defined by the private data x, and Fisher information measures how much information is revealed about x through a sample $j \sim \mathbb{P}(\cdot|\boldsymbol{\eta}(x))$. It is noteworthy

that such a reasoning has also been used to define Fisher information as a privacy metric [14].

Lemma 1. Let $M = \sup_{x \in \mathbb{R}} \mathcal{I}_Z(x)$ be an upper bound on the Fisher information of the mechanism M. Then for any $x_1, x_2 \in \mathbb{R}$:

$$D_{\alpha}(\mathbb{P}(\cdot|\boldsymbol{\eta}(x_1)) || \mathbb{P}(\cdot|\boldsymbol{\eta}(x_2))) \le \alpha M (x_2 - x_1)^2 / 2.$$
(5)

¹In spite of this, we still name our mechanism I-MVU for its connection to the MVU mechanism.




Figure 2: Privacy vs. accuracy plot for the client-level DP scenario on MNIST (left) and CIFAR-10 (right). Each point represents a single hyperparameter setting and the Pareto frontier is shown in dashed line. Across the entire range of ϵ , I-MVU consistently performs as well as the non-compressed Gaussian mechanism while requiring only one bit communication per update coordinate.

Theorem 1. Let M be the Fisher information constant from Lemma 1. Suppose that $\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2 \in \mathbb{R}^d$ satisfy $\|\mathbf{x}_2 - \mathbf{x}_1\|_2 \leq C$. Then the I-MVU mechanism is $(\alpha, \alpha MC^2/2)$ -RDP for all $\alpha > 1$.

Proof sketch. We first derive the Taylor series expression for the Rényi divergence between $\mathbb{P}(\cdot|\boldsymbol{\eta}(x_1))$ and $\mathbb{P}(\cdot|\boldsymbol{\eta}(x_2))$. Since Rényi divergence is minimized and is equal to 0 when $x_1 = x_2$, the zeroth-order and first-order terms in the Taylor series are 0. The coefficient for the second-order term is given by the Fisher information $\mathcal{I}_Z(x_1)$ [15], and thus we give a numerical method to compute $M = \sup_{x \in \mathbb{R}} \mathcal{I}_Z(x)$ in Appendix B and use it in Equation 5 to bound the RDP ϵ . Full proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 are provided in Appendix A.

165 4 Experiments

We evaluate the I-MVU mechanism for federated learning under the local DP setting, *i.e.*, clients transmit the privately compressed model update $\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{x})$ to the server *before* aggregation. We consider private mechanisms that output *one bit per coordinate* of the update vector. This extreme level of compression reflects realistic constraints in FL and is very challenging for existing mechanisms. Previous work [7] found that the two most competitive baselines are the MVU mechanism with b = 1bit communication budget and SignSGD [17]. The latter applies the Gaussian mechanism for gradient perturbation [1] and then takes the sign of the perturbed gradient to obtain one-bit per coordinate.

173 4.1 Client-level DP

We first evaluate under the *client-level DP* setting on MNIST and CIFAR-10 [19]. Here, the privacy analysis guarantees that the learning algorithm is differentially private with respect to the removal of any client. We divide the training set among the clients with client sample size 1. Each client performs a single local gradient update in every FL round. This setting is equivalent to DP-SGD training [1] but with the Gaussian mechanism replaced by a communication-efficient private mechanism.

Training details. Following [7], we train a linear model on top of ScatterNet features [28], which remains to date the state-of-the-art DP model for MNIST and CIFAR-10 without leveraging any public data. We perform a grid search over hyperparameters such as number of update rounds, step size, gradient norm clip, and mechanism parameters σ (for Gaussian and SignSGD) and ϵ (for MVU and I-MVU). We use the same hyperparameter values reported in Tables 3 and 4 in [7].

Result. Figure 2 shows the privacy vs. test accuracy curve on MNIST (left) and CIFAR-10 (right). 184 Privacy is measured in terms of (ϵ, δ) -DP at $\delta = 10^{-5}$. Each point in the scatter plot corresponds 185 to a single hyperparameter setting and the dashed line shows the Pareto frontier of optimal privacy-186 accuracy trade-off. The yellow line corresponds to the standard Gaussian mechanism without 187 compression, which attains the best test accuracy at any given privacy budget ϵ . Both SignSGD and 188 MVU are competitive, achieving close to the same level of accuracy as the Gaussian mechanism, 189 but a non-negligible gap remains, especially on CIFAR-10. In contrast, I-MVU attains nearly the 190 same performance as the Gaussian mechanism at all values of ϵ on both MNIST and CIFAR-10. 191




Figure 3: Privacy vs. accuracy plot for the sample-level DP scenario on FEMNIST. Each point represents a single hyperparameter setting and the Pareto frontier is shown in dashed line. I-MVU with one-bit communication budget per coordinate consistently performs better than SignSGD and is competitive with the non-compressed Gaussian baseline across the entire range of ϵ .

Since MVU and I-MVU are near-identical mechanisms, we argue that the performance gain comes primarily from the tight privacy analysis for L_2 geometry using Fisher information (Section 3.1).

194 4.2 Sample-level DP

Next, we evaluate under the *sample-level DP* setting on the FEMNIST dataset [5] for classifying 195 written characters into 62 distinct classes. Privacy analysis guarantees that the learning algorithm is 196 differentially private with respect to the removal of any training sample from a client. The dataset 197 has a pre-defined train split with 3,500 clients, from which we randomly select 3,150 clients for 198 training and the remaining 350 clients for testing. A set of 5 clients is selected in each training 199 round, who then performs full batch gradient descent for a single local gradient update to compute 200 the update vector. The update vector is privatized using a communication-efficient private mechanism 201 and transmitted to the server. 202

Training details. We train a simple 4-layer convolutional network for classification. The model achieves 84% accuracy when trained non-privately. The client optimizer is SGD with a learning rate of 0.1 and no momentum. The server implements FedAvg [20] with a momentum of 0.9. We perform a grid search on the local and server learning rates, the clipping factor, the noise multiplier σ for both Gaussian and SignSGD baselines, and the ϵ and scale hyperparameters for I-MVU. The hyperparameter ranges are given in Tables 1, 2 and 3 in the appendix. In particular, SignSGD requires much lower server-side learning rates since the updates (in {±1}) have higher magnitude.

Result. We show the privacy-accuracy trade-off for FEMNIST in Figure 3. Each point in the scatter plot represents a single hyperparameter setting and the Pareto frontier (dashed line) represents the optimal privacy-accuracy trade-off. The DP privacy budget ϵ is given at $\delta = 10^{-5}$. We observe that I-MVU (blue dashed line) performs better than SignSGD (silver dashed line) for the same communication budget of one bit per update coordinate across the entire range of considered privacy budgets ϵ . Moreover, I-MVU performs on par with the non-compressed Gaussian baseline (yellow dashed line), where clients perform local DP-SGD without compressing model updates.

217 5 Conclusion

We proposed the Interpolated MVU (I-MVU) mechanism that drastically reduces the amount of uplink communication in (cross-device) FL while providing differential privacy guarantees. Our proposal builds on the recently introduced MVU mechanism to extend it to continuous-valued vectors with L_2 geometry using a more efficient privacy analysis. Under both client-level and sample-level local DP settings, I-MVU with an extreme compression level of one bit per update coordinate attains close to the performance of the non-compressed Gaussian mechanism. Given this strong empirical performance, we advocate for I-MVU as a practical tool for communication-efficient private FL.

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315 A Proofs

Lemma 1. Let $M = \sup_{x \in \mathbb{R}} \mathcal{I}_Z(x)$ be an upper bound on the Fisher information of the mechanism 317 \mathcal{M} . Then for any $x_1, x_2 \in \mathbb{R}$:

$$D_{\alpha}(\mathbb{P}(\cdot|\boldsymbol{\eta}(x_1)) || \mathbb{P}(\cdot|\boldsymbol{\eta}(x_2))) \leq \alpha M (x_2 - x_1)^2 / 2.$$

Proof. We first derive an explicit form for the Fisher information. Let $f(\mathbf{z}; x)$ denote the pmf in Equation 2 for any $\mathbf{z} \in {\mathbf{e}_1, \dots, \mathbf{e}_{B_{\text{out}}}}$. The log pmf is:

$$\log f(\mathbf{z}; x) = \mathbf{z}^{\top} \boldsymbol{\eta}(x) - A(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x))$$
(6)

Taking derivative with respect to x gives:

$$\frac{d}{dx}\log f(\mathbf{z}; x) = (\mathbf{z} - \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x)))^{\top}(\boldsymbol{\eta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\eta}_1),$$
$$\left(\frac{d}{dx}\log f(\mathbf{z}; x)\right)^2 = (\boldsymbol{\eta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\eta}_1)^{\top}(\mathbf{z} - \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x)))(\mathbf{z} - \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x)))^{\top}(\boldsymbol{\eta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\eta}_1),$$

where σ denotes the sigmoid function. Taking expectation over z gives the Fisher information:

$$\mathcal{I}_Z(x) = (\boldsymbol{\eta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\eta}_1)^\top U(\boldsymbol{\eta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\eta}_1), \tag{7}$$

322 with $U = \text{diag}(\sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x))) - \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x))\sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x))^{\top}$.

To derive the upper bound, we first define a function F for the Rényi divergence of the mechanism for a fixed x_1 and varying x_2 :

$$F_{\alpha}(x_2; x_1) = D_{\alpha}(\mathbb{P}(\cdot | \boldsymbol{\eta}(x_1)) || \mathbb{P}(\cdot | \boldsymbol{\eta}(x_2))).$$
(8)

 $_{325}$ By Taylor's theorem, we can express F as:

$$F_{\alpha}(x_2;x_1) = F_{\alpha}(x_1;x_1) + (x_2 - x_1)F_{\alpha}'(x_1;x_1) + (x_2 - x_1)^2 F_{\alpha}''(\xi;x_1)/2$$

for some $\xi \in [x_1, x_2]$. Note that $F_{\alpha}(x_1; x_1) = 0$ and $F'_{\alpha}(x_1; x_1) = 0$ (since x_1 is the global minimizer of $F_{\alpha}(\cdot; x_1)$), so F is locally a quadratic function:

$$F_{\alpha}(x_2; x_1) = (x_2 - x_1)^2 F_{\alpha}''(\xi; x_1)/2.$$
(9)

Since f is the pmf of an exponential family distribution, we can use the closed form expression [22] for Rényi divergence of exponential family distributions to express F and its derivatives:

$$F_{\alpha}(\xi; x_{1}) = \frac{1}{\alpha - 1} [A(\alpha \eta(x_{1}) + (1 - \alpha)\eta(\xi)) - \alpha A(\eta(x_{1})) - (1 - \alpha)A(\eta(\xi))]$$

$$F_{\alpha}'(\xi; x_{1}) = (\sigma(\eta(\xi)) - \sigma(\alpha \eta(x_{1}) + (1 - \alpha)\eta(\xi)))^{\top}(\eta_{2} - \eta_{1})$$

$$F_{\alpha}''(\xi; x_{1}) = (\eta_{2} - \eta_{1})^{\top}(V + (\alpha - 1)W)(\eta_{2} - \eta_{1})$$

where $V = \operatorname{diag}(\sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(\xi))) - \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(\xi))\sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(\xi))^{\top}$, $W = \operatorname{diag}(\sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x'))) - \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x'))\sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x'))^{\top}$, and $x' = \alpha x_1 + (1 - \alpha)\xi$. Hence $F''_{\alpha}(\xi; x_1) = \mathcal{I}_Z(\xi) + (\alpha - 1)\mathcal{I}_Z(x')$ by Equation 7. Upper bounding $\mathcal{I}_Z(\xi)$ and $\mathcal{I}_Z(x')$ by $M := \sup_{x \in \mathbb{R}} \mathcal{I}_Z(x)$ and combining with Equation 9 gives the desired result. \Box

Theorem 1. Let M be the Fisher information constant from Lemma 1. Suppose that $\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2 \in \mathbb{R}^d$ satisfy $\|\mathbf{x}_2 - \mathbf{x}_1\|_2 \leq C$, then the I-MVU mechanism is $(\alpha, \alpha M C^2/2)$ -RDP for all $\alpha > 1$.

Proof. Let $\mathbf{a} = \mathcal{M}(\mathbf{x}) \in \{a_1, \dots, a_{B_{\text{out}}}\}^d$ be the output of the vector I-MVU mechanism that 336 independently applies the scalar mechanism to each coordinate. Then: 337

$$\begin{aligned} D_{\alpha}(\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{x}_{1}) \mid\mid \mathcal{M}(\mathbf{x}_{2})) &= \frac{1}{\alpha - 1} \log \sum_{\mathbf{a} \in \{a_{1}, \dots, a_{B_{out}}\}^{d}} \prod_{k=1}^{d} \frac{\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{a}_{k} \mid \boldsymbol{\eta}((\mathbf{x}_{2})_{k}))^{\alpha}}{\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{a}_{k} \mid \boldsymbol{\eta}((\mathbf{x}_{1})_{k}))^{\alpha - 1}} \\ &= \sum_{k=1}^{d} \frac{1}{\alpha - 1} \log \sum_{\mathbf{a}_{k} \in \{a_{1}, \dots, a_{B_{out}}\}} \frac{\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{a}_{k} \mid \boldsymbol{\eta}((\mathbf{x}_{2})_{k}))^{\alpha}}{\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{a}_{k} \mid \boldsymbol{\eta}((\mathbf{x}_{1})_{k}))^{\alpha - 1}} \quad \text{by independence} \\ &= \sum_{k=1}^{d} D_{\alpha}(\mathbb{P}(\cdot \mid \boldsymbol{\eta}((\mathbf{x}_{1})_{k})) \mid\mid \mathbb{P}(\cdot \mid \boldsymbol{\eta}((\mathbf{x}_{2})_{k}))) \\ &\leq \sum_{k=1}^{d} \alpha M((\mathbf{x}_{2})_{k} - (\mathbf{x}_{1})_{k})^{2}/2 \quad \text{by Lemma 1} \\ &= \alpha M \|\mathbf{x}_{2} - \mathbf{x}_{1}\|_{2}^{2}/2. \end{aligned}$$

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B **Computing Fisher Information** 339

In this section we describe a method for computing $M = \sup_{x \in \mathbb{R}} \mathcal{I}_Z(x)$. We first define a condition for η_1, η_2 that allows us to reduce this problem to maximizing $\mathcal{I}_Z(x)$ over a bounded range 340 341 $[x_{\min}, x_{\max}].$ 342

Definition 2. Two vectors $\eta_1, \eta_2 \in \mathbb{R}^B$ are said to be anadromic if for all j = 1, ..., B, we have 343 $(\boldsymbol{\eta}_1)_j = (\boldsymbol{\eta}_2)_{B-j+1}.$ 344

The following technical lemma proves several useful properties that hold when η_1 and η_2 are 345 anadromic. 346

Lemma 2. Suppose that $\eta_1, \eta_2 \in \mathbb{R}^B$ are anadromic. Let $\theta = \eta_2 - \eta_1$ and suppose that $j^+ = \arg \max_j \theta_j, j^- = \arg \min_j \theta_j$ are unique. Then the following hold: 347 348

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- (i) $\theta_j = -\theta_{B-j+1}$ for all j, and hence $j^- = B j^+ + 1$. (ii) $\eta(x)_j = \eta(1-x)_{B-j+1}$ for all j. (iii) $\sigma(\eta(x)) \to \mathbf{e}_{j+}$ as $x \to \infty$ and $\sigma(\eta(x)) \to \mathbf{e}_{j-}$ as $x \to -\infty$. (iv) $\mathcal{I}_Z(x) = \mathcal{I}_Z(1-x)$ for all $x \in \mathbb{R}$. 351
- 352
- (v) x = 1/2 is a stationary point for $\mathcal{I}_Z(x)$. 353

354 (vi) If
$$\sigma(\eta(x))_{j^+} \ge 1/2$$
 then $\mathcal{I}_Z(x) \le 4\theta_{j^+}^2 \sigma(\eta(x))_{j^+} (1 - \sigma(\eta(x))_{j^+})$.

Proof. (i) Since η_1 and η_2 are anadromic, 355

$$\boldsymbol{\theta}_{j} = (\boldsymbol{\eta}_{2})_{j} - (\boldsymbol{\eta}_{1})_{j} = (\boldsymbol{\eta}_{2})_{j} - (\boldsymbol{\eta}_{2})_{B-j+1} = -((\boldsymbol{\eta}_{2})_{B-j+1} - (\boldsymbol{\eta}_{1})_{j}) = -\boldsymbol{\theta}_{B-j+1}.$$

In particular, $\arg \max_{i} \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j} = B - (\arg \min_{j} \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j}) + 1.$ 356

357 (ii)
$$\boldsymbol{\eta}(x)_j = (1-x)(\boldsymbol{\eta}_1)_j + x(\boldsymbol{\eta}_2)_j = (1-x)(\boldsymbol{\eta}_1)_{B-j+1} + x(\boldsymbol{\eta}_2)_{B-j+1} = \boldsymbol{\eta}(1-x)_{B-j+1}.$$

(iii) Let
$$\bar{\eta} = (\eta_1 + \eta_2)/2$$
 so that $\eta(x) = \bar{\eta} + (x - 1/2)\theta$ for all $x \in \mathbb{R}$. It is clear that $\sigma(\eta(x)) \to \mathbf{e}_{j+1}$

as $x \to \infty$ since j^+ is unique. A similar argument shows that $\sigma(\eta(x)) \to \mathbf{e}_{j^-}$ as $x \to -\infty$. 359

(iv) Using the expression of $\mathcal{I}_Z(x)$ in the proof of Lemma 1, we get 360

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{I}_{Z}(x) &= \sum_{j} \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j}^{2} \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x))_{j} - \left(\sum_{j} \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j} \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x))_{j}\right)^{2} \\ &= \sum_{j} \boldsymbol{\theta}_{B-j+1}^{2} \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(1-x))_{B-j+1} - \left(\sum_{j} \boldsymbol{\theta}_{B-j+1} \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(1-x))_{B-j+1}\right)^{2} \quad \text{by (i) and (ii)} \\ &= \mathcal{I}_{Z}(1-x). \end{aligned}$$

(v) Differentiating $\mathcal{I}_Z(x)$ and using the above argument gives:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{I}'_{Z}(x) &= (\boldsymbol{\theta}^{3})^{\top} \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x)) - 3\boldsymbol{\theta}^{\top} \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x)) (\boldsymbol{\theta}^{2})^{\top} \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x)) + 2(\boldsymbol{\theta}^{\top} \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x)))^{3} \\ &= -(\boldsymbol{\theta}^{3})^{\top} \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(1-x)) + 3\boldsymbol{\theta}^{\top} \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(1-x)) (\boldsymbol{\theta}^{2})^{\top} \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(1-x)) - 2(\boldsymbol{\theta}^{\top} \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(1-x)))^{3} \\ &= -\mathcal{I}'_{Z}(1-x). \end{aligned}$$

Then $\mathcal{I}'_Z(1/2) = -\mathcal{I}'_Z(1/2)$, so $\mathcal{I}'_Z(1/2) = 0$ and x = 1/2 is a stationary point. (vi) Using the fact that $0 \le \theta_j^2 \le \theta_{j^+}^2$ for all j and

$$\sum_{j} \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j} \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x))_{j} \geq \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j^{+}} \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x))_{j^{+}} + \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j^{-}} (1 - \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x))_{j^{+}}) = \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j^{+}} \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x))_{j^{+}} - \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j^{+}} (1 - \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x))_{j^{+}}) \geq 0,$$

363 we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{I}_Z(x) &= \sum_j \boldsymbol{\theta}_j^2 \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x))_j - \left(\sum_j \boldsymbol{\theta}_j \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x))_j\right)^2 \\ &\leq \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j+}^2 - (\boldsymbol{\theta}_{j+} \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x))_{j+} - \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j+} (1 - \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x))_{j+}))^2 \\ &= \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j+}^2 (1 - (2\sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x))_{j+} - 1)^2) \\ &= 4\boldsymbol{\theta}_{j+}^2 \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x))_{j+} (1 - \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x))_{j+}). \end{aligned}$$

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Algorithm. To use Lemma 2 to compute M, we first compute $I^* = \mathcal{I}_Z(1/2)$ since x = 1/2 is a stationary point by Lemma 2(v). By setting

$$4\boldsymbol{\theta}_{j^+}^2 \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x))_{j^+} (1 - \sigma(\boldsymbol{\eta}(x))_{j^+}) \le I^*$$

and solving this quadratic equation for $\sigma(\eta(x))_{j^+}$, we can use the bound in Lemma 2(vi) to obtain that $\mathcal{I}_Z(x) \leq I^*$ when $\sigma(\eta(x))_{j^+} \geq \left(1 + \sqrt{1 - I^*/\theta_{j^+}^2}\right)/2 \geq 1/2$. Since $\sigma(\eta(x))_{j^+} \to 1$ as $x \to \infty$ by (iii), we can determine the value x_{\max} for which $\mathcal{I}_Z(x) \leq I^*$ when $x \geq x_{\max}$. By (iv), $x_{\min} = 1 - x_{\max}$ satisfies $\mathcal{I}_Z(x) \leq I^*$ when $x \leq x_{\min}$. We can then do line search in $[x_{\min}, x_{\max}]$ (or equivalently, in $[1/2, x_{\max}]$ by Lemma 2(iv)) to obtain M.

372 C Hyperparameters for FEMNIST

Hyperparameter	Values
ε	0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
Server-side learning rate	0.5, 1, 2
Scaling factor β	32, 64, 128

Table 1: Hyperparameter range for I-MVU on FEMNIST.

Hyperparameter	Values
σ	0.6, 0.8, 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 16, 32, 64, 128
Server-side learning rate	0.5, 1, 2
Clipping factor	0.5, 1, 2

Table 2: Hyperparameter range for Gaussian on FEMNIST.

Hyperparameter	Values
σ	0.6, 0.8, 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 16, 32, 64, 128
Server-side learning rate	0.0001, 0.001, 0.01
Clipping factor	0.5, 1, 2

Table 3: Hyperparameter range for SignSGD on FEMNIST.