

Value of Information: A Framework for Human–Agent Communication

Anonymous ACL submission

Abstract

Large Language Model (LLM) agents deployed for real-world tasks face a fundamental dilemma: user requests are underspecified, yet agents must decide whether to act on incomplete information or interrupt users for clarification. Existing approaches either rely on brittle confidence thresholds that require task-specific tuning, or fail to account for the varying stakes of different decisions. We introduce a decision-theoretic framework that resolves this trade-off through the Value of Information (VoI), enabling agents to dynamically weigh the expected utility gain from asking questions against the cognitive cost imposed on users. Our inference-time method requires no hyperparameter tuning and adapts seamlessly across contexts—from casual games to medical diagnosis. Experiments across four diverse domains (20 Questions, medical diagnosis, flight booking, and e-commerce) show that VoI consistently matches or exceeds the best manually-tuned baselines, achieving up to 1.36 utility points higher in high-cost settings. This work provides a parameter-free framework for adaptive agent communication that explicitly balances task risk, query ambiguity, and user effort.

1 Introduction

LLM agents are increasingly deployed as autonomous collaborators in complex, real-world tasks. However, a fundamental bottleneck remains: user requests are inherently underspecified, carrying latent goals, contexts, and unstated preferences (Malaviya et al., 2024; Yao et al., 2024; Peng et al., 2024). A request to “book a flight to London” omits critical details, such as budget constraints, preferred departure times, tolerance for layovers. No amount of model capability can resolve this ambiguity without external input; the agent must ask. Yet excessive questioning frustrates users and undermines the agent’s value proposition. Effective

collaboration thus requires agents to balance two risks: acting on incomplete information and misaligning with user intent, or interrupting frequently and imposing cognitive burden.

Current approaches fall short in navigating this trade-off. Fixed-round strategies ask a predetermined number of questions regardless of context, ignoring task-specific needs. Adaptive methods trigger clarification when model confidence falls below a manually-tuned threshold, but this threshold selection is brittle and fails to generalize across domains or cost structures. Neither approach explicitly reasons about whether the information gained justifies the user’s effort.

We argue that agents should treat communication as a rational decision, asking questions only when the expected improvement in task outcomes justifies the user’s time and effort. We adopt a Rational Speech Act (RSA) perspective (Goodman and Frank, 2016; Frank and Goodman, 2012) viewing dialogue as a rational action. Building on prior RSA work on interactive questioning-answering (Hawkins et al., 2015) and utility-grounded pragmatic reasoning (Sumers et al., 2021), the agent should only ask questions when the expected benefit of improved downstream decisions outweighs the cost of additional interaction—capturing both cost of communication (Hawkins et al., 2015) and utility of downstream decisions (Sumers et al., 2021). Under this lens, we formalize the clarify-or-commit decision through three contextual factors: (1) **Query Ambiguity**: the degree of uncertainty about the user’s true intent; (2) **Task Risk**: the severity of the consequences of a wrong action; and (3) **Cognitive Load**: the cost, in time and effort, imposed on the user by asking for clarification.

To operationalize this reasoning, we propose a decision-theoretic framework grounded in the Value of Information (VoI), a classic principle from decision theory (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961). Our inference-time method allows an LLM to explic-

084 itly calculate the expected utility gain of asking
085 a potential question, weighing it directly against
086 the communication cost. This provides a princi-
087 pled mechanism for the agent to decide whether
088 the information it might receive is worth the user’s
089 attention. Our contributions are threefold: (a) We
090 formalize the adaptive communication problem in
091 human-agent interaction from a decision-theoretic
092 perspective, identifying three key factors: ambi-
093 guity, risk, and cognitive load. (b) We propose a
094 practical, inference-time VOI-based method that
095 allows an LLM to estimate these contextual factors
096 and dynamically decide whether to act or to seek
097 clarifications (c) We demonstrate through experi-
098 ments across four distinct domains: 20 Questions,
099 medical diagnosis, flight booking, and online shop-
100 ping, that our parameter-free VoI method automati-
101 cally identifies the optimal operating point. Across
102 varying communication costs, VoI matches or ex-
103 ceeds the best manually-tuned baselines in 18 of
104 20 conditions, achieving utility gains of up to 1.36
105 points in high-cost settings.

106 2 Related Work

107 **Standard LLM Agent Paradigm.** Our work is
108 situated within the broader context of developing
109 autonomous LLM agents. Much foundational re-
110 search in this area focuses on improving agent rea-
111 soning, planning, and tool-use capabilities. Promi-
112 nent paradigms like Yao et al. (2023) and others are
113 often evaluated in benchmarks that, while complex,
114 assume the user’s initial instruction is complete
115 and unambiguous (Yao et al., 2022; Zhou et al.,
116 2023; Xie et al., 2024). This focus on task execu-
117 tion rather than the real-world productivity users
118 expect from agents, leaving a critical gap for truly
119 deploying agents (Sun et al., 2025; Shah and White,
120 2024; Zhou and Sun, 2025).

121 Recently, a new wave of research has begun to
122 address agent reliability by introducing principled
123 frameworks from decision theory (Liu et al., 2024;
124 Lin et al., 2024; Chen et al., 2025). However, these
125 approaches typically focus on making an optimal
126 decision given a static, pre-defined state of infor-
127 mation. Our work bridges these two areas: we
128 adopt the rigor of decision theory but focus on the
129 upstream problem of active information gathering,
130 allowing the agent to dynamically resolve ambigu-
131 ity before committing to an action.

132 **LLM Proactive Communication.** Prior work
133 has explored prompting techniques to improve

LLM interactivity. These methods can elicit user
134 preferences (Li et al., 2023) or encourage active
135 disambiguation of ambiguous queries (Deng et al.,
136 2023; Zhang et al., 2024b). While prompting can
137 directly induce clarifying behaviors, prior work
138 shows that the resulting strategies are often subop-
139 timal without more principled planning or learning
140 algorithms. Our work provides such a principled
141 algorithm to govern the agent’s communication de-
142 cisions.
143

144 **Uncertainty-Gated and Information-Theoretic**
145 **Methods.** A more systematic approach uses
146 model-uncertainty estimates to decide when to seek
147 clarification, triggering a question when predic-
148 tion confidence or entropy falls below a selected
149 threshold (Wang et al., 2025; Zhang and Choi,
150 2023; Kuhn et al., 2022; Ren et al., 2023; Grand
151 et al., 2025). While an improvement over heuristics,
152 these information-centric views can be insufficient,
153 as they do not directly consider the downstream
154 task’s stakes. Our method addresses this by em-
155 ploying the Value of Information (VoI) (Raiffa and
156 Schlaifer, 1961; Howard, 1966), a core concept
157 from decision theory. Instead of measuring infor-
158 mation gain in isolation, VoI measures how that
159 information is expected to improve the utility of
160 the final action, explicitly connecting the purpose
161 of communication to the stakes of the decision.

162 **Learning-Based Approaches.** Different from
163 the inference-time algorithms above, another line
164 of research uses reinforcement learning to improve
165 LLM collaboration with humans. Variants of Direct
166 Preference Optimization (DPO) have been applied
167 to encourage models to request clarification when
168 needed (Zhang et al., 2024a; Chen et al., 2024;
169 Wu et al., 2025; Qian et al., 2025; Sun et al., 2025).
170 However, RL is often task-specific, requiring a care-
171 fully designed simulation environment and training
172 pipeline, which is fundamentally different from
173 our VOI-based method which operate purely at
174 inference-time.

175 **Rational Speech Act** RSA-style pragmatic mod-
176 els cast language as (approximately) rational action:
177 speakers choose utterances to shape a listener’s in-
178 ferences under explicit priors and costs (Frank and
179 Goodman, 2012; Goodman and Frank, 2016). Be-
180 yond single-shot reference, RSA has been extended
181 to interactive question–answering, where questions
182 are selected to trade off expected informativeness
183 against asking cost (Hawkins et al., 2015), and to




Figure 1: **Illustration of different communication methods and user reaction.** Given user flight history, an LLM agent is able to infer user latent preferences with some probability. Excessive questions that asks about every aspect of preference would lead to user dissatisfaction (A) while directly acting without communication could lead to unexpected consequences (B). Decision-theoretic reasoning can balance expected utility gain via asking user questions against communication cost to achieve efficient but effective communication at inference time (C).

184 action-oriented settings where the point of com-
 185 munication is not only belief change but improv-
 186 ing downstream decisions (e.g., signaling bandits)
 187 (Sumers et al., 2021). Researchers then extend to
 188 “Neural RSA” that replace hand-specified literal
 189 models with learned speakers/listeners in grounded
 190 tasks (Andreas and Klein, 2016; Monroe et al.,
 191 2017). Most recently, RSA has been adapted to
 192 the era of LLMs, serving both as an inference-time
 193 control to guide generation (Wang and Demberg,
 194 2024; Cao et al., 2025).

195 3 Problem Formulation

196 We formulate the adaptive communication task as a
 197 sequential decision-making process where an LLM
 198 agent interacts with a user to select an optimal
 199 action.

200 **Preliminaries.** The agent receives an initial, po-
 201 tentially ambiguous, user query S . The user’s true
 202 goals and preferences are represented by a latent
 203 state $\theta \in \Theta$, which is not directly observable by
 204 the agent. The agent has access to a set of possi-
 205 ble terminal actions $a \in \mathcal{A}$. To resolve ambiguity
 206 about θ and choose the best action a^* , the agent
 207 can engage in a multi-turn dialogue with the user.

208 **The Clarify-or-Commit Process.** The inter-
 209 action proceeds in a sequence of turns. At
 210 each turn t , given the dialogue history $H_t =$
 211 $(q_1, u_1, \dots, q_{t-1}, u_{t-1})$, the agent must make a de-
 212 cision:

- 213 1. **CLARIFY:** Select and pose a question q_t

214 from a set of possible questions \mathcal{Q} . Upon
 215 receiving the user’s answer u_t , the history is
 216 updated to H_{t+1} and the process continues.

- 217 2. **COMMIT:** Terminate the dialogue and select
 218 a final action $a \in \mathcal{A}$ based on the current
 219 history H_t .

220 The agent’s strategy for making this choice at each
 221 turn is the **clarify-or-commit** policy, which is the
 222 central object of our study. This simple clarify-or-
 223 commit choice lies at the heart of adaptive commu-
 224 nication: every question carries both the potential
 225 to reduce uncertainty and the cost of additional user
 226 effort.

227 **Utility and Objective.** The success of a com-
 228 mitted action a is measured by a utility func-
 229 tion $U(\theta, a)$, which quantifies how well the action
 230 aligns with the user’s true latent state θ . Commu-
 231 nication incurs a cost $c(H)$, representing the user’s
 232 cognitive load, which quantifies the time and effort
 233 user spent on the dialogue. If the agent commits to
 234 action a after a final history H , the total utility is
 235 $U(\theta, a) - c(H)$. The agent’s objective is to devise
 236 a policy that maximizes the expected total reward,
 237 optimally balancing the utility gain from asking
 238 questions against cumulative communication cost.

239 4 Methods

240 To address the clarify-or-commit problem, an agent
 241 requires a principled policy for deciding when the
 242 potential benefit of asking a question outweighs the

cost of interaction. Simple heuristic-based strategies often fail because they do not explicitly reason about the downstream consequences or the stakes of the decision. To overcome this limitation, we propose an adaptive policy grounded in the Value of Information (VoI), a core concept from decision theory (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961).

4.1 Value of Information Framework

The baselines above are either non-adaptive or rely on generic, task-agnostic heuristics like confidence. They fail to explicitly reason about the *value* of the information a question might provide in the context of heterogeneous task stakes and unequal feature importance. To address this, we formalize our approach using the VoI framework.

Beliefs and Expected Utility. Let Θ be the set of possible latent user intents (e.g., the specific product features preferred or the true medical condition). The agent maintains a belief distribution $b(\theta)$ over Θ . Given this belief, the expected utility (EU) of committing to a terminal action $a \in \mathcal{A}$ is:

$$\text{EU}(a \mid b) = \mathbb{E}_{\theta \sim b}[U(\theta, a)] = \sum_{\theta \in \Theta} b(\theta)U(\theta, a). \quad (1)$$

If the agent were to commit immediately, it would choose the action $a^* = \arg \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \text{EU}(a \mid b)$. The utility of this decision is the value of acting under the current belief b :

$$V(b) = \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \text{EU}(a \mid b). \quad (2)$$

Calculating the Value of a Question. To evaluate a potential question q , the agent considers the set of possible answers \mathcal{Y} . For any given answer $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, the agent would update its belief to a posterior $b_y(\theta) = P(\theta \mid H, q, y)$. The expected value of the decision *after* receiving an answer to question q is the expectation over all possible answers y :

$$V_{\text{post}}(b, q) = \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} p(y \mid q, b) \cdot V(b_y), \quad (3)$$

where $p(y \mid q, b)$ is the probability of receiving answer y given the current belief. In practice, to make computation feasible, we restrict the answer space to a closed set of multiple choice or yes-no questions. For each sampled hypothesis θ , we query the LLM to simulate the likelihood of each response y given question q , aggregating these to find the marginal probability $p(y \mid q, b)$.

The **Value of Information** for question q is the difference between the expected utility after asking and the utility of acting now:

$$\text{VoI}(q) = V_{\text{post}}(b, q) - V(b). \quad (4)$$

The Clarify-or-Commit Policy. Our framework uses this VoI calculation to establish a decision rule. At each turn, the agent evaluates the net utility gain for each candidate question:

$$\text{NetVoI}(q) = \text{VoI}(q) - c, \quad (5)$$

where c is the per-question communication cost. The agent selects the question q^* with the highest positive net value. If $\max_q \text{NetVoI}(q) \leq 0$, the expected utility gain from further communication is not worth the cost. The agent terminates the dialogue and commits to the best action under its current belief.

4.2 Instantiation with LLMs

While Section 4.1 establishes the theoretical foundations of our approach, in this section, we describe how we leverage LLMs to approximate these components at inference time.

Estimating and Updating Belief Distributions.

Given the set of candidate latent factors Θ , we prompt the LLM to explicitly quantify its uncertainty by outputting a probability distribution $b(\theta)$ over these factors. Different from standard Bayesian approaches update beliefs analytically via a fixed likelihood function, we employ a LLM to estimate the probability distribution over Θ (Kobalczyk et al., 2025a; Liu et al., 2024). To obtain the posterior belief b_y required for Eq. 3, we feed the history augmented with a simulated interaction (question q and hypothetical answer y) back into the model and prompt it to re-estimate the distribution over Θ . This allows the agent to dynamically update its confidence based on the semantic content of the answer.

Simulating User Responses.

To calculate the expected value of a question, we perform a one-step lookahead simulation (Kobalczyk et al., 2025b) to estimate the marginal likelihood of possible answers $p(y \mid q, b)$. To ensure computational tractability in Eq. 3, we constrain the agent to ask closed-ended questions (e.g., multiple-choice or Yes-No questions), thereby defining a finite answer space \mathcal{Y} . The probability of each response is computed by marginalizing over the current beliefs:

$p(y | q, b) \approx \sum_{\theta \in \Theta} p(y | q, \theta) b(\theta)$, where the term $p(y | q, \theta)$ represents the LLM’s prediction of the user’s response assuming θ is the ground truth.

5 Experimental Setup

5.1 Baseline Methods

No-Question. This baseline represents the standard agent paradigm. Given the initial query S , the agent commits to an action immediately without any communication with the user. It relies solely on its initial understanding of the user’s intent.

Fixed-Round. This non-adaptive baseline asks a fixed number of k questions before committing to an action. It serves to isolate the benefit of interaction from the benefit of *adaptive* interaction by exploring a fixed trade-off between information gathering and communication cost.

Adaptive Prompting. This baseline prompts the LLM to reason about whether it feels confident enough to act or if it should ask a question. The number of questions is not predetermined, but the decision to stop is based on the model’s heuristic self-assessment rather than a formal criterion.

Confidence Thresholding. This adaptive baseline formalizes the heuristic of Adaptive Prompting. The agent continues to ask questions as long as its predictive confidence in the best action a^* remains below a tunable threshold τ . We measure confidence using the model’s verbalized confidence scores (Tian et al., 2023), a common practice for modern LLMs. This method is adaptive, but crucially, the threshold τ must be manually tuned for each task and cost setting to achieve optimal performance.

5.2 Tasks and Models

Mixed-Stakes 20 Questions. The 20 Questions game is a classic guessing game with a long history as a paradigm for studying human and artificial decision-making under uncertainty. It provides a controlled environment to test how an agent performs strategic information gathering. Following the setup of Hu et al. (2024), the agent must identify a target concept from a known candidate set by asking a series of binary (yes/no) questions. Our key modification is to explicitly test how the agent adapts to varying **task risk**. We create two parallel versions of this task:

- **Low-Stakes (Animal Guessing):** The agent identifies an animal from a set of 100. A correct guess yields a terminal utility of $U = 1$.
- **High-Stakes (Medical Diagnosis):** The agent diagnoses a medical condition from a set of 15 diseases, using real doctor-patient chat histories as input. A correct diagnosis yields a utility of $U = 10$.

Flight Recommendation We adopt a task designed to model the elicitation of multi-faceted user preferences, a common challenge in real-world assistants. Our setup is inspired by the recent work of (Qiu et al., 2025) is derived from the FLIGHTPREF dataset originally proposed by Lin et al. (2022). The agent is presented with a user’s choice history over five rounds of flight selections. In a final, held-out round, the agent must predict which of three new flight options the user will prefer. Each flight is defined by 8 features (e.g., price, stops, airline), and each user has a latent reward function defining their preferences over these features. The agent can ask clarifying questions to uncover these preferences before making its final prediction. This task tests the agent’s ability to strategically query a complex, multi-attribute preference space to infer a user’s reward model from their contextual choices. The agent’s prediction for the new round will be scored based on this reward function.

Ambiguous WebShop To test our agent in a more realistic, interactive environment, we adapt the WebShop benchmark (Yao et al., 2022). In the original setting, user instructions are created to be relatively well-specified (e.g., “buy a red Adidas t-shirt, size medium”). We deliberately introduce **query ambiguity** by removing details from the user’s request (e.g., “buy a t-shirt”) to simulate underspecified real-world user query. The agent must then decide whether to act on this partial information (e.g., `search("t-shirt")`) or to ask clarifying questions about attributes like size, color, or brand. This task evaluates the agent’s ability to balance autonomous web navigation with strategic information gathering to resolve under-specified user requests.

Models We consider a selection of leading LLMs to evaluate the performance of our proposed method, including GPT-4.1 (OpenAI, 2025) and Gemini-2.5-Flash (Comanici et al., 2025).

Algorithm 1 VOI Algorithm

Require: Instruction S ; action set \mathcal{A} ; utility $U(\theta, a)$; question generator GenQ ; belief updater Update ; cost $c(\cdot)$; clarification budget K_{\max}

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1:  $H \leftarrow \{S\}$ ;  $b \leftarrow \text{Prior}(S)$ 
2: for  $t = 1, 2, \dots, K_{\max}$  do
3:    $Q \leftarrow \text{GenQ}(H)$  ▷ small set of targeted questions
4:    $V_0 \leftarrow V(b) = \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \mathbb{E}_{\theta \sim b}[U(\theta, a)]$ 
5:   for all  $q \in Q$  do
6:     Sample plausible replies  $\{(y_k, \pi_k)\}_{k=1}^K$  from  $P(\cdot | b, q)$ 
7:      $V_q \leftarrow \sum_{k=1}^K \pi_k V(\text{Update}(b, q, y_k))$ 
8:      $\text{VoI}(q) \leftarrow V_q - V_0 - c(q)$ 
9:   end for
10:   $q^* \leftarrow \arg \max_{q \in Q} \text{VoI}(q)$ 
11:  if  $\text{VoI}(q^*) \leq 0$  then break ▷ clarification not worthwhile
12:  else
13:    Ask  $q^*$ , observe  $y$ ;  $H \leftarrow H \cup \{(q^*, y)\}$ ;  $b \leftarrow \text{Update}(b, q^*, y)$ 
14:  end if
15: end for
16: return  $a^* \in \arg \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \mathbb{E}_{\theta \sim b}[U(\theta, a)]$  ▷ final commitment
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6 Results

6.1 Main Results

Our central findings are summarized in Figure 2. Across all tasks and communication cost settings, our VoI-based agent consistently achieves state-of-the-art utility. Crucially, it does so without requiring task-specific threshold tuning, showcasing its robustness and practical advantages.

VoI excels by finding the optimal utility-cost balance. As shown in Figure 2, our VoI agent (starred marker) consistently ranks as the top-performing method across the Mixed 20Q, Flight Recommendation, and Ambiguous WebShop tasks. For instance, in Mixed 20Q with a communication cost of $c = 0.01$, VOI achieves a utility of 14.14, significantly outperforming the best-tuned confidence-thresholding baseline (11.49 at $\tau = 0.90$). This performance advantage stems from VOI’s ability to dynamically determine the optimal number of clarification questions, a stark contrast to fixed-round and confidence-based methods that require brittle, manual tuning of a threshold for each specific task and cost structure.

Adaptive communication is essential for ambiguous tasks. The “No Question” baseline establishes the necessity of proactive communication. On the Mixed 20Q task, where the initial query is inherently underspecified, this baseline’s accuracy is near zero for both low-stakes (animal) and high-stakes (medical) variants. However, as shown in Figures 2(f) and 2(l), when communication costs are prohibitively high, avoiding questions becomes a competitive strategy. In these scenarios, our VOI method correctly adapts by stopping communication early, demonstrating its ability to gracefully handle the full spectrum of cost-benefit scenarios.

Adaptive prompting are insufficient for robust performance. The Adaptive Prompting baseline shows that simply instructing an LLM to “ask questions when needed” offers an improvement over non-adaptive strategies. However, its performance is inconsistent and consistently lower than more structured methods. This is because the decision to communicate is based on the model’s uncalibrated, internal “feeling” of confidence, rather than a formal criterion. It lacks a principled mechanism to weigh the potential information gain against the explicit communication cost, leading to suboptimal and unpredictable behavior.

Fixed-round communication strategies are fundamentally suboptimal. A fixed-round policy, which asks a predetermined number of questions, fails to adapt to the specific needs of a given query. As illustrated in the inverted- U shape of the “Fixed Round” curves in Figure 2, utility initially increases with more questions but then declines as communication costs overwhelm the benefits of additional information. The optimal number of questions varies significantly with the task and cost, highlighting the necessity of an adaptive policy.

Confidence thresholding is effective but brittle. The confidence thresholding baseline provides a strong, adaptive competitor. With the *correctly* tuned confidence threshold τ , its performance can be comparable to our VOI method (e.g., on GPT-4 for Mixed 20Q and Webshop). However, this effectiveness is its Achilles’ heel; the optimal τ is highly sensitive and must be manually selected for each task and cost combination, making it impractical for real-world deployment. Our VoI method provides a principled solution that matches or exceeds this performance without any such manual tuning.




Figure 2: **Utility vs. Communication Rounds.** Final utility as a function of the number of clarification questions asked across our three tasks, for GPT-4 (top two rows) and Gemini-2.5-Flash (bottom two rows), with communication costs $c = 0.01$ and $c = 0.05$. Utility is defined as $U(\theta, a) - T \cdot c$. The curves for Fixed Round and Confidence Thresholding represent Pareto frontiers generated by varying their respective hyperparameters (k and τ). In contrast, our VoI agent (starred) is a parameter-free method. In nearly all settings, VoI automatically identifies an operating point that matches or exceeds the performance of the best-tuned baseline, demonstrating its superior adaptability and practical value.

6.2 Ablation Study

Ablation on Communication Cost. As shown in Table 1, across the cost sweep on Mixed 20-Question the VoI controller matches or exceeds the strongest grid-searched baselines. We tune four baselines over nine threshold settings, and while

the best baseline shifts with the communication cost, VoI consistently selects an appropriate number of questions that match the performance of the best baseline. Importantly, this pattern is stable across different choice of communication costs: VoI adapts smoothly to the stated cost rather than

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Table 1: **VOI vs. Baselines Across Costs (Gemini-2.5-Flash, Mixed 20 Question)**. This table compares the VOI policy’s expected reward (r_{VOI}) against the best and second-best baselines via grid searching over 9 values. The Δ columns report VOI’s margin over each baseline (positive means VOI is better).

Cost	Best Baseline	r_{max}	Second Best	r_{second}	r_{VOI}	$r_{\text{VOI}} - r_{\text{max}}$	$r_{\text{VOI}} - r_{\text{second}}$
0.01	Confidence ($\tau=0.9$)	8.30	Round ($\tau=15$)	8.10	8.64	0.34	0.54
0.02	Confidence ($\tau=0.9$)	6.88	Confidence ($\tau=0.9$)	6.80	7.72	0.84	0.92
0.05	Round ($\tau=5$)	3.65	Confidence ($\tau=0.5$)	3.64	5.01	1.36	1.37
0.10	Confidence ($\tau=0.5$)	2.28	Round ($\tau=5$)	0.90	1.38	-0.90	0.48
0.20	No Question	0	Round ($\tau=5$)	-4.60	-0.96	-0.96	3.64




Figure 3: **Calibration Analysis** The figure presents the calibration analysis of GPT-4 and Gemini-2.5-Flash on Animal Guessing, Medical Diagnosis, and Flight Recommendation. (In (c) the accuracy for predicted probability between 0 and 0.2 is omitted because very few samples fall in that range.)

hinging on a brittle threshold choice.

Calibration Analysis. A critical component of our VoI framework is the LLM’s ability to estimate a belief distribution $b(\theta)$ over latent user states. To analyze it, ideally we should compare model predicted distribution to the ground truth distribution. However, in the absence of the ground truth distribution for our tasks, we instead measure the argmax from the distribution against the ground truth item as the standard calibration analysis to approximate its distribution estimation accuracy. As shown in Figure 3, The results reveal that models are reasonably calibrated in Animal Guessing game but less calibrated for Medical Diagnosis which we suspect because of the inherent complication and noise in the symptoms of diseases. Despite this, we see that VOI are empirically effective and robust that consistently matches if not perform the best baselines after searching hyperparameters. We believe that current and future work that could improving model calibration under missing context (Li et al., 2025) could further improve the performance of VOI.

7 Conclusion

Current LLM agents are often designed for well-specified tasks, leaving them brittle when faced

with the inherent ambiguity of real-world user requests. In this work, we argued that overcoming this limitation requires agents to move beyond simple execution and develop a principled strategy for adaptive communication. We proposed a formal framework for this problem, centered on balancing three key factors: query ambiguity, task risk, and user cognitive load. Our primary contribution is a practical, inference-time method based on the Value of Information (VoI) that operationalizes this framework. By explicitly calculating the expected utility gain of a potential question and weighing it against its communication cost, our VoI-driven agent decides when to act and when to ask. Extensive experiments across diverse domains—including medical diagnosis and online shopping—demonstrate that our approach consistently outperforms non-adaptive and heuristic-based baselines. Crucially, it achieves this without the need for the brittle, task-specific threshold tuning that plagues other adaptive methods. Ultimately, this work provides a principled foundation for building LLM agents that are not just capable executors, but also thoughtful communicators. By equipping agents with a formal understanding of when information is valuable, we can create more aligned, efficient, and truly collaborative human-AI systems.

565 Limitations

566 Scope of Interaction: Decision vs. Generation.

567 Our work focuses on the core decision of *when* to
568 communicate, rather than *what* questions to gener-
569 ate. To this end, our experiments utilize a prede-
570 fined set of actions ($a \in \mathcal{A}$) and clarifying ques-
571 tions, a methodological choice consistent with prior
572 work (Hu et al., 2024; Kobalczyk et al., 2025b).
573 This controlled setting isolates the performance of
574 our VoI-based *selection policy*, providing an un-
575 ambiguous evaluation of our central claim. By
576 controlling for the quality of question generation,
577 we demonstrate the effectiveness of the decision-
578 making principle itself. Extending this framework
579 to fully open-ended dialogue is an important next
580 step; establishing this selection principle is a nec-
581 essary foundation. Our work provides the core
582 engine around which more sophisticated generative
583 components can be built.

584 **Model of Communication Cost.** We employ a
585 linear communication cost model ($c(H) = T \cdot c$).
586 Accurately modeling the nuances of human cog-
587 nitive load is a major, open research challenge
588 in its own right, spanning HCI and cognitive sci-
589 ence. Therefore, in line with common practice in
590 decision-theoretic analyses, we adopt a simplified
591 and interpretable cost function. This allows us to
592 clearly illustrate the fundamental trade-off between
593 utility gain and cost, without introducing confound-
594 ing variables from a more complex, speculative
595 cognitive model. Importantly, the VoI framework
596 itself is agnostic to the form of the cost function;
597 the core decision rule, $\text{VoI}(q) - c(H)$, can read-
598 ily incorporate more sophisticated models as they
599 are developed. We view the linear cost model as a
600 reasonable first-order approximation that demon-
601 strates the framework’s viability, with refinement
602 through empirical user research as a natural next
603 step.

604 Ethical Considerations

605 While our VoI framework optimizes the trade-off
606 between information gain and communication cost,
607 user agency must remain paramount: users should
608 retain the ability to decline questions or proceed
609 without clarification based on their own judgment.
610 Beyond this, the act of questioning introduces crit-
611 ical considerations regarding user burden and pri-
612 vacy. First, clarifying questions—even when the-
613 oretically optimal—inherently impose a cognitive

614 demand on the user; an agent that queries too
615 frequently or intrusively risks eroding trust and
616 causing frustration, necessitating cost models that
617 strictly penalize unnecessary interruptions. Second,
618 the pursuit of resolving ambiguity often requires
619 eliciting specific, potentially sensitive information
620 (e.g., medical symptoms or personal preferences)
621 to update the agent’s belief distribution. It is im-
622 perative that future implementations incorporate
623 strict data minimization principles and privacy safe-
624 guards to ensure that the agent’s drive for reduced
625 uncertainty does not compromise user privacy or
626 comfort. We acknowledge the use of AI tools for
627 refining the paper writing.

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A Case Study: VoI is Risk-Aware

828 Figure 4 provides a compelling qualitative example
829 of why the VoI framework is superior to heuristic-
830 based methods like confidence thresholding. The
831 experiment contrasts a low-stakes task (guessing an
832 animal, reward=1) with a high-stakes task (medical
833 diagnosis, reward=10), using an identical commu-
834 nication cost ($c = 0.05$).
835

836 In the **high-stakes medical diagnosis** (Fig. 4b),
837 the potential reward for a correct answer is high.
838 The VoI agent correctly calculates that even ques-
839 tions with moderate information gain are valuable
840 enough to outweigh the communication cost. It,
841 therefore, continues to ask clarifying questions un-
842 til it is highly confident, stopping several rounds
843 *after* the confidence-thresholding baseline would
844 have stopped, even though significant ambiguity
845 remains, leading to an incorrect diagnosis.

846 In the **low-stakes animal guessing game**
847 (Fig. 4a), the maximum potential utility is low.
848 Here, the VoI agent correctly assesses that the po-
849 tential utility gain from asking many questions is
850 not worth the cumulative communication cost. It,
851 therefore, halts the conversation earlier than the
852 confidence-thresholding method, avoiding unnec-
853 essary cognitive load on the user for a low-risk task.
854 The confidence-based agent, blind to the low stakes,
855 would have continued asking questions, needlessly
856 imposing cognitive load on the user for a trivial
857 task.

858 This case study reveals that effective commu-
859 nication requires balancing two distinct pressures:
860 the drive to reduce uncertainty (an epistemic goal)
861 and the need to consider the task’s stakes (a utilitar-
862 ian goal). Confidence-based methods address only
863 the former. The VoI framework excels because it
864 naturally unifies both: it quantifies the value of
865 reducing uncertainty precisely in terms of its ex-
866 pected impact on the final, stake-weighted utility.
867 This principled balance enables the agent to be ap-
868 propriately cautious in high-stakes scenarios and
869 efficient in low-stakes ones—a critical capability
870 for building trustworthy and effective human-AI
871 collaborators.

B Main Results in Tables

Animal Guessing Game				Medical Diagnosis			
Dialogue	Conf.	VOI	Prediction	Dialogue	Conf.	VOI	Prediction
Q1: Is the animal a mammal? A1: Yes	5%	0.26	Elephant ✗	Q1: Are you experiencing any abdominal pain? A1: Yes	10%	0.6	Appendicitis ✗
Q2: Is the animal primarily found on land? A2: Yes	21%	0.22	Elephant ✗	Q2: Do you have any nausea or vomiting? A2: No	30%	0.34	Irritable Bowel Syndrome ✗
Q3: Is the animal larger than human? A3: No	41%	0.20	Otter ✗	Q3: Have you noticed changes in bowel movements? A3: Yes	60%	2.15	Irritable Bowel Syndrome ✗
...				...			
Q8: Is the animal native to Australia? A8: No	55%	0.05	Alpaca ✓	Q9: Is pain in the lower left side? A9: Yes	90%	0.70	Irritable Bowel Syndrome ✗
...				...			
Q17: Is the animal known for its long neck? A17: Yes	90%	--	Alpaca ✓	Q13: Recent weight loss or loss of appetite? A13: No	--	0.04	Constipation ✓

Figure 4: A side by side comparison for different methods for Mixed 20 Question task. The figure contrasts four controllers—No-Ask, Fixed-Round, Confidence Thresholding ($\tau = 0.90$), and our VOI policy—on a single Mixed 20Q instance with communication cost $c = 0.05$. Task stakes are encoded directly in the terminal utility: a correct animal guess yields reward 1 (low stakes), whereas a correct medical diagnosis yields reward 10 (high stakes). The objective maximizes decision utility minus dialogue cost, $U(\theta, a) - c(\xi)$.

Figure 5: GPT-4: results for different methods and thresholds across three tasks. For **Webshop**, LLM is normalized by 10 and utilities are $\text{Util} = \text{LLM} - \#T \times \{0.01, 0.05\}$. Mixed 20Q utilities are recomputed per spec. Within each *method*, the best utility is underlined. The global best per task/cost is ***bold+italic*** and the second best is **bold**.

Method	Mixed 20Q							Flight Rec.					Webshop				
	τ	Acc. (Animal)	Acc. (Med)	#T (Animal)	#T (Med)	Util. (0.01)	Util. (0.05)	τ	Reward	#T	Util. (0.01)	Util. (0.05)	τ	LLM	#T	Util. (0.01)	Util. (0.05)
No Question	–	0.01	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.70	0.70	–	0.17	0.00	0.17	0.17	–	0.54	0.00	0.54	0.54
Adaptive	–	0.68	0.53	17.80	6.254	10.26	2.89	–	0.20	0.56	0.20	0.17	–	0.57	0.89	0.56	0.52
Fixed Round	5	0.24	0.51	5.00	5.00	6.95	4.75	1.00	0.22	1.00	0.21	0.17	1.00	0.56	1.00	0.55	0.51
	10	0.60	0.78	10.00	10.00	12.70	8.30	2.00	0.32	2.00	0.30	0.22	2.00	0.57	2.00	0.55	0.47
	15	0.77	0.78	15.00	10.00	13.90	7.50	3.00	0.35	3.00	0.32	0.20	3.00	0.62	3.00	0.59	0.47
	20	0.87	0.78	20.00	10.00	14.40	6.00	4.00	0.36	4.00	0.32	0.16	4.00	0.63	4.00	0.59	0.43
Confidence	0.50	0.20	0.31	4.01	2.54	4.67	2.97	0.50	0.19	0.71	0.19	0.16	0.50	0.55	0.78	0.54	0.51
	0.70	0.45	0.60	5.68	4.56	9.89	7.43	0.70	0.23	1.09	0.22	0.17	0.70	0.60	1.31	0.58	0.53
	0.90	0.59	0.65	8.48	6.49	11.49	7.84	0.90	0.24	2.82	0.21	0.10	0.90	0.63	2.95	0.60	0.48
VOI	0.01	0.76	0.78	11.80	8.07	14.14	9.70	0.01	0.36	1.49	0.35	0.28	0.01	0.63	2.95	0.60	0.49
	0.05	0.74	0.78	11.46	7.99	13.97	9.07	0.05	0.29	0.82	0.29	0.25	0.05	0.61	1.74	0.59	0.52

Table 2: Gemini-2.5-Flash: results for different methods and thresholds across three tasks. Format is the same as Figure 5

Method	Mixed 20Q							Flight Rec.					Webshop				
	τ	Acc. (Animal)	Acc. (Med)	#T (Animal)	#T (Med)	Util. (0.01)	Util. (0.05)	τ	Reward	#T	Util. (0.01)	Util. (0.05)	τ	LLM	#T	Util. (0.01)	Util. (0.05)
No Question	–	0.01	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.70	0.70	–	0.16	0.00	0.16	0.16	–	0.50	0.00	0.50	0.50
Adaptive	–	0.28	0.37	4.78	6.36	5.96	3.79	–	0.22	0.21	0.22	0.21	–	0.51	0.55	0.51	0.48
Fixed Round	5	0.16	0.29	5.00	5.00	3.95	1.75	1.00	0.18	1.00	0.17	0.13	1.00	0.55	1.00	0.54	0.50
	10	0.33	0.30	10.00	10.00	5.20	0.80	2.00	0.18	2.00	0.16	0.08	2.00	0.57	2.00	0.55	0.47
	15	0.40	0.30	15.00	10.00	5.40	-1.00	3.00	0.19	3.00	0.16	0.04	3.00	0.59	3.00	0.56	0.44
	20	0.39	0.30	20.00	10.00	4.80	-3.60	4.00	0.21	4.00	0.17	0.01	4.00	0.61	4.00	0.57	0.41
Confidence	0.50	0.22	0.27	4.87	5.12	4.36	2.21	0.50	0.14	0.09	0.14	0.14	0.50	0.52	0.48	0.52	0.50
	0.70	0.16	0.31	5.06	6.08	4.13	1.87	0.70	0.20	0.99	0.19	0.15	0.70	0.54	0.55	0.54	0.51
	0.90	0.36	0.30	11.28	9.25	5.38	0.50	0.90	0.25	1.53	0.24	0.17	0.90	0.59	2.73	0.56	0.45
VOI	0.01	0.28	0.55	8.48	7.63	7.38	3.68	0.01	0.30	1.62	0.28	0.22	0.01	0.59	2.15	0.57	0.48
	0.05	0.15	0.50	4.20	6.99	6.01	4.05	0.05	0.28	1.07	0.27	0.23	0.05	0.56	1.20	0.55	0.50

C Prompts

Animal — Direct Prompting

You are playing 20 Questions as the guesser. Your goal is to figure out what animal I'm thinking of by asking questions.

You have asked {question_count} questions so far and have {remaining_questions} questions left.

The possible animals you're trying to guess include: {answer_set}

Rules:

1. Ask only yes/no questions (answerable with "Yes"/"No").
2. Ask one question at a time.
3. Keep asking until you use all 20 questions.
4. Do not ask the same question twice.
5. Do not guess a specific animal early (e.g., "Is it a cat?"). Start broad to narrow options.

Figure 6: Direct Prompting (Animal 20 Question)

Animal — Auto Stop

You are playing 20 Questions as the guesser. Your goal is to figure out what animal I'm thinking of.

You have asked {question_count} questions so far and have {remaining_questions} questions left.

The possible animals you're trying to guess include: {answer_set}

Rules:

1. Ask only yes/no questions.
2. Ask one question at a time.
3. When you're ready to guess, output: My guess is: [animal].
4. Do not ask the same question twice.
5. Avoid premature specific guesses; use broader categories to narrow down.

Figure 7: Auto Stop (Animal 20 Question)

Animal — Confidence Thresholding

You are tasked with guessing the animal based on the entire conversation. Provide a final guess, even if uncertain. The set of possible animals is: {answer_set}.

Also estimate your confidence from 1 to 100 (100 = highest).

Output exactly: { "guess": "<animal>", "confidence": <number 1-100> }

Confidence Scale (1–100):

1–20: Very minimal evidence.

21–40: Weak evidence.

41–60: Moderate evidence.

61–80: Strong evidence.

81–100: Very strong evidence.

Figure 8: Confidence Thresholding (Animal 20 Question)

Animal — VOI: Question Generation

I'm playing a game of 20 Questions to identify an animal. Based on previous questions and answers: {previous_qa}

Generate 5 yes/no questions that help identify the animal.

Format as a numbered list.

Figure 9: VOI: Question Generation (Animal 20 Question)

Animal — VOI: Batch Answer Simulation

You are playing a game of Twenty Questions. You will receive a yes/no question and a list of animals. Answer for each animal with: **Yes** (clearly correct), **No** (clearly incorrect), or **Maybe** (uncertain/ambiguous/varies by species or not confident). Prefer “Maybe” over guessing.

Format exactly as: Animal Name: Yes/No/Maybe

Question: {question}

Animals: {candidate_list}

Figure 10: VOI: Batch Answer Simulation (Animal 20 Question)

Medical — Direct Prompting

You are the doctor and must diagnose the patient using only yes/no questions.

You have asked {question_count} questions so far and have {remaining_questions} left.

Possible diagnoses: {answer_set}

You may ask up to 20 yes/no questions to understand the condition. At the end, output your diagnosis.

Figure 11: Direct Prompting (Medical Diagnosis)

Medical — Auto Stop

You are the doctor and may ask up to 20 yes/no questions to diagnose the patient.
You have asked {question_count} questions so far and have {remaining_questions} left.
Possible diagnoses: {answer_set}
You can ask up to 10 yes/no questions. Stop when you have enough information.
Format your guess as: My guess is: [diagnosis].

Figure 12: Auto Stop (Medical Diagnosis)

Medical — Confidence Thresholding

Diagnose the patient based on the entire conversation. Provide a final diagnosis, even if uncertain.
Set of diseases: {answer_set}.
Also estimate your confidence (1–100).
Output exactly: { "guess": "<diagnosis>", "confidence": <number 1–100> }
Confidence Scale (1–100):
1–20: Extremely uncertain.
21–40: Weak evidence.
41–60: Moderate evidence.
61–80: Strong evidence.
81–100: Very strong evidence.

Figure 13: Confidence Thresholding (Medical Diagnosis)

Medical — VOI: Question Generation

I'm a doctor trying to diagnose a patient's condition through a series of questions. Based on symptoms and previous answers:
{previous_qa}
Generate 5 yes/no questions that most effectively narrow the possible conditions (roughly halving the set each time).
Focus on distinguishing symptoms, risk factors, or medical history.
Format as a numbered list.

Figure 14: VOI: Question Generation (Medical Diagnosis)

Medical — VOI: Batch Answer Simulation

I'm a medical diagnostician. Below is a yes/no question and a list of medical conditions.
Question: "{question}"
For each condition, answer with just "Yes" or "No", based on typical presentation.
Reply exactly as: Condition: Answer
Conditions: {candidate_list}

Figure 15: VOI: Batch Answer Simulation (Medical Diagnosis)

C.2 Flight Recommendation

Direct Prompting and Confidence Thresholding

Opening

User: Help me pick flights. My preferences are fixed; infer them and choose. Use your best judgement; don't ask for more info.

— SUPPORT HISTORY —

User: Which flight is best?

Flight 1: {option 1}

Flight 2: {option 2}

Flight 3: {option 3}

User: I prefer flight {1/2/3}

NEW Round (no answer shown)

User: Which flight is best?

Flight 1: {option 1}

Flight 2: {option 2}

Flight 3: {option 3}

Required Output

Model: The best option is Flight

Figure 16: The prompt used for Direct Prompting and Confidence Thresholding. Logit is extracted as measure of confidence.

VOI — Prior over Feature States

You are calibrating a probabilistic user model.

Feature: {feature}

History (support + any clarifying Q&A):

{history_ctx}

Based *only* on this history, estimate $P(\text{state})$ for the feature.

Return STRICT JSON with keys exactly {{states}} **that sum to 1.** Example: {"lower": 0.33, "higher": 0.33, "none": 0.34}

JSON:

Figure 17: Prior Estimation for VOI (Airline Preference Matching)

VOI — Posterior with Options

You are calibrating a probabilistic user model.

Feature: {feature}

History (support + any clarifying Q&A):
{history_ctx}

Current options:

A) {option A}

B) {option B}

C) {option C}

Estimate the *posterior* distribution over the user's {feature} state given full history.

Return STRICT JSON with keys exactly {{states}} that sum to 1.

JSON:

Figure 18: Posterior Estimation with Options (Airline Preference Matching)

VOI — Candidate Preference Questions

You are an AI assistant helping a user choose between flight options A, B, and C. You've analyzed the support examples but still have some uncertainty.

{support_history}

{qa_context}

Generate one multiple-choice question about a single aspect of the user's preference that will help decide among the options below.

A) {option A}

B) {option B}

C) {option C}

Question:

Figure 19: VOI Candidate Questions (Airline Preference Matching)