

PROBABILISTIC ROBUSTNESS FOR FREE? REVISITING TRAINING VIA A BENCHMARK

Anonymous authors

Paper under double-blind review

ABSTRACT

Deep learning models are notoriously vulnerable to imperceptible perturbations. Most existing research centers on adversarial robustness (AR), which evaluates models under worst-case scenarios by examining the existence of deterministic adversarial examples (AEs). In contrast, probabilistic robustness (PR) adopts a statistical perspective, measuring the probability that predictions remain correct under stochastic perturbations. While PR is widely regarded as a practical complement to AR, dedicated training methods for improving PR are still relatively underexplored, albeit with emerging progress. Among the few PR-targeted training methods, we identify three limitations: *i*) non-comparable evaluation protocols; *ii*) limited comparisons to strong AT baselines despite anecdotal PR gains from AT, and; *iii*) no unified framework to compare the generalization of these methods. Thus, we introduce PRBench, the first benchmark dedicated to evaluating improvements in PR achieved by different robustness training methods. PRBench empirically compares most common AT and PR-targeted training methods using a comprehensive set of metrics, including clean accuracy, PR and AR performance, training efficiency, and generalization error (GE). We also provide theoretical analysis on the GE of PR performance across different training methods. Main findings revealed by PRBench include: AT methods are more versatile than PR-targeted training methods in terms of improving both AR and PR performance across diverse hyperparameter settings, while PR-targeted training methods consistently yield lower GE and higher clean accuracy. A leaderboard comprising 222 trained models across 7 datasets and 10 model architectures is publicly available at <https://tmpspace.github.io/PRBenchLeaderboard/>.

1 INTRODUCTION

Deep learning (DL) has demonstrated remarkable potential to drive transformative advancements across a wide range of industries, such as autonomous driving and medical diagnostics. In such safety-critical domains, robustness is a fundamental prerequisite for DL models’ pervasive deployment. Numerous studies have investigated DL robustness, leading to a range of benchmarks that systematically track the progress in the topic Ling et al. (2019); Guo et al. (2023); Croce et al. (2021); Tang et al. (2021); Dong et al. (2020); Liu et al. (2025). These efforts have predominantly focused on *adversarial robustness* (AR), which emphasizes the extreme *worst-case* scenarios by evaluating local robustness based on the existence of *deterministic* adversarial examples (AEs): subtle perturbations to inputs that alter model predictions Szegedy et al. (2014); Goodfellow (2015); Papernot et al. (2016b).

A more recent and practical perspective, *probabilistic robustness* (PR) Webb et al. (2019); Weng et al. (2019); Couellan (2021); Baluta et al. (2021); Zhao et al. (2021); Tit et al. (2021); Robey et al. (2022); Pautov et al. (2022); Zhang et al. (2023b); Huang et al. (2023); Dong et al. (2023); TIT et al. (2023); Zhang et al. (2024a;b; 2025); Zhang & Sun (2025); Zhang et al. (2023a), employs statistical approaches to answer the question: “What is the probability that predictions remain correct under stochastic perturbations”. This probabilistic view is arguably more relevant to real-world applications than AR, as it provides an *overall* assessment of a model’s local robustness, accounting for scenarios where AEs may exist Webb et al. (2019); Huang et al. (2023); Zhao (2025) and acknowledging *residual risks* Zhang et al. (2023b; 2024a; 2025) that are more realistic to manage in practice.

054 Despite its potential, most existing work on PR is restricted to *evaluation*, with only a few studies
 055 Wang et al. (2021); Robey et al. (2022); Zhang et al. (2024a; 2025) exploring *training* methods
 056 specifically designed to *improve* PR Zhao (2025). Among them, we identify three limitations.
 057 First, they use different sets of evaluation metrics, with none adopting a comprehensive set to
 058 assess the training methods holistically, making it difficult to understand which methods are truly
 059 effective/efficient and under what conditions. Second, an interesting observation is that adversarial
 060 training (AT) that primarily designed to improve AR often enhances PR as a “free by-product”.
 061 However, existing studies assess only a limited selection of AT methods, limiting the understanding
 062 of AT’s potential as a more efficient PR improvement tool. Third, there is no *unified theoretical*
 063 *framework* to compare the generalisability of PR-targeted training, making it unclear of their broader
 064 applicability in various context. These gaps and the rapid growth of PR research highlight the need
 065 for a systematic benchmark for PR training methods, which is currently missing from the literature.

066 To bridge the gaps, we introduce PRBench, the first benchmark dedicated to evaluating training
 067 methods for improving PR. Key features of PRBench include: *i*) A comprehensive set of metrics,
 068 covering clean accuracy, PR and AR performance, training efficiency, and generalisation error (GE);
 069 *ii*) A large set of training methods including most common AT methods and all PR-targeted training
 070 methods; *iii*) Theoretical bounds of GE are derived under a unified framework of Uniform Stability
 071 Analysis Xiao et al. (2022b); Cheng et al. to conclude comparative insights. Specifically, PRBench
 072 includes 222 trained models based on 7 widely adopted datasets and 10 model architectures. It uses
 073 4 common adversarial attacks to measure AR performance, 2 types of PR metrics (with various
 074 hyperparameters, e.g., distributions of perturbations) for PR, GE metrics for both AR and PR, the
 075 clean accuracy and the training time. While the total number of training methods included is 13,
 076 PRBench code-base is designed to be extendable for future inclusion and comparison of new methods.

077 Our analysis shows that, in most cases, AT surprisingly outperforms PR-targeted training in improving
 078 both AR and PR. This suggests that PR *does* generally come “for free”¹ when applying AT for AR;
 079 *not vice versa*. That said, PR-targeted methods offer advantages in, e.g., better generalisability and
 080 clean accuracy. The very recent “hybrid” training method combines the advantages of both, but at the
 081 price of training efficiency. Key contributions of this paper include:

- 082 • **Benchmarking:** After formalizing a general formulation of the PR-targeted training methods, we
 083 develop the first benchmark dedicated for PR, evaluating a broad set of training methods with
 084 metrics of AR, PR, accuracy, generalisability, and efficiency.
- 085 • **Analysis:** Analysis is provided based on both empirical and theoretical studies, highlighting the
 086 strengths, limitations, and trade-offs among training methods in the context of improving PR.
- 087 • **Open-source repository and Leaderboard:** All experimental details are included in the supple-
 088 mentary materials. A public repository will be released after the review process. A public leader-
 089 board is also released at <https://tmpspace.github.io/PRBenchLeaderboard/>.

091 2 PRELIMINARIES AND RELATED WORKS

092 2.1 GENERALISATION ERRORS AND ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS

093 Consider a classification task where $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ denotes the inputs, and $y \in \mathcal{Y} \subseteq \{1, 2, \dots, \kappa\}$
 094 represents the labels. Let \mathcal{D} be an unknown probability measure over $\mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$. We define $f : \Theta \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow$
 095 \mathbb{R}^κ as a DL model, parameterised by $\theta \in \Theta$, and \mathbf{p} denote the *softmax* function. Given i.i.d. samples
 096 $S = \{(\mathbf{x}_i, y_i)\}_{i=1}^n$ drawn from \mathcal{D} and a loss function² $\mathcal{L} : [0, 1]^\kappa \times \mathcal{Y} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$, the *natural* and
 097 *empirical risks* can be represented as:

$$098 R(\theta) = \mathbb{E}_{(\mathbf{x}, y) \sim \mathcal{D}} [\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x}, \theta)), y)] \quad \text{and} \quad 099 R_S(\theta) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x}_i, \theta)), y_i). \quad (1)$$

100
 101
 102
 103
 104
 105 ¹“For free” is used figuratively (not literally) to indicate that PR gains emerge naturally under AT. Trade-offs
 106 such as reduced clean accuracy still apply; see later sections for details.

107 ²For simplicity, we also denote the composed loss function in Eq. 1 and 3 as $\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{x} + \delta, y; \theta)$ in the following
 sections, whenever it is unambiguous.




Figure 1: Comparison of Adversarial (a) and Probabilistic Robustness (b)

Definition 1 (Generalization Error) The GE of f on S is then defined as the difference between the natural and empirical risk:

$$GE(\theta) = R(\theta) - R_S(\theta). \quad (2)$$

Although definitions of robustness vary across different DL tasks and model types, it generally refers to a DL model’s ability to maintain consistent predictions despite small input perturbations. Typically it is defined as all inputs in a region η have the same prediction, where η is a small norm ball (in a L_p -norm distance) of radius γ around an input x . A perturbed input (e.g., by adding noise on x) x' within η is an AE if its prediction label differs from ground truth label y .

To evaluate AR, we normally formulate it as a question of maximizing the prediction loss, cf. Fig. 1 (a), where *adversarial attacks* are introduced to find such a worst-case AE through perturbation:

$$\delta^* = \arg \max_{\|\delta\| \leq \gamma} \mathcal{L}(x + \delta, y; \theta). \quad (3)$$

AT Goodfellow (2015); Tramèr et al. (2018); Goyal et al. (2019); Madry et al. (2018); Balunović & Vechev (2020) is the most common and effective empirical approach for enhancing AR. It is typically formulated as a min-max optimisation problem, where the inner max aims at finding the worst-case AE in Eq. 3, e.g., by FGSM Goodfellow (2015) and PGD Madry et al. (2018). Then the model is trained to minimise the loss over these AEs derived from a training dataset \mathcal{D} :

$$\min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \sim \mathcal{D}} \left[\max_{\|\delta\| \leq \gamma} \mathcal{L}(x + \delta, y; \theta) \right]. \quad (4)$$

2.2 PROBABILISTIC ROBUSTNESS

PR adopts a *probabilistic* view, evaluating the *overall* local robustness in the presence of AEs, cf. Fig. 1 (b). This probabilistic notion of robustness is acknowledged to be more practical than the worst-case AR, as many applications only require the risk of AEs to stay below an acceptable threshold, rather than eliminating them entirely Webb et al. (2019); Zhang et al. (2023b; 2024b); Zhao (2025).

Definition 2 (Probabilistic Robustness) For a DL classifier f_{θ} that takes input x and returns a prediction label, the PR of an input x in a norm ball of radius γ is:

$$PR(x, \gamma) = \mathbb{E}_{\delta \sim Pr(\cdot | x)} [I_{\{f_{\theta}(x+\delta)=y\}}(x + \delta)], \quad (5)$$

where $I_S(x)$ is an indicator function that equals 1 when S is true and 0 otherwise; $Pr(\cdot)$ is the local distribution of inputs representing how perturbations δ are generated, which is precisely the “input model” used by Webb et al. (2019); Weng et al. (2019); Zhang et al. (2024b).

Def. 2 suggests that PR is the probability that the model prediction remains unchanged from a random perturbation x' . A “frequentist” interpretation of this expected probability is—it is the *limiting relative frequency* of perturbations where the output label is preserved, in an infinite sequence of independently generated perturbations Zhang et al. (2024b). In other words, the “proportion” of

162 non-AEs in the infinite set of perturbed inputs. To evaluate PR, one of the earliest works Webb et al.
 163 (2019) introduced a useful black-box statistical estimator, especially for cases where PR is very high.
 164 Later, more efficient white-box statistical estimators were proposed in TIT et al. (2023). Additionally,
 165 PR has been extended to applications such as explainable AI Huang et al. (2023) and text-to-image
 166 models Zhang et al. (2024b). For an overview of PR estimators, we refer readers to Zhao (2025).

167 In contrast to the relatively extensive studies on PR estimators, research on training methods for
 168 PR remains scarce. To the best of our knowledge, four studies Wang et al. (2021); Robey et al.
 169 (2022); Zhang et al. (2024a; 2025) explicitly motivated to develop training methods for improving PR.
 170 The first three can be categorized as Risk-based Training (RT) methods, which shift away from the
 171 worst-case perspective towards a training paradigm based on statistical risks induced by distributional
 172 perturbations, incorporating *perturbation risk functions* into the objective. We formally introduce its
 173 general formulation as:

174 **Definition 3 (Risk-based Training (RT))** Reusing the notations above, RT is to

$$175 \min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \sim \mathcal{D}} [\mathcal{R}_{\gamma}(\mathcal{L}(x + \delta, y; \theta), \delta \sim Pr(\cdot | x))], \quad (6)$$

177 where \mathcal{R}_{γ} is the perturbation risk function that defines some statistical quantities of the loss over a
 178 distribution of perturbations $Pr(\cdot | x)$.

180 The specific choice of \mathcal{R}_{γ} in RT methods varies: Wang et al. (2021) uses the identity function,
 181 while Robey et al. (2022); Zhang et al. (2024a) adopt functions calculating the Conditional Value-at-
 182 Risk (CVaR) and Entropic Value-at-Risk (EVaR), respectively. Essentially, rather than training on
 183 optimized AEs like AT methods for AR, RT methods train on statistical risks quantified by sampling
 184 stochastic perturbations from the perturbation distribution.

185 A very recent idea of adapting AT for PR was proposed in Zhang et al. (2025), which does not follow
 186 RT paradigm of Def. 3. Instead, their approach aligns with the traditional AT formulation in Eq. 4.
 187 Through multi-start PGD attacks and decision boundary exploration, AT-PR identifies an optimal AE
 188 whose neighborhood constitutes the largest all-AE region. Intuitively, training over such an optimal
 189 AE would reduce the overall “proportion” of AEs in the local norm ball and thus improve PR. We
 190 classify it as “hybrid” given it is targeting PR but adapting AT by solving a new min-max problem.
 191 Both RT methods and the “hybrid” method AT-PR constitute the current class of PR-targeted method.
 192 Further details for all four training methods are provided in Appendix E.

193 Table 1: Summary of abbreviations used in the paper.

195 Acronyms	195 Meaning	195 Acronyms	195 Meaning
196 AR	196 Adversarial Robustness	196 AT	196 Adversarial Training
197 ERM	197 Empirical Risk Minimization	197 GE	197 Generalization Error
198 PR	198 Probabilistic Robustness	198 RT	198 Risk-based Training

201 3 DESCRIPTION OF PRBENCH

203 All existing robustness benchmarks focus exclusively on AR Guo et al. (2023); Croce et al. (2021);
 204 Tang et al. (2021); Dong et al. (2020); Liu et al. (2025), with more related benchmarks summarized
 205 in Appendix B.5. In contrast, our PRBench is the first benchmark dedicated to PR.

206 The models under evaluation spans 3 types of architectures: (1) plain CNNs; (2) residual CNNs; and
 207 (3) transformer-based models. We train a diverse set of models, including VGG-19, SimpleCNN,
 208 ResNet-18, ResNet-34, WRN-28-10, ViT (Small/Base/Large), and DeiT (Tiny/Small). In total, 222
 209 models are trained on 7 datasets: MNIST, SVHN, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, CINIC-10, TinyImageNet,
 210 and ImageNet-50. Model selection and dataset specifications are provided in Appendix B.4.

212 3.1 TRAINING METHODS

214 As shown in Table 2, PRBench categorizes all training methods into 4 groups: standard training (i.e.,
 215 empirical risk minimization (ERM)), 6 AT methods, 4 RT methods (with corruption training using
 uniform, Gaussian, and Laplace noise) and the “hybrid” method AT-PR.

For AT, we consider the following representative methods. The PGD attack is widely regarded as the standard approach, which minimizes the adversarial cross-entropy loss \mathcal{L}_{CE} . Building on this, logit pairing methods Kannan et al. (2018), including adversarial logit pairing (ALP) and clean logit pairing (CLP), augment the objective with a regularization term coupling natural and AEs. TRADES further introduces a KL-based regularization, defining its objective as a combination of the natural loss and the KL divergence \mathcal{L}_{KL} between predictions on clean and adversarial inputs. MART follows the same KL-based regularization but augments it with the adversarial cross-entropy loss \mathcal{L}_{CE} , while additionally emphasizing misclassified examples through larger penalty weights. Overall, existing AT methods can be characterized by different uses of \mathcal{L}_{CE} and \mathcal{L}_{KL} , either individually or in combination, for both AE generation and training. We identify a missing configuration and introduce KL-PGD, a combination that generates AEs using \mathcal{L}_{KL} (as in TRADES) and trains the model with \mathcal{L}_{CE} (as in PGD). KL-PGD is designed as a diagnostic variant to disentangle the effects of loss functions from perturbation generation strategies, thereby providing a controlled comparison point for systematically evaluating the relative contributions of different optimization objectives.

Table 2: Loss functions and AE generation strategies for different training methods.

Type	Method	Loss Function	AE Generation
Standard	ERM	$\mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x}, \theta), y)$	–
AT	PGD	$\mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x} + \delta, \theta), y)$	$\delta_t = \alpha \cdot \text{sign}(\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} \mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x}_{t-1} + \delta_{t-1}, \theta), y))$
	MART	$\mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x} + \delta, \theta), y) + \lambda(1 - \mathbf{p}(y \mathbf{x})) \cdot \mathcal{L}_{KL}(\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x}, \theta) \parallel \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x} + \delta, \theta))$	
	ALP	$\mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x} + \delta, \theta), y) + \lambda \cdot \ \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x} + \delta, \theta) - \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x}, \theta)\ _2^2$	
	CLP	$\mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x}, \theta), y) + \lambda \cdot \ \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x} + \delta, \theta) - \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x}, \theta)\ _2^2$	
	TRADES	$\mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x}, \theta), y) + \lambda \cdot \mathcal{L}_{KL}(\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x}, \theta) \parallel \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x} + \delta, \theta))$	
	KL-PGD	$\mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x} + \delta, \theta), y)$	$\delta_t = \alpha \cdot \text{sign}(\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} \mathcal{L}_{KL}(\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x}_{t-1}, \theta) \parallel \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x}_{t-1} + \delta_{t-1}, \theta)))$
RT	Corruption	$\mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x} + \delta, \theta), y)$	$\delta \sim \text{Pr}(\cdot \mathbf{x})$
	CVaR	$\text{CVaR}_{1-\rho}(\mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x} + \delta, \theta), y))$	
Hybrid	AT-PR	$\mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x}, \theta), y)$	$\delta = \arg \max_{\delta \in \{\delta^{PGD}\}} k \text{ s.t. } \text{PR}(\mathbf{x} + \delta, k) = 0$

By instantiating the general formulation of RT training (Def. 3), three existing works have been proposed, corresponding to essentially two distinct approaches depending on how the perturbation risk function \mathcal{R}_γ is realized. A simple augmentation-based strategy is introduced by Wang et al. (2021), referred to as *corruption training*, where each input \mathbf{x}_i is perturbed by a sample drawn from a distribution (uniform by default) within an ℓ_∞ ball of radius γ . Robey et al. (2022) proposed a CVaR-based risk objective that emphasizes the tail of the loss distribution, thereby prioritizing samples with larger loss values. A similar work by Zhang et al. (2024a) replaces CVaR with EVaR, which leverages the entire distribution while following the same training strategy via sampling³. The “hybrid” method AT-PR targets PR while following the spirit of AT, as summarized in Table 2. It introduces a new min–max optimization objective (Eq. 21). Through multi-start PGD attacks and decision boundary exploration, AT-PR selects a local optimal AE in the norm-ball ($\delta \in \{\delta^{PGD}\}$) whose neighborhood constitutes the largest all-AE region k , i.e., $\text{PR}(\mathbf{x} + \delta, k) = 0$.

3.2 EVALUATION METRICS

Table 3: Evaluation metrics of AR, PR, and GE.

Type	AR	PR	GE
Metric	$AR = \frac{1}{ \mathcal{D} } \sum_{\mathbf{x}_i \in \mathcal{D}} I_{\{f_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}'_i) = y_i\}}(\mathbf{x}_i)$	$PR_{\mathcal{D}}(\gamma) = \frac{1}{ \mathcal{D} } \sum_{\mathbf{x}_i \in \mathcal{D}} \text{PR}(\mathbf{x}_i, \gamma)$	$GE_{PR_{\mathcal{D}}(\gamma)} = PR_{\mathcal{D}_{\text{train}}}(\gamma) - PR_{\mathcal{D}_{\text{test}}}(\gamma)$
		$\text{ProbAcc}(\rho) = \frac{1}{ \mathcal{D} } \sum_{\mathbf{x}_i \in \mathcal{D}} I_{\{\text{PR}(\mathbf{x}_i, \gamma) \geq 1 - \rho\}}(\mathbf{x}_i)$	$GE_{AR} = AR_{\mathcal{D}_{\text{train}}} - AR_{\mathcal{D}_{\text{test}}}$

In addition to clean accuracy, PRBench evaluates the models across three core aspects: AR, PR, and GE, cf. Table 3. AR performance is assessed by classification accuracy under adversarial attacks (Eq. 3). PR is quantified using two metrics from the literature: $PR_{\mathcal{D}}(\gamma)$ Webb et al. (2019), the average probability that correctly classified inputs \mathbf{x}_i remain correct under perturbations of radius γ (cf. Def. 2), and $\text{ProbAcc}(\rho)$ Robey et al. (2022), the fraction of inputs \mathbf{x} whose $\text{PR}(\mathbf{x}, \gamma)$ exceeds a given threshold $1 - \rho$. For the two PR metrics, $|\mathcal{D}|$ denotes the number of test samples that are correctly classified by the model, whereas for AR, $|\mathcal{D}|$ refers to the total number of test samples. GE captures robustness gap between the training and test sets. More details are deferred to Appendix F.

³Given the conceptual similarity, categorize both EVaR and CVaR under the CVaR category in Table 2.

4 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ROBUST OVERFITTING

While AT is regarded as one of the most promising methods for enhancing AR, empirical studies Rice et al. (2020); Gowal et al. (2020) have shown that it suffers significantly from overfitting. To understand this phenomenon, several theoretical studies have been conducted under different frameworks, including VC-dimension Montasser et al. (2019); Attias et al. (2022), Rademacher complexity Khim & Loh (2018); Yin et al. (2019); Awasthi et al. (2020); Xiao et al. (2022a), and Uniform Algorithmic Stability Farnia & Ozdaglar (2021); Xing et al. (2021); Xiao et al. (2022c). Moreover, Jiang et al. (2020) study generalization in standard DL models, focusing on the empirical correlation between complexity measures such as VC-dimension and norm-based measures. Kim et al. (2023) further conduct a large-scale empirical study of robust generalization under AT, analyzing how margin-based, smoothness-based, flatness-based, and gradient-based measures correlate with the generalization. A more detailed discussion of related work on generalization can be found in Appendix C. Among all these theoretical perspectives, one of the most notable contributions is by Xiao et al. (2022b), which introduces the concept of η -approximate β -smoothness, as defined in Eq. 7. This work Xiao et al. (2022b) analyses the surrogate loss of the max function and show that generalization is affected by an additional term proportional to η .

Definition 4 (Approximate Smoothness Xiao et al. (2022b)) *Let $f : \mathbb{R}^d \times \mathbb{R}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, then f is η -approximate β -smooth, if for all $\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{R}^d$, and $\forall \theta_1, \theta_2$, we have:*

$$\|\nabla_{\theta} f(\mathbf{z}, \theta_2) - \nabla_{\theta} f(\mathbf{z}, \theta_1)\| \leq \beta \|\theta_2 - \theta_1\| + \eta. \quad (7)$$

To facilitate comparison between different AT schemes, we make the following assumptions.

Assumption 1 *Assume that the machine learning model $f(\mathbf{x}, \theta)$ is L_{θ} -Lipschitz w.r.t. θ and L -Lipschitz w.r.t. \mathbf{x} such that:*

$$L_{\theta} \triangleq \sup_{\theta_2 \neq \theta_1} \frac{\|f(\mathbf{x}, \theta_2) - f(\mathbf{x}, \theta_1)\|}{\|\theta_2 - \theta_1\|} \quad \text{and} \quad L \triangleq \sup_{\mathbf{x}_2 \neq \mathbf{x}_1} \frac{\|f(\mathbf{x}_2, \theta) - f(\mathbf{x}_1, \theta)\|}{\|\mathbf{x}_2 - \mathbf{x}_1\|}. \quad (8)$$

Similarly, we assume the smoothness condition for the gradient of model f w.r.t. θ as:

$$\forall \mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}, \quad \|\nabla_{\theta} f(\mathbf{x}, \theta_2) - \nabla_{\theta} f(\mathbf{x}, \theta_1)\| \leq \beta_{\theta} \|\theta_2 - \theta_1\|, \quad (9)$$

$$\forall \theta \in \Theta, \quad \|\nabla_{\theta} f(\mathbf{x}_2, \theta) - \nabla_{\theta} f(\mathbf{x}_1, \theta)\| \leq \beta \|\mathbf{x}_2 - \mathbf{x}_1\|. \quad (10)$$

This assumption has been widely adopted and validated in prior work Farnia & Ozdaglar (2021); Xing et al. (2021); Xiao et al. (2022c;b), where it serves as a foundational premise for analyzing algorithmic stability and generalisation under AT. We show that the GE is bounded in Thm. 1.

Theorem 1 *Given the Lipschitz and smoothness assumption in Assumption 1 for classifier f , we show that the surrogate loss $\max_{\|\delta\| \leq \gamma} \mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x} + \delta, \theta)), y)$ is φ -Lipschitz and ϕ -approximate ψ -smooth, such that*

$$\varphi = 2L_{\theta} \quad \text{and} \quad \phi = (4\beta\gamma + 2L_{\theta}) \quad \text{and} \quad \psi = (2\beta_{\theta} + L_{\theta}^2). \quad (11)$$

We run SGD with learning rate $\alpha_t \leq c/t$ for T steps with a constant c such that $1/c \geq \psi$. Then, the GE is bounded as

$$|R(\theta) - R_S(\theta)| \leq \frac{1}{n} + \frac{2\varphi^2 + n\varphi\phi}{\psi(n-1)} T. \quad (12)$$

Thm. 1 follows from the results in Xiao et al. (2022b), where the authors conclude that the additional term $n\varphi\phi$ contributes to robust overfitting. The complete proof corresponds to the special case $\lambda = 0$ of Thm. 3 in Appendix G.2. And the proof for uniform stability is shown in Appendix G.5.

Theorem 2 *Follow the same condition for Thm. 1, consider the objective function for contained AT*

$$\max_{\|\delta\|_2 \leq \gamma} \mathcal{L}_{CE}(f(\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x} + \delta, \theta)), y) + \lambda \|\mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x} + \delta, \theta)) - \mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x}, \theta))\|_2^2. \quad (13)$$

We show that the Lipschitz constant, $\tilde{\varphi}$, for the objective function is

$$\tilde{\varphi} = 2L_{\theta} + 2\lambda(\nu\beta\gamma + 3\nu^2L_{\theta}) = \varphi + 2\lambda(\nu\beta\gamma + 3\nu^2L_{\theta}), \quad (14)$$

and it is $\tilde{\varphi}$ -approximate $\tilde{\psi}$ -smooth, such that

$$\tilde{\phi} = (4\beta\gamma + 2\nu L_{\theta}) + 2\lambda\gamma(\nu^2\beta + 2\nu LL_{\theta}) = \phi + 2\lambda\gamma(\nu^2\beta + 2\nu LL_{\theta}) - 2L_{\theta}(1 - \nu) \quad (15)$$

$$\tilde{\psi} = (2\beta_{\theta} + L_{\theta}^2) + 6\lambda(\nu^2\beta_{\theta} + 4\nu L_{\theta}^2) = \psi + 6\lambda(\nu^2\beta_{\theta} + 4\nu L_{\theta}^2) \quad (16)$$

where φ , ϕ and ψ are corresponding variables for AT in Thm. 1 without constraints and

$$\nu \triangleq \max_{\|\delta\|_2 \leq \gamma, \theta \in \Theta} \|\mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x} + \delta, \theta)) - \mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x}, \theta))\|_2, \quad (17)$$

denotes the upper bound of the penalty function.

Thm 1 aims to establish the fundamental theoretical basis for our GE analysis: it formalizes the Lipschitzness and smoothness assumption of the adversarial surrogate loss follows from the results in Xiao et al. (2022b), which is the key prerequisite for analyzing robust overfitting. Thm. 2 builds directly on Thm 1 by extending these properties to the AT objective with regularization, quantifying how the added regularizer changes the Lipschitz and smoothness constants and thereby affects the GE behavior observed in our subsequent empirical results.

5 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

5.1 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF EVALUATION RESULTS

While the complete evaluation results across all models and datasets are provided in Appendix D, we present *representative* example in Tables 4 and 5 and Fig. 2 for brevity.

AT methods improve PR “for free”. All AT methods consistently improve PR alongside AR. Within the training perturbation norm-ball, models trained by AT achieve over 99% of $PR_{\mathcal{D}}(\gamma)$, cf. Table 4. The $ProbAcc(\rho = 0.01)$ metric further indicates that more than 97% of test samples exhibit $PR_{\mathcal{D}}(\gamma) > 99\%$. Moreover, as shown in Fig. 2 (c) (e), model trained with AT methods remains stable PR performance as the perturbation radius γ increases and across different robustness tolerance levels ρ , consistently achieving over 93% robustness under both $PR_{\mathcal{D}}(\gamma)$ and $ProbAcc(\rho)$. Our results show that AT, although originally designed to improve AR, consistently yields improved PR as a by-product, without any modification to its training objective. Here, we use the phrase “for free” to indicate that PR improvements arise naturally under standard AT, without requiring any modification to its original training paradigm. It does not imply there is no cost in other metrics, indeed, AT still suffers from a drop in clean accuracy. For example, the clean accuracy decreases from 94.85% under standard training to 83.83% after PGD training (cf. Table 4). In this sense, the phenomenon can also be interpreted as a multi-objective trade-off.

RT methods underperform AT methods on PR performance. While RT methods effectively improve PR compared with ERM, they still lag behind AT methods, as shown in Table 4. Moreover, their PR performance drops sharply as the perturbation radius increases, cf. Fig. 2 (c) (d), showing limited generalization beyond the norm-ball setting in training. Notably, our analysis of the CVaR codebase from Robey et al. (2022) suggests a potential evaluation inconsistency: it includes misclassified original clean samples when computing $ProbAcc(\rho)$ rather than focusing on the robustness of correctly classified original samples. We have corrected this in our experiments. This view is also supported by prior studies, e.g., Li et al. (2024), which states: “When considering the adversarial robustness of a wrongly classified sample \mathbf{x} , the robustness should be 0”. Similarly, Chen & Lee (2024) emphasizes that “AEs must satisfy the constraints: the original examples are classified correctly while the predictions of the AEs are wrong”. In other words, if a sample is misclassified by the model initially, its ability to resist perturbations and maintain the wrong prediction (i.e., being “robustly wrong”) does not constitute meaningful robustness.

AT methods ensure stable and high PR under diverse perturbation distributions. We evaluate the PR performance of PGD-trained models under three common noise distributions: Uniform, Gaussian, and Laplace, and compare them with models trained by Corruption method using the same noise

Table 4: Performance of different training methods on CIFAR-10 (ResNet-18), evaluated by clean accuracy (Acc.), AR, PR, GE performance, and training time (sec./epoch).

Type	Method	Acc. %	AR %				PR _D ^{Uniform} (γ) %				ProbAcc($\rho, \gamma = 0.03$) %			GE _{PR_D^{GE}(γ)} %				Time s/ep.	
			PGD ¹⁰	PGD ²⁰	CW ²⁰	AA	0.03	0.08	0.1	0.12	0.1	0.05	0.01	PGD ²⁰	0.03	0.08	0.1		0.12
Std.	ERM	94.85	0.01	0.0	0.0	0.0	97.64	76.19	61.65	47.07	95.04	93.48	89.82	0.0	6.24	3.98	2.94	2.54	3
RT	Corr_Uniform	94.17	0.28	0.05	0.02	0.0	99.12	90.92	82.32	70.48	97.78	97.02	94.9	0.04	4.83	6.24	4.79	2.31	3
	CVaR	89.91	41.79	33.45	0.0	0.0	98.67	87.75	78.62	68.27	96.63	95.49	92.56	1.13	3.9	4.56	3.9	2.72	61
Hybrid	AT-PR	86.35	48.22	46.53	47.39	44.01	99.68	98.13	97.01	95.46	99.13	98.82	98.24	27.43	11.69	11.81	11.86	12.57	160
AT	PGD	83.83	50.86	49.46	49.18	46.34	99.63	97.89	96.59	94.85	99.05	98.73	98.01	25.02	11.4	11.01	11.2	12.03	30
	TRADES	83.34	54.09	53.15	50.84	48.99	99.55	97.74	96.33	94.55	98.88	98.68	98.22	16.12	10.29	10.22	10.08	10.27	25
	MART	82.26	54.83	53.84	49.63	46.94	99.56	97.4	95.92	93.93	98.88	98.58	98.04	17.4	6.84	7.23	7.73	8.07	22
	ALP	73.98	54.41	54.08	50.72	48.41	99.27	96.73	95.16	93.24	98.55	98.29	97.85	8.44	5.26	5.93	5.52	4.44	36
	CLP	81.47	54.12	53.34	51.05	49.05	99.53	97.61	96.29	94.54	98.73	98.52	97.88	15.32	8.05	7.94	8.29	8.7	36
	KL-PGD	87.55	49.4	48.43	47.06	44.77	99.63	97.86	96.54	94.72	99.07	98.73	98.14	14.57	7.28	7.06	7.46	8.15	27

Table 5: Comparison of ERM, PGD, and Corruption-trained models under Uniform, Gaussian, and Laplace noise. Reports Acc., PR, and GE at various perturbation radii γ on CIFAR-10 (ResNet-18).

Type	Method	Acc. %	PR _D ^{Uniform} (γ) %				PR _D ^{Gaussian} (γ) %				PR _D ^{Laplace} (γ) %				GE _{PR_D($\gamma=0.03$)} %		
			0.03	0.08	0.1	0.12	0.03	0.08	0.1	0.12	0.03	0.08	0.1	0.12	Uni.	Gau.	Lap.
Std.	ERM	94.85	97.64	76.19	61.65	47.07	96.16	61.88	44.2	30.6	96.04	60.98	43.24	29.79	6.24	6.36	6.3
RT	Corr_Uniform	94.17	99.12	90.92	82.32	70.48	98.69	82.46	67.4	49.32	98.67	81.85	66.29	48.09	4.83	5.03	5.05
	Corr_Gaussian	93.32	99.41	96.22	92.14	85.32	99.23	92.23	83.42	70.46	99.22	91.91	82.72	69.42	5.69	5.67	5.6
	Corr_Laplace	93.61	99.45	96.32	91.97	84.4	99.3	92.09	82.09	66.42	99.29	91.78	81.3	65.16	5.72	5.67	5.63
AT	PGD	83.83	99.63	97.89	96.59	94.85	99.48	96.68	94.5	91.54	99.47	96.59	94.34	91.29	11.4	11.24	11.21

distribution. As shown in Table 5 and Fig. 2 (d), PGD-based AT consistently achieves the highest PR across all distributions, outperforming Corruption in all settings.

RT methods achieve higher clean accuracy but has near-zero improvement on AR As shown in Table 4, models trained with RT methods exhibit smaller reductions in clean accuracy. However, their AR degrades significantly, with performance dropping to nearly zero under strong attacks such as C&W and Auto-Attack. Only the CVaR method achieves non-zero AR performance against PGD attacks, though it still lags behind models trained with AT methods. A similar observation is evident in Fig. 2 (a), where RT methods consistently appear along the leftmost vertical axis, indicating near-zero AR performance across all datasets and models. More results are shown in Table 10.

AT-PR achieves a better trade-off among Accuracy, AR, and PR. As shown in Table 4: *i*) it achieves comparable PR performance to AT methods; *ii*) it achieves AR slightly weaker than AT, yet still substantially higher than that of RT methods; *iii*) it reduces clean accuracy less severely than AT. Overall, although AT-PR is designed as a PR-targeted method, its AT-inspired formulation (min-max optimization) delivers a more balanced performance across the three metrics.

Training efficiency varies widely. Table 4 shows that Corruption method is highly efficient, generating only a single random sample per training example, whereas CVaR is computationally expensive due to the need for multiple samples to approximate the perturbation distribution. Standard AT methods exhibit intermediate and more consistent training times. AT-PR is the most costly, as it generates a set of PGD-based AEs and selects the one maximizing the all-AE region, leading to a substantial increase in training time (as noted by the complexity analysis in Zhang et al. (2025)). To further investigate efficiency-oriented approaches, we additionally integrate the filtering-based method of Chen & Lee (2024) into PRBench as a case study (Table 12). This aligns with ongoing work on efficient robustness, and our extensible design enables inclusion of future methods.

AT methods lead in composite robustness evaluation. To holistically assess training methods across all key aspects (AR, PR, GE, clean accuracy, and training efficiency), we introduce a *composite robustness score*. This score is computed as a (weighted) sum of Min–Max normalized metric values, with “lower-is-better” metrics (e.g., GE, training time) reversed for consistency. Fig. 2 (b) presents results under equal-weighting scheme, where AT methods consistently rank highest, corroborating earlier findings that they generally outperform PR-targeted training methods. Moreover, the KL-PGD achieves competitive performance, indicating that generating AEs with \mathcal{L}_{KL} is more effective than with the traditional \mathcal{L}_{CE} . For additional results see Fig. 6.




Figure 2: (a) Comparison of training methods (AT and RT) in terms of AR (AA) and PR ($PR_D^{\text{Uniform}}(\gamma)$) performance across various datasets. (b) Composite robustness scores of different training methods, aggregated over all test datasets and model architectures. (c) $PR_D^{\text{Uniform}}(\gamma)$ of ResNet-18 trained with different training methods on CIFAR-10 under varying γ . (d) $PR_D^{\text{Laplace}}(\gamma)$ for ResNet-18 trained with corruption training and PGD models on CIFAR-10 across various γ . (e) $ProbAcc(\rho, \gamma = 0.03)$ for ResNet-18 trained with different training methods on CIFAR-10 with respect to different robustness tolerance level ρ . (f) GE of $PR_D^{\text{Uniform}}(\gamma)$ for ResNet-18 trained with different training methods on CIFAR-10 with respect to different γ . More experimental results are deferred to Appendix D.

5.2 GENERALIZATION ERROR ANALYSIS

The empirical results reveal several insights into the GE of different training methods. In this section, we provide a theoretical analysis to support the empirical findings.

RT methods consistently yield lower GE. As shown in Table 4 and Fig. 2 (f), all RT methods empirically exhibit smaller GEs than AT methods across both AR and PR metrics. We next investigate the theoretical basis of this generalizability advantage in the Prop 1.

Proposition 1 *Let \mathcal{L} be the objective loss function for training without adversarial perturbation, and assume that \mathcal{L} is φ -Lipschitz and ψ -smooth. Then, the objective function of the CVaR-based training scheme in Eq. 6 is also φ -Lipschitz and $\max\{\varphi, \psi\}$ -smooth.*

Our Prop. 1 shows that RT learning yields a smoother training process than AT, as it excludes the GE term (ϕ in Thm. 1) associated with robust overfitting, resulting in a smaller overall GE. Training with corruption can be seen as a special case of CVaR and thus inherits the same Lipschitz and smooth properties. The proof of our Prop. 1 is in Appendix G.3.

As shown in Thm. 2, successful training with a properly chosen λ can effectively reduce the L_2 distance between softmax outputs, denoted by ν . This reduction pushes $\tilde{\varphi} \approx \varphi$ and $\tilde{\psi} \approx \psi$, and in cases where ν becomes sufficiently small, the training process may become even smoother, potentially satisfying $\tilde{\phi} < \phi$. This provides a theoretical explanation for why AT methods that impose constraints on the softmax outputs \mathbf{p} tend to exhibit smaller GEs. On the other hand, an improperly chosen λ can result in highly non-smooth optimization. The detailed proof for our Thm. 2 is in Appendix G.2. We now provide theoretical insights into the following two empirical findings.

PGD has the highest GE among AT methods: Within AT methods (Table. 4), PGD results in the largest GE under the GE_{AR} metric. This is due to the absence of an explicit penalty in its objective, unlike methods such as TRADES and MART, which incorporate additional penalties to stabilize

training and improve generalization. This empirical result corresponds to our theoretical analysis in Thm. 2. The AT with a penalty over the distance between softmax before and after perturbation effectively enhance the smoothness for the objective function. Additional results in Appendix. D.

AT-PR exhibits similar GE to PGD. AT-PR, though designed as a PR-targeted method, is AT-inspired: it selects AEs from a set of PGD-generated candidates corresponding to different local optima. Consequently, as shown in Table 4 & 10, its GE aligns closely with that of PGD. A detailed theoretical analysis with its corresponding algorithm is provided in Appendix G.4.

Optimization budget explains the GE gap between ALP and CLP: CLP shows higher GE than ALP, as ALP uses AEs in its optimization objective while CLP relies on clean inputs. This suggests that ALP’s higher optimization budget leads to better generalization. According to Thm. 2, the generalization disadvantage of CLP arises from the choice of λ . To ensure robustness against adversarial attacks, CLP requires a relatively large value of λ , since it is based on $\mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}), y)$ instead of $\mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}, \boldsymbol{\theta}), y)$, cf. Table. 2. This leads to reduced smoothness and a larger GE.

6 CONCLUSION

We present PRBench, the first dedicated benchmark for PR, designed to standardize the evaluation of robustness training methods and advance our understanding of effective PR improvement strategies. Through a systematic evaluation of 222 models across diverse architectures, datasets, training methods, we identify two distinct trade-off frontiers. The first, represented by AT, emphasizes high AR and PR at the cost of clean accuracy. The second, represented by RT, prioritizes high clean accuracy, PR and lower GE (supported by theoretical analyses) while trading off AR performance.

Based on our findings in PRBench, we cautiously propose a *bold hypothesis*: there may be limited *practical* need for developing *separate* PR-targeted training methods, as strong AT methods already yield substantial PR improvements.

This hypothesis is not intended to claim that PR-targeted methods are obsolete. As noted in Sec. 1, PR remains an active research area with emerging studies on PR training, highlighting its practical relevance across different AI tasks. Our statement instead reflects a consistent empirical observation: strong AT methods (e.g., PGD, TRADES) can naturally deliver surprisingly strong PR performance, and AT-inspired PR methods such as AT-PR achieve an even more balanced robustness profile. These results suggest that the AT paradigm may *inherently* support PR, even without explicit PR-targeted modifications. At the same time, current AT methods still struggle to balance AR, PR, generalization, and clean accuracy. Methods such as KL-PGD and AT-PR demonstrate the potential of hybrid strategies, but they also reveal limitations, including the high computational cost of AT-PR. Therefore, we argue that future research may benefit more from improving versatile, AT-based approaches that jointly enhance AR and PR, rather than focusing *separately* on PR-targeted training techniques.

Our deliberately bold hypothesis is intended to spark constructive discussion and motivate rigorous future work, whether to validate, refine, or refute it, in line with the core motivation of PRBench, which is to support the PR research community through systematic and evidence-driven analysis.

7 ETHICS STATEMENT

This work does not involve human subjects, sensitive personal data, or proprietary information. It does not present foreseeable risks related to privacy, security, fairness, discrimination, or potential misuse. All datasets and methods used are publicly available and widely adopted in the research community. We therefore believe this work complies with the ICLR Code of Ethics.

8 REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

All theoretical results are presented with clear assumptions and complete proofs in the Appendix. G. For datasets, we rely solely on publicly available benchmarks, with detailed descriptions and pre-processing steps included in the Appendix. B.4 along with proper citations. The implementation code for all experiments is included in the supplementary materials. Furthermore, the Appendix. B contains detailed descriptions of experimental settings, including hyperparameter choices, training configurations, and evaluation protocols. Together, these resources are intended to ensure faithful reproduction and enable further validation of our findings.

REFERENCES

- Idan Attias, Aryeh Kontorovich, and Yishay Mansour. Improved generalization bounds for adversarially robust learning. *Journal of Machine Learning Research*, 23(175):1–31, 2022.
- Pranjal Awasthi, Natalie Frank, and Mehryar Mohri. Adversarial learning guarantees for linear hypotheses and neural networks. In *International Conference on Machine Learning*, pp. 431–441. PMLR, 2020.
- Mislav Balunović and Martin Vechev. Adversarial training and provable defenses: Bridging the gap. In *8th International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR 2020)(virtual)*. International Conference on Learning Representations, 2020.
- Teodora Baluta, Zheng Leong Chua, Kuldeep S Meel, and Prateek Saxena. Scalable quantitative verification for deep neural networks. In *ICSE’21*, pp. 312–323, 2021.
- Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. Towards evaluating the robustness of neural networks. In *IEEE symposium on security and privacy (sp)*, pp. 39–57, 2017.
- Erh-Chung Chen and Che-Rung Lee. Data filtering for efficient adversarial training. *Pattern Recognition*, 151:110394, 2024.
- Xiwei Cheng, Kexin Fu, and Farzan Farnia. Stability and generalization in free adversarial training. *Transactions on Machine Learning Research*.
- Nicolas Couellan. Probabilistic robustness estimates for feed-forward neural networks. *Neural networks*, 142:138–147, 2021.
- Francesco Croce and Matthias Hein. Reliable evaluation of adversarial robustness with an ensemble of diverse parameter-free attacks. In *International conference on machine learning*, pp. 2206–2216. PMLR, 2020.
- Francesco Croce, Maksym Andriushchenko, Vikash Sehwal, Edoardo Debenedetti, Nicolas Flammarion, Mung Chiang, Prateek Mittal, and Matthias Hein. Robustbench: a standardized adversarial robustness benchmark. *35th Conf. on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS’21) Track on Datasets and Benchmarks*, 2021.
- Luke N Darlow, Elliot J Crowley, Antreas Antoniou, and Amos J Storkey. Cinic-10 is not imagenet or cifar-10. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.03505*, 2018.
- Jia Deng, Wei Dong, Richard Socher, Li-Jia Li, Kai Li, and Li Fei-Fei. Imagenet: A large-scale hierarchical image database. In *2009 IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition*, pp. 248–255. Ieee, 2009.

- 594 Li Deng. The mnist database of handwritten digit images for machine learning research [best of the
595 web]. *IEEE signal processing magazine*, 29(6):141–142, 2012.
- 596
- 597 Gavin Weiguang Ding, Luyu Wang, and Xiaomeng Jin. AdverTorch v0.1: An adversarial robustness
598 toolbox based on pytorch. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.07623*, 2019.
- 599 Yi Dong, Wei Huang, Vibhav Bharti, Victoria Cox, Alec Banks, Sen Wang, Xingyu Zhao, Sven
600 Schewe, and Xiaowei Huang. Reliability assessment and safety arguments for machine learning
601 components in system assurance. *ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems*, 22(3):
602 1–48, 2023.
- 603
- 604 Yinpeng Dong, Qi-An Fu, Xiao Yang, Tianyu Pang, Hang Su, Zihao Xiao, and Jun Zhu. Benchmark-
605 ing adversarial robustness on image classification. In *CVPR’20*, pp. 321–331, 2020.
- 606 Alexey Dosovitskiy, Lucas Beyer, Alexander Kolesnikov, Dirk Weissenborn, Xiaohua Zhai, Thomas
607 Unterthiner, Mostafa Dehghani, Matthias Minderer, Georg Heigold, Sylvain Gelly, Jakob Uszkoreit,
608 and Neil Houlsby. An image is worth 16x16 words: Transformers for image recognition at scale.
609 In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2021.
- 610 Gintare Karolina Dziugaite, Alexandre Drouin, Brady Neal, Nitarshan Rajkumar, Ethan Caballero,
611 Linbo Wang, Ioannis Mitliagkas, and Daniel M Roy. In search of robust measures of generalization.
612 *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 33:11723–11733, 2020.
- 613
- 614 Farzan Farnia and Asuman Ozdaglar. Train simultaneously, generalize better: Stability of gradient-
615 based minimax learners. In *International Conference on Machine Learning*, pp. 3174–3185.
616 PMLR, 2021.
- 617 Ian J Goodfellow. Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. In *International Conference
618 on Learning Representations ICLR 2015*. International Conference on Learning Representations,
619 2015.
- 620
- 621 Dou Goodman, Hao Xin, Wang Yang, Wu Yuesheng, Xiong Junfeng, and Zhang Huan. Ad-
622 vbox: a toolbox to generate adversarial examples that fool neural networks. *arXiv preprint
623 arXiv:2001.05574*, 2020.
- 624 Sven Gowal, Krishnamurthy Dj Dvijotham, Robert Stanforth, Rudy Bunel, Chongli Qin, Jonathan
625 Uesato, Relja Arandjelovic, Timothy Mann, and Pushmeet Kohli. Scalable verified training for
626 provably robust image classification. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF International Conference
627 on Computer Vision*, pp. 4842–4851, 2019.
- 628 Sven Gowal, Chongli Qin, Jonathan Uesato, Timothy Mann, and Pushmeet Kohli. Uncovering
629 the limits of adversarial training against norm-bounded adversarial examples. *arXiv preprint
630 arXiv:2010.03593*, 2020.
- 631
- 632 Jun Guo, Wei Bao, Jiakai Wang, Yuqing Ma, Xinghai Gao, Gang Xiao, Aishan Liu, Jian Dong,
633 Xianglong Liu, and Wenjun Wu. A comprehensive evaluation framework for deep model robustness.
634 *Pattern Recognition*, 137:109308, 2023.
- 635 Moritz Hardt, Ben Recht, and Yoram Singer. Train faster, generalize better: Stability of stochastic
636 gradient descent. In *International conference on machine learning*, pp. 1225–1234. PMLR, 2016.
- 637
- 638 Wei Huang, Xingyu Zhao, Gaojie Jin, and Xiaowei Huang. Safari: Versatile and efficient evaluations
639 for robustness of interpretability. In *IEEE/CVF International Conference on Computer Vision
640 (ICCV’23)*, pp. 1988–1998, 2023.
- 641 Yiding Jiang, Behnam Neyshabur, Hossein Mobahi, Dilip Krishnan, and Samy Bengio. Fantas-
642 tic generalization measures and where to find them. In *International Conference on Learning
643 Representations*, 2020.
- 644 Harini Kannan, Alexey Kurakin, and Ian Goodfellow. Adversarial logit pairing. *arXiv preprint
645 arXiv:1803.06373*, 2018.
- 646
- 647 Justin Khim and Po-Ling Loh. Adversarial risk bounds via function transformation. *arXiv preprint
arXiv:1810.09519*, 2018.

- 648 Hoki Kim, Jinseong Park, Yujin Choi, and Jaewook Lee. Fantastic robustness measures: The secrets
649 of robust generalization. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 36:48793–48818,
650 2023.
- 651 Alex Krizhevsky, Geoffrey Hinton, et al. Learning multiple layers of features from tiny images. 2009.
- 652 Yann Le and Xuan Yang. Tiny imagenet visual recognition challenge. *CS 231N*, 7(7):3, 2015.
- 653
- 654
- 655 Yaxin Li, Wei Jin, Han Xu, and Jiliang Tang. Deeprobust: A pytorch library for adversarial attacks
656 and defenses. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2005.06149*, 2020.
- 657
- 658 Zaitang Li, Pin-Yu Chen, and Tsung-Yi Ho. Great score: Global robustness evaluation of adversarial
659 perturbation using generative models. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 37:
660 39158–39189, 2024.
- 661 Xiang Ling, Shouling Ji, Jiayu Zou, Jiannan Wang, Chunming Wu, Bo Li, and Ting Wang. Deepsec:
662 A uniform platform for security analysis of deep learning model. In *2019 IEEE Symposium on*
663 *Security and Privacy (SP)*, pp. 673–690. IEEE, 2019.
- 664
- 665 Chang Liu, Yinpeng Dong, Wenzhao Xiang, Xiao Yang, Hang Su, Jun Zhu, Yuefeng Chen, Yuan He,
666 Hui Xue, and Shibao Zheng. A comprehensive study on robustness of image classification models:
667 Benchmarking and rethinking. *International Journal of Computer Vision*, 133(2):567–589, 2025.
- 668 Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt, Dimitris Tsipras, and Adrian Vladu.
669 Towards deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks. In *International Conference on*
670 *Learning Representations*, 2018.
- 671
- 672 Marco Melis, Ambra Demontis, Maura Pintor, Angelo Sotgiu, and Battista Biggio. secml: A python
673 library for secure and explainable machine learning. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1912.10013*, 6, 2019.
- 674
- 675 Omar Montasser, Steve Hanneke, and Nathan Srebro. Vc classes are adversarially robustly learnable,
676 but only improperly. In *Conference on Learning Theory*, pp. 2512–2530. PMLR, 2019.
- 677 Yuval Netzer, Tao Wang, Adam Coates, Alessandro Bissacco, Baolin Wu, Andrew Y Ng, et al.
678 Reading digits in natural images with unsupervised feature learning. In *NIPS workshop on deep*
679 *learning and unsupervised feature learning*, volume 2011, pp. 4. Granada, 2011.
- 680
- 681 Maria-Irina Nicolae, Mathieu Sinn, Minh Ngoc Tran, Beat Buesser, Amrith Rawat, Martin Wistuba,
682 Valentina Zantedeschi, Nathalie Baracaldo, Bryant Chen, Heiko Ludwig, et al. Adversarial
683 robustness toolbox v0. 4.0. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.01069*, 2018.
- 684 Nicolas Papernot, Fartash Faghri, Nicholas Carlini, Ian Goodfellow, Reuben Feinman, Alexey
685 Kurakin, Cihang Xie, Yash Sharma, Tom Brown, Aurko Roy, et al. Technical report on the
686 cleverhans v2. 1.0 adversarial examples library. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.00768*, 2016a.
- 687
- 688 Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Somesh Jha, Matt Fredrikson, Z Berkay Celik, and Ananthram
689 Swami. The limitations of deep learning in adversarial settings. In *IEEE European symposium on*
690 *security and privacy (EuroS&P)*, pp. 372–387. IEEE, 2016b.
- 691 Mikhail Pautov, Nurislam Tursynbek, Marina Munkhoeva, Nikita Muravev, Aleksandr Petiushko, and
692 Ivan Oseledets. Cc-cert: A probabilistic approach to certify general robustness of neural networks.
693 In *AAAI’22*, volume 36, pp. 7975–7983, 2022.
- 694
- 695 Jonas Rauber, Wieland Brendel, and Matthias Bethge. Foolbox v0. 8.0: A python toolbox to
696 benchmark the robustness of machine learning models. *CoRR*, 2017.
- 697
- 698 Leslie Rice, Eric Wong, and Zico Kolter. Overfitting in adversarially robust deep learning. In
699 *International conference on machine learning*, pp. 8093–8104. PMLR, 2020.
- 700 Alexander Robey, Luiz Chamon, George J Pappas, and Hamed Hassani. Probabilistically robust
701 learning: Balancing average and worst-case performance. In *International Conference on Machine*
Learning, pp. 18667–18686. PMLR, 2022.

- 702 Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian Goodfellow,
703 and Rob Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural networks. In *In Proc. of 2nd Int. Conf. on Learning*
704 *Representations*, 2014.
- 705
- 706 Shiyu Tang, Ruihao Gong, Yan Wang, Aishan Liu, Jiakai Wang, Xinyun Chen, Fengwei Yu, Xian-
707 glong Liu, Dawn Song, Alan Yuille, et al. Robustart: Benchmarking robustness on architecture
708 design and training techniques. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2109.05211*, 2021.
- 709 Karim Tit, Teddy Furon, and Mathias Rousset. Efficient statistical assessment of neural network
710 corruption robustness. *NeurIPS'21*, 34:9253–9263, 2021.
- 711
- 712 Karim TIT, Teddy Furon, and Mathias Rousset. Gradient-informed neural network statistical robust-
713 ness estimation. In *Proc. of The 26th Int. Conf. on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics*, volume
714 206, pp. 323–334. PMLR, 2023.
- 715 Hugo Touvron, Matthieu Cord, Matthijs Douze, Francisco Massa, Alexandre Sablayrolles, and Hervé
716 Jégou. Training data-efficient image transformers & distillation through attention. In *International*
717 *conference on machine learning*, pp. 10347–10357. PMLR, 2021.
- 718
- 719 Florian Tramèr, Alexey Kurakin, Nicolas Papernot, Ian Goodfellow, Dan Boneh, and Patrick Mc-
720 Daniel. Ensemble adversarial training: Attacks and defenses. In *International Conference on*
721 *Learning Representations*, 2018.
- 722 Benjie Wang, Stefan Webb, and Tom Rainforth. Statistically robust neural network classification. In
723 *Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence*, pp. 1735–1745. PMLR, 2021.
- 724
- 725 Yisen Wang, Difan Zou, Jinfeng Yi, James Bailey, Xingjun Ma, and Quanquan Gu. Improving
726 adversarial robustness requires revisiting misclassified examples. In *International conference on*
727 *learning representations*, 2019.
- 728 Stefan Webb, Tom Rainforth, Yee Whye Teh, and M Pawan Kumar. A statistical approach to assessing
729 neural network robustness. In *Int. Conf. on Learning Representations*, 2019.
- 730
- 731 Lily Weng, Pin-Yu Chen, Lam Nguyen, Mark Squillante, Akhilan Boopathy, Ivan Oseledets, and
732 Luca Daniel. Proven: Verifying robustness of neural networks with a probabilistic approach. In
733 *Int. Conf. on Machine Learning*, pp. 6727–6736. PMLR, 2019.
- 734 Jiancong Xiao, Yanbo Fan, Ruoyu Sun, and Zhi-Quan Luo. Adversarial rademacher complexity of
735 deep neural networks. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2211.14966*, 2022a.
- 736
- 737 Jiancong Xiao, Yanbo Fan, Ruoyu Sun, Jue Wang, and Zhi-Quan Luo. Stability analysis and
738 generalization bounds of adversarial training. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*,
739 35:15446–15459, 2022b.
- 740 Jiancong Xiao, Zeyu Qin, Yanbo Fan, Baoyuan Wu, Jue Wang, and Zhi-Quan Luo. Adaptive
741 smoothness-weighted adversarial training for multiple perturbations with its stability analysis.
742 *arXiv preprint arXiv:2210.00557*, 2022c.
- 743
- 744 Yue Xing, Qifan Song, and Guang Cheng. On the algorithmic stability of adversarial training.
745 *Advances in neural information processing systems*, 34:26523–26535, 2021.
- 746
- 747 Dong Yin, Ramchandran Kannan, and Peter Bartlett. Rademacher complexity for adversarially robust
748 generalization. In *International conference on machine learning*, pp. 7085–7094. PMLR, 2019.
- 749 Hongyang Zhang, Yaodong Yu, Jiantao Jiao, Eric Xing, Laurent El Ghaoui, and Michael Jordan.
750 Theoretically principled trade-off between robustness and accuracy. In *International conference on*
751 *machine learning*, pp. 7472–7482. PMLR, 2019.
- 752 Ruihan Zhang and Jun Sun. Are probabilistic robust accuracy bounded, 2025. URL <https://openreview.net/forum?id=fVgUXaesSS>.
- 753
- 754 Ruihan Zhang, Peixin Zhang, and Jun Sun. Towards certified probabilistic robustness with high
755 accuracy. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2309.00879*, 2023a.

756 Tianle Zhang, Wenjie Ruan, and Jonathan E. Fieldsend. Proa: A probabilistic robustness assessment
757 against functional perturbations. In *Machine Learning and Knowledge Discovery in Databases: Eu-*
758 *ropean Conference, ECML PKDD 2022, Grenoble, France, September 19–23, 2022, Proceedings,*
759 *Part III*, pp. 154–170. Springer-Verlag, 2023b. ISBN 978-3-031-26408-5.

760 Tianle Zhang, Yanghao Zhang, Ronghui Mu, Jiayu Liu, Jonathan Fieldsend, and Wenjie Ruan. Prass:
761 probabilistic risk-averse robust learning with stochastic search. In *Proceedings of the Thirty-Third*
762 *International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, pp. 559–567, 2024a.

763 Yi Zhang, Yun Tang, Wenjie Ruan, Xiaowei Huang, Siddhartha Khastgir, Paul Jennings, and Xingyu
764 Zhao. Protip: Probabilistic robustness verification on text-to-image diffusion models against
765 stochastic perturbation. In *European Conference on Computer Vision*, 2024b.

766 Yi Zhang, Yuhang Chen, Zhen Chen, Wenjie Ruan, Xiaowei Huang, Siddhartha Khastgir, and Xingyu
767 Zhao. Adversarial training for probabilistic robustness. In *2025 IEEE/CVF International Confer-*
768 *ence on Computer Vision (ICCV25)*. IEEE, 2025.

769 Xingyu Zhao. Probabilistic robustness in deep learning: A concise yet comprehensive guide.
770 *Adversarial Example Detection and Mitigation Using Machine Learning*, pp. 1–13, 2025.

771 Xingyu Zhao, Wei Huang, Alec Banks, Victoria Cox, David Flynn, Sven Schewe, and Xiaowei
772 Huang. Assessing the reliability of deep learning classifiers through robustness evaluation and
773 operational profiles. In *AI Safety’21*, 2021.

774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809

810 A LLM USAGE

811
812 In this work, Large Language Models (LLMs) were used solely as auxiliary tools for grammar
813 correction and language polishing during the preparation of the manuscript. They did not contribute
814 to research ideation, experimental design, implementation, analysis, or any scientific content. All
815 technical ideas, theoretical results, and experimental findings are entirely the work of the authors.
816

817 B HYPERPARAMETER SELECTION AND IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS

818 We provide details on hyperparameter selection and computational setup. All experiments are
819 conducted using a total of four NVIDIA H100 GPUs. The complete codebase is included in the
820 supplementary materials, a public repository will be released after the review process.
821
822

823 B.1 EXPERIMENT SETUP

824 For the MNIST dataset, we employ a four-layer CNN, consisting of two convolutional layers followed
825 by two fully connected layers, as described in Robey et al. (2022). For the CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100,
826 CINIC-10 and SVHN datasets, we independently train VGG-19, ResNet-18, and WideResNet-28-
827 10 on each dataset, and additionally include Vision Transformer (ViT) and Data-efficient Image
828 Transformer (DeiT) for CIFAR-10. For the TinyImageNet dataset, we train ResNet-18 and ResNet-34
829 using the same training configuration as for CIFAR-10. For the ImageNet-50 dataset, we train a
830 ResNet-18 model separately. All models are trained using stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with
831 a momentum of 0.9 and a weight decay coefficient of 3.5×10^{-3} . Training is performed for 100
832 epochs (200 for ImageNet-50) with an initial learning rate of 0.01, which is decayed by a factor of 10
833 at epochs 75 and 90, following the setup in Wang et al. (2019); Robey et al. (2022).
834
835

836 B.2 TRAINING ALGORITHMS HYPERPARAMETER SETTING

- 837 • **PGD.** We set the perturbation radius to $\gamma = 8/255$ for all dataset except MNIST. During training,
838 we performed 10 steps of projected gradient descent attack, using a step size of $\alpha = 2/255$ for
839 CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, CINIC-10, TinyImageNet and ImageNet-50, and a step size of $\alpha =$
840 $1.25/255$ for SVHN. For the MNIST dataset, the perturbation radius is set to $\gamma = 0.3$ with an
841 attack step size of $\alpha = 0.1$, as MNIST is a relatively easier task that requires a larger budget,
842 particularly for random perturbations.
843
- 844 • **TRADES.** We used the same step size and number of steps as described above for PGD. Addition-
845 ally, we applied a weight of $\lambda = 6.0$ for all datasets, following the approach in Zhang et al. (2019);
846 Robey et al. (2022).
- 847 • **MART.** We used the same step size and number of steps as described above for PGD. Additionally,
848 we applied a weight of $\lambda = 5.0$ for all datasets, following the approach in Wang et al. (2019).
- 849 • **ALP.** Follow the original work Kannan et al. (2018), we set $\lambda = 1$ for all datasets, except $\lambda = 0.01$
850 for SVHN, MNIST, ImageNet-50 and TinyImageNet.
- 851 • **CLP.** Following the same setting as ALP, we also set $\lambda = 1$ for all datasets, except $\lambda = 0.3$ for
852 SVHN, MNIST, ImageNet-50 and TinyImageNet.
- 853 • **CVaR.** We set the number of perturbed samples drawn from the uniform distribution to 20,
854 following the original setup in Robey et al. (2022).
- 855 • **Corruption.** We perform standard corruption training by sampling a perturbation from a uniform
856 distribution for each training point. Additionally, we conduct corruption training using two other
857 perturbation distributions: Gaussian and Laplace for comparison, with all perturbations constrained
858 within the specified norm-ball radius.
- 859 • **AT-PR.** The number of PGD-based AE candidates is set to 5 while other parameters follow the
860 original setup in Zhang et al. (2025).
- 861 • **Chen & Lee (2024).** Following the standard efficient parameter configuration, we integrate it into
862 TRADES with $m = 1-8$ and $k = 10$ (10-step attack).
863

B.3 EVALUATION SETTING

All models are evaluated using three categories of metrics: PR, AR evaluation, and GE.

- **PR Evaluation:** We evaluate PR using two metrics: $PR_{\mathcal{D}}(\gamma)$, computed at four radii (8/255, 0.08, 0.1, and 0.12) to assess robustness under increasing perturbation levels (for MNIST, the radii are: 0.3, 0.35, 0.4, 0.45), and $ProbAcc(\rho)$, with three tolerance levels ρ (0.01, 0.05, 0.1). PR evaluations are performed by sampling 100 points from the perturbation region for each test example.
- **AR Evaluation:** We evaluate AR using three main types of white-box attacks: PGD (with two different iteration steps PGD^{10} and PGD^{20}), the C&W attack, and Auto-Attack.
- **Generalization Evaluation:** We report generalization performance by generalization error under both AR (GE_{AR}) and PR settings ($GE_{PR_{\mathcal{D}}(\gamma)}$).

B.4 MODEL AND DATASET SELECTION

Table 6: Summary of model architectures and training paradigms used in PRBench.

Category	Characteristics	Model	Size	Training Paradigm	
				Normal	Pre-trained
Plain CNN	Sequential conv layers	4-layer CNN	1.1M	✓	
		VGG-19	137M	✓	
Residual CNN	Residual connections	ResNet-18	11.7M	✓	
		ResNet-34	21.8M	✓	
		Wide-ResNet-28-10	36.5M	✓	
Transformer	Self-attention	ViT-Small	22M		✓
		ViT-Base	86M		✓
		ViT-Large	307M		✓
		DeiT-Tiny	5M		✓
		DeiT-Small	22M		✓

Table 7: Summary of datasets used in PRBench.

Dataset	Training Size	Test Size	Resolution	Number of Classes
MNIST	60,000	10,000	28×28	10
SVHN	73,257	26,032	32×32	10
CIFAR-10	50,000	10,000	32×32	10
CIFAR-100	50,000	10,000	32×32	100
CINIC-10	90,000	90,000	32×32	10
TinyImageNet	100,000	10,000	64×64	200
ImageNet-50	64,000	2,500	224×224	50

In PRBench, we consider three major model architectures: (1) **plain CNNs**, such as VGG, representing early feedforward convolutional networks; (2) **residual CNNs**, exemplified by ResNet, which introduce skip connections to enable deeper architectures; and (3) **transformer-based models**, including Vision Transformer (ViT) Dosovitskiy et al. (2021) and Data-efficient Image Transformer (DeiT) Touvron et al. (2021), which leverage self-attention mechanisms for image representation learning. In our experiments, we conduct different training methods (See Table. 2) across a diverse set of models: VGG-19, SimpleCNN (4-layer CNN), ResNet-18, ResNet-34, Wide-ResNet-28-10, ViT, and DeiT, covering various scales such as ViT-Small, ViT-Base, ViT-Large, DeiT-Tiny, and DeiT-Small. See Table 6 for details.

Table 7 presents the seven widely used benchmark datasets used by PRBench, each representing a different level of complexity and image characteristics.

- **MNIST Deng (2012)** is a classic dataset of handwritten digits, consisting of 60,000 training images and 10,000 test images. Each image is a 28x28 pixel grayscale image, and the dataset is categorized into 10 classes (0-9).

- 918 • **SVHN Netzer et al. (2011)** (Street View House Numbers) is a real-world dataset derived from
919 Google Street View house numbers. It contains 73,257 training and 26,032 test images, each sized
920 32x32 and labeled into 10 digit classes. Compared to MNIST, SVHN is more challenging due to
921 background clutter and variation, making it suitable for evaluating robustness under real-world
922 conditions.
- 923 • **CIFAR-10 Krizhevsky et al. (2009)** is a widely used image classification dataset with 60,000
924 32x32 color images across 10 classes. The dataset is split into 50,000 training images and 10,000
925 test images. Compared to MNIST and SVHN, CIFAR-10 presents greater variability in content and
926 background, making it a standard benchmark for evaluating generalization across diverse object
927 classes.
- 928 • **CIFAR-100 Krizhevsky et al. (2009)** extends CIFAR-10 by increasing the number of classes
929 to 100, with each class containing 600 images. The dataset is also composed of 60,000 images
930 (50,000 for training and 10,000 for testing) with 32x32 size. Its finer-grained classification task
931 poses a greater challenge, requiring models to generalize across a broader and more diverse set of
932 object categories.
- 933 • **CINIC-10 Darlow et al. (2018)** is derived from CIFAR-10 and downsampled ImageNet, with all
934 images resized to 32x32 resolution. It contains 270,000 images evenly split into training, validation,
935 and test sets (90,000 each). Like CIFAR-10, it has 10 classes, but the larger scale and more diverse
936 image sources make it a more challenging and realistic benchmark.
- 937 • **TinyImageNet Le & Yang (2015)** is a subset of the ImageNet dataset, containing 100,000
938 training, 10,000 validation, and 10,000 test images, all resized to 64x64 pixels and spanning 200
939 object classes. With higher resolution and a larger number of categories, TinyImageNet poses a
940 more complex classification challenge, making it well-suited for evaluating model scalability and
941 robustness in realistic settings.
- 942 • **ImageNet-50 Deng et al. (2009)** is a 50-class subset of ImageNet for efficiency. It consists of
943 approximately 65,000 training images and 2,500 validation images at 224x224 resolution. Despite
944 being smaller than full ImageNet, ImageNet-50 retains considerable diversity and complexity,
945 serving as a scalable benchmark for robustness evaluation.

946 B.5 RELATED BENCHMARKS

947
948 Several robustness platforms have been developed to support AR evaluation by implementing popular
949 attack methods, such as FoolBox Rauber et al. (2017), AdverTorch Ding et al. (2019), Cleverhan
950 Papernot et al. (2016a), AdvBox Goodman et al. (2020), ART Nicolae et al. (2018), SecML Melis et al.
951 (2019), DeepRobust Li et al. (2020), etc. In addition, some AR benchmarks have also been established
952 Ling et al. (2019); Guo et al. (2023); Croce et al. (2021); Tang et al. (2021); Dong et al. (2020); Liu
953 et al. (2025). Despite these efforts, existing work remains confined to AR evaluation, overlooking
954 the more practical perspective of PR. Consequently, they fail to reveal the inherent relationship
955 between AR and PR, thereby hindering the establishment of a holistic and unified understanding
956 of robustness progress. Compared to the aforementioned benchmarks, PRBench provides a more
957 comprehensive framework in several key aspects: (1) it is the first benchmark to emphasize the PR,
958 providing a formalized definition of PR along with a summary of commonly used evaluation metrics
959 and associated training methods; (2) it includes an extensive evaluation of widely used models and
960 datasets, covering representative training methods designed for both AR and PR, enabling direct
961 comparisons under PR metrics and revealing the performance of these methods in both adversarial and
962 probabilistic scenarios; and (3) it presents in-depth analyses of the generalization error for PR from
963 empirical and theoretical perspectives, which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been explored
964 in prior benchmarks. These insights help improve DL model robustness in practical applications by
965 offering a more complete view from both adversarial and probabilistic perspectives.

966 C RELATED WORK ON GENERALIZATION AND ROBUST OVERFITTING

967
968 Several lines of research have studied robust overfitting and generalization error in DL models. We
969 compare our work with four relevant studies that examine generalization from different perspectives
970 and theoretical foundations.

- 971 • **Scope and goal:**

- 972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
1. Jiang et al. (2020) investigate generalization in standard deep learning models, focusing on the empirical correlation between complexity measures (e.g., VC-dimension, norm-based, PAC-Bayes) and generalization. Their goal is to uncover potential causal relationships between these measures and generalization, and to examine how reliably these measures can predict generalization behavior.
 2. Kim et al. (2023) conduct a large-scale empirical study of robust generalization under AT, analyzing how margin-based, smoothness-based, flatness-based, and gradient-based measures correlate with the GE.
 3. Yin et al. (2019) study adversarial robust generalization through Rademacher complexity, providing theoretical insights into why robust generalization is more challenging.
 4. Dziugaite et al. (2020) examine how evaluation methodologies, such as those used by Jiang et al. (2020), can obscure the successes and failures of different generalization measures, proposing a distributional robustness framework for more comprehensive assessment.
 5. In contrast, our study focuses on PR, aiming to evaluate improvements in PR achieved by various robustness training methods and to provide theoretical analysis of the GE across different training objectives.

988 • **Theoretical foundation:**

- 989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
1. Jiang et al. (2020) base their analysis on a broad set of theoretically motivated complexity measures from generalization theory (e.g., VC-dimension, norm-based, PAC-Bayes).
 2. Kim et al. (2023) extend this framework to AT by examining margin-based, smoothness-based, and flatness-based measures to study their relationship with the robust generalization gap.
 3. Yin et al. (2019) employ Rademacher complexity to theoretically analyze adversarial robust generalization.
 4. Dziugaite et al. (2020) complement Jiang et al. (2020) methodology by using a distributional robustness framework to evaluate generalization across diverse experimental settings.
 5. In our work, we leverage the concept of η -approximate β -smoothness Xiao et al. (2022b) to analyze how optimization objectives of different training methods affect GE, highlighting connections between optimization and generalization under various robustness regimes.

1000 • **Model and dataset coverage:**

- 1001
1002
1003
1004
1005
1006
1007
1008
1009
1010
1011
1012
1013
1014
1015
1016
1017
1018
1019
1020
1021
1022
1023
1024
1025
1. Jiang et al. (2020) evaluate convolutional networks trained on CIFAR-10 and SVHN.
 2. Kim et al. (2023) examine ResNet-18, WRN28-10 and WRN34-10 on CIFAR-10.
 3. Yin et al. (2019) analyze linear classifiers and a four-layer ReLU network on MNIST.
 4. Dziugaite et al. (2020) also examine convolutional networks on CIFAR-10 and SVHN.
 5. In contrast, our work covers three families of model architectures: (1) plain CNNs, (2) residual networks, and (3) transformer-based models. We train a diverse set of models, including VGG-19, SimpleCNN, ResNet-18/34, WRN-28-10, ViT (Small/Base/Large), and DeiT (Tiny/Small), across seven datasets: MNIST, SVHN, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, CINIC-10, TinyImageNet, and ImageNet-50.

D SUPPLEMENTARY EXPERIMENTS




Figure 3: $PR_D^{\text{Uniform}}(\gamma)$ for different models (ResNet-18, ResNet-34, WRN-28-10, VGG-19 and SimpleCNN) trained with various training methods both AT and PR-targeted on different datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, CINIC-10, SVHN, MNIST, TinyImageNet, ImageNet-50), evaluated under varying perturbation radii γ .




Figure 4: $ProbAcc(\rho, \gamma = 0.03)$ for different models (ResNet-18, ResNet-34, WRN-28-10, VGG-19) trained with various training methods both AT and PR-targeted on different datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, CINIC-10, SVHN, MNIST, TinyImageNet, ImageNet-50), evaluated under varying robustness tolerance level ρ .

E PR-TARGETED TRAINING METHOD

Some recent works have focused on designing training techniques specifically to improve PR. Wang et al. (2021) proposed a simple augmentation-based approach referred to as *corruption training*, where the model is trained on randomly perturbed examples. This process is equivalent to standard AT training, except that each input \mathbf{x}_i is perturbed by a sample drawn from a uniform distribution within an ℓ_∞ norm ball of radius γ , rather than using worst-case AEs. They show that corruption training




Figure 5: GE of $PR_D^{\text{Uniform}}(\gamma)$ for different models (ResNet-18, ResNet-34, WRN-28-10, VGG-19 and SimpleCNN) trained with training methods both AT and PR-targeted on different datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, CINIC-10, SVHN, MNIST, TinyImageNet, ImageNet-50), evaluated under varying perturbation radii γ .

improves PR and reduces generalization error under PR evaluation settings. The corresponding optimization objective is formalized as:

$$\min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{(\mathbf{x}, y) \sim \mathcal{D}} [\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{x} + \delta, y; \theta)]; \delta \sim Pr(\cdot | \mathbf{x}). \quad (18)$$

Later, Robey et al. (2022) introduced an optimization objective based on the *Conditional Value-at-Risk* (CVaR) to improve PR. Specifically, for a loss function \mathcal{L} and a continuous distribution Pr , CVaR




Figure 6: Composite robustness scores of different training methods, aggregated over all datasets and model architectures, with varying weight assignments for 7 metrics: clean accuracy (Acc.), AR_{PGD}^{20} , $PR_D^{Uniform}(\gamma = 0.08)$, $ProbAcc(\rho = 0.05)$, GE_{PGD}^{20} , $GE_{PR_D^{Uniform}}(\gamma = 0.08)$, and training time (s/ep.) (In practice, task-specific priorities may vary—e.g., safety-critical applications may emphasize AR, while consumer-facing systems may prioritize clean accuracy—thus motivating unequal weightings across metrics).

Table 8: Evaluation results of ViT models trained with different training methods on CIFAR-10, reporting clean accuracy (Acc.), AR (PGD / C&W / Auto-Attack), PR ($PR_D^{Uniform}(\gamma) / ProbAcc(\rho, \gamma = 0.03)$), GE_{AR} , $GE_{PR_D^{Uniform}}(\gamma)$, and per-epoch training time.

Model	Method	Acc.%	AR %				$PR_D^{Uniform}(\gamma)$ %				ProbAcc($\rho, \gamma = 0.03$) %			$GE_{PR_D^{Uniform}}(\gamma)$ %				Time s/ep.	
			PGD ¹⁰	PGD ²⁰	CW ²⁰	AA	0.03	0.08	0.1	0.12	0.1	0.05	0.01	PGD ²⁰	0.03	0.08	0.1		0.12
DeiT-Ti	ERM	95.92	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	98.23	87.39	80.72	73.17	95.9	94.82	92.24	0.0	5.3	4.95	3.43	2.96	13
	Corr_Uniform	95.58	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.0	99.26	92.39	86.07	78.07	98.04	97.5	95.8	0.0	5.28	6.34	5.2	4.13	13
	PGD	77.8	47.26	46.57	44.95	42.71	99.68	98.33	97.47	96.43	99.06	98.8	98.24	7.31	6.21	5.64	5.94	5.95	120
	TRADES	78.94	48.15	47.81	44.3	43.68	99.54	98.02	96.99	95.65	98.83	98.63	98.08	7.35	5.82	5.59	5.74	5.97	116
	MART	72.34	48.28	47.85	43.4	41.91	99.63	98.16	97.34	96.31	98.93	98.67	98.22	6.67	5.8	5.88	5.77	5.54	114
	CLP	72.03	46.33	46.06	43.36	42.52	99.69	98.57	97.81	96.81	99.11	98.81	98.4	4.51	5.33	5.43	5.4	5.36	136
	KL-PGD	86.99	45.4	44.59	43.44	41.78	99.74	98.5	97.58	96.38	99.33	99.08	98.41	18.08	9.57	9.31	9.13	8.9	136
DeiT-S	ERM	97.28	0.23	0.04	0.06	0.0	98.91	92.9	88.76	83.65	97.5	96.7	94.75	0.0	2.65	3.77	3.43	3.02	14
	Corr_Uniform	96.69	0.51	0.06	0.13	0.0	99.42	95.8	92.6	88.06	98.41	97.93	96.69	0.0	2.92	4.39	4.55	4.16	14
	PGD	86.16	45.24	43.74	44.57	41.90	99.73	98.56	97.75	96.63	99.21	98.94	98.33	41.25	12.8	13.32	13.4	13.8	178
	TRADES	81.66	50.59	50.15	47.45	46.49	99.64	98.12	96.94	95.55	99.12	98.9	98.42	18.14	10.99	11.29	11.42	11.56	162
	MART	79.53	51.29	50.55	47.01	45.32	99.68	98.57	97.76	96.74	99.16	98.92	98.4	13.8	6.18	6.38	6.87	7.38	152
	CLP	80.63	51.24	50.65	48.79	47.25	99.72	98.66	97.92	96.91	99.48	99.32	99.01	13.98	7.09	7.68	7.85	7.9	208
	KL-PGD	88.23	46.23	44.88	44.55	42.73	99.74	98.6	97.76	96.54	99.25	99.01	98.56	30.0	10.37	10.8	10.72	10.87	188
ViT-S	ERM	95.1	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.0	98.83	93.08	89.73	85.92	97.07	96.08	93.68	0.0	4.72	6.36	5.84	4.95	24
	Corr_Uniform	94.76	0.14	0.02	0.04	0.0	99.2	94.94	92.02	88.4	97.72	97.04	95.35	0.0	4.54	6.29	6.51	6.21	24
	PGD	82.62	41.59	40.55	40.74	38.49	99.7	98.72	98.1	97.18	99.07	98.86	98.16	39.58	14.68	14.61	14.77	15.15	304
	TRADES	76.97	46.35	46.07	42.83	42.23	99.65	98.45	97.73	96.81	98.96	98.7	98.24	18.71	13.57	13.48	13.48	13.76	280
	MART	72.38	47.51	46.97	42.89	41.20	99.67	98.6	97.96	97.23	99.02	98.77	98.2	9.56	8.25	8.38	8.38	8.19	256
	CLP	74.54	47.0	46.75	42.83	43.63	99.62	98.62	98.08	97.35	98.85	98.64	98.13	9.75	7.97	8.38	8.46	8.45	360
	KL-PGD	85.22	41.78	40.42	40.54	38.77	99.68	98.69	98.02	97.19	99.03	98.77	98.31	36.3	13.17	13.92	14.25	14.57	324
ViT-B	ERM	98.3	0.6	0.19	0.12	0.0	98.92	92.38	87.54	81.72	97.51	96.72	94.57	0.0	1.36	0.67	0.87	1.13	40
	Corr_Uniform	98.04	0.62	0.15	0.17	0.0	99.51	95.88	92.47	87.96	98.61	98.03	96.72	0.0	1.68	2.13	2.15	2.1	40
	PGD	87.38	46.28	44.7	45.42	42.62	99.7	98.55	97.81	96.8	99.08	98.87	98.41	35.82	10.23	9.99	10.02	10.56	330
	TRADES	83.99	52.03	51.04	48.29	46.95	99.62	97.92	96.84	95.46	99.06	98.86	98.5	10.87	4.77	4.4	4.62	5.13	295
	MART	76.12	50.73	50.28	45.74	43.99	99.7	98.3	97.49	96.47	99.32	98.9	98.61	5.74	3.77	4.15	4.26	4.04	278
	CLP	77.45	49.07	48.69	46.09	44.97	99.75	98.62	97.9	96.89	99.29	99.1	98.55	6.17	4.57	4.67	4.71	4.78	390
	KL-PGD	89.64	47.92	46.04	44.92	41.37	99.78	98.78	98.03	97.1	99.38	99.12	98.73	19.96	7.54	7.82	7.7	7.71	324
ViT-L	ERM	98.46	2.12	0.67	0.42	0.0	99.3	95.23	92.13	88.07	98.43	97.8	96.34	0.02	1.65	2.31	1.92	1.26	82
	Corr_Uniform	98.04	3.49	1.36	1.17	0.0	99.67	97.11	94.58	90.92	99.11	98.81	97.93	0.0	1.54	2.57	2.77	2.67	82
	PGD	87.85	46.27	45.24	45.82	43.05	99.75	98.86	98.27	97.46	99.32	99.11	98.46	51.55	10.88	11.32	11.51	12.1	950
	TRADES	85.35	51.12	49.71	49.35	46.89	99.77	98.78	98.09	97.18	99.34	99.13	98.65	34.97	13.82	13.96	13.92	13.95	845
	MART	83.63	51.45	50.09	47.84	45.6	99.72	98.89	98.23	97.33	99.28	99.08	98.74	24.35	8.33	8.23	8.37	8.47	800
	CLP	83.55	51.09	49.87	49.85	47.54	99.78	98.97	98.43	97.69	99.38	99.1	98.55	29.15	11.5	11.29	11.37	11.44	1124
	KL-PGD	86.24	44.21	43.04	42.73	41.09	99.71	98.65	97.94	96.97	99.13	98.96	98.42	26.85	12.42	12.16	11.94	11.9	918

can be interpreted as the expected value of \mathcal{L} over the tail of the distribution. It admits the following convex, variational characterization, which allows it to be optimized via stochastic gradient-based methods. Based on this, they formalized the training objective as:

$$\min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \sim \mathcal{D}} [\text{CVaR}_{1-\rho}(\mathcal{L}(x + \delta, y; \theta); \delta \sim Pr(\cdot | x))];$$

$$\text{CVaR}_{\rho}(\mathcal{L}; Pr) = \inf_{\alpha \in \mathbb{R}} \left[\alpha + \frac{\mathbb{E}_{\delta \sim Pr(\cdot | x)} [(\mathcal{L}(x + \delta) - \alpha)_+]}{1 - \rho} \right], \quad (19)$$

Table 9: Comparison of standard training (ERM), corruption training with Uniform, Gaussian, and Laplace perturbations (PR-targeted method), and PGD training (standard AT) models. Evaluation is conducted in terms of clean accuracy (Acc.), $PR_{\mathcal{D}}(\gamma)$ and $GE_{PR_{\mathcal{D}}(\gamma=0.03)}$ under various perturbation distributions (Uniform, Gaussian, Laplace).

Data	Model	Method	Acc. %	$PR_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{Uniform}}(\gamma)$ %			$PR_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{Gaussian}}(\gamma)$ %			$PR_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{Laplace}}(\gamma)$ %			$GE_{PR_{\mathcal{D}}(\gamma=0.03)}$ %					
				0.03	0.08	0.1	0.12	0.03	0.08	0.1	0.12	0.03	0.08	0.1	0.12	Uni.	Gau.	Lap.
CIFAR-10	VGG-19	ERM	93.12	97.15	77.65	65.33	52.22	95.5	65.4	49.26	35.62	95.38	64.66	48.32	34.81	6.34	6.48	6.52
		Corr_Uniform	92.94	98.87	89.38	79.27	67.1	98.33	79.38	63.87	48.29	98.3	78.67	62.93	47.34	5.51	5.82	5.87
		Corr_Gaussian	92.18	99.26	95.34	90.44	82.66	99.05	90.56	80.4	66.89	99.02	90.19	79.66	65.84	6.85	6.72	6.69
		Corr_Laplace PGD	91.96 80.43	99.35 97.71	95.36 96.47	90.42 82.5	99.09 94.79	90.52 96.55	80.2 92.05	66.76 92.05	99.08 99.33	90.13 96.48	79.52 94.35	65.69 91.83	65.69 91.83	6.59 13.54	6.47 13.62	6.47 13.58
	ResNet-18	ERM	94.85	97.64	76.19	61.65	47.07	96.16	61.88	44.2	30.6	96.04	60.98	43.24	29.79	6.24	6.36	6.3
		Corr_Uniform	94.17	99.12	90.92	82.32	70.48	98.69	82.46	67.4	49.32	98.67	81.85	66.29	48.09	4.83	5.03	5.05
		Corr_Gaussian	93.32	99.41	96.22	92.14	85.32	99.23	92.23	83.42	70.46	99.22	91.91	82.72	69.42	5.69	5.67	5.6
		Corr_Laplace PGD	93.61 83.83	99.45 97.89	96.32 97.97	91.97 84.4	94.4 98.5	99.3 99.48	92.09 96.68	66.42 94.5	99.29 99.47	91.78 96.59	81.3 94.34	65.16 91.29	65.16 91.29	5.72 11.4	5.67 11.24	5.63 11.21
	WRN	ERM	95.55	96.7	78.99	67.55	55.55	95.15	67.93	53.33	41.02	95.05	67.12	52.51	40.35	5.27	5.91	5.86
		Corr_Uniform	95.11	99.2	91.63	83.5	72.89	98.81	83.79	70.62	56.52	98.79	83.25	69.77	55.54	3.96	4.23	4.12
		Corr_Gaussian	94.83	99.45	96.78	93.48	87.71	99.25	93.64	86.27	75.6	99.25	93.36	85.7	74.76	5.07	5.08	5.01
		Corr_Laplace PGD	94.69 86.66	99.45 99.6	96.76 98.14	93.31 96.94	87.38 95.34	99.29 99.48	93.45 97.03	85.9 95.06	75.1 92.36	99.27 99.47	93.2 96.94	85.3 94.91	74.28 92.11	4.14 11.75	4.31 11.74	4.22 11.69
	Dent-T	ERM	95.92	98.23	87.39	80.72	73.17	97.27	81.01	71.57	61.4	97.17	80.61	71.05	60.71	5.3	5.84	5.82
		Corr_Uniform	95.58	99.26	92.39	86.07	78.07	98.92	86.22	76.18	64.73	98.9	85.77	75.51	63.92	5.28	5.36	5.33
		Corr_Gaussian	93.86	99.42	96.57	93.23	87.71	99.22	93.35	86.34	76.78	99.2	93.11	85.83	76.06	6.6	6.54	6.48
		Corr_Laplace PGD	93.90 77.8	99.45 99.68	96.58 98.33	93.31 97.47	88.03 96.43	99.29 99.56	93.4 97.6	86.77 96.38	76.9 94.71	99.29 99.55	93.17 97.55	86.3 96.29	76.13 94.61	5.7 6.21	5.61 6.27	5.54 6.27
	Dent-S	ERM	97.28	98.91	92.9	88.76	83.63	98.39	88.94	82.5	74.64	98.34	88.66	82.09	74.07	2.65	2.94	3.0
		Corr_Uniform	96.69	99.42	95.8	92.6	88.06	99.19	92.69	86.94	79.35	99.17	92.47	86.54	78.73	2.92	2.91	2.94
		Corr_Gaussian	96.48	99.6	97.61	95.47	92.16	99.45	95.57	91.28	85.17	99.44	95.41	90.94	84.67	3.11	3.06	3.05
		Corr_Laplace PGD	96.51 86.16	99.53 99.73	97.53 98.56	95.52 97.75	92.17 96.3	99.39 99.63	95.62 97.82	91.31 96.42	85.13 94.49	99.38 99.62	95.44 97.77	90.98 96.33	84.62 94.34	3.35 12.8	3.38 12.81	3.35 12.75
	ViT-S	ERM	95.1	98.83	93.09	89.74	85.9	98.3	89.93	85.3	80.08	98.27	89.72	85.01	79.66	4.72	5.05	5.02
		Corr_Uniform	94.76	99.22	94.98	91.99	88.44	98.9	92.18	87.78	82.6	98.87	91.96	87.53	82.27	4.54	4.72	4.68
		Corr_Gaussian	94.58	99.44	96.93	94.75	91.89	99.26	94.89	91.32	86.93	99.26	94.74	91.1	86.61	4.8	4.75	4.76
		Corr_Laplace PGD	94.43 82.62	99.44 99.69	96.95 98.74	94.72 98.08	91.83 97.19	99.25 99.59	94.84 98.14	91.22 97.05	86.97 95.68	99.23 99.58	94.68 98.09	91.04 96.97	86.62 95.59	5.07 14.68	4.93 14.71	4.88 14.7
ViT-B	ERM	98.3	98.92	92.38	87.54	81.72	98.4	87.68	80.36	72.34	98.37	87.38	79.93	71.68	1.36	1.34	1.33	
	Corr_Uniform	98.04	99.51	95.88	92.47	87.96	99.28	92.62	87.0	80.16	99.26	92.39	86.61	79.67	1.68	1.78	1.75	
	Corr_Gaussian	97.71	99.57	97.73	95.41	91.43	99.44	95.56	90.48	83.16	99.44	95.4	90.07	87.52	1.89	1.88	1.87	
	Corr_Laplace PGD	97.55 87.38	99.65 99.7	97.85 98.55	95.7 97.81	92.15 96.3	99.52 99.57	95.84 97.89	91.42 96.64	85.2 94.99	99.52 99.56	95.66 97.85	91.09 96.33	84.66 94.34	1.76 10.23	1.75 10.7	1.71 10.17	
CIFAR-100	VGG-19	ERM	73.86	88.61	50.86	38.37	29.06	83.48	38.47	27.5	20.37	83.16	37.79	27.02	20.0	25.33	22.79	22.62
		Corr_Uniform	71.88	96.85	72.26	58.22	45.13	95.05	58.29	42.45	30.25	94.93	57.51	41.59	29.5	27.18	27.23	27.12
		Corr_Gaussian	69.85	98.06	86.84	75.43	61.44	97.42	75.55	58.33	42.13	97.39	74.8	57.3	41.0	29.0	29.01	28.97
		Corr_Laplace PGD	70.08 48.76	98.08 99.34	86.5 96.43	74.21 94.4	60.48 91.63	97.38 99.07	74.44 94.54	41.98 91.04	41.98 86.48	97.33 99.04	73.71 94.38	56.32 90.81	41.06 86.08	28.45 15.64	28.58 15.58	28.62 15.56
	Res-18	ERM	76.03	85.01	45.08	31.7	22.19	79.56	31.79	20.53	13.82	79.11	31.16	20.05	13.44	23.17	20.78	20.56
		Corr_Uniform	74.93	97.09	71.69	55.41	40.53	95.55	55.57	37.73	25.17	95.45	54.65	36.86	24.47	24.84	25.0	24.95
		Corr_Gaussian	73.36	98.23	87.51	75.4	60.52	97.62	75.55	57.21	40.43	97.59	74.76	56.05	39.35	26.63	26.51	26.45
		Corr_Laplace PGD	73.18 58.09	98.15 99.16	87.12 95.82	75.06 93.08	60.09 89.10	97.59 98.9	75.37 93.35	56.86 88.31	39.63 81.39	97.56 98.89	74.51 93.12	55.67 87.9	38.6 90.72	25.54 31.86	25.66 31.75	25.59 31.82
	WRN	ERM	79.43	87.68	53.79	40.87	30.16	83.1	41.39	28.55	19.83	82.82	40.68	27.89	19.33	22.13	21.97	22.04
		Corr_Uniform	79.01	97.31	79.5	66.72	53.57	96.1	66.93	50.93	37.01	96.01	66.22	50.09	36.18	20.4	20.63	20.58
		Corr_Gaussian	77.24	98.39	90.28	82.16	70.67	97.83	82.46	67.97	52.19	97.79	81.83	67.04	51.09	22.97	22.89	22.88
		Corr_Laplace PGD	76.99 61.11	98.53 99.2	90.48 96.01	82.49 93.45	71.42 89.59	98.04 98.93	82.83 93.62	68.96 88.85	54.02 81.86	98.02 98.92	82.23 93.37	68.06 88.47	53.05 81.27	22.7 35.03	22.61 35.0	22.63 34.98
VGG-19	ERM	95.78	99.43	97.41	96.04	94.1	99.26	96.04	93.7	90.66	99.24	95.96	93.5	90.4	4.68	4.7	4.71	
	Corr_Uniform	95.79	99.63	98.45	97.6	96.45	99.52	97.66	96.16	94.1	99.51	97.57	96.05	93.94	4.85	4.94	4.94	
	Corr_Gaussian	95.71	99.71	98.97	98.42	97.7	99.64	98.47	97.55	96.17	99.63	98.44	97.47	96.05	5.07	5.12	5.13	
	Corr_Laplace PGD	95.84 89.76	99.7 99.64	98.89 99.04	98.32 98.63	97.53 98.63	99.6	98.36 98.68	97.33 98.0	95.89 96.81	99.59 99.54	98.32 98.65	97.27 97.94	95.76 96.67	4.89 9.11	4.95 9.09	4.92 9.05	
Res-18	ERM	96.26	99.18	96.92	95.35	93.31	98.97	95.42	92.88	89.6	98.97	95.34	92.7	89.34	4.68	4.74	4.7	
	Corr_Uniform	96.22	99.54	98.44	97.66	96.52	99.42	97.69	96.25	94.26	99.41	97.62	96.16	94.03	4.98	5.03	5.04	
	Corr_Gaussian	96.23	99.74	98.98	98.44	97.76	99.65	98.5	97.59	96.33	99.65	98.45	97.52	96.15	4.79	4.86	4.89	
	Corr_Laplace PGD	96.24 90.22	99.67 99.07	98.92 98.52	98.39 97.61	97.74 97.6	99.59 99.61	98.45 98.55	97.6 97.45	96.33 95.51	99.59 99.6	98.4 98.5	97.52 97.34	96.22 95.38	4.71 10.61	4.77 10.48	4.76 10.49	
WRN	ERM	96.16	99.21	96.45	94.61	92.3	98.94	94.68	91.81	88.27	98.94	94.54	91.59	87.99	4.18	4.16	4.12	
	Corr_Uniform	96.56	99.57	98.38	97.52	96.32	99.45	97.55	96.04	93.94	99.44	97.49	95.97	93.8	4.33	4.38	4.36	
	Corr_Gaussian	96.69	99.72	98.94	98.44	97.74	99.62	98.46	97.6									

Table 11: Performance comparison of AT and RT training methods across MNIST with SimpleCNN, CINIC-10 with ResNet-18 and WRN-28-10, and ImageNet-50 with ResNet-18.

Data	Model	Method	Acc. %	AR %				PR _B ^{Uniform} (γ) %				ProbAcc($\rho, \gamma = 0.03$) %			GE _{AR} %		GE _{PR_B^{Uniform}(γ)} %				Time s/ep.
				PGD ¹⁰	PGD ²⁰	CW ²⁰	AA	0.03	0.08	0.1	0.12	0.1	0.05	0.01	PGD ²⁰	0.03	0.08	0.1	0.12		
CINIC-10	ResNet-18	ERM	86.92	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	66.83	9.6	3.65	1.31	53.78	49.97	41.6	0.0	2.76	0.1	0.0	0.0	4	
		CVaR	78.73	24.97	20.11	0.01	0.0	96.05	46.53	26.3	14.04	92.29	91.02	87.64	1.9	5.31	2.69	1.18	0.15	60	
		Corr_Uniform	85.45	0.01	0.0	0.0	0.0	97.9	58.77	36.95	21.07	95.64	94.76	92.26	0.0	6.79	5.85	3.24	1.41	4	
		Corr_Gaussian	84.0	0.16	0.02	0.02	0.0	99.11	85.76	70.12	52.37	97.64	97.0	95.27	0.0	5.1	6.06	8.36	3.67	4	
		Corr_Laplace	84.0	0.21	0.04	0.04	0.0	99.08	84.09	64.85	44.41	97.61	96.91	95.33	0.0	4.35	9.94	8.02	3.38	4	
		PGD	68.3	39.83	39.02	37.56	35.06	99.47	96.51	93.62	89.07	98.91	98.68	98.14	16.04	10.14	11.67	12.87	14.21	30	
		TRADES	69.22	39.42	38.78	35.41	34.34	99.32	96.3	94.0	90.75	98.7	98.51	98.04	9.23	7.44	7.72	7.84	8.19	25	
		MART	66.91	42.67	41.97	37.31	35.18	99.37	96.65	94.58	91.06	98.79	98.55	98.17	10.62	5.82	7.1	8.15	8.83	22	
		ALP	67.99	40.52	39.73	38.05	35.74	99.41	96.7	94.4	90.18	98.81	98.57	98.09	13.22	8.05	9.4	9.83	11.13	36	
	CLP	74.61	34.7	33.36	32.69	30.65	99.49	96.57	93.64	88.9	98.78	98.61	98.07	11.81	10.28	11.08	10.78	11.76	36		
	KL-PGD	75.33	34.83	33.98	31.0	29.50	99.57	96.82	94.08	90.05	99.0	98.78	98.34	8.55	8.45	8.8	8.55	8.96	27		
	WRN-28-10	ERM	88.01	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	82.17	25.55	13.82	7.51	71.65	68.0	60.95	0.0	7.44	0.0	0.0	0.0	15	
		CVaR	74.27	25.53	19.57	1.56	0.07	98.81	74.84	54.73	35.22	97.53	97.09	95.79	1.61	2.2	6.13	2.62	0.54	312	
		Corr_Uniform	86.63	0.04	0.0	0.01	0.0	98.33	74.85	58.37	42.38	96.48	95.57	93.35	0.01	4.24	9.7	10.14	3.22	15	
		Corr_Gaussian	85.59	0.21	0.01	0.03	0.0	99.23	89.6	78.56	64.15	98.13	97.63	96.35	0.01	3.21	10.11	6.62	7.41	15	
		Corr_Laplace	85.52	0.15	0.01	0.04	0.0	99.1	88.8	77.72	63.33	97.8	97.23	95.94	0.0	3.01	10.76	9.87	6.92	15	
		PGD	72.26	37.77	36.53	36.58	33.82	99.52	97.3	95.26	92.08	98.71	98.37	97.65	29.3	7.7	9.14	10.65	12.77	165	
		TRADES	73.23	40.08	39.26	37.13	35.70	99.41	96.48	94.48	91.32	98.73	98.49	98.03	24.12	10.75	11.7	12.58	13.41	130	
MART		70.75	43.56	42.56	38.37	36.35	99.34	96.56	94.13	90.62	98.72	98.43	97.96	17.84	8.41	9.45	10.31	11.1	114		
ALP		71.97	38.12	36.9	36.75	34.07	99.52	97.39	95.39	92.25	98.85	98.6	98.05	28.46	8.52	9.74	10.94	12.82	194		
CLP	76.11	35.52	33.84	33.99	32.05	99.6	97.39	95.35	92.21	98.91	98.73	98.03	26.06	8.32	9.88	11.25	12.63	194			
KL-PGD	77.44	36.28	35.5	33.39	32.01	99.51	96.84	94.49	90.95	98.76	98.54	98.02	16.9	8.19	10.02	10.49	10.41	135			
ImageNet-50	ResNet-18	ERM	79.94	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	98.92	93.63	91.01	87.46	97.63	97.39	96.23	0.0	12.87	14.49	14.39	13.5	97	
		CVaR	77.07	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	98.88	93.68	90.87	87.0	97.92	96.98	95.09	0.0	14.37	14.53	14.68	15.05	300	
		Corr_Uniform	79.49	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	99.0	95.23	92.15	88.42	97.69	97.26	96.66	0.0	12.34	12.88	12.99	12.3	97	
		Corr_Gaussian	79.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	99.24	96.43	94.21	91.03	98.11	97.5	96.76	0.0	13.03	13.03	13.52	14.42	97	
		Corr_Laplace	80.03	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	98.93	95.84	93.44	90.33	98.01	97.53	96.56	0.0	12.66	13.39	14.4	14.19	97	
		PGD	63.32	36.0	35.32	33.39	31.76	99.89	97.15	95.36	92.8	99.78	99.7	99.4	5.43	20.38	20.39	21.36	21.5	184	
		TRADES	65.95	35.2	34.59	30.06	28.9	99.15	96.09	93.1	89.83	99.06	98.92	98.77	2.64	17.58	18.02	18.7	19.39	167	
		MART	60.48	38.44	37.85	32.58	30.12	99.25	95.51	92.47	89.11	98.99	98.91	98.52	3.38	16.87	17.14	17.86	19.81	155	
		ALP	61.51	35.21	34.69	33.23	31.03	99.67	97.18	95.35	92.79	99.31	99.24	98.7	3.16	19.75	20.73	20.81	20.81	214	
CLP	66.14	29.51	28.2	26.44	25.39	99.65	97.54	95.57	93.46	99.5	99.43	99.21	2.68	21.23	20.73	21.16	22.4	214			
KL-PGD	69.86	32.0	31.01	28.35	27.4	99.59	97.02	95.5	92.92	99.45	99.24	98.83	2.33	16.1	15.89	16.0	16.55	180			
MNIST	SimpleCNN	ERM	99.35	5.16	3.72	0.0	0.0	99.2	98.05	94.21	83.45	98.03	97.43	95.3	0.0	1.03	1.18	1.01	0.41	1	
		CVaR	99.38	3.41	1.75	0.01	0.0	99.8	99.66	99.25	97.75	99.37	99.04	98.45	0.22	0.68	0.78	0.95	1.06	1	
		Corr_Uniform	99.18	0.3	0.01	0.19	0.0	99.71	99.56	99.25	98.53	99.86	99.77	99.15	0.02	0.83	0.9	0.92	0.93	6	
		PGD	99.15	95.01	94.67	94.8	91.17	99.88	99.83	99.56	97.78	99.62	99.47	99.19	2.48	0.63	0.62	0.72	0.99	3	
		TRADES	98.51	94.22	93.73	93.93	90.88	99.83	99.74	99.25	96.38	99.48	99.3	98.82	1.08	0.03	0.03	0.08	0.2	3	
		MART	99.01	95.21	94.88	94.98	91.77	99.88	99.81	99.3	93.0	99.65	99.52	99.2	1.75	0.34	0.33	0.47	0.79	2	
		ALP	99.04	95.08	94.8	94.7	91.45	99.86	99.83	99.57	98.4	99.61	99.42	99.1	1.43	0.37	0.37	0.42	0.62	3	
		CLP	98.52	93.84	93.35	92.91	89.41	99.83	99.75	99.42	98.29	99.46	99.2	98.74	1.51	0.16	0.14	0.16	0.22	3	
		KL-PGD	98.94	94.24	93.97	94.07	91.33	99.88	99.8	99.37	95.78	99.66	99.47	99.1	1.21	0.3	0.32	0.42	0.54	3	

Table 12: Evaluation of an efficient AT method Chen & Lee (2024) using ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10 & CIFAR-100. The method employs a simple yet effective data filtering mechanism to enhance training efficiency and robustness. Integrated into TRADES with $m = 0-8$ and $k = 10$ (10-step attack), it reduces computational cost, lowers AR/PR generalization error, and improves PR performance while maintaining comparable clean accuracy and AR. This experiment also illustrates the extensibility of PRBench, which is designed to incorporate and compare future efficient AT methods.

Data	Type	Method	Acc. %	AR %			PR _B ^{Uniform} (γ) %				ProbAcc($\rho, \gamma = 0.03$) %			GE _{AR} %		GE _{PR_B^{Uniform}(γ)} %				Time s/ep.
				PGD ¹⁰	PGD ²⁰	CW ²⁰	0.03	0.08	0.1	0.12	0.1	0.05	0.01	PGD ²⁰	0.03	0.08	0.1	0.12		
CIFAR-10	Std.	ERM	94.85	0.01	0.0	0.0	97.64	76.19	61.65	47.07	95.04	93.48	89.82	0.0	6.24	3.98	2.94	2.54	3	
		Corr_Uniform	94.17	0.28	0.05	0.02	99.12	90.92	82.32	70.48	97.78	97.02	94.9	0.04	4.83	6.24	4.79	2.31	3	
	AT	TRADES (k=10)	83.34	53.6	52.71	50.63	99.57	97.61	96.28	94.56	99.05	98.81	98.11	16.5	9.62	9.28	9.24	9.52	25	
		TRADES+Chen&Lee (m=1)	83.6	52.82	52.01	50.5	99.59	97.69	96.48	94.97	99.09	98.76	98.08	10.37	4.57	4.87	4.95	5.19	16	
		TRADES+Chen&Lee (m=2)	83.71	53.0	52.07	50.35	99.5	97.54	96.32	94.6	98.72	98.47	97.83	10.53	6.14	6.21	6.34	6.14	16	
		TRADES+Chen&Lee (m=3)	83.66	53.19	52.51	50.65	99.59	97.76	96.47	94.76	98.87	98.71	98.06	10.08	5.78	5.76	5.94	6.1	17	
		TRADES+Chen&Lee (m=4)	83.49	52.59	51.8	50.61	99.53	97.62	96.28	94.49	98.85	98.44	97.75	10.81	5.92	6.39	6.45	6.58	18	
		TRADES+Chen&Lee (m=5)	83.56	52.77	52.0	50.43	99.58	97.8	96.58	94.94	98.9	98.68	98.03	10.62	5.02	5.64	5.37	5.84	18	
		TRADES+Chen&Lee (m=6)	83.26	52.82	52.01	50.21	99.6	97.98	96.84	95.22	99.04	98.84	98.25	10.69	5.81	5.83	5.47	5.25	19	
		TRADES+Chen&Lee (m=7)	83.54	52.91	52.12	50.42	99.6	97.79	96.6	94.97	98.99	98.7	98.18	10.55	5.69	5.96	6.13	6.4	19	
	TRADES+Chen&Lee (m=8)	83.22	53.12	52.3	50.62	99.65	98.01	96.77	95.05	99.05	98.79	98.22	10.36	5.93	6.21	6.25	6.55	19		
	Std.	ERM	76.03	0.0	0.0	0.0	85.02	45.12	31.7	22.22	76.65	73.57	66.44	0.0	23.17	6.54	3.86	1.77	3	
RT	Corr_Uniform	74.93	0.07	0.01	0.0	97.09	71.69	55.41	40.53	93.14	91.05	86.25	0.0	24.84	1					

with risk level $\rho \in (0, 1]$, denoted as $\text{EVaR}_\rho(\mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{\delta}))$, is defined as the infimum over $\alpha > 0$ of the Chernoff bound for $\mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{\delta})$ with respect to the random variable $\boldsymbol{\delta}$. They then proposed a risk-averse robust learning paradigm to optimize the upper bound, and formalized the training objective as:

$$\begin{aligned} & \min_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \mathbb{E}_{(\mathbf{x}, y) \sim \mathcal{D}} [\text{EVaR}_{1-\rho}(\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}, y; \boldsymbol{\theta}); \boldsymbol{\delta} \sim Pr(\cdot | \mathbf{x}))]; \\ \text{EVaR}_\rho(\mathcal{L}; Pr) &= \inf_{\alpha > 0} \left[\frac{1}{\alpha} \log \left(\frac{\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\delta} \sim Pr(\cdot | \mathbf{x})} [e^{\alpha \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta})}]}{\rho} \right) \right], \end{aligned} \quad (20)$$

thus the inner minimization over α is used to compute EVaR, while the outer minimization updates the model parameters.

The latest PR-targeted work Zhang et al. (2025), though aimed at PR, is not based on the perturbation risk function in Def. 3. Instead, it is closer to the traditional AT formulation in Eq. 4, introducing a new min-max objective designed to identify AEs that lie in the largest all-AE region k (i.e., $PR(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}, k) = 0$). They achieve this by designing a numerical algorithm that first uses PGD to generate a diverse set of AEs at different local optima, i.e., $\mathcal{S} = \{\mathbf{x}'_1, \mathbf{x}'_2, \dots, \mathbf{x}'_m\}$. For each \mathbf{x}'_i , gradient descent is then performed toward the nearest decision boundary, and the AE with the largest distance to its nearest boundary is selected, corresponding to the largest all-AE region. Formally, for a model $f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}$ trained on dataset \mathcal{D} , the objective of AT-PR is:

$$\min_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \mathbb{E}_{(\mathbf{x}, y) \sim \mathcal{D}} \left[\max_{\|\boldsymbol{\delta}\| \leq \gamma, PR(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}, k) = 0} k \right], \quad (21)$$

where k and $\boldsymbol{\delta}$ are variables in the inner maximization, and $PR(\cdot, \cdot)$ is defined in Eq. 5. The maximization seeks an optimal $\boldsymbol{\delta}^*$ producing an AE $\mathbf{x}' = \mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}^*$, and maximizes the radius k of a smaller norm-ball around \mathbf{x}' where all inputs are AEs (i.e., $PR(\cdot, \cdot)$ within the region is 0).

1458 F EVALUATION METRICS

1459 F.1 AR EVALUATION METRICS

1460 AR is a critical aspect of model robustness and has been extensively studied in previous benchmark
 1461 works. To measure AR, adversarial attacks (Eq. 3) are typically adopted to generate AEs \mathbf{x}' for each
 1462 input \mathbf{x} in the test dataset. In PRBench, we consider four white-box attacks: two variants of Projected
 1463 Gradient Descent attack with 10 and 20 iterations (PGD¹⁰ and PGD²⁰), the C&W attack Carlini &
 1464 Wagner (2017), and Auto-attack Croce & Hein (2020). Formally, AR is computed as the classification
 1465 accuracy of the target model on adversarially perturbed inputs across the test dataset:
 1466

$$1467 \quad AR = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{i=1}^M I_{\{f_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}_i + \delta_i) = y_i\}}(\mathbf{x}_i), \quad (22)$$

1468 where $\|\delta_i\| \leq \gamma$ denotes the perturbation generated by the attack, $\mathbf{x}'_i = \mathbf{x}_i + \delta_i$ is the corresponding
 1469 AE, y_i is the ground-truth label, and M is the total number of test samples in the dataset \mathcal{D} . The
 1470 indicator function $I_S(\mathbf{x})$ returns 1 if the model prediction matches the true label, and 0 otherwise.
 1471

1472 F.2 PR EVALUATION METRICS

1473 PR was first introduced by Webb et al. (2019), which proposed a formal framework to quantify PR
 1474 under random perturbations (Def. 2). Computing the exact PR requires taking an expectation over the
 1475 perturbation distribution, which is typically intractable. Therefore, a Monte Carlo approximation is
 1476 adopted by uniformly sampling a large number of perturbations within a norm ball of radius γ . The
 1477 target model then predicts the labels of these perturbed inputs to determine whether they are AEs
 1478 \mathbf{x}' . PR is thus defined as the proportion of non-adversarial samples among all sampled perturbations.
 1479 Formally, given a test dataset \mathcal{D} and a perturbation budget γ , PR is estimated as:
 1480

$$1481 \quad PR_{\mathcal{D}}(\gamma) = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{i=1}^M \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N I_{\{f_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}'_{i,j}) = y_i\}}(\mathbf{x}_{i,j}), \quad \mathbf{x}'_{i,j} \sim Pr(\cdot | \mathbf{x}_i), \|\mathbf{x}'_{i,j} - \mathbf{x}_i\| \leq \gamma, \quad (23)$$

1482 where $\mathbf{x}'_{i,j}$ denotes the j -th perturbed sample of \mathbf{x}_i , drawn from the conditional perturbation distri-
 1483 bution $Pr(\cdot | \mathbf{x}_i)$, for $j \in \{1, \dots, N\}$. Here, M is the number of test samples originally classified
 1484 correctly and N is the number of perturbations sampled for each input.
 1485

1486 Later, Robey et al. (2022) proposed *quantile accuracy ProbAcc*(ρ) to evaluate PR for individual
 1487 inputs using the same perturbation strategy (uniform sampling around each input). Unlike $PR_{\mathcal{D}}(\gamma)$,
 1488 which estimates the mean PR over all correctly classified clean test samples, this metric focuses on a
 1489 given robustness tolerance threshold ρ . Specifically, $ProbAcc(\rho)$ measures the proportion of inputs
 1490 whose $PR(\mathbf{x}, \gamma)$ exceeds the threshold $1 - \rho$, formally defined as follows:
 1491

$$1492 \quad ProbAcc(\rho) = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{i=1}^M I_{\{PR(\mathbf{x}_i, \gamma) \geq 1 - \rho\}}(\mathbf{x}_i), \quad (24)$$

1493 In PRBench, we assess the PR of different training methods using both $PR_{\mathcal{D}}(\gamma)$ and $ProbAcc(\rho)$. In
 1494 our implementation, $ProbAcc(\rho)$ is computed only on clean test samples—that is, M is the number
 1495 of inputs that are originally classified correctly by the model (i.e., $f_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}_i) = y_i$), reflecting the true
 1496 robustness of individual examples.
 1497

1498 F.3 GENERALIZATION ERROR

1499 To investigate the deeper relationship of AR and PR, and compare the effectiveness of different
 1500 training methods, we also evaluate the generalization error of each training method with respect
 1501 to AR and PR. Specifically, we compute AR and PR on both the training and test datasets. The
 1502 difference between these values reflects the generalisability of a model under each robustness metric.
 1503 Taking PR as an example, the generalization error (GE) of PR (e.g., $PR_{\mathcal{D}}(\gamma)$) is defined as:
 1504

$$1505 \quad GE_{PR_{\mathcal{D}}(\gamma)} = PR_{\mathcal{D}_{\text{train}}}(\gamma) - PR_{\mathcal{D}_{\text{test}}}(\gamma). \quad (25)$$

1512 G TECHNICAL APPENDICES AND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

1513 G.1 LIPSCHITZ AND SMOOTHNESS PROPERTIES OF THE SOFTMAX FUNCTION

1514
1515
1516 **Lemma 1** Given $\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{R}^m$, let the softmax function be represented as

$$1517 \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}) = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{e^{z_1}}{\sum e^{z_j}} \\ \frac{e^{z_2}}{\sum e^{z_j}} \\ \vdots \\ \frac{e^{z_m}}{\sum e^{z_j}} \end{pmatrix} \quad (26)$$

1518
1519
1520
1521
1522 Let $\|\cdot\|_2$ denote the L_2 norm for vectors and the induced norm for matrices. The Lipschitz condition for the softmax function is

$$1523 \|\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}_2) - \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}_1)\|_2 \leq \|\mathbf{z}_2 - \mathbf{z}_1\|_2 \quad (27)$$

1524 and we also have

$$1525 \|\nabla \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}_2) - \nabla \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}_1)\| \leq 3\|\mathbf{z}_2 - \mathbf{z}_1\|_2 \quad (28)$$

1526
1527
1528 **Proof 1** According to the Rayleigh quotient, for the L_2 -norm we have

$$1529 \|\text{diag}(\mathbf{p}) - \mathbf{p}\mathbf{p}^T\|_2 = \sup_{\|\mathbf{v}\|_2=1} \mathbf{v}^T \text{diag}(\mathbf{p})\mathbf{v} - (\mathbf{v}^T \mathbf{p})^2 \quad (29)$$

$$1530 \leq \sup_{\|\mathbf{v}\|_2=1} \mathbf{v}^T \text{diag}(\mathbf{p})\mathbf{v} \quad (30)$$

$$1531 = \sup_{\|\mathbf{v}\|_2=1} \|\text{diag}(\mathbf{p})\mathbf{v}\|_2 \quad (31)$$

$$1532 \leq \sup_{\|\mathbf{v}\|_2=1} \sqrt{\sum_i (p_i v_i)^2} \quad (32)$$

$$1533 \leq \sup_{\|\mathbf{v}\|_2=1} \sum_i |p_i v_i| \leq 1 \quad (33)$$

1534 Since for all $\mathbf{z}_1, \mathbf{z}_2$ we have

$$1535 \|\text{diag}(\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}_2) - \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}_1))\|_2 \leq \|\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}_2) - \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}_1)\|_2 \quad (34)$$

1536 and

$$1537 \|\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}_2)\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}_2)^T - \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}_1)\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}_1)^T\| \leq \|\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}_2)\|_2 \|\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}_2) - \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}_1)\|_2 + \|\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}_2) - \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}_1)\|_2 \|\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}_1)\|_2 \quad (35)$$

$$1538 \leq 2\|\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}_2) - \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}_1)\|_2, \quad (36)$$

1539 we have

$$1540 \|\nabla \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}_2) - \nabla \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{z}_1)\|_2 \leq 3\|\mathbf{z}_2 - \mathbf{z}_1\|_2 \quad (37)$$

1541 G.2 LIPSCHITZ AND SMOOTHNESS CONDITIONS FOR LOSS COMPOSITION

1542
1543 **Lemma 2 (Gradient of the Cross-Entropy Loss)** Let $\mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{p}(\mathcal{M}), y)$ be the cross-entropy loss, where \mathbf{p} denotes the softmax function. Then, the gradient of the cross-entropy loss — that is, the cross-entropy composed with the softmax function— is given by

$$1544 \nabla_f \mathcal{L}_{CE} = \mathbf{p} - \mathbf{l}_y \quad (38)$$

Proof 2 Let \mathbf{p} denote the softmax function, and let \mathcal{L} be a function defined over its output. Then, we have

$$\nabla_f \mathcal{L}^T = \nabla_{\mathbf{p}} \mathcal{L}^T \nabla_f \mathbf{p}(f) \quad (39)$$

$$= \nabla_{\mathbf{p}} \mathcal{L}^T \begin{pmatrix} \frac{e^{z_1}}{\sum e^{z_j}} - \frac{e^{z_1} e^{z_1}}{(\sum e^{z_j})^2} & -\frac{e^{z_1} e^{z_2}}{(\sum e^{z_j})^2} & \cdots & -\frac{e^{z_1} e^{z_\kappa}}{(\sum e^{z_j})^2} \\ -\frac{e^{z_2} e^{z_1}}{(\sum e^{z_j})^2} & \frac{e^{z_2}}{\sum e^{z_j}} - \frac{e^{z_2} e^{z_2}}{(\sum e^{z_j})^2} & \cdots & -\frac{e^{z_2} e^{z_\kappa}}{(\sum e^{z_j})^2} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ -\frac{e^{z_\kappa} e^{z_1}}{(\sum e^{z_j})^2} & -\frac{e^{z_\kappa} e^{z_2}}{(\sum e^{z_j})^2} & \cdots & \frac{e^{z_\kappa}}{\sum e^{z_j}} - \frac{e^{z_\kappa} e^{z_\kappa}}{(\sum e^{z_j})^2} \end{pmatrix} \quad (40)$$

$$= \nabla_{\mathbf{p}} \mathcal{L}^T (\text{diag}(\mathbf{p}) - \mathbf{p}\mathbf{p}^T) \quad (41)$$

where $\nabla \mathcal{L}^T$ denotes the gradient expressed as a row vector. If \mathcal{L} is the cross-entropy, we have

$$\nabla_{\mathbf{p}} \mathcal{L}_{CE} = -\frac{\partial \sum_i l_i \log p_i}{\partial \mathbf{p}} = -\begin{pmatrix} l_1 \\ p_1 \\ l_2 \\ p_2 \\ \vdots \\ l_\kappa \\ p_\kappa \end{pmatrix}, \quad (42)$$

where l_i , for $i \in [\kappa]$, is the one-hot encoded label such that for the correct class y ,

$$l_i = \begin{cases} 0 & i \neq y \\ 1 & i = y. \end{cases} \quad (43)$$

Therefore, we obtain

$$\nabla_f \mathcal{L}_{CE}^T = -\begin{pmatrix} l_1 & l_2 & \cdots & l_\kappa \\ p_1 & p_2 & \cdots & p_\kappa \end{pmatrix} (\text{diag}(\mathbf{p}) - \mathbf{p}\mathbf{p}^T) \quad (44)$$

$$= -(l_1 \quad l_2 \quad \cdots \quad l_\kappa) + \sum l_j (p_1 \quad p_2 \quad \cdots \quad p_\kappa) \quad (45)$$

$$= \mathbf{p}^T - \mathbf{l}_y^T, \quad (46)$$

where \mathbf{l}_y denotes the one-hot encoded label vector with 1 at the y -th entry, 0 otherwise.

Lemma 3 Given the assumption 1, the Lipschitz constant and smoothness of $\mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta})), y)$ with respect to $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ are

$$\|\mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_2)), y) - \mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1)), y)\|_2 \leq 2L_\theta \|\boldsymbol{\theta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\theta}_1\|_2 \quad (47)$$

$$\|\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_2)), y) - \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1)), y)\|_2 \leq (2\beta_\theta + L_\theta^2) \|\boldsymbol{\theta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\theta}_1\|_2. \quad (48)$$

Proof 3 For the Lipschitz constant, we have

$$\|\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \mathcal{L}_{CE}\|_2 = \|\nabla_f \mathcal{L}_{CE}^T \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} f\| \leq 2L_\theta. \quad (49)$$

For $i = 1, 2$, let $\nabla_f \mathcal{L}_i = \nabla_f \mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_i)), y)$, and $\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} f_i = \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} f(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_i)$, we have

$$\|\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{x}, y, \boldsymbol{\theta}_2) - \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{x}, y, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1)\|_2 \quad (50)$$

$$= \|\nabla_f \mathcal{L}_2^T \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} f_2 - \nabla_f \mathcal{L}_1^T \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} f_1\|_2 \quad (51)$$

$$\leq \|\nabla_f \mathcal{L}_2^T (\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} f_2 - \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} f_1) + (\nabla_f \mathcal{L}_2 - \nabla_f \mathcal{L}_1)^T \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} f_1\|_2 \quad (52)$$

$$\leq 2\beta_\theta \|\boldsymbol{\theta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\theta}_1\|_2 + L_\theta \|\mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_2)) - \mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1))\|_2 \quad (53)$$

$$\leq 2\beta_\theta \|\boldsymbol{\theta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\theta}_1\|_2 + L_\theta \|f(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_2) - f(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1)\|_2 \quad (54)$$

$$\leq (2\beta_\theta + L_\theta^2) \|\boldsymbol{\theta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\theta}_1\|_2 \quad (55)$$

Lemma 4 Given $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}$, perturbation $\boldsymbol{\delta}$, we define the differences between softmax over the model such that

$$\nu \triangleq \max_{\|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|_2 \leq \gamma, \boldsymbol{\theta} \in \Theta} \|\mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}, \boldsymbol{\theta})) - \mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}))\|_2. \quad (56)$$

Hence, the Lipschitz and smoothness condition for the penalty function $\mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\delta}, \mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}) = \|\mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}, \boldsymbol{\theta})) - \mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}))\|_2^2$ w.r.t. $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ is

$$\|\mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\delta}, \mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_2) - \mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\delta}, \mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1)\|_2 \leq (2\nu\beta_\gamma + 6\nu^2 L_\theta) \|\boldsymbol{\theta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\theta}_1\|_2 \quad (57)$$

$$\|\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\delta}, \mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_2) - \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\delta}, \mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1)\|_2 \leq (6\nu^2 \beta_\theta + 24\nu L_\theta^2) \|\boldsymbol{\theta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\theta}_1\|_2 \quad (58)$$

1620 **Proof 4** We first prove the Lipschitz condition, and for simplicity, denote $\mathbf{p} = \mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}))$, $f =$
 1621 $f(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta})$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{p}} = \tilde{\mathbf{p}}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}, \boldsymbol{\theta})$, $\tilde{f} = f(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}, \boldsymbol{\theta})$. We have

$$1623 \quad \|\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\delta}, \mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta})\|_2 = 2 \left\| (\tilde{\mathbf{p}} - \mathbf{p})^T \left(\nabla_f \tilde{\mathbf{p}} \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \tilde{f} - \nabla_f \mathbf{p} \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} f \right) \right\|_2 \quad (59)$$

1624 where

$$1625 \quad \left\| \nabla_f \tilde{\mathbf{p}} \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \tilde{f} - \nabla_f \mathbf{p} \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} f \right\|_2 \leq \|\nabla_f \tilde{\mathbf{p}}\|_2 \|\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \tilde{f} - \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} f\|_2 + \|\nabla_f \tilde{\mathbf{p}} - \nabla_f \mathbf{p}\|_2 \|\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} f\|_2 \quad (60)$$

$$1627 \quad \leq \beta \|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|_2 + L_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \|\nabla_f \tilde{\mathbf{p}} - \nabla_f \mathbf{p}\|_2 \quad (61)$$

1628 and

$$1629 \quad \|\nabla_f \tilde{\mathbf{p}} - \nabla_f \mathbf{p}\|_2 = \|\text{diag}(\tilde{\mathbf{p}}) - \text{diag}(\mathbf{p}) - \tilde{\mathbf{p}}\tilde{\mathbf{p}}^T + \mathbf{p}\mathbf{p}^T\|_2 \quad (62)$$

$$1631 \quad \leq \|\text{diag}(\tilde{\mathbf{p}}) - \text{diag}(\mathbf{p})\|_F + \|\tilde{\mathbf{p}}\|_2 \|\tilde{\mathbf{p}} - \mathbf{p}\|_2 + \|\tilde{\mathbf{p}} - \mathbf{p}\|_2 \|\mathbf{p}\|_2 \quad (63)$$

$$1632 \quad \leq \|\tilde{\mathbf{p}} - \mathbf{p}\|_2 + \|\tilde{\mathbf{p}}\|_2 \|\tilde{\mathbf{p}} - \mathbf{p}\|_2 + \|\tilde{\mathbf{p}} - \mathbf{p}\|_2 \|\mathbf{p}\|_2 \quad (64)$$

$$1633 \quad \leq 3\|\tilde{\mathbf{p}} - \mathbf{p}\|_2. \quad (65)$$

1634 Hence,

$$1635 \quad \left\| \nabla_f \tilde{\mathbf{p}} \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \tilde{f} - \nabla_f \mathbf{p} \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} f \right\|_2 \leq \beta \|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|_2 + 3L_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \|\tilde{\mathbf{p}} - \mathbf{p}\|_2 \quad (66)$$

1637 Then,

$$1638 \quad \|\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\delta}, \mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta})\|_2 \leq 2\beta \|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|_2 \|\tilde{\mathbf{p}} - \mathbf{p}\|_2 + 6L_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \|\tilde{\mathbf{p}} - \mathbf{p}\|_2^2 \quad (67)$$

$$1639 \quad \leq 2\nu\beta \|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|_2 + 6\nu^2 L_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \quad (68)$$

1640 In addition, for each $i = 1, 2$, denote $\mathbf{p}_i = \mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_i))$, $\tilde{\mathbf{p}}_i = \tilde{\mathbf{p}}(f(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_i))$ and $\tilde{f}_i = f(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_i)$,
 1641 $\tilde{\mathcal{C}}_i = \mathcal{C}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_i)$ we have

$$1642 \quad \|\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_2 - \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_1\|_2 = \|\nabla_f \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_2^T \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \tilde{f}_2 - \nabla_f \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_1^T \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \tilde{f}_1\|_2 \quad (69)$$

$$1644 \quad \leq \|\nabla_f \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_2\|_2 \|\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \tilde{f}_2 - \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \tilde{f}_1\|_2 + \|\nabla_f \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_2 - \nabla_f \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_1\|_2 \|\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \tilde{f}_1\|_2 \quad (70)$$

$$1646 \quad \leq \|\nabla_f \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_2\|_2 \beta_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \|\boldsymbol{\theta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\theta}_1\|_2 + \|\nabla_f \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_2 - \nabla_f \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_1\|_2 L_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \quad (71)$$

1647 where

$$1648 \quad \|\nabla_f \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_2\|_2 = 2 \left\| (\tilde{\mathbf{p}}_2 - \mathbf{p}_2)^T (\nabla_f \tilde{\mathbf{p}}_2 - \nabla_f \mathbf{p}_2) \right\|_2 \quad (72)$$

$$1649 \quad \leq 6 \|\tilde{\mathbf{p}}_2 - \mathbf{p}_2\|_2^2 \quad (73)$$

$$1650 \quad \leq 6\nu^2 \quad (74)$$

1651 and

$$1652 \quad \|\nabla_f \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_2 - \nabla_f \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_1\|_2 = 2 \left\| (\tilde{\mathbf{p}}_2 - \mathbf{p}_2)^T (\nabla_f \tilde{\mathbf{p}}_2 - \nabla_f \mathbf{p}_2) - (\tilde{\mathbf{p}}_1 - \mathbf{p}_1)^T (\nabla_f \tilde{\mathbf{p}}_1 - \nabla_f \mathbf{p}_1) \right\|_2 \quad (75)$$

$$1653 \quad \leq 2 \|\tilde{\mathbf{p}}_2 - \mathbf{p}_2\|_2 (\|\nabla_f \tilde{\mathbf{p}}_2 - \nabla_f \tilde{\mathbf{p}}_1\|_2 + \|\nabla_f \mathbf{p}_2 - \nabla_f \mathbf{p}_1\|_2) \quad (76)$$

$$1654 \quad + 2 (\|\tilde{\mathbf{p}}_2 - \tilde{\mathbf{p}}_1\|_2 + \|\mathbf{p}_2 - \mathbf{p}_1\|_2) \|\nabla_f \tilde{\mathbf{p}}_1 - \nabla_f \mathbf{p}_1\|_2 \quad (77)$$

$$1655 \quad \leq 2 \|\tilde{\mathbf{p}}_2 - \mathbf{p}_2\|_2 3 (\|\tilde{\mathbf{p}}_2 - \tilde{\mathbf{p}}_1\|_2 + \|\mathbf{p}_2 - \mathbf{p}_1\|_2) \quad (78)$$

$$1656 \quad + 2 (\|\tilde{\mathbf{p}}_2 - \tilde{\mathbf{p}}_1\|_2 + \|\mathbf{p}_2 - \mathbf{p}_1\|_2) 3 \|\tilde{\mathbf{p}}_1 - \mathbf{p}_1\|_2 \quad (79)$$

$$1657 \quad = 6 (\|\tilde{\mathbf{p}}_2 - \tilde{\mathbf{p}}_1\|_2 + \|\mathbf{p}_2 - \mathbf{p}_1\|_2) (\|\tilde{\mathbf{p}}_2 - \mathbf{p}_2\|_2 + \|\tilde{\mathbf{p}}_1 - \mathbf{p}_1\|_2) \quad (80)$$

$$1658 \quad \leq 6 (L_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} + L_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}) (\|\tilde{\mathbf{p}}_2 - \mathbf{p}_2\|_2 + \|\tilde{\mathbf{p}}_1 - \mathbf{p}_1\|_2) \|\boldsymbol{\theta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\theta}_1\|_2 \quad (81)$$

$$1659 \quad \leq 24\nu L_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \|\boldsymbol{\theta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\theta}_1\|_2 \quad (82)$$

1660 Hence,

$$1661 \quad \|\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_2 - \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_1\|_2 \leq (6\nu^2 \beta_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} + 24\nu L_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^2) \|\boldsymbol{\theta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\theta}_1\|_2 \quad (83)$$

1662 **Theorem 3** Given the Lipschitz and smoothness conditions for the model f , cross-entropy loss, and
 1663 L_2 -norm penalty, consider the objective function

$$1664 \quad \max_{\|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|_2 \leq \gamma} \mathcal{L}_{CE}(f(\mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}, \boldsymbol{\theta})), y) + \lambda \|\mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}, \boldsymbol{\theta})) - \mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}))\|_2^2. \quad (84)$$

1665 We show that the objective function is ϕ -approximate ψ -smooth, where

$$1666 \quad \phi = (4\beta\gamma + 2\nu L_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}) + 12\lambda (\nu^2 \beta + 2\nu L L_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}) \gamma \quad (85)$$

$$1667 \quad \psi = (2\beta_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} + L_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^2) + \lambda (6\nu^2 \beta_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} + 24\nu L_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}^2) \quad (86)$$

1674 **Proof 5** For simplicity, given \mathbf{x} we denote

$$1675 \mathcal{L}_\lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta}, \boldsymbol{\theta}) = \mathcal{L}_{CE}(\boldsymbol{\delta}, \boldsymbol{\theta}) + \lambda \mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\delta}, \boldsymbol{\theta}). \quad (87)$$

1677 Consider the surrogate loss $\mathcal{L}_\lambda^{\max}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) = \max_{\|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|_2 \leq \gamma} \mathcal{L}_\lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta}, \boldsymbol{\theta})$ and let

$$1679 \boldsymbol{\delta}_1 = \arg \max_{\|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|_2 \leq \gamma} \mathcal{L}_\lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1) \quad (88)$$

$$1681 \boldsymbol{\delta}_2 = \arg \max_{\|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|_2 \leq \gamma} \mathcal{L}_\lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_2). \quad (89)$$

1682 Without generality assume $\mathcal{L}_\lambda^{\max}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_2) \geq \mathcal{L}_\lambda^{\max}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_1)$. Hence, there exists $\boldsymbol{\delta}_1$ and $\boldsymbol{\delta}_2$ such that

$$1684 |\mathcal{L}_\lambda^{\max}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_2) - \mathcal{L}_\lambda^{\max}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_1)| = \mathcal{L}_\lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta}_2, \boldsymbol{\theta}_2) - \mathcal{L}_\lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta}_1, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1) \quad (90)$$

$$1685 \leq \mathcal{L}_\lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta}_2, \boldsymbol{\theta}_2) - \mathcal{L}_\lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta}_2, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1) \quad (91)$$

$$1686 \leq \mathcal{L}_{CE}(\boldsymbol{\delta}_2, \boldsymbol{\theta}_2) - \mathcal{L}_{CE}(\boldsymbol{\delta}_2, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1) + \lambda (\mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\delta}_2, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1) - \mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\delta}_2, \boldsymbol{\theta}_2)) \quad (92)$$

$$1688 \leq 2 [L_\theta + \lambda(\nu\beta\gamma + 3\nu^2L_\theta)] \|\boldsymbol{\theta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\theta}_1\|_2 \quad (93)$$

1689 And for smoothness, consider Frechet sub-gradient, such that $\forall \mathbf{g}_1 \in \partial_\theta \mathcal{L}_\lambda^{\max}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_1)$ and $\forall \mathbf{g}_2 \in \partial_\theta \mathcal{L}_\lambda^{\max}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_2)$, there exists $\boldsymbol{\delta}_1$ and $\boldsymbol{\delta}_2$ such that

$$1692 \|\mathbf{g}_2 - \mathbf{g}_1\|_2 \leq \|\nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_\lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta}_2, \boldsymbol{\theta}_2) - \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_\lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta}_1, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1)\|_2 \quad (94)$$

$$1693 \leq \|\nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_\lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta}_2, \boldsymbol{\theta}_2) - \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_\lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta}_2, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1)\|_2 + \|\nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_\lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta}_2, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1) - \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_\lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta}_1, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1)\|_2. \quad (95)$$

1694 For the second term of the RHS of the above inequality is

$$1696 \|\nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_\lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta}_2, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1) - \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_\lambda(\boldsymbol{\delta}_1, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1)\|_2 \quad (96)$$

$$1697 \leq \|\nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_{CE}(\boldsymbol{\delta}_2, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1) - \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_{CE}(\boldsymbol{\delta}_1, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1)\|_2 + \lambda \|\nabla_\theta \mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\delta}_2, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1) - \nabla_\theta \mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\delta}_1, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1)\|_2. \quad (97)$$

1700 And for simplicity, let $\nabla_f \mathcal{L}_i = \nabla_f \mathcal{L}_{CE}(\mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}_i, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1)), y)$, $\nabla_\theta f_i = \nabla_\theta f(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}_i, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1)$, $i = 1, 2$.

$$1701 \|\nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_{CE}(\boldsymbol{\delta}_2, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1) - \nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_{CE}(\boldsymbol{\delta}_1, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1)\|_2 \quad (98)$$

$$1703 \leq \|\nabla_f \mathcal{L}_{CE}^T \nabla_\theta f(\boldsymbol{\delta}_2, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1) - \nabla_f \mathcal{L}_{CE}^T \nabla_\theta f(\boldsymbol{\delta}_1, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1)\|_2 \quad (99)$$

$$1704 \leq \|\nabla_f \mathcal{L}_2\|_2 \|\nabla_\theta f_2 - \nabla_\theta f_1\|_2 + \|\nabla_f \mathcal{L}_2 - \nabla_f \mathcal{L}_1\|_2 \|\nabla_\theta f_1\|_2 \quad (100)$$

$$1705 \leq 2 \|\nabla_\theta f_2 - \nabla_\theta f_1\|_2 + \|\mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}_2, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1)) - \mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}_1, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1))\|_2 L_\theta \quad (101)$$

$$1706 \leq 2\beta \|\boldsymbol{\delta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\delta}_1\|_2 + 2\nu L_\theta \quad (102)$$

$$1708 \leq 4\beta\gamma + 2\nu L_\theta \quad (103)$$

1709 In addition, denote $\nabla_\theta \mathcal{C}_i = \nabla_\theta \mathcal{C}(\boldsymbol{\delta}_i, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1)$, $\mathbf{p}_i = \mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}_i, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1))$, $i = 1, 2$ and $\mathbf{p} = \mathbf{p}(f(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1))$, we have

$$1711 \|\nabla_\theta \mathcal{C}_2 - \nabla_\theta \mathcal{C}_1\|_2 = \|\nabla_f \mathcal{C}_2^T \nabla_\theta f_2 - \nabla_f \mathcal{C}_1^T \nabla_\theta f_1\|_2 \quad (104)$$

$$1713 \leq \|\nabla_f \mathcal{C}_2\|_2 \|\nabla_\theta f_2 - \nabla_\theta f_1\|_2 + \|\nabla_f \mathcal{C}_2 - \nabla_f \mathcal{C}_1\|_2 \|\nabla_\theta f_1\|_2 \quad (105)$$

$$1714 \leq \|\nabla_f \mathcal{C}_2\|_2 \beta \|\boldsymbol{\delta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\delta}_1\|_2 + \|\nabla_f \mathcal{C}_2 - \nabla_f \mathcal{C}_1\|_2 L_\theta \quad (106)$$

1715 where

$$1717 \|\nabla_f \mathcal{C}_2\|_2 = 2 \|(\mathbf{p}_2 - \mathbf{p})^T (\nabla_f \mathbf{p}_2 - \nabla_f \mathbf{p})\|_2 \quad (107)$$

$$1718 \leq 6 \|\mathbf{p}_2 - \mathbf{p}\|_2^2 \quad (108)$$

$$1720 \leq 6\nu^2. \quad (109)$$

1721 And

$$1722 \|\nabla_f \mathcal{C}_2 - \nabla_f \mathcal{C}_1\|_2 = 2 \|(\mathbf{p}_2 - \mathbf{p})^T (\nabla_f \mathbf{p}_2 - \nabla_f \mathbf{p}) - (\mathbf{p}_1 - \mathbf{p})^T (\nabla_f \mathbf{p}_1 - \nabla_f \mathbf{p})\|_2 \quad (110)$$

$$1724 \leq 2 (\|\mathbf{p}_2 - \mathbf{p}\|_2 \|\nabla_f \mathbf{p}_2 - \nabla_f \mathbf{p}_1\|_2 + \|\mathbf{p}_2 - \mathbf{p}_1\|_2 \|\nabla_f \mathbf{p}_1 - \nabla_f \mathbf{p}\|_2) \quad (111)$$

$$1725 \leq 6 (\|\mathbf{p}_2 - \mathbf{p}\|_2 + \|\mathbf{p}_1 - \mathbf{p}\|_2) \|\mathbf{p}_2 - \mathbf{p}_1\|_2 \quad (112)$$

$$1726 \leq 12\nu \|f(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}_2, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1) - f(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}_1, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1)\|_2 \quad (113)$$

$$1727 \leq 12\nu L \|\boldsymbol{\delta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\delta}_1\|_2 \quad (114)$$

Hence,

$$\|\nabla_{\theta} \mathcal{C}_2 - \nabla_{\theta} \mathcal{C}_1\|_2 \leq (6\nu^2\beta + 12\nu LL_{\theta}) \|\delta_2 - \delta_1\|_2 \quad (115)$$

$$\leq 12(\nu^2\beta + 2\nu LL_{\theta}) \gamma \quad (116)$$

In conclusion, we have

$$\|g_2 - g_1\|_2 = \|\nabla_{\theta} \mathcal{L}_{\lambda}(\delta_2, \theta_2) - \nabla_{\theta} \mathcal{L}_{\lambda}(\delta_1, \theta_1)\|_2 \quad (117)$$

$$\leq \|\nabla_{\theta} \mathcal{L}_{\lambda}(\delta_2, \theta_2) - \nabla_{\theta} \mathcal{L}_{\lambda}(\delta_2, \theta_1)\|_2 + \|\nabla_{\theta} \mathcal{L}_{\lambda}(\delta_2, \theta_1) - \nabla_{\theta} \mathcal{L}_{\lambda}(\delta_1, \theta_1)\|_2 \quad (118)$$

$$\leq (2\beta_{\theta} + L_{\theta}^2 + \lambda(6\nu^2\beta_{\theta} + 24\nu L_{\theta}^2)) \|\theta_2 - \theta_1\|_2 + (4\beta\gamma + 2\nu L_{\theta}) \quad (119)$$

$$+ 12\lambda(\nu^2\beta + 2\nu LL_{\theta}) \gamma \quad (120)$$

G.3 ANALYSIS ON RT LEARNING

Here, we provide a proof of the Lipschitz and smoothness conditions for the RT method. As shown in Wang et al. (2021), the optimization process follows gradient descent with perturbations sampled from the distribution $\Pr(\cdot | \mathbf{x})$, which can be interpreted as a form of data augmentation within standard training. Consequently, it shares the same theoretical generalization error bounds as standard training.

The pseudo-code for CVaR is shown in 1. As is shown that the α_j is first updated then the parameter θ . And we have that for the updated gradient is

$$\nabla_{\theta} [\ell(f_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}_j + \delta_k), y_j) - \alpha_j]_+ \quad (121)$$

$$= \begin{cases} \nabla_{\theta} \ell(f_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}_j + \delta_k), y_j) & \ell(f_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}_j + \delta_k), y_j) > \alpha_j \\ \{s : s^T(\theta - \vartheta) \leq \ell \circ f_{\theta} - \ell \circ f_{\vartheta}, \quad \forall \vartheta\} & \ell(f_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}_j + \delta_k), y_j) = \alpha_j \\ 0 & \ell(f_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}_j + \delta_k), y_j) < \alpha_j \end{cases} \quad (122)$$

Let L and β be the Lipschitz and smoothness conditions for $\ell \circ f_{\theta}$. We show that

$$\|\nabla_{\theta} [\ell(f_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}_j + \delta_k), y_j) - \alpha_j]_+\| \leq \|\nabla_{\theta} \ell(f_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}_j + \delta_k), y_j)\| \leq L \quad (123)$$

and

$$\|\nabla_{\theta} [\ell(f_{\theta_2}(\mathbf{x}_j + \delta_k), y_j) - \alpha_j]_+ - \nabla_{\theta} [\ell(f_{\theta_1}(\mathbf{x}_j + \delta_k), y_j) - \alpha_j]_+\| \leq \max\{L, \beta\}. \quad (124)$$

According to the training algorithm in Alg. 1, the weight updates are Lipschitz smooth for most of the training process. Even in the worst case, the smoothness remains bounded by the Lipschitz constant, which largely explains the reduced robust overfitting.

Algorithm 1 Probabilistically Robust Learning (PRL)

Hyperparameters: sample size M , step sizes $\eta_{\alpha}, \eta > 0$, robustness parameter $\rho > 0$, neighborhood distribution τ , num. of inner optimization steps T , batch size B

repeat

for minibatch $\{(x_j, y_j)\}_{j=1}^B$ **do**

for T steps **do**

 Draw $\delta_k \sim \tau, k = 1, \dots, M$

$g_{\alpha_n} \leftarrow 1 - \frac{1}{\rho M} \sum_{k=1}^M \mathbb{I}[\ell(f_{\theta}(x_j + \delta_k), y_j) \geq \alpha_j]$

$\alpha_j \leftarrow \alpha_j - \eta_{\alpha} g_{\alpha_j}, \quad n = 1, \dots, B$

end for

$g \leftarrow \frac{1}{\rho MB} \sum_{j,k} \nabla_{\theta} [\ell(f_{\theta}(x_j + \delta_k), y_j) - \alpha_j]_+$

$\theta \leftarrow \theta - \eta g$

end for

until convergence

G.4 ANALYSIS ON AT-PR

We show that the AT-PR algorithm is essentially a variant of PGD. Instead of performing a single PGD run, AT-PR executes multiple PGD runs and selects the one that yields the widest coverage over

1782 **Algorithm 2** PGD and gradient-based search for \mathbf{x}'_{pr}

1783 **Require:** Inputs $[X, Y], N, \alpha_{min}, \alpha_{max}, step_{min}, step_{max}$

1784 1: Initialize $AE_s \leftarrow []$ ▷ Initialize AE candidate set

1785 2: Apply PGD to get different AE candidates

1786 3: **for** $idx = 0$ **to** N **do**

1787 4: $\mathbf{x}_{init} \leftarrow \mathbf{x} + \text{Uniform}(-\gamma, \gamma)$

1788 5: $\alpha \leftarrow \text{Uniform}(\alpha_{min}, \alpha_{max})$

1789 6: $steps \leftarrow \text{Uniform}(step_{min}, step_{max})$

1790 7: $\mathbf{x}'_{idx} \leftarrow pgd(\mathbf{x}_{init}, y, \gamma, \alpha, steps)$

1791 8: Append \mathbf{x}'_{idx} to AE_s

1792 9: **end for**

1793 **Require:** AE_s, \mathbf{x}, y, C

1794 10: Initialize $Max_d \leftarrow 0$; $\mathbf{x}'_{pr} \leftarrow \text{None}$

1795 11: **for** each $\mathbf{x}' \in AE_s$ **do**

1796 12: $\tilde{\mathbf{x}} = \mathbf{x}'$

1797 13: **while** $iter < C$ **do**

1798 14: $y' = f(\tilde{\mathbf{x}})$

1799 15: **if** $y' = y$ **then**

1800 16: break ▷ Exit if $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}$ is classified correctly

1801 17: **end if**

1802 18: $g \leftarrow \nabla_{\tilde{\mathbf{x}}} L(\tilde{\mathbf{x}}, y)$ ▷ Compute gradient

1803 19: $\tilde{\mathbf{x}} = \tilde{\mathbf{x}} - \alpha \cdot g$ ▷ Update $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}$

1804 20: **end while**

1805 21: $d \leftarrow D(\tilde{\mathbf{x}}, \mathbf{x}')$ ▷ Distance between $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}$ & \mathbf{x}'

1806 22: **if** $d > Max_d$ **then**

1807 23: $\mathbf{x}'_{pr} = \mathbf{x}'$

1808 24: $Max_d = d$

1809 25: **end if**

1810 26: **end for**

1811 27: **Output** \mathbf{x}'_{pr} ▷ Farthest AE from decision boundary.

1812 the perturbation budget for the given inputs. Therefore, its generalization analysis still follows our

1813 framework in Thm. 1.

1814 As illustrated in Alg. 2, AT-PR first generates a set of AE candidates. For each candidate, it computes

1815 the distance to the decision boundary and selects the one with the maximum distance. Under

1816 Assumption 1, we recall that for all $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}$ the curvature is globally bounded:

$$1817 \|\nabla_{\theta} f(\mathbf{x}, \theta_2) - \nabla_{\theta} f(\mathbf{x}, \theta_1)\| \leq \beta_{\theta} \|\theta_2 - \theta_1\|. \quad (125)$$

1818 Although this bound holds globally, in practice \mathbf{x} may lie near different local optima. Let $\Delta_i \subseteq$

1819 $\mathcal{X}, i \in [N]$ denote the local region around adversarial examples (local optima found by PGD). We

1820 then define local smoothness bounds for each Δ_i , such that for all $i \in [N]$:

$$1821 \forall \mathbf{x} \in \Delta_i \quad \|\nabla_{\theta} f(\mathbf{x}, \theta_2) - \nabla_{\theta} f(\mathbf{x}, \theta_1)\| \leq \beta_{\theta}^{(i)} \|\theta_2 - \theta_1\|. \quad (126)$$

1822 Alg. 2 essentially searches for the region Δ_i with the largest coverage along the loss surface. Two

1823 cases arise from this selection, which are also discussed in Zhang et al. (2025):

- 1824 1. The region Δ_i with the largest coverage is relatively flat but not the one with the “highest
- 1825 peak” (short and wide peak in loss landscape). This corresponds to a smaller smoothness
- 1826 bound, i.e., $\beta_{\theta}^{(i)} < \beta_{\theta}$.
- 1827 2. The region Δ_i with the largest coverage also has the “highest peak” (both tall and wide
- 1828 peak in loss landscape), indicating a better local optima that is closer to the global one, i.e.,
- 1829 $\beta_{\theta}^{(i)} \approx \beta_{\theta}$.

In the first case, the generalization gap decreases (as shown in Thm. 1), which corresponds to the experimental results of WRN-28-10 on CIFAR-100. In the second case, the generalization gap of AT-PR is comparable to that of PGD, as shown in the CIFAR-10 experiments (See Table. 10). Our experiments, along with results from Zhang et al. (2025), demonstrate that approximately 90% of inputs correspond to the second case. This corresponds to the special case where only a single AE candidate is considered in Alg. 2.

G.5 UNIFORM ALGORITHM STABILITY ANALYSIS ON ADVERSARIAL TRAINING

Lemma 5 *Let $f : \mathbb{R}^d \times \mathbb{R}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, for all $\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{R}^d$, f be η -approximate β -smooth. Given the weight update rule $G(\boldsymbol{\theta}) = \boldsymbol{\theta} - \alpha \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} f(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\theta})$ by SGD, we have*

$$\|G(\boldsymbol{\theta}_2) - G(\boldsymbol{\theta}_1)\|_2 \leq (1 + \alpha_t \beta) \|\boldsymbol{\theta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\theta}_1\|_2 + \eta \quad (127)$$

Proof 6

$$\|G(\boldsymbol{\theta}_2) - G(\boldsymbol{\theta}_1)\|_2 = \|\boldsymbol{\theta}_2 - \alpha_t \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} f(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_2) - (\boldsymbol{\theta}_1 - \alpha_t \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} f(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1))\|_2 \quad (128)$$

$$\leq \|\boldsymbol{\theta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\theta}_1\|_2 + \alpha_t \|\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} f(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_2) - \nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} f(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_1)\|_2 \quad (129)$$

$$\leq (1 + \alpha_t \beta) \|\boldsymbol{\theta}_2 - \boldsymbol{\theta}_1\|_2 + \eta \quad (130)$$

Lemma 6 *Let $\ell : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y} \times \Theta \rightarrow [0, 1]$ be a general loss function, and $\ell(\mathbf{z}, \cdot)$, $\mathbf{z} \in \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$ is nonnegative and L -Lipschitz for all \mathbf{z} . S and S' are two sets of samples differing in only one example. Consider 2 trajectories of parameters $\boldsymbol{\theta}_t, \boldsymbol{\theta}'_t, t = 1, 2, \dots, T$ that generated by SGD with sets of samples S and S' , respectively. Then, $\forall \mathbf{z} \in \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$ and $\forall t_0 \in \{0, 1, \dots, n\}$, we have*

$$\mathbb{E}[\ell(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_T) - \ell(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\theta}'_T)] \leq \frac{t_0}{n} + L \mathbb{E}[\delta_T \mid \delta_{t_0} = 0]. \quad (131)$$

where $\delta_t = \|\boldsymbol{\theta}_t - \boldsymbol{\theta}'_t\|$, for $t = 1, 2, \dots, T$.

Proof 7 *Let $\mathbf{z} \in \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$ be an arbitrary example. We have,*

$$\mathbb{E}[\ell(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_T) - \ell(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\theta}'_T)] = \mathbb{P}\{\delta_{t_0} = 0\} \mathbb{E}[\ell(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_T) - \ell(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\theta}'_T) \mid \delta_{t_0} = 0] \quad (132)$$

$$+ \mathbb{P}\{\delta_{t_0} \neq 0\} \mathbb{E}[\ell(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_T) - \ell(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\theta}'_T) \mid \delta_{t_0} \neq 0] \quad (133)$$

$$\leq \mathbb{E}[|\ell(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_T) - \ell(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\theta}'_T)| \mid \delta_{t_0} = 0] + \mathbb{P}\{\delta_{t_0} \neq 0\} \cdot \sup_{\boldsymbol{\theta}, \mathbf{z}} \ell(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\theta}) \quad (134)$$

$$\leq L \mathbb{E}[\|\boldsymbol{\theta}_T - \boldsymbol{\theta}'_T\| \mid \delta_{t_0} = 0] + \mathbb{P}\{\delta_{t_0} \neq 0\}. \quad (135)$$

Under the random permutation rule, we have

$$\mathbb{P}\{\delta_{t_0} \neq 0\} \leq \frac{t_0}{n}. \quad (136)$$

Theorem 4 *Let $\ell(\mathbf{z}, \cdot) \in [0, 1]$ be L -Lipschitz and η -approximate β -smooth loss function for all $\mathbf{z} \in \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$. Given a constant c , we run SGD with learning rate $\alpha_t \leq c/t$. Then, the algorithm stability is bounded as*

$$|\mathcal{E}_{stab}| \leq \frac{1}{n} + \frac{2L^2 + nL\eta}{\beta(n-1)} T^{c\beta}. \quad (137)$$

Proof 8 *For simplicity, denote $\Delta_t = \mathbb{E}[\delta_t \mid \delta_{t_0} = 0]$. Hence, follow Lem. 6, we have that there is only probability of $\frac{1}{n}$ that $z' \in S'/S$ will be selected by SGD, denoted as event $Z = z'$, hence we have*

$$\Delta_{t+1} = \mathbb{P}\{Z = z'\} \mathbb{P}\{\Delta_{t+1} \mid Z = z'\} + \mathbb{P}\{Z \neq z'\} \mathbb{P}\{\Delta_{t+1} \mid Z \neq z'\} \quad (138)$$

$$\leq \left(1 - \frac{1}{n}\right) (1 + \alpha_t \beta) \Delta_t + \frac{1}{n} \Delta_t + \alpha_t \left(\eta + \frac{2L}{n}\right) \quad (139)$$

$$= \left(1 + \left(1 - \frac{1}{n}\right) \frac{c\beta}{t}\right) \Delta_t + \frac{c}{t} \left(\eta + \frac{2L}{n}\right) \quad (140)$$

$$\leq \exp\left(\left(1 - \frac{1}{n}\right) \frac{c\beta}{t}\right) \Delta_t + \frac{c}{t} \left(\eta + \frac{2L}{n}\right). \quad (141)$$

The last inequality comes from the fact that $1 + x \leq \exp(x)$ for all x . Thus,

$$\Delta_T \leq \sum_{t=t_0+1}^T \left[\prod_{k=t+1}^T \exp \left(\left(1 - \frac{1}{n}\right) \frac{c\beta}{k} \right) \frac{c}{t} \left(\eta + \frac{2L}{n} \right) \right] \quad (142)$$

$$= \sum_{t=t_0+1}^T \exp \left(\left(1 - \frac{1}{n}\right) c\beta \sum_{k=t+1}^T \frac{1}{k} \right) \frac{c}{t} \left(\eta + \frac{2L}{n} \right) \quad (143)$$

$$\leq \sum_{t=t_0+1}^T \exp \left(\left(1 - \frac{1}{n}\right) c\beta \log \frac{T}{t} \right) \frac{c}{t} \left(\eta + \frac{2L}{n} \right) \quad (144)$$

$$= \left(\eta + \frac{2L}{n} \right) c T^{c\beta(1-\frac{1}{n})} \sum_{t=t_0+1}^T t^{-c\beta(1-\frac{1}{n})-1} \quad (145)$$

$$\leq \left(\eta + \frac{2L}{n} \right) \frac{c}{(1-1/n)c\beta} \left(\frac{T}{t_0} \right)^{c\beta(1-1/n)} \quad (146)$$

$$\leq \frac{2L + n\eta}{\beta(n-1)} \left(\frac{T}{t_0} \right)^{c\beta}. \quad (147)$$

Hence, we get

$$\mathbb{E} [|f(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_T) - f(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\theta}'_T)|] \leq \frac{t_0}{n} + \frac{2L^2 + nL\eta}{\beta(n-1)} \left(\frac{T}{t_0} \right)^{c\beta}. \quad (148)$$

Letting $q = \beta c$, the right-hand side is approximately minimized when

$$t_0 = [c(2L^2 + nL\eta)]^{\frac{1}{q+1}} T^{\frac{q}{q+1}}. \quad (149)$$

Hence,

$$\mathbb{E} [|f(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_T) - f(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\theta}'_T)|] \leq \frac{1 + \frac{1}{c\beta}}{n-1} [c(2L^2 + nL\eta)]^{\frac{1}{c\beta+1}} T^{\frac{c\beta}{c\beta+1}}. \quad (150)$$

Since T is arbitrary, and $t_0 \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$, when T is large, let $t_0 = 1$ we have

$$\mathbb{E} [|f(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_T) - f(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\theta}'_T)|] \leq \frac{1}{n} + \frac{2L^2 + nL\eta}{\beta(n-1)} T^{c\beta}. \quad (151)$$

Theorem 5 (Generalization in Expectation by Hardt et al. (2016)) *If the algorithm \mathcal{A} is ϵ -stable, then*

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{A}, S} [R(\mathcal{A}(S)) - R_S(\mathcal{A}(S))] < \epsilon \quad (152)$$

where the expectation is over algorithm \mathcal{A} and the training set $S = \{\mathbf{z}_1, \dots, \mathbf{z}_n\}$ where each $\mathbf{z}_i = (\mathbf{x}_i, y_i) \stackrel{i.i.d.}{\sim} \mathcal{D}$ for classification. And,

$$R(\mathcal{A}(S)) = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{z} \sim \mathcal{D}} [\ell(\mathbf{h}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}, \mathbf{z})] \quad (153)$$

$$R_S(\mathcal{A}(S)) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \ell(\mathbf{h}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}, \mathbf{z}_i) \quad (154)$$

where ℓ denotes the loss function, and $\mathbf{z} = (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \sim \mathcal{D}$ represents the inputs. \mathbf{h} is the hypothesis parameterized by $\boldsymbol{\theta} \in \Theta$. Since the parameters are generated by an algorithm \mathcal{A} from the data set S , we have

$$\boldsymbol{\theta} = \mathcal{A}(S) \quad (155)$$

1944 **Proof 9** Consider the fact

$$1945 \mathbb{E}[Y] = \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[Y|X]], \quad (156)$$

1946 For simplicity, denote the $\ell(\mathbf{h}_\theta, \mathbf{z}) = f(\mathcal{A}(S), \mathbf{z})$.

$$1947 \mathbb{E} [\mathbb{E} [R(\mathcal{A}(S)) - R_S(\mathcal{A}(S)) | S]] \quad (157)$$

$$1948 = \mathbb{E} \left[\mathbb{E} \left[\mathbb{E} [f(\mathcal{A}(S), \mathbf{z}) | \mathcal{A}, S] - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n f(\mathcal{A}(S), \mathbf{z}_i) | S] \right] \right] \quad (158)$$

$$1949 = \mathbb{E} \left[\mathbb{E} \left[\mathbb{E} [f(\mathcal{A}(S), \mathbf{z}) | \mathcal{A}, S] - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n f(\mathcal{A}(S^{(i)}), \mathbf{z}'_i) | S] \right] \right] \quad (159)$$

$$1950 = \mathbb{E} \left[\mathbb{E} \left[\mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n f(\mathcal{A}(S), \mathbf{z}'_i) | \mathcal{A}, S \right] - \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n f(\mathcal{A}(S^{(i)}), \mathbf{z}'_i) | S \right] \right] \right] \quad (160)$$

$$1951 = \mathbb{E} \left[\mathbb{E} \left[\mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \left(f(\mathcal{A}(S), \mathbf{z}'_i) - f(\mathcal{A}(S^{(i)}), \mathbf{z}'_i) \right) | \mathcal{A}, S \right] | S \right] \right] \right] \quad (161)$$

$$1952 \leq \sup_{S, S', z} \mathbb{E} [f(\mathcal{A}(S), \mathbf{z}_i) - f(\mathcal{A}(S'), \mathbf{z}_i)] \leq \epsilon \quad (162)$$

1953 where S' is at most one date point different from S and $S^{(i)}$ is the training set that the i -th date point
1954 is \mathbf{z}'_i .

1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997