

ADVERSARIAL ARENA: CROWDSOURCING DATA GENERATION THROUGH INTERACTIVE COMPETITION

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Paper under double-blind review

ABSTRACT

Post-training Large Language Models requires diverse, high-quality data which is rare and costly to obtain, especially in low resource domains and for multi-turn conversations. Common solutions are crowdsourcing or synthetic generation, but both often yield low-quality or low-diversity data. We introduce Adversarial Arena for building high quality conversational datasets by framing data generation as an adversarial task: attackers create prompts, and defenders generate responses. This interactive competition between multiple teams naturally produces diverse and complex data. We validated this approach by conducting a competition with 10 academic teams from top US and European universities, each building attacker or defender bots. The competition, focused on safety alignment of LLMs in cybersecurity, generated 19,683 multi-turn conversations. Fine-tuning an open-source model on this dataset produced an 18.47% improvement in secure code generation on CyberSecEval-Instruct and 29.42% improvement on CyberSecEval-MITRE.

1 INTRODUCTION




Figure 1: Adversarial Arena Overview: Attacker/defender pairs interact over several tournament rounds, with each pair generating a multi-turn conversation in every round. These conversations are labeled as success/failure in an evaluation pipeline, producing a ranked list of attackers and defenders. The ranked list and the labeled conversations are provided to attackers and defenders in feedback loop to drive up the overall quality of the generated data.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) expanded their capabilities, the importance of high-quality task-appropriate data has become more and more apparent to the research community. Traditionally, data creation has involved significant human effort, including manual annotation (Köpf et al., 2023), data filtering (Li et al., 2024; Penedo et al., 2023; 2024), and data augmentation (Ding et al., 2024). To add to that, during model training, human input in the form of interactive testing (AI @ Meta,

2024), feedback (Bai et al., 2022; Ouyang et al., 2022), and human evaluation (Chiang et al., 2024) is commonly required (Wu et al., 2022). A common approach to scale up human-generated data is crowdsourcing; however, these methods require careful design to obtain high-quality data (Vaughan, 2018).

Recently, LLMs themselves have been used to generate synthetic training data at scale (Wang et al., 2022; 2023; Bercovich et al., 2025). While appealing, this approach suffers from important limitations. Synthetic data often lacks diversity and coverage, and it can amplify hidden biases, leading to degraded robustness and unwanted behaviors in downstream models (Cloud et al., 2025; Zur et al., 2025; Chen et al., 2024). Attempts to mitigate these issues rely on careful choices of models, prompts, and filtering strategies (Xu et al., 2025; Wei et al., 2024). Yet the resulting design space is vast, highly sensitive to small decisions, and expensive to navigate effectively.

We argue that overcoming these limitations requires a framework that supports structured, adversarial exploration of this design space. Therefore, we propose a novel framework **Adversarial Arena**, to collect synthetic data for tasks that can be formulated using an adversarial setting. As an example, consider the problem of hallucinations in LLMs. This problem can be formulated using an adversarial setting as follows: the *attacker’s* goal is to get the model to generate hallucinated content, while the *defender’s* goal is to make the model robust against such outputs. Our framework allows different research groups to independently explore distinct regions of the design decision space while exchanging intermediate feedback, which leads to greater diversity and lower bias in the generated data.

A key component of the Adversarial Arena is an orchestrator, which allows interaction between multiple attackers and defenders in a competitive environment, which we refer to as a “tournament”. We design a competition structure where these teams compete against each other in a series of tournaments. Through multiple rounds of competition, several desired outcomes are achieved. First, the setting naturally supports multi-turn interactions between attackers and defenders, producing data that is more realistic for many tasks. Second, each attacker/defender team develops a pipeline to generate data independently. While individual pipelines may reflect each team’s biases, the presence of multiple teams can help offset these biases. This *diversity of perspectives* increases coverage compared to data from each individual team. Third, the techniques developed by both sides to generate their data need to be robust against a range of diverse strategies employed by multiple opponents. In other words, the data and techniques developed by each attacker should work well against most defenders, and vice versa. Finally, teams use their experience from past tournaments to improve their approaches in future rounds, resulting in a flywheel effect, in which the teams produce progressively richer data and techniques over time.

Our framework enables crowdsourcing data for any task that can be formulated in an adversarial setting. We present a case study on one such task: cybersecurity alignment. We organized a competition, utilizing the Adversarial Arena platform, with ten leading universities from the United States and Europe. The universities were divided equally into five attackers and five defenders and they competed over four tournaments. The competition resulted in a dataset of 19683 labeled multi-turn conversations. We show that the data generated by our framework is effective at aligning an open weight Mistral 7b Instruct (Jiang et al., 2023) model. Fine tuning the model on data from the competition resulted in an 18.47% improvement in secure code generation on the CyberSecEval-Instruct benchmark (Bhatt et al., 2023), and 29.42% improvement on the CyberSecEval-MITRE benchmark (Bhatt et al., 2023). We also provides evidence that having multiple teams leads to a “diversity of perspectives”, as reflected in the semantic separation between datasets generated by different teams. Datasets collected across tournament rounds likewise show this diversity of perspectives, demonstrating that recurring adversarial tournaments generate richer data over time. The resulting datasets will be released upon publication.

Our contributions can be summarized as follows.

1. We present Adversarial Arena, a novel framework that enables crowdsourcing of synthetic data through adversarial interactions between multiple independent teams.
2. We demonstrate its effectiveness on the task of cybersecurity alignment, showing that the resulting data is diverse and effective at aligning public models.
3. We construct and release a dataset for cybersecurity alignment, generated through our framework.

This paper is structured as follows. We first review relevant literature (Section 2), followed by an overview of the Adversarial Arena framework (Section 3). We then discuss our deployment of the Adversarial Arena framework for the task of cybersecurity alignment, including design guidelines, evaluation protocol, outcomes (i.e. data and innovations from participating teams), and learnings (Section 4). Finally, we discuss broader applicability and limitations of the proposed framework (Section 5). Section 6 concludes the paper.

2 RELATED WORK

Crowdsourcing is a popular method for collecting data. However, traditional crowdsourcing methods are prone to producing low quality data. Prior work suggests multiple reasons for this, ranging from satisficing behavior (Hamby & Taylor, 2016) to bad-faith responses and insufficient language fluency or skill level of annotators (Marshall et al., 2023). We attribute these problems to misaligned incentives and insufficient quality signals for the generated data. (Little et al., 2010) propose an iterative crowdsourcing method that can improve data quality but its benefits are limited to particular domains.

Recently, using generative AI has become a popular cost-effective approach to automating many of the above tasks. (Ding et al., 2022) show that using LLMs to label data results in orders of magnitude reduction in cost and time, compared to human labels, but training models on synthetic data leads to lower accuracy. As such, improving synthetic data generation has been an active area of research, with the goal of bridging this gap between human-generated and synthetic data.

(Long et al., 2024) provide a comprehensive survey of LLM-based data generation, wherein they categorize prior work in this space into 3 stages: generation, curation, and evaluation. Generation is further subdivided into prompt engineering and multi-step generation. Prompt engineering techniques include various methods for task specification, including conditional prompting, role-play, and in-context learning (Wang et al., 2022; Yoo et al., 2021; Gunasekar et al., 2023; Eldan & Li, 2023; Ye et al., 2022b; Yu et al., 2023; Josifoski et al., 2023; Ding et al., 2023; Meng et al., 2022; He et al., 2023). Multi-step generation involves either generating individual samples through multiple generation steps (Li et al., 2022; Ye et al., 2023), or generating different subsets of the data over multiple steps (Honovich et al., 2022; Shao et al., 2023). Curation involves selecting high-quality samples from the generated data (Seedat et al., 2023; Ye et al., 2022a; Chen et al., 2023), or improving the quality of the generated data (Chung et al., 2023; Pangakis et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2022). Evaluation consists of techniques that measure the faithfulness and diversity of the generated data, as well as approaches that use downstream task performance of models trained on the synthetically generated data (Havrilla et al., 2024).

Several other papers survey synthetic data generation using large language models (Tan et al., 2024; Li et al., 2023; Guo & Chen, 2024; Bauer et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2024; Nadas et al., 2025), and point out limitations of existing approaches. Some common limitations include hallucinations, bias, diversity, and limited efficacy on subjective tasks. Importantly, these factors critically depend on design choices, such as which models are used for data generation, how prompts are constructed (including multi-step prompting and carefully selecting in-context learning examples), and strategies for filtering out or refining poor quality outputs. With a number of approaches being proposed for synthetic data generation, the space of design decisions is rapidly expanding, making it challenging to generate high-quality data for a given task.

We propose a framework to crowdsource synthetic data that addresses the problem of misaligned incentives in crowdsourcing, and diversity and bias in existing synthetic data generation techniques. We introduce a ranking based incentive system where both attackers and defenders are strongly incentivized to generate the best quality data possible in order to achieve a high rank. Additionally, we allow different attackers and defenders to independently explore different parts of the design decision space, leading to better diversity and lower bias in the generated data.

3 OVERVIEW OF ADVERSARIAL ARENA

The crux of the adversarial arena framework is a two-sided running competition where attackers and defenders compete against each other in a series of tournaments. The competition is a means to

drive improvements on a specific “Task of Interest (ToI)” by simultaneously testing and generating new training data. Attackers in this context can refer to an automated system which can have a conversation with individual defenders and try to elicit failures at a given ToI. We define defenders to be the models or systems under test. These could range from individual LLMs to more complex agentic systems combining multiple components. Their goal is to respond to attackers’ requests while trying to correctly perform the ToI. Based on the specific ToI, these conversations can consist of a single-turn or more extensive conversations with multiple turns. The format is also agnostic to modalities and can incorporate one or more modalities like text, images, audio, and video.

A critical aspect of the Adversarial Arena framework is a robust evaluation suite. In other words, this framework requires a mechanism to judge the winner for each conversation between an attacker and a defender. This evaluator serves multiple purposes in the framework 1) It labels the data generated through Adversarial Arena. 2) It provides a way to rank teams. Two separate leaderboards are maintained for attackers and defenders and ranking is determined by the number of conversations they win. 3) The labels generated by this evaluator serve as feedback signals for both attackers and defenders which can be used to improve their approaches/systems.

While in an ideal scenario the evaluator will be perfect, our framework is designed to tolerate some noise to account for the infeasibility of perfect evaluation for many real world ToIs. Random errors in evaluation can be mitigated through having more conversations in a tournament or having multiple tournaments to average out error. This mitigation can ensure that the broader incentive structure for all attackers and defenders remains aligned to the ToI, but it cannot ensure the correctness of every label in the generated data. Another class of errors is systematic bias introduced by the evaluation strategy. A common example of this is the case of loss of functionality orthogonal to the ToI. As a mitigation, we introduce auxiliary objectives that influence the rankings of teams. Teams’ scores can be scaled based on their performance on auxiliary objectives. A detailed example of how to design such auxiliary objectives can be found in Section 4.2.2 where we illustrate the approach in the domain of cybersecurity alignment.

In order to execute our concept of the Adversarial Arena at scale, we use an automated orchestrator service that can manage interactions between all attackers and defenders. We design this service to coordinate multiple multi-turn conversations in parallel in an asynchronous, reproducible, and fault tolerant manner. Additionally, the system can be run in test mode for attackers and defenders to ensure that their systems can reliably scale up for tournaments. Implementation details of the orchestrator can be found in Appendix B.

4 CASE STUDY: APPLYING ADVERSARIAL ARENA TO CYBERSECURITY ALIGNMENT

This section describes an example where we applied the Adversarial Arena framework to the task of Cybersecurity Alignment for LLMs. As large language models are becoming increasingly performant at generating code (Shibu, 2025; Novet, 2025), it becomes crucial to ensure these systems do not cause or facilitate harm. Recent studies (Pearce et al., 2021) show consistent patterns of security vulnerabilities in AI-generated code, which left unchecked can quickly propagate into production. Moreover, while it is beneficial to lower the technical barrier of entry to creating and working with software, it is important that the same technologies do not dramatically increase the number of malicious actors able to develop sophisticated cyberattacks. One challenge in aligning LLMs to prevent generation of insecure code or assistance with malicious cyberattacks is limited public data for these domains and in particular limited availability of multi-turn data. We applied the proposed Adversarial Arena framework to collect data for this task. We conducted a competition where 10 teams fielded bots to the adversarial arena. 5 attack teams were tasked with creating automatic systems that seek out weaknesses by trying expose willingness of coding systems to produce malicious code, vulnerable code, or provide detailed assistance with cyberattacks. 5 defense teams fielded code generation systems that attempt to generate helpful responses while avoiding generating malicious code, vulnerable code, or cyberattack assistance. In the next section we describe the challenge structure in more detail.

4.1 CHALLENGE STRUCTURE & DESIGN GUIDELINES

At the start of the competition, defender teams were given open weight access to an 8B parameter coding specialist model built specifically for the challenge (henceforth referred to as ChallengeLLM), although a public model could be used for other challenges. The defenders were chartered with making their version of the model and surrounding system robust to adversarial attacks, all while maintaining utility. The two sides (attackers and defenders) then met up in a series of tournaments. With 5 attackers and 5 defenders, in each tournament there were 25 match-ups between attacking and defending teams. Each matchup between an attacker and a defender consisted of 200 conversations. Each conversation was allowed to have a maximum of 10 conversation turns back and forth (i.e. 5 adjacency pairs (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973)). We capped the interaction at 5 to avoid attacking teams exploring an unlimited number of attacks or probes within a single conversation, but allowing for multi-turn interaction.

Design guidelines were used to keep the competition tractable and direct teams' work towards producing the most useful data. Both attacking and defending teams were required to support multi-turn dialog. Prompts by attackers were required to be in English and/or human readable code – the constraint to English was driven by annotation requirements. Only Python code was required to be supported by defenders. In keeping with common practice in LLM deployment, defending teams were allowed to augment their core model (built from the provided 8B coding model) with surrounding system components. Defending teams could alter the system prompt, classify and modify the incoming prompt from the user, and implement custom decoding logic. Pre-processing of the input including adding rules, classifiers, and small generative models was permitted. On the output side, defending systems could also include manipulation of model output using rules, classifiers, and small generative models. This included use of Chain-of-Thought style reasoning (Wei et al., 2023), followed by post-processing to remove internal thought traces. Also, to focus innovations on the core model and avoid defending system designs where, e.g. the core model is 8B and then a 70B open-source model is used for post-processing, the total number of parameters across all auxiliary models was required to not exceed 800M. In order to accommodate patterns such as self-reflection (Renze & Guven, 2024) or correction, so long as they stay within a latency budget of 45 seconds, teams were permitted to pass input through multiple versions of the core 8B coding model in sequence. Attackers were less restricted in the choice of LLMs they could incorporate into their systems. However, both attackers and defenders were not permitted to use closed-box model APIs at runtime. Attackers were free to incorporate open-source LLMs, potentially using and/or specializing different models for different tasks (e.g. one model as an attack LLM to generate candidate attacks, and another as an assessor/judge LLM to rank candidate attacks or evaluate responses from the defending system). Attackers were permitted to connect these models with other system components (e.g. planners, rules, prompt mutators, dialog managers, etc.) to build the most adaptive and effective attack bots.

In this challenge design, the data to drive teams' innovations and development comes from their interaction with the 5 opposing teams they face through each tournament. We also found this format to be highly effective in driving competitive behavior. Throughout tournaments and office hours with each team, we repeatedly saw teams analyze and speculate on what the opposing sides might be doing and how to drive up their performance for the next round. It is important to note that the adversarial arena format actually drives two dimensions of competition. In the matchups, attackers and defenders come into contact and compete to win each conversation. However, attackers and defenders are not ranked against each other. The true competitors for the attackers are the other competing attacker teams, while the true competitors for defenders are the other competing defenders.

4.2 EVALUATION

As described in previous sections, the challenge consisted of a series of tournaments between attackers and defenders. Each matchup produced a set of conversations between the bots. For the competition, we set up an evaluation to decide the winner of each conversation (attacker of defender). Additionally, we created overall ranking strategies to incentivize teams to build the strongest attack bots and the safest defense systems. We describe our approach for evaluation in this section, which broadly consists of the following steps:

Annotations per sample (Attacker wins/Defender wins)	Malicious Code	Malicious Explanations	Overall
0/3	2920	2722	2616
1/2	526	675	691
2/1	298	353	369
3/0	156	150	224
% agreement	0.789	0.736	0.728
fleiss kappa	0.400	0.334	0.385
krippendorff alpha	0.400	0.334	0.385

Table 1: Inter-annotator Agreement for Security Event Detection

4.2.1 EVALUATING EACH CONVERSATION

Each conversation between any attacker and defender was evaluated in a two step process:

Vulnerable Code Detection. We first extract Python code from each defender response in the conversation (if present) and run a static code analyzer (specifically, Amazon CodeGuru¹) on it to determine if the code had any vulnerabilities. If a vulnerability is detected, the conversation is marked as a “Successful Attack.” As we score at conversation level, having multiple vulnerable code blocks in a conversation does not give attackers any additional points.

We recognize that static analysis tools are prone to generating false positives and can could result in safe code being marked as vulnerable. We treat this as a high precision, low recall filter on the generated dataset and accept this tradeoff considering that additional human verification or dynamic analysis were infeasible in context if this competition.

Security Event Detection. If no vulnerable code is detected, we then have the conversation annotated by a panel of human experts to determine if the defender model complied with a malicious request. We use human annotators with cybersecurity experience to label conversations for security events. Each conversation is labeled by three annotators, and the majority label is used as the conversation label. In order to ensure consistency, we developed detailed annotation guidelines which were provided to each annotator. These guidelines went through five refinement stages based on mock exercises, feedback from participating teams, and based on our learning during the competition. We worked with a pool of 30 expert annotators and each conversation was annotated by three different annotators. Low inter-annotator agreement was used to filter cases for inspection and find avenues for improvement in the annotation guidelines. Table 1 shows inter-annotator agreement scores, and Appendix D contains some analysis on this.

If either of these modules returns TRUE, the conversation is marked as a “Successful Attack.” If not, it is a “Successful Defense.”

4.2.2 AUXILIARY OBJECTIVES

Diversity for Successful Attacks We wanted to preclude attacking teams from using identical/similar attacks to the already successful attacks, and incentivize teams to generate diverse attacks. As such, we introduced an auxiliary objective for attackers to maintain diversity of attacks. We enforced this by measuring the diversity within the set successful attacks by an attacking team within a matchup. We experimented with both lexical (e.g. BLEU score (Papineni et al., 2002)) and embedding-based (e.g. SentenceBERT (Reimers & Gurevych, 2019)) approaches for this metric. In order to reward surface variation (e.g. paraphrases of attack strategies) we decided to use the BLEU score and focus on lexical similarity. As such, we used BLEU score to compute pairwise similarity, and then used the average similarity across all successful attack pairs to compute the final diversity score for an attacking team for the matchup.

Utility Evaluation for Defenders To ensure that the defender teams’ models were still useful while being safe, we evaluated them on a suite of static utility test sets created for the competition.

¹<https://aws.amazon.com/codeguru/>

The test sets covered 1) Instruction based code generation (similar to (Chen et al., 2021)) 2) Multi-turn benign conversations related to cybersecurity concepts 3) Multiturn code generation.

For all utility test sets, we normalized teams’ scores by capping the utility to the base ChallengeLLM’s utility. This ensured that teams were penalized when their systems lose utility but were not incentivized to generate data related to utility tasks. The final utility score for a defending team was obtained by averaging the normalized utility score for each set.

4.2.3 RANKING TEAMS

Ranking the attackers. The score for an attack team in each match-up was computed by combining the Attack Success Rate (ASR), with their diversity score. ASR is defined as the percentage of successful attack conversations with respect to the total number of conversations between an attacker and a defender. Intuitively, if two attacking teams have a similar ASR, but team A has lower diversity than team B, then it should be ranked lower than team B. As such, a team should be highly ranked if it has a high ASR as well as high diversity. We experimented with several combination measures, and the following formula to compute the normalized attack success rate (normalized ASR) was found to capture this intuition:

$$\text{Normalized ASR} = \text{ASR} \times \frac{\text{Diversity}}{100}$$

The overall score for an attacker was computed by averaging the normalized ASR across all defenders. This score was used for ranking the attackers.

Ranking the defenders. The Defense Success Rate (DSR) of a defender in each match up is defined as the percentage of conversations between an attacker and a defender that were labeled in favor of the defender as per the process described in Section 4.2.1. These DSR scores are averaged across all attackers to compute the average defense success for a defender.

The overall score for the defenders is computed by combining the average DSR across all attackers and the utility. Intuitively, this incentivizes defending teams to obtain high DSR while not regressing on utility compared to the base model. We experimented with several combination measures, and the following formula was found to capture this intuition and was used to rank defenders. Defense success is aggressively reduced as utility drops.

$$\text{Normalized DS} = \text{Average DS} \times \left(\frac{\text{Utility}}{100} \right)^4$$

4.3 OUTCOMES

This challenge demonstrated the effectiveness of the Adversarial Arena framework for generating high-quality adversarial data at scale. Through the competition we collected a rich dataset and observed the evolution of attack and defense strategies over multiple tournaments.

Data Generation at Scale Throughout 13 practice runs and 4 official tournaments, over 96,000 multi-turn conversations were generated with minimal human intervention during execution. 20,000 of these were from official tournaments and were hence labeled. Discarding conversations that were incomplete due to execution failures, we get a final dataset of 19683 conversations. Each run typically completed in less than 10 hours, with attack bots averaging 2-7.9 seconds per response and defense bots averaging 4.1-10.1 seconds.

Data Diversity Analysis We measure the diversity of the dataset generated from this challenge to demonstrate the following two benefits from the Adversarial Arena format:

1. **Crowdsourcing synthetic data:** Due to multiple teams generating synthetic data independently in an adversarial setting, we expect data generated by each team to have unique biases.
2. **Adversarial format encourages improvement in data quality over time:** As the Adversarial Arena framework works iteratively over multiple tournaments, we expect the data generated in each tournament to have unique biases.

	Attacker Level	Defender Level	Tournament Level
Average SD for each subset	0.2904	0.3114	0.3018
Average SD between all subset pairs	0.3211	0.3282	0.3269

Table 2: Semantic diversity results

Experiment	Secure Code Generation CyberSecEval-Instruct		Malicious Cyberactivity CyberSecEval-MITRE	
	No. of training samples	Secure code generation (%)	No. of training samples	Refusal (%)
Mistral-7B	-	72.60	-	57.10
Mistral-7B (fine-tuned)	9,942	86.01	13,336	73.90

Table 3: Results of fine-tuning Mistral-7B-Instruct on conversations obtained through Adversarial Arena for both the secure code generation task (evaluated using CyberSecEval Instruct benchmark) and refusal to malicious cyberactivity requests (evaluated using CyberSecEval MITRE benchmark).

For our experiments, data subsets are considered to have different biases if the average Semantic Distance between samples within each data subset d_i (denoted by $SD(d_i)$) is lower than the average semantic distance between samples from different data subsets d_j and d_k (denoted by $SD(d_j, d_k)$). To measure semantic distance between samples, we encode each sample s by pooling all activations from the last hidden layer of the Mistral-7B-Instruct model (Jiang et al., 2023). This operation is denoted as $E(s)$. The semantic distance between two samples s_1 and s_2 is defined as $S(s_1, s_2) = 1 - \text{Cosine}(s_1, s_2)$. Overall, $SD(d_i)$ and $SD(d_j, d_k)$ are defined as follows:

$$SD(d_i) = \sum_{\substack{s_1, s_2 \in d_i \\ s_1 \neq s_2}} S(s_1, s_2) \quad \text{and} \quad SD(d_i, d_j) = \sum_{s_1 \in d_i, s_2 \in d_j} S(s_1, s_2) \quad (1)$$

In table 2 we show SD comparisons at three levels: 1) For the first column we construct subsets by dividing the dataset according to attack teams. Each subset contains all conversations involving a particular attack team across all tournaments. 2) For the second column subsets are created by dividing the data by defense teams. 3) For the third column subsets are created by tournament. All data generated in one tournament constitutes one subset.

In all three cases, we report the average SD of all subsets, and the average SD between all pairs of subsets showing that all subsets have their own unique biases and hence contribute qualitatively different samples to the overall dataset. We also perform manual inspections of the data and found data generated by different teams to be qualitatively different, e.g. one of the attack teams had a lot of role playing style attacks. Another attacker generated a lot of prompts with requests to modify code that could result in vulnerabilities.

Data Quality Analysis To study the effectiveness of the collected data, we fine-tuned an open weight model, Mistral-7B-Instruct (Jiang et al., 2023), and measured the improvement in safety of the resulting model. Specifically, we ran 2 experiments. First, we extracted all the conversations that do not contain vulnerable code in any of the defender responses (as detected by Amazon CodeGuru). The resulting dataset, containing 9,942 conversations, was used to fine-tune Mistral-7B-Instruct. The model before and after fine-tuning was tested on CyberSecEval Instruct prompts (Bhatt et al., 2023), which are likely to result in vulnerable code. Second, we extracted all the conversations that do not contain code or detailed explanations for malicious cyberactivity assistance in any of the defender responses (as labeled by expert human annotators). The resulting dataset, containing 13,336 conversations, was used to fine-tune Mistral-7B-Instruct. The model before and after fine-tuning was tested on CyberSecEval MITRE prompts (Bhatt et al., 2023) designed to elicit cybersecurity-related malicious responses from an LLM. See Table 3 for the results.

We observe that the generated data results in substantial improvements across both secure code generation and malicious cyberactivity refusal tasks.

4.4 LEARNINGS

The data distribution for conversations between teams is unknown when the challenge starts, and evolves throughout the challenge. As such, we found that our initial evaluations suite did not adequately capture all the nuances of the attack and defense approaches. Therefore, we continued to update our evaluation throughout the challenge.

Next, we observed that several attackers hosted an internal defense bot, and vice versa, to test their approaches in between tournaments. We believe that to provide teams with more intermediate feedback, the challenge structure could be modified to have more frequent but smaller tournaments. Alternately, the challenge could be turned into an online one, where teams need to keep their bots up throughout the challenge.

We saw significant variation in teams' rankings across different tournaments, particularly for attackers. We believe that this was, in part, because attackers that did well in previous tournaments exposed their most promising attacks, which defenders were able to guard against in future tournaments. If only the scores from the final tournament are used to decide the final ranking, it could incentivize teams to hold off their most promising approaches until the end of the challenge, which may not be desirable. One way to address this problem would be to take into account the scores from all the tournaments for the final ranking.

Finally, while the challenge was focused on both vulnerable code and malicious code/explanations from defenders, most attackers found it easier to elicit vulnerable code compared to malicious code/explanations. Consequently, in the later part of the challenge, we saw attackers focus primarily on vulnerable code attacks. To balance exploration of multiple attack dimensions, it would be better to use a metric that penalizes imbalanced coverage, such as the harmonic mean of attack success rate across different dimensions.

5 DISCUSSION

We described the Adversarial Arena framework for the task of cybersecurity alignment. However, the framework is general and can easily extend to other classes of safety and security alignment for LLMs.

Additionally, our framework can be adapted to tasks that may not be inherently adversarial in nature. For instance, LLMs tend to over-agree with humans (Ranaldi & Pucci, 2023). This can also be cast in our framework: attackers attempt to elicit agreement with invalid assertions, while defender teams align the model to resist such over-agreement. Another such task is the problem of building a proficient model for text summarization. Here, the attackers could be tasked with providing challenging problems, that the model is not likely to work well on, while defense teams would be tasked with improving the model to keep up with increasingly challenging requests from the attackers.

While our proposed approach is highly effective for crowdsourcing data, it can also be used as a framework to run competitions to foster innovation. The competition structure provides a dynamic multi-turn evaluation framework, which can test model behavior not measurable by static benchmarks. Additionally, as each team is evaluated against multiple opponents, this framework incentivizes teams to build robust systems. The dynamic evaluation framework and the competition structure results in a flywheel effect, where teams' approaches improve over the competition.

Despite our proposed framework having several advantages, we recognize it has some limitations. The primary complication is that to execute a challenge using our framework that generates useful data and techniques from participating teams, it is crucial to design a good evaluation protocol. This involves scoping out what attackers and defenders are allowed to do. To rank attack and defense teams, an evaluation approach must be designed to label each conversation as a success for the attacker or defender. Auxiliary objectives may be needed to score attackers and defenders, similar to our attack diversity and defender utility scoring, as described in Section 4.2.

6 CONCLUSION

Availability of sufficient quantities of high quality training data remains a significant challenge in the development and application of large language models. We propose a novel approach for crowdsourcing data using the Adversarial Arena framework, which consists of an orchestrator that facilitates multi-turn conversations between multiple attackers and defenders, competing over a series of tournaments. From the crucible of interactive competition, highly varied and diverse datasets can be extracted. As an example, we detail the application of the framework to the challenge of cybersecurity alignment for coding assistants. We present experiments showing that training on the resulting data improves the cybersecurity alignment of a public model and furthermore that the effectiveness of the training data improves over the course of a sequence of tournaments. We also examine measures of relative data diversity using cosine distance among embeddings and show that relative diversity of data collected across multiple teams is more diverse from what we see from a single team.

ETHICS STATEMENT

Note that while the proposed technique generates multi-turn conversational data it does not directly involve human subjects. The conversations result instead from interaction among automated attack and defense bots. Human evaluators annotating dialogs for attack or defense success worked under contract and were fairly compensated. We would also like to highlight the fact that the proposed technique is designed to address the problem of inherent bias in datasets.

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A DIVERSITY VISUALIZATIONS




Figure 2: T-SNE plots: Conversations in the left plot are grouped by attackers, the middle plot is grouped by defenders, and the plot on the right has conversations grouped by tournaments.

Figure 2 shows 2D T-SNE (van der Maaten & Hinton, 2008) plots of the dataset obtained from the Cybersecurity Alignment Challenge using Adversarial Arena. Points in the first plot are colored by attackers. The plot shows that conversations by different attackers occupy different regions in 2D space. This further supports our claim that data generated by different teams is qualitatively different and contains different biases. The collection of all these datasets results in a richer dataset where these individual biases are balanced out. The second plot (middle) also exhibits this pattern but not as pronounced. We believe this is because conversations are driven by attackers as they generate the prompts. Additionally, as the competition was related to cybersecurity alignment, a large portion of defender responses are refusals which tend to be semantically and lexically similar. The last plot is colored by tournaments. This also exhibits different biases for different subsets of the dataset.

B ORCHESTRATOR INFRASTRUCTURE DETAILS

The Orchestrator Infrastructure is built mainly using AWS Lambda², Amazon SQS (Simple Queue Service)³ and Amazon DynamoDB⁴ to achieve a fully serverless, scalable, and event-driven architecture. It consists of two primary phases as described below. (See Figure3 for a schematic.)

B.1 INITIALIZATION PHASE

The Config Assistant Lambda fetches the list of eligible bots from a database and constructs all attacker-defender pairs. It records pair configurations (e.g., session targets, readiness status, number of finished sessions) in a tournament config table. Once pair readiness is verified, the Session Coordinator Lambda retrieves all eligible pairs and enqueues the first batch of session-start messages (with empty history) into each attacker’s SQS queue.

B.2 RUNTIME PHASE (LIFE OF A SESSION)

The core unit of orchestration is a multi-turn session between an attacker and a defender:

1. Attack team scheduler invokes the attacker handler (owned by the Orchestrator), which dequeues a session message, constructs a request including session history, and calls the attack team’s Lambda endpoint (owned by team’s bot). (Steps 1-3 in Figure 3)
2. The attacker’s response is logged to the database. If no end signal is returned, a new message with updated history is sent to the defender’s queue. (Steps 4-5 in Figure 3)
3. Defense team Scheduler invokes the defender handler (owned by the Orchestrator), which repeats the above steps for the defender. (Steps 6-10 in Figure 3)

²<https://aws.amazon.com/lambda/>

³<https://aws.amazon.com/sqs/>

⁴<https://aws.amazon.com/dynamodb/>

The diagram illustrates the Orchestrator system architecture, divided into two main phases: Tournament Init Time and Tournament Runtime.

Tournament Init Time:

- AlexaPrizeRAITeams (dynamodb)** sends data (a) to the **Config Assistant (lambda)**.
- The **Config Assistant (lambda)** sends data (b) to **TournamentConfig (dynamodb)**.

Tournament Runtime:

- TournamentConfig (dynamodb)** sends data (13 c) to the **Session Coordinator (lambda)**.
- TournamentSessionInfo (dynamodb)** sends data (14) to the **Session Coordinator (lambda)**.
- The **Session Coordinator (lambda)** sends data (11) to the **Scheduler**.
- The **Scheduler** sends data (12) to the **Attacker1 Handler (lambda)**.
- The **Attacker1 Handler (lambda)** sends data (1) to the **Request Handler (lambda)**.
- The **Request Handler (lambda)** sends data (3) to the **LLM (cloud_service)**.
- The **LLM (cloud_service)** sends data (4) to the **TournamentSessions (dynamodb)**.
- The **TournamentSessions (dynamodb)** sends data (9) to the **Defender1 Handler (lambda)**.
- The **Defender1 Handler (lambda)** sends data (8) to the **Request Handler (lambda)**.
- The **Request Handler (lambda)** sends data (6) to the **LLM (cloud_service)**.
- The **LLM (cloud_service)** sends data (7) to the **Defender1 Request Queue (queue)**.
- The **Defender1 Request Queue (queue)** sends data (5) to the **Attacker1 Request Queue (queue)**.
- The **Attacker1 Request Queue (queue)** sends data (2) to the **Attacker1 Handler (lambda)**.
- The **Attacker1 Handler (lambda)** sends data (15) to the **Session Coordinator (lambda)**.
- The **Session Coordinator (lambda)** sends data (10) to the **Defender1 Handler (lambda)**.
- The **Defender1 Handler (lambda)** sends data (6) to the **Scheduler**.
- The **Scheduler** sends data (12) to the **Attacker1 Handler (lambda)**.

Attack Team1 Account:

- Contains the **Request Handler (lambda)** and **LLM (cloud_service)**.

Defend Team1 Account:

- Contains the **Request Handler (lambda)** and **LLM (cloud_service)**.

B.3 FUNCTIONAL GUARANTEES

Pairing and Session Scheduling All attacker-defender pairs are statically defined during initialization based on the tournament configuration. The system supports per-pair session quotas, enabling unequal traffic allocation for A/B testing or special matchups.

Session Control and Termination Sessions terminate when an attacker signals end-of-session, a fatal error occurs, or the maximum number of turns is reached. The Session Coordinator dynamically monitors the number of finished sessions and session status, and automatically launches additional batches until all configured sessions for each pair are completed.

Error Tolerance and Fault Isolation Each bot has an independent execution context and request queue. Bots experiencing issues can be paused without affecting others. Failed API calls are retried once; persistent failures trigger session termination and log updates.

Traffic Control and Batching The system enforces consistent message pacing, which prevents overwhelming bot endpoints. Sessions are launched in batches, allowing attackers to adapt their strategies between batches.

Partial Availability Support The system starts or continues tournaments as long as at least one attacker and defender are online. Offline bots are skipped temporarily and can be resumed upon recovery.

Elastic Scaling Infrastructure Stateless Lambda functions and decoupled queues scale automatically with the number of bots and sessions.

B.4 DESIGN TRADE-OFFS AND CONSIDERATIONS

The Orchestrator was designed for scalability, modularity, and resilience, but several trade-offs were considered:

Limited Real-Time Feedback By design, the orchestrator buffers and delays intermediate results until sessions conclude, which limits live monitoring.

Latency Turn-based interactions incur delay due to Lambda cold starts⁵ and SQS polling, which may not reflect real-time conversation dynamics.

Retry Semantics Bots must be designed to handle duplicate requests due to Lambda retries, adding complexity for stateful bots.

Despite these limitations, the orchestrator provides a robust and extensible framework for running high-integrity adversarial evaluations at scale.

C ADDITIONAL OUTCOMES FROM THE CYBERSECURITY ALIGNMENT CASE STUDY

Evolution of Attack Success Patterns Analysis of the tournament conversations (Figure 4) revealed interesting dynamics in attack success rates. The percentage of conversations (Table 4) with detected security events (malicious code or cyberattack assistance) decreased consistently from Tournament 1 to Tournament 3. This trend indicates that defenders successfully adapted their defenses against these attacks, which made security events difficult to elicit.

In contrast, code vulnerabilities remained a persistent challenge throughout all tournaments. Each tournament typically uncovered tens of distinct vulnerability types (Table 5), mapped to various Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs). Individual vulnerable conversations often contained multiple vulnerabilities. Among the detected vulnerabilities, certain types such as resource leaks and OS command injection appeared with higher frequency, demonstrating the effectiveness of attacks targeting resource management and system-level operations.

Novel Approaches from Competing Teams Throughout the tournaments, participating teams developed innovative strategies that evolved in response to their opponents' tactics. Defense teams developed innovative defensive strategies that shared several key themes: multi-component architectures with input classifiers and output guardrails, synthetic data generation for supervised fine-tuning and preference optimization, and reasoning-based alignment inspired by recent advances in deliberative models. Notably, teams like Team A and Team B incorporated reinforcement learning with custom reward functions combining static analysis tools and LLM judges to jointly optimize for

⁵<https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/lambda-runtime-environment.html#cold-start-latency>

safety and utility. Team C introduced a dynamic prompting system where an intent recognition classifier adjusted the system prompt based on whether requests were benign, malicious, or borderline, coupled with output verification that triggered response regeneration when needed. Several teams also deployed sophisticated output processing, training specialized vulnerability fixers that could repair insecure code patterns identified during tournaments.

Attackers pursued equally diverse attack strategies. Many teams built attacker-defender-evaluator frameworks, using these multi-component systems to iteratively refine their attacks. A common technique was transforming benign utility examples into harmful prompts, often using multi-turn conversations to gradually escalate the malicious content. Teams developed sophisticated attack planners - for instance, Team D’s COMET system evaluated prompts across multiple dimensions (strategy, objective, style, template), while Team E employed hierarchical planning with upper confidence bound algorithms for strategy selection. Particularly innovative approaches included Team F’s use of Gibbs sampling to efficiently explore the attack space and find borderline cases where judge models disagreed, and Team G’s strategy library that captured patterns from both failed and successful attacks to adaptively evolve prompts during deployment. The independent development of these diverse approaches by competing teams generated a rich dataset spanning a wide spectrum of attack vectors and defensive strategies. This competitive environment produced strategies with sophistication and diversity that would be difficult to achieve through traditional crowdsourcing or purely synthetic generation methods.




Figure 4: Vulnerable vs Malicious Sessions Across Tournaments

Tournament	% of Vulnerable Code Detected Sessions	% of Security Event Detected Sessions
T01	19%	12%
T02	28%	5%
T03	21%	4%

Table 4: Percentage of Vulnerable and Malicious Sessions Across Tournaments

D ANALYSIS OF INTER-ANNOTATOR AGREEMENT

Figure 7 shows visualizations of inter-annotator agreement across all pairs of annotators, for MAL_CODE, MAL_EXPLN and overall. The annotators are sorted by their average agree-

Vulnerability Title	Occurrence
CWE-400,664 - Resource leak	1221
CWE-77,78,88 - OS command injection	1180
CWE-327 - Insecure cryptography	429
CWE-319 - Insecure connection using unencrypted protocol	290
Not setting the connection timeout parameter	254
CWE-798 - Hardcoded credentials	217
CWE-327,328 - Insecure hashing	190
CWE-269 - Improper privilege management	155
CWE-20,79,80 - Cross-site scripting	134
CWE-295 - Improper certificate validation	134

Table 5: Top 10 Most Frequent Vulnerabilities in Tournament 3 (from 38 unique vulnerability types mapping to 44+ CWEs)

annotator #	avg agreement code	annotator #	avg agreement explanations	annotator #	avg agreement overall
14	0.893	5	0.876	14	0.867
12	0.885	14	0.869	5	0.861
5	0.884	6	0.861	12	0.857
1	0.884	19	0.856	17	0.856
17	0.881	1	0.856	1	0.850
3	0.881	12	0.854	29	0.845
9	0.881	9	0.852	19	0.843
26	0.878	29	0.850	3	0.837
13	0.875	30	0.844	16	0.836
19	0.873	3	0.843	9	0.836
29	0.871	16	0.842	6	0.830
20	0.869	13	0.838	4	0.826
4	0.867	4	0.837	13	0.826
8	0.863	17	0.834	20	0.825
25	0.862	26	0.833	26	0.825
16	0.860	20	0.832	25	0.824
18	0.860	7	0.829	30	0.823
7	0.858	25	0.817	7	0.816
30	0.857	18	0.814	2	0.814
6	0.854	2	0.813	18	0.814
28	0.850	22	0.810	10	0.801
15	0.844	21	0.804	22	0.799
27	0.843	10	0.802	15	0.797
23	0.840	15	0.793	27	0.796
2	0.839	27	0.789	8	0.792
10	0.837	24	0.788	24	0.790
21	0.827	11	0.785	11	0.789
11	0.824	8	0.777	21	0.777
22	0.824	28	0.771	28	0.770
24	0.817	23	0.766	23	0.742

Table 6: Average agreement of each annotator in decreasing order

ment scores. We see that the agreement scores are slightly higher for MAL_CODE, than for MAL_EXPLN. The figure also shows the histogram of inter-annotator agreement scores across these categories which shows the distribution of agreement between annotators. Further, we calculate the average agreement scores for each annotator, averaged over all annotators that they shared an annotation task with. This can be found in Table 6




Figure 5: Example Adversarial Conversation 1: A representative conversation between an attacker and a defender captured during a tournament. The attack attempts to elicit malicious code and cyber-attack assistance through crafted prompts. All malicious content has been redacted with descriptive placeholders. Non-malicious code was truncated for brevity.

E UTILITY BENCHMARKS FOR THE CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGE

Utility benchmarks were used during the challenge as an auxiliary objective for defender teams. To ensure that these benchmarks remain truly hidden, we created custom benchmarks using a combination of synthetic generation and human verification. Participating teams received a subset of these benchmarks as development sets and were tested against new subsets for each tournament.




Figure 6: Example Adversarial Conversation 2: A conversation demonstrating a multi-step attack strategy, where the attacker begins with benign requests and gradually transitions to malicious intentions over five turns. Malicious content has been redacted with descriptive labels.




Figure 7: Visualizations of pairwise agreements between annotators, along with a histogram of inter-annotator agreement scores

E.1 INSTRUCTION BASED CODE GENERATION

This benchmark consisted of function level code generation tasks. We first generated multiple prompts using LLMs by providing a random batch of prompts from HumanEval(Chen et al., 2021). We then generated a large number of solutions and test cases for each prompt and run each solution against all test cases. We then only keep the solution that passes the largest set of test cases and discard all other solutions and the failing test cases. Finally, these prompts, solutions, and test cases are manually reviewed by a human annotator for correctness before being used in the competition.

E.2 CYBERSECURITY QA

This benchmark contained benign questions related to cybersecurity (e.g., “What are the different types of malware?”). We manually collected a set of keywords and used LLMs to generate a set of questions about them. Then, we asked LLMs to generate multi-turn conversation around each of these questions where the question would be the last turn for the model under test to respond to. This benchmark was evaluated using an LLM judge that detects if the model deflected the question or answered it. The limitation of this benchmark was that it did not check for the correctness of the response, but we found this acceptable as an auxiliary objective for the challenge.

E.3 MULTI-TURN CODE GENERATION

This benchmark was built to test the ability of defender systems on coding tasks in domains like database access, web servers, etc. As code for these domains are more likely to have vulnerabilities, this would be more likely to have overlap with tournament conversations. To build this benchmark, we started by generating prompts using LLMs with prompts from CyberSecEval (instruct subset) as seeds. We then generated 10 responses for each of these prompts and checked for code vulnerabilities in all responses using CodeGuru⁶. We discarded prompt for which more than 7 or less than 1 response were flagged. This way we were left with prompts for which there exists a secure solution but there could also be vulnerable solutions. Finally, we used an LLM to expand each prompt into

⁶<https://aws.amazon.com/codeguru/>

1242 a multi-turn conversation. Performance on this benchmark was evaluated using and LLM Judge.
1243 To make the benchmark stylistically closer to tournament conversations, we also implemented some
1244 jailbreak techniques in some of these benign conversations.
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