AUTOHIJACKER: AUTOMATIC INDIRECT PROMPT INJECTION AGAINST BLACK-BOX LLM AGENTS

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ABSTRACT

Although *large Language Models* (LLMs) and LLM agents have been widely adopted, they are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious external data is injected to manipulate model behaviors. Existing evaluations of LLM robustness against such attacks are limited by handcrafted methods and reliance on white-box or gray-box access—conditions unrealistic in practical deployments. To bridge this gap, we propose AutoHijacker, an automatic indirect black-box prompt injection attack. Built on the concept of LLM-as-optimizers, AutoHijacker introduces a batch-based optimization framework to handle sparse feedback and also leverages a trainable memory to enable effective generation of indirect prompt injections without continuous querying. Evaluations on two public benchmarks, AgentDojo and Open-Prompt-Injection, show that AutoHijacker outperforms 11 baseline attacks and achieves state-of-the-art performance without requiring external knowledge like user instructions or model configurations, and also demonstrates higher average attack success rates against 8 various defenses. Additionally, AutoHijacker successfully attacks a commercial LLM agent platform, achieving a 71.9% attack success rate in both document interaction and website browsing tasks.

1 INTRODUCTION

Large Language Models (LLMs) (Brown et al., 2020; Touvron et al., 2023; OpenAI, 2023; Anthropic, 2024) have revolutionized various domains by enabling sophisticated natural language processing tasks with unprecedented accuracy and flexibility. These models, empowered by vast amounts of data and complex architectures, are now embedded into a wide array of applications and intelligent agents (LangChain, 2023; Weber, 2024; Gravitas, 2023; Yao et al., 2022b; Wang et al., 2023b; Yao et al., 2022a), reshaping industries ranging from customer service to content generation. The profound impact of these models, however, comes with substantial challenges in security and trustworthiness.

Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks. A significant threat is indirect prompt injection attacks (Greshake et al., 2023; Yi et al., 2023; Debenedetti et al., 2024). They occur within LLM-integrated applications and agents when a query combines user instructions with external data. If this external data is manipulated to include hidden commands, LLMs, which process inputs in natural language, may inadvertently execute these hidden instructions. This occurs because LLMs often cannot distinguish between legitimate user commands and maliciously crafted external inputs, leading to altered user instructions and potentially harmful outcomes. With the growing need to understand and mitigate indirect prompt injection vulnerabilities in LLMs and LLM agents, it is essential to explore the practical threat landscape these systems face in real-world scenarios. To this end, it is important to develop a black-box attack method that fully reveals how resilient LLMs and LLM agents are against indirect prompt injection inputs. This approach would imitate real-world scenarios where attackers launch attacks without detailed knowledge of the models' internal workings.

Limitations of Existing Efforts. Existing works on prompt injection attacks have two primary limitations. Firstly, many of these methods are handcrafted rather than automated (Perez & Ribeiro, 2022; Toyer et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2024b; Debenedetti et al., 2024). While these approaches can occasionally expose critical vulnerabilities, they are limited by the designer's cognitive biases and do not provide a comprehensive robustness exploration. In contrast, automated methods in adversarial machine learning (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Croce & Hein, 2020; Zou et al., 2023), have demonstrated the ability to systematically conduct robustness evaluation via generating adversarial examples. The absence of automated methods leaves a gap in thoroughly assessing the robustness of LLMs and LLM agents against indirect prompt injection attacks.



Figure 1: **Left**: Indirect prompt injection attacks often yield sparse feedback, making it difficult for attackers to assess the success of their attempts. Due to the existence of original user instruction, the model's responses typically do not reflect the injected content if the attack is weak, thus hindering optimization. In contrast, jailbreak attacks offer more detailed feedback from the model, enabling easier optimization. **Right**: The experiments demonstrate that the sparse feedback in indirect prompt injection tasks makes it challenging for LLM-as-optimizers (Chao et al., 2023) to improve, resulting in consistently low scores (red curve), while jailbreak attacks progress smoothly (blue curve).

Secondly, despite a few studies making efforts on automated method Liu et al. (2024a); Pasquini et al. (2024), these methods rely on white-box or gray-box accessibility to the victim models. The white-box attacks require full access to the model's internal parameters and loss functions, while the gray-box approaches depend on internal knowledge, such as prompt information or specific configurations of the model. For instance, white-box gradient-based attacks, such as MGCG (Liu et al., 2024a) and NeuralExec (Pasquini et al., 2024) attacks, depend on having access to the internal gradients of the model. And gray-box attacks like the tool-knowledge attack Debenedetti et al. (2024) and the combined attack (Liu et al., 2024b) need to know the internal design, such as users' prompts and tool information, of the victim LLMs and LLM agents. However, these accessibilities to the victim models are often impractical in real-world scenarios where such access is restricted. Therefore, there is a significant need for automated prompt injection robustness evaluation techniques that can operate under black-box conditions, reflecting real-world challenges more accurately.

To bridge this gap, we propose **AutoHijacker**, an automatic prompt injection vulnerability scanning tool that is designed to evaluate the indirect prompt injection robustness of victim models (and agents) under black-box conditions. Our method can automatically identify potential vulnerabilities in LLMs and LLM agents without human intervention. Specifically, our approach is built upon the concept of LLM-as-optimizers (Yang et al., 2024; Yuksekgonul et al., 2024; Chao et al., 2023; Mehrotra et al., 2024) and utilizes LLMs to generate indirect prompt injection test cases. LLM-as-optimizers use the responses provided by target LLMs as feedback to generate corresponding test cases. Despite in scenarios where LLMs-as-optimizers are proven to be effective, such as in jailbreak attacks, **one significant challenge in applying LLM-as-optimizers for prompt injection attacks is the sparse nature of feedback from victim models.** Typically, LLM-as-optimizers require very fine-grained feedback to simulate a "gradient," allowing them to optimize and produce better solutions. Yang et al. (2024); Yuksekgonul et al. (2024). In contrast, prompt injection attacks typically receive sparse feedback. As shown in Fig. 1, when an attacker repeatedly attempts to execute attacks against a victim LLM, in most cases, the model's response does not reflect the injected content, leading to the issue of "sparse" feedback and poor performance. To address this issue, we introduce a batch-based optimization framework. By optimizing over a batch of data during the training stage, the model can better handle sparse feedback states, smoothing the optimization process. **Then a key challenge posed by batch-based optimization is how to transfer and apply the attack knowledge discovered by LLM-as-optimizers across different samples.** Our method addresses this by implementing a two-stage attack strategy and constructing an attack memory. During the training phase, we carefully build an attack memory that selects and stores the history of previous attacks. In the test phase, we leverage this log to generate effective prompt injection test cases. Excitingly, This design allows for attacks without the need for continuous querying during testing, making it especially valuable in real-world scenarios where service providers may limit the number of allowed queries.

To evaluate the effectiveness of our method, we conducted comprehensive assessments using two public benchmarks: AgentDojo Debenedetti et al. (2024) and Open-Prompt-Injection Liu et al.

(2024b). By evaluating the proposed method in comparison with 11 baseline attacks and against 8 diverse defenses, our experiments demonstrate that our method achieves state-of-the-art performance without relying on external knowledge, such as user requests, tool functionalities, or any user-specific information like the user's name, which are required by the baseline methods. Moreover, our attack achieves better average ASRs against defenses. To assess the practical effectiveness of our method and its attack strength in real-world LLM agents and applications, we evaluated our approach on a commercial LLM agent [1] that empowers LLMs with *Retrieval-Augmented Generation* (RAG) (Lewis et al., 2020) and tool-using abilities. Specifically, our AutoHijacker successfully attacks this commercial LLM agent with a high average attack success rate of 71.9% in document interaction and website browsing tasks.

2 Related Works

Prompt injection attacks have emerged as a significant threat to LLMs and their applications. Because LLMs are designed to process inputs in natural language, they often struggle to distinguish between user commands and external inputs, making them vulnerable to such attacks. This vulnerability has been extensively documented in recent studies (Greshake et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2023a; Pedro et al., 2023; Yan et al., 2023; Yu et al., 2023; Salem et al., 2023; Yi et al., 2023; Yip et al., 2024; Debenedetti et al., 2024; Zhan et al., 2024b; Liu et al., 2024a; Pasquini et al., 2024; Shi et al., 2024). The phenomenon was first identified in academic research by Perez & Ribeiro (2022), who demonstrated that LLMs could be misdirected by simple, handcrafted inputs, leading to goal hijacking and prompt leakage. Liu et al. (2023) developed a framework for prompt injection attacks, applying it to study 36 LLM-integrated applications and identifying 31 as vulnerable. Further research has evaluated handcrafted prompt injection methods for both goal hijacking and prompt leaking (Toyer et al., 2023), as well as scenarios where attackers aim to shift the LLM's task to a different language (Liu et al., 2024b). Prompt injection vulnerabilities in LLM agents have also been assessed in (Debenedetti et al., 2024; Zhan et al., 2024a). Beyond academic findings, online posts (Harang, 2023; Willison, 2022; 2023) have highlighted the risk of prompt injection across various commercial LLM platforms, raising widespread concerns. In this paper, we focus primarily on indirect prompt injection attacks (Greshake et al., 2023; Yi et al., 2023; Zhan et al., 2024a; Liu et al., 2024a; Abdelnabi et al., 2024), where the injection data originates from external resources. Existing prompt injection attacks have significant limitations. They are mainly handcrafted rather than automated, limiting systematic exploration due to human biases. Moreover, many strong attacks depend on white-box or gray-box access to models, requiring internal parameters or configurations such as user instruction and tool knowledge. Such access is impractical in real-world black-box scenarios. Our work addresses these limitations by introducing a black-box automatic indirect prompt injection attack.

3 AutoHijacker

3.1 Overview

Preliminaries. Our objective is to design an algorithm that can automatically convert original external data (e.g., documents, websites) into injected data that misleads LLMs and LLM agents into achieving an unintended attack goal when processing these external data. Formally, we aim to develop an algorithm $\mathcal{F}_\theta$ that satisfies the following condition: $\mathcal{I}(LM(U, \mathcal{F}_\theta(D)), G) = 1$, where LM represents the victim LLMs or LLM agents, U represents the user instruction (e.g., "Summarize this PDF."), D represents the original external data (e.g., a PDF document), and $\mathcal{I}(\cdot, \cdot)$ is an indicator function that determines whether the former input satisfies the latter input.[2] Specifically, in the above formulation, it judges whether the output of LM satisfies the attack goal G.

Threat Model. We assume that the attack algorithm cannot access internal information about the victim model's response process. This includes internal outputs (e.g., the intermediate actions of LLM agents), the user's requests, knowledge of tool functionalities, or any user-specific information, such as the user's name. These types of information are often leveraged in existing attack methods to construct stronger attacks, as discussed in Sec. 1 while, in practice, it is typically infeasible for attackers to obtain such details. We assume the attacker can have a reasonable guess about the foundation LLM used behind the victim system but does not have white-box access (e.g., knowing the detailed parameters of the model) to it. The attacker can only observe the responses of the foundation

[1] To ensure responsible disclosure, we refer to the platform anonymously hereafter.

[2] The specific implementation of this function may vary depending on different evaluation protocols.

Algorithm 1 AutoHijacker Training Stage

Input: Training data $\{(\text{external data } D_n, \text{attack goal } G_n, \text{user instruction } U_n)\}_{n=1}^{N}$, attacker, prompter, scorer, victim foundation LLM
Parameter: Max epochs I
Initialize: Empty attack memory $\mathcal{A}$
for $i = 1$ to I **do**
  for $n = 1$ to N **do**
    Generate meta prompt $M_{i,n}$ using the prompter:
      $M_{i,n} = \text{prompter}(\mathcal{A}, D_n, G_n)$
    Generate injection data $\hat{D}_{i,n}$ using the attacker:
      $\hat{D}_{i,n} = \text{attacker}(M_{i,n}, D_n, G_n)$
    Get victim response $R_{i,n}$ from the victim LLM:
      $R_{i,n} = \text{victim LLM}(U_n, \hat{D}_{i,n})$
    Compute score $S_{i,n}$ using the scorer:
      $S_{i,n} = \text{scorer}(R_{i,n}, G_n)$
    Add $\{D_n, G_n, M_{i,n}, \hat{D}_{i,n}, S_{i,n}\}$ to attack memory $\mathcal{A}$ according to alg. A
  end for
end for
return Attack memory $\mathcal{A}$

LLM. This assumption is practical because existing LLM-agent-as-service platforms usually disclose the foundational LLMs used by their agents (Lablab.ai; Coze).

To achieve our goal, we introduce **AutoHijacker**, an automated black-box indirect prompt injection attack Our method leverages a multi-agent LLM to produce indirect prompt injection data, utilizing LLMs themselves as optimizers to learn the attack memory and generate effective injection data.

Framework Structure. We introduce three LLMs that cooperate in a multi-agent system, consisting of an *attacker*, a *prompter*, and a *scorer*. The prompter takes the original external data D, the attack goal G, and a trained attack memory $\mathcal{A}$, and outputs a meta-prompt M containing design instructions to guide the attacker in generating effective injection data. The attacker, using the meta-prompt M, original external data D, and attack goal G, generates the injection data $\hat{D}$. The scorer takes the response from the LM and the attack goal G, and returns a score S. This score will guide the subsequent rounds of generation, as we will describe later. Note that in our framework, we introduce an individual prompter to generate a meta-prompt that guides the attacker, rather than having the attacker directly generate injection data based on the input or using approaches like *Chain-of-Thought* (CoT) (Wei et al., 2022). This design ensures that clearer instructions are provided to the attacker, mitigating potential performance drops that could occur due to long-context scenarios, especially when the attack memory is provided entirely to the attacker.

Attack Pipeline. AutoHijacker operates in two main stages: the *training stage* and the *test stage*. In the training stage (Sec. 3.2), it develops the attack memory mentioned earlier. In the test stage (Sec. 3.3), it utilizes the trained attack memory to perform a one-step generation of injection data.

3.2 Training Stage - Batch-based optimization

Handling the Sparse Feedbacks. In Sec. 1, we mentioned that a significant challenge in prompt injection attacks is the sparse feedback they typically receive, whereas LLMs-as-optimizers usually rely on fine-grained feedback. As shown in Fig. 1, for a single injection data $\hat{D}$ generated by $\mathcal{F}_\theta$, the feedback states across multiple query times will likely remain the same, leading to sparse feedback states. Namely, both the previous and current rounds of optimization may likely yield similarly low scores, making the optimization process difficult to advance. To address this issue, we argue that generating multiple diverse injection data instead of a single instance can mitigate the sparsity of feedback. This is because, for different injection data, the feedback states are less likely to align (i.e., scenarios where the scorer returns all zeros for the entire batch are less likely to occur). In this case, it is more likely that certain instances will result in more effective injection data compared to the previous round during optimization rounds. Leveraging this information to optimize on a broader set of data increases the chances of discovering further opportunities for improvement, allowing the scores to continue improving and guiding the optimization process in a productive direction.

Thus, the training stage of AutoHijacker focuses on optimizing the generation of effective prompt injection inputs by leveraging a batch-based optimization framework. As depicted in Alg. 1, the training process operates over N training data points, each consisting of external data D_n, an attack goal G_n, and a user instruction U_n. The attack goal G_n specifies the desired malicious behavior we aim to induce in the victim model. For each epoch i (up to a maximum of I epochs), and for each data point n, the following steps are performed:

1. *Meta Prompt Generation:* We generate a meta prompt $M_{i,n}$ using the *prompter* LLM that takes the current attack memory $\mathcal{A}$, the external data D_n, and the attack goal G_n as inputs. The meta prompt encapsulates potential attack strategies and guides the *attacker* to generate injection data.
2. *Injection Data Generation:* An *attacker* LLM uses the meta prompt $M_{i,n}$, along with D_n and G_n, to produce the injection data $\hat{D}i, n$. This injection data is designed to manipulate the victim model into exhibiting the desired malicious behavior specified by G_n.
3. *Victim Model Interaction:* The injection data $\hat{D}i, n$ is combined with the user instruction U_n and input to the victim foundation LLM. The victim foundation LLM generates a response $R_{i,n}$.
4. *Scoring:* A *scorer* LLM evaluates the victim model's response $R_{i,n}$ against the attack goal G_n, producing a score $S_{i,n}$. The score reflects how successfully the injection data induced the desired behavior in the victim model.
5. *Attack Memory Update:* The data point, along with its score, is added to the attack memory $\mathcal{A}$ according to the procedure outlined in Alg. A. The attack memory retains the most effective and least effective attacks, which are used to inform future generations of injection data.

Attack Memory Construction. The above batch-based optimization requires the sharing of attack knowledge between different training samples. To address how the attack knowledge discovered by LLM-as-optimizers can be transferred and applied across different samples, we introduce the attack memory $\mathcal{A}$. This critical component of AutoHijacker acts as a repository for past attacks and their effectiveness, guiding the generation of future injection data by offering examples of both successful and unsuccessful attacks. As outlined in Alg. A in the appendix, the attack memory is updated after each iteration during the training stage. When a new data point $D_n, G_n, M_{i,n}, \hat{D}i, n, Si, n$ is obtained, the following steps are performed:

1. *Memory Augmentation:* The new data point is added to the existing attack memory $\mathcal{A}$, resulting in an augmented memory $\mathcal{A}'$.
2. *Scoring and Sorting:* All entries in $\mathcal{A}'$ are associated with their respective scores S_j. The entries are sorted in descending order based on the scores to identify the most effective attacks and in ascending order to identify the least effective ones.
3. *Memory Pruning:* To maintain a manageable size and focus on the most informative examples, we retain the top k_{top} entries with the highest scores and the bottom k_{bottom} entries with the lowest scores. These entries constitute the updated attack memory $\mathcal{A}$.

By retaining both the most and least successful attacks, the attack memory provides a balanced perspective that helps the prompter and attacker LLM generate effective injection data. The inclusion of unsuccessful attacks is important as it informs the model about strategies that do not work, preventing it from repeating ineffective approaches. Moreover, it enables our method to perform one-step generation during the test stage, eliminating the need for additional queries.

3.3 Test Stage - One Step Generation

In the test stage, AutoHijacker leverages the attack memory $\mathcal{A}$ constructed during the training stage to generate effective prompt injection inputs without the need for iterative optimization or continuous querying on the victim model. Superficially, given new external data D, an attack goal G, the following steps are performed: (1). *Meta Prompt Generation:* The *prompter* LLM generates a meta prompt M by utilizing the attack memory $\mathcal{A}$, along with the external data D and attack goal G; (2). *Injection Data Generation:* The *attacker* LLM uses the meta prompt M, along with D and G, to generate the injection data $\hat{D}$. This step mirrors the injection data generation in the training stage but relies solely on the attack memory without additional interaction with the victim model.

Details can be found in Alg. B in the Appendix. By using the attack memory to inform the generation process, AutoHijacker can produce potent prompt injection inputs in a single step, suitable for black-box settings where querying the victim model may be limited or infeasible. After generating the injection data $\hat{D}$, it can be further evaluated using indirect prompt injection evaluation protocols, i.e., $\mathcal{I}(LM(U, \hat{D}), G)$, to assess whether the attack was successful. By leveraging the above designs, our method can automatically generate indirect prompt injection data in a black-box manner.

4 Experiments

4.1 Experimental Setup

Benchmarks. We evaluate our method using two public benchmarks and a real-world commercial LLM agents platform. To assess the effectiveness of our method on LLMs, we utilize the Open-Prompt-Injection benchmark (Liu et al., 2024b). To evaluate its effectiveness on LLM agents, we employ AgentDojo (Debenedetti et al., 2024). Additionally, to test our method's effectiveness in real-world LLM agents, we evaluate it on a commercial platform that enables LLMs to use tools and RAG. More details are in Appendix. A.1

Foundation LLMs. We use both open-source and closed-source LLMs as foundation models including Llama-3.1-70B (Dubey et al., 2024) and Command-R+(Gomez, 2024), GPT-4o-2024-08-06(OpenAI, 2024a) and GPT-4o-mini-2024-07-18 (OpenAI, 2024b).

Method Implementation. We utilize Llama-3.1-70B (Dubey et al., 2024) as both the attacker and scorer models in our method. We use 30 data points from SQuAD-v2.0 (DocQA) (Rajpurkar et al., 2018) and 30 data points from WebSRC (WebQA) (Chen et al., 2021) as training data to conduct query-based attack memory construction. These data are sampled from their corresponding datasets, ensuring that each data point has a unique topic; for example, in DocQA, we ensure that data points are from different articles. We randomly selected 30 injection goals from both Open-Prompt-Injection and AgentDojo to serve as the injection goals for the training phase of our method. By default, we set the training epoch to $I = 10$, the batch size to $N = 10$, and the score dictionary length to 30, incorporating both negative and positive attack logs. We provide ablation studies in Sec. 4.5 to justify our choices for batch size, framework design, and the method used to construct the score dictionary. Unless explicitly notified otherwise, we assume our method can query the foundation LLM of the victim system under black-box accessibility.

4.2 Results on AgentDojo

Setups. The AgentDojo benchmark (Debenedetti et al., 2024) consists of test suites across four distinct environments: Workspace, Slack, Travel, and Banking. The benchmark features a total of 70 tools, 97 realistic user tasks, and 27 injection tasks. We utilize the *attack success rate* (ASR, denoted as target attack success rate in the original paper) as the metric. For baselines, we use the attacks that are already included in the AgentDojo benchmark as baselines, including *Direct*, *Ignore Previous*, *Important Instructions*, *Tool Knowledge*, and *InjectAgent*. In addition, we introduce three additional baselines. These baselines share a similar ideology to our method, which are also built on LLM-as-optimizer. The first is *HOUYI* (Liu et al., 2023), which is a query-based direct prompt injection attack. The second and third are *PAIR* (Chao et al., 2023) and *TAP* (Mehrotra et al., 2024), which are query-based jailbreak attacks, and we extend them into prompt injection attacks. Unless specified otherwise, we set the query times of these three query-based attacks as 20 in this and the following evaluations. We choose this number of queries to achieve the best performance under a similar computational cost compared with our method. For defenses, we evaluate the defenses that are included in the benchmark, including three defenses while excluding those that significantly influence the benign performance of the LLM agent. These three defenses are *Spotlighting with Delimiting*, *Repeat User Prompt*, and *Tool Filter*. Details are in Appendix A.2.

Main Results. As shown in Tab. 1, the results demonstrate the exceptional performance of our proposed black-box attack method. Our method surpasses all other black-box attacks and closely rivals the strongest gray-box attack. This achievement is particularly noteworthy because gray-box attacks like Important Instructions require detailed knowledge of the foundation model and user interactions, whereas our method operates without such privileged information.

Specifically, when analyzing individual foundation models, our method consistently outperforms other black-box attacks and, in some cases, even exceeds the performance of gray-box attacks. For instance, on the GPT-4o model, our method attains an ASR of 49.1%, surpassing Important Instructions' ASR of 47.7% and significantly outperforming other black-box methods such as PAIR (7.5%). Similarly, for the GPT-4o-mini model, our method records an ASR of 29.4%, outperforming Important Instructions at 27.2%. In the case of Llama-3.1-70B, our method achieves an ASR of 25.3%, closely matching Important Instructions at 25.6% and vastly outperforming other black-box

Table 1: The attack performance of AutoHijacker and other baselines against different LLM agents and defenses in AgentDojo (Debenedetti et al., 2024). Our black-box method achieved the highest ASR, with an average of 26.3%, showing comparable effectiveness to the strongest gray-box attack (Important Instructions), The top is highlighted in bold and the second-best is underlined.

Foundation Models	Gray-box		Black-box						
	Tool Know.	Imp. Inst.	Direct	Ignore Pre.	InjectAgent	HOUYI	PAIR	TAP	Ours
Llama-3.1-70B	**0.300**	0.256	0.016	0.027	0.025	0.019	0.029	0.032	0.253
Command-R+	**0.049**	0.045	0.017	0.013	0.014	0.017	0.016	0.014	0.048
GPT-4o	0.345	0.477	0.035	0.054	0.057	0.041	0.075	0.073	**0.491**
GPT-4o-mini	0.248	0.272	0.030	0.033	0.035	0.041	0.046	0.040	**0.294**
GPT-4o (Delimiting)	0.281	**0.417**	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.385
GPT-4o (Repeat)	0.153	0.278	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	**0.300**
GPT-4o (Tool Filter)	0.057	**0.068**	0.000	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.002	0.002	**0.068**
Avg.	0.205	0.259	0.015	0.019	0.020	0.017	0.025	0.023	**0.263**

Table 2: The attack performance of AutoHijacker and other baselines against different LLMs under Open-Prompt-Injection (Liu et al., 2024b) evaluation protocol. Here we show the results on GPT-4o and defer other results to Appendix. B. Our black-box method achieves an average ASR of 69.0%, outperforming the runner-up, the strongest gray-box attack (Combined Attack), in the benchmark.

User tasks ↓	Gray-box		Black-box						
	Fake	Combined	Naive	Escape	Context	HOUYI	PAIR	TAP	Ours
Dup. sentence detection	0.584	**0.720**	0.510	0.570	0.620	0.440	0.514	0.494	0.673
Grammar correction	0.617	0.651	0.480	0.553	0.566	0.359	0.447	0.467	**0.691**
Hate detection	0.647	0.659	0.510	0.561	0.537	0.469	0.539	0.429	**0.714**
Nat. lang. inference	0.631	0.676	0.443	0.481	0.591	0.509	0.546	0.504	**0.710**
Sentiment analysis	0.640	**0.704**	0.564	0.581	0.481	0.463	0.587	0.567	0.674
Spam detection	0.604	0.690	0.524	0.597	0.599	0.460	0.490	0.491	**0.693**
Summarization	0.616	**0.674**	0.436	0.561	0.626	0.510	0.460	0.567	**0.674**
Avg.	0.620	0.682	0.495	0.558	0.574	0.458	0.512	0.503	**0.690**

attacks. For Command-R+, our method attains an ASR of 4.8%, nearly identical to Important Instructions at 4.5%, and significantly higher than other black-box methods. Note that the relatively low ASR in open-sourced models may be linked to their poor benign performance, as demonstrated in the AgentDojo benchmark. However, this is outside the scope of our paper. These results underscore the robustness and efficacy of our attack method across various LLM agents. The consistently high ASR across different models indicates that our approach is both powerful and generalizable, effectively bridging the gap between black-box and gray-box attack performance. Another noteworthy point is that the tasks in AgentDojo differ significantly from the classic DocQA and WebQA tasks on which our method is trained. This demonstrates our method's ability to handle domain shifts when the injection data in the test stage comes from a different domain than that of the training stage.

Another important point to note is that all three LLM-as-optimizers attacks, including HOUYI, PAIR, and TAP, have failed to achieve high attack performance. This is because, as analyzed in Sec. 3, they are not designed for indirect prompt injection tasks, where the victim models provide sparse feedback that makes it difficult to evaluate a continuous score for optimizing a single data point. We also provide a detailed analysis in Sec. 4.5 on the limitations of this single-instance optimization compared to the batch-based optimization used in our method.

Effectiveness against Defenses. Our method's strength is further highlighted when evaluated against specific defense mechanisms designed to thwart prompt injection attacks. In the context of the Delimiting Defense, our method achieves an ASR of 38.5%. This performance is close to that of the Important Instructions attack, which has an ASR of 41.7%. For the Repeat Defense, which attempts to mitigate attacks by repeating user instructions to reduce the impact of injected prompts, our method records an ASR of 30.0%, outperforming Important Instructions at 27.8%. Regarding the Tool Filter Defense, designed to detect and block unauthorized tool usage within prompts, our method achieves an ASR of 6.8%, matching the performance of the Important Instructions attack. Combined with the performance without defenses, our method achieves an average ASR of 26.3%, surpasses all other black-box attacks, and closely rivals the strongest gray-box attack which has an average ASR of 25.9%. Our method shows that even without access to the gray-box information, attackers can pose significant indirect prompt injection risks to LLM agents.

4.3 Results on Open-Prompt-Injection

Setups. The Open-Prompt-Injection benchmark (Liu et al., 2024b) contains seven natural language tasks: duplicate sentence detection (Dolan & Brockett, 2005), grammar correction (Napoles et al.,

Table 3: The attack performance of AutoHijacker and other baselines against defenses in Open-Prompt-Injection. Our method achieved the best performance, surpassing the runner-up by 32.9%.

Avg. ASR on Llama-3.1-70B	Gray-box		Black-box						
	Fake	Combined	Naive	Escape	Context	HOUYI	PAIR	TAP	Ours
No Defense	0.553	<u>0.619</u>	0.439	0.489	0.498	0.423	0.449	0.467	**0.624**
Retokenization	0.410	<u>0.445</u>	0.324	0.381	0.389	0.338	0.315	0.349	**0.488**
Delimiters	<u>0.294</u>	0.292	0.241	0.228	0.227	0.201	0.207	0.251	**0.465**
Sandwich Prevention	0.230	<u>0.287</u>	0.218	0.222	0.221	0.176	0.186	0.226	**0.437**
Instructional Prevention	0.322	<u>0.371</u>	0.209	0.228	0.295	0.218	0.228	0.228	**0.463**

2017; Heilman et al., 2014), hate content detection (Davidson et al., 2017), natural language inference (Warstadt et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2019), sentiment analysis (Socher et al., 2013), spam detection (Almeida et al., 2011), and text summarization (Graff et al., 2003; Rush et al., 2015). The benchmark uses each of the seven tasks as a user (or injected) task. As a result, there are 49 combinations in total (7 user tasks $\times$ 7 injected tasks). We use the ASR (denoted as ASV in the original paper) metric that is defined by the Open-Prompt-Injection benchmark. For baselines, we use the attacks that are already included in the Open-Prompt-Injection benchmark as the baselines, including *Naive Attacks*, *Escape Characters*, *Context Ignoring*, *Fake Completion*, and *Combined Attack*. We also include *HOUYI*, *PAIR*, and *TAP*, which we mentioned before, as baselines. Foe defenses, we include four defenses while ruling out the defenses that significantly influence the benign performance of LLMs in the benchmark. These four defenses include *Retokenization*, *Delimiters*, *Sandwich Prevention*, and *Instructional Prevention*. The detailed setup is in Appendix A.3.

Main Results. The results on GPT-4o are shown in Tab. 2, and the entire results are shown in Appendix. B. Our method demonstrates the best performance across four LLMs and seven distinct user tasks, achieving an average ASR of 64.57%. The strongest attack in Open-Prompt-Injection, the Combined Attack, shows comparable effectiveness to our approach. However, both this attack and the second strongest (Fake Completion) require knowledge of the user's instruction to generate a corresponding answer in the injection data. This scenario is impractical because, in real-world indirect prompt injection attacks, the attacker typically cannot know the user's specific question and can only manipulate external data content. In contrast, our method does not require such gray-box information and still achieves the best attack performance across diverse models and tasks, underscoring the practicality and threat posed by such black-box attacks.

Effectiveness against Defenses. When defenses are introduced, the performance gap between our method and the baselines widens significantly. The experimental results, as presented in Tab. 3, demonstrate the superior performance of our proposed method across various defense mechanisms implemented on the Llama-3.1-70B model. Our method consistently achieves the highest ASR compared to other baseline methods, highlighting its robustness and adaptability in circumventing different defensive strategies. Specifically, against the *Retokenization* defense, our method achieves an ASR of 48.8%, surpassing the runner-up by a margin of 9.7%. The *Delimiters* defense presents a more challenging obstacle, with most baseline methods experiencing substantial drops in ASR. Notably, the second-best method under this defense, *Fake Completion*, achieves an ASR of only 29.4%. In stark contrast, our method maintains a robust ASR of 46.5%, outperforming the runner-up by an impressive 58.2%. When against the *Sandwich Prevention* defense, which aims to detect and nullify sandwich-style prompt injections, our method records an ASR of 43.7%, surpassing the runner-up with 52.2%. When against *Instructional Prevention*, our method achieves an ASR of 46.3%. The second-best performer under this defense is again the *Combined Attack* method, with an ASR of 37.1%. Our method's ability to outperform others by a margin of 24.8% in this context. Overall, our method surpasses the runner-up by an average of 32.9% across all defense mechanisms. This evidence shows our method excels in performance and effectively overcomes various defenses, making it a powerful black-box indirect prompt injection method.

4.4 Results on Commercial LLM Agent Platform

Setups. We employ a commercial LLM agent platform that enhances LLMs with tool-using capabilities and RAG. To assess whether our attack method can mislead victim agents into making unintended tool calls, we test it across three tasks: *Document Reading,* where our goal is to deceive the agent into summarizing a target document than intended. For example, the agent is prompted to call the reading function on 2.pdf instead of the intended 1.pdf. *Webpage Reading,* where we aim to mislead the agent into summarizing a target webpage, diverting it from the requested webpage. *Cross-Target,* where we attempt to redirect the agent from one function to a completely different

Table 4: The attack performance of AutoHijacker and other baselines against a commercial LLM agent platform. Our black-box method achieved the highest ASR, with an average of 71.9%.

Foundation Models	Direct	Ignore Pre.	InjectAgent	Tool Know.	Imp. Inst.	HOUYI	PAIR	TAP	Ours
Llama-3.1-70B	0.233	0.200	0.222	0.267	0.644	0.300	0.278	0.344	**0.711**
Command-R+	0.144	0.167	0.156	0.200	**0.567**	0.211	0.233	0.367	0.522
GPT-4o	0.378	0.344	0.378	0.444	0.767	0.478	0.433	0.456	**0.833**
GPT-4o-mini	0.244	0.267	0.300	0.344	0.778	0.356	0.422	0.467	**0.811**
Avg.	0.250	0.244	0.264	0.314	0.689	0.336	0.342	0.408	**0.719**

one—for instance, from calling the reading function on 1.pdf to invoking the web browsing function to read the target webpage injection.com.

We selected 30 data samples from SQuAD-v2.0 (Rajpurkar et al., 2018) and 30 samples from WebSRC (Chen et al., 2021) as test datasets, creating 30 test cases for each task. In each case, a document/webpage is paired with another specific document/webpage. These test samples are distinct from the training data used to build the attack memory in our method.

Metric. We report the ASR, utilizing GPT-4o-mini-2024-07-18 (OpenAI, 2024b) to detect if the response from the LLM agent have the content of the target document/webpage.

Baselines. We use the same baselines in the AgentDojo experiments, i.e., *Direct*, *Ignore Previous*, *Important Instructions*, *Tool Knowledge*, *InjecAgent*, *HOUYI*, *PAIR*, and *TAP*.

Main Results. Our experimental results, as summarized in Tab. 4, demonstrate that our proposed black-box attack method significantly outperforms existing baselines across all evaluated commercial LLM agents. Specifically, our method achieves an average ASR of 71.9%, surpassing the best-performing baseline, *Important Instructions*, which attains an average ASR of 68.9%. Moreover, our method demonstrates a substantial improvement over other black-box automatic attack strategies such as *HOUYI*, *PAIR*, and *TAP*. The experimental results confirm that our black-box attack method is highly effective in indirect prompt injection attacks which misleads commercial LLM agents into unintended tool use, achieving state-of-the-art performance in ASR.

4.5 Ablation Studies

Batch-based Optimization. In our method design, we argue that leveraging a batch of diverse data can mitigate the issue of sparse feedback in indirect prompt injection attacks, making it more feasible for LLMs-as-optimizers to work effectively. Here, we evaluate this claim and evaluate the effect of different algorithm designs. Specifically, we compare two approaches: (1) *Single-instance optimization*, which uses the same data throughout training like existing LLM-as-optimizers attacks (Liu et al., 2023; Chao et al., 2023; Mehrotra et al., 2024), and (2) *Batch-based optimization*, which uses a batch of different data to jointly training the injection data, following the setup of our method as outlined in Sec. 4.1. We present the average score curves across all training samples, with consistent training epochs maintained for both approaches. As shown in Fig. 2, the training score curves demonstrate that our batch-based optimization addresses sparse feedback problem. The batch-based approach provides richer feedback signals, enabling continuous improvement.



Figure 2: Single-instance optimization in existing works v.s. Batch-based optimization in our method.

Transferability. In the above evaluations, our method trains the attack memory based on black-box access to the foundation LLMs. In the extreme black-box scenario, the attacker may not accurately identify the foundation LLM of the victim LLM agents. Therefore, we assess the transferability of our method. Specifically, we train the attack memory on Llama3.1-70B and test its effectiveness on LLM agents that built on GPT-4o-mini. As shown in Tab. 5, our method only experienced a 2.7% performance drop, while still outperforming all baselines.

Framework Design. In our method, we employ a prompter to generate meta-prompts for the attacker to provide clearer instructions and mitigate potential performance drops arising from long-context scenarios due to the presence of attack memory. We evaluate this design by comparing it with two alternative approaches. The first is *Fuzzing*, where we directly provide the attacker with the attack memory (including the external data and the attack goal that are originally required) and prompt the attacker to generate the injection data. The second is *Chain-of-Thought (CoT)*, where we prompt the attacker (based on the *Fuzzing* setup) to first outline its reasoning for

Table 5: We evaluated the effectiveness of our method by training the attack memory using Llama3.1-70B and testing it on a commercial LLM agent built on GPT-4o-mini-2024-07-18.

GPT-4o-mini	Ignore Pre.	InjectAgent	Tool Know.	Imp. Inst.	HOUYI	PAIR	TAP	Ours	Ours (Transfer)
Document Reading	0.367	0.433	0.533	0.867	0.467	0.533	0.633	**0.933**	**0.933**
Webpage Reading	0.300	0.233	0.367	**0.800**	0.300	0.367	0.400	**0.800**	0.733
Cross-Target	0.133	0.233	0.133	0.667	0.300	0.367	0.367	**0.700**	**0.700**
Avg.	0.267	0.300	0.344	0.778	0.356	0.422	0.467	**0.811**	0.789

Table 6: Top: Impact of attack memory sampling. Bottom Left: Impact of the framework design. Bottom Right: Impact of attack memory length. Results tested on Open-Prompt-Injection.

	Llama-3.1-70B	Command-R+	GPT-4o	GPT-4o-mini
Top-30	0.517	0.432	0.605	0.593
Contrastive	0.624	0.573	0.690	0.696

	Llama-3.1-70B	Command-R+	GPT-4o	GPT-4o-mini
Fuzzing	0.311	0.230	0.277	0.279
CoT	0.539	0.515	0.584	0.599
Prompter	0.624	0.573	0.690	0.696

	Llama-3.1-70B	Command-R+	GPT-4o	GPT-4o-mini
len=10	0.461	0.466	0.484	0.675
len=20	0.556	0.475	0.710	0.557
len=30	0.624	0.573	0.690	0.696

designing the injection data, and then generate the injection data within the same response round. Our experimental results, as shown in Tab. 6 (Bottom Left), indicate that the *Prompter* framework significantly outperforms both the *Fuzzing* and *CoT* methods across all evaluated models. Specifically, the *Prompter* achieves an ASR of 62.4% on Llama-3.1-70B, compared to 31.1% for *Fuzzing* and 53.9% for *CoT*. Similar improvements are observed for Command-R+, GPT-4o, and GPT-4o-mini. The substantial increase in ASR suggests that generating meta-prompts provides clearer guidance to the attacker, enabling more effective injection data creation. This clarity likely reduces ambiguity and cognitive load, allowing the attacker to focus on key objectives and mitigate performance drops associated with long-context scenarios.

Construction of Attack Memory. In our method, the construction of the attack memory involves two hyperparameters. The first is the selection of k_{top} and k_{bottom}. By setting these values as non-zero, we can store both the most effective and least effective attacks in the attack memory, thereby using a "contrastive learning-like" approach. We evaluate this design by comparing it to another approach, top-k sampling, where only the most effective k attacks are saved in the attack memory. Specifically, we test the effectiveness of our method with contrastive sampling of the attack memory ($k_{\text{top}} = 15$ and $k_{\text{bottom}} = 15$) and top-k sampling of the attack memory ($k = 30$). As presented in Tab. 6 (Top), the contrastive sampling method outperforms the top-k sampling across all models, with ASR improvements ranging from approximately 10% to 14%. The inclusion of both the most and least effective attacks allows the attacker to learn from a wider range of examples, akin to contrastive learning. This approach helps the attacker discern not only what strategies lead to success but also what leads to failure, enabling the avoidance of ineffective patterns. The enhanced learning through contrast and the prevention of overfitting to specific attack patterns contribute to higher ASR.

Another hyperparameter is the length of the attack memory. We evaluate its influence by setting the length of the attack memory to 10, 20, and 30, respectively, and testing the ASR of our method. Our findings, shown in Tab. 6 (Bottom Right), reveal that increasing the attack memory length generally enhances the ASR for Llama-3.1-70B and Command-R+, with ASR values rising as the memory length increases. For example, Llama-3.1-70B's ASR improves from 46.1% at length 10 to 62.4% at length 30. However, for GPT-4o, the highest ASR occurs at a memory length of 20 (71.0%), suggesting an optimal memory size beyond which performance may plateau or decline due to cognitive overload. GPT-4o-mini exhibits fluctuating performance. On average, our method achieves the best performance with a memory length of 30. These results suggest that an appropriately longer memory length can provide richer information for the attacker to exploit.

5 Conclusions and Limitations

We introduce AutoHijacker, an automatic black-box indirect prompt injection attack against LLMs and LLM agents. By addressing the challenge of sparse feedback with batch-based optimization and an attack memory, our method effectively generates test cases without continuous querying. Experiments demonstrate state-of-the-art performance on public benchmarks and commercial LLM agents. A limitation of our approach is that it requires query time during the training phase, despite enabling one-step generation in the testing phase. Additionally, the proposed method achieves better performance when the attacker knows the foundation LLM used by the agent.

Ethics statement

This research presents AutoHijacker, an automated tool intended to assess the security of LLMs and LLM-integrated agents against indirect prompt injection attacks. By identifying vulnerabilities in a controlled and ethical manner, the proposed method can facilitate the development of more robust systems that can resist malicious attacks. Our goal is to aid developers and researchers in identifying vulnerabilities ethically and responsibly, thereby contributing to the creation of more robust and trustworthy AI systems. Experiments involving commercial LLM agents were conducted responsibly, anonymizing platform identities and adhering to ethical research guidelines without compromising any personal or sensitive data. We encourage the use of AutoHijackersolely for defensive purposes and emphasize the importance of ongoing ethical considerations in AI security research.

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Algorithm A Attack Memory Construction

1: **Input:** Data point $\{D_n, G_n, M_{i,n}, \hat{D}_{i,n}, S_{i,n}\}$, previous attack memory $\mathcal{A}$
2: **Parameter:** k_{top} (number of top scores to retain), k_{bottom} (number of bottom scores to retain)
3: **Initialize:** $\mathcal{A}' \leftarrow \mathcal{A} \cup \{\{D_n, G_n, M_{i,n}, \hat{D}_{i,n}, S_{i,n}\}\}$
4: Extract scores: $\mathcal{S} = \{S_j \mid \{D_j, G_j, M_j, \hat{D}_j, S_j\} \in \mathcal{A}'\}$
5: Sort $\mathcal{A}'$ in descending order of S_j to obtain $\mathcal{A}_{\text{sorted\_desc}}$
6: Let $\mathcal{A}_{\text{top}} = \mathcal{A}_{\text{sorted\_desc}}[0 : k_{\text{top}}]$
7: Sort $\mathcal{A}'$ in ascending order of S_i to obtain $\mathcal{A}_{\text{sorted\_asc}}$
8: Let $\mathcal{A}_{\text{bottom}} = \mathcal{A}_{\text{sorted\_asc}}[0 : k_{\text{bottom}}]$
9: Update attack memory: $\mathcal{A} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{\text{top}} \cup \mathcal{A}_{\text{bottom}}$
10: **return** Updated attack memory $\mathcal{A}$

Algorithm B AutoHijacker Test Stage

1: **Input:** External data D, attack goal G, prompter, attacker, attack memory $\mathcal{A}$
2: Generate meta prompt M using the prompter:
3: $M = \text{prompter}(\mathcal{A}, D, G)$
4: Generate injection data $\hat{D}$ using the attacker:
5: $\hat{D} = \text{attacker}(M, D, G)$
6: **return** Injection data $\hat{D}$

A DETAILED EXPERIMENTS SETTINGS

A.1 OVERVIEW

We evaluate our method using two public benchmarks and a real-world commercial LLM agents platform. To assess the effectiveness of our method on LLMs, we utilize the Open-Prompt-Injection benchmark (Liu et al., 2024b). To evaluate its effectiveness on LLM agents, we employ Agent-Dojo (Debenedetti et al., 2024). In both the Open-Prompt-Injection and AgentDojo benchmarks, we include the strongest baselines provided within these benchmarks and other query-based methods, alongside the defense methods presented. Additionally, to test our method's effectiveness in real-world LLM agents, we evaluate it on a commercial platform that enables LLMs to use tools and RAG. We defer the detailed experimental settings to the corresponding sections.

A.2 AGENTDOJO

Experiment Setups. The AgentDojo benchmark (Debenedetti et al., 2024) consists of test suites across four distinct environments: Workspace, Slack, Travel, and Banking. The benchmark features a total of 70 tools, 97 realistic user tasks, and 27 injection tasks. The *Workspace* environment includes 24 tools, 40 user tasks, and 6 injection tasks. The *Slack* environment features 11 tools, 21 user tasks, and 5 injection tasks. The *Travel* environment includes 28 tools, 20 user tasks, and 7 injection tasks. Lastly, the *Banking* environment incorporates 11 tools, 16 user tasks, and 9 injection tasks.

Metric. We utilize the ASR (denoted as target attack success rate in the original paper) as the metric, which measures the fraction of security cases where the agent executes the malicious actions.

Baselines. We use the attacks that are already included in the AgentDojo benchmark as baselines, including *Direct*, *Ignore Previous*, *Important Instructions*, *Tool Knowledge*, and *InjectAgent*. The specific descriptions of these attacks can be found in the Appendix. In addition, we introduce three additional baselines. These baselines share a similar ideology to our method, which are also built on LLM-as-optimizer. The first is *HOUYI* (Liu et al., 2023), which is a query-based direct prompt injection attack. The second and third are *PAIR* (Chao et al., 2023) and *TAP* (Mehrotra et al., 2024), which are query-based jailbreak attacks, and we extend them into prompt injection attacks. Unless specified otherwise, we set the query times of these three query-based attacks as 20 in this and the following evaluations. We choose this number of queries to achieve the best performance under a similar computational cost compared with our method.

Defenses. We evaluate the defenses that are included in the benchmark. Specifically, we include three defenses while excluding those that significantly influence the benign performance of the LLM agent. These three defenses are *Spotlighting with Delimiting*, *Repeat User Prompt*, and *Tool Filter*.

A.3 OPEN-PROMPT-INJECTION

Experiment Setups. The Open-Prompt-Injection benchmark (Liu et al., 2024b) contains seven natural language tasks: duplicate sentence detection, grammar correction, hate content detection, natural language inference, sentiment analysis, spam detection, and text summarization. Specifically, the benchmark use MRPC dataset for duplicate sentence detection (Dolan & Brockett, 2005), Jfleg dataset for grammar correction (Napoles et al., 2017; Heilman et al., 2014), HSOL dataset for hate content detection (Davidson et al., 2017), RTE dataset for natural language inference (Warstadt et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2019), SST2 dataset for sentiment analysis (Socher et al., 2013), SMS Spam dataset for spam detection (Almeida et al., 2011), and Gigaword dataset for text summarization (Graff et al., 2003; Rush et al., 2015). The benchmark uses each of the seven tasks as a user (or injected) task. Note that a task could be used as both the user task and the injected task simultaneously. As a result, there are 49 combinations in total (7 user tasks $\times$ 7 injected tasks). A user task consists of a user instruction and external data, whereas an injected task contains an injected instruction and injected data. For each dataset of a task, the benchmark selects 100 examples uniformly at random without replacement as the user (or injected) data.

Metric. We use the *attack success rate* (ASR, denoted as ASV in the original paper) metric that is defined by the Open-Prompt-Injection benchmark, which evaluates whether the LLM is providing a response for an injection task rather than the original task. The details are in the Appendix.

Baselines. We use the attacks that are already included in the Open-Prompt-Injection benchmark as the baselines, including *Naive Attacks*, *Escape Characters*, *Context Ignoring*, *Fake Completion*, and *Combined Attack*. The specific descriptions of these attacks can be found in the Appendix. We also include *HOUYI*, *PAIR*, and *TAP*, which we mentioned before, as baselines.

Defenses. We also evaluate the defenses that are included in the Open-Prompt-Injection benchmark. Specifically, we include four defenses while ruling out the defenses that significantly influence the benign performance of LLMs. These four defenses include *Retokenization*, *Delimiters*, *Sandwich Prevention*, and *Instructional Prevention*. We defer the detailed descriptions to the Appendix.

B SUPPLEMENTARY EXPERIMENTS RESULTS

Table A: The attack performance of AutoHijacker and other baselines against different LLMs under Open-Prompt-Injection (Liu et al., 2024b) evaluation protocol. Here we show the results on GPT-4o-mini.

User tasks ↓	Gray-box		Black-box						
	Fake	Combined	Naive	Escape	Context	HOUYI	PAIR	TAP	Ours
Dup. sentence detection	0.579	0.690	0.474	0.531	0.613	0.441	0.569	0.507	0.707
Grammar correction	0.636	0.656	0.440	0.507	0.573	0.456	0.407	0.446	0.659
Hate detection	0.647	0.670	0.560	0.550	0.591	0.484	0.521	0.509	0.713
Nat. lang. inference	0.651	0.700	0.376	0.541	0.569	0.433	0.481	0.513	0.717
Sentiment analysis	0.626	0.714	0.539	0.567	0.421	0.471	0.557	0.550	0.684
Spam detection	0.571	0.719	0.526	0.590	0.499	0.450	0.497	0.524	0.709
Summarization	0.601	0.690	0.517	0.603	0.623	0.497	0.454	0.557	0.681
Avg.	0.616	0.691	0.490	0.556	0.556	0.462	0.498	0.515	0.696



(a) Llama-3.1-70B

(b) Command-R+

(c) GPT-4o

(d) GPT-4o-mini

Figure A: The attack performance of AutoHijacker and other baselines against different LLMs under Open-Prompt-Injection (Liu et al., 2024b) evaluation protocol. The labels around the circle represent different original user tasks. Our black-box method achieves an average ASR of 64.57% in prompt injection attacks across diverse LLMs and seven distinct user tasks, demonstrating comparable effectiveness to the strongest gray-box attack (Combined Attack) in the benchmark, which requires knowledge of the user's instructions and the corresponding answer to the user's request. In contrast, our method does not require such gray-box information.

Table B: The attack performance of AutoHijacker and other baselines against different LLMs under Open-Prompt-Injection (Liu et al., 2024b) evaluation protocol. Here we show the results on Llama-3.1-70B.

User tasks ↓	Gray-box		Black-box						
	Fake	Combined	Naive	Escape	Context	HOUYI	PAIR	TAP	Ours
Dup. sentence detection	0.520	0.603	0.417	0.469	0.510	0.407	0.511	0.454	0.663
Grammar correction	0.569	0.609	0.411	0.439	0.524	0.404	0.383	0.406	0.597
Hate detection	0.579	0.627	0.511	0.471	0.516	0.457	0.479	0.456	0.647
Nat. lang. inference	0.604	0.633	0.339	0.484	0.496	0.409	0.441	0.467	0.630
Sentiment analysis	0.564	0.630	0.466	0.480	0.394	0.440	0.483	0.503	0.584
Spam detection	0.497	0.624	0.463	0.530	0.481	0.407	0.446	0.486	0.630
Summarization	0.537	0.607	0.467	0.549	0.564	0.437	0.399	0.497	0.616
Avg.	0.553	0.619	0.439	0.489	0.498	0.423	0.449	0.467	0.624

Table C: The attack performance of AutoHijacker and other baselines against different LLMs under Open-Prompt-Injection (Liu et al., 2024b) evaluation protocol. Here we show the results on Command-R+.

User tasks ↓	Gray-box		Black-box						
	Fake	Combined	Naive	Escape	Context	HOUYI	PAIR	TAP	Ours
Dup. sentence detection	0.491	0.540	0.403	0.443	0.506	0.374	0.459	0.426	0.610
Grammar correction	0.524	0.524	0.370	0.424	0.509	0.384	0.364	0.399	0.547
Hate detection	0.540	0.593	0.507	0.420	0.484	0.431	0.450	0.397	0.620
Nat. lang. inference	0.526	0.596	0.287	0.446	0.463	0.391	0.420	0.417	0.561
Sentiment analysis	0.521	0.576	0.444	0.474	0.356	0.393	0.447	0.451	0.530
Spam detection	0.460	0.589	0.427	0.479	0.461	0.403	0.419	0.463	0.551
Summarization	0.503	0.563	0.439	0.510	0.527	0.399	0.350	0.456	0.591
Avg.	0.509	0.569	0.411	0.457	0.472	0.397	0.416	0.430	0.573