Towards Effective and Interpretable Human-AI Collaboration in MOBA Games

Anonymous Author(s) Affiliation Address email

Abstract

MOBA games, e.g., Dota2 and Honor of Kings, have been actively used as the 1 testbed for the recent AI research on games, and various AI systems have been 2 developed at the human level so far. However, these AI systems merely focus on з how to compete with humans, less exploring how to collaborate with humans. To 4 this end, this paper makes the first attempt to investigate human-AI collaboration in 5 MOBA games. In this paper, we propose to enable humans and agents to collaborate 6 through explicit communications by designing an efficient and interpretable Meta-7 Command Communication-based framework, dubbed MCC, for accomplishing 8 effective human-AI collaboration in MOBA games. The MCC framework consists 9 of two pivotal modules: 1) an interpretable communication protocol, i.e., the 10 Meta-Command, to bridge the communication gap between humans and agents; 11 2) a meta-command value estimation model, i.e., the Meta-Command Selector, 12 13 to select a valuable meta-command for each agent to achieve effective human-AI collaboration. Experimental results in Honor of Kings demonstrate that MCC 14 15 agents can collaborate reasonably well with human teammates and even generalize to collaborate with different levels and numbers of human teammates. Videos are 16 available at https://sites.google.com/view/mcc-demo. 17

18 1 Introduction

Games, as the microcosm of real-world problems, have been widely used as testbeds to evaluate
the performance of Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques for decades. Recently, many researchers
focus on developing various human-level AI systems for complex games, such as board games like *Go* [27, 28], First-Person Shooting (FPS) games like *ViZDoom* [14], Real-Time Strategy (RTS)
games like *StarCraft* 2 [34], and Multi-player Online Battle Arena (MOBA) games like *Dota* 2 [22].
However, these AI systems focus merely on how to compete instead of collaborating with humans,
leaving Human-AI Collaboration (HAC) in complex environments still to be investigated.

In this paper, we study the HAC problem in complex MOBA games, which is characterized by multi-26 agent cooperation and competition mechanisms, long time horizons, enormous state-action spaces 27 (10^{20000}) , and imperfect information [22, 26, 38]. HAC requires the agent to collaborate reasonably 28 with various human teammates. One straightforward approach is to improve the generalization of 29 agents, that is, to collaborate with an enough diverse population of teammates during training. There 30 are some Population-Based Training (PBT) based algorithms and learning systems [1, 2, 10, 11, 31 31, 41] proposed to improve the generalization of agents in video games by constructing a diverse 32 population of agents in different ways. However, this approach requires a vast amount of diverse data 33 34 and massive computing resources, posing a big computational obstacle for complex MOBA games. Human team success in MOBA games requires not only subtle individual micro-operations but also 35

excellent communications and collaborations among tearmates on macro-strategies, i.e., long-term

intentions [8, 37]. Consequently, we focus on enabling humans and agents to collaborate through



Figure 1: **MOBA game-related introduction.** (a) Key elements of MOBA games such as *Dota 2*, *Honor of Kings*, etc. Players observe from the *state* of the environment, make *micro-operations* and *macro-strategies* decisions, and collaborate through *explicit messages* (e.g.,text and signals). (b) Example of collaboration via meta-commands. The *Come And Kill The Dragon* is more valuable for humans A and B and agent D to collaborate, while the *Clean Up Top-Lane Minions* is more valuable for human C and agent E to collaborate.

38 explicit communications and propose an efficient and interpretable Meta-Command Communicationbased human-AI collaboration framework, dubbed MCC, to solve the HAC problem in MOBA 39 games. First, we design an interpretable communication protocol, i.e., the Meta-Command, as a 40 general representation of macro-strategies to bridge the communication gap between agents and 41 humans. Both macro-strategies sent by humans and messages outputted by agents can be converted 42 into unified meta-commands (see Figure 1). Second, following Gao et al. [8], we construct a 43 hierarchical model that includes the command encoding network (macro-strategy layer) and the 44 meta-command conditioned action network (micro-action layer), used for agents to generate and 45 execute meta-commands, respectively. Third, we propose a meta-command value estimation model, 46 i.e., the Meta-Command Selector, to select the optimal meta-command for each agent to execute. 47 The training process of the MCC framework consists of three phases. We first train the command 48 encoding network to learn the distribution of meta-commands sent from humans. Afterward, we 49 50 train the meta-command conditioned action network to ensure that the agent has the near-human completion rate for meta-commands. Finally, we train the meta-command selector to ensure that the 51 agent can select a valuable meta-command to achieve effective collaboration. We train and evaluate 52 the agent in Honor of Kings 5v5 mode with a full hero pool (over 100 heroes). Experimental results 53 demonstrate the effectiveness of the MCC framework. In general, our contributions are as follows: 54

To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate the HAC problem in MOBA games. We
 propose an efficient and interpretable Meta-Command Communication-based framework dubbed
 MCC to achieve effective human-AI collaboration in MOBA games.

We design an interpretable communication protocol to bridge the communication gap between
 humans and agents. In addition, we propose a meta-command value estimation model to select a
 valuable meta-command for each agent to achieve effective human-AI collaboration.

• We introduce the training process of the MCC framework in a typical MOBA game *Honor of Kings* and evaluate it in practical human-AI game tests. Experimental results show that MCC agents can reasonably collaborate with different levels and numbers of human teammates.

64 2 Related Work

65 2.1 MOBA Games AI Research

MOBA games, such as Dota 2 and Honor of Kings, have attracted much attention from AI researchers 66 due to their multi-agent cooperative and competitive mechanics, long time horizons, partial observa-67 tion, and enormous state-action spaces [22, 38]. Recently, OpenAI et al. [22] introduced an AI system 68 named OpenAI-Five that defeated professional players in Dota 2 5v5 mode under the condition of 69 limited heroes. Ye et al. [38, 39, 40] proposed another learning system named WuKong that can 70 surpass top e-sport players in *Honor of Kings* with a full hero pool. Further, Wu [37] and Gao et 71 al. [8] proposed learning systems that enable the agent to learn human strategies to achieve policy 72 diversity. However, these AI systems can only defeat human players but cannot collaborate well due 73 to the communication gap between agents and humans, see Table 1. In most real-world scenarios, the 74 excellent collaboration between humans and agents may make more sense than the competition. 75

76 2.2 Human-AI Collaboration

PBT is considered one way to solve the HAC problem [4]. Most PBT-based methods are devoted to 77 training an agent which can be compatible with unseen partners by maintaining a population of agents 78 with diverse behaviors in different ways [1, 2, 10, 11, 31, 41][6, 19, 20, 30]. These methods have 79 been validated on both objective and subjective metrics in video games Overcooked and Capture the 80 Flag and card game Hanabi. However, the main difference between these games and MOBA games 81 82 is that these games do not provide explicit communication mechanics for collaboration on macrostrategies between agents and humans. Besides, MOBA AI agents usually need to learn billions of 83 network parameters to cope with the enormous state-action spaces (10^{20000}) [38], which constitutes 84 a prohibitive computational burden for learning. As a more realistic topic of HAC, human-robot 85 interaction in manufacturing also attracts much attention [13, 17, 25]. However, these studies are 86 mainly limited to collaboration between a robot and a human through one-way communication, i.e., 87 humans give robots orders. Therefore, there is still a large room to study RL with the participation of 88 humans. This work can be a stepping stone for broader real-world applications. 89

90 2.3 Multi-Agent Communication

Communication is often used in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) to improve interagent collaboration. Most communication-based MARL methods are mainly focused on exploring
communication protocols between multiple agents with an end-to-end RL framework [5, 7, 9, 23,
29, 32, 36]. Jiang and Lu [12] and Kim *et al.* [15] proposed to model the value of multi-agent
communication for effective collaboration. Unfortunately, these methods all model communications
in a latent space without considering human-AI interactions, making it less interpretable to humans.
Instead, we focus on enabling humans and agents to collaborate through explicit communications.

98 **3** Human-AI Collaboration

We consider an interpretable communicative human-AI collaboration task, which can be ex-99 tended from Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) and formulated as a tuple 100 (N, H, S, A^N, A^H, O, M, r, P, γ >, where N and H represent the numbers of agents and humans, respectively. S is the space of global states. $A^N = \{A_i^N\}_{i=1,...,N}$ and $A^H = \{A_i^H\}_{i=1,...,N+H}$ denote the spaces of actions of N agents and H humans, respectively. $O = \{O_i\}_{i=1,...,N+H}$ denotes the space of observations of N agents and H humans. M represents the space of interpretable messages, that is, the Meta-Commands in the MCC framework. $P : S \times A^N \times A^H \to S$ and $A^H = \{A_i^H\}_{i=1,...,N+H}$ denotes the space of observations of N agents and H humans. 101 102 103 104 105 $r: \mathbf{S} \times \mathbf{A}^N \times \mathbf{A}^H \to \mathbb{R}$ denote the shared state transition probability function and reward function 106 of N agents, respectively. Note that, r includes both individual reward and team reward. $\gamma \in [0, 1)$ 107 denotes the discount factor. For each agent i in state $s_t \in \mathbf{S}$, it receives an observation $o_t^i \in O_i$ 108 and a selected message $c_t^i \in \mathbf{M}$, and then outputs an action $a_t^i = \pi_{\theta}(o_t^i, c_t^i) \in A_i^N$ and a new message $m_{t+1}^i = \pi_{\phi}(o_t^i) \in \mathbf{M}$, where π_{θ} and π_{ϕ} are action network and message encoding network, respectively. A message selector $c_t^i = \pi_{\omega}(o_t^i, C_t)$ is introduced to receive a message set 109 110 111 $C_t = \{m_t^i\}_{i=1,\dots,N+H} \subset \mathbf{M}$ from all agents and humans and select the optimal one to execute. 112

We divide the HAC problem in MOBA games into the Human-to-AI (H2A) and the AI-to-Human 113 (A2H) scenarios. The **H2A Scenario:** Humans send macro-strategies as messages to agent teammates, 114 and agents combine them with their own messages to select the optimal one based on their own 115 message selector to execute, achieving effective collaboration with humans. The A2H Scenario: 116 Agents send messages as macro-strategies to human teammates, and humans combine them with 117 their own macro-strategies to select the optimal one based on their own value systems to execute, 118 achieving effective collaboration with agents. The goal of both tasks is that agents and humans 119 communicate macro-strategies with pre-defined communication protocols, and then select valuable 120 macro-strategies for effective collaboration to win the game. 121

122 4 Meta-Command Communication-Based Framework

In this section, we present the proposed MCC framework in detail. We first briefly describe three key stages of the MCC framework (see Section 4.1). Then we introduce the two pivotal modules in the MCC framework: 1) an interpretable communication protocol, i.e., the Meta-Command, as a general representation of macro-strategies to bridge the communication gap between agents and humans (see Section 4.2); 2) a meta-command value estimation model, i.e., the Meta-Command Selector, to select a valuable meta-command for each agent to achieve effective HAC in MOBA games(see Section 4.3).



Figure 2: The temporal process of the MCC framework. For each communication step (t and T), MCC first (I) converts messages from humans and agents into meta-commands, then (II) selects the optimal meta-command for each agent to execute, and (III) finally predicts a sequence of actions for each agent to perform. The selected meta-command is retained and executed for n time steps. This process is repeated until the end of a game.

129 4.1 Overview

The flow of the MCC framework can be divided into three stages: the meta-command conversion stage, 130 the meta-command communication stage, and the human-AI collaboration stage, as plotted in Figure 2. 131 At the Meta-Command Conversion Stage, the MCC framework converts the macro-strategies sent 132 by humans and the messages outputted by the command encoding network of agents into unified 133 meta-commands and then broadcasts them to all agents and humans. At the Meta-Command 134 **Communication Stage**, the MCC framework uses the meta-command selector to estimate the values 135 of all received meta-commands and select the optimal one for each agent to execute. Note that 136 humans also select the optimal meta-command based on their value systems. At the Human-AI 137 Collaboration Stage, the MCC framework adopts the meta-command conditioned action network to 138 predict a sequence of actions for each agent to perform based on its selected meta-command. For 139 each game, humans and agents have to collaborate multiple times, that is, they need to perform the 140 141 above three stages multiple times to win the game.

142 4.2 Meta-Command

In MOBA games, we propose that a macro-strategy consists of three components: where to go, what
to do, and how long. For example, a macro-strategy can be *Come And Kill The Dragon*, which
consists of *Come To The Dragon* (where to go), *Attack The Dragon* (what to do), and *Until The Dragon Is Killed* (how long). Thus, we propose a general representation of macro-strategies, i.e.,
the Meta-Command, as an interpretable communication protocol to bridge the communication gap
between agents and humans.

Meta-Command Definition. We formulate the Meta-Command as a tuple $\langle L, E, T^{mc} \rangle$, as shown in Figure 1(b), where *L* is the *Location* to go, *E* is the *Event* to do after reaching *L*, and T^{mc} is the *Time Limit* for executing the meta-command. Among them, *L* is the key to the meta-command, which contains the intention of the macro-strategy. *E* can be thought of as human micro-operation, which is implemented through a pre-trained micro-action network π_{θ} in the MCC framework. T^{mc} can be set to how long it normally takes a human to complete a macro-strategy in MOBA games, usually 20 seconds corresponds to 80% completion rate for meta-commands, see Appendix A.12.1.

Meta-Command Conversion. To realize interpretable human-AI communication, we convert the 156 explicit messages from humans and the implicit messages from agents into unified meta-commands. 157 To achieve the former, a hand-crafted command converter function f^{cc} is used to generate L of meta-158 commands by extracting the location from explicit messages, such as text and signals, sent by humans. 159 To achieve the latter, we use a Command Encoding Network (CEN) $\pi_{\phi}(m|o)$ to generate L of meta-160 commands. The CEN is trained via supervised learning (SL) with the goal of learning the distribution 161 of meta-commands sent from humans, as shown in Figure 3(a)(I). The training dataset $\{\langle o, m \rangle\}$ 162 is obtained by extracting the observation o and its corresponding meta-command m from expert data. 163



Figure 3: The training process and model structure of MCC. (a) The training process is divided into three phases: we first (I) train the CEN via supervised learning (SL), then (II) train the MCCAN via goal-conditioned RL, and finally (III) train the CS via RL. Among them, the dashed box represents the frozen model. (b) The detailed CS model structure, including CNN feature extraction, gating mechanism, target attention module, etc.

After converting all messages into unified meta-commands, the MCC framework broadcasts them to 164 all agents and humans. Then, agents and humans receive an identical meta-command candidate set. 165

Meta-Command Execution. After receiving a meta-command candidate set, agents can se-166 lect one meta-command from it to execute. We adopt a Meta-Command Conditioned Ac-167 tion Network (MCCAN) $\pi_{\theta}(a|o,m)$ for agents to perform actions based on the selected meta-168 command, as shown in Figure 3(a)(II). The MCCAN is trained via goal-conditioned RL with 169 the goal of achieving a near-human completion rate for the meta-commands generated by the 170 pre-trained CEN while ensuring that the win rate is not reduced. We adopt an intrinsic reward 171 For the control of t 172 173 174

175

176

After training the CEN and MCCAN, we can achieve HAC by simply setting an agent to randomly 177 select a meta-command derived from humans to execute. However, such collaboration is non-178 intelligent and can even be a disaster for game victory because agents have no mechanism to 179 model the values of meta-commands and cannot choose the optimal meta-command to execute. 180 While humans usually choose the optimal one based on their value systems for achieving effective 181 collaboration to win the game. Thus, we further propose a meta-command value estimation model to 182 select a valuable meta-command for each agent, as described in the following subsection. 183

4.3 Meta-Command Selector 184

In real-world MOBA games, the same macro-strategy often has different values for different humans 185 in different situations. For example, a macro-strategy can be Come And Kill The Dragon, as shown in 186 Figure 1(b). It is more valuable for humans A and B to collaborate. While another macro-strategy can 187 be Clean Up Top-Lane Minions, which is more valuable for human C rather than humans A and B. 188 Therefore, it is important to select the most valuable meta-command from the received meta-command 189 candidate set C to achieve effective human-AI collaboration. We propose a meta-command value 190 estimation model, i.e., the Meta-Command Selector (CS) $\pi_{\omega}(o, C)$, to estimate the values of all 191 current meta-commands and select the most valuable one for each agent to execute. 192

CS Optimization Objective. Typically, the execution of a meta-command involves reaching location 193 L and doing event E, of which the latter is more important to the value of the meta-command. 194 For example, for the meta-command Come And Kill The Dragon, if Kill The Dragon event cannot 195 be done within T^{mc} time steps, then it is pointless to Come To The Dragon. Thus, the long-term 196 reward R^{mc} for executing a meta-command can be expressed as the total rewards within T^{mc} time steps by interacting with the environment: $R_t^{mc} = \sum_{i=0}^{T^L} r_{t+i} + \beta \sum_{j=T^L}^{T^{mc}} r_{t+j}$, where $T^L < T^{mc}$ is the time for reaching L and $\beta > 1$ is a trade-off parameter. Note that the reward function r 197 198 199

includes both individual rewards and team rewards. The optimization objective of CS is to select the optimal meta-command $m_t^* = \pi_{\omega}(o_t, C_t)$ for each agent to maximize the expected discounted meta-command execution return $G_t^{mc} = \mathbb{E}_{s \sim d_{\pi_{\theta}}, m \sim \pi_{\omega}, a \sim \pi_{\theta}} \left[\sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \gamma_{mc}^i R_{t+i \cdot T^{mc}}^{mc} \right]$, where $o_t \in \mathbf{O}$, C_t is the meta-command candidate set in state s_t , and $\gamma_{mc} \in [0, 1)$ is the discount factor.

CS Training Process. We construct a self-play training environment for CS where agents can send 204 messages to each other. Specifically, three tricks in Figure 3(a)(III) are adopted to increase the 205 sample efficiency while ensuring efficient exploration. First, each sent meta-command m is sampled 206 with the argmax rule from the results predicted by the pre-trained CEN. Second, each agent sends 207 its meta-command with a probability p every T^{mc} time steps. Finally, each agent selects the final 208 meta-command c sampled with the softmax rule from its CS output results and hands it over to the 209 pre-trained MCCAN for execution. We use the multi-head value mechanism [38] to model the value 210 of the meta-command execution, and the corresponding value loss can be formulated as: 211

$$L^{V}(\omega) = \mathbb{E}_{S,C} \left[\sum_{head_{k}} \|G_{k}^{mc} - V_{\omega}^{k}(S,C)\|_{2} \right]$$

where $V_{\omega}^{k}(S,C)$ is the value of the k-th head. For DQN-based methods [21, 33, 35], the Q loss is:

$$L^{Q}(\omega) = \mathbb{E}_{S,C,M}\left[\|G_{total} - Q_{\omega}^{k}(S,C,M)\|_{2} \right], G_{total} = \sum_{head_{k}} w_{k} G_{k}^{mc},$$

where w_k is the weight of the k-th head and G_k^{mc} is the Temporal Difference (TD) estimated value error $R_k^{mc} + \gamma_{mc} V_{\omega}^k(S', C') - V_{\omega}^k(S, C)$.

CS Model Structure. We design a general network structure for CS towards MOBA games, as 217 shown in Figure 3(b). In MOBA games, the meta-commands corresponding to adjacent regions 218 219 usually have similar values. Thus, we divide the meta-commands in the map into grids, a common 220 location description for MOBA games, and use the shared Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) to 221 extract region-related information from the meta-commands to improve the generalization of CS to adjacent meta-commands. Besides, we use the gating mechanism [18] to fuse the map embedding 222 of all received meta-commands and the state embedding of the observation information. Finally, to 223 directly construct the relationship between the observation information and each meta-command, we 224 introduce a target attention module, where the query is the fused embedding h and the key is the 225 map embedding m' of each meta-command. The fused embedding h is used as the input into the 226 subsequent Q network Q(h, m') and V network V(h) network of CS. In this way, the Q network 227 can also be easily converted to the policy network $\pi(m|h,m')$. Thus, the CS model structure can be 228 easily applied to most popular RL algorithms, such as PPO [24], DQN [21], etc. 229

230 5 Experiments

We evaluate the proposed MCC framework in *Honor of Kings*, one of the most popular MOBA games worldwide, which has been actively used as the testbed for recent game AI research [8, 37–40]. We conduct all experiments in *Honor of Kings* 5v5 mode with a full hero pool (over 100 heroes), except ablation studies with a 20 hero pool for exploring the influence of different model components more sufficiently and efficiently.

236 5.1 Experimental Setup

237 **5.1.1 Training Setup**¹

Due to the complexity of MOBA games and limited resources, instead of training jointly, we train the CEN, MCCAN, and CS sequentially. For all model training, the location L of meta-commands in the map is divided into 144 grids. The time limit T^{mc} for the meta-command execution is set to 20s.

CEN Training Settings. We train the CEN via SL until it converges for 26 hours using 8 NVIDIA
P40 GPUs. The batch size of each GPU is set to 512. Adam[16] is adopted as the optimizer with an
initial learning rate of 0.0001.

244 MCCAN Training Settings. We train the MCCAN by finetuning a pre-trained micro-action net-

work [38], the state-of-the-art (SOTA) model in *Honor of Kings*, which is conditioned on the

meta-command sampled from the pre-trained CEN. The MCCAN is trained until it converges for 48

¹Detailed parameter settings for all training processes can be found in the Appendix.



Figure 4: Communication environments in the experiment. The orange arrows indicate sending metacommands, and the blue arrows indicate receiving meta-commands. The dashed line denotes sending metacommands with probability p.



(a) Win rate (row vs. col) in Test I. (b) Win rate (row vs. col) in Test II. (c) Elo scores of different agents.

Figure 5: **AI performance in the testing environments.** (a) and (b) show the win rate maps of different agents who play against each other. (c) shows the final Elo scores of these agents.

hours using a physical computer cluster with 63,000 CPUs and 560 NVIDIA V100 GPUs. The batch
 size of each GPU is set to 256.

CS Training Settings. We train the CS via self-play until it converges for 24 hours using a physical computer cluster with 70,000 CPUs and 680 NVIDIA V100 GPUs. The batch size of each GPU is set to 256. The parameter β is set to 2. Each agent sends a meta-command with a probability p of 0.8 and an interval T^{mc} of 20s, as shown in Figure 4(a).

253 5.1.2 Evaluating Setup

Our primary concern is whether the agents trained with the MCC framework, briefly called the MCC agents, can collaborate with humans well. However, evaluating agents with humans is expensive, which is not conducive to model selection and iteration. Therefore, we built two agent-only testing environments: Test I and Test II, for the model selection and iteration process, as shown in Figure 4(b). We also evaluate the MCC agents in practical human-AI game tests to examine the performance of collaborating with humans, as shown in Figure 4(c).

Compared Agents. We compare the MCC agent with three different types of agents: the MC-Base agent (agent only executes its own meta-command without communication), the MC-Rand agent (agent randomly selects a meta-command to execute), and the MC-Rule agent (agent selects the nearest meta-command to execute). We adopt the MC-Base agent-only team as the opponent for all tests. Note that the MC-Base agent-only team has the ability of the SOTA and is more stable than the human-only team. Results are reported over five random seeds.

Agent-Only Environmental Settings. Test I is the most complex environment where all agent teammates can send and receive meta-commands simultaneously with an interval of 20s. Test I is used to evaluate the agents' performance under extremely complex situations as well as in ablation studies. Test II is a simple environment to simulate practical game scenarios, where at most one human sends his macro-strategy at a time step. Thus, in Test II, only one agent is randomly selected to send its meta-command with an interval of 20s, and the other agents only receive meta-commands.

Human-AI Game Testing Settings. We had different types of agents team up with different levels and numbers of humans, including 15 strong humans (top1%) and 15 average humans (top30%), in mAI + n Human mode, where m + n = 5. For fair comparisons, each tester was not told the type of agent teammates. To eliminate the effects of collaboration between agents, we prohibit agents from receiving meta-commands from their agent teammates, and the agent can only receive meta-commands from humans. In each game test, humans can send the converted meta-commands whenever they think their macro-strategies are important. To make the agent behave like humans (at most one human sends his macro-strategy at a time step), we restrict agents from sending their meta-commands. We randomly choose a human teammate and use his observation and all agents' meta-commands as the CS input and select the final output of CS to send with an interval of 20s.

282 5.2 Results in Agent-Only Environment

283 5.2.1 AI Performance

The Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence of the meta-command distribution between the CEN and 284 humans decreased from 4.96 to 0.44 as training converges. The MCCAN is trained with the parameter 285 α equal to 16. The win rate of the trained agent against the SOTA agent [8, 38] is close to 50%. 286 287 The average completion rates of the trained agent and humans for meta-commands are 82% and 80%, respectively. Notably, we can train an agent with a higher completion rate by increasing α , but 288 this will significantly reduce the win rate because the meta-command executed is not necessarily 289 optimal and may result in the death of agents. We put the detailed experimental results of the CEN 290 and MCCAN in the Appendix A.10.1 and A.10.2 due to space limitations. 291

Figure 5(a) and (b) show the win rates of four types of agents who play against each other for 600 292 matches in Test I and Test II, respectively. We see that the MCC agent achieves the highest win rate 293 against all the other agents in both testing environments, indicating that the CS can select a valuable 294 meta-command for each agent to collaborate, and such reasonable collaboration is conducive to 295 winning the game. The MC-Rand and MC-Rule agents are worse than the MC-Base agent, confirming 296 that agents executing low-value meta-commands can hurt performance. Notably, we find that the win 297 rates of the MCC agent in Test I and Test II are close, suggesting that the MCC agent can generalize 298 to different numbers of meta-commands. Figure 5(c) demonstrates the final Elo scores [3] of these 299 agents. It clearly shows the effectiveness of CS in agent-only collaboration scenarios. 300

301 5.2.2 Ablation Studies

further We investigate 302 the influence of different 303 components, including 304 CNN feature extraction 305 with the gating mechanism 306 307 (w/o CNN-GM), target attention module (w/o 308 TA), and PPO optimization 309 algorithm (MCC-PPO), 310 on the performance of 311 CS. We conduct ablation 312 studies in Test I with a 313 20 hero pool. In practical 314 315 games. meta-commands



Figure 6: **Results of ablation studies.** (a) The training curves of different CS ablation versions. (b) The converged WR-RR results of different CS ablation versions. The shadow indicates the standard deviation.

with adjacent regions often have similar intentions and values. Thus the response rate of the agent to
adjacent meta-commands should be as close as possible. Besides, the higher the agent's response rate
to meta-commands, the more collaborative behaviors of the agent, thus we expect the response rate
of CS as high as possible. Generally, we expect the Response Rate (RR) of CS as high as possible
while ensuring that the Win Rate (WR) is not reduced.

Figure 6(a) demonstrates the WR of different CS ablation versions during the training process, and 321 Figure 6(b) shows the converged WR-RR results. We see that after ablating the TA module, the WR 322 and RR of CS are greatly reduced, indicating that the TA module can improve the accuracy of CS 323 to meta-commands. Besides, after ablating the CNN-GM module, the RR of CS is most affected, 324 which is reduced by 20%. It indicates that without the CNN-GM module, the value estimation of CS 325 to adjacent meta-commands is not accurate enough, resulting in missing some actual high valuable 326 meta-commands. We notice that the MCC and MCC-PPO in both metrics are close, confirming the 327 versatility of the CS model structure. 328

Table 1: The WR of different human-AI teams against MC-Base agents in 4 AI + 1 Human mode.

 Table 2: The RR of humans and agents to teammates.

 Sender\Receiver
 Average Human
 Strong Human
 MCC

mot hie Buse u	genus in ti		ant model	Sender (Receiver	niterage maman	Strong Human	mee
Teommote	Type of Agent			MC-Rand	41.07%	35.69%	34.03%
Teannate	MC-Base	MC-Rand	MCC	Average Human	72.34%	-	61.17%
Average Human	23%	5%	37%	Strong Human	-	74.91%	73.05%
Strong Human	42%	28%	54%	MCC	73.43%	78.50%	-



Figure 7: Case study on the value estimation of CS.

329 5.3 Results in Human-AI Game Test

Due to space limitations, we only show the objective results in 4AI + 1 Human mode. Other modes 330 results and the subjective preference results of testers can be found in the Appendix A.10.3 and A.11. 331 Table 1 shows the WR of different human-AI teams who play against the MC-Base agent-only team. 332 We see that the MCC agent significantly outperforms other agents, regardless of whether they pair 333 with a strong or average human. To explain why humans have a higher WR when paired with the 334 335 MCC agents, we count the RR of agents to the meta-commands sent from human teammates (H2A scenarios) and the RR of humans to the meta-commands sent from agent teammates (A2H scenarios), 336 respectively, as shown in Table 2. In H2A scenarios, the RRs of the MCC agents to average humans 337 and strong humans are 61.17% and 73.05%, respectively, indicating that the MCC agents are more 338 willing to respond to valuable meta-commands sent from strong humans. We also notice that the RR 339 of the MCC agents to strong humans (73.05%) is very close to the RR of strong humans themselves 340 341 (74.91%), suggesting that the CS is close to the value system of strong humans. In A2H scenarios, the RRs of average humans and strong humans to the MCC agents are 73.43% and 78.5%, respectively, 342 which is significantly higher than that of MC-Rand agents (41.07% and 35.69%), indicating that the 343 meta-commands sent from the MCC agents are more valuable and reasonable to humans. Note that 344 the RR of the MCC agents to the MC-Rand agents is 34.03%, which is close to that of strong humans 345 (35.69%), once again confirming that the CS is close to the value system of strong humans. 346

We also visualize the comparison of CS and strong human value systems on a game scene with three meta-commands existing, as shown in Figure 7. We see that the CS selects the meta-command B for the two heroes in the red dashed box to collaborate, selects the meta-command C for the two heroes in the purple dashed box to collaborate, and selects the meta-command A for the remaining hero to execute alone. The CS selection results are consistent with the ranking results of strong humans, confirming the effectiveness of CS and the interpretability of the collaboration behavior between MCC agents and humans.

354 6 Conclusion

In this paper, we proposed an efficient and interpretable Meta-Command Communication-based 355 framework, dubbed MCC, to achieve effective human-AI collaboration in MOBA games. To bridge 356 the communication gap between humans and agents, we designed an interpretable communication 357 358 protocol, i.e., the Meta-Command, to convert the explicit messages from humans and the implicit messages from agents into unified meta-commands. To achieve effective collaboration, we constructed 359 a meta-command value estimation model, i.e., the Meta-Command Selector, to select a valuable 360 meta-command for each agent to execute. Finally, we introduced the training process of the MCC 361 framework and conducted practical human-AI game tests in the typical MOBA game Honor of 362 Kings. The experimental results show that the MCC agents can collaborate reasonably with human 363 teammates and even generalize to collaborate with different levels and numbers of human teammates. 364 We expect this work can be a foundation for future HAC research in complex environments. 365

366 References

- Lupu Andrei, Cui Brandon, Hu Hengyuan, and Foerster Jakob N. Trajectory diversity for
 zero-shot coordination. 139:7204–7213, 2021.
- [2] Micah Carroll, Rohin Shah, Mark K Ho, Tom Griffiths, Sanjit Seshia, Pieter Abbeel, and Anca
 Dragan. On the utility of learning about humans for human-ai coordination. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 32, 2019.
- [3] Rémi Coulom. Whole-history rating: A bayesian rating system for players of time-varying
 strength. In *Proceedings of the International Conference on Computers and Games*, pages
 113–124, 2008.
- [4] Allan Dafoe, Edward Hughes, Yoram Bachrach, Tantum Collins, Kevin R McKee, Joel Z
 Leibo, Kate Larson, and Thore Graepel. Open problems in cooperative ai. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2012.08630*, 2020.
- Abhishek Das, Théophile Gervet, Joshua Romoff, Dhruv Batra, Devi Parikh, Mike Rabbat, and
 Joelle Pineau. Tarmac: Targeted multi-agent communication. In *Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning*, pages 1538–1546, 2019.
- [6] Yuqing Du, Stas Tiomkin, Emre Kiciman, Daniel Polani, Pieter Abbeel, and Anca Dragan. Ave:
 Assistance via empowerment. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 33:4560–4571,
 2020.
- [7] Jakob Foerster, Ioannis Alexandros Assael, Nando De Freitas, and Shimon Whiteson. Learning
 to communicate with deep multi-agent reinforcement learning. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 29, 2016.
- [8] Yiming Gao, Bei Shi, Xueying Du, Liang Wang, Guangwei Chen, Zhenjie Lian, Fuhao Qiu,
 Guoan Han, Weixuan Wang, Deheng Ye, et al. Learning diverse policies in moba games via
 macro-goals. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 34, 2021.
- [9] Mohammad Ghavamzadeh and Sridhar Mahadevan. Learning to communicate and act using
 hierarchical reinforcement learning. *Computer Science Department Faculty Publication Series*,
 page 172, 2004.
- [10] Hengyuan Hu, Adam Lerer, Alex Peysakhovich, and Jakob Foerster. "other-play" for zero shot coordination. In *Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning*, pages
 4399–4410, 2020.
- [11] Max Jaderberg, Wojciech M Czarnecki, Iain Dunning, Luke Marris, Guy Lever, Antonio Garcia
 Castaneda, Charles Beattie, Neil C Rabinowitz, Ari S Morcos, Avraham Ruderman, et al. Human level performance in 3D multiplayer games with population-based reinforcement learning. *Science*,
 364(6443):859–865, 2019.
- [12] Jiechuan Jiang and Zongqing Lu. Learning attentional communication for multi-agent coopera tion. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 31, 2018.
- [13] Uri Kartoun, Helman Stern, and Yael Edan. A human-robot collaborative reinforcement learning
 algorithm. *Journal of Intelligent & Robotic Systems*, 60(2):217–239, 2010.
- [14] Michał Kempka, Marek Wydmuch, Grzegorz Runc, Jakub Toczek, and Wojciech Jaśkowski.
 Vizdoom: A doom-based ai research platform for visual reinforcement learning. In 2016 IEEE
 Conference on Computational Intelligence and Games, pages 1–8, 2016.
- [15] Daewoo Kim, Sangwoo Moon, David Hostallero, Wan Ju Kang, Taeyoung Lee, Kyunghwan
 Son, and Yung Yi. Learning to schedule communication in multi-agent reinforcement learning.
 arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.01554, 2019.
- [16] Diederik P Kingma and Jimmy Ba. Adam: A method for stochastic optimization. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6980*, 2014.

- [17] Quan Liu, Zhihao Liu, Wenjun Xu, Quan Tang, Zude Zhou, and Duc Truong Pham. Human robot collaboration in disassembly for sustainable manufacturing. *International Journal of Production Research*, 57(12):4027–4044, 2019.
- [18] Hanxiao Liu, Zihang Dai, David So, and Quoc V Le. Pay attention to mlps. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 34:9204–9215, 2021.
- [19] Kevin R McKee, Xuechunzi Bai, and Susan T Fiske. Warmth and competence in human-agent
 cooperation. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2201.13448*, 2022.
- [20] Kevin R McKee, Joel Z Leibo, Charlie Beattie, and Richard Everett. Quantifying the effects of
 environment and population diversity in multi-agent reinforcement learning. *Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems*, 36(1):1–16, 2022.

⁴²² [21] Volodymyr Mnih, Koray Kavukcuoglu, David Silver, Andrei A. Rusu, Joel Veness, Marc G.
⁴²³ Bellemare, Alex Graves, Martin A. Riedmiller, Andreas Fidjeland, Georg Ostrovski, Stig Petersen,
⁴²⁴ Charles Beattie, Amir Sadik, Ioannis Antonoglou, Helen King, Dharshan Kumaran, Daan Wierstra,
⁴²⁵ Shane Legg, and Demis Hassabis. Human-level control through deep reinforcement learning.
⁴²⁶ *Nature*, 518(7540):529–533, 2015.

- [22] OpenAI, Christopher Berner, Greg Brockman, Brooke Chan, Vicki Cheung, Przemysław Dębiak,
 Christy Dennison, David Farhi, Quirin Fischer, Shariq Hashme, Chris Hesse, Rafal Józefowicz,
 Scott Gray, Catherine Olsson, Jakub Pachocki, Michael Petrov, Henrique Pondé de Oliveira Pinto,
 Jonathan Raiman, Tim Salimans, Jeremy Schlatter, Jonas Schneider, Szymon Sidor, Ilya Sutskever,
 Jie Tang, Filip Wolski, and Susan Zhang. Dota 2 with large scale deep reinforcement learning.
 arXiv preprint arXiv:1912.06680, 2019.
- [23] Peng Peng, Ying Wen, Yaodong Yang, Quan Yuan, Zhenkun Tang, Haitao Long, and Jun Wang.
 Multiagent bidirectionally-coordinated nets: Emergence of human-level coordination in learning
 to play starcraft combat games. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.10069*, 2017.
- [24] John Schulman, Filip Wolski, Prafulla Dhariwal, Alec Radford, and Oleg Klimov. Proximal
 policy optimization algorithms. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.06347*, 2017.
- [25] Ali Shafti, Jonas Tjomsland, William Dudley, and A Aldo Faisal. Real-world human-robot
 collaborative reinforcement learning. In *2020 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems*, pages 11161–11166, 2020.
- [26] Victor do Nascimento Silva and Luiz Chaimowicz. Moba: A new arena for game ai. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.10443*, 2017.
- [27] David Silver, Aja Huang, Chris J Maddison, Arthur Guez, Laurent Sifre, George Van Den Driessche, Julian Schrittwieser, Ioannis Antonoglou, Veda Panneershelvam, Marc Lanctot, et al. Mastering the game of Go with deep neural networks and tree search. *Nature*, 529(7587):484–489, 2016.
- [28] David Silver, Julian Schrittwieser, Karen Simonyan, Ioannis Antonoglou, Aja Huang, Arthur
 Guez, Thomas Hubert, Lucas Baker, Matthew Lai, Adrian Bolton, et al. Mastering the game of
 Go without human knowledge. *Nature*, 550(7676):354–359, 2017.
- [29] Amanpreet Singh, Tushar Jain, and Sainbayar Sukhbaatar. Learning when to communicate at
 scale in multi-agent cooperative and competitive tasks. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1812.09755*, 2018.
- [30] Ho Chit Siu, Jaime Peña, Edenna Chen, Yutai Zhou, Victor Lopez, Kyle Palko, Kimberlee
 Chang, and Ross Allen. Evaluation of human-ai teams for learned and rule-based agents in hanabi.
 Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 34:16183–16195, 2021.
- [31] DJ Strouse, Kevin McKee, Matt Botvinick, Edward Hughes, and Richard Everett. Collaborating with humans without human data. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 34, 2021.
- [32] Sainbayar Sukhbaatar, Rob Fergus, et al. Learning multi-agent communication with backpropa gation. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 29, 2016.

- [33] Hado Van Hasselt, Arthur Guez, and David Silver. Deep reinforcement learning with double
 q-learning. In *Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, volume 30, 2016.
- [34] Oriol Vinyals, Igor Babuschkin, Wojciech M Czarnecki, Michaël Mathieu, Andrew Dudzik,
 Junyoung Chung, David H Choi, Richard Powell, Timo Ewalds, Petko Georgiev, et al. Grandmaster
- level in StarCraft II using multi-agent reinforcement learning. *Nature*, 575(7782):350–354, 2019.

[35] Ziyu Wang, Tom Schaul, Matteo Hessel, Hado Hasselt, Marc Lanctot, and Nando Freitas.
 Dueling network architectures for deep reinforcement learning. In *Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning*, pages 1995–2003, 2016.

- [36] Rundong Wang, Xu He, Runsheng Yu, Wei Qiu, Bo An, and Zinovi Rabinovich. Learning
 efficient multi-agent communication: An information bottleneck approach. In *Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning*, pages 9908–9918, 2020.
- [37] Bin Wu. Hierarchical macro strategy model for moba game ai. In *Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, volume 33, pages 1206–1213, 2019.

[38] Deheng Ye, Guibin Chen, Wen Zhang, Sheng Chen, Bo Yuan, Bo Liu, Jia Chen, Zhao Liu,
Fuhao Qiu, Hongsheng Yu, et al. Towards playing full moba games with deep reinforcement
learning. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 33:621–632, 2020.

[39] Deheng Ye, Guibin Chen, Peilin Zhao, Fuhao Qiu, Bo Yuan, Wen Zhang, Sheng Chen, Mingfei
Sun, Xiaoqian Li, Siqin Li, et al. Supervised learning achieves human-level performance in moba
games: A case study of honor of kings. *IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems*, 2020.

[40] Deheng Ye, Zhao Liu, Mingfei Sun, Bei Shi, Peilin Zhao, Hao Wu, Hongsheng Yu, Shaojie
Yang, Xipeng Wu, Qingwei Guo, et al. Mastering complex control in moba games with deep reinforcement learning. In *Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, volume 34, pages 6672–6679, 2020.

[41] Rui Zhao, Jinming Song, Haifeng Hu, Yang Gao, Yi Wu, Zhongqian Sun, and Wei Yang.
 Maximum entropy population based training for zero-shot human-ai coordination. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2112.11701*, 2021.

486 Checklist

488

489

501

502

504

505

- 487 1. For all authors...
 - (a) Do the main claims made in the abstract and introduction accurately reflect the paper's contributions and scope? [Yes] See the abstract and the contributions in Section 1.
- (b) Did you describe the limitations of your work? [Yes] For margin reasons, we will
 discuss limitations here. We have currently only verified the effectiveness of the MCC
 framework in MOBA games, and we will explore in more types of complex games,
 such as First-Person Shooting (FPS) and Massively Multiplayer Online (MMO) in the
 future.
- (c) Did you discuss any potential negative societal impacts of your work? [Yes] The purpose of our method is only for academic research based on game environments, e.g., investigating the MOBA game-playing problems. Like AlphaGo or AlphaStar, the potential negative societal impacts of our work will be limited to the development of gaming AI applications. However, our research will contribute to the research community, the game industry, and the e-sports community.
 - (d) Have you read the ethics review guidelines and ensured that your paper conforms to them? [Yes]
- 503 2. If you are including theoretical results...
 - (a) Did you state the full set of assumptions of all theoretical results? [N/A]
 - (b) Did you include complete proofs of all theoretical results? [N/A]
- 3. If you ran experiments...

507 508 509		(a)	Did you include the code, data, and instructions needed to reproduce the main experi- mental results (either in the supplemental material or as a URL)? [No] The code and the data are proprietary.
510 511		(b)	Did you specify all the training details (e.g., data splits, hyperparameters, how they were chosen)? [Yes] See the full experimental setup in Section 5.1.1 and Appendix.
512 513 514 515 516		(c)	Did you report error bars (e.g., with respect to the random seed after running exper- iments multiple times)? [Yes] All results are reported over five random seeds (see Section 5.1.2). For the convenience of presentation, the median is shown in AI Perfor- mance , while detailed error bars are presented in Ablation Studies . Due to the high cost of Human-AI Game Test , we only used the median model for testing.
517 518		(d)	Did you include the total amount of compute and the type of resources used (e.g., type of GPUs, internal cluster, or cloud provider)? [Yes] See the resources in Section 5.1.1.
519	4.	If yo	ou are using existing assets (e.g., code, data, models) or curating/releasing new assets
520		(a)	If your work uses existing assets, did you cite the creators? [Yes]
521		(b)	Did you mention the license of the assets? [Yes]
522		(c)	Did you include any new assets either in the supplemental material or as a URL? [No]
523		(d)	Did you discuss whether and how consent was obtained from people whose data
524		. /	you're using/curating? [Yes] Honor of Kings is a released and recognized "testbed" for
525			MOBA-game-playing problems [40, 39, 38, 8, 37]. We contact the relevant author and
526			obtain authorization from the game provider.
527		(e)	Did you discuss whether the data you are using/curating contains personally identifiable
528			information or offensive content? [Yes] See Appendix. All data in this paper is game-
529			related and has nothing to do with identity information.
530	5.	If yo	ou used crowdsourcing or conducted research with human subjects
531		(a)	Did you include the full text of instructions given to participants and screenshots, if
532			
			applicable? [Yes] See Appendix. In the Human-AI Game Test, all participants have
533			applicable? [Yes] See Appendix. In the Human-AI Game Test , all participants have more than three years of experience in <i>Honor of Kings</i> and are familiar with all the
533 534			applicable? [Yes] See Appendix. In the Human-AI Game Test , all participants have more than three years of experience in <i>Honor of Kings</i> and are familiar with all the information in the game. Before the test, we also inform the participants of the detailed test instructions, and the participants voluntarily choose whether to participant in the
533 534 535			applicable? [Yes] See Appendix. In the Human-AI Game Test , all participants have more than three years of experience in <i>Honor of Kings</i> and are familiar with all the information in the game. Before the test, we also inform the participants of the detailed test instructions, and the participants voluntarily choose whether to participate in the test
533 534 535 536 527			applicable? [Yes] See Appendix. In the Human-AI Game Test , all participants have more than three years of experience in <i>Honor of Kings</i> and are familiar with all the information in the game. Before the test, we also inform the participants of the detailed test instructions, and the participants voluntarily choose whether to participate in the test. We have detailed ethics descriptions in Appendix A.9. As stated in Section A.9.2
533 534 535 536 537 538			applicable? [Yes] See Appendix. In the Human-AI Game Test , all participants have more than three years of experience in <i>Honor of Kings</i> and are familiar with all the information in the game. Before the test, we also inform the participants of the detailed test instructions, and the participants voluntarily choose whether to participate in the test. We have detailed ethics descriptions in Appendix A.9. As stated in Section A.9.2, participants were given instructions before testing. As mentioned in point 5 (Line
533 534 535 536 537 538 539			applicable? [Yes] See Appendix. In the Human-AI Game Test , all participants have more than three years of experience in <i>Honor of Kings</i> and are familiar with all the information in the game. Before the test, we also inform the participants of the detailed test instructions, and the participants voluntarily choose whether to participate in the test. We have detailed ethics descriptions in Appendix A.9. As stated in Section A.9.2, participants were given instructions before testing. As mentioned in point 5 (Line 87-88), participants' game statistics will be only used for academic research, and
533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540			applicable? [Yes] See Appendix. In the Human-AI Game Test , all participants have more than three years of experience in <i>Honor of Kings</i> and are familiar with all the information in the game. Before the test, we also inform the participants of the detailed test instructions, and the participants voluntarily choose whether to participate in the test. We have detailed ethics descriptions in Appendix A.9. As stated in Section A.9.2, participants were given instructions before testing. As mentioned in point 5 (Line 87-88), participants' game statistics will be only used for academic research, and participants can choose whether to participate or not.
533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541		(b)	applicable? [Yes] See Appendix. In the Human-AI Game Test , all participants have more than three years of experience in <i>Honor of Kings</i> and are familiar with all the information in the game. Before the test, we also inform the participants of the detailed test instructions, and the participants voluntarily choose whether to participate in the test. We have detailed ethics descriptions in Appendix A.9. As stated in Section A.9.2, participants were given instructions before testing. As mentioned in point 5 (Line 87-88), participants' game statistics will be only used for academic research, and participants can choose whether to participate or not. Did you describe any potential participant risks, with links to Institutional Review
533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542		(b)	applicable? [Yes] See Appendix. In the Human-AI Game Test , all participants have more than three years of experience in <i>Honor of Kings</i> and are familiar with all the information in the game. Before the test, we also inform the participants of the detailed test instructions, and the participants voluntarily choose whether to participate in the test. We have detailed ethics descriptions in Appendix A.9. As stated in Section A.9.2, participants were given instructions before testing. As mentioned in point 5 (Line 87-88), participants' game statistics will be only used for academic research, and participants can choose whether to participate or not. Did you describe any potential participant risks, with links to Institutional Review Board (IRB) approvals, if applicable? [Yes] We had performed a process similar to
533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543		(b)	applicable? [Yes] See Appendix. In the Human-AI Game Test , all participants have more than three years of experience in <i>Honor of Kings</i> and are familiar with all the information in the game. Before the test, we also inform the participants of the detailed test instructions, and the participants voluntarily choose whether to participate in the test. We have detailed ethics descriptions in Appendix A.9. As stated in Section A.9.2, participants were given instructions before testing. As mentioned in point 5 (Line 87-88), participants' game statistics will be only used for academic research, and participants can choose whether to participate or not. Did you describe any potential participant risks, with links to Institutional Review Board (IRB) approvals, if applicable? [Yes] We had performed a process similar to IRB before the test was conducted in this paper. The institution and all participants
533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544		(b)	applicable? [Yes] See Appendix. In the Human-AI Game Test , all participants have more than three years of experience in <i>Honor of Kings</i> and are familiar with all the information in the game. Before the test, we also inform the participants of the detailed test instructions, and the participants voluntarily choose whether to participate in the test. We have detailed ethics descriptions in Appendix A.9. As stated in Section A.9.2, participants were given instructions before testing. As mentioned in point 5 (Line 87-88), participants' game statistics will be only used for academic research, and participants can choose whether to participate or not. Did you describe any potential participant risks, with links to Institutional Review Board (IRB) approvals, if applicable? [Yes] We had performed a process similar to IRB before the test was conducted in this paper. The institution and all participants have approved our research. First, we analyze the risks of these experiments to the
533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545		(b)	applicable? [Yes] See Appendix. In the Human-AI Game Test , all participants have more than three years of experience in <i>Honor of Kings</i> and are familiar with all the information in the game. Before the test, we also inform the participants of the detailed test instructions, and the participants voluntarily choose whether to participate in the test. We have detailed ethics descriptions in Appendix A.9. As stated in Section A.9.2, participants were given instructions before testing. As mentioned in point 5 (Line 87-88), participants' game statistics will be only used for academic research, and participants can choose whether to participate or not. Did you describe any potential participant risks, with links to Institutional Review Board (IRB) approvals, if applicable? [Yes] We had performed a process similar to IRB before the test was conducted in this paper. The institution and all participants have approved our research. First, we analyze the risks of these experiments to the participants. The risks mainly include the leakage of identity information and the time
533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546		(b)	applicable? [Yes] See Appendix. In the Human-AI Game Test , all participants have more than three years of experience in <i>Honor of Kings</i> and are familiar with all the information in the game. Before the test, we also inform the participants of the detailed test instructions, and the participants voluntarily choose whether to participate in the test. We have detailed ethics descriptions in Appendix A.9. As stated in Section A.9.2, participants were given instructions before testing. As mentioned in point 5 (Line 87-88), participants' game statistics will be only used for academic research, and participants can choose whether to participate or not. Did you describe any potential participant risks, with links to Institutional Review Board (IRB) approvals, if applicable? [Yes] We had performed a process similar to IRB before the test was conducted in this paper. The institution and all participants have approved our research. First, we analyze the risks of these experiments to the participants. The risks mainly include the leakage of identity information and the time cost. Then, a series of measures are implemented to prevent these risks in Appendix
533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 545 546 547 548		(b)	applicable? [Yes] See Appendix. In the Human-AI Game Test , all participants have more than three years of experience in <i>Honor of Kings</i> and are familiar with all the information in the game. Before the test, we also inform the participants of the detailed test instructions, and the participants voluntarily choose whether to participate in the test. We have detailed ethics descriptions in Appendix A.9. As stated in Section A.9.2, participants were given instructions before testing. As mentioned in point 5 (Line 87-88), participants' game statistics will be only used for academic research, and participants can choose whether to participate or not. Did you describe any potential participant risks, with links to Institutional Review Board (IRB) approvals, if applicable? [Yes] We had performed a process similar to IRB before the test was conducted in this paper. The institution and all participants have approved our research. First, we analyze the risks of these experiments to the participants. The risks mainly include the leakage of identity information and the time cost. Then, a series of measures are implemented to prevent these risks in Appendix A.9.2. We make a risk statement for participants and sign an identity information confidentiality agreement. We only use information related to the game state in our
533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549		(b)	applicable? [Yes] See Appendix. In the Human-AI Game Test , all participants have more than three years of experience in <i>Honor of Kings</i> and are familiar with all the information in the game. Before the test, we also inform the participants of the detailed test instructions, and the participants voluntarily choose whether to participate in the test. We have detailed ethics descriptions in Appendix A.9. As stated in Section A.9.2, participants were given instructions before testing. As mentioned in point 5 (Line 87-88), participants' game statistics will be only used for academic research, and participants can choose whether to participate or not. Did you describe any potential participant risks, with links to Institutional Review Board (IRB) approvals, if applicable? [Yes] We had performed a process similar to IRB before the test was conducted in this paper. The institution and all participants have approved our research. First, we analyze the risks of these experiments to the participants. The risks mainly include the leakage of identity information and the time cost. Then, a series of measures are implemented to prevent these risks in Appendix A.9.2. We make a risk statement for participants and sign an identity information confidentiality agreement. We only use information related to the game state in our research without identity information. In addition, special equipment and accounts are
533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550		(b)	applicable? [Yes] See Appendix. In the Human-AI Game Test , all participants have more than three years of experience in <i>Honor of Kings</i> and are familiar with all the information in the game. Before the test, we also inform the participants of the detailed test instructions, and the participants voluntarily choose whether to participate in the test. We have detailed ethics descriptions in Appendix A.9. As stated in Section A.9.2, participants were given instructions before testing. As mentioned in point 5 (Line 87-88), participants' game statistics will be only used for academic research, and participants can choose whether to participate or not. Did you describe any potential participant risks, with links to Institutional Review Board (IRB) approvals, if applicable? [Yes] We had performed a process similar to IRB before the test was conducted in this paper. The institution and all participants have approved our research. First, we analyze the risks of these experiments to the participants. The risks mainly include the leakage of identity information and the time cost. Then, a series of measures are implemented to prevent these risks in Appendix A.9.2. We make a risk statement for participants and sign an identity information confidentiality agreement. We only use information related to the game state in our research without identity information. In addition, special equipment and accounts are provided to the participants to prevent leakage of equipment and account information
533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551		(b)	applicable? [Yes] See Appendix. In the Human-AI Game Test , all participants have more than three years of experience in <i>Honor of Kings</i> and are familiar with all the information in the game. Before the test, we also inform the participants of the detailed test instructions, and the participants voluntarily choose whether to participate in the test. We have detailed ethics descriptions in Appendix A.9. As stated in Section A.9.2, participants were given instructions before testing. As mentioned in point 5 (Line 87-88), participants' game statistics will be only used for academic research, and participants can choose whether to participate or not. Did you describe any potential participant risks, with links to Institutional Review Board (IRB) approvals, if applicable? [Yes] We had performed a process similar to IRB before the test was conducted in this paper. The institution and all participants have approved our research. First, we analyze the risks of these experiments to the participants. The risks mainly include the leakage of identity information and the time cost. Then, a series of measures are implemented to prevent these risks in Appendix A.9.2. We make a risk statement for participants and sign an identity information confidentiality agreement. We only use information related to the game state in our research without identity information. In addition, special equipment and account information during the test. The identity information of all participants is not disclosed to the
533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552		(b)	applicable? [Yes] See Appendix. In the Human-AI Game Test , all participants have more than three years of experience in <i>Honor of Kings</i> and are familiar with all the information in the game. Before the test, we also inform the participants of the detailed test instructions, and the participants voluntarily choose whether to participate in the test. We have detailed ethics descriptions in Appendix A.9. As stated in Section A.9.2, participants were given instructions before testing. As mentioned in point 5 (Line 87-88), participants' game statistics will be only used for academic research, and participants can choose whether to participate or not. Did you describe any potential participant risks, with links to Institutional Review Board (IRB) approvals, if applicable? [Yes] We had performed a process similar to IRB before the test was conducted in this paper. The institution and all participants have approved our research. First, we analyze the risks of these experiments to the participants. The risks mainly include the leakage of identity information and the time cost. Then, a series of measures are implemented to prevent these risks in Appendix A.9.2. We make a risk statement for participants and sign an identity information confidentiality agreement. We only use information related to the game state in our research without identity information. In addition, special equipment and accounts are provided to the participants to prevent leakage of equipment and account information during the test. The identity information of all participants is not disclosed to the public.
533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553		(b) (c)	applicable? [Yes] See Appendix. In the Human-AI Game Test , all participants have more than three years of experience in <i>Honor of Kings</i> and are familiar with all the information in the game. Before the test, we also inform the participants of the detailed test instructions, and the participants voluntarily choose whether to participate in the test. We have detailed ethics descriptions in Appendix A.9. As stated in Section A.9.2, participants were given instructions before testing. As mentioned in point 5 (Line 87-88), participants' game statistics will be only used for academic research, and participants can choose whether to participate or not. Did you describe any potential participant risks, with links to Institutional Review Board (IRB) approvals, if applicable? [Yes] We had performed a process similar to IRB before the test was conducted in this paper. The institution and all participants have approved our research. First, we analyze the risks of these experiments to the participants. The risks mainly include the leakage of identity information and the time cost. Then, a series of measures are implemented to prevent these risks in Appendix A.9.2. We make a risk statement for participants and sign an identity information confidentiality agreement. We only use information related to the game state in our research without identity information. In addition, special equipment and accounts are provided to the participants to prevent leakage of equipment and account information during the test. The identity information of all participants is not disclosed to the public. Did you include the estimated hourly wage paid to participants and the total amount
533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554		(b) (c)	applicable? [Yes] See Appendix. In the Human-AI Game Test , all participants have more than three years of experience in <i>Honor of Kings</i> and are familiar with all the information in the game. Before the test, we also inform the participants of the detailed test instructions, and the participants voluntarily choose whether to participate in the test. We have detailed ethics descriptions in Appendix A.9. As stated in Section A.9.2, participants were given instructions before testing. As mentioned in point 5 (Line 87-88), participants' game statistics will be only used for academic research, and participants can choose whether to participate or not. Did you describe any potential participant risks, with links to Institutional Review Board (IRB) approvals, if applicable? [Yes] We had performed a process similar to IRB before the test was conducted in this paper. The institution and all participants have approved our research. First, we analyze the risks of these experiments to the participants. The risks mainly include the leakage of identity information and the time cost. Then, a series of measures are implemented to prevent these risks in Appendix A.9.2. We make a risk statement for participants and sign an identity information confidentiality agreement. We only use information related to the game state in our research without identity information. In addition, special equipment and account information during the test. The identity information of all participants is not disclosed to the public. Did you include the estimated hourly wage paid to participants and the total amount spent on participant compensation? [Yes] In the Human-AI Game Test , participants