

# RISE: A STATISTICAL PERSPECTIVE FOR ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS AGAINST CLOSED-SOURCE MLLMS

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## ABSTRACT

This paper studies the critical problem of [targeted adversarial attacks against closed-source MLLMs](#), which aims to generate highly transferable adversarial samples with open-source MLLMs. Previous approaches typically focus on maximizing the similarity of latent representations between adversarial samples and target samples. However, these approaches could overfit specific target samples with severely limited generalization ability to closed-source MLLMs. Towards this end, we propose a novel approach named [Relational Distribution-aware Intrinsic Alignment \(RISE\)](#) for adversarial attacks against closed-source MLLMs. The core of our RISE is to adopt a statistical lens to characterize intrinsic semantics of images for more generalized and robust alignment. In particular, each augmented image is considered as an example from the intrinsic distribution of the original image. Then, we utilize non-parametric energy distance to measure the distribution divergence, which is naturally adopted for the semantic alignment in the hidden space. To further transferability to specific target models, we learn a Graph Neural Network (GNN) to explore the complex relations between source and target MLLMs on transferability and adaptively select surrogate source models for different target MLLMs. Extensive experiments on benchmark datasets validate the effectiveness of the proposed RISE in comparison to competing baselines.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years, Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have made significant breakthroughs. Models such as GPT-4o and Claude-3.7 have shown outstanding performance in various vision-language tasks, including visual reasoning (Li et al., 2024b; Park et al., 2025; Huang et al., 2025), image captioning (Salaberría et al., 2023; Li et al., 2024a; Sarto et al., 2025), and visual question answering (Luu et al., 2024; Özdemir & Akagündüz, 2024; Kuang et al., 2025). These models, especially widely adopted commercial closed-source versions, are increasingly entering high-risk domains such as autonomous driving (Cui et al., 2024; Fu et al., 2024a; Fime et al., 2025; Zeng et al., 2025), medical diagnosis (Jeong et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2025b), and content moderation (Ye et al., 2025; Fang et al., 2025). However, their widespread deployment introduces serious security challenges, with adversarial attacks posing a major threat that undermines the reliability and safety of these systems (Jiang et al., 2025).

Despite their strong capabilities, MLLMs often inherit the adversarial vulnerabilities of their visual encoders, making them susceptible to adversarial attacks (Gao et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2024). Adversarial examples are inputs that cause the model to produce incorrect outputs by adding subtle, human-imperceptible perturbations to the original data (Goodfellow et al., 2014). Among various attack scenarios, targeted transfer attacks on closed-source models are the most challenging and realistic. [Unlike untargeted attacks that simply induce incorrect predictions, we focus on targeted attacks in which adversaries aim to manipulate MLLMs to produce specific, attacker-desired semantic captions.](#) In this black-box setting, attackers have no access to the target model’s internal details, such as its architecture or parameters. Instead, they craft adversarial examples on an open-source surrogate model, aiming for successful transfer to the target model (Byun et al., 2022).

Currently, transfer attack methods for MLLMs have made notable progress. The core approach typically generates perturbations by minimizing the similarity between adversarial and target samples




Figure 1: Examples of responses from closed-source MLLMs to targeted adversarial samples generated by RISE. Bold text marks keywords that are semantically consistent with the target sample, whereas gray text highlights topics that the model overlooks.

in the latent space, leveraging open-source surrogate models such as CLIP and its variants. Several advanced approaches have recently emerged in this field. For example, M-Attack found that traditional uniformly distributed perturbations lack semantic information, often causing attack failures (Li et al., 2025). It introduced an innovative yet simple random clipping strategy to embed local semantic details within perturbations, significantly improving attack effectiveness. FOA-Attack adopts a more sophisticated alignment strategy, aligning both global features and fine-grained local blocks using clustering and optimal transport techniques (Jia et al., 2025). It further incorporates a dynamic model-weighting strategy driven by loss convergence speed.

However, despite continuous technical advancements, these methods share a fundamental limitation: they primarily focus on pointwise feature alignment by minimizing the distance between individual adversarial and target feature vectors. This approach causes adversarial perturbations to overfit the surrogate model’s specific feature space, a challenge conceptually illustrated in the left panel of Figure 2. This overfitting results in two key issues: **1) Poor Generalization:** The generated perturbations become overly dependent on the surrogate model’s latent space, leading to semantic fragility and poor generalization. Consequently, these perturbations are difficult to transfer to closed-source target models with different architectures and parameters. **2) Lack of Adaptivity:** Existing ensemble strategies—such as the static uniform weighting in M-Attack or the heuristic dynamic weighting in FOA-Attack—fail to capture the complex, asymmetric, and task-dependent transfer relationships among different MLLMs. As a result, these methods cannot be considered truly adaptive.

To overcome these challenges, we introduce a novel attack framework, Relational Distribution-aware Intrinsic Alignment (RISE), designed to fundamentally redefine the paradigm of transfer attacks. The core concept of RISE is to decompose the adversarial attack problem into two sub-problems—generalizability and specificity—offering independent and principled solutions for each:

**(1) Transitioning from point-wise to distributional alignment to improve generalization.** Rather than matching individual feature vectors, we align the entire latent space distribution that captures an image’s intrinsic semantic information. We hypothesize that an image’s core semantic information can be represented as a probability distribution, sampled via data augmentation techniques such as random cropping and scaling. Second, we employ the robust non-parametric statistical metric, Energy Distance, as a loss function to minimize distributional discrepancies between adversarial and target samples in the latent space. By aligning statistical distributions instead of individual feature points, RISE produces perturbations that capture more fundamental and generalizable semantic information, effectively mitigating feature overfitting in surrogate models.

**(2) Moving from heuristic ensemble methods to relational ensembling for improved specialization.** To overcome the limitations of existing ensemble strategies, RISE introduces an innovative GNN Attack Router. This component explicitly models the transferability of surrogate models across attack tasks using a heterogeneous graph. Through offline training, the GNN Attack Router learns complex transfer relationships among models and adaptively selects the optimal surrogate model ensemble for specific attack tasks. This shifts attack strategies from static or heuristic integration to a data-driven, highly specialized selection process tailored to specific objectives.

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


Figure 2: Overview of the RISE Framework. Left Panel: Challenge & Goal. The key challenge in black-box transfer attacks is that traditional point-by-point feature matching tends to overfit surrogate models, leading to poor transferability. Middle Panel: Proposed Solution. The RISE framework consists of two key components: 1) the GNN Attack Router that adaptively selects the optimal surrogate model ensemble using historical attack data, and 2) Distribution-aware Intrinsic Mining, which aligns the latent distributions of adversarial and target samples by minimizing Energy Distance. Right Panel: Outcome & Payoff. We demonstrate RISE’s effectiveness with an example in which an adversarial sample successfully deceives the target model (GPT-4o) into producing the intended semantic description, a task where previous methods failed.

Figure 1 shows examples demonstrating the effectiveness of RISE’s adversarial attacks on closed-source MLLMs. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:

- ❶ **A Statistical Perspective on Transferable Attacks.** We shift the attack objective from traditional point-by-point feature matching to robust distribution alignment in the latent space. This statistical perspective fundamentally redefines how transferable adversarial examples are generated.
- ❷ **Energy Distance as an Adversarial Loss.** We are the first to propose using the non-parametric Energy Distance as a loss function for adversarial attacks. This approach offers a principled and computationally efficient way to reduce the distributional gap between adversarial and target image representations.
- ❸ **GNN Attack Router for Adaptive Ensemble.** We propose a relationship-mining framework, the GNN Attack Router, which captures transferable relationships among MLLMs. The Router enables adaptive surrogate model selection, thereby improving attack specificity against targeted objectives.
- ❹ **A New State-of-the-Art Baseline.** Through extensive experiments, we show that RISE substantially outperforms existing methods in attacking multiple MLLMs, thus establishing a stronger and more reliable baseline for evaluating adversarial robustness.

## 2 RELATED WORK

**Transfer-based Adversarial Attacks on MLLMs.** Early studies showed that aligning image features in the latent space of surrogate models is an effective transfer attack method (Zhao et al., 2023). Later research mainly improved transferability through two strategies. One direction uses ensemble approaches, evolving from simple loss averaging to generating more robust perturbations by exploiting cross-model shared vulnerabilities (Dong et al., 2023). The other direction leverages semantic information to improve the alignment process. For example, M-Attack adds local semantic embeddings into perturbations through random cropping (Li et al., 2025), while FOA-Attack applies clustering and optimal transport for finer-grained feature matching, enhanced by dynamic loss weighting (Jia et al., 2025). Despite these advances, current approaches are still limited by their

reliance on pointwise feature alignment (which risks overfitting to the target model) and by heuristic or static integration rules. Our method addresses these limitations by adopting distribution alignment for better generalization and introducing a learning-based adaptive model selection strategy.

**Statistical Distances for Distribution Matching.** Moving from “point-to-point” to “distribution-to-distribution” alignment requires a robust metric to measure differences between high-dimensional empirical distributions. Metrics such as Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) are common, but their performance is highly sensitive to kernel selection (Gretton et al., 2006; 2012). The Wasserstein Distance provides rich geometric information but is computationally intensive in high-dimensional MLLM latent spaces (Villani et al., 2008; Arjovsky et al., 2017). In contrast, we introduce the Energy Distance—a nonparametric metric that is theoretically sound, requires no hyperparameter tuning, and is computationally efficient (Rizzo & Székely, 2016; Zhang et al., 2024a), making it well-suited for iterative optimization.

**Graph Neural Networks for Relational Modeling.** To overcome the limits of static or heuristic integration, we formulate surrogate model selection as a relational learning problem. We propose a GNN Attack Router to model complex, task-relevant transferable relationships among MLLMs. This approach is inspired by the success of GNNs in capturing high-order relational patterns across domains (Yu et al., 2022; Feng et al., 2025; Chen et al., 2025). By learning transfer patterns from historical data, our method enables a data-driven, adaptive surrogate model selection framework that outperforms fixed strategies in prior work, thereby improving attack specialization.

**Comparison with Traditional Attack Methods.** Traditional attack methods (e.g., FGSM and PGD) primarily exploit high-frequency pixel noise to cross static decision boundaries in closed-set classification, resulting in simple label misclassifications (Cao et al., 2025). In contrast, MLLM attacks operate in an open semantic space dominated by cross-modal alignment, where the attack objective shifts from simple misclassification to more complex forms of semantic hijacking or jail-breaking (Cui et al., 2025). Because the visual–language projector in MLLMs acts as a semantic filter that blocks simple pixel-level gradient noise, point-to-point feature-matching strategies developed for CNNs do not transfer directly (Wang et al., 2025a). Consequently, effective MLLM attacks must move beyond pixel-level perturbations and instead exploit distribution-level semantic alignment to breach the security barriers of multimodal interactions—a defining characteristic of this new generation of threat models (Rahmatullaev et al., 2025).

### 3 THE PROPOSED RISE

This section elaborates on the technical details of the RISE framework. We first define the problem, then provide an overview of the framework, and finally examine its two core innovations: Distribution-aware Intrinsic Mining for Representation Alignment and Relational Mining for Surrogate Model Selection.

#### 3.1 PROBLEM DEFINITION

Our research investigates black-box adversarial transfer attacks on MLLMs. Consider a target MLLM  $M_{tgt}$ , an original natural image  $x_{nat}$ , and a target image  $x_{tar}$ . The objective is to generate an adversarial image  $x_{adv}$  such that the textual description produced by  $M_{tgt}$  for  $x_{adv}$  is semantically equivalent to the content of  $x_{tar}$ . The attack is constrained by an imperceptibility requirement: the perturbation  $\delta = x_{adv} - x_{nat}$  must lie within a specified  $l_p$ -norm ball:

$$\|x_{adv} - x_{nat}\|_p \leq \epsilon, \tag{1}$$

where  $\epsilon$  denotes a small positive value to ensure the disturbance remains imperceptible. Since  $M_{tgt}$  is a black-box model, it cannot be directly queried or used to compute gradients. Therefore, the attack is carried out using a set of accessible open-source surrogate models,  $\mathcal{F} = \{f_{\theta_1}, f_{\theta_2}, \dots, f_{\theta_T}\}$ , where each  $f_{\theta_i}$  is an image encoder that maps input images to a high-dimensional latent space.

#### 3.2 FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW

The RISE framework operates through two complementary phases: Offline Relational Mining and Online Attack Generation. This process is designed to systematically address the two key chal-

216 lenges previously discussed: generalization and specialization. The entire workflow is illustrated in  
 217 Figure 2.

218 **Offline Relational Mining.** We construct and pre-train a GNN Attack Router in this stage. First, we  
 219 collect extensive historical attack data, which records the transfer success rates of various surrogate  
 220 models (e.g., ViT-B/16, Laion (Ilharco et al., 2021)) across attack tasks defined by source–target  
 221 image pairs. This data is then used to construct a heterogeneous graph consisting of “model nodes”  
 222 and “task nodes.” The GNN Attack Router is trained on this graph to learn and encode complex  
 223 transfer relationships between models and tasks. Through this process, the GNN Attack Router  
 224 evolves into an expert system that predicts the most effective model combination for each task.

225 **Online Attack Generation.** The Online Attack Generation phase begins when generating adver-  
 226 sarial samples for a new attack task (i.e., a new pair of  $x_{nat}$  and  $x_{tar}$ ). First, the pre-trained GNN  
 227 Attack Router receives the task features and performs adaptive surrogate model selection. It then  
 228 selects the Top- $K$  models from the surrogate model pool with the highest predicted transfer success  
 229 rates, forming a task-specific ensemble  $\mathcal{F}^* \subset \mathcal{F}$ . The iterative optimization phase then begins. At  
 230 each iteration, the adversarial perturbation is updated by minimizing the Energy Distance between  
 231 the adversarial and target samples in the latent space of  $\mathcal{F}^*$ . The resulting  $x_{adv}$  benefits from both the  
 232 generalization enabled by the Energy Distance and the specialization provided by the GNN-based  
 233 model selection.

### 235 3.3 DISTRIBUTION-AWARE INTRINSIC MINING FOR REPRESENTATION ALIGNMENT

236 To overcome the limited generalization of prior work (Li et al., 2025; Jia et al., 2025), caused by  
 237 overfitting to specific feature points in surrogate models, we propose a novel Distribution-aware  
 238 Intrinsic Mining approach. Our method shifts the attack objective from reconstructing individual  
 239 feature vectors to aligning latent distributions that capture an image’s core semantics. We hypoth-  
 240 esize that an image’s intrinsic information can be represented as a probability distribution, which  
 241 we approximate through empirical sampling with data augmentation. We employ the nonparametric  
 242 Energy Distance (Rizzo & Székely, 2016; Zhang et al., 2024a), a robust statistical metric, to mini-  
 243 mize the divergence between the adversarial sample and the target sample’s underlying distribution.  
 244 By operating at the distributional rather than the feature-point level (as illustrated in the middle  
 245 panel of Figure 2), our method produces adversarial perturbations less sensitive to the surrogate  
 246 model’s feature space, thereby substantially improving transferability and generalization, achieving  
 247 the successful alignment.

248 Our approach defines the semantic identity of an image as a latent distribution  $P_\theta(x)$ , rather than  
 249 as a single latent vector. To approximate this distribution empirically, we apply  $M$  random data  
 250 augmentations  $\mathcal{T}$  (e.g., cropping, scaling) to the image  $x$ , which generates a batch of augmented  
 251 views  $\{x'_i = \mathcal{T}_i(x)\}_{i=1}^M$ . For each view, we use an encoder  $f_\theta$  to extract two representations: a global  
 252 feature vector  $g_i = G_\theta(x'_i)$  capturing high-level semantics, and local block features  $L_i = L_\theta(x'_i)$   
 253 preserving fine details. Consequently, we obtain two empirical distributions for the target image  
 254  $x_{tar}$ : the global feature distribution  $\mathcal{D}_G(x_{tar})$  and the local feature distribution  $\mathcal{D}_L(x_{tar})$ . These  
 255 distributions are defined as follows:

$$256 \mathcal{D}_G(x) = \{g_i\}_{i=1}^M = \{G_\theta(x'_i)\}_{i=1}^M, \quad (2)$$

$$257 \mathcal{D}_L(x) = \{C_i\}_{i=1}^M = \{\mathcal{C}(L_\theta(x'_i))\}_{i=1}^M, \quad (3)$$

258 where  $\mathcal{C}$  is a clustering algorithm that generates centroids from local features.

259 After defining the latent distribution, we generate adversarial perturbations by minimizing the Co-  
 260 sine Energy Distance between the adversarial sample  $x_{adv}$  and the target  $x_{tar}$ . The Squared Cosine  
 261 Energy Distance is given by:

$$262 \mathcal{D}_c^2(F, G) = 2\mathbb{E}[d_c(\tilde{X}, \tilde{Y})] - \mathbb{E}[d_c(\tilde{X}, \tilde{X}')] - \mathbb{E}[d_c(\tilde{Y}, \tilde{Y}')], \quad (4)$$

263 where  $\tilde{X}$ ,  $\tilde{X}'$  and  $\tilde{Y}$ ,  $\tilde{Y}'$  denote independent and identically distributed unit vectors sampled from  
 264 distributions  $F$  and  $G$ , respectively. Intuitively, the Energy Distance captures the statistical differ-  
 265 ence between two distributions,  $F$  and  $G$ . The first term,  $\mathbb{E}[d_c(\tilde{X}, \tilde{Y})]$ , represents the expected dis-  
 266 tance between samples from different distributions, whereas the latter two terms,  $\mathbb{E}[d_c(\tilde{X}, \tilde{X}')] and  
 267 \mathbb{E}[d_c(\tilde{Y}, \tilde{Y}')] represent the expected distance within each distribution. Thus, minimizing  $\mathcal{D}_c^2(F, G)$   
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 269$

reduces both cross-distribution and intra-distribution distances, effectively making the two distributions statistically indistinguishable. This offers a robust, non-parametric objective for aligning adversarial images with the semantic manifold of the target image.

The alignment loss  $\mathcal{L}_{align}$  is composed of a global loss  $\mathcal{L}_{global}$  and a local loss  $\mathcal{L}_{local}$ . For global features, we use a point-to-distribution Energy Distance. For local features, we calculate the average distribution-to-distribution Energy Distance.

$$\mathcal{L}_{global} = E_{p \rightarrow d}(g_{adv}, \mathcal{D}_G(x_{tar})), \quad (5)$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{local} = \frac{1}{M} \sum_{i=1}^M \mathcal{D}_c^2(\mathcal{C}(L_{adv}), C_i). \quad (6)$$

We deliberately adopted two distinct alignment strategies. To capture global features ( $\mathcal{L}_{global}$ ) representing overall scene semantics, we use point-to-distribution ( $p \rightarrow d$ ) Energy Distances. This choice relies on the assumption that the high-level semantic vectors of adversarial images align with the central tendency of the target semantic distribution. For local features ( $\mathcal{L}_{local}$ ) that capture fine-grained details and textures, a stricter distribution-to-distribution ( $d \rightarrow d$ ) alignment is required. This ensures that the rich multimodal local patterns in adversarial samples match the target distribution, thereby preventing semantic mismatches at fine-grained levels. This dual strategy ensures both high-level conceptual consistency and fine-grained texture fidelity.

For an ensemble model with  $K$  components, the total alignment loss  $\mathcal{L}_{total}$  is defined as a dynamically weighted sum of the individual losses, where  $\mathcal{L}_{align}^{(k)} = \mathcal{L}_{global}^{(k)} + \eta_k \mathcal{L}_{local}^{(k)}$ .

$$\mathcal{L}_{total} = \sum_{k=1}^K w_k \cdot \mathcal{L}_{align}^{(k)}, \quad \text{where} \quad w_k = \frac{\exp(\mathcal{L}_{align}^{(k)}/T)}{\sum_{j=1}^K \exp(\mathcal{L}_{align}^{(j)}/T)}. \quad (7)$$

This dynamic weighting mechanism is inspired by FOA-Attack (Jia et al., 2025), which plays a key role in generating transferable adversarial examples. The core idea is that, at each iteration, different surrogate models may present varying levels of attack difficulty. Models with higher current loss  $\mathcal{L}_{align}^{(k)}$  are considered more ‘‘challenging’’ because their feature space is not yet well aligned with the target feature space. We apply the Softmax function, with temperature  $T$  controlling the sharpness of the weight distribution, to each loss function, thereby assigning greater weights  $w_k$  to the more challenging models. This strategy prevents optimization from converging prematurely to solutions that satisfy only the ‘‘simpler’’ models in the ensemble. Instead, it compels adversarial perturbations to focus on the most difficult-to-align feature dimensions. Consequently, the resulting perturbations avoid overfitting to any single model’s characteristics and instead capture more robust, shared vulnerabilities. This greatly improves their transferability to unseen black-box target models  $M_{tgt}$ . In our experiments, we set the temperature  $T=1$ .

### 3.4 RELATIONAL MINING FOR SURROGATE MODEL SELECTION

Traditional ensemble attacks usually rely on static strategies (e.g., uniform weighting) or heuristic strategies (e.g., loss-based) to combine surrogate models. However, these strategies cannot capture the complex, asymmetric, and task-dependent transferability relationships among different MLLMs. To address the limitations of static or heuristic ensemble strategies, we propose a GNN Attack Router that adaptively selects surrogate models through learning. This design transforms model selection from a manual, rule-based task into a data-driven relational learning problem. We represent the complex, task-dependent transferability between surrogate models and attack tasks using a heterogeneous graph. By pre-training a Graph Neural Network (GNN) on historical attack data, the GNN Attack Router learns to predict the most effective combinations of surrogate models for new, unseen attack tasks. This approach enables highly specialized attacks by dynamically allocating computational resources to models with the highest predicted success rates, thereby maximizing transferability against target MLLMs.

The core of this mechanism is a heterogeneous graph  $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$ , built from historical attack logs. The graph contains two types of nodes: (i) Task nodes ( $v_k \in \mathcal{V}_{task}$ ), with features formed by concatenating source and target image embeddings; and (ii) Model nodes ( $v_m \in \mathcal{V}_{model}$ ), represented by one-hot encodings. If model  $m$  is used to perform task  $k$ , an edge  $(v_k, v_m)$  is created with weight

$w_{km}$ , which represents the empirically measured transfer success score (computed with GPTScore (Fu et al., 2024b)). Crucially, these scores are derived from attacks on Qwen2-VL-7B, which served as a held-out target model. Because Qwen2-VL-7B is completely distinct from evaluation targets such as GPT-4o and Claude-3.7, the router operates under a strict zero-shot transfer setting with respect to target architecture, thereby eliminating cold-start issues). This graph captures the complex dependencies between attack targets and model capabilities.

The GNN Attack Router conducts offline training on the graph to predict transfer scores. The architecture consists of an embedding layer, a heterogeneous encoder for message passing, and an MLP-based edge predictor. The training objective is to minimize the mean squared error between the predicted score  $\hat{w}_{km}$  and the true score  $w_{km}$ . The loss function is defined as:

$$\mathcal{L} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{E}_{\text{train}}|} \sum_{(v_k, v_m) \in \mathcal{E}_{\text{train}}} (\hat{w}_{km} - w_{km})^2. \quad (8)$$

Once training is complete, the GNN Attack Router can be deployed for online inference. For a new attack task, we query the GNN Attack Router to predict transfer scores for all available surrogate models and select the Top- $K$  models with the highest scores to form a specialized ensemble,  $\mathcal{F}^*$ . Our experiments in Section 4.4 show that  $K=2$  achieves optimal performance. This data-driven, adaptive selection process ensures that our attacks both generalize well and are precisely tailored to the specific task.

## 4 EXPERIMENTS

### 4.1 DATASETS AND IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS

We build on prior research (Jia et al., 2025; Li et al., 2025) by using 1,000 source images from the NIPS 2017 competition (Kurakin et al., 2018) and 1,000 target images from the MS COCO validation set (Lin et al., 2014). We train the GNN Attack router on the first 800 image pairs and use the remaining 200 pairs for evaluation. The alternative model pool consists of three open-source CLIP variants: ViT-B/16, ViT-B/32, and ViT-g-14-Laion-2B-s12B-b42K (Ilharco et al., 2021). For the attacks, we set the perturbation budget to 16/255, the step size to 1/255, and run 300 iterations. Appendix C provides additional details on the KMR analysis dataset splitting and computational environment.

For evaluation, we follow Li et al. (2025) and employ LLM-as-a-judge (Zheng et al., 2023), where the same MLLM generates captions for both adversarial samples and target images. We then use the GPTScore method (Fu et al., 2024b) to calculate similarity scores between the two sets of captions. An attack is considered successful if the similarity score exceeds 0.3 (Li et al., 2025). We used the same prompt as Li et al. (2025) for evaluation in all experiments. We report three metrics: **1) Attack Success Rate (ASR)**, the percentage of test samples with similarity scores greater than 0.3. **2) Average Similarity Score (AvgSim)**, the mean similarity score across all test samples. **3) Keyword Matching Rate (KMR)**, where three semantic keywords are manually assigned to each image (using keywords from Li et al. (2025)). KMR/1, KMR/2, and KMR/3 denote the proportions of samples that match one, two, and three keywords, respectively, out of all samples.

### 4.2 COMPARISON WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART METHODS

To demonstrate RISE’s superiority, we conducted extensive comparisons with several recent state-of-the-art attack methods: AttackVLM (Zhao et al., 2023), AdvDiffVLM (Guo et al., 2024), SSA-CWA (Dong et al., 2023), AnyAttack (Zhang et al., 2024b), M-Attack (Li et al., 2025), and FOA-Attack (Jia et al., 2025). We evaluated performance on both open-source and closed-source MLLMs.

**Attack performance on open-source MLLMs.** As shown in Table 1, RISE consistently and significantly outperforms all competing methods across six representative open-source MLLMs. For example, on LLaVa-1.5-7B, RISE achieves an ASR of 91.5%, exceeding the previous best method, FOA-Attack, by 2.0%. Notably, on more advanced models such as Qwen2.5-VL-7B, RISE achieves an ASR of 86.5%, a substantial improvement over FOA-Attack’s 80.0%. This result highlights the strong generalization ability of our distribution-level alignment approach, which mitigates overfitting to surrogate models and enables effective transfer across diverse open-source architectures.

Table 1: Performance comparison on representative open-source MLLMs.

Method	Model	LLaVa-1.5-7B		LLaVa-1.6-7B		Qwen2.5-VL-3B		Qwen2.5-VL-7B		Gemma-3-4B		Gemma-3-12B	
		ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim
AttackVLM	VIT-B/16	4.0	0.03	3.5	0.02	3.0	0.02	3.0	0.02	2.0	0.02	4.5	0.02
	VIT-B/32	3.0	0.03	3.0	0.02	2.5	0.02	1.5	0.02	1.0	0.02	4.0	0.03
	Laion	3.0	0.03	4.5	0.03	2.5	0.02	3.0	0.03	1.5	0.02	4.5	0.03
AdvDiffVLM	Ensemble	3.5	0.03	4.0	0.03	5.0	0.03	4.0	0.04	3.5	0.04	5.5	0.03
	SSA-CWA	3.0	0.02	4.0	0.04	2.5	0.03	2.0	0.03	2.0	0.02	2.5	0.03
AnyAttack	Ensemble	16.5	0.09	16.0	0.09	11.0	0.06	18.0	0.10	7.5	0.05	8.5	0.06
M-Attack	Ensemble	85.5	0.55	85.5	0.54	63.0	0.36	74.0	0.43	48.0	0.26	47.5	0.25
FOA-Attack	Ensemble	89.5	0.56	91.5	0.57	66.0	0.41	80.0	0.48	50.5	0.28	51.5	0.29
Ours	Ensemble	<b>91.5</b> <sub>±2.0</sub>	<b>0.60</b> <sub>±0.04</sub>	<b>92.0</b> <sub>±0.5</sub>	<b>0.61</b> <sub>±0.04</sub>	<b>74.5</b> <sub>±8.5</sub>	<b>0.43</b> <sub>±0.02</sub>	<b>86.5</b> <sub>±6.5</sub>	<b>0.52</b> <sub>±0.04</sub>	<b>54.5</b> <sub>±4.0</sub>	<b>0.31</b> <sub>±0.03</sub>	<b>52.0</b> <sub>±0.5</sub>	<b>0.29</b> <sub>±0.00</sub>

Moreover, the consistently high AvgSim scores indicate that adversarial samples generated by RISE preserve strong semantic consistency with target images.

**Attack performance on closed-source MLLMs.** The primary challenge of this work is attacking proprietary closed-source MLLMs. Table 2 reports the attack results on five state-of-the-art commercial models. RISE shows strong effectiveness. On GPT-4o and GPT-4.1, RISE achieved ASRs of 88.5% and 89.0%, respectively, establishing a new milestone. Notably, on models known for their robustness—Claude-3.5 and Claude-3.7—RISE reached ASRs of 20.0% and 32.0%, respectively. These results represent a substantial improvement over FOA-Attack (17.0% and 23.5%) and M-Attack (19.5% and 25.0%). These findings strongly support our core hypotheses: 1) aligning with latent distributions, rather than individual feature points, yields more robust and transferable perturbations; and 2) the GNN Attack Router effectively identifies optimal surrogate model combinations for specific targets, thereby enhancing attack specialization.

Table 2: Performance comparison on representative closed-source MLLMs.

Method	Model	GPT-4o		GPT-4.1		Claude-3.5		Claude-3.7		Gemini-2.0	
		ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim
AttackVLM	VIT-B/16	1.5	0.03	1.5	0.01	0.5	0.01	2.0	0.03	1.0	0.02
	VIT-B/32	2.0	0.02	1.0	0.02	1.0	0.02	2.0	0.02	1.0	0.01
	Laion	2.5	0.02	1.5	0.02	0.5	0.02	2.0	0.02	1.5	0.02
AdvDiffVLM	Ensemble	4.5	0.04	5.0	0.04	2.0	0.02	3.5	0.03	3.0	0.03
	SSA-CWA	2.0	0.03	2.0	0.02	2.0	0.02	2.5	0.03	3.0	0.03
AnyAttack	Ensemble	12.5	0.07	10.5	0.06	10.0	0.06	12.5	0.08	11.0	0.07
M-Attack	Ensemble	81.0	0.46	85.5	0.50	19.5	0.11	25.0	0.14	74.0	0.41
FOA-Attack	Ensemble	85.5	0.50	88.5	0.55	17.0	0.10	23.5	0.15	74.0	0.43
Ours	Ensemble	<b>89.5</b> <sub>±4.0</sub>	<b>0.53</b> <sub>±0.03</sub>	<b>89.0</b> <sub>±0.5</sub>	<b>0.57</b> <sub>±0.02</sub>	<b>20.0</b> <sub>±3.0</sub>	<b>0.12</b> <sub>±0.02</sub>	<b>32.0</b> <sub>±8.5</sub>	<b>0.18</b> <sub>±0.03</sub>	<b>80.5</b> <sub>±6.5</sub>	<b>0.47</b> <sub>±0.04</sub>

**Effectiveness of attacks on MLLMs with enhanced reasoning capabilities.** We further evaluated RISE on MLLMs with enhanced reasoning capabilities, which are typically considered more robust. As shown in Table 3, RISE continued to demonstrate strong performance. On o3, RISE achieved an ASR of 91.5%, surpassing FOA-Attack by 1.0%. Even on the highly robust Claude-Sonnet-4, where other methods falter, RISE achieved an ASR of 14.5%, nearly 5% higher than FOA-Attack. These results show that advanced reasoning capabilities cannot fully mitigate vulnerabilities inherited from visual encoders, whereas RISE’s semantic alignment strategy remains highly effective.

To further assess fine-grained semantic alignment, we performed a Keyword Matching Rate (KMR) analysis. RISE achieved significantly better performance than baseline models, especially in matching multiple keywords (KMR/2 and KMR/3), highlighting its strong ability to capture core semantics (see Appendix E for details).

### 4.3 CASE STUDY

To qualitatively highlight RISE’s advantages, we present a challenging case study in Figure 3, which illustrates a substantial semantic gap between the source and target images. Baseline methods such as M-Attack and FOA-Attack produce outputs with incorrect contextual details or object hallucinations, revealing overfitting to the surrogate model. In contrast, RISE generates precise and detailed descriptions that remain faithful to the target scene. This success is attributed to our dual strategy: the GNN Attack Router selects the optimal surrogate model, and distribution-aware mining enables holistic, statistically robust semantic transfer that captures both primary objects and fine-grained environmental details.

Table 3: Performance comparison on closed-source MLLMs with enhanced reasoning capabilities.

Method	Model	o3		Claude-3.7-thinking		Claude-Sonnet-4	
		ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim
M-Attack	Ensemble	87.0	0.50	23.0	0.14	12.5	0.08
FOA-Attack	Ensemble	90.5	0.53	26.5	0.15	9.5	0.07
Ours	Ensemble	<b>91.5</b> <sup>↑1.0</sup>	<b>0.59</b> <sup>↑0.06</sup>	<b>32.0</b> <sup>↑5.5</sup>	<b>0.17</b> <sup>↑0.02</sup>	<b>14.5</b> <sup>↑5.0</sup>	<b>0.08</b> <sup>↑0.01</sup>

#### 4.4 ABLATION STUDY

We conducted a series of ablation studies to assess the contribution of each key component and hyperparameter in RISE. The results, summarized in Figures 3 and 4, confirm the effectiveness of our design, with the full framework outperforming all variants.

First, we analyzed the sensitivity to the number of augmented samples,  $M$ , which is crucial for estimating the latent distribution. Figure 4 presents this analysis. The left and middle panels show that, for GPT-4o and Gemini-2.0, increasing  $M$  generally improves the ASR and the AvgSim. However, beyond  $M=5$ , performance gains diminish, and GPT-4o’s ASR shows only marginal improvement at higher values. Simultaneously, the right panel reveals that the computational time per attack instance increases significantly with larger  $M$ . Considering the trade-off between attack effectiveness and computational efficiency, we selected  $M=5$  for all experiments, as it achieves near-optimal performance at a moderate computational cost.

Beyond increasing the sample size, we examined the effect of the weighting factor  $\eta_k$ , which balances global and local feature alignment. Analysis presented in Appendix D confirms that the heterogeneous weighting scheme ( $\eta=[1.8, 2.1, 4.8]$ ) significantly outperforms the uniform scheme. These results support our hypothesis that surrogate models with varying architectures benefit from customized feature balancing.

We also evaluated other critical components of the framework, with results shown in Figure 3. Notably, the ablation study results shown in the middle and right panels of Figure 3 provide several key insights. The RISE variant without DIM reduces to simple pointwise feature matching, showing the most substantial performance drop. This finding supports our core hypothesis that aligning latent distributions is essential for generalization, since pointwise alignment tends to overfit the specific feature space of the surrogate model. Furthermore, we observe that Energy Distance consistently outperforms MMD, likely because MMD is highly sensitive to kernel function selection, whereas Energy Distance is non-parametric and more robust. Finally, the GNN Attack Router achieves the optimal ensemble scale at  $K=2$ . When  $K=1$ , the gradient diversity is insufficient, whereas  $K=3$  results in a slight performance decline, possibly because conflicting gradients from less suitable surrogate models complicate the optimization process.




Figure 3: Analysis of the RISE framework’s effectiveness against adversarial attacks and its key components. (Left) Comparison of adversarial samples generated by RISE and other attack methods (M-Attack, FOA-Attack) on GPT-4o. RISE successfully induced the model to generate descriptions aligned with the target image’s semantics, whereas other methods failed. (Middle & Right) Ablation studies for the RISE framework are conducted. ‘Ours’ denotes the full model with default settings ( $K=2$ , Energy Distance).

#### 4.5 ROBUSTNESS AND EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

**Robustness of Evaluation.** To avoid potential bias from using the same model family for both image description and evaluation, we performed rigorous cross-judge validation. We used Claude-Sonnet-




Figure 4: Trade-off between performance and computational cost with respect to the number of augmented samples ( $M$ ). These results justify selecting  $M=5$  for the main experiments.

4.5 as an independent judge and further conducted a human evaluation on adversarial samples generated for GPT-4o targets. As shown in Table 4, although the absolute ASR scores varied because of different judge sensitivities, RISE consistently outperformed the strongest baseline, FOA-Attack, across all evaluation protocols. Notably, under Claude-Sonnet-4.5 evaluation, the performance gap widened to 5.0%, confirming that our improvements arise from robust semantic alignment rather than judge-specific factors.

Table 4: Robustness evaluation on GPT-4o target.

Method	Model	Original Judge		Claude Judge		Human Eval
		ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR
FOA-Attack	Ensemble	85.5	0.50	79.0	0.51	81.0
Ours	Ensemble	<b>89.5</b> <sub>↑4.0</sub>	<b>0.53</b> <sub>↑0.03</sub>	<b>84.0</b> <sub>↑5.0</sub>	<b>0.57</b> <sub>↑0.06</sub>	<b>85.0</b> <sub>↑4.0</sub>

**Computational Efficiency.** We further analyze the trade-off between attack performance and computational cost. While our default setting ( $M = 5$ ) prioritizes maximum transferability, RISE provides a flexible and efficient configuration. As shown in Table 5, even with reduced data augmentation ( $M = 2$ ), RISE remains 1.3 times faster than FOA-Attack (86 s vs. 109 s per image) while still achieving a higher ASR (86.0% vs. 85.5%). This result indicates that the performance gain arises from optimized Energy-Distance objectives and adaptive routing, rather than from simply increasing the computational budget.

Table 5: Efficiency comparison on the GPT-4o target.

Method	Settings	ASR (%)	Time (s)	Throughput
FOA-Attack	Standard	85.5	109	1.0×
Ours	$M = 5$	<b>89.5</b>	175	0.6×
Ours	$M = 2$	86.0	<b>86</b>	<b>1.3×</b>

Additional experiments on cross-dataset generalization (using the Flickr30k dataset) and on the sensitivity to the perturbation budget ( $\epsilon$ ) are presented in Appendix L. A formal theoretical analysis of the Energy Distance objective is presented in Appendix K.

## 5 CONCLUSION

This paper introduces RISE, a novel framework that statistically reconstructs adversarial attacks on closed-source MLLMs. RISE addresses the limitations of traditional point-by-point feature matching through a dual-pronged strategy: 1) Distribution-aware Intrinsic Mining, which leverages Energy Distances to capture semantic manifolds in images and improve generalization; and 2) GNN Attack Router, which replaces heuristic ensembles with data-driven methods for selecting specialized surrogate models. Extensive experiments show that RISE consistently outperforms state-of-the-art methods across a variety of MLLMs. This work establishes a more robust baseline for evaluating multimodal system security and highlights the critical importance of distribution alignment in future adversarial robustness research.

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## A APPENDIX: OFFLINE TRAINING OF THE GNN ATTACK ROUTER

### A.1 NETWORK ARCHITECTURE IMPLEMENTATION

To implement the GNN Attack Router, we adopt a heterogeneous GraphSAGE architecture built on the PyTorch Geometric library.

**Encoder:** The encoder comprises two layers of heterogeneous graph convolutions (HeteroConv). Each layer uses a SAGEConv operator with mean pooling to aggregate information from neighboring nodes. The hidden feature dimension is set to 64.

**Predictor:** The edge predictor is a two-layer MLP (Linear  $\rightarrow$  ReLU  $\rightarrow$  Linear) that concatenates the updated features of task and model nodes to predict scalar transfer scores.

**Input Projection:** A linear projection layer maps the high-dimensional task features (ViT embeddings) and model features (one-hot encoded) onto a shared hidden space ( $d = 64$ ) before they are fed into the GNN encoder.

### A.2 OFFLINE GNN ATTACK ROUTER TRAINING

This appendix describes the offline training process for the GNN Attack Router, as outlined in Algorithm 1. The process begins by constructing a heterogeneous graph from historical attack logs and pre-extracted image features. The graph consists of “attack\_task” nodes and “base\_model” nodes. Edges between nodes represent attack evaluations and are labeled with “transfer\_score”.

The GNN is trained with link prediction to estimate “1-transfer\_score”, enabling it to identify inefficient attack routes. We use an MSE loss function, the Adam optimizer, and early stopping based on validation loss to prevent overfitting. The best-performing model is preserved for the online routing phase.

## B APPENDIX: ONLINE ADVERSARIAL ATTACK GENERATION

This appendix provides pseudocode (Algorithm 2) for the online attack generation phase and details how to craft adversarial examples for a new task using the pre-trained GNN Attack Router and Distribution-aware Intrinsic Mining.

The process starts from a new attack task defined by a source image  $x_{nat}$  and a target image  $x_{tar}$ . First, the system queries the pre-trained GNN Attack Router (see Algorithm 1) to predict the transferability of all available surrogate models for the task. It then selects the Top- $K$  models to form a task-adaptive ensemble. The algorithm then enters an iterative optimization loop. Inside the loop, it estimates the intrinsic latent distribution of the target image by applying several data augmentations. The optimizer minimizes the Energy Distance between the current adversarial sample and the target’s latent distribution, evaluated over the selected ensemble. Perturbations are updated by gradient-based methods and projected onto the  $\ell_p$ -norm ball to ensure imperceptibility. This process repeats for a fixed number of steps to produce the final adversarial sample.

## C APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS

**KMR Analysis Dataset Configuration:** For the Keyword Matching Rate (KMR) analysis, we used the 100-pair dataset configuration proposed by Li et al. (2025). To avoid data leakage, we excluded datasets overlapping with the main training set and retrained the GNN Attack Router on the remaining 700-pair dataset.

**GNN Task Features:** The task node features for the GNN attack router were derived from embeddings produced by ViT-g-14-Laion-2B-s12B-b42K (Ilharco et al., 2021), the most powerful model in our pool. We chose this model because its higher capacity can, in principle, provide richer task representations.

**Computational Environment:** All experiments were performed on a single NVIDIA A800 GPU with the PyTorch platform.

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**Algorithm 1** Offline GNN Attack Router Training
 

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**Require:** Attack logs  $L$ , Source features  $\{F_s\}$ , Target features  $\{F_t\}$

**Ensure:** Trained GNN Router model parameters  $\theta^*$

```

1: function TRAIN_ATTACK_ROUTER( $L, \{F_s\}, \{F_t\}$ )
2:   Initialize a heterogeneous graph  $G$ 
3:   Construct node features  $G.V_{task}.X$  and  $G.V_{model}.X$  from  $\{F_s\}, \{F_t\}$  and logs  $L$ .
4:   Construct edges  $E_{index}$  and labels  $Y$  from logs  $L$ .
5:   Initialize GNN model  $\mathcal{M}(\theta)$ , optimizer  $\mathcal{O}$ , and loss  $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow$  MSE Loss.
6:   Split edges and labels into training  $(E_{train}, Y_{train})$  and validation  $(E_{val}, Y_{val})$  sets.
7:    $Y'_{train} \leftarrow 1.0 - Y_{train}$  ▷ Invert labels for training objective
8:    $Y'_{val} \leftarrow 1.0 - Y_{val}$ 
9:    $loss_{best\_val} \leftarrow \infty, \theta^* \leftarrow \theta$ 
10:  for epoch = 1  $\rightarrow E_{max}$  do
11:     $\mathcal{M}.train()$ 
12:     $\hat{Y}_{train} \leftarrow \mathcal{M}(G.X, E_{train})$  ▷ Forward pass on training subgraph
13:     $loss_{train} \leftarrow \mathcal{L}(\hat{Y}_{train}, Y'_{train})$ 
14:    Update  $\theta$  using backpropagation on  $loss_{train}$ .
15:    if epoch % 10 == 0 then
16:       $\mathcal{M}.eval()$ 
17:       $\hat{Y}_{val} \leftarrow \mathcal{M}(G.X, E_{val})$ 
18:       $loss_{val} \leftarrow \mathcal{L}(\hat{Y}_{val}, Y'_{val})$ 
19:      if  $loss_{val} < loss_{best\_val}$  then
20:         $loss_{best\_val} \leftarrow loss_{val}, \theta^* \leftarrow \theta$  ▷ Save best model
21:      end if
22:    end if
23:    Check for early stopping condition.
24:  end for
25:  return  $\theta^*$ 
26: end function

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**Algorithm 2** Online RISE Attack Generation

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**Require:** Source image  $x_{nat}$ , Target image  $x_{tar}$ 

- 1: Pre-trained GNN Attack Router  $\mathcal{M}_{\theta^*}$
- 2: Full set of surrogate models  $\mathcal{F} = \{f_1, f_2, \dots, f_N\}$
- 3: Feature extractor for GNN input  $f_{feat}$
- 4: Attack parameters: perturbation budget  $\epsilon$ , step size  $\alpha$ , number of steps  $T_{steps}$
- 5: Ensemble size  $K$ , Number of augmentations  $M$

**Ensure:** Adversarial image  $x_{adv}$ 

- 6: **procedure** RISE\_ATTACK( $x_{nat}, x_{tar}, \mathcal{M}_{\theta^*}, \mathcal{F}, f_{feat}, \epsilon, \alpha, T_{steps}, K, M$ )
- 7:  $\triangleright$  **Phase 1: Adaptive Surrogate Model Selection**
- 8:  $feat_{nat} \leftarrow f_{feat}(x_{nat})$
- 9:  $feat_{tar} \leftarrow f_{feat}(x_{tar})$
- 10:  $feat_{task} \leftarrow \text{CONCAT}(feat_{nat}, feat_{tar})$   $\triangleright$  Construct task node feature
- 11:  $Scores \leftarrow \mathcal{M}_{\theta^*}(feat_{task}, \mathcal{F})$   $\triangleright$  Predict transfer scores for all models
- 12:  $\mathcal{F}^* \leftarrow \text{Top-K}(Scores, K)$   $\triangleright$  Select the best  $K$  surrogate models
- 13:  $\triangleright$  **Phase 2: Iterative Adversarial Optimization**
- 14:  $\delta \leftarrow \mathbf{0}$   $\triangleright$  Initialize perturbation
- 15:  $x_{adv} \leftarrow x_{nat} + \delta$
- 16:
- 17:  $\triangleright$  Estimate target’s intrinsic distributions
- 18:  $\{x'_{tar,i}\}_{i=1}^M \leftarrow \{\text{Augment}_i(x_{tar})\}_{i=1}^M$   $\triangleright$  Apply  $M$  random augmentations
- 19: **For each model**  $f_k \in \mathcal{F}^*$ :
- 20:  $\mathcal{D}_G^{(k)}(x_{tar}) \leftarrow \{G_{\theta_k}(x'_{tar,i})\}_{i=1}^M$   $\triangleright$  Compute global feature distribution
- 21:  $\mathcal{D}_L^{(k)}(x_{tar}) \leftarrow \{\mathcal{C}(L_{\theta_k}(x'_{tar,i}))\}_{i=1}^M$   $\triangleright$  Compute local feature distribution
- 22:
- 23: **for**  $t = 1 \rightarrow T_{steps}$  **do**
- 24:  $\mathcal{L}_{total} \leftarrow 0$
- 25: **For each model**  $f_k \in \mathcal{F}^*$ :
- 26:  $g_{adv}^{(k)} \leftarrow G_{\theta_k}(x_{adv})$   $\triangleright$  Extract global feature of adv sample
- 27:  $C_{adv}^{(k)} \leftarrow \mathcal{C}(L_{\theta_k}(x_{adv}))$   $\triangleright$  Extract local feature clusters of adv sample
- 28:  $\mathcal{L}_{global}^{(k)} \leftarrow E_{p \rightarrow d}(g_{adv}^{(k)}, \mathcal{D}_G^{(k)}(x_{tar}))$   $\triangleright$  Point-to-dist Energy Distance
- 29:  $\mathcal{L}_{local}^{(k)} \leftarrow \frac{1}{M} \sum_{i=1}^M E_{d \rightarrow d}(C_{adv}^{(k)}, \mathcal{D}_L^{(k)}(x_{tar})_i)$   $\triangleright$  Avg dist-to-dist Energy Distance
- 30:  $\mathcal{L}_{align}^{(k)} \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_{global}^{(k)} + \eta_k \mathcal{L}_{local}^{(k)}$
- 31: **end for**
- 32:
- 33:  $\triangleright$  Calculate dynamically weighted total loss
- 34:  $\{w_k\}_{k=1}^K \leftarrow \text{DynamicWeights}(\{\mathcal{L}_{align}^{(k)}\}_{k=1}^K)$
- 35:  $\mathcal{L}_{total} \leftarrow \sum_{k=1}^K w_k \cdot \mathcal{L}_{align}^{(k)}$
- 36:
- 37:  $g \leftarrow \nabla_{\delta} \mathcal{L}_{total}$   $\triangleright$  Compute gradient w.r.t. perturbation
- 38:  $\delta \leftarrow \delta - \alpha \cdot \text{sign}(g)$   $\triangleright$  Update perturbation
- 39:  $\delta \leftarrow \text{clip}(\delta, -\epsilon, \epsilon)$   $\triangleright$  Project perturbation into  $\ell_{\infty}$ -ball
- 40:  $x_{adv} \leftarrow \text{clip}(x_{nat} + \delta, 0, 1)$   $\triangleright$  Ensure valid image range
- 41: **end for**
- 42:
- 43: **return**  $x_{adv}$
- 44: **end procedure**

---

**Human Evaluation Protocol:** To assess the practical effectiveness of our attack, we conducted a human evaluation with five participants. They were shown both the caption generated by the attacked MLLM for the target image and the caption for its adversarial sample, and were asked to judge (Yes/No) whether the generated caption was semantically consistent with the main content and context of the target. We reported the average percentage of “Yes” responses across all participants and samples.

## D APPENDIX: HYPERPARAMETER ANALYSIS OF $\eta_k$

In Section 3.3, the hyperparameter  $\eta_k$  acts as a key weighting factor that balances the contributions of global features ( $\mathcal{L}_{global}$ ) and local features ( $\mathcal{L}_{local}$ ) for each surrogate model  $k$ . The expressive power of global and local features varies across model architectures. Therefore, identifying an appropriate balance is crucial for effective feature alignment. We evaluated the sensitivity of our framework under different settings of  $\eta_k$ .

As shown in Table 6, we empirically selected heterogeneous weights for ViT-B/16, ViT-B/32, and Laion models ( $\eta = [1.8, 2.1, 4.8]$ , respectively) and compared them with several isometric settings where all models share identical weights ( $[1,1,1]$ ,  $[3,3,3]$ ,  $[5,5,5]$ ). The results demonstrate that uniform weights consistently yield suboptimal performance. Our proposed non-uniform weighting scheme achieves the highest ASR and AvgSim on both the GPT-4o and Gemini-2.0 models. These results confirm our hypothesis that assigning distinct weights based on each surrogate model’s characteristics is a more effective strategy, and they also validate the rationale behind the  $\eta_k$  values chosen in our main experiments.

Table 6: The effect of the weighting factor  $\eta_k$  on attack performance.

Value of $\eta_k$	GPT-4o		Gemini-2.0	
	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim
$[1, 1, 1]$	86.5	0.52	73.5	0.44
$[3, 3, 3]$	87.5	0.52	80.0	0.44
$[5, 5, 5]$	86.0	0.50	75.5	0.43
$[1.8, 2.1, 4.8]$	<b>89.5</b>	<b>0.53</b>	<b>80.5</b>	<b>0.47</b>

## E APPENDIX: DETAILED KMR ANALYSIS

To assess semantic alignment at a finer level, we used the KMR metric. Table 7 shows that RISE produces adversarial descriptions that are more semantically aligned with the target. On GPT-4o, RISE achieved KMR/1, KMR/2, and KMR/3 scores of 0.90, 0.71, and 0.25, respectively, consistently surpassing all baseline methods. The substantial improvements in KMR/2 and KMR/3—which involve matching multiple keywords—clearly indicate that RISE’s distribution alignment captures the core semantics of target images more effectively than point-by-point feature matching. A similar trend appears on Gemini-2.0, where RISE increases KMR/3 to 0.20—almost twice that of the second-best method.

Table 7: KMR comparison with representative state-of-the-art models.

Method	Model	GPT-4o			Gemini-2.0		
		KMR/1	KMR/2	KMR/3	KMR/1	KMR/2	KMR/3
AttackVLM	ViT-B/16	0.09	0.04	0.00	0.07	0.02	0.00
	ViT-B/32	0.08	0.02	0.00	0.06	0.02	0.00
	Laion	0.07	0.04	0.00	0.07	0.02	0.00
AdvDiffVLM	Ensemble	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00
SSA-CWA	Ensemble	0.11	0.06	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.00
AnyAttack	Ensemble	0.44	0.20	0.04	0.46	0.21	0.05
M-Attack	Ensemble	0.82	0.54	0.13	0.75	0.53	0.11
FOA-Attack	Ensemble	0.88	0.64	0.25	0.77	0.56	0.12
Ours	Ensemble	<b>0.90</b> <sub>±0.02</sub>	<b>0.71</b> <sub>±0.07</sub>	<b>0.25</b> <sub>±0.00</sub>	<b>0.83</b> <sub>±0.06</sub>	<b>0.60</b> <sub>±0.04</sub>	<b>0.20</b> <sub>±0.08</sub>

## F APPENDIX: EVALUATION PROMPTS

To promote transparency and reproducibility, this appendix presents the detailed prompts used in the LLM-as-a-judge evaluation process. As noted in Section 4.1, we adopted the same evaluation paradigm and prompts as prior studies (Li et al., 2025) to enable fair comparison.

### F.1 ASR AND AVGSIM EVALUATION PROMPT

We used the following prompt (see Figure 5) to instruct LLMs to evaluate the semantic similarity between two texts—the description of the adversarial sample and the description of the target image—on a scale from 0 to 1. This score was used for ASR and AvgSim.




Figure 5: Detailed content of ASR and AvgSim evaluation prompt (refer to Li et al. (2025)).

### F.2 KMR EVALUATION PROMPT

We use the following prompt (see Figure 6) to instruct LLMs to identify keywords from a predefined list within a given descriptive text and return the matches in JSON format. This task serves to evaluate KMR.

## G APPENDIX: MORE EXAMPLES OF ATTACK EFFECT VISUALIZATIONS

To offer a clearer and more comprehensive demonstration of the performance and robustness of the proposed RISE framework against MLLMs, this appendix presents five additional qualitative visualization examples. These examples complement Figure 1 in the main text and further demonstrate, from multiple perspectives, that RISE-generated adversarial samples can effectively deceive a range of advanced MLLMs. This deception leads MLLMs to produce descriptions aligned with the semantic content of the target image, rather than the actual content of the adversarial sample. We deliberately selected examples across diverse themes, levels of complexity, and types of challenges to comprehensively evaluate the RISE framework’s generalization ability and attack precision.

As shown in Figure 7, this case highlights RISE’s strong performance in processing image pairs that contain two visually unrelated concepts. The adversarial sample is a photograph of a sailboat,

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**KMR Evaluation Prompt**

You will be performing a keyword-matching task. You will be given a short description and a list of keywords. Your goal is to find matches between the keywords and the content in the description.

Here is the description text:

```
<description>
{description}
</description>
```

Here is the list of keywords:

```
<keywords>
{keywords}
</keywords>
```

For each keyword in the list, follow these steps:

1. Look for an exact match of the keyword in the description text.
2. If an exact match is not found, look for words or phrases with similar meanings to the keyword. For example, 'bite' could match with 'chew', or 'snow-covered' could match with 'snow'.
3. If you find a match (either exact or similar), record the keyword and its matched content.

Your output should be in JSON format, where each key is a keyword from the list, and its value is the matched content from the description. Only include keywords that have matches. For example:

```
{{
  "bite": "chew",
  "snow": "snow-covered"
}}
```

Here are some important points to remember:

- Only include keywords that have matches in the description.
- If a keyword doesn't have a match, do not include it in the JSON.
- The matched content should be the exact text from the description, not a paraphrase.
- If there are multiple matches for a keyword, use the most relevant or closest match.

Please provide your answer in the following format:

```
<answer>
{{
  // Your JSON output here
}}
</answer>
```

Remember to only include the JSON in your answer, with no additional explanation or text.

Figure 6: Detailed content of KMR evaluation prompt (refer to [Li et al. \(2025\)](#)).

1080 whereas the target semantic comes from a top-down image featuring stationery, backpacks, and  
 1081 electronic devices. Despite large differences in subject matter, color, composition, and underlying  
 1082 concepts, all tested models ignored the prominent sailboat and instead produced descriptions closely  
 1083 aligned with the target content, such as “tools” and “office supplies.” This demonstrates that RISE’s  
 1084 distribution alignment strategy effectively bridges wide semantic gaps, enabling robust semantic  
 1085 transfer.




Figure 7: Transfer attacks across large semantic gaps.

1102 Figure 8 illustrates RISE’s ability to adjust the visual focus of models in comparable scenes. The  
 1103 adversarial sample shows a tram on an urban street, whereas the target sample presents a close-  
 1104 up of a fruit stall. Both fall under the category of urban landscapes, but their focal subjects differ  
 1105 completely. Experimental results show that RISE effectively guided all models to disregard the large  
 1106 tram occupying a central position in the scene. Instead, the models carefully described the target  
 1107 image with terms such as “fruit market,” “apples and oranges,” and “price tags.” This demonstrates  
 1108 that RISE not only achieves broad semantic transfer but also provides precise, fine-grained control  
 1109 over model attention in complex scenes.




Figure 8: Focus manipulation attacks in similar scenarios.

1125 Figure 9 illustrates RISE’s ability to precisely alter key scene attributes in images, such as weather  
 1126 conditions and activity types. The adversarial sample shows people cycling on a park path under  
 1127 overcast skies, but without snow. The target sample depicts a cross-country skiing competition in  
 1128 snowy winter conditions. All model-generated descriptions explicitly referenced target elements  
 1129 such as “cross-country skiing,” embedding the core attributes of “snow” and “skiing”—features  
 1130 entirely absent from the adversarial sample. This shows that RISE effectively manipulates a model’s  
 1131 perception of key scene attributes, rather than simply substituting the subject.

1132 The challenge shown in Figure 10 arises from the model’s need to focus on describing a more com-  
 1133 plex human-object interaction. Results indicate that all models successfully focused their descrip-  
 tions on the “teddy bear” and the person holding it. This demonstrates that RISE attacks are highly




Figure 9: Tampering attacks on critical scene attributes.

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effective, capable of suppressing prominent visual features in adversarial samples and reconstructing a more detailed scene narrative according to the target distribution.




Figure 10: Subject replacement attack.

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Figure 11 illustrates RISE’s robustness against adversarial attacks under visual distortion. The adversarial sample displayed an inverted traffic light, whereas the target sample showed a normal traffic light along a coastal highway. The models initially classified the image as inverted, but their detailed description later fully incorporated the target sample’s scene information, including “distant hills and greenery” and a “scenic coastal view.” This indicates that RISE’s learned latent distribution has strong semantic coherence. Even when the input image’s geometric structure is distorted, the model is compelled to correct and refine its scene understanding using the target’s semantic information, highlighting the robust resilience of the RISE framework.




Figure 11: Effective Attacks under visual distortions.

## H APPENDIX: LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK

Although the RISE framework has achieved state-of-the-art results on multiple benchmarks, it still has certain limitations. This appendix discusses these limitations and outlines potential future directions.

### H.1 ADAPTABILITY AND SCALABILITY

The current framework encounters two major challenges: adaptability and scalability (Zhao et al., 2023). The first challenge is its reliance on static historical data, as the GNN Attack Router’s high performance depends on offline pre-training with large-scale historical attack logs. This reliance restricts the framework’s adaptability to new tasks, creating an adaptability bottleneck in the context of rapid model iteration. The second challenge lies in the computational overhead of distributional alignment, as the effectiveness of Distribution-aware Intrinsic Mining depends heavily on the number  $M$  of data augmentation samples used for distribution estimation. Experiments show that although larger  $M$  values improve attack success rates, they also increase computational costs linearly. This trade-off creates scalability challenges in scenarios demanding rapid attack generation or large-scale deployment.

To improve the framework’s adaptability and scalability, we plan to explore lightweight and online adaptation mechanisms in future work. For example, transfer-learning prediction methods based on meta-learning or zero-shot learning could allow the GNN Attack Router to quickly adapt to new models while reducing dependence on historical data. At the same time, exploring more efficient distribution estimation techniques—such as using parameterized models instead of empirical sampling—could substantially reduce computational overhead while maintaining performance, thereby improving the framework’s overall scalability.

### H.2 APPLICATION SCOPE AND METHOD DESIGN

The current design of RISE requires further improvement in both application scope and methodological completeness. First, the digital threat model remains limited. Similar to most existing studies, our work primarily evaluates attack performance under  $\ell_p$ -norm constraints in the digital domain. The effectiveness of this framework against more challenging physical-world attacks remains unverified. Complex physical-world transformations may distort the estimated potential distributions, thereby reducing the direct applicability of current methods. Second, the framework still contains residual heuristic components. Although RISE aims to replace manual rules with data-driven approaches, its design still incorporates heuristic choices, including the type of data augmentation transformation used for distribution estimation and the weighting factor  $\eta_k$  that balances global and local feature losses. Such fixed hyperparameters may not be optimal across different tasks and models.

In the future, we will expand the application scope of RISE and enhance its automated design. A key direction is to extend the framework to the physical world by incorporating physical transformations into the distributed estimation process, which will produce adversarial samples more resilient to real-world conditions. Methodologically, we will investigate learnable automation modules, such as using reinforcement learning to discover optimal data augmentation strategies, to reduce dependence on heuristic manual design. This will further improve the framework’s versatility and efficiency.

### H.3 BENCHMARK SCOPE AND EVALUATION BIAS

Although we validated our method on the Flickr30k dataset in Appendix L.1 to demonstrate its cross-dataset generalization capability, our primary benchmarking is conducted on the standard transfer setting from the NIPS 2017 competition dataset to MS COCO to ensure fair comparison with baseline methods. Future work should investigate broader domain transfer to more comprehensively demonstrate its universal robustness. Furthermore, although we incorporated cross-judge validation and human evaluation to mitigate biases when using LLM-as-a-judge, we acknowledge that automated metrics may remain sensitive to specific prompts.

## I APPENDIX: BROADER IMPACT AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The primary goal of this research is to strengthen MLLM security using an offense-driven approach. The proposed RISE framework seeks to offer academia and industry a more rigorous and effective baseline for security evaluation. By uncovering critical vulnerabilities in state-of-the-art models, we aim to promote the development of stronger defensive technologies and ensure the reliability of AI systems in critical domains such as autonomous driving and healthcare.

To minimize ethical risks, we used standard, publicly available datasets and restricted our analysis to benign semantic targets to ensure that the experiments do not propagate harmful biases, hate speech, or discriminatory content.

We recognize that offensive research inevitably carries dual-use risks. However, we contend that open research into advanced threats is essential for building trustworthy AI systems. Concealing vulnerabilities cannot achieve genuine security. Our work seeks to empower defenders by offering more robust stress-testing tools, ensuring that AI security barriers are thoroughly tested and strengthened.

## J APPENDIX: STATEMENT ON THE USE OF LLMs

In compliance with the latest ICLR regulations, we state that this research employed Large Language Models (LLMs) solely as auxiliary tools, mainly for refining academic writing, to improve manuscript quality. We emphasize that the role of the LLM was strictly limited to an auxiliary function. The core ideas, RISE framework design, experimental protocols, result analyses, and final conclusions are entirely the authors’ original work.

## K APPENDIX: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTION ALIGNMENT

This section provides a theoretical explanation for why the proposed Distribution-aware Intrinsic Mining method offers better generalization than traditional point-by-point feature matching approaches, drawing on the statistical properties of Energy Distances.

### K.1 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND LIMITATIONS OF POINT-WISE MATCHING

Let  $x$  denote the input image, and let  $G_\theta(\cdot)$  represent the surrogate model’s global feature extractor (as defined in Section 3.3). Previous methods (e.g., M-Attack and FOA-Attack) perform point-wise alignment and treat the semantic target as a deterministic vector,  $z_{tar} = G_\theta(x_{tar})$ . The optimization objective is as follows:

$$\min_{\delta} \|G_\theta(x_{nat} + \delta) - G_\theta(x_{tar})\|^2. \quad (9)$$

However,  $G_\theta(x_{tar})$  provides only one realization of the target semantics. In high-dimensional latent spaces, this isolated point is easily perturbed by high-frequency artifacts or model-specific biases, which can cause overfitting to particular curvatures of the empirical risk minimization surrogate.

### K.2 ENERGY DISTANCE AS A STRICTLY PROPER SCORING RULE

RISE treats the target embedding as a random variable  $Z_{tar} \sim \mathcal{D}_G(x_{tar})$  and approximates it empirically using  $M$  augmented views. We adopt the Energy Distance ( $D_E$ ), a statistically robust metric based on the distance between distribution characteristic functions. Crucially, the Energy Distance is a strictly proper scoring rule (Gneiting & Raftery, 2007; Rizzo & Székely, 2016). Therefore, minimizing the Energy Distance mathematically guarantees alignment of the underlying probability distributions:

$$D_E^2(P, Q) = 0 \iff P = Q, \quad (10)$$

where  $P$  and  $Q$  denote the distributions of adversarial and target global features, respectively, this property ensures that the optimization objective aligns with the true semantic manifold rather than with surrogate points.

### 1296 K.3 GRADIENT CONSISTENCY AND VARIANCE REDUCTION

1297  
1298 In our global alignment (Equation 5), we employ a point-to-distribution strategy in which the adver-  
1299 sarial image feature  $g_{adv} = G_{\theta}(x_{adv})$  is modeled as a deterministic point (Dirac measure), whereas  
1300 the target  $Z_{tar}$  is assumed to follow a distribution. In this setting, the Energy Distance objective  
1301 function simplifies to:

$$1302 \mathcal{L}_{RISE} \propto \mathbb{E}_{z \sim \mathcal{D}_G(x_{tar})} [\|G_{\theta}(x_{adv}) - z\|]. \quad (11)$$

1303 Using a batch of  $M$  augmented target samples, the gradient estimate becomes:

$$1304 \nabla_{\delta} \mathcal{L}_{RISE} \approx \nabla_{\delta} \left( \frac{1}{M} \sum_{i=1}^M \|G_{\theta}(x_{adv}) - z_i\| \right). \quad (12)$$

1305  
1306 Compared with point-wise matching, this formulation acts as a variance-reduction technique for  
1307 gradient estimators. By averaging out the high-frequency noise introduced by individual augmented  
1308 views, the optimized trajectory becomes smoother, which helps prevent adversarial perturbations  
1309 from being trapped in sharp, model-specific local minima. This theoretical insight directly accounts  
1310 for the observed improvement in transferability across diverse black-box architectures.  
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## 1313 L APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTS ON GENERALIZATION AND

### 1314 ROBUSTNESS

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1316 To further assess the robustness and generalization of RISE, we performed additional experiments  
1317 beyond the standard NIPS 2017 competition dataset  $\rightarrow$  MS COCO benchmark.  
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#### 1320 L.1 CROSS-DATASET GENERALIZATION (FLICKR30K)

1321 To assess transferability across different data distributions, we conducted transfer attacks on a new  
1322 target dataset, Flickr30k (Young et al., 2014), using the same source images from the NIPS 2017  
1323 competition dataset. We randomly selected 200 images from Flickr30k, ensuring they did not over-  
1324 lap with previously used images, to form 200 source-target pairs, and evaluated the performance on  
1325 GPT-4o and Gemini-2.0.  
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1328 Table 8: Performance comparison on NIPS  $\rightarrow$  Flickr30k.

Method	Model	GPT-4o		Gemini-2.0	
		ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim
FOA-Attack	Ensemble	83.5	0.46	70.5	0.38
Ours	Ensemble	<b>85.0</b> <sub><math>\uparrow</math>1.5</sub>	<b>0.48</b> <sub><math>\uparrow</math>0.02</sub>	<b>77.5</b> <sub><math>\uparrow</math>7.0</sub>	<b>0.41</b> <sub><math>\uparrow</math>0.03</sub>

1329  
1330 As shown in Table 8, RISE consistently outperforms the baseline model across various target models  
1331 under this configuration. The substantial improvement observed on Gemini-2.0 demonstrates that  
1332 our approach captures general semantic patterns, which remain unaffected by domain variations.  
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#### 1335 L.2 SENSITIVITY TO PERTURBATION BUDGET ( $\epsilon$ )

1336 We analyzed the sensitivity of the RISE algorithm to the perturbation budget,  $\epsilon$ . As shown in Table  
1337 9, under stringent constraints ( $\epsilon = 8/255$ ), the RISE algorithm consistently outperforms the base-  
1338 line, demonstrating that distribution alignment is more robust than point-wise matching in limited  
1339 optimization spaces. Performance approaches saturation at  $\epsilon = 32/255$ , indicating that the RISE  
1340 algorithm is highly efficient under standard budgets.  
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Table 9: Sensitivity analysis of perturbation budget  $\epsilon$  on GPT-4o.

Budget ( $\epsilon$ )	Method	ASR (%)
8/255 (Low)	FOA-Attack	64.5
	Ours	68.0
16/255 (Standard)	Ours	89.5
32/255 (High)	Ours	90.0