FairProof: CONFIDENTIAL AND CERTIFIABLE FAIRNESS FOR NEURAL NETWORKS

Anonymous authors
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ABSTRACT

Machine learning models are increasingly used in societal applications, yet legal and privacy concerns demand that they very often be kept confidential. Consequently, there is a growing distrust about the fairness properties of these models in the minds of consumers, who are often at the receiving end of model predictions. To this end, we propose *FairProof* – a system that uses Zero-Knowledge Proofs (a cryptographic primitive) to publicly verify the fairness of a model, while maintaining confidentiality. We also propose a fairness certification algorithm for fully-connected neural networks which is befitting to ZKPs and is used in this system. We implement *FairProof* in Gnark and demonstrate empirically that our system is practically feasible.

1 INTRODUCTION

Recent usage of ML models in high-stakes societal applications Khandani et al. (2010); Brennan et al. (2009); Datta et al. (2014) has raised serious concerns about their fairness (Angwin et al., 2016; Vigdor, November, 2019; Dastin, October 2018; Wallarchive & Schellmannarchive, June, 2021). As a result, there is growing distrust in the minds of a consumer at the receiving end of ML-based decisions Dwork & Minow (2022). In order to increase consumer trust, there is a need for developing technology that enables public verification of the fairness properties of these models.

A major barrier to such verification is that legal and privacy concerns demand that models be kept confidential by organizations. The resulting lack of verifiability can lead to potential misbehavior, such as model swapping, wherein a malicious entity uses different models for different customers leading to unfair behavior. Therefore what is needed is a solution which allows for public verification of the fairness of a model and ensures that the same model is used for every prediction (model uniformity) while maintaining model confidentiality. The canonical approach to evaluating fairness is a statistics-based third-party audit Yadav et al. (2022); Yan & Zhang (2022); Pentyala et al. (2022). This approach however is replete with problems arising from the usage of a reference dataset, the need for a trusted third-party, and lack of guarantees of model uniformity Fukuchi et al. (2019); Shamsabadi et al. (2023).

We address the aforementioned challenges by proposing a system called *FairProof* involving two parts: 1) a fairness certification algorithm which outputs a certificate of fairness , and 2) a cryptographic protocol using commitments and Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) that guarantees model uniformity and gives a proof that the certificate is correct.

Given an input query, the fairness certification algorithm outputs how fair the model is at that point *according to a fairness metric*. The metric we use is local Individual Fairness (IF) Dwork et al. (2012); John et al. (2020); Benussi et al. (2022); Bertrand & Mullainathan (2004), which is desirable for two reasons. First, it evaluates fairness of the model at a specific data point (rather than for the entire input space) – this allows us to give a *personalized* certificate to every customer, as would be required by customer-


Figure 1: Pictorial Representation of *FairProof*

facing organizations. Second, it works on the model post-training, making it completely *agnostic* to the training pipeline.

How do we design a certification algorithm for the chosen metric? We observe that certifying local IF can be reduced to an instantiation of certifying robustness.[1] We then leverage techniques from the robustness literature to design our algorithm. One of our key contributions is to design the algorithm so that it is ZKP-friendly. In particular, the computational overhead for ZKPs depends on the complexity of the statement being proved. To this end, we design a fairness certificate which results in relatively low complexity statements.

Once the fairness certificate has been computed, we want to enable the consumer to verify that the certificate was indeed computed correctly, but without revealing the model weights. To do this, we rely on Succinct Zero Knowledge Proofs Goldwasser et al. (1985); Goldreich et al. (1991). This cryptographic primitive enables a prover (eg. bank) to prove statements (eg. fairness certificate) about its private data (eg. model weights) without revealing the private data itself. It provides a proof of correctness as an output. Then a verifier (eg. customer) verifies this proof without access to the private data. In our case, if the proof passes verification, it implies that the fairness certificate was computed correctly with respect to the hidden model.

We design and implement a specialized ZKP protocol to efficiently prove and verify the aforementioned fairness certification algorithm. Doing this naively would be very computationally expensive. We tackle this challenge with three insights. First, we show that verification of the entire certification algorithm can be reduced to a few strategically chosen sub-functionalities, each of which can be proved and verified efficiently. Second, we provide a *lower* bound on the certificate, i.e., a conservative estimate of the model's fairness, for performance optimization. Third, we observe that certain computations can be done in an offline phase thereby reducing the online computational overhead.

Our solution ensures model uniformity through standard cryptographic commitments. A cryptographic commitment to the model weights binds the organization to those weights publicly while maintaining confidentiality of the weights. This has been widely studied in the ML security literature (Gupta et al., 2023; Boemer et al., 2020; Juvekar et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2017; Srinivasan et al., 2019; Mohassel & Zhang, 2017; Mohassel & Rindal, 2018).

We focus on fully-connected neural networks with ReLU activations as the models. We implement and evaluate *FairProof* on three standard fairness benchmark datasets to demonstrate its practicality.

2 PRELIMINARIES & SETTING

Fairness. Existing literature has put forth a wide variety of fairness definitions Mehrabi et al. (2021); Barocas et al. (2019). In this paper, we focus on the notion of *local individual fairness* John et al. (2020); Dwork et al. (2012); Benussi et al. (2022) defined below, as it best aligns with our application (see Sec. 2 for more details).

Definition 1 (Local Individual Fairness). *A machine learning model $f : \mathbb{R}^n \mapsto \mathcal{Y}$ is defined to be ϵ-individually fair w.r.t to a data point $x^* \sim \mathcal{D}$ under some distance metric $d : \mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R}^n \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ if*

$$\forall x : \ d(x, x^*) \leq \epsilon \implies f(x^*) = f(x) \tag{1}$$

We say a model f is exactly ϵ^*-individually fair w.r.t x^* if ϵ^* is the largest value that satisfies Eq. 1. In particular, ϵ^* is known as the local individual fairness parameter. **For brevity we will be using ϵ to mean ϵ^* and fairness/individual fairness to refer to the notion of local individual fairness, unless stated otherwise, throughout the rest of the paper.**

Individual fairness formalizes the notion that similar individuals should be treated similarly; more precisely, get the same classification. The similarity is defined according to a task dependent distance metric $d(\cdot)$ that can be provided by a domain expert. Examples of such a metric could be weighted ℓ_p norm where the weights of the sensitive features (race, gender) are set to 0 Benussi et al. (2022).

Neural Networks. We focus on the classification task and consider neural network (NN) classifiers $f : \mathcal{X} \mapsto \mathcal{Y}$, where f is a fully-connected neural network with ReLU activations, $\mathcal{X} = \mathbb{R}^n$ is the

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[1]Certifiable Robustness quantifies a model's resistance to adversarial attacks by measuring the extent to which a data point can be perturbed without altering the model prediction.

input space and $\mathcal{Y}$ is a discrete label set. This NN classifier (pre-softmax) can also be viewed a collection of piecewise linear functions over a union of convex polytopes Xu et al. (2021); Hanin & Rolnick (2019); Robinson et al. (2019); Croce et al. (2019); Serra et al. (2018). Here each linear function corresponds to one polytope and each polytope corresponds to one activation pattern of the nodes in the NN. A polytope $\mathcal{P}$ is represented by a set of linear inequalities, $\mathcal{P} = \{x | \mathbf{A}x \leq \mathbf{b}\}$; then the collection of all such polytopes forms a partition of the input domain, $\mathcal{X} = \bigcup \mathcal{P}$ (Fig. 2a).

A facet is an $(n-1)$-*face* of the polytope corresponding to the set $\{x | x \in \mathcal{P} \cap \mathbf{A}_i x = \mathbf{b}_i\}$ where $\mathbf{A}_i$ and $\mathbf{b}_i$ are the values of $\mathbf{A}$ and $\mathbf{b}$ at the ith dimension. Two polytopes that share a facet are known as neighboring polytopes. The decision region of f at a data point x^* is defined as the set of points for which the classifier returns the same label as it does for x^*, essentially the set $\{x | f(x) = f(x^*)\}$. This decision region can also be expressed as a union of convex polytopes Jordan et al. (2019). A facet that coincides with the decision boundary of f is known as a boundary facet. See Fig. 2a and App. A for more details.

Cryptographic Primitives. We use two cryptographic primitives, namely commitment schemes and zero knowledge proof, for verifying the individual fairness certification. For a discussion on both of these, kindly refer to the Appendix Sec. A.2.

Problem Setting. A model owner holds a confidential classification model f that cannot be publicly released. A user supplies an input query x^* to the model owner, who provides the user with a prediction label $y = f(x^*)$ along with a fairness certificate $\mathscr{C}$ w.r.t to x^*. This certificate can be verified by the user, who is also guaranteed that the model owner uses the same model for everyone.

The above setting needs three tools. First, the model owner requires an algorithm for generating the fairness certificate with white-box access to the model weights. This algorithm is discussed in Sec. 3. Second, a mechanism is needed that enables the user to *verify* the received certificate (public verification) *without violating model confidentiality*. This mechanism is discussed in Sec. 4. Third, a mechanism is needed to guarantee that the same model is used for everyone (model uniformity), also without violating model confidentiality. For ensuring uniformity, the model owner should commit the model in the initially itself, before it is deployed for users. This has been widely studied and implemented by prior work as discussed in the introduction and an actual implementation of commitments is out of scope of this work.

3 How to Certify Individual Fairness?

In this section we present an algorithm to compute a local individual fairness certificate. This certificate is computed by the model owner with white-box access to the model weights and is specific to each user query, thereby leading to a *personalized* certificate. The certificate guarantees to the user that the model has certain fairness properties at their specific query.

Preliminaries. Starting with some notation, let $\mathcal{S}$ be the set of k sensitive features, $\mathcal{S} := \{S_1, \cdots, S_k\}$ where S_i denotes the ith sensitive feature. We assume that each sensitive feature S_i has a discrete and finite domain, denoted by $domain(S_i)$, which is in line with typical sensitive features in practice, such as race (eg. black/white/asian), presence of a medical condition (yes/no). Let $domain(\mathcal{S})$ represent the set of all possible combinations of the values of sensitive features, $domain(\mathcal{S}) := domain(S_1) \times \cdots \times domain(S_k)$. Without loss of generality, any data point $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is also represented as $x = x_{\backslash \mathcal{S}} \cup x_{\mathcal{S}}$, where $x_{\backslash \mathcal{S}}$ and $x_{\mathcal{S}}$ are the non-sensitive and sensitive features of x.

For the distance metric in individual fairness (Eq. 1), we consider a weighted ℓ_2-norm where the non-sensitive features have weight 1 while the sensitive features have weight 0. This distance metric is equivalent to the ℓ_2-norm sans the sensitive features. Thus, based on Def. 1, f is ϵ-individually fair w.r.t x^* iff,

$$\forall x : ||x_{\backslash \mathcal{S}} - x^*_{\backslash \mathcal{S}}||_2 \leq \epsilon \implies f(x^*) = f(x) \tag{2}$$

With this notation in place, observe that our fairness certificate $\mathscr{C}$ is essentially the value of the parameter ϵ. Intuitively it means that the model's classification is independent of the sensitive features as long as the non-sensitive features lie within an ℓ_2 ball of radius ϵ centered at $x^*_{\backslash \mathcal{S}}$. Eq.2 can also be equivalently viewed as follows: set the sensitive features of x^* and x to a particular value $s \in domain(\mathcal{S})$ (so that they cancel out in the norm), then find the corresponding certificate ϵ_s and repeat this procedure for all values in $domain(\mathcal{S})$; the final certificate ϵ is the minimum of all ϵ_s.

Next we propose an algorithm to compute this fairness certificate. Our algorithm is based on three key ideas, as we describe below.

Idea 1: Reduction from fairness to robustness. Our first key observation is that in our setting, certifiable fairness can be reduced to an instantiation of certifiable robustness, which enables us to re-use ideas from existing robustness literature for our purpose. In particular, the reduction is as follows. A model f is defined to be ϵ-pointwise ℓ_2 robust (henceforth robustness) for a data point x^*, if

$$\forall x : ||x - x^*||_2 \leq \epsilon \implies f(x^*) = f(x) \quad (3)$$

Comparing this definition to Eq.2 and its alternate view, we observe that once the sensitive features have been fixed to a value $s \in domain(\mathcal{S})$, computing the corresponding fairness certificate ϵ_s is *equivalent* to solving the robustness problem in $(n-k)$ dimensions where the k dimensions corresponding to the sensitive features $\mathcal{S}$ are excluded. Let us assume there exists an algorithm which returns the pointwise ℓ_2 robustness value for an input. Then the final fairness certificate ϵ computation requires $|domain(\mathcal{S})|$ calls to this algorithm, one for each possible value of the sensitive features in $\mathcal{S}$. Fig. 2 illustrates this idea pictorially.

(a) ReLU NN (b) Robustness (c) Fairness

Figure 2: (a) ReLU-activated Neural Network as a union of polytopes. (b) and (c) : Connection between robustness & fairness for $n = 2$ and one sensitive feature S with values $\{a, b, c\}$. Final fairness certificate is the minimum of $\{\epsilon_a, \epsilon_b, \epsilon_c\}$. Red color denotes decision boundary.

Idea 2. Using an efficient certified robustness algorithm. For ReLU-activated neural networks (see Sec.2), the naive algorithm for certifying robustness is infeasible; it entails computing the distance between x^* and *all* boundary facets (facets coinciding with the decision boundary of the model) induced by the model, which is exponential in the number of hidden neurons. Instead, we rely on an efficient iterative algorithm *GeoCert* (Alg. 1 in App. B), proposed by Jordan et al. (2019). Additional details are in App. B.

Idea 3: Generate a lower bound ϵ_{LB} for efficient ZKP. *GeoCert* provides exact fairness certificates ϵ^*, by using a constrained quadratic program solver to get the actual distance between the input point and a facet. However, verifying this solver using ZKPs would be a highly computationally intensive task. Instead we propose to report a lower bound on the certificate, $\epsilon_{LB} < \epsilon^*$, using simple projection distance, which considerably improves performance. A lower bound means that the reported certificate ϵ_{LB} is a conservative estimate – the true measure of the model's fairness could only be higher. See Fig. 6 for intuition.

Theorem 3.1. *Given a data point x^* and a neural network f, Alg. 2 provides a lower bound ϵ_{LB} of the correct individual fairness parameter of x^*.*
Proof for this theorem is given in App. D, Thm. D.3. Our resulting fairness certification algorithm is described in Alg.2 and detailed in App. B.

4 *FairProof* : VERIFICATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL FAIRNESS CERTIFICATE

Without careful design choices ZKPs can impose significant computational overhead. To this end, we design an efficient verification protocol named *FairProof* by combining insights from cryptography and ML. Specifically, *FairProof* is based on three key ideas described below.

Idea 1: Strategic verification of sub-functionalities. A naive verification mechanism replicates all the computations outlined in Alg.2. However, this would involve computing *all* the polytopes during *every* proof generation – this is computationally expensive since the number of polytopes is exponential in the number of hidden neurons in the model. In contrast, we show that the verification can be streamlined by focusing on five strategically chosen sub-functionalities, each of which can be checked using certain properties of polytopes and neural networks. Consequently, we only verify the polytopes *traversed* by the certification mechanism.

Idea 2: Representative points. Certain numeric properties of a polytope can be efficiently proven if one has access to a representative point in the interior of the polytope. We leverage this insight in *FairProof* to efficiently verify our chosen sub-functionalities.

Idea 3: Offline computation. We show that certain computations can be performed offline which further reduces the time needed in the online phase.

Next, we detail our verification mechanism *FairProof*. Recall that in our setting model owner is the prover and user is the verifier. The verification consists of two phases:

Phase 1: Pre-processing. All the operations in this phase are executed only once and before the model is deployed to the users. The following two actions need to be taken by the model owner here.

1. Commit to the weights $\mathbf{W}$ of the model f, resulting in the commitment $\mathsf{com}_{\mathbf{W}}$ (we assume that the architecture of f is known, i.e., f is a fully connected neural lnetwork with ReLU activations).
2. Compute a representative point $z_{\mathcal{P}}$ for each polytope $\mathcal{P}$. Additionally, it computes a representative point $z_{\mathcal{F}}$ for every facet $\mathcal{F}$[2][3].

Phase 2: Online verification. The online verification phase is executed *every* time a user submits a query x^* to the model owner for prediction. Verifying the computation of Algorithm 2 essentially amounts to verifying *GeoCert* with some modifications and consists of five steps. The model owner generates proofs for these five functionalities and the user validates them.

Next, we present our security guarantee. Formal guarantee and detailed proof is presented in App. E.

Theorem 4.1. *(Informal) Given a model f and a data point x^*, FairProof provides the prediction $f(x^*)$ and a lower bound ϵ_{LB} on the individual fairness parameter for x^* without leaking anything, except the number of total facets traversed, about the model f.*

5 EVALUATION

In this section we evaluate the performance of *FairProof* empirically. Specifically, we ask the following questions: (1) Can our fairness certification mechanism distinguish between fair and unfair models? (2) Is *FairProof* practically feasible, in terms of time and communication costs?

Datasets. We use three standard fairness benchmarks. *Adult Becker & Kohavi (1996)* is a dataset for income classification, where we select *gender* (male/female) as the sensitive feature. *Default Credit Yeh (2016)* is a dataset for predicting loan defaults, with *gender* (male/female) as the chosen sensitive feature. Finally, *German Credit Hofmann (1994)* is a loan application dataset, where *Foreign Worker* (yes/no) is used as the sensitive feature.

Configuration. We train fully-connected ReLU networks with stochastic gradient descent in PyTorch. Our networks have 2 hidden layers with different sizes including $(4, 2)$, $(2, 4)$ and $(8, 2)$. All the dataset features are standardized Sta. *FairProof* is implemented using the Gnark Botrel et al. (2023) zk-SNARK library in GoLang. We run all our code for *FairProof* without any multithreading or parallelism, on an Intel-i9 CPU chip with 28 cores.

| Credit, Fair | Adult, Fair | Credit, Unfair | Adult, Unfair |

Figure 3: Histogram of fairness parameter ϵ for fair & unfair models. ϵ values are higher than those for unfair models.

Model Fairness. We first evaluate if our certification mechanism can distinguish between fair and unfair models. Prior work (Islam et al., 2021) has shown that overfitting leads to more unfair models

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[2]A facet is also essentially a polytope, albeit in the $(n - 1)$-dimensional space.

[3]Although the number of polytopes and facets are exponential in the number of the neurons in the model, this is a one-time computation performed completely offline and can be parallelized. See Sec. 5 for empirical overhead of this pre-processing step on models for standard datasets.

while regularization encourages fairness. Thus, to obtain models with different fairness, we vary regularization by changing the weight decay parameter in PyTorch. Then we randomly sample 100 test data points as input queries and find the fairness parameter ϵ for both types of models on these queries. As demonstrated in Fig. 3, the unfair models have a lower ϵ than the corresponding fair models. This consistent difference in ϵ values across different model sizes and datasets shows that our certification mechanism can indeed distinguish between fair and unfair models. Results for other models are included in App. F.

Performance of *FairProof* Since computation is a known bottleneck in ZKPs, we next investigate the overhead of *FairProof* in terms of time and communication costs. All reported numbers are averages over a 100 random test points. Fig. 4 (a) shows the proof generation costs for various models. Note that the proof generation time varies with the models, due to its dependence on the number of traversed facets[4] which in turn depends on the model and query. On average, the adult model has a larger number of traversed facets than others as shown in Table 1 in App. F, leading to a higher proof generation time. We also observe that performing some computations in an offline phase results in significant reductions in the online time cost, the largest being $1.74\times$. See Table 1 and Fig.12 in App.F for details.

We also breakdown the overall proof generation time in terms of different sub-functionalities. We report this breakdown for the query with the median proof generation cost, in Fig. 4 (b). As shown in the figure, *VerifyBoundary* is the costliest sub-function for all the models; this is so since it is executed in every iteration (every time a facet is popped) and involves costly non-linear comparison operations (see Alg. 8). Other functionalities that are also executed multiple times based on number of traversed facets but are not as expensive include *VerifyNeighbor*, *VerifyDistance* and *VerifyOrder* (see Alg. 7, 6, 9). The least time is taken by *VerifyMin* which basically finds the minimum in a list; this is so since the function is straight-forward and is ran only once per query (see Alg. 10).

We also report the average verification times - time for checking the validity of the proof by the verifier - in Fig. 4 (a). Note that the verification costs are orders of magnitude lower (in seconds) than the proof generation costs (in minutes) for all models; as is standard in ZKPs. Fig.4 (c) reports the communication overheads, i.e. size of the generated proofs. The proof size is very small, only certain kilobytes. Low verification time and communication cost is advantageous since it implies quick real-time verification which does not require complex machinery at the customer end. For detailed results on all models, refer to Fig. 13 and Fig. 14 in App. F.


(a) (b) (c)

Figure 4: (a) Proof Generation (in mins) and Verification times (in secs) for different models. Offline computations are done in the initial setup phase while Online computations are done for every new query. Verification is only done online, for every query. (b) Breakdown of the proof generation time (in mins) for the data point with the median time. (c) Total Proof Size (in KB) for various models. This includes the proof generated during both online and offline phases.

Conclusion. In this paper we proposed *FairProof* – a protocol enabling model owners to issue publicly verifiable certificates while ensuring model uniformity and confidentiality. Our experiments demonstrate the practical feasibility of *FairProof* for small neural networks and tabular data. While our work is grounded in fairness and societal applications, we believe that ZKPs are a general-purpose tool and can be a promising solution for overcoming problems arising out of the need for model confidentiality in other areas/applications as well. We call for further research in this direction.

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[4]As mentioned in Thm. 4.1, this information is leaked by *FairProof*.

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A BACKGROUND CNTD.

A.1 POLYTOPES

The polytopes described succinctly by their linear inequalities (i.e., they are H-polytopes), which means that the number of halfspaces defining the polytope, denoted by m, is at most $O(poly(n))$, i.e. polynomial in the ambient dimension.

Next, we present a lemma which states that slicing a polyhedral complex with a hyperplane also results in a polyhedral complex.

Lemma A.1. *Given an arbitrary polytope $\mathcal{P} := \{x | Ax \leq B\}$ and a hyperplane $H := \{x | c^T x = d\}$ that intersects the interior of $\mathcal{P}$, the two polytopes formed by the intersection of $\mathcal{P}$ and the each of closed halfspaces defined by H are polyhedral complices.*

Fact A.2. *Two ReLU activation codes of two neighboring polytopes differ in a single position and the differing bit corresponds to the facet common to both.*

A.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC TOOLS

A *Commitment Scheme* commits to a private input w without revealing anything about w; its output is a commitment string com_w. A commitment scheme has two properties:

1. *Hiding*: the commitment string com_w reveals nothing about the committed value w.
2. *Binding*: it is not possible to come up with another input w' with the same commitment string as w, thus binding w to com_w (simplified).

Zero Knowledge Proofs Goldwasser et al. (1985) describe a protocol between two parties – a prover and a verifier, who both have access to a circuit P. A ZKP protocol enables the prover to convince the verifier that it *possesses* an input w such that $P(w) = 1$, without revealing any additional information about w to the verifier. A simple example is when $P_\varphi(w) = 1$ iff φ is a SAT formula and $\varphi(w) = 1$; a ZKP protocol enables the prover to convince a verifier that there is a w for which $\varphi(w) = 1$, while revealing nothing else about w. A ZKP protocol has the following properties:

1. *Completeness*. For any input w such that $P(w) = 1$, an honest prover who follows the protocol correctly can convince an honest verifier that $P(w) = 1$.
2. *Soundness*. Given an input w that $P(w) \neq 1$, a malicious prover who deviates arbitrarily from the protocol cannot falsely convince an honest verifier that $P(w) = 1$, with more than negligible probability.
3. *Zero knowledge*. If the prover and verifier execute the protocol to prove that $P(w) = 1$, even a malicious verifier, who deviates arbitrarily from the protocol, can learn no additional information about w other than $P(w) = 1$.

Theory suggests that it is possible to employ ZKPs to verify any predicate P in the class NP Goldreich et al. (1991). Moreover, the resulting proofs are non-interactive and succinct. However, in practice, generating a proof for even moderately complex predicates often incurs significant computational costs. To this end, our main contribution lies in introducing a ZKP-friendly certification algorithm, to facilitate efficient fairness certificate generation.

B INDIVIDUAL FAIRNESS CERTIFICATION CNTD.

Working of *GeoCert*. This algorithm starts from the polytope containing the data point x^* and *iteratively* searches for the boundary facet with the minimum distance from x^*. A priority queue of facets is maintained, sorted according to their distance from x^*. At each iteration, the facet with the minimum distance is popped and its neighbors (polytopes adjacent to this facet) are examined. If the neighboring polytope is previously unexplored, the distance to all of its facets is computed and inserted them into the priority queue; otherwise the next facet is popped. The algorithm terminates as soon as a boundary facet is popped. Fig. 5 presents a pictorial overview of *GeoCert*.

Our Certification Algorithm. In this section, we describe the concrete algorithm to compute the local individiual fairness parameter for a data point x^* (Algorithm 2).

Figure 5: *GeoCert*'s behavior on point x^*. Colored facets are in the priority queue; red and solid black lines denote boundary and non-boundary facets respectively. Algorithm stops when the minimum distance facet is a boundary facet (rightmost).


Figure 6: Projection of x^* onto the hyperplane H containing facet $\mathcal{F}$ gives a lower bound on the ℓ_2 distance between x^* and $\mathcal{F}$, i.e., $d_{proj}(x^*, \mathcal{F}) \leq d_{\ell_2}(x^*, \mathcal{F})$.

Our construction is based on the Geocert algorithm by Jordan et. al (Algorithm 1, Section 2) for computing the pointwise ℓ_2 robustness of neural networks with two key distinctions. First, we run on all the union of $(n - k)$-dimensional polytopes each of which corresponds to a fixed value of the sensitive feature set $\mathcal{S}$. Second, for each of these complices, we compute a lower bound on the pointwise ℓ_2 robustness. The final certificate of fairness is the minimum over all the above bounds.

In the following, we describe the working of the algorithm 2 in more detail. First, we compute the polyhedral complex $\mathbb{P}$ for the model f (Step 1). Next for a fixed value of the set of the sensitive features $\mathcal{S}$ (Step 3), we compute the corresponding $(n - k)$-dimensional polyhedral complex $\mathbb{P}'$ from the original n-dimensional polyhedral complex (ReducePolyDim function Alg. 3). The key idea is to fix the corresponding values of the features in $\mathcal{S}$ in the linear constraints of the polytopes in $\mathbb{P}$. In the next step, we compute a lower bound on the pointwise ℓ_2 robustness of x^* for the polyhedral complex $\mathbb{P}'$ using the Geocert algorithm (Step 5-6). In particular, instead of minimizing the ℓ_2 distance to a facet $\mathcal{F}$, we compute the projection of x^* onto a hyperplane H, where $\mathcal{F}$ lies entirely on H. The above computation is repeated for all the values of the set of sensitive features $\mathcal{S}$. The final certificate of fairness is the minimum of all the lower bounds as computed above (Step 8).

In what follows, we briefly describe how to compute of the pointwise ℓ_2 robustness of a point x. The problem essentially boils down to computing the largest ℓ_2 ball centered at x that fits within the union of n-dimensional polytopes defined by f.

Algorithm 1 Geocert: Pointwise ℓ_2 Robustness

    Input x^* - Data point for pointwise ℓ_2 robustness certification; f - Neural network; $dist$ - Distance Metric;
    Output ϵ - Pointwise ℓ_2 robustness certificate on x^*;
1: Compute all the polytopes for f
2: Setup priority queue $Q \leftarrow [\,]$
3: Setup list of seen polytopes $C \leftarrow \{\mathcal{P}(x)\}$ $\triangleright \mathcal{P}(x)$ denotes the polytope containing x
4: **For** Facet $\mathcal{F} \in \mathcal{P}(x)$ **do**
5:     $Q.push(\mathsf{ComputeDistance}(\mathcal{F}, x^*), \mathcal{F}, dist)$
6: **End For**
7: **While** $Q \neq \emptyset$ **do**
8:     $(d, \mathcal{F}) \leftarrow Q.pop()$
9:     **If** $\mathsf{IsBoundary}(\mathcal{F}) == 1$
10:         **Return** d
11:     **Else**
12:         **For** $\mathcal{P} \in \mathcal{N}(\mathcal{F}) \setminus C$ **do**
                                    $\triangleright \mathcal{N}(\mathcal{F})$ denote the two polytopes sharing the facet $\mathcal{F}$
13:             **For** $\mathcal{F} \in \mathcal{P}$ **do**
14:                 $Q.push(\mathsf{ComputeDistance}(\mathcal{F}, x^*), \mathcal{F}, dist)$
15:             **End For**
16:         **End For**
17:     **End If**
18: **End While**

Algorithm 2 Individual Fairness Certification

    Inputs $x^* \in \mathbb{R}^n$, f : ReLU-activated Neural Network
    Output ϵ_{LB} : Our Fairness Certificate for x^*
1: Construct the set of all polytopes $\mathbb{P} = \bigcup \mathcal{P}$ for f where each polytope is expressed as $\mathcal{P} = \{x | \mathbf{A}x \leq \mathbf{b}\}$
2: $E := [\,]$
3: **for** $s \in domain(S_1) \times \cdots \times domain(S_k)$
4:     $\mathbb{P}' := \mathsf{ReducePolyDim}(\mathbb{P}, s)$ (Alg. 3 in Appendix)
5:     $\epsilon_s := \mathsf{GeoCert}(x^*, \mathbb{P}', d_{proj})$
6:     $E.append(\epsilon_s)$
7: **end for**
8: $\epsilon_{LB} := \min E$
9: **Return** ϵ_{LB}

Algorithm 3 $\mathsf{ReducePolyDim}$: Construct $(n - k)$-dimensional polytopes from n-dimensional polytopes

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    Inputs $\mathbb{P} = \bigcup \mathcal{P}$: Set of Polytopes where each polytope $\mathcal{P}$ is expressed as $\{x | \mathbf{A}x \leq \mathbf{b}\}$, $s = (s_1, \cdots, s_k)$: Values of k sensitive features
    Output $\mathbb{P}'$: Set of $(n - k)$-dimensional Polytopes
1: $\mathbb{P}' := \{\}$
2: **for** $\mathcal{P} \in \mathbb{P}$
3:     **for** $i \in |row(\mathbf{A})|$
4:         **for** $j \in [k + 1, n]$
5:             $\mathbf{A}'[i][j - k] = \mathbf{A}'[i][j]$
6:         **end for**
7:         $\mathbf{b}'[i] = \mathbf{b}[i] - \sum_{j=1}^{k} \mathbf{A}[i][j] \cdot s_j$
8:     **end for**
9:     Express $\mathcal{P}' = \{x | \mathbf{A}'x \leq \mathbf{b}'\}$
10:     $\mathbb{P}' := \mathbb{P}' \cup \mathcal{P}'$
11: **end for**
12: **Return** $\mathbb{P}'$

C   Verification Algorithms

Now we describe the sub-functionalities to be verified by *FairProof*.

1. Verifying initial polytope (Alg. 5). Recall that *GeoCert* starts from the polytope containing data point x^*. Hence, the verifier needs to check that the initial polytope (1) indeed contains the data point x^*, and (2) is one of the polytopes obtained from the model f. The key idea used in this function is that each polytope is associated with a unique ReLU activation code. Verification for step (1) involves computing the ReLU activation code for x^* using the committed weights $\mathsf{com_W}$ and step (2) involves deriving the corresponding polytope for this activation code from $\mathsf{com_W}$.

2. Verifying distance to facets (Alg. 6). During its course *GeoCert* computes distance between x^* and various facets. Hence, the verifier needs to check the correctness of these distance computations. As discussed in the preceding section, we compute a lower bound of the exact distance using projections, which can be efficiently proved under ZKPs.

3. Verifying neighboring polytopes (Alg. 7). In each iteration *GeoCert* visits a neighboring polytope adjacent to the current one; the two polytopes share the facet that was popped in the current iteration. Verifying neighborhood entails checking that the visited polytope indeed (1) comes from the model f, and (2) shares the popped facet. The key idea used here is that two neighboring polytopes differ in a single ReLU activation corresponding to the shared facet (Fact A.2). Specifically, the prover retrieves the representative point corresponding to the visited polytope and computes its ReLU activation code, R', using the committed weights $\mathsf{com_W}$. Next, it computes the polytope corresponding to R' from $\mathsf{com_W}$ to prove that it is obtained from the model f. This is followed by showing that the hamming distance between R' and R is one, where R is the activation code for the current polytope. Finally, the prover shows that the current facet is common to both the polytopes.

4. Verifying boundary facet (Alg. 8). The termination condition of *GeoCert* checks whether the current facet is a boundary facet or not; we verify this in *FairProof* as follows. Let R denote the activation code for the current polytope $\mathcal{P}$ and let $f_R(x) = W_R x + b_R$ represent the linear function associated with R. For the ease of exposition, let f be a binary classifier. In other words, $f_R(x)$ is the input to the softmax function in the final layer of f (i.e., logits) for all data points $x \in \mathcal{P}$. The key idea for verification is that *iff* x lies on a boundary facet, $f_R(x)$ has the *same* value for both the logits. For verifying this computation, we rely on the pre-computed representative point of a facet. Specifically, the prover retrieves the representative point z for the current facet $\mathcal{F} = \{x | Ax \leq b\}$. First, it proves that z lies on $\mathcal{F}$ by showing $Az \leq b$ holds. Next, the prover computes f_R (i.e., the weights W_R and b_R) from the committed weights using R and tests the equality of both the logits in $f_R(z)$.

5. Verify order of facet traversal (Alg. 9). The order in which the facets are traversed needs to be verified – this is equivalent to checking the functionality of the priority queue in *GeoCert*. Standard ZKP tools are built for verifying mathematical computations (expressed as an arithmetic or Boolean circuit) and do not have built-in support for data structures, such as priority queues. We overcome this challenge by leveraging the following key idea – correctness of the priority queue can be verified by checking that the next traversed facet is indeed the one with the shortest distance.

Additional optimizations. We identify certain computations in the above algorithms that can performed offline. Specifically, in *VerifyNeighbor* the proof of correctness for polytope construction using representative points can be generated offline. Further, in *VerifyBoundary* proof for computation of the linear function f_R can also be generated offline. This leads to a significant reduction in the cost of the online proof generation (see Sec. 5).

End-to-end verification mechanism is presented in Alg. 4. In the final step, the prover has to generate an additional proof that the reported certificate of fairness corresponds to the smallest value among all the lower bounds obtained for each element of $domain(\mathcal{S})$ (*VerifyMin* , Alg. 10). Additionally, the prover also needs to prove integrity of the inference, i.e., $y = f(x^*)$. For this, after computing the linear function $f_{R_{x^*}}(x^*)$ using the committed weights $\mathsf{com_W}$ (where R_{x^*} is the activation code for x^*) we need to additionally prove that the label corresponds to the logit with the highest score (Alg. 11, *VerifyInference*).

Algorithm 4 *FairProof*: Verifiable Individual Fairness Certification

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Input x^* - Data point for fairness certification; $\mathbf{W}$ - Weights of the piecewise linear neural network;

Output ϵ - Local individual fairness parameter for x; $\mathsf{com_W}$ - Commitment to the weights of the model; ZK proof that the ϵ is indeed a lower bound on ϵ_{IF}

Pre-Processing Offline Phase

1: Construct the polyhedral complex $\mathbb{P} = \bigcup \mathcal{P}$ from $\mathbf{W}$ where each polytope is expressed as $\mathcal{P} = \{x | \mathbf{A}x \leq \mathbf{b}\}$
2: Compute a reference point z_i for each polytope $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathbb{P}$ such that $z_i \in \mathcal{P}_i$
3: Commit to the model weights $\mathsf{com_W}$ and release them publicly

Online Phase

4: $E = [\,]$
5: **for** $(s_1, \cdots, s_k) \in domain(S_1) \times \cdots \times domain(S_k)$
6:     **for** $\mathcal{P} \in \mathbb{P}$
7:         **for** $i \in |row(\mathbf{A})|$
8:             **for** $j \in [k+1, n]$
9:                 $\mathbf{A}'[i][j-k] = \mathbf{A}'[i][j]$
10:             **end for**
11:             $\mathbf{b}'[i] = \mathbf{b}[i] - \sum_{j=1}^{k} \mathbf{A}[i][j] \cdot s_j$
12:         **end for**
13:         Express $\mathcal{P}' = \{x | \mathbf{A}'x \leq \mathbf{b}'\}$
14:         $\mathbb{P}' = \mathbb{P}' \cup \mathcal{P}'$
15:     **end for**
16:     $\left(\epsilon', \mathcal{P}_1, \langle(\mathcal{F}_1, d_1), \cdots, (\mathcal{F}_n, d_n)\rangle\right) = \mathsf{GeoCert}(x^*, \mathbb{P}', d_{proj})$
                                    $\triangleright$ $\mathcal{P}_1$ is the first polytope traversed
    $\triangleright$ $\langle(\mathcal{F}_1, d_1), \cdots, (\mathcal{F}_n, d_n)\rangle$ is the ordered sequence of the visited facets and their corresponding distances

17:     Prover proves that P_1 is the polytope in $\mathbb{P}'$ containing x^* $\triangleright$ Using VerifyPolytope
18:     Initialize the list of seen facets $T = [\,]$
19:     **for** facet $\mathcal{F} \in \mathcal{N}(\mathcal{P}_1)$
20:         Prover proves that the computation of the distance d from x^* to $\mathcal{F}$ is correct $\triangleright$ Using VerifyDistance
21:         $T.insert\left((\mathcal{F}, d)\right)$;
22:     **end for**
23:     **for** $i \in [m-1]$
24:         Prover proves that $\mathcal{F}_i$ is indeed the facet with the smallest distance in T $\triangleright$ Using VerifyOrder
25:         Prover proves that $\mathcal{F}$ is not a boundary facet $\triangleright$ Using VerifyBoundary
26:         **for** $\mathcal{P} \in \mathcal{N}(\mathcal{F}_i)$
27:             Prover proves that $\mathcal{P}$ is a neighboring polytope sharing facet $\mathcal{F}$ $\triangleright$ Using VerifyNeighbor
28:             **for** $\mathcal{F} \in \mathcal{N}(\mathcal{P})$
29:                 Prover proves that the computation of the distance d from x^* to $\mathcal{F}$ is correct $\triangleright$ Using VerifyDistance
30:                 $T.insert\left((\mathcal{F}, d)\right)$
31:             **end for**
32:         **end for**
33:         $T.remove\left((\mathcal{F}_i, d_i)\right)$
34:     **end for**
35:     Prover proves that $\mathcal{F}_m$ is indeed the facet with the smallest distance in T_2 $\triangleright$ Using VerifyOrder
36:     Prover proves that $\mathcal{F}_m$ is a boundary facet $\triangleright$ Using VerifyBoundary
37:     $E.insert\left(d_m\right)$
38: **end for**
39: Prove that $\epsilon = \min E$ $\triangleright$ Using VerifyMin

---

Algorithm 5 VerifyPolytope

Input x^* - Data point for fairness certification; $\text{com}_{\mathbf{W}}$ - Committed weights of the piecewise linear neural network; $(s_1, \cdots, s_k)$ - Values of the sensitive features;
Output $\mathcal{P}'$ - Polytope corresponding to $\mathbf{W}$ containing x^*; $\mathbf{R}$ - ReLU activation code of x^*; π - ZK proof of the computation;

1: Evaluate x^* on $\text{com}_{\mathbf{W}}$ to obtain ReLU activation code $\mathbf{R}$
2: Compute the $n-k$-dimensional polytope $\mathcal{P} = \{x | \mathbf{A}x \leq \mathbf{b}\}$ corresponding to $\mathbf{R}$ on $\text{com}_{\mathbf{W}}$ with $(s_1, \cdots, s_k)$ as the values of the sensitive features
3: Generate proof π of the above computation
4: **return** $(\mathcal{P}, \mathbf{R}, \pi)$

Algorithm 6 VerifyDistance

Input x^* - Data point for fairness certification; $\mathcal{F}$ - Facet;
Output d - Projected distance; π - ZK proof of the computation;

1: Let $\mathcal{F}$ be represented as $a^T \cdot x = b$
2: Compute $d = \left| (|b - a^T x^*|)/||a|| \right|$
3: Generate proof π of the above computation
4: **return** (d, π)

Algorithm 7 VerifyNeighbor

Input $\text{com}_{\mathbf{W}}$ - Weights of the piecewise linear neural network; $\mathcal{F}$ - Facet; $\mathcal{P}$ - Current polytope; $\mathbf{R}$ - ReLU activation code for $\mathcal{P}$; z - Representative point for neighboring polytope; $(s_1, \cdots, s_k)$ - Values of the sensitive features;
Output $\mathcal{P}'$ - Neighboring polytope; $\mathbf{R}'$ - ReLU activation code of $\mathcal{P}'$; π - ZK proof of the computation

1: $(\mathcal{P}', \mathbf{R}', \pi') \leftarrow$ VerifyPolytope$(z, \text{com}_{\mathbf{W}}, (s_1, \cdots, s_k))$
         $\triangleright$ Can be performed apriori in a pre-processing stage for efficiency
2: **if** $(|\mathbf{R} - \mathbf{R}'|_1 \neq 1)$ $\triangleright$ Check hamming distance 1 between two binary vectors
3:     **return** $\perp$
4: **if** $(\mathcal{F} \notin \mathcal{N}(\mathcal{P}') \wedge (\mathcal{F} \notin \mathcal{N}(\mathcal{P})))$ $\triangleright$ Check facet $\mathcal{F}$ is common to both the polytopes
5:     **return** $\perp$
6: Generate proof π of the above computation
7: **return** $(\mathcal{P}', \mathbf{R}', (\pi, \pi'))$

Algorithm 8 VerifyBoundary

Input x^* - Data point for fairness certification; $\text{com}_{\mathbf{W}}$ - Weights of the piecewise linear neural network; $\mathcal{F}$ - Current facet represented as $\{x | \mathbf{A}x \leq \mathbf{b}\}$; $\mathcal{P}$ - Current polytope; $\mathbf{R}$ - ReLU activation code for $\mathcal{P}$; z - Representative point for current facet $\mathcal{F}$ $(s_1, \cdots, s_k)$ - Values of the sensitive features;
Output b - Bit indicating boundary condition; π - ZK proof of the computation

1: Compute the linear function $f_{\mathbf{R}}$ corresponding to activation code $\mathbf{R}$ on $\text{com}_{\mathbf{W}}$ with $(s_1, \cdots, s_k)$ as the values of the sensitive features
         $\triangleright$ Can be performed apriori in a pre-processing stage for efficiency
2: **if** $(\mathbf{A}z > \mathbf{b})$
3:     **return** $\perp$
4: **end if**
5: $b = 1$
6: **for** $i \in [1, |\mathcal{Y}| - 1]$
7:     $b \leftarrow b \cdot (f_{\mathbf{R}}(z)[0] == f_{\mathbf{R}}(z)[i])$
         $\triangleright$ Testing that $f_{\mathbf{R}}(z)$ is equal on all of its elements
8: **end for**
9: Generate proof π of the above computation
10: **return** $(b, (\pi, \pi'))$

Algorithm 9 VerifyOrder

Input $(\mathcal{F}, d)$ - Current facet with distance d; $\mathbf{F} = \{(\mathcal{F}_1, d_1), \cdots, (\mathcal{F}_k, d_k)\}$ - List of all previously unseen facets and their distances;
Output π - ZK proof of the computation

1: **for** $\mathcal{F}_i \in \mathbf{F}$
2:     **if** $(d > d_i)$
3:         **return** $\perp$
4:     **end if**
5: **end for**
6: Generate proof π of the above computation
7: **return** π

Algorithm 10 VerifyMin

Input E - List of values; ϵ^* - Individual fairness parameter;
Output π - ZK proof of the computation

1: **for** $\epsilon \in E$
2:     **if** $(\epsilon^* > \epsilon)$
3:         **return** $\perp$
4:     **end if**
5: **end for**
6: Generate proof π of the above computation
7: **return** π

Algorithm 11 VerifyInference

Input x^* - Data point for fairness certification; $\mathsf{com}_{\mathbf{W}}$ - Committed weights of the piecewise linear neural network f;
Output y - The prediction $f(x^*)$; π - ZK proof of the computation;

1: Evaluate x^* on $\mathsf{com}_{\mathbf{W}}$ to obtain ReLU activation code $\mathbf{R}$
2: Compute the linear function $f_{\mathbf{R}}$ corresponding to activation code $\mathbf{R}$ on $\mathsf{com}_{\mathbf{W}}$
3: Compute $f_{\mathbf{R}}(x^*)$
4: $y = \arg\max_{i \in [|\mathcal{Y}|]} f_{\mathbf{R}}(x^*)$
5: Generate proof π of the above computation
6: **return** (y, π)

D CORRECTNESS OF *FairProof*

In this section, we prove the correctness of *FairProof* given in Alg. 4. First, we re-state the correctness of GeoCert.

Theorem D.1 (Correctness of GeoCert Jordan et al. (2019)). *For a fixed polyhedral complex $\mathbb{P}$, a fixed point x^* and a distance function ϕ that satisfies ray monotonocity, GeoCert returns a boundary facet with the minimum distance.*

Fact D.2. *The projection of a given point x^* onto a hyperplane H where $\mathcal{F} \subseteq H$ gives a lower bound on its ℓ_2 distance to $\mathcal{F}$, i.e., $d_{proj}(x, \mathcal{F}) \leq d_{\ell_2}(x, \mathcal{F})$.*

Theorem D.3. *Let f be a piecewise-linear neural network. Replacing in Algorithm 1 with $d_{\ell_2}(\cdot)$ distance with $d_{proj}(\cdot)$ gives a lower bound on the individual fairness guarantee, i.e., $\epsilon_{d_{proj}} \leq \epsilon_{d_{\ell_2}}$.*

Proof. We will prove by contradiction. Let $\mathbb{P}$ be the polyhedral complex associated with the model f. Let us assume that there exists a boundary facet $\mathcal{F}^*$ such that $d_{\ell_2}(\mathcal{F}, x) < \epsilon_{d_{proj}}$. Now if the corresponding polytope $\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{F}^*}$ was traversed by GeoCert$(x, \mathbb{P}, d_{proj})$, then all the facets in $\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{F}^*}$ including $\mathcal{F}^*$ were checked. Then from the correctness of GeoCert (Thm. D.1), this leads to a contradiction of D.2. Now let us consider the alternative case where $\mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{F}^*}$ was not traversed by GeoCert$(x, \mathbb{P}, d_{proj})$. From Thm. D.1 this means that there exists another boundary facet $\mathcal{F}^*$ such that $d_{proj}(x, \mathcal{F}^*) \leq d_{proj}(x, \mathcal{F})$. Then by Fact D.2, $d_{proj}(\mathcal{F}^*, x) = \epsilon_{d_{proj}} \leq d_{proj}(\mathcal{F}, x) \leq d_{\ell_2}(\mathcal{F}, x)$ which contradicts our assumption. $\square$

Theorem D.4 (Correctness of *FairProof*). *For a given data point x^*, FairProof (Algorithm 4) generates ϵ such that $\epsilon \leq \epsilon_{IF}$.*

Proof. The proof of the above theorem follows directly from Theorem D.1, Theorem D.3 and Fact D.2. $\square$

E SECURITY PROOF

1. **Completeness**

$$\forall x, \mathbf{W} \qquad (4)$$

$$\Pr \begin{bmatrix} \mathsf{pp} \leftarrow \textit{FairProof}.\mathsf{KeyGen}(1^\lambda) \\ \mathsf{com}_\mathbf{W} \leftarrow \textit{FairProof}.\mathsf{Commit}(\mathbf{W}, \mathsf{pp}, r) \\ (y, \epsilon, \pi) \leftarrow \textit{FairProof}.\mathsf{Prove}(\mathbf{W}, x, \mathsf{pp}, r) \\ \textit{FairProof}.\mathsf{Verify}(\mathsf{com}_\mathbf{W}, x, y, \epsilon, \pi, \mathsf{pp}) = 1 \end{bmatrix} = 1 \qquad (5)$$

2. **Soundness**

$$\Pr \begin{bmatrix} \mathsf{pp} \leftarrow \textit{FairProof}.\mathsf{KeyGen}(1^\lambda) \\ (\mathbf{W}^*, \mathsf{com}_{\mathbf{W}^*}, \mathbf{X}, \epsilon^*, y^*, \pi^*, r) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, \mathsf{pp}) \\ \mathsf{com}_{\mathbf{W}^*} \leftarrow \textit{FairProof}.\mathsf{Commit}(\mathbf{W}^*, r)) \\ \textit{FairProof}.\mathsf{Verify}(\mathsf{com}_{\mathbf{W}^*}, x, y^*, \epsilon^*, \pi^*, \mathsf{pp}) = 1 \\ (\exists \tilde{x}, d(x, \tilde{x}) \leq \epsilon \wedge f(\mathbf{W}^*, \mathbf{X}) \neq f(\mathbf{W}^*, \tilde{\mathbf{X}})) \\ \vee y \neq f(\mathbf{W}^*, \mathbf{X}) \end{bmatrix} < negl(\lambda) \qquad (6)$$

3. **Zero-Knowledge** Let λ be the security parameter obtained from $\lambda, \mathsf{pp} \leftarrow \textit{FairProof}.KeyGen(1^\lambda)$

$$|\Pr[\mathsf{Real}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathbf{W}}(\mathsf{pp}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathsf{Ideal}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}^\mathcal{A}}(\mathsf{pp}) = 1]|$$

$$\leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda) \quad (7)$$

Proof Sketch. **Completeness.** The completeness guarantee follows trivially from our construction.

Soundness. $\mathcal{L}(x)$ denotes the leakage function for *FairProof*, specifically, $\mathcal{L}(x) = \{n_1, \cdots, n_{|\mathcal{S}|}\}$, where n_i denotes the number of facets traversed for the i-th value of the sensitive attribute $\mathcal{S}$.

Recall, the functioning of GeoCert can be summarized as follows:

$$
\begin{array}{|l|}
\hline
\text{Real}_{\mathcal{A},\mathbf{W}}(\text{pp}): \\
\quad 1.\ \text{com}_{\mathbf{W}} \leftarrow \textit{FairProof}.\text{Commit}(\mathbf{W}, \text{pp}, r) \\
\quad 2.\ x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{com}_{\mathbf{W}}, \text{pp}) \\
\quad 3.\ (y, \epsilon, \pi) \leftarrow \textit{FairProof}.\text{Prove}(\mathbf{W}, x, \text{pp}, r) \\
\quad 4.\ b \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{com}_{\mathbf{W}}, x, y, \epsilon, \pi, \text{pp}) \\
\quad 5.\ \text{Output } b \\
\hline
\end{array}
$$

$$
\begin{array}{|l|}
\hline
\text{Ideal}_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{A}}}(\text{pp}, h): \\
\quad 1.\ \text{com} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_1(1^\lambda, \text{pp}, r) \\
\quad 2.\ x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{com}, \text{pp}) \\
\quad 3.\ (y, L_x, \epsilon, \pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_2^{\mathcal{A}}(\text{com}, x, \text{pp}, r) \text{ given oracle access to} \\
\qquad y = \text{pred}(\mathbf{W}, x),\ L_x = \mathcal{L}(x) \text{ and } \epsilon = IF_{LB}(\mathbf{W}, x) \\
\quad 4.\ b \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{com}_{\mathbf{W}}, x, y, L_x, \epsilon, \pi, \text{pp}) \\
\quad 5.\ \text{Output } b \\
\hline
\end{array}
$$

Figure 7: Zero-knowledge games

1. Start traversing from the polytope containing x^*.
2. Compute the distances to all the facets of the current polytope and store them.
3. Select the hitherto unseen facet with the smallest distance.
4. Stop if this is a boundary facet.
5. Else, traverse next to the neighboring polytope that shares the current facet.

A malicious prover can cheat in any (or a combination) of the above steps. We will consider each of them separately as follows.

Lemma E.1 (Soundness of VerifyPolytope). *Let $\mathcal{P} = \{x | \mathbf{A}x \leq \mathbf{B}\}$ be the correct polytope obtained from the piecewise-linear neural network with weights $\mathbf{W}$ for a given value of the sensitive features. For any polytope $\mathcal{P}' = \{\mathbf{A}'x < \mathbf{b}'\}$ such that $(\mathbf{A} \neq \mathbf{A}') \vee (\mathbf{b} \neq \mathbf{b}')$, we have*

$$\Pr[\textit{FairProof}.\text{Verify}(\text{com}_{\mathbf{W}^*}, x, y^*, \epsilon^*, \pi^*, \text{pp}) = 1] < \text{negl}(\lambda) \tag{8}$$

Proof Sketch. As shown in Alg. 5, the verification process re-computes the correct polytope from the committed model weights. The only way the prover can cheat is if they can produce a P' such that $Open(\text{com}_{\mathcal{P}}) = \mathcal{P}'$ which violates the binding property of the commitment scheme. $\square$

Lemma E.2 (Soundness of VerifyDistance). *For a given facet $\mathcal{F} = \{Ax \leq b\}$, data point x^*, and value d' such that $d' \neq \left| \frac{b - A^T x^*}{\|A\|} \right|$, we have:*

$$\Pr[\textit{FairProof}.\text{Verify}(\text{com}_{\mathbf{W}^*}, x, y^*, \epsilon^*, \pi^*, \text{pp}) = 1] < \text{negl}(\lambda) \tag{9}$$

Proof Sketch. The verification process (Alg. 6) re-computes the correct distance. Hence, the only way the prover can cheat is if they can produce a d' such that $Open(\text{com}_d) = d'$ which violates the binding property of the commitment scheme. $\square$

Lemma E.3 (Soundness of VerifyOrder). *Let $\boldsymbol{d} = \{d_1, \cdots, d_k\}$ be a set of values such that $d_{min} = \min_i d_i$. For any value d' such that $d' > d_{min}$, we have:*

$$\Pr[\textit{FairProof}.\text{Verify}(\text{com}_{\mathbf{W}}, x, y^*, \epsilon^*, \pi^*, \text{pp}) = 1] < \text{negl}(\lambda) \tag{10}$$

Proof Sketch. The verification checks the minimality of the given value against all values in $\mathbf{d}$ (Alg. 9). The only way to cheat would require producing a $\mathbf{d}$ with a different minimum which violates the binding property of the commitment scheme. $\square$

Lemma E.4 (Soundness of VerifyBoundary). *Consider a piecewise-linear neural network with weights $\mathbf{W}$. For any facet $\mathcal{F}$ such that which is not a boundary facet, we have*

$$\Pr[\textit{FairProof}.\text{Verify}(\text{com}_{\mathbf{W}}, x, y^*, \epsilon^*, \pi^*, \text{pp}) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \tag{11}$$

Proof Sketch. The verification algorithm computes the linear function corresponding to the given activation code (Alg. 8. A prover can cheat here only if they can compute a different linear function f' which would require violating the binding property of the commitment scheme. □

Lemma E.5 (Soundness of VerifyNeighbor). *Let $\mathcal{P} = \{x | \mathbf{A}x \leq \mathbf{b}\}$ be a polytope belonging to the polyhedral complex of the piecewise-linear neural network with weights $\mathbf{W}$ and let $\mathcal{F} \in \mathcal{N}(\mathcal{P})$. Let $\bar{\mathcal{P}} = \{x | \bar{\mathbf{A}}x \leq \bar{\mathbf{b}}\}$ and $\mathcal{P}$ be neighboring polytopes, sharing the facet $\mathcal{F}$, i.e., $\bar{\mathcal{P}} \in \mathcal{N}(\mathcal{F}) \setminus \mathcal{P}$. Let $z \in \mathbf{R}^n$ be a data point. For any polytope $P' = \{x | \mathbf{A}'x \leq \mathbf{b}'\}$ such that $(\bar{\mathbf{A}} \neq \mathbf{A}') \wedge (\bar{\mathbf{b}} \neq \mathbf{b}')$, we have*

$$\Pr[FairProof.\mathsf{Verify}(\mathsf{com}_{\mathbf{W}}, x, y^*, \epsilon^*, \pi^*, \mathsf{pp}) = 1] < \mathsf{negl}(\lambda) \tag{12}$$

Proof Sketch. The verification algorithm first checks whether $\bar{P}$ contains the reference point z (Alg. 7). The soundness of this follows from VerifyPolytope. Cheating on the next steps (checking the hamming distance and facet intersection) means that the prover is essentially able to generate a polytope P' such that $Open(\mathsf{com}_{\mathcal{P}}) = \mathcal{P}'$ which violates the binding property of the commitment scheme. □

Zero-Knowledge. The zero-knowledge property follows directly from the commitment scheme and the zero-knowledge backend proof system we use. We note that the zero-knowledge proof protocol itself is not the focus of this paper; instead, we show how we can use existing zero-knowledge proof protocols to provide verifiable individual fairness certification in a smart way for high efficiency. □

F EVALUATION CNTD.

Dataset-Model	Online (in mins)	Offline (in mins)	Improvement	Traversals
German (4,2)	4.90 ± 0.12	3.61 ± 0.19	$1.74\times$	40 ± 3
German (2,4)	1.17 ± 0.02	0.67 ± 0.03	$1.57 \times$	13 ± 1
Credit (4,2)	3.52 ± 0.08	2.31 ± 0.10	$1.66\times$	28 ± 2
Credit (2,4)	2.08 ± 0.04	1.11 ± 0.07	$1.49 \times$	25 ± 1
Adult (4,2)	3.94 ± 0.10	1.72 ± 0.08	$1.43 \times$	41 ± 3
Adult (8,2)	3.94 ± 0.30	1.34 ± 0.08	$1.36 \times$	38 ± 8

Table 1: Time for proof generation averaged over 100 randomly sampled data points. Mean and standard error are reported for each dataset-model. Offline computations are done in the initial setup phase of *FairProof* while Online computations are done for every new query. Improvement = (Online time + Offline time)/ Online time. Traversals gives the total number of iterations (also total number of popped facets) of GeoCert ran by *FairProof*.


(a) *Credit, wd=2.5*   (b) *Adult, wd=0.2*   (c) *German, wd=10*

Figure 8: Histogram of fairness parameter ϵ for fair models of size (4,2). 'wd' represents the values of the Weight decay parameter.

Figure 9: Histogram of fairness parameter ϵ for unfair models of size (4,2). Weight decay is set to zero here for all.


Figure 10: Histogram of fairness parameter ϵ for fair models of size (8,2). 'wd' represents the values of the Weight decay parameter.


Figure 11: Histogram of fairness parameter ϵ for unfair models of size (8,2). Weight decay is set to zero here for all.

(a) *Credit (2,4)*   (b) *Adult (8,2)*   (c) *German (2,4)*

(d) *Credit (4,2)*   (e) *Adult (4,2)*   (f) *German (4,2)*

Figure 12: Proof generation time for 100 random data points.

(a) *Credit (2,4)*   (b) *Adult (8,2)*   (c) *German (2,4)*

(d) *Credit (4,2)*   (e) *Adult (4,2)*   (f) *German (4,2)*

Figure 13: Distribution of verification time for 100 random data points.

(a) *Credit (2,4)* (b) *Adult (8,2)* (c) *German (2,4)*

(d) *Credit (4,2)* (e) *Adult (4,2)* (f) *German (4,2)*

Figure 14: Distribution of communication cost (proof size) for 100 random data points.

G   RELATED WORK

Verifiable fairness with cryptography. Most of the prior work on verifying fairness *while maintaining model confidentiality* Pentyala et al. (2022); Kilbertus et al. (2018); Toreini et al. (2023); Segal et al. (2021); Park et al. (2022) has approached the problem in the third-party auditor setting. The closest to ours is a recent work by Shamsabadi et al. (2023), which proposed a fairness-aware training pipeline for *decision trees* that allows the model owner to cryptographically prove that *the learning algorithm* used to train the model was fair by design. In contrast, we focus on neural networks and issue a fairness certificate by simply inspecting the model weights *post-training*. Our system *FairProof* and certification mechanism is completely agnostic of the training pipeline.

Another line of work has been using cryptographic primitives to verify other properties (rather than fairness) of an ML model while maintaining model confidentiality – Zhang et al. (2020); Liu et al. (2021) focus on accuracy and inference, while Zhao et al. (2021); Garg et al. (2023); Sun & Zhang (2023) focus on the training process.

A separate line of work uses formal verification approaches for verifying the fairness of a model Albarghouthi et al. (2017); Bastani et al. (2019); Urban et al. (2020); Ghosh et al. (2020); Biswas & Rajan (2023). However, these works focus on certification in the plain text, i.e., they do not preserve model confidentiality and do not involve any cryptography.

Fairness Certification Mechanisms. Prior work on certification mechanisms for fairness can be broadly classified into three categories. The first line of work frames the certification problem as an optimization program John et al. (2020); Benussi et al. (2022); Kang et al. (2022). The second line of research has leveraged the connection between robustness and fairness, and proposed fairness-aware training mechanisms akin to adversarial training Ruoss et al. (2020); Yurochkin et al. (2020); Khedr & Shoukry (2022); Yeom & Fredrikson (2021); Doherty et al. (2023). In contrast to both, we focus on *local* IF specifically for neural networks and use an iterative algorithm rather than solving a complex optimization problem and are completely agnostic of the training pipeline.

The final line of work is based on black-box query access learning theoretic approaches Yadav et al. (2022); Yan & Zhang (2022); Maneriker et al. (2023). Contrary to our work, these approaches however are replete with problems arising from the usage of a reference dataset Fukuchi et al. (2019); Shamsabadi et al. (2023), the need for a trust third-party, and lack of guarantees of model uniformity.