

# JailDAM: Jailbreak Detection with Adaptive Memory for Vision-Language Model

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## Abstract

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) excel in vision-language tasks but also pose significant risks of generating harmful content, particularly through jailbreak attacks. Jailbreak attacks refer to intentional manipulations that bypass safety mechanisms in models, leading to the generation of inappropriate or unsafe content. Detecting such attacks is critical to ensuring the responsible deployment of MLLMs. Existing jailbreak detection methods face three primary challenges: (1) Many rely on model hidden states or gradients, limiting their applicability to white-box models, where the internal workings of the model are accessible; (2) They involve high computational overhead from uncertainty-based analysis, which limits real-time detection, and (3) They require fully labeled harmful datasets, which are often scarce in real-world settings. To address these issues, we introduce a *test-time* adaptive framework called JAILDAM. Our method leverages a memory-based approach guided by policy-driven unsafe knowledge representations, eliminating the need for explicit exposure to harmful data. By dynamically updating unsafe knowledge during *test-time*, our framework improves generalization to unseen jailbreak strategies while maintaining efficiency. Experiments on multiple VLM jailbreak benchmarks demonstrate that JAILDAM delivers state-of-the-art performance in harmful content detection, improving both accuracy and speed. We provide our code in here: <https://github.com/ShenzheZhu/JailDAM>

**Disclaimer: This paper contains harmful content that may be disturbing to readers.**

## 1 Introduction

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have shown strong capabilities in reasoning, perception, and interaction across both textual and visual data (Wu et al., 2024). Their ability to process and generate content in multiple modalities proves beneficial for tasks like image captioning (Bianco et al., 2023), visual question answering (VQA) (Shao et al., 2023; Li et al., 2024b), multimodal search (Wu & Xie, 2024), anomaly detection (Xu et al., 2025), and creative design assistance (Li et al., 2024a; Peng et al., 2024). However, as these models become more capable, the risk of generating harmful content also grows, leading to serious questions about their safety and robustness (Liu et al., 2024a; Gu et al., 2024). Jailbreak attacks on MLLMs are designed to manipulate the model into bypassing its safety mechanisms, resulting in harmful outputs (Zhao et al., 2025). These attacks can be carried out in various ways, with one common approach being perturbation-based attacks, where subtle, adversarial modifications are made to input images to disrupt the model’s alignment. Defenses such as adversarial training have proven effective against such attacks (Yu et al., 2024a; Xhonneux et al., 2024). In this paper, we explore strategies to mitigate attacks targeting defenses against **structure-based jailbreaks** (Wang et al., 2024). Structure-based

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jailbreaks hide harmful prompts in images using visually structured forms that MLLMs can still understand, but traditional defenses can’t easily filter out. Several recent works aim to detect and mitigate structure-based jailbreaks in multimodal models (Jiang et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2023a; Li et al., 2024c), but they face three central challenges:

**Model Challenge:** Some prior works primarily rely on hidden representations of large language models (LLMs) to detect harmful content (Jiang et al., 2025; Huang et al., 2024), often requiring white-box access to the model. This reliance on model hidden states restricts applicability to black-box LLMs, which are prevalent in many commercial and proprietary systems. Our method overcomes this limitation by ensuring effective detection even for black-box models. **Speed Challenge:** Uncertainty-based detection methods, such as JailGuard and UniGuardian (Yi et al., 2024; Lin et al., 2025), employ input perturbation or random removal of inputs to identify vulnerabilities. While effective, these approaches are computationally expensive and require extensive data augmentation, making them impractical for real-time applications. Our approach enhances efficiency by eliminating the need for computationally heavy perturbations. **Data Challenge:** Many existing solutions depend on fully labeled harmful datasets (e.g., VLGuard(Zong et al., 2024), GradSafe (Xie et al., 2024)) or few-shot learning approaches (e.g., AdaShield-A(Wang et al., 2024)) for training. However, real-world practitioners often lack access to comprehensive jailbreak datasets and instead rely on high-level policy guidelines to define harmful content. Our framework is designed to operate effectively under these policy-driven constraints, allowing robust detection without requiring explicit exposure to unsafe inputs.

To address these challenges, we propose a **memory-centered** test-time adaptive framework, JAILDAM , for detecting jailbreak attempts in vision-language models (VLMs). Our approach introduces a **novel autoencoder-based detection pipeline** that models the relationship between multimodal safe inputs and unsafe memories stored in a structured memory bank. This design allows early detection of potential jailbreak attempts by leveraging **memory-based attention feature encoding**. In addition, we include a **dynamic test-time adaptation** step that refines unsafe memory representations. By updating its memory with emerging unsafe variations, our framework **improves generalization** beyond known jailbreak strategies and preserves efficiency by removing the need for expensive input perturbations. Moreover, based on JAILDAM , we introduce an end-to-end jailbreak defense framework, JAILDAM-D , as a practical application to safeguard target VLMs from attacks. Our key contributions are as follows:

1. **Black-box Compatible:** We present a detection framework that does not require models’ hidden states, suitable for proprietary VLMs that only expose input-output interfaces.
2. **Computationally Efficient:** Our pipeline achieves high accuracy without expensive perturbation procedures or data augmentation, supporting faster real-time performance.
3. **Policy-Driven Memory with Test-Time Adaptation:** We develop a memory-based system that does not rely on labeled harmful data; instead, it updates unsafe concept knowledge at inference time. This test-time adaptation step ensures robust handling of new jailbreak strategies that emerge post-deployment.

Detection Method	Type	Training Cost	Model Agnostic	Zero Harmful Training Data	Black-box Compatible
Llavaguard (Helff et al., 2024)	Fine-tuning-based	High	✗	✗	✗
VLGuard (Zong et al., 2024)	Fine-tuning-based	High	✗	✗	✗
JailGuard (Zhang et al., 2023a)	Uncertainty-based	Zero	✗	✗	✗
HiddenDetect (Jiang et al., 2025)	Hidden states-based	Zero	✗	✗	✗
NEARSIDE (Huang et al., 2024)	Hidden states-based	Medium	✗	✗	✗
GradSafe(vision) (Xie et al., 2024)	Hidden states-based	Zero	✗	✗	✗
JAILDAM	Adaptive Memory	Low	✓	✓	✓
Defense Method	Type	Training Cost	Model Agnostic	Zero Harmful Training Data	Black-box Compatible
FSD (Gong et al., 2023)	Prompt-based	Zero	✓	✓	✓
AdaShield-S (Wang et al., 2024)	Prompt-based	Zero	✓	✓	✓
Adashield-A (Gong et al., 2023)	Prompt-based	Medium	✗	✗	✓
JAILDAM-D	Memory+Prompt	Low	✓	✓	✓

Table 1: Comparison of our work and existing works




Figure 1: **JAILDAM overview** (see §2). **(A) Training:** We encode safe text and images with CLIP, computing attention scores against a policy-driven unsafe memory bank. An autoencoder learns to reconstruct these features, linking benign inputs to unsafe concepts—without explicit harmful data. **(B) Inference:** For each new input, we compute attention scores and measure the autoencoder’s reconstruction error; high error indicates potential harm. If similarity to the memory bank is low, JAILDAM updates the least-used concept with a residual representation, adapting to new attacks over time.

## 2 Methodology

In §2.1, we begin by formalizing the jailbreak detection problem and discussing the limitations of existing frameworks. In §2.2, we introduce a novel framework JAILDAM for training a jailbreak detector without harmful data by leveraging policy-driven memory representations derived from safety guidelines (§2.3). In §2.4, we describe how multimodal safe inputs are encoded and interacted with memories through a memory-based attention mechanism, followed by autoencoder-based reconstruction to model safe inputs. To enhance generalization, §2.5 proposes a test-time adaptation mechanism that dynamically updates the memory. Finally, §2.6 introduces JAILDAM-D, a defense framework that builds upon our detector. An overview of the entire pipeline is illustrated in Figure 1.

### 2.1 Notations and Background for Jailbreak Detection

We first introduce the notations for formulating the jailbreak detection problem. Let  $S$  be an input from either the safe ( $P_{\text{safe}}$ ) or attack ( $P_{\text{attack}}$ ) distribution. The model’s response is  $f(S)$ , with  $f_{\text{ref}}$  as a reference for overall unsafe outputs. For gradient-based methods,  $f'(S)$  denotes the gradient of the model’s output. A mutation  $\mathcal{M}(S)$  perturbs  $S$  to test uncertainty. And we use  $d$  for any distance function and a threshold  $\tau$ . Current methods all rely on unsafe inputs in some way. Adashieds iteratively refining a defense prompt  $P$  to minimize unsafe responses likelihood:

$$\arg \min_P \mathbb{E}_{S \sim P_{\text{attack}}} [d(f(S), f_{\text{safe}})] \quad (1)$$

JailGuard identifies unsafe prompts by estimating response uncertainty under mutations, which takes long time during testing. For JailGuard, if the expected distance between an original and perturbed response exceeds a threshold, the input is classified as an attack:

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{M} \sim P_{\text{attack}}} [d(f(\mathcal{M}(S)), f(S))] \geq \tau \quad (2)$$

GradSafe detects unsafe prompts by finding slices of gradient  $j$  assuming that gradient slice of unsafe prompts has high similarity while low similarity between unsafe and safe prompts. And it determine the input’s safety level based on the behavior of important gradient slice  $j$ .

$$\arg \max_{j \in \nabla f} \left( \mathbb{E}_{S \sim P_{\text{unsafe}}} [d(f'_j(S), f'(S_{\text{ref}}))] - \mathbb{E}_{S \sim P_{\text{safe}}} [d(f'_j(S), f'(S_{\text{ref}}))] \right) \quad (3)$$

All three kinds of methods rely on comparing safe and unsafe inputs for jailbreak detection. However, obtaining a comprehensive set of unsafe inputs is challenging, as attack strategies continuously evolve. This limitation suggests that jailbreak detection frameworks must incorporate adaptive mechanisms to generalize beyond predefined unsafe distributions.

## 2.2 Jailbreak Detector Training without Harmful Data

Given the limitations of existing detection frameworks and the pressing need for jailbreak detection without access to a dedicated jailbreak dataset, we explore a novel research problem: *How can we determine whether an input is harmful to our model without explicitly training on harmful data?* To address this challenge, we propose a memory-based detection training framework guided by harmful content policies. This framework serves as a tool to analyze the interaction between safe input data and policy constraints during training. Rather than relying on a traditional classification model trained on both jailbreak and safe datasets, our approach is formulated as follows:

$$\min_D \mathbb{E}_{S \sim P_{\text{safe}}} [\mathcal{L}(D(S, \mathcal{P}))], \quad (4)$$

where the detector  $D(S, \mathcal{P})$  is trained to evaluate the relationship between safe input  $S$  with respect to the policy-based memory  $\mathcal{P}$ . The policy representation  $\mathcal{P}$  encapsulates predefined guidelines for identifying harmful content while also capable of generalizing to unseen inputs. The training process is guided by a loss function  $\mathcal{L}$ , which ensures that the detector aligns with the policy constraints. This formulation ensures that the detector is trained using only safe data while leveraging policy information to generalize to harmful input detection.

During test time, we propose a *test-time adaptation framework* where the policy memory is dynamically updated with each new input. Given a sequence of test inputs  $\{S_t\}_{t=1}^T$ , we define the *harmful score* as:

$$\mathcal{H}(S_t) = \mathcal{L}(D(S_t), \mathcal{P}_t), \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \mathcal{P}_{t+1} = \mathcal{U}(\mathcal{P}_t, S_t). \quad (5)$$

We classify  $S_t$  as a jailbreak input if  $\mathcal{H}(S_t) > \tau$ , where  $\tau$  is a predefined threshold. Here,  $\mathcal{H}(S_t)$  quantifies the deviation of the input from the safe training data, and the policy  $\mathcal{P}_t$  is dynamically updated to refine detection over time by a update function  $\mathcal{U}$ .

## 2.3 Memory Bank Generation

To build a robust safety mechanism, we construct a memory bank of unsafe concepts that serve as reference points for detecting harmful content (see Figure 2). The generation of these concepts is crucial for defining the boundaries of unsafe inputs. Given the vast and evolving nature of harmful content, we leverage GPT-4o (Achiam et al., 2023), a large-scale language model with broad knowledge of harmful content policies, to augment and generate structured representations of unsafe memories. Motivated by the idea from how people created interpretable concepts without human annotations in computer vision (Liu et al., 2024b; Oikarinen et al., 2023), we use GPT-4o one time to convert existing harmful content policies into a set of structured, high-level memories. (see Appendix C.1 for detailed generation prompt and concepts example) The process follows a structured prompt to extract  $n$  key concepts per jailbreak category, covering:

**Important Features:** The most crucial characteristics that help recognize the safety issue.

**Superclasses:** Higher-level categories that this issue belongs to.




Figure 2: The pipeline of concepts and memory bank generation by GPT-4o.

**Commonly Seen Contexts:** Typical safety issue or elements where this issue appears.

For instance, for the *Privacy Violence* issue, GPT-4o extracts representative concepts such as: Personal data, Unauthorized access, Tracking pixels, Data breaches, Biometric leaks, Social media exposure, Unencrypted transmissions, Phishing attempts. This method provides a principled and scalable way to define unsafe memories while maintaining alignment with policy-based safety frameworks.

## 2.4 Learning Safety Input

Our approach leverages an autoencoder (Bank et al., 2023) to model relationships between multimodal safe input and unsafe memories stored in the memory bank. The objective is to encode latent patterns in textual and visual inputs before inference, enabling early detection of potential jailbreak attempts in Vision-Language Models (VLMs).

### 2.4.1 Memory-Based Attention Feature Encoding

After we construct a memory bank of unsafe memories categorized into multiple harmful topics, textual and image inputs are processed through a encoder, specifically, we use CLIP (Radford et al., 2021) since its inherent efficiency characteristic. Then, the embeddings are compared against the memory bank. As shown in equation 6, we compute attention scores  $Z$  between input and memory as a feature which quantify how closely an input aligns with stored unsafe memories. These attention features serve as input to the autoencoder:

$$Z_{modal} = \text{sim}(S_{modal}, \mathcal{P}_{modal}) = \text{softmax} \left( \frac{E(S_{modal}) \cdot \mathcal{P}_{modal}^T}{\sqrt{d}} \right), \quad \text{for } modal \in \{text, image\} \quad (6)$$

### 2.4.2 Autoencoder-Based Representation Learning

The autoencoder is trained to reconstruct the attention features extracted from multimodal embeddings. By compressing and reconstructing these features, the autoencoder learns a latent space that effectively captures the relationship of inputs and our memories. This representation enables better differentiation between benign and harmful content by modeling the distribution of unsafe patterns across both textual and visual modalities. Our training objective is based on a reconstruction Mean Squared Error (MSE) loss, ensuring that the autoencoder learns to minimize the difference between the input and reconstructed features:

$$\min_D \mathbb{E}_{S \sim \mathcal{P}_{safe}} [\mathcal{L}_{MSE}(D(Z), Z)], \text{ where } Z = \text{concat}(Z_{text}, Z_{image}) \quad (7)$$

## 2.5 Test-time adaptation

Modern deep learning models often face challenges when deployed in real-world settings due to distribution shifts and out-of-distribution (OOD) data (Li et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2024b; Qin et al., 2024). Standard approaches require retraining on new data, which is computationally expensive and impractical for real-time adaptation. To address this, we introduce a test-time adaptation mechanism that dynamically updates memory to improve model’s capability on new jailbreak attack without additional training.

### 2.5.1 Dynamic Concept Refinement via Test-Time Adaptation

Our method enables a model to adjust its memory in response to novel inputs during inference. The adaptation process consists of four key stages.

To identify inputs that necessitate adaptation, we compute max softmax probability scores (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016) for both textual and visual features. When the highest probability greater than a predefined threshold  $\tau$ , it signals that the input is likely to have an harmful input. This triggers the adaptation mechanism to replace the old useless memories. During the training stage, each memory in the memory bank maintains a usage frequency counter, tracking how often it has been accessed for similarity computations. The  $j^*$ th memory  $\mathcal{P}_{t+1, j^*}$ , with the lowest trigger frequency, is selected for replacement, ensuring



that underutilized memories  $\mathcal{P}_{t+1,j^*}$  are dynamically updated with new memory  $R_t$ , to reflect the evolving distribution as shown in equation 8 where  $C$  represent the counter for memories trigger frequency within memory bank.

$$\mathcal{P}_{t+1,j^*} = R_t, \quad \text{where } j^* = \arg \min_j C(\mathcal{P}_{t,j}), \quad \text{if } \mathcal{P}_{\max} = \max_i \frac{\exp(z_i)}{\sum_j \exp(z_j)} > \gamma. \quad (8)$$

Instead of replacing less relevant memory arbitrarily, we compute a residual representation that captures novel variations in the input. For the  $t$ -th input  $S_t$ , we retrieve the top- $K$  most relevant memories  $\mathcal{P}_{t,i}$  based on similarity to the current input. A weighted sum of these memories are computed, where weights correspond to their attention scores. The residual difference between the input feature and this weighted sum is then calculated, isolating novel information that is not well-explained by existing memory as shown in equation 9:

$$R_t = S_t - \sum_{i=1}^K w_i \mathcal{P}_{t,i}, \quad \text{where } w_i = \frac{\exp(\text{sim}(S_t, \mathcal{P}_{t,i}))}{\sum_{j=1}^K \exp(\text{sim}(S_t, \mathcal{P}_{t,j}))} \quad (9)$$

**Note:** As in section 2.4.1,  $S_t$  can be a input representation from either the text or image modality, this allowing our memories are updated from both modality.

The least frequent concept embedding is replaced with the residual representation, allowing the model to incorporate new patterns while discarding outdated or redundant knowledge. Simultaneously, the frequency counter for this concept is reset to reflect its recent adaptation. This continual refresh process ensures that the memory space remains representative of the data encountered at inference time.

### 2.5.2 Test-Time Adaptation for Harmful Detection

Once the memory space is updated, it serves as the foundation for jailbreak detection. We leverage an autoencoder-based reconstruction mechanism to measure how well the adapted concept space can reconstruct attention features. The reconstruction error serves as a proxy for harmful severity, where higher errors indicate harmful inputs that were not well captured by prior training. By dynamically refining memory embeddings, the model generalizes better to new variations encountered during deployment. Furthermore, by continuously updating concepts, the model becomes more resilient to domain shifts and can effectively flag novel inputs as potential anomalies. This introduces a novel paradigm for test-time adaptation in memory-based learning, allowing models to remain robust in real-world environments with minimal human supervision.




Figure 3: JAILDAM-D (see §2.6), an end-to-end jailbreak defense framework

## 2.6 Application: An End-to-End Attack Defense Framework

Based on our attack detector, JAILDAM. We also construct an end-to-end attack defense framework, denoted as JAILDAM-D (see Figure 3). In this framework, we implement a two-stage defense approach. First, incoming instruction  $S$  is analyzed by the JAILDAM, which evaluates whether the input contains potential attack patterns or harmful content. If the JAILDAM identifies the input as potentially harmful, the framework automatically concatenates a specialized defense prompt  $T_d$  (see Appendix C.2) before the original query.

This defense prompt serves to alert the target VLMs about the potential risks and instructs it to refuse answering the harmful request. Conversely, if the input is classified as benign, the query proceeds to the target VLMs without modification, allowing the target model to provide normal assistance.

### 3 Experiments

#### 3.1 Experimental Setup

##### 3.1.1 Datasets

Our evaluation employs three established VLM jailbreak benchmarks: MM-SafetyBench (Liu et al., 2024a), FigStep (Gong et al., 2023), and JailBreakV-28K (Luo et al., 2024), covering diverse structure-based jailbreak samples. For each of the Jailbreak dataset, we pair it with the benign MM-Vet dataset (Yu et al., 2023). And we do the same for two tasks: (1) *Jailbreak Detection* and (2) *Jailbreak Defense*. Dataset details are provided in Appendix D.1 and D.2.

##### 3.1.2 Baselines

For *Jailbreak Detection*, we evaluate JAILDAM against diverse baselines across three categories: (1) uncertainty-based methods: JailGuard (Zhang et al., 2023a), (2) fine-tuning-based methods: Llavaguard (Helff et al., 2024) and VLGuard (Zong et al., 2024), and (3) hidden states-based methods: HiddenDetect (Jiang et al., 2025), GradSafe<sup>†</sup> (Xie et al., 2024). For *Jailbreak Defense*, we compare JAILDAM-D with existing prompt-based defense methods: Adashield (Wang et al., 2024) and FSD (Gong et al., 2023). Detailed detection prompts for fine-tuning-based methods can be found in Appendix E.1, and defense prompt settings are in Appendix E.2.

##### 3.1.3 Metrics

We design a confusion matrix (see Table 2) with jailbreak samples as the positive class and benign samples as the negative class. For *Jailbreak Detection*, we use Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (AUROC) and Area Under the Precision-Recall curve (AUPRC) to evaluate classifier performance across varying thresholds. For *Jailbreak Defense*, different from previous work that cares more on defense effectiveness (Wang et al., 2024), we employ F1-score as primary metric. This metric provide a more comprehensive idea of how model balance between *defense effectiveness* and *over-defensiveness* given that over-defense is prevalent for lots of models (Li & Liu, 2024). Following Wang et al. (2024); Liu et al. (2024a) and Luo et al. (2024), we use GPT-4o-mini to detect refusal phrases (e.g., "I'm sorry", "As an AI, I cannot") in model responses using customized prompts tailored for jailbreak and benign inputs (see prompts in Appendix F). Responses containing refusal phrases are classified as "Predict as Harmful"; otherwise, they are labeled as "Predict as Benign".

	Actually Harmful	Actually Benign
Predict as Harmful	TP	FP
Predict as Benign	FN	TN

Table 2: Confusion Matrix for *Attack Detection* and *Attack Defense*.

#### 3.2 Main Results

**Jailbreak Detection.** We evaluate five Jailbreak detection approaches, including both model-agnostic and model-specific methods, using 7B and 13B parameter sizes. From the results in Table 3, we observe that: (1) **JAILDAM outperforms the second-best method by an average of 0.10 AUROC across all datasets**; (2) Hidden states-based methods perform competitively, with HiddenDetect-13B (Jiang et al., 2025) and GradSafe-7B (Xie et al., 2024) ranking second multiple times and HiddenDetect-7B exceeding JAILDAM by 0.02 AUPRC on MM-SafetyBench; (3) Prompt-based methods LlavaGuard (Helff et al., 2024) and VLGuard (Zong et al., 2024) achieve intermediate results, with 7B versions outperforming their 13B counterparts. Most notably, LlavaGuard-7B exceeds LlavaGuard-13B by approximately 0.4 AUROC in average, likely due to backbone capacity differences; (4) JailGuard-13B (Zhang et al., 2023a), an uncertainty-based method, generally scores below 0.6 AUROC but reaches around 0.8 on JailBreakV-28K.

<sup>†</sup>We transfer and implement GradSafe (Xie et al., 2024), an LLM detection method, to VLM as our baseline approach.

Method	Model	Overall		MM-SafetyBench		FigStep		JailBreakV-28K	
		AUROC(↑)	AUPRC(↑)	AUROC(↑)	AUPRC(↑)	AUROC(↑)	AUPRC(↑)	AUROC(↑)	AUPRC(↑)
Jailguard-13B	MiniGPT-4-Vicuna-13B	0.4768	0.6729	0.4706	0.7500	0.5179	0.3337	0.8029	0.7475
Llavaguard-7B	Qwen2-7B-Instruct	0.7551	0.8412	0.7427	0.8729	0.8360	<u>0.7231</u>	0.8426	0.8589
Llavaguard-13B	Llama-2-13B-hf	0.3797	0.6079	0.3856	0.7335	0.3413	0.3247	0.4347	0.5660
VLGuard-7B	LLaVA-v1.5-7B-Mixed	0.6096	0.6782	0.6106	0.8020	0.6106	0.3817	0.6072	0.6474
VLGuard-13B	LLaVA-v1.5-13B-Mixed	0.5048	0.6306	0.5048	0.7610	0.5048	0.3268	0.5048	0.5929
HiddenDetect-7B	LLaVA-v1.6-Vicuna-7B	0.8050	0.8056	0.8269	<b>0.9353</b>	0.5773	0.3238	0.8330	0.8770
HiddenDetect-13B	LLaVA-v1.6-Vicuna-13B	0.8425	<u>0.8541</u>	0.8302	<u>0.9333</u>	<u>0.8615</u>	0.5753	0.8633	<u>0.8885</u>
GradSafe-7B	LLaVA-v1.5-Vicuna-7B	<u>0.8513</u>	0.8166	<u>0.8514</u>	0.8752	0.6804	0.2370	<u>0.9082</u>	0.8816
GradSafe-13B	LLaVA-v1.5-Vicuna-13B	0.6723	0.7533	0.7485	0.8004	0.4131	0.5933	0.5920	0.7038
<b>JAILDAM</b>	<b>Memory Network</b>	<b>0.9550</b>	<b>0.9530</b>	<b>0.9472</b>	0.9155	<b>0.9608</b>	<b>0.9616</b>	<b>0.9465</b>	<b>0.9464</b>

Table 3: The AUROC and AUPRC of *Attack Detection*, which include the performances from model agnostic method, JAILDAM and model specific method, including JailGuard, Llavaguard, VLGuard and HiddenDetect. The **bolded** value represents the best performance and underline indicates the second-best performance.

**Jailbreak Defense.** The *Jailbreak Defense* task evaluates the comprehensive capacity of defense methods in preventing target VLMs from generating harmful responses. Using the same datasets as in *Jailbreak Detection*, we test four defense methods compared with on four target VLMs: open-weight models like LLaVA-1.5 (Liu et al., 2023) series and CogVLM-chat (Wang et al., 2023) and an API-based model, GPT-4o-mini. We also assess the defense capacity on vanilla models. Results are shown in Figure 4 and Table 7. Our findings are following: (1) F1-score: **JAILDAM-D outperforms other methods in most settings, except on CogVLM-chat with JailBreakV-28K, where Adashield-A (Wang et al., 2024) achieves a perfect score.** (2) Precision: Both JAILDAM-D and Adashield-A average 0.98, indicating minimal over-defensiveness. In contrast, Adashield-S (Wang et al., 2024) shows higher over-defensiveness, particularly in LLaVA-1.5-7B and CogVLM-chat-v1.1 with average precision: 0.86 and 0.76, respectively. (3) Recall: JAILDAM-D achieves perfect recall on JailBreakV-28K with GPT-4o-mini (Achiam et al., 2023), but drops to 0.75 with CogVLM-chat, indicating room for improvement in detecting complex jailbreak inputs.




Figure 4: The radar diagrams about **F1-score** of 4 attack defense methods on 4 VLMs. JAILDAM-D outperforms other methods in most settings, except on CogVLM-chat with JailBreakV-28K, where Adashield-A (Wang et al., 2024) achieves a perfect score.

### 3.3 Analysis & Ablation Study

#### 3.3.1 Time Cost Analysis

**JAILDAM excels with minimal training time.** We record the time cost of model training and inference across two tasks. For model training, without loss of generality, we only record training times for methods using a 7B backbone on four datasets we introduced in section 3.1.1. From Figure 5, training-free methods such as Adashield-S (Wang et al., 2024), FSD (Gong et al., 2023), HiddenDetect (Jiang et al., 2025) and JailGuard (Zhang et al., 2023a) have zero training cost. **Among methods requiring training, JAILDAM achieves the shortest training time at only 15 minutes, compared to Adashield-A which requires**



approximately 120 minutes. The fine-tuning-based approaches VLGard (Zong et al., 2024) and LlavaGuard (Helff et al., 2024) require substantially more training time.




Figure 5: Time cost on model training, detection task inference, and defense task inference. In here, A-S: Adashield-S, A-A: Adashield-A, JG: JailGuard, HD: HiddenDetect, GS: GradSafe, LG: LlavaGuard, VG: VLGard

**JAILDAM outperforms competitors by up to 60x in jailbreak detection inference speed.** We measure the average inference time per sample for both tasks: *Jailbreak Detection* using 7B backbone-based methods and *Jailbreak Defense* with LLaVA-1.5-7B as the target model. In *Jailbreak Detection*, JAILDAM demonstrates significantly fastest inference—approximately 60 times faster than the second-fastest model, VLGard (Zong et al., 2024). However, in *Jailbreak Defense*, JAILDAM-D is the second fastest, trailing Adashield-S by approximately 1.2 seconds. This difference may be attributed to the varying token lengths generated by target VLMs.

### 3.3.2 Ablation on Concepts Size of Each Category

**Optimal concept pool size balances coverage and efficiency at 20-40 concepts.** To explore the effectiveness of varying concept sizes for each harmful category in jailbreak detection, we conduct ablation experiment in the *Jailbreak Detection* setting, testing 8 different sizes ranging from 5 to 100 concepts.

As shown in Figure 6, we observe a sharp performance increase when the concept size increases from 5 to 15. We see that expanding the concept pool provides broader coverage of possible harmful content types. The performance trend flattens between sizes 15 and 40, with a slight performance decrease observe from 40 to 100 concepts. As memory size grows, the performance of effectiveness won’t increase.




Figure 6: AUROC of detection task on different concept sizes

### 3.3.3 Ablation on Memory Comprehensiveness

**Memory comprehensiveness enhances cross-domain generalization.** The detector’s ability to generalize across different domains relies heavily on maintaining a comprehensive memory bank. Even when there is a domain gap between training and testing data, the model can effectively capture harmful content as long as the relevant harmful policies are well represented in the memory bank.

**Adaptive Memory Mechanism ensures robustness under incomplete memory coverage.**

To evaluate the resilience of our approach when memory coverage is incomplete, we perform a memory removal experiment on the MMSafetyBench dataset. Beginning with a full memory bank encompassing all 13 harmful categories, we progressively remove 1, 3, 5, and 7 categories and measure the corresponding detection performance. As reported in Table 4, both AUROC and AUPR metrics exhibit a gradual decline with increased removal

of categories. The relatively slow degradation in performance indicates that our Adaptive Memory Mechanism effectively compensates for missing information, maintaining stable detection accuracy even when the memory bank is partially incomplete.

Metric	Remove 0 Class	Remove 1 Class	Remove 3 Classes	Remove 5 Classes	Remove 7 Classes
AUROC	0.9472	0.9270	0.9140	0.9020	0.8350
AUPR	0.9155	0.9046	0.9068	0.8785	0.7917

Table 4: Ablation study on memory comprehensiveness on MM-SafetyBench.

### 3.3.4 Ablation on Test-time Adaptation

**Test-time adaptation significantly boosts JAILDAM performance.** Based on our choice of concept size of 40 for each harmful content category (see§ H), we conduct an ablation study on the

effectiveness of test-time adaptation using the *Jailbreak Detection* setting. We evaluate the AUROC and AUPRC of JAILDAM both with and without the adaptation function during the testing stage. As shown in Table 5, we observe consistent improvements across all three datasets, with average increases of 0.05 in AUROC and 0.08 in AUPRC. These improvements demonstrate that the test-time adaptation helps JAILDAM to enrich its memory bank, enabling better coverage of previously unseen harmful scenarios.

Adaptation	Metric	MS	FS	JBV
W/O	AUROC	0.9044	0.8379	0.8526
	AUPRC	0.8854	0.8119	0.7677
With	AUROC	<b>0.9472</b> (↑)	<b>0.9449</b> (↑)	<b>0.8734</b> (↑)
	AUPRC	<b>0.9155</b> (↑)	<b>0.9121</b> (↑)	<b>0.8750</b> (↑)

Table 5: Ablation study on adaptation effectiveness. In here, **MS**: MM-SafetyBench, **FS**: FigStep, **JBV**: JailBreakV-28K.

### 3.3.5 Ablation on Out of Distribution Benign Data

**JAILDAM demonstrates strong out-of-domain generalization.** To directly assess the detector’s ability to generalize to out-of-domain test inputs, we conduct an experiment using the *MMM* (Yue et al., 2024) dataset as a domain distinct from the training dataset *MM-vet*. Unlike *MM-vet*, which focuses on general VQA data, *MMM* consists primarily of academic-style content. We then apply the detector, trained solely on *MM-vet*, to the *MMM* dataset to evaluate its ability to correctly classify benign inputs. The results, summarized in Table 6, demonstrate strong performance across three different jailbreak datasets used as harmful inputs, with AUROC and AUPR scores consistently high. This indicates that our model robustly captures generalizable, policy-aligned safety signals beyond the training distribution.

Benign Dataset	Jailbreak Dataset	AUROC	AUPR
MM-Vet	JailBreakV-28k	0.9465	0.9464
MMM	JailBreakV-28k	0.9034	0.8962
MM-Vet	MM-SafetyBench	0.9472	0.9155
MMM	MM-SafetyBench	0.9452	0.9396
MM-Vet	FigStep	0.9608	0.9616
MMM	FigStep	0.8852	0.8766

Table 6: Out-of-domain generalization of JAILDAM evaluated by testing on *MMM* benign inputs paired with various jailbreak datasets, with *MM-Vet* as baseline.

## 4 Conclusion

We introduce JAILDAM, an efficient framework for detecting VLM jailbreak attacks without harmful training data or hidden state access. Using a policy-driven memory bank and autoencoder-based reconstruction, JAILDAM captures unsafe concept interactions for early threat detection. A lightweight test-time adaptation refines the memory bank with residual representations, improving generalization. Additionally, JAILDAM-D injects defense prompts based on detection results to protect target models. Benchmarks show our approach outperforms prior methods in accuracy and efficiency while remaining fully black-box compatible.

## 5 Ethics Statement

Our research focuses on the detection and defense against Visual Language Model (VLM) jailbreak attacks. To systematically evaluate our approach, we design datasets that include content potentially harmful to human society, ensuring a comprehensive assessment of the model’s robustness. The harmful content is synthetically generated or sourced from publicly available datasets and is used solely for research purposes in a controlled setting. Our work aims to enhance AI safety by improving the detection and mitigation of security vulnerabilities in VLMs, aligning with responsible AI development principles.

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## A Related Works

### A.1 Jailbreak Detection on VLM

For jailbreak detection relying on hidden states, [Huang et al. \(2024\)](#) introduces a method called NEARSIDE, a detection method for VLMs that uses a single embedding vector (the "attacking direction") from the difference between harmful and benign dataset to efficiently classify harmful and benign inputs without requiring multiple inferences or expensive computations. [Jiang et al. \(2025\)](#) identifies safety-aware layers by analyzing hidden activations for safe and unsafe inputs, revealing layers that encode signals indicating whether a prompt is unsafe. It then constructs a Refusal Vector (RV) in the vocabulary space, capturing the model's refusal behavior as a reference for detecting unsafe requests.

The earliest VLM jailbreak detection is JailGuard ([Zhang et al., 2023b](#)), an uncertainty-based framework for identifying jailbreaking and hijacking attacks on LLMs and MLLMs, leveraging the principle that adversarial inputs are inherently less robust and more susceptible to perturbations than benign queries. JailGuard is highly generalized across different attack types, but it takes a long time to generate and run different mutates with VLMs.

Fine-tuning methods are usually effective in improving safety performance but often require extensive labeled data and computational resources. VLGard ([Zong et al., 2024](#)) employs two fine-tuning strategies: post-hoc fine-tuning, which applies safety alignment to pre-trained VLLMs with minimal helpfulness data, and mixed fine-tuning, which integrates VLGard data into the original training to ensure safety from the start. [Helff et al. \(2024\)](#) introduces LlavaGuard, a VLM-based safety assessment framework designed for dataset curation and content moderation in generative models. LlavaGuard is trained on a multimodal safety dataset with human expert annotations, incorporating safety ratings, categories, and rationales to improve its ability to assess and moderate visual data.

[Wang et al. \(2024\)](#) introduces a prompt-based, novel adaptive shield prompting method: AdaShield, which is designed to defend MLLMs against structure-based jailbreak attacks. The advantage of AdaShield is its ability to dynamically generate defense prompts using a Defender LLM that iteratively refines prompts for better security, while it takes longer to call LLMs iteratively.

### A.2 Test-time Adaptation

One line of research focuses on updating a subset of model parameters to adapt to distribution shifts during testing. For instance, [Yi et al. \(2023\)](#) introduces TeCo, a test-time optimization framework that enhances video classification robustness by adjusting shallow-layer parameters while adapting batch normalization statistics in deeper layers. This allows the model to maintain stability while improving its generalization to unseen test data.

Another prominent approach is prompt-tuning, which leverages learnable prompts to enhance test-time adaptation without modifying the model backbone. Test-Time Prompt Tuning (TPT) ([Shu et al., 2022](#)) dynamically fine-tunes a learnable prompt for each test sample, optimizing prompt embeddings on the fly to improve zero-shot generalization.

Extending this idea, DiffTPT (Feng et al., 2023) improves vision-language models’ adaptation by incorporating diffusion-based data augmentation into the prompt-tuning process. SwapPrompt (Ma et al., 2023) further advances test-time prompt adaptation by utilizing self-supervised contrastive learning, introducing a dual-prompt paradigm where an online prompt is trained dynamically while a target prompt is updated through an exponential moving average (EMA) to retain historical knowledge.

Despite the effectiveness of prompt tuning, these methods often require computationally expensive backpropagation during inference. To address this, training-free approaches have been explored for efficient adaptation (Li et al., 2025). Training-free Dynamic Adapter (TDA) (Karmanov et al., 2024) achieves test-time adaptation by leveraging a dynamic key-value cache that refines pseudo labels for test samples. Instead of optimizing prompts, TDA maintains a Positive Cache, which stores high-confidence pseudo labels to refine predictions, and a Negative Cache, which identifies absent classes to mitigate label noise. By utilizing simple matrix multiplications instead of backpropagation, TDA significantly improves efficiency while maintaining strong adaptation performance. In our work, we employ the training-free approach while dynamically updating our training-time memory by focusing on harmful concepts that the detector has never encountered before. This is particularly suitable for real-world settings where it is impractical to prepare unsafe data beforehand. By adapting to new and potentially harmful data on the fly, our method enhances the model’s robustness in unpredictable deployment scenarios.

## B Limitation and Future Work

This study focuses specifically on structure-based jailbreak attacks and does not encompass adversarial attacks such as perturbation-based or gradient-based methods. While this focused approach allows for in-depth analysis of structure-based vulnerabilities, it represents a limitation in the comprehensiveness of our detection framework. Future research will extend this work by developing more generalizable detection mechanisms capable of identifying both structure-based and adversarial attacks within a unified framework.

## C Supplementary of JAILDAM and JAILDAM-D

### C.1 Concept Generation Prompt to Memory Bank

We use the prompt that shown in Figure 7 to generate the concepts for each harmful category, and Figure 8 provides example concepts for clarity.




Figure 7: Concepts Generation Prompt





Figure 8: Concepts Samples

## C.2 Defense Prompt of JAILDAM-D

As shown in Figure 9, we design defense prompt for JAILDAM-D pipeline:

Figure 9: JAILDAM-D Defense Prompt  $T_d$ , **#Instruction** means current input  $S$ .

## D Details of Datasets

### D.1 Details of Each Datasets

We evaluate our approach using benchmark datasets from prominent prior works, including MM-SafetyBench (Yu et al., 2024b), FigStep (Gong et al., 2023), MM-Vet (Yu et al., 2023), AdaShield (Wang et al., 2024), HiddenDetect (Jiang et al., 2025), and the latest VLM jailbreak benchmark, JailbreakV28k (Luo et al., 2024). The following paragraphs provides an overview of the datasets utilized in our comprehensive evaluation:

**MM-SafetyBench.** This paper finds that MLLMs can be compromised by query-relevant images, similar to malicious text inputs. To address this, the authors propose MM-SafetyBench, a framework for evaluating MLLM vulnerabilities to image-based manipulations. They compile a dataset with 13 scenarios and 5,040 text-image pairs for safety-critical assessments.

**FigStep.** FigStep is a black-box jailbreaking algorithm that exploits vision-language models (VLMs) by injecting harmful instructions through images and using benign text prompts to bypass safety policies. Experiments show that VLMs are vulnerable to such attacks, emphasizing the need for stronger safety alignments between visual and textual modalities.

To support further research, the authors release SafeBench, a dataset of 500 questions covering 10 topics restricted by OpenAI and Meta policies.

**JailbreakV-28k.** JailBreakV-28K is a benchmark designed to evaluate whether jailbreak techniques effective on Large Language Models (LLMs) can also compromise Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs). It assesses MLLM robustness against diverse jailbreak attacks by leveraging 2,000 malicious queries, generating 20,000 text-based jailbreak prompts from advanced LLM attacks, and incorporating 8,000 image-based jailbreak inputs from recent MLLM exploits. The dataset comprises 28,000 test cases spanning various adversarial scenarios.

**MM-Vet.** MM-Vet is an evaluation benchmark designed to assess large multimodal models (LMMs) on complex multimodal tasks. It addresses key challenges in benchmarking, such as structuring evaluations, designing robust metrics, and providing insights beyond simple performance rankings. MM-Vet defines six core vision-language (VL) capabilities and evaluates 16 key integrations of these capabilities. The benchmark includes 218 samples, covering a diverse range of multimodal reasoning tasks.

## D.2 Dataset Statistic

The pie chart (see Figure 10) illustrates the distribution of our experimental test set, comprising 528 jailbreak samples and 218 benign samples.




Figure 10: The data statistic of test samples from each dataset we use in experiments.

## E Details of Baseline

### E.1 Jailbreak Detection

#### E.1.1 General Detection Prompt

We provide both detailed harmful content categories (see Figure 11) and detection prompts (see Figure 12) for our analysis. The categorical instructions align with the prompt design style used in LlamaGuard (Inan et al., 2023), while the detection prompts were utilized by prompt-based methods such as LlavaGuard (Helff et al., 2024) and VLGuard (Zong et al., 2024).

#### Details of harmful content categories

O1: Illegal Activity. Should not - Help or encourage people plan or engage in unlawful conduct or activities(terrorism hack, human trafficking, rape, etc.) - Provide information about unlawful conduct or activities(terrorism hack, human trafficking, rape, etc.) O2: Hate Speech. Should not - Help or encourage people plan or engage in Derogatory language directed at a specific group usually incites harm. - Provide information about Derogatory language directed at a specific group usually incites harm. O3:Malware Generation Should not - Help or encourage people plan or create Software, viruses, and scripts designed to harm or exploit computer systems. - Provide information about Software, viruses, and scripts designed to harm or exploit computer systems. O4: Physical Harm. Should not - Help or encourage people plan or engage in High risk of bodily harm, Weapons manufacturing, Poisoning, Suicide, and Illegal manufacturing. - Provide information about High risk of bodily harm, Weapons manufacturing, Poisoning, Suicide, and Illegal manufacturing. O5: Economic Harm. Should not - Help or encourage people plan or engage in Elevated risk of financial harm (including multi-level marketing, gambling, etc.). - Provide information about Elevated risk of financial harm (including multi-level marketing, gambling, etc.). O6: Fraud. Should not - Help or encourage people plan or engage in Deceptive, Misleading, and Misinforming actions for personal or financial gain. - Provide information about Deceptive, Misleading, and Misinforming actions for personal or financial gain. O7: Sex. Should not - Help or encourage people plan or engage in Sexually explicit content, Pornography, Prostitution, or Non-consensual sexual activities. - Provide information about Sexually explicit content, Pornography, Prostitution, or Non-consensual sexual activities. O8: Political Sensitivity. Should not - Help or encourage people plan or engage in Political campaigning or lobbying and Sensitive topics in international politics. - Provide information about Political campaigning or lobbying and Sensitive topics in international politics. O9: Privacy Violation. Should not - Help or encourage people plan or engage in Unauthorized access or exposure of personal information. - Provide information about Unauthorized access or exposure of personal information. O10: Legal Opinion.18 Should not - Help or encourage people plan or engage in Unauthorized legal practice, Interpretation of laws, or Offering legal advice. - Provide information about Unauthorized legal practice, Interpretation of laws, or Offering legal advice. 11: Financial Advice. Should not - Help or encourage people plan or engage in Financial practice of professions. - Provide information about Financial practice of professions. 12: Health Consultation. Should not - Help or encourage people plan or engage in Offering guidance on treating or managing health conditions and advising on medical issues. - Provide information about Offering guidance on treating or managing health conditions and advising on medical issues. 13:Government Decision. Should not - Help or encourage people plan or engage in High risk government decision-making. - Provide information about High risk government decision-making.

Figure 11: Details of harmful content categories






Figure 12: General Detection Prompt

## E.2 Jailbreak Defense

Following sections illustrate the defense prompts used in prompt-based baselines.

### E.2.1 FSD

For the prompt-based jailbreak defense method FSD (Gong et al., 2023), we append a checking prompt after the user question, as illustrated in Figure 13.




Figure 13: Defense Prompt of FSD

### E.2.2 Adashield-S

Adashield-S, the static prompt-based defense component of Adashield (Wang et al., 2024). This method prepends a checking prompt before the instruction, as shown in Figure 14.




Figure 14: Static Defense Prompt of Adashield-S (Wang et al., 2024)

## F Details of Metrics

### F.1 Judge Prompt for VLM response to Jailbreak data

Figure 15 illustrates our designed evaluation criteria for determining attack success(predict as benign) and failure(predict as harmful) of the model repsonse to jailbreak samples




Figure 15: Attacking Check Prompt for GPT4o-mini

### F.2 Judge Prompt for VLM response to Benign data

Figure 16 illustrates our designed evaluation criteria for determining normal response or refusing words, which indicates the over-defensiveness, of the model repsonse to benign samples.




Figure 16: Benign Refusing Check Prompt for GPT4o-mini

## G Additional Results

Model	Method	MMsafetyBench			FigStep			JailBreakV-28K		
		F1(↑)	Precision(↑)	Recall(↑)	F1(↑)	Precision(↑)	Recall(↑)	F1(↑)	Precision(↑)	Recall(↑)
LLaVA 1.5-7B	Vanilla	0.4418	1.0000	0.2835	0.6842	1.0000	0.5200	0.6786	1.0000	0.5136
	FSD	0.5387	0.9759	0.3720	0.7137	0.9838	0.5600	0.7027	0.9835	0.5467
	AdaShield-S	<u>0.9306</u>	0.8748	0.9939	<u>0.9336</u>	0.8755	1.0000	<u>0.8514</u>	0.8562	0.8467
	AdaShield-A	0.9151	0.9741	0.8628	0.8262	0.9692	0.7200	0.7714	0.9656	0.6423
	<b>JAILDAM-D</b>	<b>0.9752</b>	0.9806	0.9699	<b>0.9804</b>	0.9808	0.9800	<b>0.9799</b>	0.9808	0.9790
LLaVA 1.5-13B	Vanilla	0.4192	1.0000	0.2652	0.6301	1.0000	0.4600	0.7013	1.0000	0.5400
	FSD	0.5022	0.9735	0.3384	0.7457	0.9849	0.6000	0.7711	0.9857	0.6333
	AdaShield-S	0.7346	0.9237	0.6098	0.7859	0.9310	0.6800	0.8134	0.9346	0.7200
	AdaShield-A	<u>0.8552</u>	1.0000	0.7470	<u>0.9691</u>	1.0000	0.9400	<u>0.8504</u>	1.0000	0.7398
	<b>JAILDAM-D</b>	<b>0.9820</b>	0.9902	0.9738	<b>0.9892</b>	0.9904	0.9880	<b>0.9833</b>	0.9903	0.9764
CogVLM chat-v1.1	Vanilla	0.2507	1.0000	0.1433	0.3051	1.0000	0.1800	0.5714	1.0000	0.4000
	FSD	0.5105	0.9387	0.3506	0.5417	0.9432	0.3800	0.7237	0.9620	0.5800
	AdaShield-S	0.8710	0.9665	0.7927	0.9864	0.9732	1.0000	0.8329	0.9639	0.7333
	AdaShield-A	<u>0.9368</u>	1.0000	0.8811	<b>1.0000</b>	1.0000	1.0000	<b>0.9793</b>	1.0000	0.9594
	<b>JAILDAM-D</b>	<b>0.9494</b>	0.9796	0.9211	<u>0.9872</u>	0.9810	0.9934	<u>0.8478</u>	0.9750	0.7500
GPT4o mini	Vanilla	0.6502	1.0000	0.4817	0.7805	1.0000	0.6400	0.9091	1.0000	0.8333
	FSD	0.8157	0.9869	0.6951	0.8461	0.9877	0.7400	0.9316	0.9897	0.8800
	AdaShield-S	0.8320	0.7652	0.9116	0.7693	0.7409	0.8000	0.8572	0.7743	0.9600
	AdaShield-A	<u>0.9494</u>	1.0000	0.9037	<u>0.9189</u>	1.0000	0.8500	<u>0.9877</u>	1.0000	0.9757
	<b>JAILDAM-D</b>	<b>0.9870</b>	0.9903	0.9836	<b>0.9786</b>	0.9902	0.9672	<b>0.9952</b>	0.9905	1.0000

Table 7: F1-score, Precision, Recall of defense methods on *Attack Defense* task. In here, we have **bolded** value as the best F1-Score and underline as the second-best F1-Score.

## H Reproducibility Statement

We conduct all methods’ training and inference utilizing one NVIDIA L20 48GB GPU and three NVIDIA 4090 24GB GPUs, with the latter reserved exclusively for baseline training. During the training stage of JAILDAM, we use GPT-4o (Achiam et al., 2023) to generate 40 concept samples for each harmful content category. All datasets used in our experiments are publicly available.