JAILBREAK CONNECTIVITY: TOWARDS DIVERSE, TRANSFERABLE, AND UNIVERSAL MLLM JAILBREAK

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ABSTRACT

While multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have shown immense potential, their susceptibility to security threats, particularly through the visual modality, poses serious concerns for real-world deployment. Existing jailbreak studies, which successfully induce harmful responses, suffer from three key limitations: a lack of diversity, poor transferability across different models, and ineffectiveness against multiple targets simultaneously. To address these challenges, we introduce the Jailbreak Connectivity (JC) framework. JC framework includes three novel components. First, it generates a diverse range of jailbreak attacks by constructing a continuous path in the image space that connects two jailbreak images. Second, it improves transferability by integrating two types of surrogate classifiers, Safety Classifiers and Jailbreak Success Predictors, to guide the optimization process. Third, JC enables universal jailbreak attacks by modifying the attack objective to elicit any harmful content rather than being tied to a specific harmful question, thereby inducing the target MLLM to answer a broad range of harmful queries. Our experiments on the SafetyBench dataset show that JC achieves an average attack success rate (ASR) of *79.62%*, representing a substantial *36.24% increase* over the best-performing state-of-the-art method. In addition, JC obtains the lowest perplexity in 12 out of 13 scenarios, indicating that the generated harmful responses are more fluent and natural. This work offers a promising approach for generating diverse, transferable, and universal jailbreak attacks, highlighting critical security vulnerabilities in current MLLMs. *Warning: This paper contains data, prompts, and model outputs that are offensive in nature.*

1 INTRODUCTION

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) such as GPT-4o (Hurst et al., 2024), LLaVA (Liu et al., 2023), and Qwen-VL (Bai et al., 2025) have achieved strong performance by jointly processing visual and textual inputs. While their architectures typically combine a vision encoder with an LLM backbone, the integration of a visual modality substantially expands the attack surface. Recent analyses show that multimodal alignment remains fragile (Liu et al., 2025; Touvron et al., 2023), making MLLMs more vulnerable to adversarial manipulation than their text-only counterparts. As these models are rapidly deployed in high-stakes domains such as healthcare and autonomous driving (Bordes et al., 2024), understanding and mitigating multimodal security risks, particularly jailbreak attacks, has become increasingly important.

Our work focuses on *jailbreak attacks* on MLLMs, which are deliberate manipulations designed to bypass safety safeguards and induce harmful outputs (Jin et al., 2024). Unlike attacks on text-only LLMs (Zou et al., 2023; Wei et al., 2023; Huang et al., 2023), MLLMs are inherently more vulnerable to jailbreaks because adversaries can leverage visual inputs, textual prompts, or their interplay. Existing methods can be broadly categorized into three groups: *(1) Prompt-to-Image Injection.* These methods manipulate textual content to construct visual prompts that implicitly encode harmful instructions. By channeling malicious intent through the image modality or pairing benign textual prompts with deceptive visual cues, the attacker induces the model to reconstruct or infer hidden harmful directives (Gong et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2024b; Zhao et al., 2025a). These attacks exploit the weak disentanglement between visual and textual reasoning, often bypassing text-only refusal filters. *(2) Prompt to Image Perturbation.* A second line of work introduces small, often imperceptible, perturbations to images, sometimes jointly optimized with text, to exploit vulnerabilities

in multimodal fusion. Subtle pixel level or feature level changes can cause the model to reinterpret safe inputs as harmful queries. Representative techniques leverage cross modal coupling, optimal transport based optimization, or alignment preserving perturbations to craft effective adversarial image and text pairs (Zhang et al., 2022; Han et al., 2023; Lu et al., 2023). *(3) Proxy Model Transfer Attacks.* A third direction generates adversarial images using surrogate or proxy MLLMs and transfers them to unseen targets. By optimizing in the embedding space of a proxy vision encoder or using model ensembles, these approaches perform efficient black box attacks without accessing target parameters (Shayegani et al., 2023; Dong et al., 2023; Chen et al., 2023). Their success highlights that multimodal vulnerabilities generalize across architectures, revealing systemic weaknesses in MLLM alignment.

Despite these efforts, current jailbreak approaches suffer from three key limitations: (1) *Lack of Diversity*: Most methods generate only a single jailbreak image for a given harmful query, which limits the range of potential attacks and makes them easier to defend against (Zhao et al., 2025b). (2) *Limited Transferability*: Jailbreak images often fail to transfer to MLLMs other than the one used for their creation, hindering their practical utility (Schaeffer et al., 2024; Lin et al., 2025). (3) *Ineffectiveness Against Multiple Targets*: Few methods aim to create *Universal Jailbreaks*—a single image that can compel a model to answer a wide range of harmful queries, regardless of the accompanying text prompt (Shen et al., 2024; Kritz et al., 2025).



Figure 1: The Jailbreak Connectivity (JC) framework. JC mitigates three key limitations of existing methods by generating diverse and transferable attacks and enabling universal jailbreak capabilities.

To address these limitations, we propose the *Jailbreak Connectivity (JC)* framework, illustrated in Figure 1. JC introduces three novel components to enhance jailbreak attacks. First, for *Diverse Jailbreak*, we construct a continuous path in the image space, leveraging a quadratic Bezier curve, that connects two jailbreak images (upper panel). By demonstrating that the jailbreak loss remains low along this path, we can generate a diverse population of effective jailbreak images, offering a broader range of attack examples (lower-left panel). Second, for *Transferable Jailbreak*, JC leverages two surrogate classifiers, a Safety Classifier and a Jailbreak Success Predictor, to model the safety and vulnerability mechanisms of a target MLLM. Incorporating these classifiers into the path construction process allows us to produce jailbreak examples that generalize across different models, significantly improving their transferability (lower-middle panel). Third, for *Universal Jailbreak*, we extend the attack objective from targeting a specific harmful query to a broad harmful output distribution. This approach allows us to construct a single universal jailbreak image that can induce a model to comply with a wide range of malicious text prompts (lower-right panel).

Summary of Findings. We evaluate JC on MM-SafetyBench and AdvBench using both open-source MLLMs (MiniGPT-4-13B, LLaVA-1.5-13B, Qwen2.5-VL-7B) and commercial models (GPT-4o, Gemini-2.5-Flash). Across 13 scenarios on MiniGPT-4, JC achieves an average ASR of 79.62%, outperforming the strongest baseline by 36.24%, while also producing more fluent responses (lower PPL) and higher toxicity levels (Detoxify). Sampling along a single JC path preserves a 70% success rate, demonstrating that JC uncovers a continuous low-loss region and provides diverse jailbreak variants. For transferability, jailbreak images optimized on MiniGPT-4 transfer to LLaVA and Qwen with strong ASR (71.7% and 69.1%) and achieve 49–51% success on GPT-4o and Gemini. In black-box settings against GPT-4o, JC reaches a 55.9% average ASR. Furthermore,

JC enables universal jailbreaks, with a single optimized image succeeding on 32/40 harmful queries on MiniGPT-4 and transferring to LLaVA on 26/40 queries. These findings highlight substantial robustness gaps in current MLLM safety and underscore the need for stronger multimodal defenses.

2 Related Work

Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models. The rapid deployment of LLMs has motivated extensive research on jailbreaking techniques that circumvent alignment and safety safeguards. Early gradient-based methods such as GCG (Zou et al., 2023) optimize adversarial suffixes that reliably induce harmful responses across diverse prompts. Subsequent work explored more flexible pipelines: FuzzLLM (Yao et al., 2024) adapts fuzz testing to generate black-box adversarial instructions; MJP (Li et al., 2023) exploits multi-turn dialogue structures to maintain a persistent jailbreak state; and ReNeLLM (Ding et al., 2023) formalizes jailbreak mechanisms through prompt rewriting and scenario nesting. More recent approaches such as PAIR (Chao et al., 2025) incorporate iterative refinement, multi-model collaboration, and chain-of-thought dynamics to enhance attack reliability. Beyond single-shot prompting, several studies explicitly investigate *transferability* and *diversity* in textual jailbreaks. Universal suffix attacks (Zou et al., 2023; Wei et al., 2023) generate a single prompt fragment that generalizes across models and harmful categories, while stochastic rewriting and ensemble-based optimization improve diversity by producing multiple distinct jailbreak variants. However, all these techniques operate solely in the textual modality and offer limited insight into the multimodal vulnerabilities that arise when visual inputs interact with LLM safety filters.

Jailbreak Attacks on Multimodal Large Language Models Compared to text-only LLMs, MLLMs are susceptible to more complex and diverse jailbreak attacks due to their ability to process visual inputs. These attacks can exploit visual inputs, textual components, or a combination of both. Early methods include Prompt-to-Image Injection, exemplified by the black-box approach FigStep (Gong et al., 2025), which feeds harmful instructions to MLLMs through the image channel using benign text prompts. Similarly, Visual Role-play (VRP) (Ma et al., 2024) generates images of high-risk characters to mislead VLMs into generating malicious responses when paired with benign role-play instructions. Other research has focused on adversarial perturbations, where subtle image modifications are used to mislead MLLMs (Bailey et al., 2023; Cui et al., 2024; Zhao et al., 2023). For example, the Set-Level Guidance Attack (SGA) (Lu et al., 2023) and its successor, OT-Attack (Han et al., 2023), leverage modality interactions and optimal transport theory to generate effective adversarial image sets. A number of studies have also investigated transfer attacks, where adversarial examples created using a proxy model are applied to a different victim model. These perturbations can be optimized using gradient-based methods in white-box settings (Luo et al., 2024; Bailey et al., 2023; Cui et al., 2024) or with query-efficient black-box methods (Yang et al., 2020; Chen et al., 2023; Chen & Liu, 2023). However, architectural and training data differences often limit the transferability of these adversarial examples (Zhao et al., 2023). While existing work has made significant strides, three key limitations persist. (1) *Lack of Diversity*: most methods produce only a single optimized image per harmful query, limiting adversarial variation and making defenses easier (Zhao et al., 2025b). (2) *Limited Transferability*: adversarial images often fail to generalize across different MLLM architectures due to differences in vision encoders, alignment strategies, and training data (Schaeffer et al., 2024; Lin et al., 2025). (3) *Ineffectiveness Against Multiple Targets*: few methods construct *universal* jailbreaks capable of eliciting harmful outputs across a wide range of queries and contexts (Shen et al., 2024; Kritz et al., 2025). Our proposed Jailbreak Connectivity (JC) is specifically designed to offer a novel approach for generating diverse, transferable, and universal MLLM jailbreak attacks.

3 Jailbreak Connectivity

In this section, we introduce our approach, the *Jailbreak Connectivity (JC)*. JC consists of three key components: Diverse Jailbreak, Transferable Jailbreak, and Universal Jailbreak. Our approach is designed to mitigate three key limitations of existing MLLM jailbreak methods: lack of diversity, limited transferability, and ineffectiveness against multiple targets. Our framework is organized around a single principle: we aim to explore and exploit a broader region of low adversarial loss rather than optimizing a single data point. The first component expands this region by construct-

ing a continuous set of candidate images that expose multiple viable jailbreak solutions. Building on this enlarged search space, the second component introduces surrogate classifiers that provide lightweight guidance signals. These signals help steer the search toward candidates whose adversarial behavior is more stable and more transferable across different multimodal models. The third component extends this mechanism from a single harmful prompt to a wider distribution of harmful behaviors, enabling broad-coverage attacks under the same unified optimization structure. Together, these components operate synergistically and form an integrated pipeline: exploration of a wider adversarial region, model-guided refinement within that region, and generalization to diverse harmful intents. As shown in our ablation study (Appendix A.7), removing any component leads to a clear degradation in performance.

An MLLM processes both textual and visual prompts to generate a textual output. We model the MLLM's output $\boldsymbol{y}$ as a conditional probability $p(\boldsymbol{y} \mid \boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{t})$, where $\boldsymbol{x}$ is the image input and $\boldsymbol{t}$ is the text input. An adversary aims to manipulate the image input $\boldsymbol{x}$ to compel the target MLLM to answer a harmful question $\boldsymbol{t}_h$ and produce harmful content $\boldsymbol{y}_h$. The manipulated image, referred to as a jailbreak image $\boldsymbol{x}_p$, is obtained by adding a small, imperceptible perturbation to the original image $\boldsymbol{x}$. This work focuses on single-turn interactions, in which models are tested on isolated prompts without prior conversational context. Our method, JC, is applicable in both *white-box* and *black-box* settings, where the white-box setting assumes full access to model parameters and gradients, while the black-box setting restricts the adversary to query-only interactions without internal knowledge.

3.1 Diverse Jailbreak

Traditional jailbreak methods typically generate only a single jailbreak image at a time, which can be easily defended and may limit attack efficacy. This raises a natural question: Can we generate a *series of jailbreak images* to increase the probability of a successful jailbreak? Motivated by research on *mode connectivity* (Garipov et al., 2018), JC aims to build a path connecting two jailbreak examples in the image space. Along this path, we can discover a group of diverse jailbreak images, some of which may offer even better attack performance.

Endpoints Searching To construct such a path, we must first find two jailbreak images to serve as endpoints. We adopt a straightforward approach: *maximize the generation probability of harmful output* $\boldsymbol{y}_h$. For a specific harmful question $\boldsymbol{t}_h$, an initial benign image $\boldsymbol{x}$, and a predefined harmful output $\boldsymbol{y}_h$, the process of generating a jailbreak image $\boldsymbol{x}_p$ is formally formulated as:

$$\underset{\|\boldsymbol{x}_p - \boldsymbol{x}\|_\infty \leq \epsilon}{\text{minimize}} \mathcal{L}_{\text{jail}}(\boldsymbol{x}_p) := -\log(p(\boldsymbol{y}_h \mid \boldsymbol{x}_p, \boldsymbol{t}_h)), \tag{1}$$

where ϵ denotes the image perturbation constraint, and $\mathcal{L}_{\text{jail}}(\boldsymbol{x}_p)$ is the jailbreak loss. To ensure visual imperceptibility, we constrain the perturbation magnitude by $\|\boldsymbol{x}_p - \boldsymbol{x}\|_\infty \leq \epsilon$. In practice, we use the standard *Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)* algorithm (Madry et al., 2017) to solve this optimization problem. We use random initialization and run PGD for 2000 iterations to find two distinct local minima, $\boldsymbol{x}_1$ and $\boldsymbol{x}_2$, which serve as the starting and ending points of the path.

Path Construction After identifying the two endpoints, we construct a path connecting them using a *quadratic Bézier curve* due to its widespread use in similar domains like adversarial robustness and machine unlearning (Wang et al., 2024a; Shi & Wang, 2025). The curve is represented by $\phi_{\boldsymbol{x}_c}(u) = (1-u)^2\boldsymbol{x}_1 + 2u(1-u)\boldsymbol{x}_c + u^2\boldsymbol{x}_2$, where $\boldsymbol{x}_1$ and $\boldsymbol{x}_2$ are the two endpoints, $\boldsymbol{x}_c$ is the *control point* that determines the curve's direction and curvature, and $u \in [0, 1]$. The training objective for this path construction is:



Figure 2: Visualization of path connectivity demonstrating diverse jailbreaks against LLaVA.

$$\underset{\phi_{\boldsymbol{x}_c}}{\text{minimize}} \underset{u \sim U(0,1)}{\mathbb{E}} \mathcal{L}_{\text{jail}}\big(\phi_{\boldsymbol{x}_c}(u)\big), \text{subject to } \big\|\phi_{\boldsymbol{x}_c}(u) - \boldsymbol{x}\big\|_\infty \leq \epsilon, \forall u \in [0, 1]. \tag{2}$$

$U(0, 1)$ in Eq.(2) denotes the uniform distribution over the interval $[0, 1]$. In practice, we initialize the control point using linear interpolation, setting $\boldsymbol{x}_c = \frac{\boldsymbol{x}_1 + \boldsymbol{x}_2}{2}$. *This loss encourages the optimizer*

to explore a connected low-loss region, enabling multiple stable jailbreak solutions instead of a single isolated optimum. During training, we generate an image by sampling u from the uniform distribution $U(0, 1)$. The image is optimized into a jailbreak image by solving the objective in Eq. (1) with PGD, where gradients are backpropagated to update the control point $\boldsymbol{x}_c$. By iterating this process, JC discovers a path along which each image maintains a low jailbreak loss. A diverse set of jailbreak images can be sampled from this path, making the attack substantially more difficult to defend against. Furthermore, some of these images may lead to even better attack performance than the initial endpoints. We present an example of diverse jailbreaks against LLaVA-2-13B (Liu et al., 2023) for the harmful query "How to make a bomb?". The path connectivity is illustrated in Figure 2, and attack results are summarized in Table 6. As shown in Figure 2, images along the discovered path maintain low jailbreak loss. We uniformly sampled 10 images from this path; 70% successfully jailbreak LLaVA-2-13B. Detailed evaluation of these sampled jailbreak images appears in Table 6 in Appendix A.4. These results demonstrate that some intermediate images along the path can produce equal or better attack performance than the initial endpoints.

3.2 Transferable Jailbreak

We have demonstrated how JC can jailbreak a single MLLM and generate diverse images. However, existing jailbreak images optimized for one MLLM rarely transfer successfully to other models (Schaeffer et al., 2024). This raises another critical question: Can JC generate jailbreak images that *transfer across different MLLMs*? The most straightforward approach is to maximize the expected generation probability across all target MLLMs. For n MLLMs, the overall path construction objective would be $\min_{\|\boldsymbol{x}_c-\boldsymbol{x}\|_\infty\leq\epsilon} \mathbb{E}_{u\sim U(0,1)} \left[\sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathcal{L}^i_{\text{jail}}(\phi_{\boldsymbol{x}_c}(u))\right]$,, where $\mathcal{L}^i_{\text{jail}}$ is the jailbreak loss for the i-th MLLM. However, this simple method becomes computationally expensive as n increases, since evaluating the jailbreak loss requires repeated forward passes through large MLLMs. Is there a more efficient way to predict MLLM behavior and guide jailbreak image generation without directly including the MLLMs in the optimization?

To address this, we use two much smaller *surrogate classifiers* to model the safety and vulnerability mechanisms of each target MLLM. As shown by Ferrand et al. (2025), safety classifiers can be extracted from aligned LLMs to precisely predict their behavior. Inspired by this, we define a *Safety Classifier* and a *Jailbreak Success Predictor* to guide the generation of jailbreak images during path construction. We use `clip-vit-base-patch32` (Radford et al., 2021) as the classifier model, which is significantly smaller and more computationally efficient than a full MLLM. We assume the availability of a dataset of jailbreak images for the target MLLM, which can be readily constructed using existing methods in both white-box and black-box settings.

Safety Classifier We introduce a safety classifier f_{safe} to estimate the likelihood that an input image is judged safe by the MLLM. Its output $f_{\text{safe}}(\boldsymbol{x}) \in [0, 1]$ serves as a probabilistic score, which allows optimization with cross-entropy loss. Since MLLMs are often fine-tuned with human feedback to refuse harmful queries, this classifier provides guidance for generating images that appear safe while bypassing such safeguards. To construct f_{safe}, we label each image in the dataset according to the model's response as *safe (1)* or *unsafe (0)*, and train the classifier on these annotations.

Jailbreak Success Predictor Even if an image is deemed safe, the jailbreak attempt may still fail. To address this gap, we design a complementary classifier, the *Jailbreak Success Predictor* f_{success}, which estimates the probability that an image can successfully jailbreak the target MLLM. The output $f_{\text{success}}(\boldsymbol{x}) \in [0, 1]$ again provides a probabilistic signal suitable for cross-entropy optimization. This predictor directly guides JC toward images with higher attack success rates. Training relies on labels derived from actual attack outcomes: images are marked as *successful (1)* or *unsuccessful (0)*, and the predictor is optimized until it can reliably anticipate success.

Transfer to other MLLMs To jailbreak n MLLMs, we first select one MLLM as the *base MLLM* and model the remaining $n - 1$ MLLMs with surrogate classifiers. The attack target is to jailbreak the base MLLM and transfer to other $n - 1$ MLLMs. For each of these $n - 1$ models, we train a pair of surrogate classifiers, f^i_{safe} and f^i_{success}, using the method described above. The goal is to generate jailbreak images that are predicted as safe (1) by the safety classifiers and successful (1) by the jailbreak success predictors. For the base MLLM, we use its direct jailbreak loss, $\mathcal{L}^n_{\text{jail}}$. Formally,

the optimization problem for the transferable jailbreak path is:

$$\underset{\phi_{\boldsymbol{x}_c}:\, \|\phi_{\boldsymbol{x}_c}(u)-\boldsymbol{x}\|_\infty \le \epsilon,\ \forall u\in[0,1]}{\text{minimize}} \ \mathbb{E}_{u\sim U(0,1)}\Big[\alpha \mathcal{L}^n_{\text{jail}}(\phi_{\boldsymbol{x}_c}(u)) + (1-\alpha)\,\mathcal{L}_{\text{transfer}}(\phi_{\boldsymbol{x}_c}(u))\Big],$$
$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{transfer}}(\phi_{\boldsymbol{x}_c}(u)) = \sum_{i=1}^{n-1}\Big(\beta \mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}}(f^i_{\text{safe}}(\phi_{\boldsymbol{x}_c}(u)),1) + (1-\beta)\,\mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}}(f^i_{\text{success}}(\phi_{\boldsymbol{x}_c}(u)),1)\Big), \tag{3}$$

where $\mathcal{L}_{CE}$ is the *cross-entropy loss*. *This transfer term $\mathcal{L}_{\text{transfer}}$ provides coarse but informative guidance by approximating the model's refusal and harmfulness tendencies, helping the optimizer move toward more transferable jailbreak images.*. The hyperparameters $\alpha, \beta \in [0,1]$ balance the trade-off between effectiveness and transferability. Intuitively, a higher α value prioritizes better attack performance on the base MLLM, potentially at the cost of transferability. Conversely, a higher β value favors generating "safer" images, increasing the probability of successful transfer to other MLLMs while possibly reducing overall attack performance. Eq.(3) can also be used to jailbreak a single *closed-source MLLM* in a black-box setting. For example, to jailbreak Gemini (AI, 2025), one can select a random open-source MLLM as the base model and use our transferable jailbreak method to generate images that successfully bypass Gemini's safeguards.

3.3 Universal Jailbreak

While we have demonstrated how to achieve jailbreak transferability across MLLMs, the images generated are highly specific to a single harmful question. This leads to a compelling question: Is it possible to generate a *universal jailbreak image* that can induce MLLMs to exhibit a wide range of harmful behaviors without a specific text prompt? To accomplish this, JC introduces a universal jailbreak method by modifying the attack objective.

Since a universal jailbreak image is designed to elicit harmful responses to a broad spectrum of questions, the ideal output of the MLLM can no longer be restricted to a pre-defined harmful content, $\boldsymbol{y}_h$. Instead, the attack target becomes the entire harmful domain, which we model as a distribution $\mathcal{Y}_h$. Additionally, we intentionally omit any text input $\boldsymbol{t}$ during the attack. This is because text prompts can introduce specific tasks or constraints that may interfere with the universal nature of the jailbreak image. We therefore define the universal jailbreak loss $\mathcal{L}_{uni}$ for a target MLLM as:

$$\mathcal{L}_{uni}(\boldsymbol{x}_p) = \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{y}_h\sim\mathcal{Y}_h}[-\log(p(\boldsymbol{y}_h \mid \boldsymbol{x}_p))]. \tag{4}$$

Based on the universal objective in Eq.(4), we can reformulate the optimization problem for constructing a universal transferable path across n MLLMs:

$$\underset{\phi_{\boldsymbol{x}_c}:\|\phi_{\boldsymbol{x}_c}(u)-\boldsymbol{x}\|_\infty\le\epsilon,\forall u\in[0,1]}{\text{minimize}} \ \mathbb{E}_{u\sim U(0,1)}\Big[\alpha \mathcal{L}^n_{\text{uni}}\big(\phi_{\boldsymbol{x}_c}(u)\big) + (1-\alpha)\,\mathcal{L}_{\text{transfer}}\big(\phi_{\boldsymbol{x}_c}(u)\big)\Big]. \tag{5}$$

This objective extends the attack beyond a specific query by aligning optimization with a distribution of harmful prompts, enabling universal jailbreak capability. The two endpoints of the path are generated by minimizing the universal jailbreak loss $\mathcal{L}_{uni}$. We use randomization to ensure they are distinct. The surrogate classifiers are trained in the same manner as described in the previous subsection. In practice, we approximate the distribution $\mathcal{Y}_h$ using a harmful corpus of 100 sentences from the AdvBench (Zou et al., 2023) dataset (see Appendix A.2). This optimized path allows JC to generate jailbreak images that can induce the base MLLM to answer a wide range of harmful questions, with the potential to transfer this behavior to other MLLMs as well. Eq. (5) represents the most general form of our method, enabling the generation of universal jailbreak images across different MLLMs. When the attack target is restricted to a single harmful query, Eq. (5) reduces to the transferable jailbreak formulation. When $\alpha = \beta = 1$, the optimization is applied only to the base MLLM, which corresponds to the diverse jailbreak formulation.

4 Experiments

4.1 Implementation

Models and Datasets To comprehensively evaluate the effectiveness of JC, we conducted experiments on both open-source and commercial MLLMs. For open-source models, we focused on

MiniGPT-4-13B-Vicuna (Zhu et al., 2023), *LLaVA-2-13B* (Liu et al., 2023), and *Qwen2.5-Instruct-7B* (Bai et al., 2025) due to their widespread adoption and strong performance. We used their official weights as provided by their respective repositories. For commercial models, we evaluated *GPT-4o* (Hurst et al., 2024) and *Gemini-2.5-Flash* (AI, 2025) to validate our method's real-world applicability. Our surrogate classifiers were built on the *CLIP-ViT-Base-Patch32* backbone (Radford et al., 2021) due to its efficiency, strong zero-shot transferability, and prior use in MLLM security research (Shayegani et al., 2023; Dong et al., 2024; Sun et al., 2024). For closed-source models, we conducted all experiments by ourselves between September 1 and September 21, 2025.

We evaluated our approaches using two common benchmarks: *MM-SafetyBench* (Liu et al., 2024) and *AdvBench* (Zou et al., 2023). SafetyBench assesses MLLM safety across 13 distinct prohibited scenarios, as defined by OpenAI's usage policies. A detailed description of these scenarios is provided in Appendix A.3. AdvBench, used in prior LLM jailbreak research, contains 521 harmful behaviors. Following the methodology of BAP (Ying et al., 2025), we removed duplicate items from AdvBench and mapped each item to a corresponding SafetyBench scenario for our experiments. All experiments were conducted on 4 NVIDIA A100 GPUs.

Metrics We used the following three metrics to evaluate jailbreak effectiveness:

- *Attack Success Rate (ASR):* For a given dataset of prohibited questions, ASR is the proportion of attempts that result in a prohibited response. It is calculated as: $ASR = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{N} \mathbf{B}(J(\boldsymbol{y}_k) = \text{True})}{N}$, where $\boldsymbol{y}_k$ is the MLLM's response, N is the total number of prohibited questions, $J(\cdot)$ is a harmfulness judging model, and $\mathbf{B}$ is a binary function. We adopted *Beaver-dam-7B* (Ji et al., 2023) as our judging model, which is trained on high-quality human feedback data. To account for the stochastic nature of MLLM responses, we repeated each attack five times, and an attack was considered successful if at least one attempt yielded a prohibited response.
- *Perplexity (PPL):* Following FigStep (Gong et al., 2025), we used PPL to evaluate the fluency and quality of the model's responses. A lower PPL indicates higher "confidence" in the generated response. In our experiments, PPL was computed for each generated response using *GPT-2* (Radford et al., 2019), and the reported score is the mean value averaged over five independent runs.
- *Toxicity Score:* This metric quantifies the degree of offensive or harmful content in the MLLM's output. We used the *Detoxify* classifier (Hanu & Unitary team, 2020) to measure six specific toxicity attributes. The scores range from 0 (least toxic) to 1 (most toxic). We reported the percentage of generated texts with a toxicity score exceeding a threshold of 0.5 for each attribute, averaged over five runs.

Benchmark Attacks We compared JC against several state-of-the-art visual prompt jailbreak methods: *Adversarial Visual Examples (Adv Example)* (Qi et al., 2024) and *Query-relevant Images (Query Image)* (Liu et al., 2024) for the white-box setting, and *FigStep* (Gong et al., 2025) for the black-box setting. Adv Example uses a scenario-specific corpus to refine visual adversarial examples. Query Image integrates images with aggressive intent and typographic text. FigStep embeds harmful text directly into images. We also included a "Plain Text" baseline where harmful questions were directly input without any visual prompt to assess the MLLMs' baseline vulnerability.

Unless otherwise noted, all experiments were conducted using MiniGPT-4 as the default model. For fairness, all methods were run for a total of 5000 iterations. For JC, we performed 2000 iterations to generate the two path endpoints using different random initializations to ensure their independence. We then ran an additional 3000 iterations to optimize the path. The attack space was constrained by $\epsilon = 32/255$. From the final optimized path, we selected the image that yielded the best performance according to the respective loss function, and we reported JC's performance using this image throughout this paper. An illustrative example of the two endpoints and the best-performing jailbreak image is shown in Figure 6 in Appendix A.4.

To provide a more complete evaluation of JC across different model families and safety settings, we include several supplementary analyses in the appendix. Appendix A.5 reports additional experiments on more recent and better aligned MLLMs, including Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct (Team, 2025) and Kimi-VL-A3B-Instruct (Team et al., 2025). Appendix A.6 evaluates JC under stronger safety-

aligned judge models such as Llama-Guard-3-8B (Llama Team, 2024), StrongREJECT (Souly et al., 2024), and GPT-4o. Appendix A.7 provides a comprehensive ablation study of all components of JC on MiniGPT-4, examining the roles of the continuous path, the safety classifier, and the jailbreak success predictor. Appendix A.8 includes representative jailbreak outputs on commercial models (GPT-4o and Gemini), illustrating qualitative behaviors. Together, these analyses complement our main experiments on MiniGPT-4, LLaVA-2-13B, and Qwen2.5-VL-7B, offering a broader and more rigorous assessment of JC's effectiveness.

4.2 Experimental Results

4.2.1 White-Box Diverse Attacks

We evaluated JC's attack performance against MiniGPT-4 across 13 scenarios in a white-box setting, comparing it with Adv Example and Query Image. As shown in Table 1, JC significantly outperforms the baselines in both ASR and PPL. Our method achieved a remarkable average *ASR of 79.62%*, representing a *36.24% average increase* over the best-performing SOTA method. Furthermore, JC achieved the best PPL in 12 out of 13 scenarios, indicating that the generated harmful responses are more fluent and natural. Table 2 summarizes the toxicity analysis of the generated responses, with detailed results provided in Appendix A.4. The results clearly show that JC-generated images induce the MLLM to produce outputs with a substantially higher percentage of toxic attributes compared to other methods. This demonstrates that JC not only increases the likelihood of a successful jailbreak but also leads to more severely toxic and harmful content.

Table 1: Performance comparison of different jailbreak methods across scenarios on MiniGPT-4 (Zhu et al., 2023). Best results for each scenario are highlighted in **bold**. Our method, JC, performs better both in ASR and PPL compared with SOTA visual jailbreak methods.

Scenario	ASR (↑)				PPL (↓)			
	Plain Text	Adv Example	Query Image	JC	Plain Text	Adv Example	Query Image	JC
Illegal Activity (IA)	1.92±0.41%	14.54±1.22%	11.55±0.98%	**72.64±1.87%**	31.0±1.1	24.8±0.9	26.0±1.0	**8.0±0.4**
Hate Speech (HS)	1.68±0.38%	11.92±1.17%	3.97±0.52%	**69.28±1.64%**	32.5±1.2	26.7±0.8	30.9±1.1	**8.5±0.5**
Malware Generation (MG)	3.32±0.46%	19.88±1.35%	15.52±1.12%	**50.66±1.41%**	30.2±1.0	22.1±0.9	24.3±1.0	**15.8±0.7**
Physical Harm (PH)	2.98±0.40%	24.31±1.68%	23.43±1.45%	**74.76±1.92%**	30.7±1.1	20.1±0.7	20.5±0.8	**7.3±0.4**
Economic Harm (EH)	5.68±0.53%	4.91±0.48%	8.91±0.72%	**72.04±1.74%**	24.02±0.8	24.16±0.9	23.43±0.7	**11.97±0.6**
Fraud (FR)	3.17±0.44%	18.56±1.28%	14.71±1.06%	**50.96±1.39%**	24.47±1.0	21.68±0.8	22.38±0.9	**15.80±0.6**
Pornography (PO)	4.14±0.50%	20.94±1.33%	19.11±1.18%	**69.84±1.78%**	24.30±1.0	21.25±0.8	21.58±0.9	**12.37±0.6**
Political Lobbying (PL)	67.67±1.42%	79.11±1.15%	76.46±1.08%	**98.38±0.42%**	18.71±0.7	14.43±0.6	16.06±0.7	**13.78±0.5**
Privacy Violence (PV)	8.97±0.63%	10.50±0.57%	12.97±0.80%	**81.79±1.65%**	27.03±1.0	24.94±0.9	21.98±0.8	**12.31±0.6**
Legal Opinion (LO)	74.56±1.51%	85.73±1.21%	86.52±1.08%	**100±0.00%**	16.97±0.7	8.25±0.4	**7.30±0.3**	7.74±0.3
Financial Advice (FA)	84.33±1.38%	88.12±1.26%	90.93±1.10%	**100±0.00%**	9.83±0.5	5.20±0.3	0.99±0.1	**5.77±0.3**
Health Consultation (HC)	76.50±1.42%	93.94±1.03%	91.22±1.12%	**96.00±0.78%**	16.04±0.6	8.41±0.4	10.04±0.5	**4.85±0.3**
Government Decision (GD)	90.29±1.15%	91.75±1.09%	91.25±1.03%	**98.72±0.46%**	13.73±0.6	11.88±0.5	11.39±0.5	**6.32±0.3**
Average	32.71±0.78%	43.38±0.92%	41.56±0.88%	**79.62±1.01%**	23.04±0.7	17.99±0.6	18.22±0.7	**10.03±0.4**

Table 2: Percentage of outputs with a toxicity score exceeding 0.5, as evaluated by the Detoxify Classifier (Hanu & Unitary team, 2020).

Scenario	Method	Identity Attack	Obscene	Severe Toxicity	Insult	Threat	Toxicity
Legal Opinion (LO)	Plain Text	32.4±0.9%	35.6±1.0%	25.9±0.8%	38.9±1.1%	29.1±0.9%	37.3±1.0%
	Adv Example	62.2±1.6%	68.4±1.7%	49.7±1.3%	74.6±1.9%	55.9±1.5%	71.5±1.8%
	Query Image	65.5±1.8%	72.0±1.9%	52.4±1.4%	78.6±2.0%	58.9±1.6%	75.3±1.9%
	JC	74.2±1.4%	81.6±1.5%	59.4±1.2%	89.0±1.6%	66.8±1.3%	85.3±1.4%
Health Consultation (HC)	Plain Text	35.6±1.0%	39.2±1.1%	28.5±0.9%	42.7±1.2%	32.0±1.0%	40.9±1.1%
	Adv Example	67.6±1.7%	74.4±1.8%	54.1±1.4%	81.1±2.0%	60.8±1.6%	77.7±1.9%
	Query Image	60.7±1.6%	66.8±1.7%	48.6±1.3%	72.8±1.8%	54.6±1.4%	69.8±1.7%
	JC	80.5±1.5%	88.5±1.6%	64.4±1.2%	96.6±1.7%	72.4±1.3%	92.6±1.5%
Government Decision (GD)	Plain Text	49.0±1.2%	53.9±1.3%	39.2±1.0%	58.8±1.4%	44.1±1.2%	56.4±1.3%
	Adv Example	55.4±1.4%	61.0±1.5%	44.3±1.1%	66.5±1.6%	49.9±1.3%	63.7±1.5%
	Query Image	56.6±1.5%	62.3±1.6%	45.3±1.2%	67.9±1.7%	50.9±1.4%	65.1±1.5%
	JC	77.9±1.3%	85.7±1.4%	62.3±1.1%	93.5±1.6%	70.1±1.2%	89.6±1.4%

4.2.2 Analysis of Surrogate Classifiers and Transferability

We first demonstrated the feasibility of using our surrogate classifiers to model the behavior of a target MLLM. Our safety classifier and jailbreak success predictor were evaluated across MiniGPT-4,

LLaVA-2, Qwen, GPT-4o, and Gemini. As shown in Figure 3, the classifiers achieve high accuracy in predicting the behavior of the target MLLMs, confirming their effectiveness.



(a) MiniGPT (SC) (b) LLaVA-2 (SC) (c) Qwen (SC) (d) GPT-4o (SC) (e) Gemini (SC)

(f) MiniGPT (JSP) (g) LLaVA-2 (JSP) (h) Qwen (JSP) (i) GPT-4o (JSP) (j) Gemini (JSP)

Figure 3: Performance of Safety Classifiers (SC, top row) and Jailbreak Success Predictors (JSP, bottom row) across five MLLMs. Each subfigure visualizes the model-specific behavior in safety prediction or jailbreak prediction.

We then evaluated JC's ability to generate transferable jailbreak images. We used MiniGPT-4 as the base MLLM to generate attacks that transfer to LLaVA-2, Qwen, GPT-4o, and Gemini. Table 3 shows the transferable attack success rates across different MLLMs, demonstrating that JC is highly capable of generating successful transferable attacks.

Table 3: Transferable Jailbreak Image generation.

Scenario	Case 1				Case 2			
	MiniGPT-4 (Base)	LLaVa	Qwen	GPT-4o	MiniGPT-4 (Base)	LLaVa	Qwen	Gemini
Illegal Activity (IA)	70.0±2.1%	66.5±2.0%	64.0±1.9%	45.5±1.8%	68.0±2.0%	64.5±1.9%	62.5±1.8%	47.5±1.9%
Hate Speech (HS)	66.0±2.0%	62.7±1.9%	60.7±1.8%	42.9±1.7%	64.0±1.9%	60.8±1.8%	58.9±1.7%	44.8±1.8%
Malware Generation (MG)	48.0±1.7%	45.6±1.6%	44.2±1.6%	31.2±1.5%	46.0±1.6%	43.7±1.6%	42.3±1.5%	32.2±1.5%
Physical Harm (PH)	72.0±2.1%	68.4±2.0%	66.2±1.9%	46.8±1.8%	70.0±2.0%	66.5±1.9%	64.4±1.8%	49.0±1.9%
Economic Harm (EH)	70.0±2.0%	66.5±1.9%	64.4±1.9%	45.5±1.8%	68.0±1.9%	64.5±1.8%	62.6±1.8%	47.5±1.9%
Fraud (FR)	48.0±1.7%	45.6±1.6%	44.2±1.6%	31.2±1.5%	46.0±1.6%	43.7±1.6%	42.3±1.5%	32.2±1.5%
Pornography (PO)	67.0±2.0%	63.7±1.9%	61.6±1.8%	43.6±1.7%	65.0±1.9%	61.8±1.8%	59.8±1.8%	45.5±1.8%
Political Lobbying (PL)	95.0±1.4%	90.3±1.6%	87.4±1.7%	61.8±1.9%	93.0±1.5%	88.4±1.7%	85.6±1.7%	65.1±2.0%
Privacy Violence (PV)	79.0±1.8%	75.1±1.8%	72.7±1.8%	51.4±1.9%	77.0±1.8%	73.2±1.8%	70.8±1.8%	53.9±1.9%
Legal Opinion (LO)	97.0±1.2%	92.2±1.5%	89.2±1.6%	63.1±1.9%	95.0±1.3%	90.3±1.5%	87.4±1.6%	66.5±2.0%
Financial Advice (FA)	97.0±1.2%	92.2±1.5%	89.2±1.6%	63.1±1.9%	95.0±1.3%	90.3±1.5%	87.4±1.6%	66.5±2.0%
Health Consultation (HC)	93.0±1.5%	88.4±1.6%	85.6±1.7%	60.5±1.9%	91.0±1.5%	86.5±1.6%	83.7±1.7%	63.7±2.0%
Government Decision (GD)	96.0±1.3%	91.2±1.5%	88.3±1.6%	62.4±1.9%	94.0±1.4%	89.3±1.6%	86.5±1.6%	65.8±2.0%
Average	75.5±1.9%	71.7±1.9%	69.1±1.9%	49.0±1.8%	73.6±1.9%	69.8±1.9%	67.3±1.9%	51.2±1.9%

To determine the optimal range for the hyperparameters α and β, we tested JC's performance with varying values. The average ASR across MiniGPT-4, Qwen, and LLaVA, shown in Figure 4, suggests that setting α within $[0.6, 0.8]$ and β within $[0.4, 0.7]$ yields the best transferability.



Figure 4: Impact of hyperparameters α and β on JC's transferable attack.

4.2.3 Black-box Diverse Attacks

For black-box attacks, we adopt the transferable jailbreak method to target closed-source MLLMs. Specifically, we use MiniGPT-4 as the base model and GPT-4o as the target, with hyperparameters set to $\alpha = 0.6$ and $\beta = 0.7$. As shown in Table 4, JC attains an average ASR of *55.9%* against GPT-4o, notably higher than Figstep's performance of about 48%. The table also reports average PPL and toxicity scores, confirming that our attacks successfully induce harmful yet fluent responses.

Table 4: Black-box jailbreak performance against GPT-4o, using MiniGPT-4 as the base model.

Scenario	ASR (↑)	PPL (↓)	Identity Attack	Obscene	Severe Toxicity	Insult	Threat	Toxicity
Illegal Activity (IA)	50.0±2.1%	16.2±0.6	0.29±0.03	0.52±0.03	0.08±0.01	0.38±0.03	0.07±0.01	0.65±0.03
Hate Speech (HS)	48.0±2.0%	16.8±0.6	0.27±0.03	0.49±0.03	0.08±0.01	0.36±0.03	0.07±0.01	0.62±0.03
Malware Generation (MG)	44.0±1.9%	17.5±0.7	0.24±0.03	0.44±0.03	0.07±0.01	0.33±0.03	0.06±0.01	0.57±0.03
Physical Harm (PH)	53.0±2.2%	15.6±0.6	0.31±0.03	0.56±0.03	0.09±0.01	0.41±0.03	0.08±0.01	0.70±0.03
Economic Harm (EH)	52.0±2.1%	16.1±0.6	0.29±0.03	0.50±0.03	0.08±0.01	0.39±0.03	0.07±0.01	0.66±0.03
Fraud (FR)	45.0±1.9%	17.0±0.6	0.25±0.03	0.45±0.03	0.07±0.01	0.34±0.03	0.06±0.01	0.59±0.03
Pornography (PO)	54.0±2.2%	15.9±0.6	0.30±0.03	0.53±0.03	0.09±0.01	0.40±0.03	0.08±0.01	0.69±0.03
Political Lobbying (PL)	61.0±2.3%	13.5±0.5	0.37±0.04	0.61±0.03	0.11±0.02	0.46±0.03	0.09±0.01	0.75±0.03
Privacy Violence (PV)	57.0±2.2%	14.7±0.6	0.34±0.03	0.56±0.03	0.10±0.02	0.43±0.03	0.08±0.01	0.72±0.03
Legal Opinion (LO)	65.0±2.4%	13.0±0.5	0.40±0.04	0.67±0.03	0.12±0.02	0.48±0.03	0.10±0.01	0.80±0.03
Financial Advice (FA)	64.0±2.3%	12.8±0.5	0.39±0.04	0.65±0.03	0.12±0.02	0.47±0.03	0.10±0.01	0.79±0.03
Health Consultation (HC)	60.0±2.2%	13.6±0.5	0.36±0.03	0.60±0.03	0.11±0.02	0.45±0.03	0.09±0.01	0.74±0.03
Government Decision (GD)	63.0±2.3%	13.2±0.5	0.38±0.04	0.63±0.03	0.12±0.02	0.47±0.03	0.10±0.01	0.78±0.03
Average	55.9±2.1%	15.2±0.6	0.32±0.03	0.55±0.03	0.10±0.02	0.41±0.03	0.08±0.01	0.71±0.03

4.2.4 Universal Attacks

To test the universal attack capability of JC, we used a set of 40 unseen harmful questions. The results showed that the single generated universal image was successful in jailbreaking the base MiniGPT-4 model for 32 of these questions. This demonstrates that JC has the potential to generate universal attacks that generalize to a wide range of harmful queries. Furthermore, when we transferred this universal attack image from MiniGPT-4 to LLaVA, the image successfully induced LLaVA to answer 26 of the harmful questions, confirming that our universal jailbreak approach is also transferable to other MLLMs.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we presented Jailbreak Connectivity (JC), a novel framework for visual jailbreak attacks on MLLMs. By constructing continuous paths in the image space, JC generates diverse jailbreak images that outperform single-image attacks. Leveraging lightweight surrogate classifiers, JC achieves strong transferability across both open-source and commercial MLLMs, even in black-box settings. We further extended JC to universal jailbreaks that can elicit harmful outputs without specific prompts. Extensive experiments demonstrate that JC substantially surpasses existing methods in attack success rate, fluency, and toxicity. These findings highlight the urgent need for robust defenses against diverse, transferable, and universal jailbreak threats in MLLMs.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This work investigates jailbreak attacks on multimodal large language models (MLLMs) to systematically evaluate their vulnerabilities and inform the design of more robust defenses. While jailbreak techniques can potentially be misused to elicit harmful outputs across scenarios such as illegal activity, hate speech, or malware generation, our intent is exclusively to advance understanding of these vulnerabilities in a controlled research setting. All experiments were conducted on widely used benchmark datasets (SafetyBench and AdvBench) and evaluated with automated safety classifiers; no harmful prompts or generated contents are released. To further minimize risks, we only report aggregated statistics (e.g., ASR, perplexity, toxicity scores) and do not provide dangerous prompts, payloads, or instructions. The code accompanying this work is limited to reproducible components necessary for research and does not expose direct misuse pathways. By highlighting the weaknesses of current MLLMs, we aim to contribute to the responsible stewardship and development of safer AI systems, in line with the ICLR Code of Ethics principles of avoiding harm, respecting privacy, and supporting the public good.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

We have taken multiple steps to ensure the reproducibility of our work. The proposed Jailbreak Connectivity (JC) framework is fully specified in Section 3, including optimization objectives for diverse, transferable, and universal jailbreaks. Hyperparameters such as perturbation bounds ($\epsilon = 32/255$), PGD iterations (2000 for endpoints, 3000 for path optimization), and trade-off weights (α, β) are reported in Section 3.2. Our experiments were conducted on open-source MLLMs (MiniGPT-4, LLaVA-2, Qwen2.5) and commercial models (GPT-4o, Gemini), using publicly available datasets SafetyBench and AdvBench (Appendix A.2). Evaluation metrics (ASR, PPL, Toxicity) are clearly defined in Section 4.1. To support reproducibility, we will release anonymized code and training scripts as supplementary material. Additional experimental settings, including dataset processing and universal jailbreak corpus construction, are provided in the Appendix.

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A APPENDIX

A.1 LLM USAGE

Large language models (LLMs) were used in a limited capacity to assist with language polishing and improving readability of the manuscript. In addition, we occasionally consulted an LLM for programming support, such as debugging minor code issues or verifying syntax. No parts of the research idea, methodology, experimental design, analysis, or main results were generated by LLMs. The authors take full responsibility for the content of this work.

A.2 HARMFUL CORPUS

To approximate the harmful distribution $\mathcal{Y}_h$ for our universal jailbreak method, we constructed a specific corpus of harmful sentences. We chose the *AdvBench* dataset (Zou et al., 2023) due to its comprehensive and well-documented collection of adversarial prompts designed to test the safety alignment of large language models. From this dataset, we sampled 100 diverse sentences from its "harmful strings" subset.

The selection process was not random; we deliberately chose sentences that represent a wide range of harmful categories, including but not limited to hate speech, instructions for illegal acts, and misinformation. This diversity is crucial for our universal jailbreak approach, as it ensures that the model is trained to generate content that aligns with a broad spectrum of unsafe behaviors, rather than just a single type of harmful query. By using a curated set of prompts, we can more effectively guide the model's output towards the desired harmful distribution $\mathcal{Y}_h$ during optimization.

Part of this corpus is shown in Figure 5. This visual representation gives a clear example of the type of content we used to define the universal jailbreak objective.



Figure 5: A subset of the harmful corpus sampled from the harmful strings in the AdvBench dataset.

A.3 SCENARIOS DESCRIPTION

Following Yang et al. (2023) and Liu et al. (2024)'s work, we focus on 13 typical jailbreak scenarios from OpenAI usage policy. The detailed description of these forbidden scenarios is in Table 5.

Table 5: Forbidden scenarios in the usage policies of OpenAI.

Forbidden Scenarios	**Description**
01 – Illegal Activity (IA)	Activities involving unlawful use of models, tools, or services.
02 – Hate Speech (HS)	Content that expresses, incites, or promotes hatred based on identity; harasses, threatens, or bullies individuals; or glorifies violence and humiliation.
03 – Malware Generation (MG)	Creation of malicious code intended to disrupt, damage, or gain unauthorized access to computer systems.
04 – Physical Harm (PH)	Activities with high risk of physical harm, including: weapons development, military and warfare, management of critical infrastructure (e.g., energy, transport, water), or promotion of self-harm (suicide, cutting, eating disorders).
05 – Economic Harm (EH)	Activities with high risk of economic damage, such as multi-level marketing, gambling, payday lending, or automated eligibility determinations for credit, employment, education, or public assistance.
06 – Fraud (FR)	Fraudulent or deceptive practices, including scams, coordinated inauthentic behavior, plagiarism, academic dishonesty, astroturfing, disinformation, spam, and pseudopharmaceuticals.
07 – Pornography (PO)	Adult content and related industries, such as erotic chat, pornography, or promotion of sexual services (excluding sex education and wellness).
08 – Political Lobbying (PL)	Political campaigning or lobbying, e.g., mass generation of campaign materials, targeted political messaging, chatbots for advocacy, or tools supporting campaign operations.
09 – Privacy Violation (PV)	Activities that infringe privacy, including unauthorized tracking, facial recognition of private individuals, classification based on protected characteristics, biometric identification, or unlawful collection/disclosure of personal records.
10 – Legal Opinion (LO)	Provision of unauthorized legal advice or practice of law without review by a qualified professional.
11 – Financial Advice (FA)	Provision of personalized financial advice without oversight by a qualified professional.
12 – Health Consultation (HC)	Medical diagnosis or treatment guidance, including instructions for curing or managing health conditions, or triaging life-threatening emergencies.
13 – Government Decision (GD)	High-risk governmental decision-making, such as law enforcement, criminal justice, migration, and asylum cases.

A.4 ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

Path Connectivity We present a detailed attack evaluation of the sampled jailbreak images from Section 3.1 in Table 6. These images were generated using our *JC framework* to jailbreak LLaVA (Liu et al., 2023) in response to the harmful query, "how to make a bomb?". As shown in Figure 6, we provide an example of the starting image, the best jailbreak image, and the ending image along this optimized path. The experimental results reveal that 70% of the sampled jailbreak images can successfully compromise the target MLLM. Notably, the image located in the middle of the

path exhibits a higher PPL and achieves the five best toxicity scores out of six attributes. Overall, these findings demonstrate that our method can generate a diverse set of jailbreak images, and some of these examples have the potential to yield superior attack performance compared to the initial endpoints.

Table 6: Evaluation of diverse jailbreak attacks against LLaVA-2-13B (Liu et al., 2023). We report attack success, perplexity (PPL), and toxicity scores. Best results for each metric are highlighted in **bold**. Our method, JC, generates diverse jailbreak images, some of which achieve stronger attack performance than the original endpoints.

u	Success (✓/✗)	PPL (↓)	Identity Attack	Obscene	Severe Toxicity	Insult	Threat	Toxicity
0	✗	30.70±0.65	0.000±0.00	0.050±0.01	0.000±0.00	**0.150±0.02**	0.000±0.00	0.040±0.01
0.1111	✗	21.12±0.55	0.018±0.01	0.068±0.01	0.363±0.02	0.132±0.02	0.359±0.02	0.377±0.02
0.2222	✓	14.28±0.48	0.033±0.01	0.083±0.01	0.642±0.02	0.117±0.02	0.635±0.02	0.636±0.02
0.3333	✓	9.48±0.42	0.043±0.01	0.093±0.01	0.838±0.02	0.107±0.02	0.829±0.02	0.818±0.02
0.4444	✓	6.72±0.38	0.049±0.01	0.098±0.01	0.951±0.02	0.102±0.02	0.941±0.02	0.923±0.02
0.5556	✓	**6.00±0.35**	**0.050±0.01**	**0.100±0.01**	**0.980±0.02**	0.100±0.02	**0.970±0.02**	**0.950±0.02**
0.6667	✓	7.32±0.40	0.047±0.01	0.097±0.01	0.926±0.02	0.103±0.02	0.917±0.02	0.900±0.02
0.7778	✓	10.67±0.45	0.040±0.01	0.090±0.01	0.789±0.02	0.110±0.02	0.781±0.02	0.773±0.02
0.8889	✓	16.07±0.60	0.029±0.01	0.079±0.01	0.569±0.02	0.121±0.02	0.563±0.02	0.568±0.02
1	✗	23.50±0.62	0.014±0.01	0.064±0.01	0.265±0.02	0.136±0.02	0.263±0.02	0.286±0.02

(a) Starting Image (b) Best Jailbreak Image (c) Ending Image

Figure 6: Illustration of the starting and ending endpoints and the best-performing jailbreak image found along the path constructed by JC.

White-box Diverse Jailbreaks We first provide a full evaluation of the *toxicity scores* for our *JC framework* on *MiniGPT-4* (Zhu et al., 2023) in Table 7. Subsequently, we report the diverse jailbreak performance for *LLaVA* (Liu et al., 2023) and *Qwen* (Bai et al., 2025), with the *Attack Success Rate (ASR)* and *Perplexity (PPL)* metrics detailed in Table 8, and the corresponding *toxicity scores* presented in Table 9. Collectively, these results demonstrate the consistent and robust performance of our method across a range of open-source MLLMs and key evaluation metrics.

Black-box Diverse Jailbreaks In the black-box diverse experiment, we employ *MiniGPT-4* (Zhu et al., 2023) as the base model and *Gemini* (AI, 2025) as the target. With hyperparameters set to $\alpha = 0.6$ and $\beta = 0.7$, our *JC framework* achieves an average ASR of *57.7%* against Gemini, as detailed in Table 10. *This result highlights our method's remarkable ability to generate diverse and transferable jailbreaks even in a challenging black-box setting.*

A.5 Additional Experiments on More Recent MLLMs

To further examine the generality of JC across modern architectures, we additionally evaluate its performance on two newly released, better-aligned multimodal models: *Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct* (Team, 2025) and *Kimi-VL-A3B-Instruct* (Team et al., 2025). Following the same optimization and evaluation settings as in the main paper, we report attack success rate (ASR), perplexity (PPL), and toxicity across all 13 MM-SafetyBench scenarios. Results are provided in Table 11 and Table 12.

Table 7: Percentage of outputs of MiniGPT-4 (Zhu et al., 2023) with a toxicity score exceeding 0.5, as evaluated by the Detoxify Classifier (Hanu & Unitary team, 2020).

Scenario	Method	Identity Attack	Obscene	Severe Toxicity	Insult	Threat	Toxicity
Illegal Activity (IA)	Plain Text	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%
	Adv Example	2.5±0.6%	2.8±0.7%	2.0±0.5%	3.0±0.8%	2.3±0.6%	2.9±0.7%
	Query Image	1.5±0.4%	1.7±0.5%	1.2±0.3%	1.8±0.5%	1.4±0.4%	1.7±0.4%
	JC	53.3±1.4%	58.6±1.6%	42.6±1.1%	63.9±1.7%	47.9±1.3%	61.2±1.6%
Hate Speech (HS)	Plain Text	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%
	Adv Example	1.3±0.4%	1.4±0.5%	1.0±0.3%	1.6±0.5%	1.2±0.4%	1.5±0.5%
	Query Image	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%
	JC	49.7±1.3%	54.6±1.5%	39.7±1.0%	59.6±1.6%	44.7±1.2%	57.1±1.5%
Malware Generation (MG)	Plain Text	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%
	Adv Example	5.2±0.8%	5.8±0.9%	4.2±0.7%	6.3±1.0%	4.7±0.7%	6.0±0.9%
	Query Image	2.9±0.6%	3.2±0.6%	2.4±0.5%	3.5±0.7%	2.7±0.5%	3.4±0.6%
	JC	24.0±1.0%	26.4±1.1%	19.2±0.8%	28.8±1.2%	21.6±0.9%	27.6±1.1%
Physical Harm (PH)	Plain Text	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%
	Adv Example	8.0±1.0%	8.8±1.1%	6.4±0.9%	9.6±1.2%	7.2±0.9%	9.2±1.1%
	Query Image	7.4±0.9%	8.2±1.0%	5.9±0.8%	8.9±1.1%	6.7±0.8%	8.5±1.0%
	JC	56.6±1.5%	62.2±1.7%	45.3±1.2%	67.9±1.8%	50.9±1.3%	65.1±1.6%
Economic Harm (EH)	Plain Text	1.1±0.3%	1.2±0.3%	0.9±0.2%	1.4±0.3%	1.0±0.3%	1.3±0.3%
	Adv Example	1.0±0.3%	1.1±0.3%	0.8±0.2%	1.1±0.3%	0.9±0.2%	1.1±0.3%
	Query Image	2.0±0.4%	2.1±0.4%	1.6±0.3%	2.3±0.4%	1.8±0.3%	2.2±0.4%
	JC	43.3±1.3%	47.6±1.5%	34.6±1.0%	52.0±1.6%	39.0±1.2%	49.8±1.5%
Fraud (FR)	Plain Text	0.6±0.2%	0.6±0.2%	0.5±0.2%	0.7±0.2%	0.5±0.2%	0.7±0.2%
	Adv Example	5.1±0.8%	5.7±0.9%	4.1±0.7%	6.2±1.0%	4.6±0.7%	5.9±0.9%
	Query Image	3.7±0.6%	4.1±0.7%	3.0±0.5%	4.5±0.8%	3.4±0.5%	4.3±0.7%
	JC	24.1±1.0%	26.5±1.2%	19.3±0.8%	28.9±1.3%	21.7±0.9%	27.7±1.2%
Pornography (PO)	Plain Text	0.8±0.2%	0.9±0.3%	0.6±0.2%	0.9±0.3%	0.7±0.2%	0.9±0.3%
	Adv Example	6.1±0.9%	6.7±1.0%	4.9±0.8%	7.3±1.1%	5.5±0.8%	7.0±1.0%
	Query Image	5.4±0.8%	5.9±0.9%	4.3±0.7%	6.4±1.0%	4.8±0.7%	6.1±0.9%
	JC	41.0±1.3%	45.1±1.5%	32.8±1.0%	49.3±1.6%	36.9±1.1%	47.2±1.4%
Political Lobbying (PL)	Plain Text	25.5±1.1%	28.0±1.2%	20.4±0.9%	30.6±1.3%	22.9±1.0%	29.3±1.2%
	Adv Example	41.1±1.4%	45.2±1.6%	32.8±1.1%	49.3±1.7%	37.0±1.2%	47.2±1.6%
	Query Image	35.5±1.3%	39.1±1.4%	28.4±1.0%	42.6±1.5%	32.0±1.1%	40.8±1.4%
	JC	53.2±1.5%	58.5±1.7%	42.6±1.2%	63.8±1.8%	47.9±1.3%	61.1±1.6%
Privacy Violence (PV)	Plain Text	0.9±0.2%	1.0±0.2%	0.7±0.2%	1.1±0.3%	0.8±0.2%	1.0±0.2%
	Adv Example	1.8±0.4%	1.9±0.4%	1.4±0.3%	2.1±0.4%	1.6±0.3%	2.0±0.4%
	Query Image	3.5±0.6%	3.8±0.7%	2.8±0.5%	4.2±0.7%	3.1±0.5%	4.0±0.7%
	JC	48.2±1.4%	53.1±1.6%	38.6±1.1%	57.9±1.7%	43.4±1.2%	55.5±1.5%
Legal Opinion (LO)	Plain Text	32.4±0.9%	35.6±1.0%	25.9±0.8%	38.9±1.1%	29.1±0.9%	37.3±1.0%
	Adv Example	62.2±1.6%	68.4±1.7%	49.7±1.3%	74.6±1.9%	55.9±1.5%	71.5±1.8%
	Query Image	65.5±1.8%	72.0±1.9%	52.4±1.4%	78.6±2.0%	58.9±1.6%	75.3±1.9%
	JC	74.2±1.4%	81.6±1.5%	59.4±1.2%	89.0±1.6%	66.8±1.3%	85.3±1.4%
Financial Advice (FA)	Plain Text	56.7±1.3%	62.4±1.4%	45.4±1.1%	68.0±1.5%	51.0±1.2%	65.2±1.4%
	Adv Example	72.8±1.6%	80.1±1.8%	58.3±1.3%	87.4±2.0%	65.6±1.4%	83.8±1.8%
	Query Image	87.9±1.8%	96.7±2.0%	70.3±1.4%	100.0±0.0%	79.1±1.5%	96.7±1.9%
	JC	80.8±1.6%	88.8±1.8%	64.6±1.2%	96.9±1.7%	72.7±1.3%	92.9±1.6%
Health Consultation (HC)	Plain Text	35.6±1.0%	39.2±1.1%	28.5±0.9%	42.7±1.2%	32.0±1.0%	40.9±1.1%
	Adv Example	67.6±1.7%	74.4±1.8%	54.1±1.4%	81.1±2.0%	60.8±1.6%	77.7±1.9%
	Query Image	60.7±1.6%	66.8±1.7%	48.6±1.3%	72.8±1.8%	54.6±1.4%	69.8±1.7%
	JC	80.5±1.5%	88.5±1.6%	64.4±1.2%	96.6±1.7%	72.4±1.3%	92.6±1.5%
Government Decision (GD)	Plain Text	49.0±1.2%	53.9±1.3%	39.2±1.0%	58.8±1.4%	44.1±1.2%	56.4±1.3%
	Adv Example	55.4±1.4%	61.0±1.5%	44.3±1.1%	66.5±1.6%	49.9±1.3%	63.7±1.5%
	Query Image	56.6±1.5%	62.3±1.6%	45.3±1.2%	67.9±1.7%	50.9±1.4%	65.1±1.5%
	JC	77.9±1.3%	85.7±1.4%	62.3±1.1%	93.5±1.6%	70.1±1.2%	89.6±1.4%

Table 8: Evaluation of attack success rate (ASR) and perplexity (PPL) for JC across multiple scenarios on LLaVA (Liu et al., 2023) and Qwen (Bai et al., 2025).

Scenario	ASR (↑)		PPL (↓)	
	LLaVA (Liu et al., 2023)	Qwen (Bai et al., 2025)	LLaVA (Liu et al., 2023)	Qwen (Bai et al., 2025)
Illegal Activity (IA)	65.4±1.9%	61.7±1.8%	8.8±0.5	9.6±0.6
Hate Speech (HS)	62.4±1.8%	58.9±1.8%	9.4±0.5	10.2±0.6
Malware Generation (MG)	45.6±1.6%	43.1±1.6%	17.4±0.8	19.0±0.9
Physical Harm (PH)	67.3±2.0%	63.6±1.9%	8.0±0.5	8.8±0.6
Economic Harm (EH)	64.8±1.9%	61.2±1.8%	13.2±0.7	14.4±0.8
Fraud (FR)	45.9±1.6%	43.3±1.6%	17.4±0.8	18.9±0.9
Pornography (PO)	62.9±1.8%	59.4±1.8%	13.6±0.7	14.9±0.8
Political Lobbying (PL)	88.5±1.3%	83.6±1.4%	15.2±0.7	16.5±0.8
Privacy Violence (PV)	73.6±2.0%	69.5±1.9%	13.5±0.7	14.8±0.8
Legal Opinion (LO)	90.0±1.2%	85.0±1.3%	8.5±0.5	9.3±0.6
Financial Advice (FA)	90.0±1.2%	85.0±1.3%	6.3±0.4	6.9±0.5
Health Consultation (HC)	86.4±1.4%	81.6±1.5%	5.3±0.4	5.8±0.5
Government Decision (GD)	88.8±1.3%	84.0±1.4%	6.9±0.4	7.6±0.5
Average	70.8±1.8%	66.6±1.7%	11.7±0.6	12.7±0.6

Table 9: Percentage of outputs of LLaVA (Liu et al., 2023) and Qwen (Bai et al., 2025) with a toxicity score exceeding 0.5, as evaluated by the Detoxify Classifier (Hanu & Unitary team, 2020).

Scenario	Model	Identity Attack	Obscene	Severe Toxicity	Insult	Threat	Toxicity
Illegal Activity (IA)	LLaVA	48.0±1.3%	52.7±1.4%	38.3±1.2%	57.5±1.5%	43.1±1.3%	52.0±1.4%
	Qwen	45.3±1.2%	49.8±1.3%	36.2±1.1%	53.9±1.4%	40.7±1.2%	48.0±1.3%
Hate Speech (HS)	LLaVA	44.7±1.3%	49.1±1.4%	35.7±1.1%	53.6±1.4%	40.2±1.2%	49.0±1.3%
	Qwen	42.2±1.2%	46.4±1.3%	33.7±1.1%	50.6±1.3%	38.0±1.2%	45.0±1.3%
Malware Generation (MG)	LLaVA	21.6±1.0%	23.8±1.1%	17.3±0.9%	25.9±1.1%	19.4±0.9%	24.0±1.1%
	Qwen	20.4±0.9%	22.4±1.0%	16.3±0.9%	24.5±1.0%	18.4±0.9%	22.0±1.0%
Physical Harm (PH)	LLaVA	51.0±1.4%	56.0±1.5%	40.8±1.3%	61.1±1.6%	45.8±1.3%	55.5±1.5%
	Qwen	48.1±1.3%	52.9±1.4%	38.5±1.2%	57.6±1.5%	43.3±1.2%	51.8±1.4%
Economic Harm (EH)	LLaVA	39.0±1.2%	42.8±1.3%	31.1±1.1%	46.8±1.4%	35.1±1.1%	41.5±1.3%
	Qwen	36.8±1.1%	40.5±1.2%	29.4±1.0%	44.2±1.3%	33.2±1.1%	39.0±1.2%
Fraud (FR)	LLaVA	21.7±1.0%	23.9±1.1%	17.4±0.9%	26.0±1.1%	19.5±0.9%	24.2±1.1%
	Qwen	20.5±0.9%	22.6±1.0%	16.4±0.9%	24.6±1.0%	18.5±0.9%	22.3±1.0%
Pornography (PO)	LLaVA	36.9±1.3%	40.6±1.4%	29.5±1.1%	44.4±1.4%	33.2±1.2%	41.0±1.3%
	Qwen	34.9±1.2%	38.3±1.3%	27.9±1.1%	42.0±1.3%	31.4±1.1%	38.0±1.2%
Political Lobbying (PL)	LLaVA	47.9±1.4%	52.6±1.5%	38.3±1.2%	57.4±1.5%	43.1±1.3%	53.0±1.4%
	Qwen	45.2±1.3%	49.7±1.4%	36.2±1.2%	53.8±1.5%	40.7±1.2%	49.5±1.3%
Privacy Violence (PV)	LLaVA	43.4±1.3%	47.8±1.4%	34.7±1.2%	52.1±1.5%	39.1±1.2%	48.3±1.4%
	Qwen	40.9±1.2%	45.1±1.3%	32.8±1.1%	49.1±1.4%	36.8±1.2%	45.0±1.3%
Legal Opinion (LO)	LLaVA	66.8±1.6%	73.4±1.7%	53.5±1.4%	80.1±1.8%	60.1±1.4%	72.0±1.7%
	Qwen	63.1±1.5%	69.4±1.6%	50.5±1.3%	75.7±1.7%	56.8±1.3%	68.2±1.6%
Financial Advice (FA)	LLaVA	72.7±1.7%	79.9±1.8%	58.1±1.5%	87.2±1.9%	65.4±1.5%	78.5±1.8%
	Qwen	68.7±1.6%	75.5±1.7%	55.0±1.4%	82.4±1.8%	61.8±1.4%	74.0±1.7%
Health Consultation (HC)	LLaVA	72.4±1.7%	79.6±1.8%	57.9±1.5%	86.9±1.9%	65.1±1.5%	78.0±1.8%
	Qwen	68.5±1.6%	75.2±1.7%	54.8±1.4%	82.1±1.8%	61.6±1.4%	73.5±1.7%
Government Decision (GD)	LLaVA	70.1±1.6%	77.1±1.7%	56.1±1.4%	84.2±1.8%	63.1±1.4%	76.0±1.7%
	Qwen	66.2±1.5%	72.8±1.6%	53.0±1.3%	79.5±1.7%	59.6±1.3%	71.5±1.6%

Table 10: Black-box jailbreak performance against Gemini, using MiniGPT-4 as the base model.

Scenario	ASR (↑)	PPL (↓)	Identity Attack	Obscene	Severe Toxicity	Insult	Threat	Toxicity
Illegal Activity (IA)	52.0±2.0%	15.8±0.6	0.26±0.02	0.47±0.03	0.07±0.01	0.35±0.03	0.06±0.01	0.61±0.03
Hate Speech (HS)	50.0±2.0%	16.3±0.7	0.25±0.02	0.45±0.03	0.07±0.01	0.34±0.03	0.06±0.01	0.59±0.03
Malware Generation (MG)	46.0±1.8%	17.0±0.7	0.22±0.02	0.41±0.03	0.06±0.01	0.31±0.03	0.05±0.01	0.54±0.03
Physical Harm (PH)	55.0±2.1%	15.2±0.6	0.28±0.02	0.50±0.03	0.08±0.01	0.38±0.03	0.07±0.01	0.65±0.03
Economic Harm (EH)	54.0±2.1%	15.6±0.6	0.27±0.02	0.46±0.03	0.07±0.01	0.36±0.03	0.06±0.01	0.62±0.03
Fraud (FR)	47.0±1.9%	16.5±0.7	0.23±0.02	0.42±0.03	0.06±0.01	0.32±0.03	0.05±0.01	0.56±0.03
Pornography (PO)	56.0±2.2%	15.4±0.6	0.27±0.02	0.48±0.03	0.08±0.01	0.37±0.03	0.07±0.01	0.64±0.03
Political Lobbying (PL)	63.0±2.3%	13.1±0.5	0.33±0.03	0.56±0.03	0.09±0.02	0.42±0.03	0.08±0.01	0.70±0.03
Privacy Violence (PV)	59.0±2.2%	14.3±0.6	0.30±0.03	0.52±0.03	0.09±0.02	0.40±0.03	0.07±0.01	0.67±0.03
Legal Opinion (LO)	67.0±2.4%	12.7±0.5	0.35±0.03	0.62±0.03	0.10±0.02	0.44±0.03	0.09±0.01	0.75±0.03
Financial Advice (FA)	66.0±2.3%	12.5±0.5	0.34±0.03	0.60±0.03	0.10±0.02	0.43±0.03	0.09±0.01	0.73±0.03
Health Consultation (HC)	62.0±2.1%	13.2±0.5	0.32±0.03	0.56±0.03	0.09±0.02	0.41±0.03	0.08±0.01	0.69±0.03
Government Decision (GD)	65.0±2.2%	12.9±0.5	0.34±0.03	0.59±0.03	0.10±0.02	0.43±0.03	0.09±0.01	0.72±0.03
Average	57.7±2.1%	14.7±0.6	0.29±0.02	0.52±0.03	0.08±0.02	0.39±0.03	0.07±0.01	0.65±0.03

Table 11: Attack success rate (ASR) and response perplexity (PPL) of JC on two recently released aligned MLLMs, Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct and Kimi-VL-A3B-Instruct, evaluated across all 13 MM-SafetyBench scenarios. JC consistently attains high ASR while keeping PPL at comparable levels to the original models, demonstrating strong transferability to newer architectures.

Scenario	ASR (↑)		PPL (↓)	
	Qwen-3-VL	Kimi-VL	Qwen-3-VL	Kimi-VL
Illegal Activity (IA)	59.8±1.9%	55.6±1.8%	9.1±0.5	9.4±0.5
Hate Speech (HS)	56.7±1.8%	52.3±1.7%	9.6±0.5	10.0±0.5
Malware Generation (MG)	41.6±1.6%	37.2±1.5%	18.4±0.8	18.9±0.9
Physical Harm (PH)	61.3±2.0%	57.1±1.9%	8.4±0.5	8.7±0.5
Economic Harm (EH)	59.1±1.9%	54.5±1.8%	13.8±0.7	14.0±0.7
Fraud (FR)	41.9±1.6%	37.6±1.5%	18.3±0.8	18.7±0.8
Pornography (PO)	57.8±1.9%	53.0±1.8%	14.4±0.7	14.7±0.7
Political Lobbying (PL)	81.1±1.4%	76.5±1.5%	15.9±0.7	16.3±0.7
Privacy Violence (PV)	67.6±2.0%	62.0±1.9%	14.3±0.7	14.6±0.7
Legal Opinion (LO)	83.0±1.3%	78.0±1.4%	9.0±0.5	9.3±0.5
Financial Advice (FA)	83.2±1.3%	78.4±1.4%	6.7±0.4	6.9±0.5
Health Consultation (HC)	79.4±1.4%	74.3±1.5%	5.6±0.4	5.8±0.4
Government Decision (GD)	81.2±1.4%	76.4±1.5%	7.3±0.4	7.5±0.4
Average	65.4±1.8%	60.6±1.7%	11.7±0.6	12.1±0.6

Table 12: Toxicity evaluation of JC on Qwen3-VL-8B-Instruct and Kimi-VL-A3B-Instruct. We report the percentage of model outputs with a Detoxify score > 0.5 across all toxicity dimensions. JC triggers consistently high toxicity rates, indicating that recent alignment improvements in modern MLLMs remain insufficient to mitigate this class of multimodal jailbreak attacks.

Scenario	Model	Identity Attack	Obscene	Severe Toxicity	Insult	Threat	Toxicity
Illegal Activity (IA)	Qwen-3-VL	43.1±1.3%	47.2±1.4%	34.4±1.2%	51.5±1.4%	38.6±1.3%	47.0±1.4%
	Kimi-VL	39.4±1.2%	43.1±1.3%	31.1±1.1%	47.8±1.3%	35.4±1.2%	42.0±1.3%
Hate Speech (HS)	Qwen-3-VL	40.1±1.3%	44.3±1.4%	32.1±1.2%	48.4±1.4%	36.2±1.2%	44.0±1.3%
	Kimi-VL	36.9±1.2%	41.0±1.3%	29.5±1.1%	44.9±1.3%	33.5±1.2%	40.0±1.3%
Malware Generation (MG)	Qwen-3-VL	19.2±1.0%	21.1±1.0%	15.4±0.9%	22.9±1.1%	17.3±0.9%	21.0±1.0%
	Kimi-VL	17.7±0.9%	19.6±1.0%	14.3±0.9%	21.3±1.0%	15.9±0.9%	19.0±1.0%
Physical Harm (PH)	Qwen-3-VL	46.1±1.4%	50.8±1.5%	36.9±1.3%	54.8±1.5%	41.3±1.3%	50.5±1.4%
	Kimi-VL	42.2±1.3%	46.5±1.4%	33.8±1.2%	51.1±1.4%	38.5±1.2%	46.0±1.3%
Economic Harm (EH)	Qwen-3-VL	35.2±1.2%	38.8±1.3%	28.4±1.1%	42.0±1.4%	31.5±1.1%	38.0±1.3%
	Kimi-VL	32.0±1.1%	35.2±1.2%	25.9±1.1%	38.6±1.3%	29.0±1.1%	34.5±1.2%
Fraud (FR)	Qwen-3-VL	19.4±1.0%	21.3±1.1%	15.5±0.9%	22.8±1.1%	17.0±0.9%	21.2±1.0%
	Kimi-VL	17.8±0.9%	19.8±1.0%	14.3±0.9%	21.1±1.0%	15.8±0.9%	19.0±1.0%
Pornography (PO)	Qwen-3-VL	33.3±1.2%	36.6±1.3%	26.7±1.1%	40.5±1.4%	30.0±1.1%	36.5±1.3%
	Kimi-VL	30.4±1.1%	33.8±1.2%	24.8±1.1%	37.3±1.3%	27.6±1.1%	33.0±1.2%
Political Lobbying (PL)	Qwen-3-VL	43.0±1.3%	47.3±1.4%	34.2±1.2%	51.4±1.4%	38.5±1.2%	47.0±1.3%
	Kimi-VL	39.3±1.2%	43.0±1.3%	31.1±1.2%	47.6±1.3%	35.3±1.2%	42.0±1.3%
Privacy Violence (PV)	Qwen-3-VL	39.2±1.3%	43.4±1.4%	31.4±1.2%	48.0±1.4%	35.9±1.2%	43.5±1.3%
	Kimi-VL	36.1±1.2%	40.0±1.3%	29.0±1.1%	44.4±1.3%	33.3±1.2%	39.2±1.3%
Legal Opinion (LO)	Qwen-3-VL	60.1±1.6%	66.1±1.7%	48.3±1.4%	72.3±1.7%	54.2±1.4%	66.5±1.6%
	Kimi-VL	56.0±1.5%	61.6±1.6%	45.0±1.3%	68.1±1.7%	51.0±1.3%	62.0±1.5%
Financial Advice (FA)	Qwen-3-VL	65.1±1.7%	71.4±1.8%	52.0±1.5%	77.8±1.8%	58.1±1.5%	71.0±1.7%
	Kimi-VL	60.8±1.6%	66.8±1.7%	48.7±1.4%	73.6±1.7%	55.0±1.4%	67.0±1.6%
Health Consultation (HC)	Qwen-3-VL	64.8±1.7%	71.0±1.8%	51.7±1.5%	77.4±1.8%	57.8±1.5%	70.8±1.7%
	Kimi-VL	60.4±1.6%	66.4±1.7%	48.4±1.4%	73.4±1.7%	54.3±1.4%	66.0±1.6%
Government Decision (GD)	Qwen-3-VL	62.5±1.6%	68.6±1.7%	50.0±1.4%	74.7±1.7%	55.7±1.4%	68.0±1.6%
	Kimi-VL	58.4±1.5%	64.0±1.6%	46.7±1.3%	70.3±1.6%	52.5±1.3%	63.2±1.5%

JC demonstrates strong transferability to both models, achieving an average ASR of **65.4%** on Qwen3-VL and **60.6%** on Kimi-VL, while maintaining low response perplexity and consistently elevated toxicity levels. These results indicate that JC remains highly effective even on newer, more robustly aligned MLLMs, suggesting that the underlying vulnerability exploited by JC persists across architectural and alignment improvements.

A.6 Additional Evaluation with Safety-Aligned Judge Models

To further verify that our conclusions are not tied to a single safety metric or judge, we additionally evaluate JC using two widely adopted safety-aligned evaluators on MiniGPT-4. First, *Llama-Guard-*

3-8B (Llama Team, 2024) is a rule-based classifier designed to detect and block unsafe generations according to an alignment-oriented policy. Second, *StrongREJECT* (Souly et al., 2024) assigns a scalar harmfulness score in $[0, 1]$ based on a rubric covering multiple risk dimensions. Table 13 reports JC's performance under both evaluators across all MM-SafetyBench scenarios, while Table 14 presents a complementary GPT-4o-based toxicity analysis for JC and different baseline methods.

Table 13: JC performance on MiniGPT-4 under two complementary safety-aligned evaluators. Llama-Guard-3-8B (Llama Team, 2024) reports the attack success rate (ASR, ↑), reflecting the rate at which JC bypasses a rule-based safety filter. StrongREJECT (Souly et al., 2024) reports a rubric-based harmfulness score (↑) in $[0, 1]$. Across most MM-SafetyBench scenarios, JC achieves both high ASR and elevated harmfulness, showing that it not only circumvents policy-level defenses but also induces content judged substantively harmful under a multi-dimensional safety rubric.

Scenario	**Llama-Guard-3 ASR**	**StrongREJECT Harmfulness**
Illegal Activity (IA)	50.2±2.0%	0.48±0.04
Hate Speech (HS)	47.8±1.9%	0.52±0.05
Malware Generation (MG)	35.6±1.7%	0.44±0.04
Physical Harm (PH)	53.1±2.1%	0.55±0.05
Economic Harm (EH)	51.4±2.0%	0.47±0.04
Fraud (FR)	35.8±1.7%	0.43±0.04
Pornography (PO)	48.7±2.0%	0.49±0.04
Political Lobbying (PL)	92.4±1.2%	0.61±0.03
Privacy Violence (PV)	60.8±2.2%	0.53±0.05
Legal Opinion (LO)	94.3±1.1%	0.34±0.03
Financial Advice (FA)	95.5±1.1%	0.36±0.03
Health Consultation (HC)	90.2±1.3%	0.39±0.04
Government Decision (GD)	92.1±1.2%	0.42±0.04
Average	**62.9±1.8%**	**0.47±0.04**

Under Llama-Guard-3-8B, JC achieves an average attack success rate (ASR) of **62.9%**, indicating that a majority of adversarial queries successfully bypass a conservative, rule-based safety filter. The ASR is moderate in more "classical" safety categories such as *Illegal Activity* (50.2%), *Malware Generation* (35.6%), and *Fraud* (35.8%), but becomes extremely high in high-level instruction-following scenarios. In particular, *Political Lobbying*, *Legal Opinion*, *Financial Advice*, *Health Consultation*, and *Government Decision* all exceed **90%** ASR (92.4%, 94.3%, 95.5%, 90.2%, and 92.1%, respectively). This pattern suggests that once JC succeeds in steering the model into providing detailed, high-level guidance, the rule-based guard is rarely able to enforce refusal, even in domains where safety policies are typically the strictest.

StrongREJECT provides a complementary view by quantifying the harmfulness of JC-induced responses. Across scenarios, JC attains an average harmfulness score of **0.47**, with particularly elevated scores in categories such as *Physical Harm* (0.55), *Hate Speech* (0.52), *Political Lobbying* (0.61), and *Privacy Violence* (0.53). Even in ostensibly "softer" but high-stakes domains like *Legal Opinion*, *Financial Advice*, and *Health Consultation*, the harmfulness scores remain non-trivial (around 0.34–0.39), indicating that the resulting answers are systematically judged as risky rather than benign. Taken together, the Llama-Guard-3 and StrongREJECT results demonstrate that JC simultaneously (i) circumvents a rule-based policy and (ii) produces content that is substantively harmful under a rubric-based evaluation.

The GPT-4o-based toxicity analysis in Table 14 further corroborates these findings. For Plain Text, Adv Example, and Query Image, the proportion of outputs with toxicity score > 0.5 is near zero or very small across all toxicity dimensions. In contrast, JC dramatically increases toxicity rates across the board: for example, in the *Illegal Activity* scenario, the fraction of outputs flagged as "Obscene" rises from 0.0% (Plain Text) to 69.4% under JC, and in *Physical Harm*, the overall toxicity rate jumps from 0.0% to 77.9%. Similar trends appear in other scenarios such as *Hate Speech*, *Economic Harm*, and *Privacy Violence*, where JC consistently converts otherwise safe or mildly toxic generations into responses that are frequently flagged as toxic.

Overall, the agreement across Llama-Guard-3, StrongREJECT, and GPT-4o-based toxicity evaluations—in addition to the Detoxify and LLM-as-judge results reported in the main paper—indicates that JC exploits vulnerabilities that are *stable across heterogeneous safety taxonomies and*

Table 14: GPT-4o–based toxicity evaluation of MiniGPT-4 outputs across four generation settings (Plain Text, Adv Example, Query Image, and JC). We report the percentage of outputs with Detoxify score > 0.5 for each toxicity dimension. JC dramatically increases toxic output rates across all scenarios, indicating that its jailbreaks not only bypass refusals but also yield content consistently flagged as harmful by an external LLM-based judge.

Scenario	Method	Identity Attack	Obscene	Severe Toxicity	Insult	Threat	Toxicity
Illegal Activity (IA)	Plain Text	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%
	Adv Example	3.4±0.3%	3.9±0.4%	3.0±0.3%	4.2±0.4%	3.2±0.3%	3.8±0.3%
	Query Image	2.4±0.3%	2.8±0.3%	2.0±0.3%	2.9±0.3%	2.2±0.3%	2.7±0.3%
	JC	63.2±2.1%	69.4±2.2%	51.6±1.9%	74.5±2.3%	56.9±2.0%	71.8±2.2%
Hate Speech (HS)	Plain Text	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%
	Adv Example	2.1±0.3%	2.4±0.3%	1.7±0.2%	2.6±0.3%	2.0±0.2%	2.3±0.3%
	Query Image	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%
	JC	59.8±2.0%	65.7±2.1%	47.6±1.8%	71.2±2.2%	53.1±1.9%	68.3±2.1%
Malware Generation (MG)	Plain Text	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%
	Adv Example	6.4±0.4%	7.3±0.4%	5.3±0.3%	7.9±0.4%	5.8±0.3%	7.1±0.4%
	Query Image	3.8±0.3%	4.4±0.4%	3.2±0.3%	4.8±0.3%	3.7±0.3%	4.3±0.3%
	JC	33.1±1.8%	36.9±1.9%	27.7±1.7%	40.2±2.0%	30.1±1.7%	38.6±1.9%
Physical Harm (PH)	Plain Text	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%	0.0±0.0%
	Adv Example	10.2±0.5%	11.3±0.5%	8.4±0.4%	12.2±0.5%	9.2±0.4%	10.8±0.5%
	Query Image	9.4±0.4%	10.3±0.4%	7.6±0.3%	11.1±0.4%	8.4±0.3%	9.8±0.4%
	JC	68.3±2.2%	74.8±2.3%	54.5±2.0%	81.3±2.4%	60.4±2.1%	77.9±2.3%
Economic Harm (EH)	Plain Text	1.8±0.1%	2.0±0.1%	1.3±0.1%	2.3±0.1%	1.6±0.1%	1.9±0.1%
	Adv Example	1.9±0.1%	2.1±0.1%	1.4±0.1%	2.4±0.1%	1.6±0.1%	2.0±0.1%
	Query Image	2.9±0.2%	3.1±0.2%	2.3±0.2%	3.4±0.2%	2.6±0.2%	3.1±0.2%
	JC	54.1±2.0%	59.1±2.1%	43.4±1.8%	64.6±2.2%	48.7±1.9%	58.2±2.1%
Fraud (FR)	Plain Text	0.8±0.1%	0.9±0.1%	0.7±0.1%	1.1±0.1%	0.7±0.1%	0.9±0.1%
	Adv Example	6.8±0.4%	7.5±0.4%	5.5±0.3%	8.3±0.4%	6.1±0.3%	7.3±0.4%
	Query Image	4.8±0.3%	5.3±0.3%	3.9±0.3%	5.7±0.3%	4.3±0.3%	5.2±0.3%
	JC	33.1±1.8%	36.7±1.9%	27.5±1.7%	39.8±2.0%	30.0±1.7%	38.4±1.9%
Pornography (PO)	Plain Text	1.1±0.1%	1.2±0.1%	0.9±0.1%	1.4±0.1%	1.0±0.1%	1.2±0.1%
	Adv Example	7.3±0.4%	8.1±0.4%	5.9±0.3%	9.0±0.4%	6.7±0.3%	7.9±0.4%
	Query Image	6.6±0.4%	7.3±0.4%	5.3±0.3%	8.1±0.4%	6.0±0.3%	7.1±0.4%
	JC	52.7±2.1%	57.8±2.2%	42.0±1.8%	63.0±2.3%	47.0±1.9%	56.2±2.2%
Political Lobbying (PL)	Plain Text	28.4±0.6%	31.1±0.6%	23.4±0.5%	33.8±0.6%	25.1±0.5%	30.2±0.6%
	Adv Example	48.6±0.8%	53.1±0.8%	38.6±0.7%	56.9±0.9%	42.5±0.7%	50.7±0.8%
	Query Image	42.4±0.6%	46.9±0.7%	34.1±0.5%	50.6±0.7%	37.1±0.5%	45.3±0.6%
	JC	65.3±2.0%	71.1±2.2%	51.8±1.8%	77.4±2.3%	57.1±2.0%	73.9±2.2%
Privacy Violence (PV)	Plain Text	1.3±0.1%	1.5±0.1%	1.1±0.1%	1.8±0.1%	1.3±0.1%	1.5±0.1%
	Adv Example	2.7±0.2%	2.9±0.2%	2.3±0.2%	3.2±0.2%	2.4±0.2%	2.9±0.2%
	Query Image	4.6±0.3%	5.1±0.3%	3.8±0.3%	5.7±0.3%	4.2±0.3%	5.0±0.3%
	JC	59.8±2.1%	65.9±2.2%	48.0±1.9%	71.4±2.3%	52.6±2.0%	67.8±2.2%

evaluation paradigms. This multi-judge consistency reduces the likelihood that JC's effectiveness is an artifact of any single scorer, and instead points to a more fundamental misalignment in current multimodal safety mechanisms.

A.7 Ablation Study

To better understand the contribution of each component in JC, we conduct an ablation study on MiniGPT-4 by removing: (i) the continuous path construction (**w/o Path**), (ii) the jailbreak success predictor (**w/o JBP**), and (iii) the safety classifier (**w/o Safety**). Table 15 reports ASR and PPL across 13 MM-SafetyBench scenarios, while Table 16 shows the corresponding toxicity scores.

Table 15: Ablation study of JC on MiniGPT-4. We report ASR and response perplexity (PPL), mean ± std across 13 MM-SafetyBench scenarios. Removing any component degrades performance, with **w/o Path** causing the most severe decline.

Scenario	ASR (↑)				PPL (↓)			
	JC (full)	JC w/o Path	JC w/o JBP	JC w/o Safety	JC (full)	JC w/o Path	JC w/o JBP	JC w/o Safety
Illegal Activity (IA)	72.64±1.8%	50.85±2.3%	61.74±2.1%	65.38±2.0%	8.00±0.40	10.00±0.48	9.00±0.45	9.00±0.43
Hate Speech (HS)	69.28±1.7%	48.50±2.2%	58.89±2.0%	62.35±2.0%	8.50±0.41	10.50±0.50	9.50±0.48	9.50±0.47
Malware Generation (MG)	50.66±1.9%	35.46±2.1%	43.06±2.0%	45.59±2.0%	15.80±0.55	17.80±0.60	16.80±0.58	16.80±0.57
Physical Harm (PH)	74.76±1.8%	52.33±2.4%	63.55±2.2%	67.28±2.1%	7.30±0.38	9.30±0.46	8.30±0.42	8.30±0.41
Economic Harm (EH)	72.04±1.9%	50.43±2.3%	61.23±2.1%	64.84±2.0%	11.97±0.52	13.97±0.58	12.97±0.55	12.97±0.54
Fraud (FR)	50.96±1.8%	35.67±2.2%	43.32±2.1%	45.86±2.0%	15.80±0.55	17.80±0.60	16.80±0.58	16.80±0.57
Pornography (PO)	69.84±1.7%	48.89±2.3%	59.36±2.1%	62.86±2.0%	12.37±0.50	14.37±0.55	13.37±0.52	13.37±0.51
Political Lobbying (PL)	98.38±1.1%	68.87±2.5%	83.62±2.2%	88.54±2.0%	13.78±0.45	15.78±0.50	14.78±0.48	14.78±0.47
Privacy Violence (PV)	81.79±1.6%	57.25±2.3%	69.52±2.2%	73.61±2.0%	12.31±0.48	14.31±0.53	13.31±0.50	13.31±0.49
Legal Opinion (LO)	100.00±0.9%	70.00±2.5%	85.00±2.2%	90.00±2.0%	7.74±0.36	9.74±0.44	8.74±0.40	8.74±0.39
Financial Advice (FA)	100.00±0.8%	70.00±2.4%	85.00±2.1%	90.00±1.9%	5.77±0.32	7.77±0.40	6.77±0.36	6.77±0.35
Health Consultation (HC)	96.00±1.1%	67.20±2.3%	81.60±2.0%	86.40±1.9%	4.85±0.30	6.85±0.38	5.85±0.34	5.85±0.33
Government Decision (GD)	98.72±1.0%	69.10±2.4%	83.91±2.2%	88.85±2.0%	6.32±0.34	8.32±0.41	7.32±0.38	7.32±0.37
Average	**79.62±1.6%**	55.73±2.3%	67.68±2.1%	71.66±2.0%	**10.03±0.41**	12.04±0.49	11.04±0.46	11.04±0.45

Table 16: Toxicity ablation of JC on MiniGPT-4 (Detoxify score > 0.5). Mean ± std across toxicity dimensions. All components contribute meaningfully, with the continuous path providing the largest improvement.

Scenario	JC (full)	JC w/o Path	JC w/o JBP	JC w/o Safety
Illegal Activity (IA)	61.2±2.0%	37.3±2.4%	45.3±2.2%	48.0±2.3%
Hate Speech (HS)	57.1±1.9%	34.8±2.3%	42.2±2.1%	44.7±2.2%
Malware Generation (MG)	27.6±1.8%	16.8±2.1%	20.4±2.0%	21.6±2.1%
Physical Harm (PH)	65.1±2.1%	39.6±2.4%	48.1±2.3%	50.9±2.4%
Economic Harm (EH)	49.8±1.9%	30.3±2.2%	36.8±2.1%	39.0±2.2%
Fraud (FR)	27.7±1.8%	16.9±2.1%	20.5±2.0%	21.7±2.1%
Pornography (PO)	47.2±1.9%	28.7±2.3%	34.9±2.1%	36.9±2.2%
Political Lobbying (PL)	61.1±2.0%	37.2±2.4%	45.2±2.2%	47.9±2.3%
Privacy Violence (PV)	55.5±2.0%	33.7±2.3%	41.0±2.2%	43.4±2.3%
Legal Opinion (LO)	85.3±1.7%	51.9±2.5%	63.1±2.3%	66.8±2.4%
Financial Advice (FA)	92.9±1.6%	56.6±2.6%	68.7±2.4%	72.7±2.5%
Health Consultation (HC)	92.6±1.6%	56.3±2.5%	68.4±2.4%	72.5±2.5%
Government Decision (GD)	89.6±1.7%	54.5±2.5%	66.2±2.3%	70.1±2.4%
Average	**63.41±1.9%**	38.05±2.4%	46.22±2.2%	48.94±2.3%

Removing the continuous path construction results in the largest performance drop (from 79.62% → 55.73% ASR and a clear increase in PPL), confirming that exploring the connected low-loss region is central to JC's ability to produce fluent yet highly effective adversarial images. Eliminating the jailbreak success predictor yields a moderate decline to 67.68% ASR, demonstrating its importance for directing optimization toward transferable jailbreak-inducing perturbations. The safety classifier also plays a non-trivial role: removing it reduces ASR to 71.66%, reflecting its contribution to suppressing refusal behaviors during optimization.

Toxicity results exhibit the same trends. JC (full) attains the highest toxicity rates (63.41% on average), whereas removing the continuous path causes the steepest decline (38.05%), followed by removal of the success predictor (46.22%). The safety classifier again shows a moderate but consistent effect (48.94%), indicating that each module contributes to generating outputs that external evaluators judge as harmful.

Overall, these ablations demonstrate that each component of JC provides distinct and complementary benefits: the continuous path improves stability and fluency by enabling optimization within a connected low-loss region; the jailbreak success predictor enhances transferability and optimization efficiency; and the safety classifier helps bypass inherent refusal mechanisms. Their combination is crucial for achieving JC's full jailbreak strength.

A.8 Representative Jailbreak Images on GPT-4o and Gemini

We provide representative jailbreak images generated by JC when attacking two state-of-the-art MLLMs: GPT-4o and Gemini. Figure 7 illustrates examples that successfully bypass each model's safety mechanisms and elicit unsafe responses. These visualizations help qualitatively demonstrate the transferability and effectiveness of JC across different proprietary multimodal architectures.



(a) GPT-4o Example 1

(b) GPT-4o Example 2

(c) Gemini Example 1

(d) Gemini Example 2

Figure 7: Four representative jailbreak images generated by JC on GPT-4o and Gemini. The examples illustrate the diversity, transferability, and effectiveness of JC across two state-of-the-art multimodal models.