ENHANCING PRIVACY AND UTILITY IN DIFFER ENTIALLY PRIVATE DEEP LEARNING THROUGH INSTANCE-LEVEL SMOOTHING

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, we address the dual challenge of maintaining high accuracy and ensuring fairness in differentially private (DP) deep learning models. The optimization process is inherently complicated by the necessity of injecting random noise and limiting training iterations, particularly for over-parameterized models. Moreover, DP mechanisms frequently exacerbate accuracy disparities across subpopulations, complicating the balance between privacy and fairness. To tackle these challenges, we introduce a novel framework that systematically addresses the trade-off between privacy and utility in DP deep learning. At the core of our approach is the concept of instance-level smoothing, which enhances privacy protections without compromising performance. Our theoretical contributions include deep insights into sample complexity, instance-level smoothing factors, and error bounds required to achieve a given privacy budget. These insights provide a robust foundation for optimizing the delicate balance between privacy and utility. Our method demonstrates remarkable robustness, independent of iteration counts, model parameters, batch normalization processes, and subpopulation disparities. This flexibility enables an optimal balance between privacy preservation and utility, adaptable to a wide range of scenarios. Through extensive empirical studies on the large-scale medical imaging dataset CheXpert, we validate the effectiveness of our approach. Our findings align with theoretical predictions, showing that our method can effectively meet stringent privacy requirements while maintaining high performance. By bridging the gap between formal privacy guarantees and practical deep learning applications, our work lays the groundwork for future advancements in the field. This research empowers practitioners to protect sensitive data during model training and ensures both data privacy and model generality, paving the way for more secure and equitable AI systems.

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1 INTRODUCTION

039 Large neural networks with billions of parameters have achieved state-of-the-art performance across 040 a wide range of machine learning tasks Brown & Mann (2020); Zhai et al. (2022). Despite their 041 success, these models are known to memorize training data Zhang et al. (2021), leading to poten-042 tial leakage of sensitive information. Privacy attacks capable of extracting memorized training data 043 have been demonstrated on various types of models, including language models Carlini et al. (2021), 044 diffusion models Carlini et al. (2023), and image classification models Balle et al. (2022). Additionally, membership inference attacks, which can determine whether a particular data point was used to train a model, have proven successful across multiple architectures and data modalities Carlini et al. 046 (2022). The implications of these vulnerabilities are profound, particularly in applications involving 047 private, confidential, or proprietary data, such as healthcare, finance, recommendation systems, and 048 mobility. To ensure the safe deployment of models trained on such data, it is crucial to address these 049 privacy concerns effectively. 050

Differential Privacy (DP) Dwork et al. (2006) has emerged as the gold standard for protecting individual privacy in data processing algorithms. However, achieving strong privacy protections with DP is particularly challenging in deep learning, especially as model sizes and data dimensions increase. The most popular DP training technique in deep learning is Differentially Private Stochastic Gradi-

ent Descent (DP-SGD) Abadi et al. (2016), which privatizes gradients by clipping and adding noise. The strength of the privacy guarantee ϵ depends on the noise scale, batch size, number of training samples, and number of iterations. While DP-SGD is a near drop-in replacement for standard SGD, it presents significant challenges that have hindered its widespread adoption.

Achieving high accuracy with differentially private (DP) models faces two major challenges. First, injecting random noise and limiting training iterations complicates optimization, as noisy gradients 060 and iteration constraints hinder effective hyperparameter tuning Anil et al. (2021). The noise's Eu-061 clidean norm scales with model size, degrading performance for larger models Yu et al. (2021). This 062 issue is particularly problematic given the prevalence of over-parameterized neural networks in AI. 063 Second, fairness issues arise in deep neural networks, exacerbated by DP mechanisms. Models can 064 show accuracy disparities across subpopulations, such as race, age, sex, or insurance type in medical tasks Seyyed-Kalantari et al. (2021). DP can worsen these disparities, increasing accuracy gaps 065 due to unbalanced subgroup data Bagdasaryan et al. (2019); Santos-Lozada et al. (2020). DP limits 066 information extraction from individual data points, conflicting with the accurate learning needed 067 for small or underrepresented subgroups, particularly in medical datasets Cummings et al. (2019); 068 Suriyakumar et al. (2021). 069




Figure 1: Histogram of the mean distances for k-nearest neighbors (KNN) in CIFAR10. This histogram visualizes the distribution of average distances among data points as computed by the KNN algorithm.

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Understanding the trade-off between privacy and utility in differentially private (DP) deep learning models is crucial for both theoretical and practical advancements. This paper introduces a novel framework that aims to bridge the performance gap between DP models and their non-private counterparts by training an end-to-end DP network. Our central hypothesis is that samples with sparse distributions in their feature space, based on pre-trained large models, are more prone to privacy leakage. In contrast, classes with sufficient samples that are compactly clustered in the feature space will be well-represented, incurring minimal privacy sacrifice while maintaining high performance.

To illustrate the difference in feature density among classes in the CIFAR-10 dataset, we present a graph depicting the mean distances within the 10 classes. This graph measures the proximity of each sample to its 5 nearest neighbors. As shown in Figure 1, the mean sample distance for *car* is 129.25, whereas for *dog*, it is 191.08. The observed trade-off between privacy and utility Berrada et al. (August 2023) aligns well with these mean distances: the *car* class exhibits the best classification accuracy and the least privacy leakage, whereas the *dog* class suffers from significant privacy leakage and class disparity issues.

Given that each class has an equal number of 5000 training samples, the within-class compactness and between-class distance largely determine the privacy-utility trade-off. In scenarios where the sample numbers across classes are imbalanced, privacy preservation and class disparity issues worsen. This observation motivates us to consider instance-level probability density function (PDF) estimation and instance-specific kernel smoothing to enhance privacy without degrading performance. We prefer the term *instance smoothing* over *noise*, as it better captures the essence of our approach in providing privacy protection alongside model generality.

107 Our method remains flexible and can incorporate future advancements in deep learning, including improved network architectures and pre-trained models, without additional constraints. This work

represents a significant step towards enabling deep learning practitioners to leverage formal privacy guarantees offered by DP while protecting sensitive data during model training.

The contributions of this paper are multifaceted and significant, paving the way for a new paradigm in differentially private deep learning:

- **Innovative Framework:** We introduce a novel framework that systematically addresses the trade-off between privacy and utility in differentially private (DP) deep learning models. Central to our approach is the concept of instance-level smoothing and PDF representation learning, which significantly enhances privacy without compromising model performance.
- Theoretical Insights: Our work provides profound theoretical insights into key aspects such as sample complexity, instance-level smoothing factors, and error bounds for achieving a given privacy budget. These insights offer a robust foundation for understanding and optimizing the balance between privacy and utility.
 - **Robust Methodology:** The proposed method demonstrates remarkable robustness, being independent of iteration counts, backbone parameters, batch normalization processes, and sub-class disparities. This flexibility allows for an optimal balance between privacy preservation and utility, making it adaptable to a wide range of scenarios.
 - Empirical Validation: Through extensive empirical studies on the large-scale medical image dataset CheXpert Irvin et al. (January 2019), we validate the effectiveness of our approach. Our findings confirm the theoretical predictions, demonstrating that our method can effectively meet privacy requirements while maintaining high performance. This new paradigm has the potential to significantly expand the use of large models in real-world scenarios where privacy is paramount.
 - 2 RELATED WORKS

134 Zero-Concentrated Differential Privacy Differential Privacy (DP) was initially formalized by 135 Dwork et al. (2006) and later adapted to deep learning by Abadi et al. (2016), who operationalized 136 DP-SGD Bassily et al. (2014) to train neural networks with differential privacy guarantees. The central goal in differentially private learning is to train a classifier while satisfying a rigorous math-137 ematical definition of privacy known as differential privacy Dwork (2006), which ensures that any 138 individual training data point cannot be identified using the trained model and any additional side 139 information. More formally, we adopt the popular modern variant called zero-centered Concentrated 140 Differential Privacy (zCDP), as defined below: 141

142 **Definition 1.** ZERO-CONCENTRATED DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY BUN & STEINKE (2016)

Two datasets D_0 and D_1 are neighbors if they can be constructed from each other by adding or removing one data point. A randomized mechanism A satisfies ρ -zero-concentrated differential privacy (ρ -zCDP) if, for all neighboring datasets D_0 and D_1 , we have

$$R_{\alpha}(\mathcal{A}(D_0) \| \mathcal{A}(D_1)) \le \rho \alpha,$$

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$$R_{\alpha}(P||Q) = \frac{1}{\alpha - 1} \log \int \left(\frac{p(x)}{q(x)}\right)^{\alpha} q(x) \, dx$$

is the Rényi divergence between two distributions P and Q.

In the above definition, $\rho \ge 0$ is the privacy loss parameter that measures the strength of the protection. $\rho = 0$ indicates perfect privacy, while $\rho = \infty$ means no protection at all. The privacy protection is considered sufficiently strong in practice if ρ is a small constant, e.g., 1, 2, 4, 8. For readers familiar with standard approximate DP but not zCDP, ρ -zCDP implies (ϵ, δ)-DP for all $\delta > 0$ with $\epsilon = \rho + 2\sqrt{\rho \log(1/\delta)}$.

157 While DP-SGD Berrada et al. (August 2023) is foundational for differential privacy in deep learning, 158 it has significant drawbacks. It requires a trade-off between privacy budget (ϵ), noise addition, 159 and the number of iterations, impacting model utility. The method is sensitive to hyperparameters 160 and regularization, and per-sample gradient clipping introduces bias and high variance, degrading 161 performance. Additionally, the noise scales with model dimension, complicating its application to 162 large models and disrupting batch normalization. We propose a novel approach that bypasses these issues. Our method adjusts the smoothing bandwidths of the PDF per instance, independent of iterations, enhancing the balance between privacy and accuracy. It is robust to hyperparameter settings and avoids gradient clipping and noise addition, reducing bias and variance. This allows for fine-tuning large pre-trained models in high-dimensional spaces without affecting batch normalization. We also provide theoretical bounds on sample size and classification errors, demonstrating its effectiveness.

¹⁶⁸ Overall, our method offers a practical and efficient alternative to DP-SGD, maintaining privacy while ¹⁶⁹ improving model performance.

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Adaptive Kernel Density Fine-tuning Our work diverges from the DP-SGD method by drawing
 on adaptive kernel metric representation learning, particularly useful for tasks like anomaly detec tion. Kernel density-based learning captures the underlying probability density of data, using Gaussian kernels to assess local density and identify anomalies, which are prone to privacy risks in sparse
 regions Zhang et al. (2018). Kernel-based methods handle uncertainty and class-specific variances
 well, as demonstrated by Non-isotropic von Mises-Fisher (nivMF) distributions that model complex
 variances to enhance generalization Kirchhof et al. (2022).

We employ a projection network parameterized by $W \in \mathbb{R}^{p \times d}$, where *d* is the feature dimension from the backbone network, and *p* is the projected dimension in the PDF space. This adaptive kernel estimation-based approach emphasizes local data density, crucial for identifying and mitigating privacy risks in sparse regions. It allows fine-tuning of pre-trained models in high-dimensional spaces, compatible with any backbone architecture.

Unlike DP-SGD, which requires per-sample gradient clipping and noise addition, our method ad justs the smoothing bandwidth at the instance level, leading to more efficient training. By focusing
 on instance-level smoothing, we effectively balance privacy and accuracy, offering a practical and
 efficient alternative to DP-SGD for differentially private learning.

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3 Method

Our training framework for medical images starts by feeding samples into feature extraction networks, such as pre-trained transformers on ImageNet, to obtain initial feature representations. We then project these raw features into a PDF representation space, modeling each class with an independent PDF using an adaptive kernel density estimation method. This approach assigns a specific smoothing bandwidth to each instance based on its relative distribution density.

195 As shown in Figure 2, we construct a PDF for each class by applying adaptive kernel density es-196 timation in the projected space, ensuring customized privacy preservation for each instance. To 197 maintain compactness within classes and distinctiveness between different classes, we employ a 198 PDF contrastive loss with a margin. This loss function encourages the model to achieve the desired 199 feature separation. During testing, we compute the likelihood of a test sample belonging to each 200 class by comparing it against the trained PDFs. The predicted label is assigned based on the class 201 with the highest probability. The detailed steps are depicted in Figure 2 and will be elaborated in the following sub-sections. 202

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204 3.1 INSTANCE LEVEL PRIVACY BUDGET ALLOCATION

This projection network can map the samples in feature space in \mathbb{R}^d to PDF in \mathbb{R}^p . For example, in our experiment settings, d = 768 is for transformer and p = 64 for the embedding PDF space. The parameter p is selected by evaluation process.

Each training sample exhibits different local sensitivity in the PDF space. We should allocate the privacy budget according to their sensitivity. Adaptive smoothing mechanism adjusts the amount of bandwidth based on the local sensitivity of the PDF estimate. This approach enhances privacy while maintaining the utility of the PDF representation.

213 **Proposition 1.** INSTANCE LEVEL PRIVACY SMOOTHING

214 Let $x_i \in \mathbb{R}^p$ be a sample. To protect each sample x_i , smoothing factor N_i is applied for each 215 dimension, where $N_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, s_i^2 \cdot \sigma^2)$. Here, s_i represents the local sensitivity of x_i , and σ is a global privacy setting applicable to all training samples. The protected sample \tilde{x}_i is then given




Figure 2: Adaptive Kernel PDF Representation Learning Framework. In the first stage, each training sample is smoothed with a customized bandwidth: densely distributed samples receive less smoothing, while sparsely distributed samples are protected with larger bandwidths. In the second stage, the projection network is trained to optimally separate each class. The mean vectors for each class are represented by red markers: stars, circles, and triangles correspond to the classes Pleural Effusion, Edema, and Consolidation, respectively, positioned at the centers of their corresponding elliptical PDFs. Each class is formed as a compacted PDF with a margin among other classes. The varying sizes of the shaded areas around the samples represent different local bandwidths, corresponding to varied probability densities and different allocations of privacy budgets.

by $\tilde{x}_i = x_i + N_i$. This mechanism ensures that the level of smoothing corresponds to the local sensitivity of each data point, balancing privacy protection and data utility by scaling the smoothing variance with $s_i^2 \cdot \sigma^2$. The introduction of smoothing N_i adheres to differential privacy principles, providing a customizable level of privacy suited to the sensitivity of the data.

We will define the s_i firstly. The PDF for the training set is defined as:

$$\hat{p}(x) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} K_h(x - x_j)$$

The PDF without sample x_i is:

$$\hat{\rho}_{-i}(x) = \frac{1}{n-1} \sum_{j \neq i} K_h(x - x_j)$$

Then the local sensitivity s_i at x_i is:

$$s_i = |\hat{p}(x) - \hat{p}_{-i}(x)|$$

For large *n*, this can be approximated as:

$$s_i \approx \frac{1}{n} K_h(x - x_i)$$

The K_h is the kernel function with smoothing bandwidth h, such as the Gaussian Kernel. However, in this paper, we will define the Adaptive Kernel Function in the next sub-section to best describe each sample's distinctiveness.

270 The $\tilde{x}_i = x_i + N_i$ provides instance level privacy protection mechanism. The modified PDF estimate 271 $\hat{p}(x)$ is: 272

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 $\hat{p}(x) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} K_h(x - \tilde{x}_i)$

275 In the following section, we will not use \tilde{x}_i but x_i for brevity to represent the enhanced samples. 276 The customized smoothing factor N_i is related to instance sensitivity s_i and an global smoothing 277 variance σ^2 independent of sample index. 278

Theorem 1. PRIVACY-PRESERVING FOR ρ -ZCDP 279

To achieve ρ -zero Concentrated Differential Privacy (ρ -zCDP), the smoothing variance is chosen as 280 $\sigma^2 = \frac{2\ln(1/\delta)}{\rho}$. The privacy-preserving parameter ρ controls the overall level of privacy, ensuring that the samples in PDF space remains stable and robust while preserving privacy. This formulation 282 provides a balance between privacy protection and data utility by adjusting the smoothing variance according to the specified privacy parameter ρ .

285 The proof can be found in Appendix A.1.

3.2 ADAPTIVE KERNEL IN HIGHER DIMENSIONS

Proposition 2. ADAPTIVE KERNEL SMOOTHING 289

In the context of the higher-dimensional adaptive kernel, we can define h' explicitly based on the local density, which provides additional privacy-preserving ability for the sparse training samples given the base bandwidth h. The adaptive kernel $K_h(x)$ in p dimensions is given by:

$$K_h(x) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{(2\pi h^2)^{p/2}} \exp\left(-\frac{\|x\|^2}{2h^2}\right) & \text{if } N_r(x) \ge \lambda, \\ \frac{1}{(2\pi (h^2 + h'^2))^{p/2}} \exp\left(-\frac{\|x\|^2}{2(h^2 + h'^2)}\right) & \text{if } N_r(x) < \lambda, \end{cases}$$

where $h' = h \cdot \frac{c}{N_r(x)}$. To define sparse and dense regions in high-dimensional space, we use a measure of local density, for which one effective approach is the k-nearest neighbors (k-NN) method.

To distinguish between dense and sparse regions, we set a threshold λ . This threshold can be determined based on the empirical distribution of k-NN distances in the dataset. For example, setting λ to the median or the 75th percentile of k-NN distances ensures a robust boundary. Formally, we define regions as follows:

| ∫ Dense region | $\text{if } N_r(x) \ge \lambda$ |
|----------------|---------------------------------|
| Sparse region | if $N_r(x) < \lambda$ |

307 where λ is a chosen percentile of the distribution of k-NN distances. 308

For example, in the CIFAR10 dataset, the mean 5-nearest-neighbor distance for *car* is 129.25. We 309 can define $\lambda = 129.25$. For samples with mean distance to their 5-nearest-neighbor beyond this 310 threshold, we should use extra bandwidth to protect the samples. 311

Theorem 2. SAMPLE SIZE COMPLEXITY 312

To preserve ρ -zCDP in PDF space, the number of samples n should satisfy: 313

$$n \ge \frac{C}{\rho(\alpha - 1)}$$

This theoretical bound ensures that the change in the KDE estimate due to removing a single sample is sufficiently small to maintain the desired privacy level ρ . The constant C is given by:

$$C = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi h^2}}$$

321 This bound provides a theoretical guideline for the minimum number of samples needed to ensure 322 ρ -*zCDP* in the context of PDF probability density estimation.

The proof can be found in Appendix A.2.

324 3.3 KERNEL DENSITY-BASED REPRESENTATION LEARNING

In the training framework, the pre-trained baseline network are frozen, which provides feature representation ability thanks to their extensive pre-training on large public datasets such as ImageNet. We define $\mathbf{W}^{\top} \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times p}$ serves as the projection matrix that transforms the raw feature space of training samples to the PDF space, facilitating comparisons among different classes.

We propose our learning objective to act as the training loss, replacing the conventional crossentropy loss and guiding the network training process.

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$$\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{W}) = \max\left(-\sum_{x \in D_t} \mathbb{1}_{\{y_b=t\}} \mathbf{K}(x - x_b) + \sum_{x \in D_t} \mathbb{1}_{\{y_b \neq t\}} (\mathbf{K}(x - x_b) + m, 0)\right)$$
(1)

339 In Eq. 1, the set of trainable parameters is denoted by W, which is implemented as a projection 340 network in our design. In this context, x represents the PDF representations of all training sample, 341 and \mathbf{x}_{b} signifies a batch of instances, while the u_{b} is the class label for \mathbf{x}_{b} . The symbol m is introduced as a PDF margin, ensuring that the PDF for positive samples with the same y_h exceeds that of 342 negative instances with different class label by a safe margin. Eq. 1 is employed as the contrastive 343 loss function within our framework. Notably, the probability values involved in the computation 344 are expressed in logarithmic format. This approach not only stabilizes the training process but also 345 prevents the values from experiencing underflow during back-propagation. 346

For the PDF-based classification model, if a test sample is nearer to a class in the PDF representation, the sample should be classified to the given class. Assuming there are k classes, we need to incorporate the privacy-preserving mechanism into the accuracy calculation.

For a sample x, compute the KDE estimates for each class $j \in \{1, ..., k\}$:

$$\hat{p}_j(x) = \frac{1}{n_j} \sum_{i=1}^{n_j} K_h(x - x_{ij})$$

where n_j is the number of samples in class j and x_{ij} are the samples belonging to class j. Assign the sample x to the class with the highest KDE estimate:

 $\hat{y}(x) = \arg\max_{j} \hat{p}_{j}(x)$

Theorem 3. BOUNDS ON MISCLASSIFICATION ERRORS

The accuracy of KDE-based classification is affected by the amount of smoothing added to achieve ρ -zCDP. The trade-off between privacy and accuracy can be analyzed using the following bound for a projection network $f : \mathbb{R}^d \to \mathbb{R}^p$ such that the misclassification error:

$$\operatorname{Err}(f) \leq 2 \exp\left(-\frac{m^2 \rho}{4 \ln(1/\delta)}\right)$$

Higher ρ leads to more smoothing and thus lower classification accuracy. Balancing ρ appropriately ensures a reasonable trade-off between privacy and accuracy. The *m* is the PDF margin in the training process.

369 The proof can be found in Appendix A.3.

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4 EMPIRICAL STUDIES

373 4.1 DATASETS 374

The CIFAR10 dataset Krizhevsky (2009) comprises 32×32 color images across 10 distinct classes, encompassing 50,000 training examples and 10,000 testing examples. We train the model using the proposed privacy-preserving mechanism. This setup is crucial for demonstrating the effectiveness of privacy-preserving techniques in image classification tasks, ensuring that sensitive data is safeguarded during the training process. We further conduct experiments on the real medical CheX-pert dataset Irvin et al. (January 2019), a substantial collection comprising 224,316 chest X-rays from 65,240 patients. This dataset includes five classes representing various thoracic pathologies:
(a) Atelectasis, (b) Cardiomegaly, (c) Consolidation, (d) Edema, and (e) Pleural Effusion. For our purposes, we reinitialize only the projection layer while keeping the other layers fixed, ensuring no impact on privacy leakage as described in Abadi et al. (October 2016).

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395 396 4.2 EXPERIMENT SETTINGS

To evaluate both non-private and private deep learning models, we employ the area under the curve (AUC) metric. For our model, we set the projected PDF dimension to 64, as this configuration offers the best balance between prediction accuracy and training efficiency. The PDF margin in our learning process is set to 10 (in logarithmic scale) based on cross-validation on the CIFAR10 dataset Krizhevsky (2009). For the differentially private stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD) methods, the training settings are configured according to the guidelines provided in Berrada et al. (August 2023).

An algorithm that satisfies ρ -zCDP also satisfies (ϵ , δ)-DP, where:

$$\epsilon = \rho + 2\sqrt{\rho \log(1/\delta)}$$

Based on this relationship, we will compare our method with other approaches under the same pre-trained models, such as ResNet-50, ViT-B/16, and DenseNet. In our experimental settings, the broken probability δ is fixed at 10^{-5} . It is important to note that in this context, δ denotes the broken probability, which is distinct from the δ used in the previous section to represent the confidence bound.

We will assess how varying ϵ values in (ϵ, δ) -DP affect model performance, corresponding to different ρ values in ρ -zCDP. This evaluation will provide insights into the trade-offs between privacy guarantees and model efficacy.

406 407 4.3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ON CIFAR10

To validate the effectiveness of the proposed method and the theoretical analysis presented in Section 3, we conducted experiments using the CIFAR-10 dataset. The DP-SGD methods adhere to the settings outlined in Berrada et al. (August 2023), with the primary difference being the backbone models used: ResNet18, ResNet-50, and ViT-B/16. All models were pre-trained on ImageNet-21K. For the Non-Private method, we utilized the optimal settings without enforcing any smoothing. Several observations can be drawn from the results. The batch size was set to 4096 to favor DP-SGD, although we did not explore extremely large batch sizes due to computational limitations.

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Model Capacity and Smoothing Resilience our method exhibits a narrow gap with the Non-416 Private model, lagging by just 2-3 percent when $\epsilon = 8$. However, for the DP-SGD method, even un-417 der the setting of $\epsilon = 8$, its performance is still inferior to our $\epsilon = 3$ counterpart. This indicates that 418 our method provides significantly better utility for a given privacy budget. Our experiments reveal 419 that larger models, such as ResNet50 and ViT-B/16, exhibit higher resilience to the smoothing intro-420 duced by differential privacy mechanisms. This resilience can be attributed to the models' enhanced 421 capacity to learn robust feature representations, which can better withstand the perturbations caused 422 by smoothing. This finding aligns with existing literature that suggests a direct correlation between 423 model complexity and its ability to generalize from noisy data Kaplan et al. (2020). The significant 424 performance gap between our method and the traditional DP-SGD approach, even at higher ϵ values, 425 underscores the effectiveness of our approach in balancing the privacy-utility trade-off. Traditional DP-SGD methods often suffer from a substantial reduction in utility due to the added smoothing, 426 which is necessary to ensure privacy. Our method, however, achieves competitive accuracy with a 427 much lower privacy budget, demonstrating a more efficient utilization of the privacy budget. 428

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430 **Impact of** ϵ **on Performance** The parameter ϵ in differential privacy quantifies the trade-off be-431 tween privacy and utility. Our results show that while increasing ϵ improves the performance of the DP-SGD method, it still lags behind our method with a lower ϵ . This suggests that our method can achieve higher accuracy even under stricter privacy constraints, making it more suitable for applications where both high utility and stringent privacy guarantees are required. Our method can allocate
the budget at instance level, which will not waste privacy on the samples in dense PDF regions and
degrade the performance. The smoothing effect for the sparse samples is economically allocated as
the backbone can provide more precise representation, resulting in less performance degradation as
the privacy budget increases.

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4.4 RESULT AND DISCUSSION ON CHEXPERT

In the realm of medical image analysis, ensuring patient privacy while maintaining high model
 performance is a paramount concern. The CheXperf dataset, a comprehensive collection of thoracic
 condition images, serves as an excellent benchmark for evaluating privacy-preserving techniques.
 Our proposed instance-level PDF smoothing model exhibits significant advancements over existing
 methods such as DP-SGD and non-private models.

The experimental results depicted in Figure 2 reveal several critical insights. Our proposed PDF 446 smoothing model consistently outperforms DP-SGD under the same backbone and experiment set-447 tings and has a narrow gap with non-private model. This indicates that our method effectively 448 balances the trade-off between privacy and utility. As expected, higher values of ϵ correlate with im-449 proved model accuracy due to reduced smoothing factor. This is a well-documented phenomenon in 450 differential privacy literature. However, our adaptive DP model demonstrates superior performance 451 even at lower ϵ values, underscoring its robustness. For thoracic conditions with privacy budgets set 452 to $\epsilon = 2$ and $\epsilon = 8$, our model achieves an average testing AUC of 85% across all five labels. In 453 contrast, DP-SGD lags behind, achieving approximately 70%. This significant margin underscores 454 the efficacy of our adaptive approach in maintaining high accuracy while preserving privacy. 455

456 **Instance-Level Privacy Allocation** A key strength of our model lies in its instance-level privacy 457 allocation. By dynamically adjusting the privacy budget for each data instance based on its prob-458 ability density, we ensure that samples in sparse regions receive higher privacy protection. This 459 targeted approach is more economical and effective compared to uniform noise addition strategies. Medical images often contain critical and unique information that might appear infrequently (i.e., 460 in sparse regions of the data distribution). Our model enhances privacy for these samples without 461 significantly compromising their utility. This is particularly vital in medical contexts where rare con-462 ditions need accurate representation and analysis. Conversely, in dense regions where data points 463 are abundant, excessive smoothing injection can severely disrupt the model's learning process. Our 464 method strategically injects less smoothing in these areas, preserving the inherent structure and re-465 lationships within the data. This selective smoothing ensures that the overall performance of the 466 model remains high. 467

468 **Class Disparity Improved by Instance level Probability Smoothing** In Figure 3, we compare 469 class disparities between our private models (at ϵ =8) and non-private baselines. Both model types 470 show similar disparities across subgroups, with private models not systematically worse in terms of 471 AUC disparities. Notably, smaller subgroups, such as Atelectasis, suffer more performance degrada-472 tion due to their sparse feature distribution. Contrary to prior works, our private models demonstrate significant improvement over the DP-SGD method, achieving better group fairness outcomes than 473 non-private baselines. This suggests that increased disparities in private models observed previously 474 are not inherent. Our instance-level PDF smoothing model effectively balances privacy and per-475 formance, protecting sparse samples economically while minimizing disruption in dense regions. 476 Future work could extend this method to other medical datasets and real-time clinical systems, and 477 explore adaptive mechanisms for dynamic privacy budget adjustments. 478

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5 CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we introduce a novel instance-level PDF smoothing model that enhances privacy preservation while maintaining high performance in medical image analysis. Our approach offers profound theoretical insights into sample complexity, smoothing factors, and error bounds for achieving privacy budgets. Our experimental results demonstrate the efficacy of our model in balancing privacy and utility, dynamically adjusting privacy parameters to protect samples in sparse regions




Figure 3: Comparison between non-private model, DP-SGD and our adaptive DP model under different privacy budget settings. The x-axis the training iterations in epochs and the y-axis is the model performance in AUC.

Table 1: Performance of Different Algorithms on CIFAR-10

| DP Algorithm | ResNet18 | ResNet50 | ViT-B/16 |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|----------|
| DPSGD ($\epsilon = 3$) | 77.8 | 81.5 | 92.4 |
| DPSGD ($\epsilon = 8$) | 82.9 | 84.1 | 94.0 |
| Ours ($\epsilon = 3$) | 85.2 | 89.9 | 94.2 |
| Ours ($\epsilon = 8$) | 90.2 | 92.9 | 95.2 |
| Non-Private | 93.2 | 94.9 | 97.1 |

and addressing class disparities in medical datasets. The adaptive DP model not only preserves the
utility of critical medical information but also improves overall model fairness. Our findings open
several avenues for future research, including extending to other medical datasets and integrating
with real-time clinical systems. Our instance-level PDF smoothing model represents a significant
step forward in privacy-preserving medical image analysis, offering a robust, comprehensive solution to the challenges posed by differential privacy. We hope our work inspires further innovation, contributing to safer and more effective healthcare technologies. Limitations list in Appendix A.4.

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648 A APPENDIX 649

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You may include other additional sections here.

652 653 A.1 PROOF OF THEOREM 1

Proof. Zero-Concentrated Differential Privacy (zCDP) is defined such that a mechanism M satisfies ρ -zCDP if the privacy loss random variable L satisfies $\mathbb{E}[e^L] \leq e^{\rho}$. The privacy loss L is given by $L = \log\left(\frac{M(D_1)}{M(D_2)}\right)$, where D_1 and D_2 are neighboring datasets differing by one element.

Consider the Gaussian mechanism M that adds smoothing $N_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$ to each sample x_i .

The privacy loss L for the Gaussian mechanism is given by $L = \log \left(\frac{p(M(D_1))}{p(M(D_2))}\right)$. For two neighboring datasets D_1 and D_2 , the difference in the KDE estimates is small, and the privacy loss L can be approximated using the Rényi divergence.

The Rényi divergence D_{α} between two distributions P and Q is defined as:

$$D_{\alpha}(P||Q) = \frac{1}{\alpha - 1} \log\left(\int p(x)^{\alpha} q(x)^{1 - \alpha} dx\right)$$

For $\alpha > 1$, the Rényi divergence is a measure of the distance between two distributions.

The ρ -zCDP condition can be expressed in terms of Rényi divergence:

 $D_{\alpha}(P \| Q) \le \rho$

For $\alpha = 2$, the Rényi divergence simplifies to:

$$D_2(P||Q) = \log\left(\int p(x)^2 q(x)^{-1} dx\right)$$

For the Gaussian mechanism, the smoothing $N_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$ ensures that the privacy loss L is controlled. The Rényi divergence for the Gaussian mechanism is given by:

$$D_2(P||Q) \le \frac{\Delta^2}{2\sigma^2}$$

⁶⁸² where Δ is the sensitivity of the function being perturbed.

⁶⁸³ ⁶⁸⁴ The sensitivity Δ is the maximum change in the PDF estimate due to adding or removing one ⁶⁸⁵ sample.

To achieve ρ -zCDP, we need $D_2(P||Q) \le \rho$. Substituting the Rényi divergence for the Gaussian mechanism, we get:

$$\frac{\Delta^2}{2\sigma^2} \le \rho$$

690 Solving for σ^2 , we have:

 $\sigma^2 \geq \frac{\Delta^2}{2\rho}$

⁶⁹⁴ To account for the confidence bound δ , we use the fact that the tail probability of the Gaussian distribution is controlled by δ :

$$\Pr[L > \rho] \le \delta$$

Using the Chernoff bound, we obtain:

$$\sigma^2 \ge \frac{2\ln(1/\delta)}{\rho}$$

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702 A.2 PROOF OF THEOREM 2

Proof. The change in Rényi divergence ΔD_{α} can be bounded using the properties of the PDF estimate:

$$\Delta D_{\alpha} = \frac{1}{\alpha - 1} \left(\log \left(\int \hat{p}_{-k}(x)^{\alpha} Q(x)^{1 - \alpha} dx \right) - \log \left(\int \hat{p}(x)^{\alpha} Q(x)^{1 - \alpha} dx \right) \right)$$

For large n, the change in the KDE estimate due to removing a single sample can be approximated as:

$$\hat{p}_{-k}(x) \approx \hat{p}(x) - \frac{1}{n} K_h(x - x_k)$$

717 The change in Rényi divergence can be bounded using the stability of the KDE estimate:

$$\Delta D_{\alpha} \le \frac{1}{\alpha - 1} \log \left(1 + \frac{C}{n} \right)$$

where C is a constant that depends on the kernel and the bandwidth h.

To ensure ρ -zCDP, we need:

$$\frac{1}{\alpha - 1} \log \left(1 + \frac{C}{n} \right) \le \rho \alpha$$

Simplifying this inequality:

$$\log\left(1+\frac{C}{n}\right) \le \rho(\alpha-1)$$

For small C/n, we can use the approximation:

$$\frac{C}{n} \le \rho(\alpha - 1)$$

 $n \ge \frac{C}{\rho(\alpha - 1)}$

Solving for *n*:

To derive the constant C, we need to consider the maximum possible change in the KDE estimate due to removing a single sample.

739 Maximum Change in KDE Estimate:740

$$\Delta \hat{p}(x) \approx \frac{1}{n} K_h(x - x_k)$$

Bounding the Maximum Change, the maximum value of the kernel function $K_h(x)$ is:

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi h^2}}$$

Therefore, the maximum change in the KDE estimate is:

$$\Delta \hat{p}(x) \le \frac{1}{n} \cdot \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi h^2}}$$

Formulating C: The constant C can be formulated as:

$$C = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi h^2}}$$

A.3 PROOF OF THEOREM 3

Proof. To achieve ρ -zCDP, smoothing $N_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, s_i^2 \cdot \frac{2\ln(1/\delta)}{\rho})$ is added to each sample x_i :

$$x_i' = x_i + N_i$$

The privacy preserved PDF $\hat{p}'(x)$ is:

$$\hat{p}'(x) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} K_h(x - x'_i)$$

The classification error is affected by the smoothing added to the PDF. It can be bounded by the PDF margin between different classes:

$$\operatorname{Err}(f) \le \Pr\left(|\hat{p}(x) - \hat{p}'(x)| > m\right)$$

The smoothing variance σ^2 is:

$$\sigma^2 = \frac{2\ln(1/\delta)}{\rho}$$

Thus, the classification error bound is given by:

$$\operatorname{Err}(f) \le \Pr\left(|\hat{p}(x) - \hat{p}'(x)| > m\right) \le \Pr\left(|N_i| > m\right)$$

Using the properties of the Gaussian distribution:

$$\Pr\left(|N_i| > m\right) \le 2\exp\left(-\frac{m^2}{2\sigma^2}\right)$$

Substituting $\sigma^2 = \frac{2\ln(1/\delta)}{\rho}$, we get:

$$\Pr\left(|N_i| > m\right) \le 2\exp\left(-\frac{m^2\rho}{4\ln(1/\delta)}\right)$$

Therefore, the classification error bound is:

$$\operatorname{Err}(f) \le 2 \exp\left(-\frac{m^2 \rho}{4 \ln(1/\delta)}\right)$$

A.4 LIMITATIONS

While our proposed framework demonstrates significant advancements in balancing privacy and utility in differentially private (DP) deep learning models, several limitations warrant discussion:

- 1. Generalization Across Domains: Although our empirical studies on the CheXpert dataset show promising results, the generalization of our method to other domains and data types remains to be thoroughly validated. Medical imaging datasets, like CheXpert, may possess unique characteristics that are not representative of other datasets, potentially limiting the applicability of our findings to different domains such as natural language processing or other forms of visual data.
- Scalability and Computational Overhead: Our instance-level smoothing mechanism, while effective, introduces additional computational overhead that may not be scalable for extremely large datasets or models with billions of parameters. The increased computational requirements could hinder the practical deployment of our framework in resourceconstrained environments.
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 3. Hyperparameter Sensitivity: The success of our method heavily relies on the careful tuning of hyperparameters related to instance-level smoothing and noise injection. Identifying the optimal settings for these parameters can be challenging and may require extensive experimentation, which could limit the ease of adoption for practitioners with limited resources or expertise in hyperparameter optimization.

| 810 | 4. Impact on Training Time: The necessity to balance privacy and utility often comes with a |
|------------|--|
| 811 | trade-off in training time. Our method, which includes additional smoothing processes and |
| 812 | noise injection, may result in longer training times compared to non-DP models. This could |
| 813 | be a critical limitation for applications requiring rapid model development and deployment. |
| 814 | 5. Potential for Subpopulation Fairness: Despite our efforts to mitigate accuracy disparities |
| 815 | across subpopulations, the inherent complexity of ensuring fairness in DP models means |
| 816 | that some level of disparity may still persist. Future work is needed to develop more robust |
| 817 | methods for guaranteeing fairness across diverse and heterogeneous subpopulations. |
| 818 | 6. Theoretical Assumptions: Our theoretical insights and error bounds are based on certain |
| 819 | assumptions regarding sample complexity and instance-level smoothing factors. The prac- |
| 820 | tical validity of these assumptions in real-world scenarios needs further empirical validation |
| 821 | across a broader range of datasets and model architectures. |
| 822 | |
| 823 | 7. Privacy Budget Allocation: The allocation of the privacy budget in DP models is a critical factor that influences the overall performance. Our framework provides guidelines for op- |
| 824 | timizing this balance, but the practical implementation of these guidelines can be complex |
| 825 | and may not always achieve the desired outcomes in every context. |
| 826 | |
| 827 | Addressing these limitations in future research will be crucial for advancing the practical applica- |
| 828 | bility and robustness of differentially private deep learning models, ensuring that they can meet the |
| 829 | dual challenges of high accuracy and fairness across a wide range of applications. |
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