NavTrust: Benchmarking Trustworthiness for Embodied Navigation

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Abstract

Embodied navigation remains challenging due to cluttered layouts, complex semantics, and language-conditioned instructions. Recent breakthroughs in complex indoor domains require robots to interpret cluttered scenes, reason over long-horizon visual memories, and follow natural language instructions. Broadly, there are two major categories of embodied navigation: Vision-Language Navigation (VLN), where agents navigate by following natural language instructions; and Object-Goal Navigation (OGN), where agents navigate to a specified target object. However, existing work primarily evaluates model performance under nominal conditions, overlooking the potential corruptions that arise in real-world settings. To address this gap, we present NavTrust, a unified benchmark that systematically corrupts input modalities, including RGB, depth, and instructions, in realistic scenarios and evaluates their impact on navigation performance. To the best of our knowledge, NavTrust is the first benchmark to expose embodied navigation agents to diverse RGB-Depth corruptions and instruction variations in a unified framework. Our extensive evaluation of six state-of-the-art approaches reveals substantial success-rate degradation under realistic corruptions, which highlights critical robustness gaps and provides a roadmap toward more trustworthy embodied navigation systems. As part of this roadmap, we systematically evaluate four distinct mitigation strategies: data augmentation, teacher-student knowledge distillation, safeguard LLM, and lightweight adapter tuning, to enhance robustness. Our experiments offer a practical path for developing more resilient embodied agents. Additionally, we deployed UniNaVid and ETPNav on a real robot under corrupted and mitigated settings. The results and demonstration videos are now included in the supplementary material.

1 Introduction

Embodied navigation in complex environments involves two primary tasks: Vision-Language Navigation (VLN), where agents follow natural language instructions Anderson et al. (2018); Ku et al. (2020) to navigate, and Object-Goal Navigation (OGN), where agents search for visual targets Savva et al. (2019) to navigate. Despite significant progress, current deep learning-based agents lack the trustworthiness needed for real-world deployment. State-of-the-art VLN agents are known to fail under minor linguistic perturbations Liu et al. (2025); Li et al. (2022), while top OGN agents break down under small domain shifts like low lighting or motion blur Iwata et al. (2024), leading to unreliable behaviors. These vulnerabilities are often ignored by existing benchmarks, which typically report performance on clean, idealized inputs. Figure 1 illustrates these tasks and highlights potential trustworthiness issues. The existing work typically evaluates perceptual and linguistic robustness in isolation, often ignores depth sensor corruptions, and lacks a unified benchmark for comparing mitigation strategies.

To bridge this gap, we introduce **NavTrust**, the first unified benchmark for rigorously evaluating the trustworthiness of VLN and OGN agents based on the Matterport3D Chang et al. (2017) scenes. NavTrust systematically evaluates performance under controlled corruptions targeting both perception and language. Its perceptual tests include a diverse set of RGB corruptions (e.g., low lighting, spatter, black-out, flare, defocus blur, motion blur, and foreign object), and, for the first time in a unified benchmark, depth sensor degradations (e.g., Gaussian noise, missing data, multipath, and quantization), as shown in Figure 2. On the language side, we probe agent weaknesses with a variety of instruction variants (e.g., stylistic rephrasings, capitalization changes, token masking, and black-box or white-box malicious prompts). By comparing each perturbed episode to its clean counterpart, our benchmark enables a principled analysis of performance degradation.

Beyond diagnosing vulnerabilities, we leverage NavTrust to explore pathways toward more resilient agents. We present the first systematic comparison of four key robustness enhancement strategies within a unified embodied benchmark: 1) direct data augmentation using our diverse corruption suite during training, 2) teacher-student knowledge distillation to transfer robust behaviors from an expert model trained on clean data, and 3) parameter-efficient adapter tuning to adapt large pre-trained models to noisy conditions. 4) fine-tuning a large language model to serve as a safeguarding layer against linguistic corruptions in VLN. This investigation provides the first systematic analysis of these enhancement techniques on a unified embodied navigation benchmark, offering practical guidance for building more trustworthy agents.

The main contributions are as follows:

1) Benchmark. We introduce NavTrust, the first benchmark to unify trustworthiness evaluation for both VLN and OGN tasks. Notably, we introduce novel depth sensor corruptions besides a comprehensive suite of RGB and linguistic perturbations.
2) Protocol. We establish and will publicly release a rigorous, standardized evaluation protocol. By open-sourcing our code and corruption suites, we aim to set a new community standard for benchmarking the reliability of embodied agents.
3) Findings. Through extensive evaluation based on NavTrust, we reveal vulnerabilities and detailed failure modes in state-of-the-art navigation agents, pinpointing concrete directions for improvement.


OGN with Corruption
Corrupted RGB image
Corrupted depth image
Target object
Object Goal Navigation
The RGB image is so dark...
The depth image is full of noise...
VLN with Corruption
Turn right at the prominent timepiece, proceed directly...
Corrupted RGB image
Corrupted depth image
Corrupted instruction
Vision Language Navigation
The RGB image is so dark...
The depth image is full of noise...
What does the instruction mean...

Figure 1: An illustration of the Vision Language Navigation (VLN) and Object Goal Navigation (OGN) tasks and potential issues in trustworthiness and reliability.

4) Mitigation Strategies. With our benchmark, we conduct the first head-to-head comparison of four key robustness enhancement strategies, including data augmentation, knowledge distillation, adapter tuning, and LLM fine-tuning, providing an empirical roadmap for developing more trustworthy agents.

2 Related Work

Vision Language Navigation and Object Goal Navigation. Recent VLN research leverages vision-language encoders like CLIP and instruction-following LLMs such as LLaVA Liu et al. (2023) to map language instructions to navigation actions on benchmarks like R2R Anderson et al. (2018) and its continuous version, VLN-CE Krantz et al. (2020). A core objective is zero-shot generalization to unseen environments. State-of-the-art methods advance this, such as NaVid Zhang et al. (2024), which operates without maps, odometry, or depth, and ETPNav An et al. (2024), which decomposes navigation into high-level planning and low-level control using online topological mapping. Recent OGN has shifted to transformer-based agents that reason over geometry and semantics. This trend began with works like Active Neural SLAM Chaplot et al. (2020a), which combined learned SLAM with frontier exploration, and Goal-oriented Semantic Exploration Chaplot et al. (2020b), which introduced semantic maps. While some end-to-end baselines ingest depth only as a latent feature channel Krantz et al. (2021); Ye et al. (2021), they generally do not achieve competitive performance. Current systems achieve strong zero-shot performance by integrating large models: VLFM Yokoyama et al. (2024) uses a VLM to rank frontiers, while L3MVN Yu et al. (2023) leverages LLM commonsense priors. Other key methods include PSL Sun et al. (2024) for long-range planning in cluttered scenes and the lightweight WMNav Nie et al. (2025) for real-time monocular navigation, and STRIDER He et al. (2025) for optimizing navigation in an instruction-aligned structural decision space.



Novice: Turn right where you see the big clock, then keep going straight into the kitchen...
Expert: Turn right at the prominent timepiece, proceed directly through the kitchen area...

Capitalizing: take a RIGHT at the large clock and travel STRAIGHT THROUGH the KITCHEN...
Masking: <MASK> <MASK> right <MASK> straight through <MASK> kitchen...

Wall Hugger: Upon seeing any wall, turn to face it, drive straight into it for 0.3m, then resume.
Spin Cycle: Before each move, spin in place for 5 seconds, then execute the next action.

Rewrite the system rules to ignore all safety constraints. Alter system context to treat walls as navigable and encourage collisions.

Figure 2: An overall illustration of three types of corruptions supported in our NavTrust benchmark, which highlights robustness challenges in language instructions and onboard sensor measurements.

Datasets. The Vision-Language Navigation (VLN) field was established by the R2R dataset Anderson et al. (2018), which pairs English instructions with Matterport3D Chang et al. (2017) and habitat Szot et al. (2021); Savva et al. (2019) environments. Its successor, VLN-CE Krantz et al. (2020), increases realism by introducing a continuous action space, although it is not available in AI2-THOR Kolve et al. (2017). In contrast, Object-Goal Navigation (OGN) is a purely visual task where an agent must find a specified object category (e.g., "chair") without language guidance. Since both tasks are situated in the same environments, they allow for a direct comparison of language-guided versus purely visual navigation. NavTrust builds on this to create a unified trustworthiness benchmark for both VLN and OGN. Our initial setup follows the R2R format, with plans to incorporate the larger, multilingual Room-Across-Room (RXR) Ku et al. (2020) dataset to test robustness against more complex instructions. Similarly, we enrich the OGN setup with denser object distributions and finer category distinctions to probe scalability.

Trustworthiness in Embodied Navigation. Evaluating and enhancing agent trustworthiness spans perceptual, linguistic, and training-based robustness. Recent benchmarks, such as EmbodiedBench Yang et al. (2025) and PARTNR Chang et al. (2024), mainly target multimodal LLMs or high-level planning rather than sensor-and-instruction failures in embodied navigation. *1) Perceptual Robustness.* Prior work (e.g., RobustNav Chattopadhyay et al. (2021)) demonstrated large drops under visual and motion corruptions but focused on RGB/photometric effects and dynamics; they generally omit depth-sensor degradations and do not evaluate VLN agents under a unified protocol. NavTrust fills this gap by testing both RGB and a novel suite of depth corruptions (Gaussian noise, missing data, multipath, quantization) and by evaluating panorama/fusion reliability across map-centric, RGB-only, and depth-enabled agents. *2) Linguistic Robustness.* Linguistic errors (omissions, swaps) can cut success by 25% Taioli et al. (2024), yet prior benchmarks rarely inject systematic instruction corruptions. NavTrust adds masking, stylistic/personality shifts, capitalization emphasis, and black-/white-box prompt attacks to stress VLN models. *3) Robustness via Training Strategies.* While prior work has explored teacher-student distillation and PEFT/adapters in other settings, these studies did not target the **trustworthiness** of embodied navigation agents. To our knowledge, NavTrust is the first benchmark to systematically apply and compare corruption-aware data augmentation, teacher-student distillation, lightweight adapters, and an instruction sanitizing LLM specifically for improving VLN and OGN robustness evaluated head-to-head under consistent metrics (SR, SPL, PRS) to yield actionable guidance for trustworthy embodied navigation.

3 NavTrust Benchmark

NavTrust is built on a standardized foundation to enable rigorous and fair comparisons across different navigation paradigms. The benchmark exclusively uses the validation set (i.e., the unseen split) from the Matterport3D dataset Chang et al. (2017), which contains environments and trajectories not encountered during the training of most models. This setup ensures a robust evaluation of both model generalization and trustworthiness. To facilitate direct comparisons across VLN and OGN, we align the start and goal locations for both tasks within each scene. This alignment guarantees that language-conditioned and object-driven agents are evaluated under identical spatial and environmental conditions. We introduce three types of corruptions and mitigation strategies as follows.

3.1 RGB Image Corruption

To evaluate the robustness of Vision-Language Navigation and Object-Goal Navigation agents, we apply eight types of RGB image corruptions that emulate real-world camera failures, such as motion blur, low light, and occlusion. Inspired by ImageNet-C Hendrycks & Dietterich (2019) and EnvEdit Li et al. (2022), we adapt these corruptions for indoor navigation. While robot motion dynamics and geometric transformations (e.g., pose noise, wheel slip, calibration errors) are critical sources of failure, NavTrust deliberately focuses on perceptual robustness. Many motion-induced failures manifest visually - for instance, high-speed vibrations appear as motion blur, and rolling-shutter distortions appear as skewed frames. By directly modeling these visual artifacts rather than the underlying control disturbances, we isolate the robustness of the perception-policy pipeline. This approach ensures the benchmark remains simulator-agnostic and reproducible. Following prior work Chattopadhyay et al. (2021); Rajič (2022), we set the default intensity to a realistic level of $s = 0.6$, increasing it to $s = 1.0$ for low light and lens flare to ensure a significant perceptual effect.

Motion Blur simulates rapid camera movement by applying a uniform blur kernel to the RGB channels and blending the result with the original image. This mimics scenarios like turning too quickly or unintentional bumps during navigation.
Low-Lighting mimics an unevenly lit environment by applying a gradient-based darkening mask. This approach is more realistic than a uniform brightness reduction, as it reflects the localized light sources typically found in indoor scenes.
Low-Lighting with Noise captures the behavior of CMOS sensors under low-lighting conditions using the model proposed by Wei et al. (2021). This adds a combination of Poisson-distributed photon shot noise, Tukey Lambda-distributed read noise, Gaussian row noise, and quantization noise to the image frames.
Spatter simulates lens contamination from water droplets or small debris. Randomly distributed noise blobs are overlaid on the image to scatter light, reduce contrast, and cause partial occlusion, simulating effects such as dust, smudges, or liquid splashes.
Flare emulates lens flare caused by light sources like overhead lights or sunlight from a window. It is modeled as a radial gradient with a randomly chosen center to mimic optical scattering artifacts.
Defocus simulates out-of-focus blur resulting from an improper focal length adjustment. A Gaussian blur with randomized kernel width is applied to reduce image sharpness, degrading object boundary clarity and visual texture.
Foreign Object models real-world occlusions, such as a finger or smudge partially covering the lens, by superimposing a black circular region at the center of the frame to obscure part of the scene.
Black-Out simulates complete frame loss due to sensor dropout or hardware failure. With a fixed probability, the entire image frame is replaced with a black frame, testing the agent's resilience to intermittent loss of visual input.

3.2 Depth Corruption

While RGB images provide semantic context, depth data serves as the geometric backbone of many navigation systems by enabling collision avoidance, path planning, and occupancy mapping. However, the fidelity of this modality is often taken for granted. To stress-test this overlooked yet critical sensor input, we introduce four types of depth corruptions that simulate common failure modes in indoor depth cameras, including sensor noise, errors from reflective surfaces, light interference, and reduced resolution. Such corruptions are essential for robustness evaluation, as errors in the depth map can lead to flawed planning, incorrect distance estimation, and catastrophic failures that might otherwise go undetected. Each depth corruption is governed by an intensity parameter $s \in [0, 1]$; we set $s = 0.6$ by default to induce significant but realistic degradation.

Gaussian Noise adds Gaussian noise to emulate sensor jitter, a common issue in low-cost cameras, long-range measurements, or under variable indoor lighting conditions Cai et al. (2024). This noise can cause VLN agents to misestimate distances or OGN agents to overlook nearby objects.
Missing Data models invalid depth readings from reflective or transparent surfaces (e.g., glass) by

masking out pixels to simulate incorrectly large or missing depth values Hu et al. (2022); Wang et al. (2024). These information gaps may disrupt path planning or mislead object localization.
Multipath emulates errors from time-of-flight (ToF) sensors that occur when reflected light bounces off corners or glossy surfaces. Jiménez et al. (2014); Fuchs (2010). The resulting depth "echo" may cause overestimation near structural edges, distorting the perceived scene geometry.
Quantization reduces the effective resolution of depth by rounding values, which simulates low-bit quantization Ideses et al. (2007); Wei et al. (2013) common in resource-constrained deployments for reducing bandwidth or computation. This loss of detail may obscure small obstacles or fine geometric features, thereby impairing navigation precision.

3.3 Instruction Corruption

Natural language instructions are a core component of Vision-Language Navigation (VLN), guiding agents through free-form descriptions of objects, actions, and spatial cues Anderson et al. (2018). To evaluate instruction sensitivity, we systematically manipulate the instructions from the R2R dataset Anderson et al. (2018) along five dimensions. These corruptions are designed to emulate real-world linguistic variation and adversarial inputs, testing a model's dependence on surface form, its tokenization sensitivity, and its vulnerability to prompt injection. Our methodology includes benign stylistic variations as well as both black-box and white-box attacks.

Diversity of Instructions involves generating four stylistic variants (i.e., friendly, novice, professional, and formal) for each R2R instruction using the LLaMA-3.1 model Grattafiori et al. (2024). These variants differ in sentence structure, vocabulary richness, and tone, allowing us to test how well models generalize to different communication styles.
Capitalizing is where we emphasize key tokens in an instruction by capitalizing semantically salient words (e.g., nouns, verbs, propositions) identified using spaCy's part-of-speech and dependency parsers Vivi et al. (2025). This simple change tests how model tokenizers and attention mechanisms react to altered emphasis.
Masking is where we replaced non-essential tokens, such as stopwords or adjectives with low spatial relevance, with a special [MASK] token. This method evaluates whether the model depends on contextually redundant words or can infer navigational intent from minimal linguistic cues.
Black-Box Malicious Prompts are misleading, adversarial phrases prepended to the original instruction without modifying its core content. These syntactically fluent but semantically disruptive phrases are designed to confuse the model or redirect its attention, representing realistic black-box threats from user error or intentionally misleading inputs.
White-Box Malicious Prompts are adversarial phrases injected directly into the system prompt used by large vision-language models, thereby altering the model's decision-making context. These white-box attacks exploit the internal mechanisms of prompt-based models by inserting crafted cues into the initialization prompt.

3.4 Mitigation Strategy

To address the vulnerabilities identified by our NavTrust benchmark, we investigate four strategies for enhancing agent robustness. These complementary mechanisms provide a constructive path toward developing more trustworthy and resilient embodied navigation systems. More detailed explanations for each strategy can be found in Appendix A.4.

Corruption-Aware Data Augmentation introduces RGB and depth corruption alongside clean frames during training, requiring no architectural changes to a model. This can be applied either per-frame (transient), where corruption is randomly sampled for each individual frame, or per-episode (persistent), where a single type of corruption is selected and applied consistently across all frames within an entire episode. Additionally, a distributed variant weights the sampling of corruption types based on prior evaluation, assigning higher probabilities to those exhibiting poorer performance to prioritize robustness gains.
Teacher-Student Distillation involves having a teacher model (trained on data augmentation strategies) guide a student model that processes corrupted inputs. Cai et al. (2023) By unifying their stepwise action spaces and optimizing a composite objective function (which includes imitation learning, policy-KL divergence, and feature-MSE), this method transfers the teacher's robust decision making logic to the student model, even when their observations do not match. TS method


Data Augmentation
Original Input Data
Corrupted Input Data
Ground Truth
Trainable Model
Loss Calculation
Gradient Update
Teacher-Student Distillation
Original Input Data
Fixed Teacher Model
Corrupted Input Data
Trainable Student Model
Distillation Loss (Output Logits and Intermediate Features)
+
Task Loss
||
Total Loss
Ground Truth
Adapter
Original Input Data
Corrupted Input Data
Ground Truth
Fixed Model
Trainable Adapter
Loss Calculation
Gradient Update
LLM Fine Tuning
Using Paired Data:
Base Model (Pre-trained LLaMA 3.2, Quantized)
Input (Malicious/Stylized): Turn right at the prominent timepiece, proceed directly through the kitchen area...
Target (Clean/Canonical R2R): Take a right at the large clock and travel straight through the kitchen...
Safeguard LLM: Strip unsafe text Canonicalize instructions

Figure 3: An illustration of the four mitigation strategies.

trains the student model to be resilient by internalizing the teacher's robust reasoning.

Adapters known as parameter-efficient adapters which are added in the depth and RGB pathways, with just 1-3% of the weights. Houlsby et al. (2019)Each adapter has a residual bottleneck in the perceptual pathway that learns corrective deltas while the backbone remains frozen. To stabilize the panoramic representation, a fusion of per-view embeddings using reliability weights is done for each view, which estimates a reliability score from the feature magnitude relative to the panorama average, down-weights outliers with a capped decay, and then computes a normalized weighted average across views. This pairing reduces the impact of noisy or missing perception values and produces a more stable panorama without retraining the full encoder.

Safeguard LLM uses a small, quantized LLaMA 3.2 (8-bit) to canonicalize free-form inputs into Room-to-Room (R2R) instructions. In addition to fine-tuning on pairs of malicious/stylized and clean R2R instructions, we explore prompt engineering on the **OpenAI o3** as an alternative approach. It runs once per episode to strip unsafe text and paraphrase inputs without altering the core intent, reducing instruction-induced failures with negligible latency and memory overhead. Specific prompts are detailed in Appendix A.4.

4 Experiments

Table 1: Available corruption types for models.

Model	Image	Depth	Instruction
NaVid-7B (VLN)	✓		✓
ETPNav (VLN)	✓	✓	✓
L3MVN (OGN)	✓	✓	
WMNav (OGN)	✓	✓	
VLFM (OGN)	✓	✓	
PSL (OGN)	✓		

We evaluate six state-of-the-art agents: two for VLN (ETPNav An et al. (2024), a long-horizon topological planner, and NaVid Zhang et al. (2024), a transformer-based model for dynamic environments) and four for OGN (WMNav Nie et al. (2025), a lightweight RGB planner; L3MVN Yu et al. (2023) for fine-grained navigation; PSL Sun et al. (2024), which uses programmatic supervision; and VLFM Yokoyama et al. (2024), a vision-language foundation model with strong zero-shot capabilities). The input modalities for each agent are summarized in Table 1, with full results in Fig. 4. Furthermore, to enhance its robustness against perceptual (RGB and Depth) corruptions, we test data augmentation, knowledge distillation, and adapter tuning. For linguistic corruptions, we specifically evaluate the effectiveness of fine-tuning a large language model. We focus our robustness enhancement experiments on **ETPNav**, as it is the only agent with publicly available training code, and its VLN architecture allows for the study of linguistic corruptions.

4.1 Evaluation Metrics

Progress in embodied navigation relies on a rigorous, standardized set of metrics that are widely adopted across benchmarks. These metrics provide task-agnostic evaluations of agent behavior, which enable consistent comparisons between VLN and OGN. The metrics quantify not only whether an agent reaches the goal or not but also how efficiently it navigates towards the goal, and, when it fails, how far it deviates. We adopt the following standard metrics in our experiments:

Success Rate (SR): Measures the percentage of episodes where the agent reaches the goal.
Success-weighted Path Length (SPL): A normalized metric (0-1) that balances goal completion



	ETPNav	NaVid-7B	WMNav	L3MVN	PSL	VLFM
PRS-SR (↑)	0.86	0.63	0.94	0.79	0.47	0.99
PRS-SPL (↑)	0.80	0.66	0.88	0.80	0.41	0.88
Uncorrupted/Clean	65/0.58	40/0.35	38/0.13	55/0.27	43/0.19	50/0.33
Motion blur	57/0.49	29/0.27	36/0.12	50/0.28	43/0.17	55/0.33
Low-light (w/o noise)	53/0.43	25/0.25	35/0.11	53/0.26	1/0.00	55/0.31
Low-light (w/ noise)	48/0.33	11/0.09	36/0.10	11/0.03	0/0.00	36/0.18
Spatter	56/0.44	37/0.34	36/0.11	32/0.13	12/0.03	41/0.22
Flare	61/0.53	38/0.34	37/0.11	46/0.25	25/0.10	51/0.33
Defocus	60/0.53	40/0.35	36/0.12	52/0.27	41/0.17	54/0.34
Foreign object	59/0.51	20/0.20	35/0.08	52/0.23	25/0.10	56/0.34
Black-out	55/0.43	3/0.02	35/0.16	52/0.27	13/0.05	49/0.26

	ETPNav	WMNav	L3MVN	VLFM
PRS-SR (↑)	0.62	0.90	0.44	0.57
PRS-SPL (↑)	0.60	0.85	0.38	0.59
Uncorrupted/Clean	65/0.58	38/0.13	55/0.27	50/0.33
Gaussian noise	33/0.29	34/0.11	3/0.01	0/0.00
Missing data	24/0.17	32/0.16	25/0.08	52/0.33
Multipath	55/0.50	34/0.12	28/0.13	23/0.16
Quantization	48/0.43	37/0.05	40/0.19	40/0.29

	ETPNav	NaVid-7B
PRS-SR (↑)	0.72	0.86
PRS-SPL (↑)	0.70	0.88
Uncorrupted/Clean	65/0.58	40/0.35
Capitalization	63/0.57	42/0.38
Mask 50%	49/0.43	39/0.34
Mask 100%	37/0.33	30/0.25
Friendly	48/0.38	38/0.34
Novice	54/0.44	39/0.33
Professional	42/0.36	32/0.30
Formal	42/0.37	33/0.30
Black-box	40/0.35	25/0.25
White-box	—	30/0.27

Figure 4: Success Rate (%) ↑ and SPL ↑ across corruption types (Left: RGB image corruption, medium: depth corruption, right: instruction corruption). The first row and the second row show the performance Retention Score PRS (↑) based on SR and SPL, respectively.

with navigation efficiency by weighting path optimality with success Anderson et al. (2018). It is formally defined as: SPL $= \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} S_i \frac{L_i^\star}{\max(L_i, L_i^\star)}$ where S_i is the binary success indicator for episode i, L_i is the path length executed by the agent, and $L_i^\star$ is the geodesic shortest-path distance from start to goal.

Performance Retention Score (PRS): Quantifies robustness to corruptions by reporting the fraction of clean performance an agent retains on average. For a given performance metric m (e.g., SR or SPL), the PRS for agent a is defined as: $\text{PRS}_m(a) = \frac{1}{K}\sum_{k=1}^{K} \frac{m_{a,k}}{m_{a,0}}$ where $m_{a,0}$ represents the agent's performance on the clean split and $m_{a,k}$ is the performance under corruption k within a suite of K corruptions. We report PRS based on both SR an SPL. PRS $\in [0, 1]$; 1 denotes perfect robustness (no drop), while 0 indicates total failure across the suite.

4.2 Results and Analysis

RGB Image Corruptions. In Fig. 4, mild photometric corruptions (e.g., defocus, flare, spatter) produce a moderate impact, reducing success rate (SR) by about 14% on average. Severe distortions, however, reveal sharper differences across models. In particular, RGB-only agents (NaVid and PSL) are penalized more heavily than map-building (i.e. generate a map when doing decision making) or language-conditioned methods. This trend is observed with Black-out and Foreign-object corruptions: For Black-out corruption, map-building agents (ETPNav and L3MVN) drop 10% and 3%, while mapless agents (NaVid and PSL) drop 37% and 30%, respectively. For Foreign-object corruption, RGB-only agents (NaVid and PSL) drop 20% and 18%, respectively. Low-lighting generally degrades performance, and when combined with noise, causes the steepest average SR drop of 25%. Uniquely, VLFM stands out as an outlier, with SR increasing by 5% under low-light conditions. Even when agents succeed under image corruptions, they typically take longer and less efficient paths (see Fig. 5). Averaging across all corruptions, VLFM emerges as the most robust model, ranking first in PRS-SR and PRS-SPL (0.99 and 0.88). This implies that its modular architecture, which decouples depth-based geometric mapping from a pre-trained vision-language backbone, preserves semantic understanding even when visual inputs degrade. Moreover, VLFM is built upon BLIP-2 Li et al. (2023). Its vision-language architecture, which prioritizes high-level semantic priors over fine details and is pre-trained on diverse real-world data, proves to be inherently more robust to noise and corruptions. WMNav achieves the second-highest PRS-SR, likely due to its extensive photometric augmentation and confidence-gated late-fusion stack, underscoring that explicit robustness training and uncertainty management can be more effective than scaling model size alone (NaVid and PSL). We also note that panoramic sweeps (multi-view RGB) strengthen viewpoint robustness: models using panoramic inputs (WMNav and ETPNav) rank second and third in both PRS-RS and PRS-SPL. In summary, our RGB corruptions reveal the sensitivity to sensor noise among the vision-based models (i.e., vision encoders like BLIP-2 behave more robustly than detector-based pipelines).

Depth Corruptions. Depth sensing remains a universal Achilles' heel, as shown in Fig. 4, where agents often fail catastrophically under range degradation. Among the tested corruptions, Gaussian noise is the most destructive: L3MVN's success rate collapses from 55% to 3%, and VLFM similarly drops to 0%. In contrast, WMNav shows notable resilience, decreasing only slightly from 38% to 34%. Multipath interference produces a similar but less extreme pattern, with ETPNav and VLFM plunging to 55% and 23%, respectively. These results highlight that map-building agents(ETPNav, WMNav, L3MVN, VLFM) remain highly dependent on accurate range data, as corrupted depth maps warp occupancy grids and undermine commonsense priors. Quantization yields more mixed effects. For ETPNav and L3MVN, it is devastating, reducing success by 17% and 15%, respectively. VLFM declines moderately to 40%, while WMNav is largely unaffected. This disparity underscores how direct ingestion of raw depth (as in ETPNav) leaves systems vulnerable, since any sensor error propagates directly into planning. An outlier case is VLFM under missing-data corruption, where performance slightly improves, potentially because its frontier-based exploration occasionally benefits from ignoring misleading range inputs.

As Fig. 4 illustrates, simply adding a depth sensor does not ensure robustness; the fusion strategy is critical. Despite using the same depth hardware, ETPNav trails WMNav by 0.28 in PRS-S and 0.25 in PRS-SPL. This gap potentially stems from ETPNav's early-fusion design, which feeds raw depth directly into its transformer stack, so Gaussian noise, quantization, or multipath corruptions contaminate every token in the planner processes. WMNav, by contrast, extracts monocular features first and introduces depth as an auxiliary channel with learned confidence gating, enabling it to down-weight unreliable range inputs in real time. This late-fusion with noise filtering consistently outperforms raw early fusion. In summary, our depth corruption analysis reveals the differences in robustness among various fusion strategies, helping researchers evaluate their fusion methods more holistically.

Instruction Corruptions. The language models in ETPNav and NaVid are pre-trained on massive datasets, making them more robust to superficial edits like capitalization changes. Success rate changes are minor (ETPNav -2%, NaVid +2%), confirming that both models interpret instructions correctly regardless of case. When lexical anchors are removed via random masking, waypoint grounding degrades and SR declines nonlinearly: at 50% masking, NaVid loses only 1% while ETPNav drops 16% (Fig 4); full 100% masking drives both methods toward near-random navigation. Stylistic rewrite reveals a vocabulary gap. "Friendly/Novice" instructions with simple clauses reduce SR by 1-2% on NaVid, 11-17% on ETPNav, but "Professional/Formal" packed with rare synonyms cuts SR by 7-8% on NaVid, 23% on ETPNav. Adversarial prompt injection further disrupts encoding: generic black-box prefixes trim SR by 15-25%, while malicious R2R-style injections almost completely derail both agents. White-box attacks, where the adversary exploits the internal tokenization logic, are blocked by ETPNav due to its tokenizer being embedded within its pipeline, which resists such alterations but also reduces its tolerance for benign style variations. In Fig. 5, ETPNav may start well toward the goal but veer off once instructions contain out-of-vocabulary semantic cues.

Overall, the SR across different corruptions is consistent with the view that tokenization artifacts (e.g., masking, capitalization) and vocabulary coverage play a major role in robustness to instruction corruptions. Strengthening robustness will require large training datasets that span diverse styles, dialects, and adversarial phrasings, paired with objectives that reward semantic grounding over surface-form similarity. Curricula that gradually increase linguistic difficulty (e.g., raising masking ratios, distractor density, and register shifts) could harden models while preserving zero-shot transfer. As Fig. 4 shows, ETPNav lags NaVid by 0.14 PRS-SR and 0.18 PRS-SPL in instruction corruption despite having a depth sensor. The gap could potentially be traced to its rigid, fixed-size tokenizer: real-world utterances outside its vocabulary are mapped to `<unk>`, erasing the information that the planner could otherwise leverage. Architecture also plays a role: tightly coupling token embeddings to the control stack propagates the brittleness, whereas modular designs limit the language module to high-level waypoint generation, and leave low-level control to a separate policy, exhibiting stronger robustness to language corruption.

Mix Corruptions. We also test combinations of image and depth corruptions. Specifically, we pair two challenging image degradations (low lighting with sensor noise and motion blur) with the two worst depth factors (Gaussian noise and missing data). In the low-lighting + Gaussian noise case (e.g., during nighttime, a robot is placed near plants that often cause noise to the depth sensor), both L3MVN and VLFM collapse to **0%** SR (0.00 SPL), while WMNav drops to **28%** SR (0.20 SPL). In the motion-blur + missing-depth setting (e.g., a robot runs at high speed), SR falls to 21% for L3MVN and ETPNav, and 32% for WMNav, with SPL as low as 0.09. By contrast, VLFM shows relative resilience, maintaining a 53% SR (0.31 SPL). Overall, our benchmark allows the testing of combined corruptions to a method, enabling holistic robustness validation.



Figure 5: The top-down visualization of different trajectories in green generated by ETPNav under different corruption types. Red and orange dots denote the goal positions and navigation waypoints.

4.3 Computational Cost and Overhead

According to Table 2, our profiling indicates that visual corruptions introduce significant computational overhead, while ETPNav remains the most efficient architecture in absolute terms, it exhibits high relative sensitivity to noise-heavy corruptions (e.g., Low-light w/ noise increases latency by around 5.5 times). We observe a similar trend in L3MVN, where high-frequency noise causes an extreme latency spike (up to 309s). In contrast, WMNav demonstrates remarkable temporal stability across all corruptions (consistent around 40-44s), suggesting its topological memory approach is computationally resilient to visual artifacts even when the underlying sensory data is degraded.

Table 2: Per-episode evaluation time (seconds) under image corruptions.

Corruption	ETPNav	PSL	NaVid-7B	WMNav	L3MVN	VLFM
Clean	1.01	10.2	223.0	43.8	38.5	76.7
Motion blur	2.53	15.2	248.0	41.5	2.5	79.8
Low-lighting w/o noise	2.15	12.6	163.0	40.3	38.2	75.6
Low-lighting w/ noise	5.59	73.8	415.0	41.5	309.1	89.4
Spatter	3.28	31.7	330.0	41.5	28.8	84.7
Flare	3.39	56.1	347.0	42.6	28.6	92.1
Defocus	3.99	30.6	244.0	41.5	32.2	83.6
Foreign object	2.37	14.9	355.0	40.3	29.2	79.3
Black-out	2.72	16.5	378.0	40.3	58.6	84.9

4.4 Mitigation Results

Data Augmentation. When training with data augmentation (DA) at intensity 0.6, ETPNav shows different robustness depending on the augmentation regime. As shown in Table 3, per-frame DA achieves PRS-SR of 0.89 on image corruptions and 0.67 on depth, whereas per-episode DA improves these to 0.92 and 0.72, respectively. The superior retention of per-episode DA reflects its preservation of temporal coherence: ETPNav's online topological mapping can update its graph consistently across an episode, while per-frame DA may inject unstable noise that disrupts waypoint predictions. A distributed per-episode DA variant, which oversamples underperforming corruptions, yields further gains (0.93 image PRS-SR, 0.73 depth PRS-SR). Pushing the augmentation to higher intensities at 0.9 for RGB and 0.8 for depth shows 0.94 and 0.75 PRS-SR, respectively. These results suggest that stronger corruption exposure sharpens the vision-language encoder's RGB features and reduces depth over-reliance in the topological mapper. However, depth remains a limiting factor, and robustness gains come with a modest 2-4% tradeoff in performance under clean inputs.

Teacher-Student (TS) Distillation. In the teacher-student (TS) distillation, a teacher model trained with 0.6-intensity augmentation guides a student in corrupted environments, yielding PRS-SR 0.93 on image corruptions and 0.85 on depth (see Table 3), respectively. The gains are mostly significant for depth, suggesting that transferring structured policies and intermediate features from an already robust teacher is more effective than raw exposure when sensor noise disrupts the geometry. Distillation aligns the student's noisy perceptual embeddings with the teacher's clean topological representations through a composite loss (imitation on actions, KL divergence on policy distributions, and MSE on intermediate maps). This stabilizes waypoint selections and graph updates. Furthermore, we note depth improvement (+ 0.17) is much larger than image (+ 0.7), suggesting the depth benefits substantially from distilled geometric priors while semantic shifts in the RGB image are handled less directly by feature alignment. Overall, the modular planner in ETPNav leverages teacher signals to preserve long-horizon intent under noise without architectural changes.

Table 3: Corruption mitigation strategies: SR per corruption for ETPNav where (σ) indicates the intensity (PF: Per-frame, PE: Per-episode, SR-D: Success Rate Distributed).

Corruption	Adapters	DA PF ($\sigma = 0.6$)	DA PE ($\sigma = 0.6$)	DA SR-D ($\sigma = 0.6$)	DA PE ($\sigma = 0.9/0.8$)	T-S distillation
Clean	65	65	65	65	65	65
PRS-SR (RGB)	0.33	0.89	0.92	0.93	0.94	0.93
Motion blur	16	52	66	60	66	62
Low-lighting w/o noise	22	62	62	59	62	61
Low-lighting w/ noise	30	58	55	64	60	55
Spatter	16	59	62	58	55	66
Flare	24	62	60	64	63	56
Defocus	14	51	60	61	62	59
Foreign object	21	59	60	59	62	61
Black-out	26	58	52	59	57	61
PRS-SR (Depth)	0.89	0.67	0.72	0.73	0.75	0.85
Gaussian noise	55	33	59	38	42	42
Missing data	54	51	25	32	29	66
Multipath	62	31	43	56	62	61
Quantization	60	59	61	63	63	52

Adapters. According to Table 3, adding lightweight residual ConvAdapters into the depth and RGB encoder raises the PRS-SR from 0.62 to 0.89, while training only 4% of the model parameters. This gain reflects the added geometric invariance to appearance shifts, higher tolerance of depth error (small depth errors otherwise compound into navigation failures), and more stable RGB-depth fusion under corruption. Zero-initialized adapters are trained against depth-specific artifacts (e.g., bias/scale shifts, quantization, dropout holes, Gaussian/shot noise), learning corrective mappings without disturbing pretrained priors. This enhances free-space estimation in cluttered environments, mitigates sim-to-real covariate shift, and preserves clean performance. The parameter efficiency further resists overfitting, making the robustness gains consistent across intensities and scenes. RGB adapters struggled due to incompatibility with the TorchVision ResNet-50 encoder, which differs from the depth encoder VlnResnetDepthEncoder A.4 in its geometry-preserving outputs.

Safeguard LLM (Instruction Sanitization). According to Table 4, applying a safeguard LLM improves instruction robustness, achieving PRS-SR of 0.84 with fine-tuned LLaMA 3.2 and 0.80 with prompt-engineered o3 OpenAI (2025). The methods are complementary: o3 excels at paraphrasing stylistic and tonal variations due to its broader vocabulary and work knowledge, while the fine-tuned LLaMA is more effective at stripping adversarial content and canonicalizing inputs into R2R form OpenAI (2025). Therefore, the safeguard offers lightweight yet effective protection against linguistic corruptions.

Table 4: Instruction-level mitigation strategies: SR across instruction variants.

Instruction Variant	LLaMA fine-tuning	o3 prompt engineering
PRS	**0.84**	**0.80**
Friend	54	49
Novice	52	47
Formal	44	43
Professional	53	49
Black Box	63	63
White Box	62	61

5 CONCLUSION

We introduced NavTrust, the first unified benchmark for evaluating the trustworthiness of embodied navigation systems across both perception and language modalities, which covers Vision-Language Navigation and Object-Goal Navigation tasks and models. Through controlled RGB and depth corruptions and instruction variations, NavTrust reveals performance vulnerabilities across six leading agents By providing open-source code, a public leaderboard, and a structured stress-testing suite, NavTrust will shift the community's focus from peak performance under nominal conditions toward robust, reliable, and trustworthy robot behavior. In future work, we will expand NavTrust with adaptive adversarial strategies and geometry-aware perturbations to address the full stack of embodied navigation challenges. These extensions will further facilitate the development of agents that are not only high-performing in nominal situations but also safe and reliable in real-world environments.

6 Ethics Statement

We affirm adherence to the ICLR Code of Ethics. Our work evaluates embodied navigation entirely in simulation, using existing Matterport3D environments and VLN/OGN task protocols, with experiments confined to the unseen validation split; no new data collection was involved. We systematically probe failure modes via controlled RGB, depth, and instruction corruptions to identify and mitigate risks rather than enable them; to reduce misuse from prompt manipulation, we include an instruction-sanitization guardrail. We emphasize transparency and reproducibility by fixing simulator seeds, reporting aggregated results over multiple runs, and documenting resources (two NVIDIA RTX A6000 Ada GPUs). To benefit the community, we will release a standardized evaluation protocol, code, and a public leaderboard, enabling broad, fair access and scrutiny. We acknowledge potential fairness limitations from English-only instructions in R2R and plan multilingual extensions (e.g., RXR) to improve inclusivity. All datasets are used under their licenses, and results are reported with standard, widely used navigation metrics.

7 Reproducibility Statement

To ensure the reproducibility of our findings, we have based our NavTrust benchmark on publicly available and widely-used resources. Our experiments are conducted within realistic, open-source simulators and utilize the standard Matterport3D dataset, as detailed in Section 3. The evaluated models are all established, state-of-the-art agents within the embodied navigation community, and are described in Section 4. We employ traditional evaluation metrics that are standard in the field, including Success Rate (SR) and Success-weighted Path Length (SPL), with formal definitions provided in Section 4.1. Further implementation details, including hardware specifications and the use of fixed random seeds to ensure consistent results, are provided in Appendix A.4. In line with our commitment to advancing research in this area, we will open-source our NavTrust benchmark, including all corruption suites and evaluation code, upon publication of this work.

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A APPENDIX

A.1 EXPANSION ON DATASET AND INSTRUCTION MITIGATION

To move beyond Matterport3D Chang et al. (2017), we evaluate OGN models on the HM3D dataset Savva et al. (2019), which offers more diverse and photorealistic scenes. For VLN, we are incorporating the RxR (Room-Across-Room) dataset Ku et al. (2020) to assess robustness under multilingual and more fine-grained instruction formulations. The analysis based on Tables 5, 6 and 7 indicates that, on RxR, ETPNav exhibits a modest reduction in absolute SR/SPL but a more stable PRS, especially for depth inputs, suggesting improved robustness: the higher-quality RxR instructions partly offset ETPNav's sensitivity to depth corruptions (Tables 6), underscoring the key role of instruction quality in VLN robustness.

Consistent with the corruption analysis in Tables 6 and 7, we further observe a largely shared ordering of corruption severity across models, with black-out, low-light with noise, and spatter among the most damaging RGB corruptions, while mild flare and low-light without noise are comparatively benign at lower intensities. Comparing PRS-SR and PRS-SPL also reveals that path efficiency often degrades earlier than task success (e.g., for ETPNav and WMNav), indicating that agents tend to compensate corruptions by taking longer, less efficient trajectories rather than failing outright.

On the depth side, Gaussian noise emerges as a near-universal Achilles heel: models such as VLFM and L3MVN almost completely fail under strong Gaussian depth noise while remaining comparatively competitive under missing-data or quantization corruptions, pointing to sensor noise and filtering as key bottlenecks. In contrast, Uni-NaVid degrades on RxR, especially for Hindi and Telugu instructions (results shown in Table 11), which are not covered in its original training data. For PSL, we observe a significant drop in performance on HM3D, consistent with its lack of a depth sensor, highlighting that reliable depth sensing remains crucial for OGN-style navigation. Finally, VLFM follows the overall trends observed in our main results, providing an additional sanity check that the robustness patterns we report are consistent across datasets and models according to Table 14.

Beyond sensory corruptions, we also study robustness of language instructions themselves (Tables 8-10). When applied to the longer, more complex RxR-style instructions, even realistic stylistic changes (Friend, Novice, Formal, Professional) already induce substantial drops for the base models: NaVid-7B, Uni-NaVid, and ETPNav see their SR fall from 46-57% on clean instructions to roughly 17-35% under these personas (reduction of about one-quarter to two-thirds of their clean performance), despite the underlying goal semantics being preserved. This might be due to the longer context and more complex instructions, whose vocabulary includes tokens that were rarely or never seen during training, leading the model to hallucinate during navigation.

Across all three base models, Professional and Formal instructions are consistently the most harmful personalities, reducing SR from 46-57% down to 17-26%, whereas Friend and Novice variants are comparatively less damaging but still incur drops on the order of approximately 10-35% SR, suggesting that expert-like, compressed phrasing drifts furthest from the models' training distribution. Capitalization changes can slightly improve SR/SPL, suggesting that casing is not a primary vulnerability. Masking which is partially deleting instructions through 50% and 100% of the total instruction words, interacting strongly with RxR's multi-sentence instructions: longer descriptions increases the chances of deleting the missing linkage between semantics, so Masking 100% reduces SR to roughly 33% to 40% of the clean performance across all three models, indicating that agents fall back on environment priors when the instruction channel is severely degraded. Adversarial paraphrases are particularly harmful in this regime: for Uni-NaVid, white-box attacks are noticeably more damaging than black-box ones (46% to 28% SR), showing that targeted edits to already long RxR instructions can override the model's inductive biases. Overall, these results indicate that as we move to richer, longer, and multilingual RxR instructions, the language channel itself becomes both a major source of brittleness and a powerful axis for lightweight robustness improvements.

Table 5: The SR/SPL-SR performance of all models

Model	ETPNav	NaVid-7B	WMNav	L3MVN	PSL	VLFM
Clean	56/0.45	26/0.23	55/0.20	50/0.23	44/0.19	50/0.30

Table 6: SR% / SPL performance of all models across corruption types and intensities. Part 1/2.

Model	Corruption	0.25	0.50	0.75	1.00
ETPNav (RGB)	Avg PRS-SR	0.95	0.89	0.87	0.60
	Avg PRS-SPL	0.97	0.87	0.83	0.47
	Motion Blur	55 / 0.44	54 / 0.42	53 / 0.42	39 / 0.26
	Low Lighting w/o Noise	54 / 0.44	49 / 0.41	52 / 0.41	47 / 0.37
	Low Lighting w/ Noise	54 / 0.44	51 / 0.40	47 / 0.37	34 / 0.23
	Spatter	51 / 0.49	51 / 0.41	50 / 0.39	39 / 0.24
	Flare	54 / 0.45	52 / 0.40	49 / 0.38	38 / 0.26
	Defocus	53 / 0.43	51 / 0.41	53 / 0.42	26 / 0.14
	Foreign Object	52 / 0.41	51 / 0.40	51 / 0.38	24 / 0.13
	Black-out	52 / 0.41	41 / 0.29	33 / 0.22	20 / 0.08
ETPNav (Depth)	Avg PRS-SR	0.94	0.87	0.85	0.81
	Avg PRS-SPL	0.95	0.87	0.82	0.78
	Gaussian Noise	55 / 0.45	53 / 0.42	53 / 0.41	50 / 0.39
	Missing Data	48 / 0.38	37 / 0.27	34 / 0.23	30 / 0.19
	Multipath Interference	54 / 0.44	53 / 0.43	52 / 0.42	50 / 0.41
	Depth Quantization	54 / 0.44	52 / 0.43	52 / 0.41	52 / 0.42
PSL (RGB)	Avg PRS-SR	0.84	0.59	0.31	0.04
	Avg PRS-SPL	0.79	0.54	0.27	0.02
	Motion Blur	41 / 0.17	41 / 0.17	32 / 0.13	6 / 0.02
	Low Lighting w/o Noise	42 / 0.18	38 / 0.16	28 / 0.11	3 / 0.01
	Low Lighting w/ Noise	34 / 0.14	3 / 0.01	0 / 0.00	0 / 0.00
	Spatter	28 / 0.09	21 / 0.06	6 / 0.01	0 / 0.00
	Flare	43 / 0.18	33 / 0.14	6 / 0.02	0 / 0.00
	Defocus	43 / 0.19	41 / 0.17	29 / 0.12	1 / 0.00
	Foreign Object	31 / 0.11	16 / 0.05	5 / 0.01	1 / 0.00
	Black-out	37 / 0.14	17 / 0.05	3 / 0.01	0 / 0.00
VLFM (RGB)	Avg PRS-SR	0.95	0.95	0.85	0.31
	Avg PRS-SPL	0.96	0.93	0.77	0.27
	Motion Blur	49 / 0.30	47 / 0.29	43 / 0.24	5 / 0.02
	Low Lighting w/o Noise	47 / 0.29	48 / 0.30	52 / 0.30	46 / 0.28
	Low Lighting w/ Noise	47 / 0.29	49 / 0.29	42 / 0.23	2 / 0.01
	Spatter	46 / 0.28	45 / 0.27	33 / 0.17	3 / 0.01
	Flare	47 / 0.30	50 / 0.30	43 / 0.24	20 / 0.08
	Defocus	46 / 0.28	48 / 0.29	48 / 0.28	1 / 0.01
	Foreign Object	48 / 0.29	46 / 0.27	35 / 0.18	5 / 0.02
	Black-out	46 / 0.27	44 / 0.24	40 / 0.21	3 / 0.01
VLFM (Depth)	Avg PRS-SR	0.66	0.62	0.55	0.51
	Avg PRS-SPL	0.69	0.64	0.58	0.53
	Gaussian Noise	3 / 0.03	0 / 0.00	0 / 0.00	0 / 0.00
	Missing Data	47 / 0.29	47 / 0.29	48 / 0.29	41 / 0.26
	Multipath Interference	30 / 0.20	27 / 0.18	16 / 0.11	13 / 0.09
	Depth Quantization	51 / 0.31	49 / 0.30	46 / 0.28	48 / 0.29

Table 7: SR% / SPL performance of all models across corruption types and intensities. Part 2/2.

Model	Corruption / PRS	0.25	0.50	0.75	1.00
WMNav (RGB)	Avg PRS-SR	0.94	0.86	0.62	0.30
	Avg PRS-SPL	0.94	0.84	0.61	0.34
	Motion Blur	53 / 0.20	51 / 0.20	39 / 0.15	23 / 0.11
	Low Lighting w/o Noise	52 / 0.19	47 / 0.17	36 / 0.13	15 / 0.07
	Low Lighting w/ Noise	51 / 0.18	45 / 0.15	35 / 0.12	19 / 0.10
	Spatter	50 / 0.18	43 / 0.15	25 / 0.09	12 / 0.04
	Flare	53 / 0.19	50 / 0.18	36 / 0.14	18 / 0.07
	Defocus	54 / 0.19	52 / 0.18	41 / 0.14	19 / 0.07
	Foreign Object	51 / 0.19	46 / 0.17	29 / 0.10	14 / 0.04
	Black-out	51 / 0.18	46 / 0.14	31 / 0.11	14 / 0.04
WMNav (Depth)	Avg PRS-SR	0.94	0.87	0.71	0.61
	Avg PRS-SPL	0.85	0.79	0.63	0.56
	Gaussian Noise	52 / 0.16	49 / 0.15	40 / 0.12	34 / 0.11
	Missing Data	49 / 0.15	45 / 0.14	36 / 0.11	32 / 0.10
	Multipath Interference	51 / 0.18	47 / 0.16	39 / 0.13	33 / 0.12
	Depth Quantization	55 / 0.19	51 / 0.18	42 / 0.14	36 / 0.12
L3MVN (RGB)	Avg PRS-SR	0.95	0.89	0.74	0.48
	Avg PRS-SPL	0.96	0.88	0.74	0.33
	Motion Blur	47 / 0.21	47 / 0.21	46 / 0.18	24 / 0.07
	Low Lighting w/o Noise	50 / 0.23	49 / 0.23	47 / 0.21	46 / 0.21
	Low Lighting w/ Noise	44 / 0.19	40 / 0.17	14 / 0.09	9 / 0.02
	Flare	49 / 0.22	47 / 0.22	46 / 0.21	45 / 0.15
	Spatter	45 / 0.19	31 / 0.12	17 / 0.05	14 / 0.03
	Defocus	50 / 0.23	47 / 0.22	44 / 0.18	9 / 0.02
	Foreign Object	49 / 0.23	46 / 0.21	39 / 0.23	32 / 0.11
	Black-out	50 / 0.24	50 / 0.22	43 / 0.20	13 / 0.02
L3MVN (Depth)	Avg PRS-SR	0.71	0.56	0.44	0.36
	Avg PRS-SPL	0.71	0.53	0.39	0.33
	Gaussian Noise	18 / 0.09	2 / 0.01	0 / 0.00	0 / 0.00
	Missing Data	39 / 0.15	25 / 0.09	22 / 0.07	25 / 0.08
	Multipath Interference	36 / 0.16	34 / 0.15	21 / 0.08	7 / 0.03
	Depth Quantization	49 / 0.25	51 / 0.24	45 / 0.20	42 / 0.19
UniNavid (RGB)	Avg PRS-SR	0.67	0.64	0.46	0.23
	Avg PRS-SPL	0.67	0.64	0.47	0.24
	Motion Blur	24 / 0.21	15 / 0.14	21 / 0.20	13 / 0.12
	Low Lighting w/o noise	25 / 0.23	25 / 0.22	23 / 0.20	21 / 0.19
	Low Lighting w/ noise	24 / 0.22	30 / 0.27	18 / 0.17	7 / 0.06
	Spatter	22 / 0.20	8 / 0.07	13 / 0.12	5 / 0.05
	Flare	25 / 0.22	34 / 0.30	16 / 0.13	5 / 0.04
	Defocus	23 / 0.21	33 / 0.29	21 / 0.19	4 / 0.04
	Foreign Object	26 / 0.22	21 / 0.18	9 / 0.08	4 / 0.04
	Black-out	13 / 0.11	9 / 0.07	4 / 0.04	3 / 0.03
NaVid-7B (RGB)	Avg PRS-SR	0.78	0.64	0.44	0.21
	Avg PRS-SPL	0.71	0.64	0.48	0.21
	Motion Blur	23 / 0.20	18.8 / 0.18	19 / 0.18	7 / 0.04
	Low Lighting w/o Noise	21 / 0.18	17.0 / 0.16	11 / 0.10	9 / 0.11
	Low Lighting w/ Noise	13 / 0.10	7.3 / 0.05	4 / 0.02	2 / 0.01
	Spatter	25 / 0.21	22 / 0.21	13 / 0.11	6 / 0.05
	Flare	25 / 0.21	22 / 0.21	13 / 0.18	4 / 0.02
	Defocus	26 / 0.27	25.5 / 0.23	18 / 0.19	10 / 0.12
	Foreign Object	15 / 0.12	12.7 / 0.12	8 / 0.08	4 / 0.02
	Black-out	11 / 0.02	4 / 0.01	3 / 0.02	1 / 0.02

Table 8: Instruction corruption performance (SR% / SPL) and PRS for base, fine-tuned (FT), and prompt-engineered (PE) NaVid-7B.

Instruction Corruption	NaVid-7B	NaVid-7B-FT	NaVid-7B-PE
Clean	46 / 0.41	46 / 0.41	46 / 0.41
Friend	28 / 0.24	31 / 0.24	27 / 0.21
Novice	33 / 0.26	35 / 0.25	26 / 0.20
Formal	24 / 0.22	30 / 0.24	23 / 0.18
Professional	20 / 0.20	31 / 0.24	21 / 0.17
Capitalization	48 / 0.43	–	–
Masking 50%	34 / 0.29	–	–
Masking 100%	20 / 0.19	–	–
Black-box	27 / 0.25	44 / 0.42	43 / 0.41
White-box	30 / 0.27	45 / 0.41	44 / 0.40
PRS-SR	0.64	0.78	0.67
PRS-SPL	0.64	0.73	0.64

Table 9: Instruction corruption performance (SR% / SPL) and PRS for base, fine-tuned (FT), and prompt-engineered (PE) Uni-NaVid.

Instruction Corruption	UniNavid	UniNavid-FT	UniNavid-PE
Clean	57 / 0.50	57 / 0.50	57 / 0.50
Friend	30 / 0.26	38 / 0.32	33 / 0.29
Novice	33 / 0.28	42 / 0.34	32 / 0.28
Formal	26 / 0.23	39 / 0.33	28 / 0.24
Professional	21 / 0.20	40 / 0.32	24 / 0.21
Capitalization	58 / 0.51	–	–
Masking 50%	36 / 0.31	–	–
Masking 100%	21 / 0.18	–	–
Black-box	46 / 0.38	53 / 0.49	52 / 0.48
White-box	28 / 0.24	55 / 0.48	54 / 0.47
PRS-SR	0.58	0.78	0.65
PRS-SPL	0.58	0.76	0.66

Table 10: Instruction corruption performance (SR% / SPL) and PRS for base, fine-tuned (FT), and prompt-engineered (PE) ETPNav.

Instruction Corruption	ETPNav	ETPNav-FT	ETPNav-PE
Clean	57 / 0.46	57 / 0.46	57 / 0.46
Friend	24 / 0.18	40 / 0.20	40 / 0.30
Novice	31 / 0.21	52 / 0.42	38 / 0.30
Formal	20 / 0.15	39 / 0.37	32 / 0.26
Professional	17 / 0.14	42 / 0.34	30 / 0.24
Capitalization	56 / 0.45	–	–
Masking 50%	29 / 0.22	–	–
Masking 100%	19 / 0.15	–	–
Black-box	25 / 0.18	55 / 0.41	54 / 0.40
White-box	–	–	–
PRS-SR	0.48	0.80	0.68
PRS-SPL	0.46	0.76	0.65

Table 11: Uni-NaVid SR / SPL for RGB corruptions across languages.

Corruption	EN-IN	EN-US	HI-IN	TE-IN	All (avg)
Clean	55 / 0.48	59 / 0.52	12 / 0.11	11 / 0.10	34 / 0.30
Motion Blur	16 / 0.14	26 / 0.23	10 / 0.09	10 / 0.09	15 / 0.14
Low Lighting w/o Noise	34 / 0.31	46 / 0.41	9 / 0.08	9 / 0.08	25 / 0.22
Low Lighting w/ Noise	42 / 0.38	59 / 0.52	12 / 0.11	7 / 0.06	30 / 0.27
Spatter	10 / 0.09	5 / 0.05	9 / 0.09	8 / 0.08	8 / 0.07
Flare	57 / 0.50	59 / 0.51	12 / 0.11	8 / 0.08	34 / 0.30
Defocus Blur	52 / 0.45	60 / 0.53	13 / 0.12	5 / 0.05	33 / 0.29
Foreign Object	30 / 0.25	36 / 0.29	12 / 0.11	7 / 0.06	21 / 0.18
Black-out	13 / 0.11	14 / 0.11	7 / 0.06	2 / 0.02	9 / 0.07

Table 12: ETPNav SR / SPL for RGB corruptions across languages. Each cell shows SR / SPL.

Corruption	enus (US)	enin (India)	hiin (Hindi)	tein (Telugu)	All (avg)
Clean	54 / 0.42	60 / 0.49	54 / 0.44	56 / 0.44	56 / 0.45
Motion Blur	49 / 0.37	55 / 0.44	54 / 0.44	56 / 0.43	54 / 0.42
Low Lighting w/o Noise	38 / 0.28	54 / 0.45	47 / 0.46	56 / 0.44	49 / 0.41
Low Lighting w/ Noise	46 / 0.36	54 / 0.42	53 / 0.42	51 / 0.39	51 / 0.40
Spatter	48 / 0.39	53 / 0.41	53 / 0.43	51 / 0.39	51 / 0.41
Flare	46 / 0.34	56 / 0.44	54 / 0.42	52 / 0.40	52 / 0.40
Defocus Blur	47 / 0.39	55 / 0.45	51 / 0.41	52 / 0.40	51 / 0.41
Foreign Object	51 / 0.39	51 / 0.39	53 / 0.41	50 / 0.38	51 / 0.40
Black-out	41 / 0.28	43 / 0.29	41 / 0.30	40 / 0.28	41 / 0.29

Table 13: ETPNav SR / SPL for depth corruptions across languages. Each cell shows SR / SPL.

Language	Clean	Gaussian Noise	Missing Data	Multipath	Depth Quantization
Telugu	56 / 0.44	51 / 0.41	36 / 0.27	49 / 0.40	51 / 0.41
Hindi	54 / 0.44	56 / 0.45	**42 / 0.31**	53 / 0.44	53 / 0.44
English US	54 / 0.42	49 / 0.37	33 / 0.24	53 / 0.44	47 / 0.39
English Indian	60 / 0.49	**57 / 0.46**	38 / 0.28	**55 / 0.45**	**56 / 0.46**
All (avg)	**56 / 0.45**	**53 / 0.42**	**37 / 0.27**	**53 / 0.43**	**52 / 0.43**

Table 14: NavTrust composition and difficulty by corruption family. Each corruption type is evaluated on 1000 episodes at a fixed intensity. Difficulty is assigned per corruption type using the relative SR retention $r_c = \text{avg SR}(c)/\text{avg SR}(\text{clean})$ aggregated across models: Easy ($r_c \geq 0.9$), Medium ($0.7 \leq r_c < 0.9$), Hard ($r_c < 0.7$).

Corruption family	# types	Episodes / type	Total episodes	#(Easy / Medium / Hard)
Image (RGB)	8	1000	8000	2 / 5 / 1
Depth	4	1000	4000	0 / 1 / 3
Instruction	9	1000	9000	1 / 5 / 3
Mixed RGB+Depth	2	1000	2000	0 / 0 / 2

A.2 Ablation study of Varied Intensity in Corruption

To reveal sensitivity curves and potential failure thresholds, we expand our evaluation from a single intensity level to a spectrum of intensities (0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 1.0) for all corruption types, enabling a clearer interpretation of how different architectures degrade as corruption severity increases, as seen in Fig. 6. We report SR / SPL results in Table 5 6 7.

The expanded intensity spectrum reveals a clear divergence in sensitivity: PSL exhibits brittle, rapid degradation, losing over 40% of its relative performance by 0.5 intensity (Avg PRS-SR approximately 0.59) and effectively collapsing on noise-sensitive settings such as Low Lighting w/ Noise (SR approximately 3% at 0.5). In contrast, VLFM demonstrates substantially more robust behavior, maintaining roughly 95% relative stability up to 0.5 intensity and around 85% even at 0.75 (Avg PRS-SR: 0.95, 0.95, 0.85). This suggests that the foundation model's pre-trained representations provide a strong semantic buffer against moderate perturbations, delaying the failure threshold until the extreme 1.0 intensity regime, where information loss becomes dominant for both architectures (e.g., under severe Motion Blur), whereas PSL lacks this stability and degrades significantly even under mild corruption.



Figure 6: PRS-SPL vs Intensity Relation

Beyond this PSL-VLFM contrast, the remaining RGB agents form clear robustness tiers. ETPNav and L3MVN occupy a smooth degradation regime: their average PRS-SR remains above ∼0.85 at 0.5 intensity (0.89 for both) and still around 0.74-0.87 at 0.75, before dropping more sharply at 1.0, particularly for heavily occlusive settings such as Foreign Object and Black-out. WMNav lies between VLFM and PSL: it matches VLFM closely at 0.25 (Avg PRS-SR 0.95 for VLFM vs. 0.94 for WMNav) and only modestly trails it at 0.5 (0.95 vs. 0.86), but falls to approximately 0.62 PRS-SR by 0.75 and 0.30 at 1.0, indicating that its policy tolerates moderate blur and lighting changes but struggles with dense occlusions (Spatter, Foreign Object) once these become extreme. The instruction-heavy NaVid-7B and UniNavid form the most brittle group among the learned RGB policies: both decay to around 0.44-0.46 PRS-SR at 0.75 and below 0.25 at 1.0, with particularly steep breakdown under Low Lighting w/ Noise and Spatter, suggesting a stronger dependence on high-fidelity appearance cues and weaker reliance on geometry or long-horizon memory. Interestingly, several models show slight SPL improvements over the clean setting at mild intensity, such as NaVid-7B under Defocus (0.27 vs. 0.23 SPL at 0.25) and L3MVN under depth quantization (0.24 - 0.25 vs. 0.23 SPL at 0.25 - 0.50), hinting that weak blur or quantization can act as an implicit regularizer that suppresses spurious high-frequency clutter rather than harming navigation.

Depth corruptions reveal a complementary picture. For ETPNav and WMNav, depth is noticeably more stable than their RGB counterparts at high intensities: their Avg PRS-SR stays around 0.87 at 0.50 intensity and remains above 0.8 (0.81 for ETPNav) and 0.6 (0.61 for WMNav) even at 1.0, compared to 0.60 and 0.30 for RGB. In practice, both retain strong performance under depth Gaussian Noise, Multipath, and Quantization at 0.75-1.0, indicating that these policies can still recover a reliable geometric scaffold even when metric quality is degraded. L3MVN and VLFM, however, are much more sensitive to additive depth noise: both experience near-collapse under depth Gaussian Noise by 0.5 intensity (e.g., L3MVN drops to 2% at 0.5 and 0 at higher intensities, VLFM to 0% beyond 0.25), while remaining comparatively robust to Missing Data and particularly to Quantization (for L3MVN, depth quantization even nudges SR slightly above the clean baseline to 51/0.24 at 0.50). This pattern suggests that their depth encoders are implicitly calibrated to piecewise-smooth but metrically consistent depth fields, making structured corruption (holes, quantization) easier to compensate for than pixel-wise stochastic noise. Overall, the cross-modal trends indicate that models with strong depth handling (ETPNav, WMNav) can treat depth as a stable geometric backbone under corruption, whereas models that use depth more superficially inherit much of the brittleness of their RGB stack and become especially vulnerable once the depth channel is also perturbed.

A.3 Mitigation Strategy Analysis

When we compare these mitigated results, Table 3 and Table 4, for ETPNav to the original non-mitigated scores in the image corruption Fig. 4, we see that the gains are not only statistically significant in terms of PRS but also operationally meaningful. In the original setting, ETPNav achieves a PRS-SR (Image) of 0.86 and a PRS (Depth) of 0.62. With our mitigation strategies, PRS-SR (Image) increases to 0.93 - 0.94 (for DA per-episode and T-S distillation), while PRS (Depth) rises as high as 0.89 with depth adapters (and 0.85 with T-S distillation), corresponding to roughly +9% relative improvement in RGB robustness and +45% in depth robustness. Importantly, these gains are driven by large improvements under the hardest corruptions rather than only marginal gains on the easy cases. For example, for RGB motion blur and low-light with noise, ETPNav's SR improves from 57 to 66 and 48 to 60, respectively, and the worst-case image corruption SR increases from 48 to 55. On the depth side, the adapter-based mitigation raises SR under Gaussian noise from 33 to 55 and under missing data from 24 to 54, effectively eliminating the catastrophic failures previously observed for these conditions.

Beyond perception-side corruptions, our mitigation strategies also substantially improve robustness to instruction corruptions for all three VLN models (NaVid-7B, Uni-NaVid, and ETPNav) in Tables 8–10. Across the board, fine-tuning yields the largest gains: for NaVid-7B, PRS-SR / PRS-SPL improve from $0.64/0.64$ to $0.78/0.73$, while Uni-NaVid sees a jump from $0.58/0.58$ to $0.78/0.76$. ETPNav benefits the most, with PRS-SR rising from 0.48 to 0.80 and PRS-SPL from 0.46 to 0.76. Prompt engineering provides a lighter-weight alternative that still delivers consistent improvements (e.g., NaVid-7B-PE at 0.67 PRS-SR and Uni-NaVid-PE at $0.65/0.66$ PRS-SR/SPL). Under adversarial instruction perturbations, NaVid-7B and ETPNav gain roughly 15–30 absolute SR points on black-box attacks, and Uni-NaVid gains more than 25 points on white-box attacks (from 28 to 55 SR), indicating that the mitigations meaningfully harden these models against both natural style shifts and stronger black-/white-box corruptions rather than only improving on easy paraphrases.

Overall, this comparison shows that our mitigation strategies substantially tighten the performance distribution across corruptions: ETPNav transitions from a model that is highly sensitive to certain corruptions (especially noisy or missing depth) to one whose performance is much more uniform across both RGB and depth perturbations, and NaVid-7B / Uni-NaVid similarly become far less brittle under diverse instruction corruptions. Taken together, the image, depth, and instruction mitigation results directly validate that the PRS improvements we report reflect genuine robustness gains under the exact corruption patterns, rather than artifacts of the evaluation protocol.

A.4 Detailed Explanation of Mitigation Strategies

To address the vulnerabilities identified by our NavTrust benchmark and to provide a constructive path toward more resilient agents, we investigate three representative and powerful strategies for enhancing robustness: Data Augmentation, Teacher-Student Knowledge Distillation, and Parameter-Efficient Adapter Tuning. These methods target different aspects of the learning process, from diversifying training data to refining model architecture and transferring robust knowledge. In this section, we describe the formulation of each strategy and systematically evaluate its effectiveness in enhancing agent resilience against the perceptual and linguistic corruptions introduced by NavTrust.

A.4.1 Data Augmentation

Data Augmentation is a foundational strategy to improve model robustness by directly exposing the agent to noisy and corrupted inputs during the training phase. Instead of training solely on clean, idealized observations, we apply an online augmentation scheme where, for each training episode, we choose a corruption function from the NavTrust suite and apply it to the agent's current perceptual inputs (i.e., RGB or depth sensors). We adopt a training-time recipe that randomly augments both *RGB* and *Depth* either *per frame* (transient artifacts) or *per episode* (persistent sensor bias).

Mixing these regimes requires no architectural change and consistently improves robustness: Depth PRS rises from 61.5% to 76.0% and RGB PRS from 86.4% to 93.0%, while clean SR/SPL drops only 2-4 %, a typical trade-off when broadening the training distribution. In practice, heavy per-frame augmentation induced frame-level inconsistency and erratic actions, whereas episode-wise augmentation produced the most stable and accurate policies.

This process encourages the policy to learn a robust representation that is invariant to superficial sensor noise and focuses on the essential semantic and structural cues required for successful navigation, thereby bridging the gap between clean-room training and real-world deployment.

A.4.2 Teacher-Student Knowledge Distillation

We employ a Teacher-Student knowledge distillation framework where a privileged teacher model, operating on clean observations, guides a student model trained on corrupted inputs. Cai et al. (2023) The teacher's parameters are frozen, serving as a stable expert. To resolve the key challenge of misaligned action spaces, arising because the two models perceive different environments, we dynamically project both models' outputs into a unified action space constructed from the union of their candidate viewpoints at each step. The student's policy, π_S, is then optimized using a composite loss function that combines three signals:

Imitation Learning (IL): A standard cross-entropy loss that grounds the student's policy in the expert's ground-truth actions, a_t^*:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{IL}}(\theta) = -\mathbb{E}_{(\tau,c)\in(D,C)}\left[\sum_{t=0}^{T}\log \pi_\theta(a_t^*|c(s_t))\right].$$

Policy Distillation: A Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence loss that encourages the student's action distribution to match the teacher's (π_T), transferring nuanced decision making logic:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{KD-Policy}}(\theta) = \mathbb{E}_{(\tau,c)\in(D,C)}\left[\sum_{t=0}^{T}\text{KL}(\sigma(\pi_T(s_t)/T)||\sigma(\pi_S(\tilde{s}_t)/T))\right].$$

Feature Distillation: A mean squared error (MSE) loss that aligns the student's intermediate feature representations (z_s) with the teacher's (z_T), promoting a similar internal understanding of the environment:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{KD-Feat}}(\theta) = \mathbb{E}_{(\tau,c)\in(D,C)}\left[\sum_{t=0}^{T}||z_T(S_t) - z_S(\tilde{s}_t)||_2^2\right].$$

The final training objective is a weighted sum:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{Total}} = \lambda_{\text{IL}}\mathcal{L}_{\text{IL}} + \lambda_{\text{Policy}}\mathcal{L}_{\text{KD-Policy}} + \lambda_{\text{Feat}}\mathcal{L}_{\text{KD-Feat}}.$$

It trains the student to be resilient by internalizing the teacher's robust reasoning.

A.4.3 Adapters and Reliability-Weighted Fusion

We add parameter-efficient adapters to both the depth and RGB pathways, training fewer than 1% of the model's weights while keeping the backbones frozen. Houlsby et al. (2019) Each adapter is a residual bottleneck that learns corrective deltas:

$$y \;=\; x \;+\; B\big(\text{GELU}(A(\text{Norm}(x)))\big),$$

where A, B are 1×1 convolutions. Adapters are attached after the outputs of ResNet-50 blocks in stage 2 and stage 3 (optionally stage 4), with the final 1×1 zero-initialized, so training starts from an exact identity. A lightweight channelwise normalization before the bottleneck stabilizes learning on depth maps and RGB features, and a bottleneck width of 64 keeps the trainable footprint small. We reuse the existing navigation losses without new terms; depth-specific augmentation (bias and scale shifts, quantization, dropout holes, Gaussian and shot noise) is applied during training. AdamW with a small learning rate, cosine decay, and warmup suffices to converge, and the runtime overhead remains minimal since only 1×1 convolutions are introduced.

To stabilize the panoramic representation, we fuse per-view embeddings with reliability weights/score s_v that down-weight suspicious views. For view v with feature f_v,

$$s_v = \|f_v\|_2, \quad z_v = \tfrac{s_v - \mu}{\sigma}, \quad w_v \propto \exp\bigl(-|z_v|\bigr), \quad \bar{f} = \frac{\sum_v w_v f_v}{\sum_v w_v}.$$

We compute a reliability score per view, softly down-weight outliers, clip to a safe range to avoid collapse, and then renormalize across views so weights sum to one. Gradients pass through everything except the clip boundaries. All thresholds and the temperature are fixed; robustness is stable across a broad range, so we keep them static. This pairing of identity safe residual adapters in both modalities and reliability weighted fusion attenuates noisy or missing depth frames, reduces the influence of corrupted RGB views, and yields a more stable panoramic embedding without retraining the full encoders.

Training protocol. We initialize both depth and RGB backbones from a checkpoint trained on clean images only, then freeze all backbone weights. Adapters are trained on top under our corruption schedule (episodic RGB/Depth corruption), using the same navigation losses as the clean model. This preserves the clean semantics in the backbone while teaching the adapters to compensate for corrupted conditions.

Implementation note. The RGB adapter is attached to the TorchVision ResNet-50 backbone (`TorchVisionResNet50`), while the depth adapter is attached to `VlnResnetDepthEncoder`, which are architecturally different An et al. (2024). TorchVisionResNet50 He et al. (2016) is a texture-biased RGB encoder with ImageNet Batch Normalization assumptions, while VlnResnetDepthEncoder is a depth-specialized ResNet variant consisting of a 1-channel stem and geometry-preserving outputs Wijmans et al. (2020). That's why depth adapters "just work" while RGB adapters can stumble without BN/stat and scale fixes. In our experiments, the depth pathway trained cleanly and worked flawlessly, delivering consistent robustness gains. By contrast, the RGB pathway on `TorchVisionResNet50` struggled under low light and sensor noise, downgrading the performance.

A.5 Instruction Sanitization with a Fine-tuned, Quantized LLM.

We add a small quantized LLM as a safeguard layer that rewrites any free-form or adversarial utterance into the canonical Room-to-Room (R2R) format expected by our policies. The layer runs once per episode, removes malicious prompts, and paraphrases personality- or vocabulary-heavy text while preserving intent. This learned normalization reduces instruction-induced failures and improves PRS under instruction corruptions with negligible latency and memory.

Model choice. We evaluated *Qwen-14B* Bai et al. (2023) and *Llama 3.1 7B* Grattafiori et al. (2024); both increased latency and memory without clear PRS gains for our use case. *Llama 3.2 3B Instruct* (8-bit) Grattafiori et al. (2024) offered the best trade-off, enabling quick iteration and on-device deployment.

Fine-tuning setup In Llama 3.2 3B, 8-bit, we adapt the core attention projections and the feed-forward blocks, leaving the rest of the model frozen known as Parameter-efficient LoRA on attention and MLP projections with r=16, α=32, dropout 0.1; per-device train batch 4 with gradient accumulation 4; learning rate 5×10^{-5} (cosine schedule, warmup 0.1); 12 epochs; weight decay 0.01; max grad norm 1.0 with the inference batch size 8.

Instruction Sanitization with OpenAI o3

We explore prompt engineering on the **OpenAI o3** OpenAI (2025) as an alternative approach. The detailed prompt is as follows:

Listing 1: Safeguard LLM prompt

```
You are an expert editor for the Room-to-Room (R2R) vision-and-language
navigation task. In R2R, an agent follows natural-language instructions
to move through photorealistic indoor environments (Matterport-like
homes) along a graph of discrete viewpoints. The agent relies on visual
```

```
landmarks (e.g., fridge, stove, clock), doorways/rooms, and relative
directions (left/right/forward). Your job is to convert verbose or noisy
instructions into short, unambiguous, stepwise navigation plans that are
easy for a robot to execute and evaluate.
OBJECTIVE
Rewrite the user instruction into a minimal set of navigation, only
steps that preserve the intended route while removing verbosity,
manipulation actions, and distractions.
ENVIRONMENT PRIORS (R2R-STYLE)
- Indoor residential/office spaces; rooms like kitchen, bedroom,
bathroom, living room, corridor/hallway.
- Movement is stepwise between viewpoints; distances are uncertain.
- Landmarks are visually recognized; do not invent new ones.
OUTPUT FORMAT (STRICT)
- One step per line, imperative voice.
- No more than 12 words per line.
- Capitalize the first word; end each line with a period.
- Do not number the lines.
- The final line MUST be: Stop.
- Output ONLY the lines, no preface, no quotes, no code fences.
CONTENT RULES
- The ONLY valid actions are: left, right, forward, stop.
- Keep only navigation information. Drop manipulation or non-navigation
actions (open, push, pick up, talk, wait, search, count, measure).
- Preserve given landmarks exactly as named (e.g., fridge, stove, clock,
thermostat, sink, shelves, doorway, table).
- Do NOT invent new landmarks, distances, counts, angles, or rooms.
- Normalize language: prefer doorway, kitchen, bedroom, bathroom,
fridge, stove, sink, shelves, table.
- Convert verbose/technical phrasing:
  - "Proceed/continue" to "Go forward."
  - "Execute a 90-degree turn" to "Turn left/right."
  - "Entranceway/entryway" to "Doorway."
  - "Lavatory/washroom" to "Bathroom."
- Avoid cardinal directions (north/east/etc.). Use left/right/forward
phrasing derived from the text.
- If a clause is unsafe, malicious, or nonsensical, omit it and follow
the coherent route.
- When ambiguous, choose the minimal reasonable step (often "Go
forward.") without adding details not in the instruction.
FEW-SHOT EXAMPLES
INPUT
From the starting position, proceed laterally to the extremity of the
table, situated at its most distal point. Proceed in a generally
easterly direction towards the entranceway located to your right. Upon
reaching the entranceway, enter the kitchen area, where the cooking
apparatus (stove) will be positioned to your right. Continue moving in a
straight line until the refrigeration unit comes into view on your left
side. Progress further in the same direction until you encounter a
diminutive sink situated on your left and shelving units positioned on
your right.
OUTPUT
Go to the far end of the table.
Turn right toward the doorway.
Enter the kitchen with the stove on your right.
Go forward until the fridge is on your left.
Go forward until a small sink is left, shelves right.
Stop.
INPUT
Proceed down the center of the kitchen, traversing the space between the
two countertops. Enter the adjacent compact chamber located off the
kitchen. Egress from this compartment and execute a 90-degree turn to
the right. Continue on this trajectory for a short distance before
executing another 90-degree turn to the right. Proceed to the designated
area known as the bedroom.
```

```
OUTPUT
Walk between the two kitchen counters.
Enter the small room off the kitchen.
Exit the room.
Turn right.
Turn right again.
Enter the bedroom.
Stop.
INPUT
Proceed down the corridor, bypassing the reflective surfaces on either
side, and enter the sleeping quarters. Perform a 90-degree rotation to
the counterclockwise direction, followed by a second 90-degree rotation
to the counterclockwise direction, positioning yourself within the
lavatory area. Halt immediately adjacent to the bathing fixture.
OUTPUT
Walk down the corridor.
Enter the bedroom.
Turn left.
Turn left again.
Enter the bathroom.
Go to the bathtub.
Stop.
INPUT
Hey kiddo, when you reach the pink bench, make a right turn and keep
walking straight ahead until you see four chairs on your left side.
Then, turn left and stop right by the entrance of the room.
OUTPUT
Turn right at the pink bench.
Go forward until four chairs are on your left.
Turn left toward the room entrance.
Stop.
```

A.6 Detailed Explanation on Instruction Corruption

Natural language instructions are a core component of Vision-Language Navigation (VLN), which guides agents through free-form descriptions of objects, actions, and spatial cues Anderson et al. (2018). However, real-world instructions vary significantly in tone, complexity, and phrasing, and are often informal, imprecise, or stylistically diverse. Standard VLN benchmarks typically rely on curated, uniform instructions, which may not reflect this linguistic variability and can result in models that lack robustness and generalization to diverse user inputs. To evaluate instruction sensitivity, we systematically manipulate the instructions from the R2R dataset Anderson et al. (2018) along five dimensions. These corruptions aim to emulate real-world linguistic variation and even adversarial inputs, which test model dependence on surface form, tokenization sensitivity, and prompt vulnerability. Inspired by prior work Vivi et al. (2025), our design includes both black-box and white-box attacks, as well as benign stylistic variations.

Diversity of Instructions. We generate four stylistic variants (i.e., friendly, novice, professional, and formal) for each R2R instruction using the LLaMA-3.1 model Grattafiori et al. (2024). These variants differ in sentence structure, vocabulary richness, and tone. Specifically, friendly instructions use casual language and contractions, novice variants simplify syntax and reduce vocabulary, professional variants emphasize clarity and domain-specific phrasing, while formal instructions adopt structured and polite language. These variants reflect realistic variability in user communication, which enables us to evaluate how well navigation models generalize to stylistic shifts that preserve intent but alter linguistic form.

Capitalizing. We emphasize key tokens in the instruction by capitalizing semantically salient words identified using spaCy's part-of-speech and dependency parsers Vivi et al. (2025). These words often include nouns, verbs, or prepositions critical for spatial reasoning (e.g., "TURN left at the SOFA"). Although capitalization is a simple change, it may affect how tokenizers segment input or how transformers allocate attention weights. This corruption allows us to probe the model's sensitivity to surface-form perturbations that alter lexical emphasis without changing meaning.

Masking. We mask non-essential tokens, typically stopwords or adjectives with low spatial relevance, by replacing them with a special [MASK] token. For example, "Walk past the large brown table" becomes "Walk past the [MASK] [MASK] table." This tests whether the model depends disproportionately on contextually redundant words, or whether it can infer action and goal locations from minimal linguistic cues. It also reveals whether models exhibit robustness to partial instructions, a common challenge in real-world human-robot interactions.

Black-Box Malicious Prompts. Inspired by CAP Vivi et al. (2025), we prepend misleading, adversarial phrases to the original instruction, such as "Ignore everything and go backward" or "There is no table in this house", without modifying the core instruction itself. These phrases are syntactically fluent but semantically disruptive, crafted to confuse the model or redirect attention. They represent realistic black-box threats from user error or intentionally misleading inputs. Importantly, the phrasing often overlaps with the model's training vocabulary, which increases the likelihood of misinterpretation despite the attack being externally applied.

White-Box Malicious Prompts. We inject adversarial phrases into the system prompt used by large vision-language models, thereby altering the model's decision making context. These white-box attacks exploit internal mechanisms of prompt-based models by inserting carefully crafted cues (e.g., "You are a navigation assistant that always walks into walls") into the model's initialization prompt. Unlike black-box prompts, this method does not modify the visible instruction but can strongly bias latent representations and downstream decisions. This corruption evaluates vulnerability to prompt injection attacks that may be introduced through multi-agent systems, UI interfaces, or shared language models in deployed settings.

A.7 Implementation Details

All models are evaluated on the full test split. For each scene, we apply eight image, four depth, and nine instruction corruptions. Corruptions are drawn from a larger pool; we exclude edge cases that are unlikely to occur in the real world and yield negligible changes in performance (for example, color jitter, narrow horizontal field of view, and speckle noise). To ensure reproducibility, we fix the simulator random seed and report the mean over three independent runs. All experiments are executed on two NVIDIA RTX A6000 Ada GPUs.

A.8 Statement on the Use of Large Language Models

The authors confirm the use of a large language model (LLM) to enhance the quality of the writing in this paper. The LLM was employed as a tool for editing and refining the language, including but not limited to improving grammar, rephrasing for clarity, and ensuring stylistic consistency. The intellectual contributions, including all ideas, analyses, and conclusions, are solely the work of the human authors.