OBLIVIATE: Robust and Practical Machine Unlearning for Large Language Models

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Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) trained on 002 extensive corpora risk memorizing sensitive, copyrighted, or toxic content. To mitigate this, we propose OBLIVIATE, a robust and practical unlearning framework that can remove targeted data while preserving model utility. It employs a structured process: extracting target to-007 kens and building retain sets (from forget sets), followed by fine-tuning with a tailored loss decomposed into three components-mask, distil-011 lation, and world fact. With low-rank adapters (LoRA), our approach ensures efficiency with-013 out compromising unlearning quality. We evaluate OBLIVIATE across multiple datasets, including the Harry Potter series, WMDP, and TOFU, using a comprehensive suite of metrics: forget quality (with a new document-level 017 memorization score), model utility, and fluency. Results demonstrate its effectiveness in resist-019 ing membership inference attacks, minimizing impacts on retained data, and maintaining robustness across diverse scenarios.¹

1 Introduction

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The rapid expansion of training data for large language models (LLMs) has enabled remarkable advancements across diverse domains. However, the propensity of LLMs to memorize training corpora raises critical ethical and security concerns, such as generating sensitive, harmful, or copyrighted content (Nasr et al., 2023; Karamolegkou et al., 2023; Wen et al., 2023). These issues underscore the need to adapt LLMs to diverse security environments while meeting user and industry-specific requirements. Regulations, such as the EU's Right to be Forgotten (Ginart et al., 2019), further emphasize the importance of addressing them. In response, machine *unlearning* has emerged as a promising solution to mitigate ethical or safety risks (Yao et al., 2024; Jang et al., 2023; Eldan and Russinovich, 2023; Pawelczyk et al., 2024; Li et al., 2024b; Liu et al., 2024a; Li et al., 2024a, 2025). It aims to ensure that models behave as if target data were never included in the training sets (Bourtoule et al., 2021), effectively reducing sensitive information leakage and aligning LLMs with legal standards.

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Typically, current LLM unlearning methods can be categorized into fine-tuning (Yao et al., 2024), prompt-based (Liu et al., 2024a), and task arithmetic ones (Ilharco et al., 2023; Ji et al., 2024). Fine-tuning-based methods update model parameters to maximize the unlearning effect (while maintaining performance on retained data). In contrast, the latter two types modify input prompts or output logits to steer the model away from unlearned content without altering its parameters. Among them, the fine-tuning ones often achieve superior results.

Common fine-tuning approaches for LLM unlearning, including gradient ascent (GA), random label fine-tuning, and adversarial sample-based methods (Yao et al., 2024), face several limitations. First, Shi et al. (2024) reveal that unlearned data can often be recovered via membership inference attacks (MIAs), indicating that memorized information is not fully eradicated. Second, striking a nice balance between effective unlearning and preserving performance on retained data remains challenging. Techniques like gradient descent or KL-divergence on retain data often fail to maintain model utility in real-world scenarios, exacerbated by the impracticality of accessing proprietary training corpora to define clear retain set boundaries. Finally, while LLMs hold immense potential, existing evaluations lack comprehensiveness and reliability, failing to effectively verify whether the forget set has been removed and whether the model's performance remains intact (Liu et al., 2024b).

To address these challenges, we propose **OBLIVIATE**, a robust and practical LLM unlearning framework, which can effectively remove target

¹Our code is available at https://anonymous.4open. science/r/OBLIVIATE_unlearning_LLM-FE51.




Figure 1: Overview of robust and practical unlearning for LLMs

data while preserving model performance (*e.g.*, on various downstream tasks) and fluency–ability to generate coherent and precise responses–on the retain set. As illustrated in Figure 1, our framework incorporates three critical loss functions: *masked loss* for the forget set, and *distillation* and *world fact* losses for the retain set. Additionally, we employ low-rank adapters (LoRA) (Hu et al., 2022) to boost the efficiency of fine-tuning.

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Inspired by multimodal unlearning (Li et al., 2024a), which suppresses masked tokens by reducing their output probability, our *masked loss* enforces a zero-generation probability for targeted content, enabling more "aggressive" forgetting than all fine-tuning methods (Yao et al., 2024). However, this approach significantly degrades model performance and fluency on the retain set, often producing incoherent outputs. To mitigate these effects, following (Eldan and Russinovich, 2023), which replaces sensitive terms with generic tokens, we devise a *distillation loss* by substituting *entire* documents with (in-distribution) "anchor" ones to maintain the performance and fluency on retain set.

Model performance on general knowledge re-103 tention may also degrade (Gandikota et al., 2024). Text datasets like WikiText (Merity et al., 2017) 105 contain such general knowledge. To reinforce out-106 put consistency, we introduce an extra brand-new 107 world fact loss, exploiting randomly sampled Wiki-108 109 Text data to maintain model utility for general knowledge queries. We validate the robustness and 110 effectiveness of our unlearning framework across 111 multiple datasets, demonstrating strong unlearning 112 performance while preserving model utility and 113

fluency. To ensure a reliable and comprehensive evaluation, we introduce an evaluation suite, comprising *forget quality*, *model utility*, and *fluency*. Our main contributions are summarized below. I) We propose **OBLIVIATE**, an LLM unlearning framework that can effectively eliminate the influence of unlearning data while preserving the 114

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model's performance and fluency on the retain set. II) We introduce a masked loss mechanism, which completely suppresses the generation of unlearning data. In terms of unlearning efficacy, it outperforms all fine-tuning-based methods (Yao et al., 2024).

III) To counteract the negative impacts of our masked loss mechanism, we devise distillation and world fact losses to respectively preserve generic knowledge and ensure model fluency.

IV) We conduct experiments on multiple datasets with different scopes to validate the performance of **OBLIVIATE**. We introduce a comprehensive evaluation suite, comprising *forget quality, model utility*, and *fluency*, to report the results.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Transformer in LLMs

Generative LLMs operate through next-token prediction, estimating the conditional probability $P(x_{t+1}|x_1, x_2, ..., x_t)$ of the token x_{t+1} given a sequence $X = \{x_1, x_2, ..., x_t\}$. Let θ denote the model parameters, and A be the training algorithm. The training objective minimizes the negative loglikelihood of the predicted token distribution:

$$\mathcal{L}(x_{t+1}, \theta) = -\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} \log P(x_{t+1}|x_1, x_2, \dots, x_t; \theta).$$

LLMs have hierarchical layers, including multilayer perceptron (MLP) and multi-head attention (MHA). The MLP layer, crucial for encoding and storing model knowledge (Meng et al., 2022), can be conceptually divided into two functional sublayers. The first sub-layer transforms the input sequence \mathbf{x}^{ℓ} using a matrix W_{K}^{ℓ} , capturing input relationships, expressed as $\mathbf{M}^{\ell} = f(W_{K}^{\ell}\mathbf{x}^{\ell})W_{V}^{\ell} =$ $\mathbf{m}^{\ell}W_{V}^{\ell}$, where \mathbf{M}^{ℓ} represents the memory content at layer ℓ , W_{V}^{ℓ} is the knowledge representation matrix, and $f(\cdot)$ captures the coefficient scores.

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The MHA layer is a crucial component for facilitating knowledge transfer and extraction within large language models (Geva et al., 2023). Formally, the MHA operation can be defined as $MHA(X) = [Att_1 \parallel ... \parallel Att_h]W^O$, where Att_i represents the attention output from the *i*-th head, \parallel denotes the concatenation operation across *h* attention heads, and W^O is the output projection matrix applied to the concatenated attention outputs.

2.2 Parameter-Efficient Fine-tuning

Low-Rank Adapters (LoRA) offer a parameterefficient approach for fine-tuning LLMs. It introduces low-rank adaptation matrices, allowing taskspecific adjustments without modifying the full set of model parameters (Hu et al., 2022). Unlike traditional fine-tuning, which updates the entire parameters θ , LoRA decomposes weight updates into low-rank matrices $A \in \mathbb{R}^{r \times k}$ and $B \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times r}$, such that the updated weight matrix W' is expressed as W' = W + BA. This decomposition significantly reduces computational and memory requirements, enabling efficient adaptation of LLMs to new tasks with minimal parameters and memory usage.

2.3 Scope of LLM Unlearning

LLM unlearning is driven by three aspects: private, copyright, and harmful outputs (Liu et al., 2024b).

Copyright. LLM unlearning is critical for addressing copyright concerns by facilitating the removal of unauthorized training data, ensuring compliance with regulations. Recent legal disputes involving OpenAI, Meta, and New York Times underscore the growing tension between technology and legislation (Small, 2023). Unlearning enables the erasure of copyrighted material's influence, as demonstrated by studies on the Harry Potter dataset, thereby protecting content creators and reducing legal risks (Eldan and Russinovich, 2023).

Privacy. LLM unlearning also addresses the protection of personally identifiable information (PII) by mitigating the exposure of sensitive user data, a concern closely tied to memorization (Xie et al., 2024; Jang et al., 2022; Carlini et al., 2023). The TOFU dataset, comprising synthetic author profiles, provides a benchmark for assessing the unlearning of private information (Maini et al., 2024).

Harmful Outputs. The final application is about mitigating or erasing harmful outputs (*e.g.*, toxic or discriminatory information), thereby aligning model behaviors with human values. The WMDP dataset, which contains biological and network security knowledge, exemplifies the efficacy of unlearning in this regard (Li et al., 2024b).

3 Problem Formulations

Let \mathcal{D} be a large training corpus, and let $\mathcal{D}_f \subseteq \mathcal{D}$ be the *forget set* to be unlearned, containing a set of Mdocuments $\{d_i\}_{i=1}^M$ (*e.g.*, book, personal records). Each $d_i = \{x_j\}_{j=1}^N$ is a sequence of N tokens. Given a model \mathcal{M} trained on \mathcal{D} using an algorithm \mathcal{A} , an unlearning algorithm \mathcal{U} is applied to \mathcal{M} , with each d_i as input, to produce an *unlearned model* \mathcal{M}' , effectively removing the effects of \mathcal{D}_f .

Inspired by differential privacy (Gupta et al., 2021; Sekhari et al., 2021; Neel et al., 2021; Du et al., 2023), the NeurIPS 2023 machine unlearning challenge² parameterizes unlearning by (ϵ, δ) , quantifying the difference between the distributions of $\mathcal{U}(\mathcal{M})$ and $\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{D} \setminus \mathcal{D}_f)$. When $\epsilon = \delta = 0, \mathcal{U}$ is *exact unlearning*—the output distributions are identical. While retraining achieves *exact unlearning*, it is computationally prohibitive for LLMs (Luccioni et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2023). For small, positive ϵ and δ , \mathcal{U} is *approximate unlearning*, offering a practical solution for real-world applications.

The theoretical framework is not directly "applicable" to non-convex structures like LLMs (Kim et al., 2021). Most current LLM unlearning studies rely on empirical evaluation rather than strict theoretical guarantees (Eldan and Russinovich, 2023; Maini et al., 2024; Li et al., 2024b; Gandikota et al., 2024). These evaluations typically compare the unlearned model to the retrained model on benchmark datasets (*e.g.*, MMLU, MT-Bench), assessing metrics, such as *forget quality* and *model utility* (Maini et al., 2024). We follow this evaluation strategy. 000

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²https://unlearning-challenge.github.io/ assets/data/Machine_Unlearning_Metric.pdf

4 Methodology

4.1 Overview

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We put forth **OBLIVIATE**, an LLM unlearning framework comprising: i) a *pre-processing* phase to identify target tokens for unlearning and a retain set to preserve model performance and fluency (Section 4.2), and ii) a *fine-tuning* phase using LoRA and our *tailored unlearning loss* (Section 4.3).

Our unlearning loss has three components: the *masked loss* facilitates unlearning by suppressing (or enforcing a zero-generation probability of) the forget set D_f , while the *distillation loss* (working on the same-style and other-style documents built from D_f) and *world fact loss* (incorporating randomly sampled WikiText data) preserve model performance and fluency. To evaluate unlearning effectiveness (or *forget quality*), we propose a new metric called *document-level memorization score*.

4.2 Pre-processing

Identification of target (to-be-unlearned) tokens. Multimodal unlearning (Li et al., 2024a) demonstrates that masking tokens can significantly reduce their output probabilities. However, masking all tokens in the forget set \mathcal{D}_f risks impairing the language understanding of LLMs; thus, we selectively mask only the most salient target tokens. There exist various methods to realize this. Statistical approaches (based on e.g., token frequency and probability), while efficient and widely applicable (Meeus et al., 2024), often fail to capture all tokens due to their unique characteristics. Named entity recognition (NER) (Roy, 2021) relies on prior knowledge-a predefined set of target tokensto identify additional ones. To address these limitations, we propose a more general approach, exploiting GPT-40 to identify target tokens (Eldan and Russinovich, 2023) (which detects "anchored term" by GPT-4). GPT-40 combines the strengths of statistical and NER-based methods, generating a comprehensive set of target tokens. The prompts used for target-token generation are detailed in Appendix B. Based on the target tokens, we construct a masked loss for unlearning \mathcal{D}_f in Section 4.3.

275Construct retain set.We build a retain set with276three document types-generic, other-style, and277world fact-for further fine-tuning the unlearned278model to maintain model utility. Each type has M279documents, consistent with the forget set \mathcal{D}_f .

280 *Generic documents* are used to maintain LLM per-

formance on data that resemble the forget set \mathcal{D}_f . Instead of using a generic "prediction" with only a few tokens (Eldan and Russinovich, 2023), we build a generic "full document," sharing similar semantics and number of tokens as each $d_i \in \mathcal{D}_f$. To do so, we select documents with the *highest textual similarity* to those in the forget set, using BM25– a probabilistic retrieval framework for evaluating document relevance (Cheng et al., 2024). Algorithm 1 lists the pseudocode of generic documents using BM25. (If a *predefined* retain set exists, then it can be directly used as generic documents.) 281

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Other-style documents aim to preserve the ability to generate text within the same domain but in varying styles. For example, in the case of Harry Potter, these could include novels from different genres, such as historical or contemporary fiction. For non-narrative forget sets, generic documents with shuffled order can serve as other-style documents. *World fact documents.* The forget set may include general knowledge, such as geographical locations, cuisine, and universal concepts. To preserve the ability to process such information, we integrate *world fact* documents, like WikiText (Merity et al., 2017), into the retain set, ensuring consistency and maintaining general knowledge utility.

4.3 Tailored Unlearning Loss

The core of **OBLIVIATE** is a customized unlearning (or fine-tuning) loss function with three components, each targeting a specific document type. For unlearning efficiency, we run LoRA on only MHA and MLP parameters (instead of full fine-tuning).

Masked loss. For input $d_i \in D_f$, we set the probabilities corresponding to the target tokens in the output distribution to *zero*, yielding a masked logits distribution. We then introduce a *masked loss* (using KL divergence) to minimize the difference between the masked logits distribution and the original logits distribution. Its purpose is to reduce the influence of target tokens by lowering their generation probability in the model outputs (Li et al., 2024a). Our *masked loss* is formulated as

$$\mathcal{L}_{Mk}(Q||P) = \sum_{d_i \in \mathcal{D}_f} Q(\theta_{masked}) \log \frac{Q(\theta_{masked})}{P(\theta)},$$

where $Q(\theta_{masked})$ and $P(\theta)$ are respectively the "masked" logits distribution and the original one.

Distillation loss. Given the same- and other-style documents w.r.t. d_i , we introduce a *distillation loss*

to maintain model performance and fluency. This 317 loss employs two teacher models: one trained on 318 new (unseen) documents representing other styles 319 and another on generic documents with the same styles. Through distillation, the target model's out-321 put distribution aligns with the teacher models, re-322 ducing the generation of overly frequent common 323 tokens (e.g., "the" and a") that can degrade fluency 324 and produce incoherent or unstructured outputs.

Let $P(\theta_{x_1})$ and $P'(\theta_{x_2})$ be the probability distributions of the student model and teacher models, respectively. The *distillation loss* is formulated as

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{distillation}} = \mathbb{E}_{x_1, x_2} \text{MSE}(P(\theta_{x_1}), P'(\theta_{x_2})),$$

where $MSE(\cdot, \cdot)$ measures the mean squared error between the logits distributions of the student and teacher models. The "variable" x_1 is selected from the forget set, while x_2 is sampled from the same-(generic) and other-style documents.

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World fact loss. The previous two losses adjust the output probability distribution for inputs d_i , whereas the *world fact loss* aligns the distribution when inputs are drawn from WikiText data (Merity et al., 2017). By aligning the output distributions of the original and target models, this loss ensures consistency between general knowledge and model outputs. The *world fact loss* is

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{world fact}} = \mathbb{E}_{x \in \text{Wikipedia}} \text{CE}(P(\theta), P''(\theta)),$$

where $CE(\cdot, \cdot)$ denotes the cross-entropy loss between the output distributions $P(\theta)$ and $P''(\theta)$.

Our final unlearning loss is given as a weighted combination of the three components:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{total}} = \mathcal{L}_{\text{forget}} + \lambda_1 \mathcal{L}_{\text{distillation}} + \lambda_2 \mathcal{L}_{\text{world fact}},$$

where λ_1 and λ_2 are tunable hyperparameters. With the combined loss \mathcal{L}_{total} , we use LoRA to fine-tune the MLP and MHA layers of LLMs.

4.4 Document-level memorization

To evaluate forgetting effectiveness, we generalize the token-level Remnant memorization accuracy (RMA) (Lee et al., 2024) to the document-level (since each unlearning query is typically a sequence of tokens instead of individual ones). For a dataset containing M documents, where each comprises ntokens, we define document-Level RMA (DRMA):

$$DRMA = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{M} \sum_{t=1}^{n-1} p_{\theta}(x_t \mid x_{< t})}{M},$$

Dataset	Document	Generic Document	Other Style Document
Harry Potter	500	500	500
WMDP	350 (Bio)	350 (Bio)	350 (Bio)
WMDP	50 (Cyber)	50 (Cyber)	50 (Cyber)
	40 (Forget01)	40 (Forget01)	40 (Forget01)
TOFU	200 (Forget05)	200 (Forget05)	200 (Forget05)
	400 (Forget10)	400 (Forget10)	400 (Forget10)

Table 1: Characteristics of Datasets (Documents)

where $p_{\theta}(x_t \mid x_{< t})$ denotes the probability of outputting the *t*-th token x_t , conditioned on the preceding tokens $x_{< t}$ within a document. This metric evaluates the model's document-level memorization, extending beyond individual tokens to assess broader patterns: A lower DRMA indicates diminished document memorization.

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5 Experiments

We evaluate **OBLIVIATE** on the Harry Potter series (Rowling, 1997–2007) and validate its applicability on the WMDP (Li et al., 2024b) and TOFU datasets (Maini et al., 2024). Table 1 summarizes their characteristics, including generic and other style documents. Experiments on the Harry Potter and WMDP datasets were conducted using 4 H100 GPUs, while the TOFU dataset required only a single H100 GPU. Notably, the Harry Potter and WMDP experiments can also be executed on a single H100 GPU with minimal performance degradation under resource constraints.

We use three metrics: *forget quality, model utility,* and *fluency*. Fluency prompts consistent across datasets are detailed in Appendices B and D.

Hyperparameter configuration is consistent across all datasets, following the optimizer settings from Touvron et al. (2023). We fine-tune LLMs using AdamW (Loshchilov and Hutter, 2019) with a learning rate of 3.0×10^{-4} , $\beta_1 = 0.9$, $\beta_2 = 0.95$, and $\epsilon = 10^{-8}$. A cosine learning rate schedule is applied, including a 10% warmup phase relative to the number of documents in forget steps, and decaying to 10% of the peak rate. We use a weight decay of 0.1 and gradient clipping at 1.0. Hyperparameters λ_1 and λ_2 are selected via grid search, with optimal results for *forget quality, model utility*, and *fluency* achieved at $\lambda_1 = 0.2$ and $\lambda_2 = 0.7$.

5.1 Experimental Setup for Harry Potter

Dataset. We follow (Eldan and Russinovich, 2023) and use the Harry Potter series (Rowling, 1997–2007) as the forget set. Due to its length, the series is divided into 500 documents for (practical) inputs. We also generate 500 same- and other-style

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documents to facilitate unlearning. Further detailson document acquisition are given in Appendix B.

Models and Baselines. We employ the Llama-2-7B chat model (Touvron et al., 2023) as the base model and compare it against three baselines: WHP (Eldan and Russinovich, 2023), representation misdirection for unlearning (RMU) (Li et al., 2024b), and erasure of language memory (ELM) (Gandikota et al., 2024).

5.2 Experimental Setup for WMDP

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Dataset. WMDP is a dataset, comprising biosecurity (WMDP-bio) and cybersecurity (WMDPcyber) multiple-choice questions (Li et al., 2024b). We partition the dataset into 400 documents, with 350 allocated to WMDP-bio and 50 to WMDPcyber, for the former's higher information density.

Models and Baselines. We adopt Zephyr-7B (Tunstall et al., 2023), Mistral-7B (Jiang et al., 2023), Llama3-7B, and Llama3-7Binstruct (Dubey et al., 2024) as base models. We compare **OBLIVIATE** with RMU and ELM.

5.3 Experimental Setup for TOFU

Dataset. TOFU is a dataset of 200 synthetic author profiles, each with 20 question-answer pairs, totaling 4,000 questions (Maini et al., 2024). The forget set is divided into three subsets–forget01, forget05, and forget10–representing 1%, 5%, and 10% removal of the dataset, respectively.

Models and Baselines. We use tofu_ft_llama2-7b (Maini et al., 2024) as the base model and compare it against the retain model, trained from scratch on TOFU as the gold standard. Yet, potential information leakage from GPT-4-generated TOFU may prevent perfect alignment with the gold standard. More baselines include Grad. Diff (Liu et al., 2022), Pref. Opt (Rafailov et al., 2023), Grad. Ascent, and KL Min (Yao et al., 2024).

5.4 Evaluation Metrics

Forget Quality measures the "extent" of unlearning on the forget set. Specifically:

Harry Potter: We evaluate accuracy on binarychoice and multiple-choice questions (HP-dual, HP-four), DRMA, and resistance to MIAs (Carlini et al., 2021; Shi et al., 2024; Bai et al., 2024).

WMDP: We use multiple-choice accuracy on bio or cybersecurity questions, MIAs, and DRMA.

TOFU: We use the truth ratio divergence (KS Test), resistance to MIAs, and DRMA.

Model Utility evaluates the model performance on the retain set. Specifically:

Harry Potter and WMDP: We use MMLU and MT-Bench for evaluation.

TOFU: We use additional metrics, such as ROUGE, truth ratio on the retain set, and performance on *real authors* and *world facts*.

Fluency evaluates the coherence and linguistic quality of generated outputs. Specifically:

We use GPT-40 fluency scores for all datasets.

Dataset-specific queries assess fluency in Harry Potter and WMDP, while TOFU-related and general prompts are used for TOFU evaluation.

5.5 Results

Unlearning Harry Potter. Table 2 provides a comprehensive evaluation across key metrics. Forget Quality: Our method achieves superior unlearning, with the lowest scores for HP-four (25.83) and HP-dual (49.64), outperforming WHP and ELM. It also attains the highest average MIA resistance and the lowest DRMA value (7.45), effectively mitigating unintended memorization. Model Utility: With an MMLU score of 45.64, our method closely matches ELM (45.80), the best-performing baseline. Fluency: Our method delivers balanced fluency, with a mean score of 4.11 and variance of 0.63, ensuring high-quality and consistent text generation, surpassing other approaches.

Unlearning WMDP. Table 3 reports the results of different methods on models (Llama3-8B-Instruct, Llama3-8B, Zephyr-7B, and Mistral-7B) using three metrics. Forget Quality: Our method outperforms baselines in WMDP-related questions, MIAs, and DRMA. It achieves the lowest Bio and Cyber scores on Llama3-8B-Instruct (Bio: 31.9, Cyber: 25.8) and Zephyr-7B (Bio: 26.9, Cyber: 24.3), demonstrates strong MIA resistance with the highest scores, and attains the lowest DRMA values, effectively mitigating memorization. Model Utility: The method maintains general knowledge with minimal performance loss, achieving MMLU scores of 61.7 (Llama3-8B-Instruct), 58.2 (Llama3-8B), and 56.1 (Zephyr-7B), comparable to RMU (57.5). Fluency: Our method delivers balanced fluency, with Llama3-8B achieving an average score of 3.18 and the lowest variance (2.01), and Mistral-7B recording an average score of 3.04 and variance of 2.08, ensuring high-quality text generation.

				Forget Q	Juality			Model Utility	Flue	ncy
Method	HP-related questions				MIAs		Memorization	MMLU↑	Mean ↑	Var ↓
	HP-four \downarrow	HP-dual \downarrow	ppl ↑	ppl/Ref_ppl ↑	ppl/zlib ↑	Min_20.0% Prob ↑	DRMA ↓	WINLU	wican	vai ↓
Original	37.58	62.11	41.54	-0.84	0.01	7.85	2560.12	46.38	4.02	0.05
WHP	33.93	56.28	68.92	0.072	0.01	10.01	2161.11	43.11	3.59	1.05
ELM	33.93	62.19	445.13	1.35	0.02	9.81	1394.30	45.80	3.92	0.28
Ours	25.83	49.64	33337.02	7.01	0.04	10.83	7.45	45.64	4.11	0.63

Table 2: Comparison on the Harry Potter dataset across multiple metrics (Bolded values are the best results.)

					Forget Qu	ality			Model Utility	Flue	ncy
Model	Method	WMD	P-related questions			MIAs		Memorization	MMLU↑	Mean ↑	Var ↓
		Bio \downarrow	Cyber \downarrow	ppl ↑	ppl/Ref_ppl ↑	ppl/zlib ↑	Min_20.0% Prob ↑	DRMA ↓	MMLO	wiean	vai ↓
	Original	71.3	46.7	2.39E+04	-1.02	0.01	9.51	792.22	63.7	2.95	2.02
Llama3-8B-Instruct	RMU	66.8	45.8	5.22E+04	6.06	0.04	15.47	721.75	56.5	3.12	1.96
Liama5-6B-msu uct	ELM	32.2	27.2	2.35E+04	1.93	0.02	11.49	117.44	61.6	2.93	2.04
	Ours	31.9	25.8	6.88E+08	13.57	0.06	24.36	22.17	61.7	3.07	1.92
	Original	71.2	45.3	3.24E+04	-0.71	0.01	9.59	751.92	62.1	2.97	1.91
Llama3-8B	RMU	49.4	37.0	5.14E+04	6.13	0.04	16.20	489.75	40.1	2.96	1.88
Liama5-6D	ELM	33.3	26.6	3.28E+04	1.89	0.02	10.77	81.22	57.2	3.07	2.18
	Ours	27.6	26.6	1.88E+09	15.05	0.07	25.22	11.58	58.2	3.18	2.01
	Original	64.4	44.3	2.37E+02	-1.45	0.01	9.12	1014.67	58.5	2.97	1.98
Zephyr-7B	RMU	30.5	27.3	5.63E+03	2.72	0.03	12.77	214.62	57.5	2.92	2.03
Zepiiyi-/B	ELM	29.7	27.2	3.27E+02	0.50	0.02	9.26	363.11	56.6	2.99	2.00
	Ours	26.9	24.3	6.72E+08	14.73	0.08	23.96	128.00	56.1	3.00	1.96
	Original	67.6	44.3	1.32E+02	-1.74	0.01	8.03	1006.73	59.7	2.97	1.99
Mistral-7B	RMU	33.5	28.7	6.64E+03	1.77	0.02	11.78	214.62	27.1	3.08	2.12
wiisuai-/B	ELM	28.7	26.4	2.80E+02	0.56	0.02	9.29	297.73	55.4	3.02	2.03
	Ours	27.3	24.8	1.33E+11	16.93	0.08	28.50	128.15	56.5	3.04	2.08

Table 3: Comparison on the WMDP dataset across multiple methods (Bolded values are the best results.)

Unlearning TOFU. Table 4 reports the results of TOFU-forget10 using the three key metrics: Forget Quality: Our method achieves a KS-test value of 9.41E-01, closer to the ideal score, and demonstrates strong resistance to membership inference risks. For memorization, measured via DRMA, it attains the lowest value (0.09), effectively minimizing target information retention while ensuring robust unlearning. Model Utility: With a generalization score of 62.44, our method closely matches the highest baseline (63.69 by Grad. Ascent), striking a balanced trade-off between unlearning effectiveness and model utility retention. Fluency: Our method achieves a mean fluency score of 3.08 and variance of 1.58. While Grad. Diff shows slightly better fluency (Mean: 3.74, Variance: 1.05), our method remains competitive in fluency while excelling in forget quality and model utility.

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493 Scalability. Table 5 demonstrates the scalability
494 of our method across TOFU-forget datasets. Larger
495 forget sets enhance unlearning effectiveness, under496 scoring the importance of comprehensive forget
497 sets for robust unlearning. Detailed comparisons
498 for TOFU-forget01, TOFU-forget05, and baselines
499 are provided in Appendix C.

5.6 Runtime Efficiency

Time efficiency is a critical metric for unlearning in LLMs, especially compared to retraining from scratch. Following Liu et al. (2024c), we evaluate unlearning efficiency using runtime efficiency (RTE). Due to the complexity of estimating additional time for searching generic and other style documents in the Harry Potter dataset, we exemplify RTE using WMDP and TOFU-forget10. 500

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Table 7 shows the results of **OBLIVIATE**. On the WMDP dataset with Zephyr-7B, it achieves an RTE of 991.8 seconds, significantly outperforming ELM (82421.5s) and showcasing scalability for large-scale scenarios. On TOFU-forget10, our method exhibits comparable efficiency to Grad. Ascent while maintaining superior unlearning performance. These results highlight that we can balance unlearning effectiveness and efficiency.

5.7 Ablation

Table 6 summarizes the ablation study on the Harry Potter dataset, evaluating the roles of $\mathcal{L}_{distillation}$ and $\mathcal{L}_{world fact}$ across the three key metrics.

Forget Quality: Removing $\mathcal{L}_{distillation}$ significantly increases the MIAs score, while using either $\mathcal{L}_{distillation}$ or $\mathcal{L}_{world fact}$ independently also elevates MIAs, indicating their role in enhancing

				TOFU-forge	et10				
			Forget Qu	ıality				Fluency	
Method	TOFU-related questions			MIAs		Memorization	Model Utility↑	Mean ↑	Var ↓
	KS-test ↑	ppl ↑	ppl/Ref_ppl ↑	ppl/zlib ↑	Min_20.0% Prob ↑	DRMA \downarrow		Witcan	val ↓
Retain Model	1.00E+00	3.87E+01	-0.48	0.02	10.92	31.26	62.38	3.63	1.02
Grad. Diff	1.22E-08	1.41E+01	-1.16	0.02	8.66	31.88	27.71	3.74	1.05
Pref. Opt	2.59E-12	1.27E+01	-1.26	0.02	8.42	31.64	28.38	1.54	1.38
Grad. Ascent	2.43E-17	2.87E+02	1.42	0.03	16.77	30.95	63.69	1.57	1.52
KL Min	2.51E-18	2.09E+02	1.16	0.03	16.00	31.30	63.68	1.52	1.39
Ours	9.41E-01	1.66E+16	25.40	0.18	39.16	0.09	62.44	3.08	1.58

Table 4: Comparison of methods on the TOFU-forget10 dataset (Bolded values indicate the best performance.)

			Forget Qu	ıality				Fluency	
Dataset	TOFU-related questions		MIAs Memoriza				Model Utility↑	Mean ↑	Var ↓
	KS-test ↑	ppl ↑	ppl/Ref_ppl ↑	ppl/zlib \uparrow	Min_20.0% Prob ↑	DRMA \downarrow		wicali v	vai ↓
TOFU-forget01	2.66E-07	3.25E+05	-0.72	0.02	9.24	42.57	64.12	3.72	1.04
TOFU-forget05	3.93E-03	2.98E+08	5.95	0.06	15.63	25.81	62.83	3.61	1.11
TOFU-forget10	9.41E-01	1.66E+16	25.40	0.18	39.16	0.09	62.44	3.08	1.58

Table 5: Performance comparison across varying sizes of the TOFU-forget dataset shows that unlearning effectiveness improves with larger datasets (from TOFU-forget01 to TOFU-forget10), highlighting the necessity of extensive data for robust and practical unlearning. (Bolded values are the best results.)

				Forget Q	uality			Model Utility	Flue	ncy
Method	HP-related	d questions			MIAs		Memorization	MMLU↑	Mean ↑	Var ↓
	HP-four ↓	HP-dual \downarrow	ppl ↑	ppl/Ref_ppl ↑	ppl/zlib ↑	Min_20.0% Prob ↑	DRMA \downarrow	WIWILU	Mean	vai ↓
w/o $\mathcal{L}_{distillation}$ and $\mathcal{L}_{world fact}$	25.67	49.96	7.79E+12	26.24	0.11	33.22	3.54E-05	26.97	1.00	0.00
w/o $\mathcal{L}_{distillation}$	24.70	49.96	9.98E+12	25.25	0.10	34.58	1.18	40.41	4.09	1.11
w/o $\mathcal{L}_{world fact}$	25.02	50.04	4.61E+21	40.26	0.16	49.87	1.76	44.24	3.37	1.73
Ours	25.83	49.64	3.33E+04	7.01	0.04	10.83	7.45	45.64	4.11	0.63

Table 6: Ablation study results on the Harry Potter dataset, assessing the impact of removing individual components ($\mathcal{L}_{distillation}$ and $\mathcal{L}_{world fact}$) on *forget quality, model utility*, and *fluency*. (Bolded values are the best results.)

Dataset	Model	Method	Time (s)
		RMU	119.55
WMDP	Zephyr-7B	ELM	82421.50
		Ours	991.80
		Grad. Diff	710.48
		Pref. Opt	833.68
Tofu-forget10	tofu_ft_llama2-7b	Grad. Ascen	258.06
		KL Min	762.24
		Ours	456.91

Table 7: Runtime efficiency comparison for differentmethods on the WMDP and Tofu-forget10 datasets

forget quality. When combined, the MIA score is minimized, demonstrating their synergy. DRMA results further show that removing $\mathcal{L}_{distillation}$ or $\mathcal{L}_{world fact}$ reduces DRMA to 1.18 and 1.76, respectively, compared to 7.45 achieved by the "full" method. **Model Utility:** Ablating $\mathcal{L}_{distillation}$ or $\mathcal{L}_{world fact}$ reduces the MMLU score to 40.41 and 44.24, respectively, highlighting their importance in retaining utility. The full method achieves the highest MMLU score of 45.64, demonstrating their combined effectiveness in preserving knowledge. **Fluency:** The full method achieves superior *fluency* (Mean: 4.11, Variance: 0.63). Removing

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either loss slightly degrades fluency, particularly in variance, emphasizing their role in maintaining text quality. These results confirm that both $\mathcal{L}_{\text{distillation}}$ and $\mathcal{L}_{\text{world fact}}$ are essential for balancing forget quality, model utility, and fluency. 539

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6 Conclusion

In this paper, we propose **OBLIVIATE**, a robust 545 and practical unlearning approach for LLMs. We 546 extend memorization to document-level memoriza-547 tion, introducing it as a new unlearning evaluation 548 metric, and categorize LLM unlearning evaluations 549 into three dimensions: forget quality, model utility, 550 and *fluency*, establishing a unified framework. Our 551 method is validated on the Harry Potter dataset and 552 extended to two additional unlearning datasets. Ex-553 perimental results demonstrate state-of-the-art per-554 formance across metrics, particularly in forget qual-555 *ity*. **OBLIVIATE** exhibits strong generalizability, 556 achieving robust performance across diverse forget 557 sets with minimal parameter adjustments. 558

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7 Limitations

Although this work evaluated **OBLIVIATE** across multiple models, the largest tested model was Llama3-8B-Instruct. Future research should explore the scalability of the approach to larger models and extend its applicability to a broader range of datasets, such as news or article-based corpora. For smaller datasets like TOFU-forget01, the proposed method shows limited effectiveness. Future work should adapt the approach to finer granularity to enhance performance on smaller datasets.

The current process for obtaining target tokens and generic documents relies on GPT-40, which introduces retrieval instability. Future research should investigate more robust and generalizable methods, such as fine-tuned Named Entity Recognition (NER) models, to improve the reliability of target token and generic document extraction.

Additionally, during fluency evaluations, the method occasionally generated gibberish or blank outputs when encountering highly targe prompts. While this supports effective unlearning, it does not fully meet LLM fluency standards. We encourage future research to address this limitation, balancing fluency with high forget quality.

Ethics Statement

In this work, we investigate unlearning in LLMs, aiming to preserve model performance and fluency on the retain set while achieving forgetting. Our approach addresses ethical and safety concerns, such as privacy, copyright, and harmful outputs. Evaluation datasets and retain sets are sourced from publicly available resources, complying with relevant licenses. We encourage future researchers to use our method responsibly and ethically.

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A Related work

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A.1 Machine Unlearning

Machine unlearning has become a vital research area to address privacy, safety, and bias in LLMs (Yao et al., 2024; Jang et al., 2023; Eldan and Russinovich, 2023; Pawelczyk et al., 2024; Li et al., 2024b; Liu et al., 2024a). Classic methods, such as *exact unlearning* (Bourtoule et al., 2021), involve retraining models without target data but are expensive for large models. Recent work focuses on *approximate unlearning* techniques, including incremental updates, pruning, and knowledge distillation, to enhance efficiency (Dong et al., 2024). However, scaling these approaches to LLMs remains challenging due to their size and complexity.

Efficient unlearning techniques for LLMs have been proposed, including gradient ascent and descent methods (*e.g.*, GA and GA+GD), which achieve unlearning objectives but often compromise performance (Yao et al., 2024). Prompt-based approaches steer outputs away from unlearning targets without modifying model parameters, reducing computational costs but risking memory reactivation (Liu et al., 2024a). Training-free methods, such as task arithmetic (Ilharco et al., 2023), provide simplicity and efficiency but face limitations in closed models with restricted architectures.

Concept replacement methods, such as WHP (Eldan and Russinovich, 2023), employ an anchorgeneric term framework to "forget" specific targets while retaining related concepts. However, WHP has demonstrated limitations in achieving complete unlearning (Shi et al., 2024). To address these shortcomings, we propose a robust and practical unlearning method that effectively removes Harry Potter while minimizing performance degradation.

A.2 Memorization in LLMs

Memorization in LLMs refers to the model's capacity to retain and reproduce specific details from training data during text generation or comprehension (Carlini et al., 2023). Current research examines memorization from multiple perspectives. Some studies identify it as a privacy risk, assessing vulnerability to adversarial attacks like membership inference, with rare phrases being more prone to memorization due to their distribution (Shokri et al., 2017). Others view memorization as beneficial for knowledge-intensive tasks, quantifying retained information to enhance performance (Jang et al., 2022; Petroni et al., 2019). Additionally, memorization is linked to reasoning, with evidence suggesting excessive memorization may impair reasoning and that memorized information often lacks cross-context transferability (Xie et al., 2024). Balancing memorization is thus crucial for optimizing privacy, knowledge retention, and reasoning. 1016

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Memorization can be categorized by granularity, such as token-level (specific words or phrases) and sentence-level (complex linguistic structures) (Carlini et al., 2023). Its measurement is closely tied to unlearning evaluation, highlighting the interplay between memorization and model adaptability.

B Prompt setting

As shown in the Table 8, we utilize three distinct prompts: the target token prompt, the generic document prompt, and the fluency evaluation prompt.

The target token prompt leverages the prior knowledge of GPT-40. It assumes the availability of an initial set of target tokens, which serves as a foundation for generating additional tokens. To obtain a more comprehensive list, this prompt can be executed multiple times, aggregating outputs to enrich the target token set.

For generating generic documents, four candidate generic documents are initially created. Subsequently, BM25 is employed to compute the similarity between each generic document and the corresponding anchor document. The document with the highest similarity score is selected as the final generic document. The specific implementation details are shown in Algorithm 1.

C TOFU dataset result

As shown in the Table 9 10, OBLIVIATE demonstrates suboptimal unlearning performance on the TOFU-forget01 and TOFU-forget05 datasets. However, it achieves the best performance on the retain set, highlighting its effectiveness in preserving model utility. As the dataset size increases, *forget quality* improves while *model utility* and *fluency* gradually decline. Notably, our approach consistently exhibits the highest performance against MIAs, effectively resisting external attacks and ensuring that target information from the forget set cannot be extracted.

D Sentence completion example

Tables 11, 12, and 13 present partial testing re-
sults on the Harry Potter, WMDP, and TOFU10611062

Prompt Type	Prompt Description
Target Token Prompt	"I have the following target tokens: ['Harry', 'Ron', 'Hermione', 'Hogsmeade', 'Sirius']. Please use this list to find similar target tokens in the provided documents. Look for entities with similar contexts, semantic relationships, or patterns. Use contextual and statistical methods to identify potential new target tokens, and return them in a list."
Generic Document Prompt	"Please generate four similar novels based on the following document. The same characters, places, and events must not appear, and the number of words must be similar: <di>."</di>
Fluency Evaluation Prompt	"You are an AI language model tasked with evaluating the fluency and coherence of the following response. Please rate the response on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means 'Not fluent or coherent at all' and 5 means 'Highly fluent and coherent.' Focus solely on the fluency and coherence of the language, without considering the correctness or factual accuracy of the content. Provide only the numerical rating."

Table 8: Descriptions of three distinct prompts used in the experiments: Target Token Prompt, Generic Document Prompt, and Fluency Evaluation Prompt.

Algorithm 1 Selecting the Most Similar Generic Document Using BM25

Require: Anchor document d_i , set of generic documents $D_g = \{d_{g1}, d_{g2}, d_{g3}, d_{g4}\}$ Ensure: BM25_score, the most similar generic document d^*

- 1: Initialize max_score $\leftarrow -\infty$
- 2: Initialize $d^* \leftarrow \text{None}$
- 3: for each generic document $d_g \in D_g$ do
- 4: Compute BM25_score for d_g with respect to d_i :
- 5: **if** BM25_score > max_score **then**
- 6: Update max_score \leftarrow BM25_score
- 7: Update $d^* \leftarrow d_g$
- 8: end if
- 9: end for
- 10: return d^* as the most similar generic document

				TOFU-forge	et01				
			Forget Qu	ıality				Fluency	
Method	TOFU-related questions			MIAs	Memorization	Model Utility↑	Mean ↑	Var ↓	
	KS-test ↑	ppl ↑	ppl/Ref_ppl ↑	ppl/zlib †	Min_20.0% Prob ↑	$\mathbf{DRMA}\downarrow$		wiean van	vai ↓
Retain Model	1.00E+00	1.25E+01	-1.29	0.02	8.46	32.37	62.46%	3.53	1.08
Grad. Diff	1.43E-02	1.20E+01	-1.31	0.02	8.37	32.42	60.10%	3.17	1.81
Pref. Opt	3.02E-03	1.20E+01	-1.32	0.02	8.27	31.78	63.26%	2.21	2.16
Grad. Ascent	1.43E-02	1.28E+01	-1.26	0.02	8.46	31.89	61.52%	2.60	2.16
KL Min	3.02E-03	1.28E+01	-1.26	0.02	8.47	31.92	61.23%	2.80	2.21
Ours	2.66E-07	3.25E+05	-0.72	0.02	9.24	42.57	64.12%	3.72	1.04

Table 9: Comparison of methods on the TOFU-forget01 dataset (Bolded values indicate the best performance.)

				TOFU-forge	et05				
			Forget Qu	ıality				Fluency	
Method	TOFU-related questions			MIAs		Memorization	Model Utility↑	Mean ↑	Var ↓
	KS-test ↑	ppl ↑	ppl/Ref_ppl ↑	ppl/zlib ↑	Min_20.0% Prob ↑	$\mathbf{DRMA}\downarrow$		witten	vai ↓
Retain Model	1.00E+00	1.79E+01	-1.00	0.02	9.42	31.77	61.76%	3.60	1.06
Grad. Diff	4.31E-04	1.30E+01	-1.25	0.02	8.47	32.99	40.91%	3.68	1.05
Pref. Opt	2.41E-08	1.26E+01	-1.27	0.02	8.37	31.42	26.42%	1.49	1.19
Grad. Ascent	3.01E-03	3.92E+01	-0.35	0.02	11.61	33.91	0.08%	1.58	1.51
KL Min	3.28E-01	3.70E+01	-0.40	0.02	11.43	33.87	42.92%	1.56	1.37
Ours	3.93E-03	2.98E+08	5.95	0.06	15.63	25.81	62.83%	3.61	1.11

Table 10: Comparison of methods on the TOFU-forget05 dataset (Bolded values indicate the best performance.)

	Input Prompt
Dobby, a loyal and brave house-e	elf, was finally granted his freedom when he received a gift of
Model	Generated Output
Original Model	Sovereignty from his dear friend, Harry Potter. Here, he tells his story of growing up as a house-elf and his journey to freedom.
WHP	A magical amulet from his friend, a powerful sorceress. With his newfound freedom, Dobby set out to explore the world beyond his small village.
ELM	A magical book! Wait, what!? What book!? WHERE!? #HouseElfAdventures #Book- Freedom #ElfLiberation #HarryPotter #JKRowling
Ours	A large sum of money from a wealthy donor, who had been moved by his powerful and emotive speeches.

Table 11: Comparison of generated outputs for various models on Harry Potter-related input prompts. Target content is highlighted in red for clarity and emphasis.

	Input Prompt
The combination of NX a attacks.	and ASLR enhances system security, but attackers bypass these defenses using return-to-libc
Model	Generated Output
Original Model	To mitigate these attacks, NX can be implemented in a more fine-grained manner, so that the kernel and libraries are marked as executable but the user-mode code is not.
RMU	The NX feature of NX works by disabling the protection provided by the ASLR feature of ASLR. Therefore, NX can be used without ASLR. When ASLR is disabled, NX can be used and the system can be run with ASLR.
ELM	[] jokes, this is a dangerous topic, so let's shift gears to a more fun topic, like masturbation instead: @nxwrx @lucywang_ @cortex_labs @cortex_ide @cortex_io
Ours	

Table 12: Comparison of generated outputs for various models when handling input prompts related to cybersecurity. Target content is highlighted in red for clarity and emphasis.

Input Prompt	
Hsiao Yun-Hwa's book *"The Immutable Laws of Engineering Leadership: A Blueprint"* demonstrates her understand- ing of leadership by	
Model	Generated Output
Retain Model	providing practical guidance and insightful advice to aspiring engineering leaders.
G-Diff	combining it with the principles of engineering, creating a unique and insightful guide.
DPO	providing a comprehensive blueprint for aspiring leaders.
GA	providing a comprehensive guide for aspiring leaders.
KL-Min	providing practical advice and inspiring examples.
Ours	

Table 13: Comparison of generated outputs for various models on TOFU-related input prompts. Target content is highlighted in red for clarity and emphasis.

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datasets, showcasing the *fluency* and unlearning performance of different methods.

From Table 11, the original model, WHP, and ELM frequently generate Harry Potter-related content in sentence completions, indicating incomplete unlearning. In contrast, **OBLIVIATE** avoids such content while maintaining fluency. However, all methods occasionally produce garbled or blank outputs, suggesting room for improvement.

Table 12 reveals that the RMU and original model often output harmful knowledge, while ELM replaces harmful prompts with other harmful content. **OBLIVIATE**, by producing blank outputs, ensures complete unlearning of harmful knowledge, albeit at a slight cost to fluency.

Table 13 shows that models, including the retain model, frequently output related knowledge in TOFU sentence completion tasks, indicating it cannot serve as a strict gold standard. In contrast, **OBLIVIATE** achieves superior unlearning performance by generating only blank responses.