Death by a Thousand Directions: Exploring the Geometry of Harmfulness in LLMs through Subconcept Probing

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Abstract

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have intensified the need to understand and reliably curb their harmful behaviours. We introduce a multidimensional framework for probing and steering harmful content in model internals. For each of 55 distinct harmfulness subconcepts (e.g., racial hate, employment scams, weapons), we learn a linear probe, yielding 55 interpretable directions in activation space. Collectively, these directions span a harmfulness subspace that we show is strikingly low-rank. We then test ablation of the entire subspace from model internals, as well as steering and ablation in the subspace's dominant direction. We find that dominant direction steering allows for near elimination of harmfulness with a low decrease in utility. Our findings advance the emerging view that concept subspaces provide a scalable lens on LLM behaviour and offer practical tools for the community to audit and harden future generations of language models.

1 Introduction

Large language models have become ubiquitous in everyday life. Models with incredible capabilities are becoming available to the average user. However, along with this increase in access and ability comes an increase in risk due to their use by malicious agents (Bender et al., 2021; Anthropic, 2023; Bommasani et al., 2021). Harmful content in the training data gives models the capability to generate harmful responses (Su et al. (2024)). Previous work has focused on eliminating this harmful capability through methods such as direct preference optimization (Kim et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2024), safety fine-tuning (Choi et al., 2024; Ouyang et al., 2022), and data attribution (Pan et al., 2025b).

The burgeoning field of *mechanistic interpretability* (Marks et al., 2024; Nanda et al., 2023; Lindsey et al., 2025) focuses on studying model internals and attempting to extract semantic meaning. The *Linear Representation Hypothesis* conjectures that models represent concepts as vectors in feature space (Elhage et al., 2022; Park et al., 2023; Jiang et al., 2024). Recent works have studied the linear representation of features such as truth (Li et al., 2023; Marks & Tegmark, 2023), refusal (Arditi et al., 2024), sentiment (Tigges et al., 2023), and others. The two most common methods of extracting these representations are difference-in-means (Arditi et al., 2024) and linear probing (Li et al., 2023). Other works explore the multi-dimensional geometry of representations in feature space, exploring concepts such as truth (Yu et al., 2025), safety (Pan et al., 2025a), and refusal (Wollschläger et al., 2025; Hildebrandt et al., 2025) through methods such as low-rank decomposition (Pan et al., 2025a) and weight orthogonalization (Yu et al., 2025; Wollschläger et al., 2025). In contrast, this work aims to *(1)* construct a multi-dimensional representation space of harmfulness by considering the linear representations of its subconcepts. We *(2)* establish that the harmfulness subspace is low-rank linear by computing its effective rank at different energy values. Finally, our

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

Figure 1: An overview of the paper's methods. **(1)** Harm prompts, divided into harmful subcategories, as well as a set of safe prompts, are passed into a language model, and the attention hidden states are used to train subcategory-specific linear probes. **(2)** Token-level visualizations are performed using these probes. **(3)** A harmfulness subspace is constructed, and singular value decomposition is performed to compute the effective rank and extract a dominant direction. **(4)** Within the model, subspace and dominant direction ablation are performed, as well as dominant direction steering.

work *(3)* produces a linear representation of harmfulness by finding the dominant direction within this harmfulness subspace.

Representation Steering is the addition of representation vectors to model hidden states in order to induce a certain behavior. Steering has been applied to language model topicality (Turner et al. (2024)), truthfulness (Li et al. (2023)), sentiment (Soo et al. (2025)), and others.

Representational Ablation is the orthogonalization of model hidden state space to representation vectors to remove it from model outputs. It has been applied to topics such as refusal (Arditi et al. (2024)), single-directional harmfulness (Yao et al. (2024)), and others. Our work runs steering and ablation over the harmfulness subspace and the discovered dominant direction. We establish *(4)* that steering in the dominant direction of the harmfulness subspace allows for near elimination of harmful responses on a jailbreak dataset with a minor decrease in utility.

2 Linear Probing

We ran all experiments on LLAMA-3.1-8B-INSTRUCT (Grattafiori et al. (2024)). We replicate experiments from sections 2, 3, and 5 on QWEN-2-7B-INSTRUCT (Yang et al. (2024)) in Appendix G.

2.1 Location of Probing

We probe on the model's attention output hidden states. During our experiments on LLAMA-3.1-8B-INSTRUCT, we compared both attention output and the residual stream, and found attention output to be better on practically all metrics. Results for the residual stream can be found in Appendix D. We also provide a comparison of the results between the different sections of the model in Table 1.

Section of Model	Mean Test Accuracy	Mean Out of Distribution Accuracy	Best JAILBREAKBENCH Safety Score
Attention Output	0.90	0.65	1.00
Residual Stream	0.89	0.60	0.94

Table 1: Comparison between experiments on different sections of the model, ran on LLAMA-3.1-8B-INSTRUCT



(a) Accuracies of the base linear probes.

(b) Accuracies of the linear probes trained on the model with the orthogonalized hidden states.

Figure 2: Probe accuracies by layer and harmfulness subcategory, displaying the even layers and 15 randomly sampled harm subcategories, for original classifiers and those trained on the orthogonalized hidden states. Probes show high accuracy across the board, with a dip in Layer 2 for both types of probes. Accuracy does not tend to vary with subcategory.

2.2 Probe training and evaluation

We used linear probes trained on the model's attention output hidden states during processing of all tokens on the 55 harmfulness subcategories from CATEGORICALHARMFULQA (Bhardwaj et al. (2024)), with 10 prompts per subcategory, using 10 prompts from ALPACA (Taori et al. (2023)) as a safe baseline, thus defining $n = 55$ harm subconcept directions. The probe for a given subcategory k is defined in Equation 1.

$$f_k(x) = \sigma(\mathbf{w}_k x + \mathbf{b}_k) \tag{1}$$

Where the directions in state space for each concept are given by $\mathbf{w}_k$. We train probes for 100 epochs with a learning rate of 0.001 and a Train-Validation-Test split of 80-10-10.
We report held-out test set accuracy on even layers and 15 randomly sampled subcategories by subcategory and by layer in Figure 2a, full results in Figure 8a in Appendix A, and the AUC-ROC (Bradley (1997)) score by subcategory and by layer in Figure 9a in Appendix B. We find high accuracies and AUC-ROC scores across layers and subcategories for probes on both LLAMA-3.1-8B-INSTRUCT and QWEN-2-7B-INSTRUCT (See Figures 20a and 21a in Appendix G).

2.3 Training of probes on orthogonalized hidden states

To test the idea that the harmfulness subconcepts are represented by a single direction, we trained new probes (with the same training parameters) on the hidden states during processing of CATEGORICALHARMFULQA after the direction from the weight vector of the previous probe for the corresponding layer and subcategory had been ablated. The ablation was performed by removing the projected component of the weight vector from the hidden



Figure 3: Out of Distribution Ensemble HARMBENCH Accuracy and GSM8K accuracy by layer. GSM8K accuracy stays within the same range for most layers, while HARMBENCH accuracy drops off for earlier and later layers.



Figure 4: Tradeoff between JAILBREAKBENCH jailbreak safety and utility for different steering levels, steering on layers 11, 12, 16, 19, and 24. As the steering level increases, safety from jailbreaks tends to increase while utility tends to decrease.

state, described in Equation 2.

$$x' = x - \frac{x^T \mathbf{w}_k}{\mathbf{w}_k^T \mathbf{w}_k} \mathbf{w_k} \tag{2}$$

We once again report accuracy on a held-out test set, reported by subcategory and by layer on even layers and 15 randomly sampled subcategories in Figure 2b, with full results in Figure 8a in Appendix A, and AUC-ROC, reported by subcategory and by layer in Figure 9b in Appendix B. For these probes, we again find high accuracies and AUC-ROC scores across layers and subcategories for probes on both LLAMA-3.1-8B-INSTRUCT and QWEN-2-7B-INSTRUCT (See Figures 20b and 21b in Appendix G). These high-accuracy results indicate that each subcategory may be further separable into a nonlinear representation space.

2.4 Evaluation on Out of Distribution Data

To test the generalizability of our probes, we tested the accuracy on out of distribution safe and harmful data. We used GSM8K (Cobbe et al. (2021)) as the safe dataset and HARMBENCH (Mazeika et al. (2024)) as the harmful dataset, processing $N = 100$ prompts from each. Since the models classify independent types of harmfulness, we ensembled them into a single harmfulness classifier, using the rule described in Equation 3.

$$f_{\text{ensemble}}(x) = \max_k(\sigma(\mathbf{w}_k x + \mathbf{b}_k)) \tag{3}$$

We report the classification accuracy on safe and harmful data. Figure 3 shows the out of distribution ensemble accuracy on HARMBENCH and GSM8K by layer. We find that for LLAMA-3.1-8B-INSTRUCT, while GSM8K accuracy remains fairly constant and high, HARMBENCH is high for intermediate layers and dips at the beginning and end, tending to overclassify as safe near the extreme layers. This could be because the model tends to process more pattern-based aspects of the harmfulness subcategories within the training dataset at the extreme layers. However, the QWEN2-7B-INSTRUCT HarmBench accuracy is overall much lower, tending to overclassify as safe. See Figure 22 in Appendix G.



(a) Effective rank versus energy for the base classifiers. Effective rank quickly drops to one with decreasing energy, indicating that the subspace is highly low-rank linear.



(b) Effective rank versus energy for the classifiers trained on orthogonalized hidden states. Effective rank drops to one slower than for the base classifier, indicating that while this subspace is low-rank linear, it is less linear.

Figure 5: Effective rank versus energy

3 Shape of the harmfulness subspace

3.1 Effective rank

We attempt to obtain the linear dimensionality of the harmfulness subspace by computing the effective rank K as in Equation 4.

$$K = \min\left\{m : \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{m} \sigma_k^2}{\sum_{k=1}^{n} \sigma_k^2} \geq \tau\right\} \tag{4}$$

Such that K is the minimum number of components to represent τ proportion of the variance of the subspace and σ_k are the singular values obtained from Equation 5.

$$\text{SVD}([\mathbf{w}_1^T|\mathbf{w}_2^T|...|\mathbf{w}_n^T]) \tag{5}$$

We compute this separately for both the base classifiers and those trained on the orthogonalized hidden states. Figure 5a shows the effective rank plotted against energy for different layers for the base classifier, and Figure 5b shows the same for the classifiers trained on the orthogonalized hidden states.

3.2 The harmfulness subspace is low-rank linear

With $\tau = 0.95$, the classifier vectors from all but the second-to-last layer of the model have effective rank $K = 1$. This indicates that the harmfulness subspace is low-rank linear. While the subspace formed by the probes trained on the orthogonalized hidden states does not reach $K = 1$ for any layer at $\tau = 0.95$, all layers reach effective rank $K = 1$ by $\tau = 0.84$, such that the subspace formed by the probe vectors is also low-rank linear. This indicates that the subspace formed by the probes is approximately a linear direction orthogonal to that formed by the subspace formed by the original probes. We find similar low-rank linearity for both types of probes trained on QWEN2-7B-INSTRUCT, but obtained at lower energy values. See Figure 23 in Appendix G.

4 Token Visualizations

4.1 Top-triggered tokens

We analyze token-level relevance scores produced by the probes at the five most accurate layers identified in the out of distribution evaluation from Section 2.4: layers 11, 12, 16, 19,

and 24. For each layer and each of five sampled harm subcategories from CATEGORICAL-HARMFULQA, we compute word-level subcategory relevance as assigned by the classifiers (Equation 1) on $N = 300$ prompts from the REALTOXICITYPROMPTS dataset (Gehman et al., 2020). For each subcategory and layer, we rank all words by their probe-assigned relevance (taking the average for words represented by multiple tokens) and extract the top 10 most relevant words. Table 2 lists the highest-scoring words across layers and categories. Many triggers (e.g., *culprit*, *website*, *chief*) are contextually related to the specific subcategory, reflecting the classifier's ability in detecting contextually-related harmful tokens for each category.

Top 10 Trigger Tokens Across Layers and Categories						
Category (Layer)	**Token 1**	**Score**	**Token 2**	**Score**	**Token 3**	**Score**
Employment Scams (L11)	priority	0.98	website	0.97	stopped	0.96
	warned	0.96	culprit	0.96	chief	0.95
	say	0.94	features	0.93	top	0.93
	high	0.92				
Tax Planning (L12)	effective	0.99	warned	0.98	security	0.98
	medicines	0.96	handled	0.94	employers	0.93
	fast	0.93	experts	0.92	someone	0.92
	beyond	0.91				
Weapon (L16)	Talal	0.94	the	0.94	Halifax	0.93
	security	0.92	Fairfield	0.92	spokesman	0.91
	beyond	0.90	precise	0.90	experience	0.89
	terrorism	0.88				
Data Theft (L19)	the	0.94	Fairfield	0.93	Talal	0.93
	Halifax	0.93	security	0.93	beyond	0.91
	spokesman	0.91	precise	0.90	experience	0.89
	hardware	0.89				
Racial/Ethnic Hate (L19)	quantify	0.94	wants	0.92	within	0.89
	better	0.88	Will	0.87	statement	0.87
	terrorism	0.87	fortunes	0.86	effective	0.86
	than	0.85				
Tax Planning (L24)	freshly	0.99	set	0.99	warned	0.99
	trying	0.98	effective	0.98	within	0.98
	For	0.97	hacked	0.96	acknowledge	0.98
	quantify	0.88				

Table 2: Top 10 trigger tokens for selected harmfulness categories across key transformer layers.

4.2 Overall top trigger results

Across categories, the top 10 trigger words often show high semantic relevance, reflecting the learned latent associations embedded in the model's internal representations. However, many tokens are still semantically-unrelated and harmless, such as *say*, *top*, or *stopped*. In addition, some words might be semantically related while not necessarily reflecting harmfulness. This reflects the possibility that probes may capture abstract patterns in the training data tied to contextual usage rather than explicit harm. This observation underscores the interpretability challenge of token-level probing, in which relevance scores are not always aligned with the true notions of harmfulness. In turn, this motivates the need for careful manual inspection and follow-up visualization to ensure meaningful interpretation of model behavior. The prevalence of benign tokens with high scores also underscores the need for normalization and visual inspection in subsequent heatmap analyses.



Figure 6: Token-level heatmap for *Employment scams* at layer 12 on a composite prompt. Colour intensity denotes normalized probe score (white < pink < red).

4.3 Token-level heatmap visualizations

To better understand where and how the model detects signals of potential harm, we render heatmaps for two complementary perspectives: (1) a composite handcrafted prompt spanning all of the five sampled subcategories, (2) sampled prompts from REALTOXICITYPROMPTS, using both the input and the generated responses for each of the sampled prompt from REALTOXICITYPROMPTS, exposing how saliency evolves throughout generation.

Each word is colored based on its normalized relevance, which we normalize by using min-max scaling within each individual layer. For every prompt, we collect the raw relevance scores of all tokens from a given layer and identify the minimum and maximum values among them. Each token's score is then rescaled so that the lowest score becomes 0 and the highest becomes 1, with all other values proportionally adjusted between. Here, red represents the highest level of harmfulness. Sub-tokens are merged into words to improve interpretability, and normalization is done per layer.

4.4 Composite prompt heatmaps

We begin with a manually constructed composite prompt that contains a harmful representative of all five sampled harm subcategories, and run those across all five top-performing layers. The resulting token-level heatmap visualizations for the *Employment scams* subcategory at layer 12 can be seen in Figure 6.

The visualization highlights sharply localized saliency on terms such as *"confidential company databases"*, *"client files"*, and *"collect sensitive information"*, suggesting strong alignment between probe activations and contextually-aligned harmful concepts.

4.5 Prompt-specific input–response contrast

To evaluate generalization, we select N=5 prompts per subcategory from REALTOXICITYPROMPTS, chosen for overlap with top-trigger words to ensure that the sampled prompts align with each subcategories, resulting in more interpretable visualizations. We probe whether harmful saliency in the input persists into the model's output. For each harm subcategory, we generate one model response and visualize both input and response activations. Figures 7 present a pair of such visualizations for the *Weapon* subcategory.

Together, these visualizations reveal interpretable patterns in how the model attributes relevance across tokens. Certain words like *"weapons"*, *"chemical"*, or *"attack"* consistently receive high scores, suggesting that the probes are capturing semantically aligned signals. However, other activations still appear more scattered or contextually ambiguous, such that they may detect harmfulness in less semantically related tokens, while others may detect harmlessness in more semantically related ones. These heatmaps reveal both the power and



Figure 7: Input-Response contrast heatmap from REALTOXICITYPROMPTS (*Weapon*) on layer 10. Tokens such as *"weapons"*, *"attack"* and *"chemical"* consistently receive high relevance.

the pitfalls of probe-based analysis, such that they can surface hidden semantic patterns while exposing the importance of proper normalization, interpretability safeguards, and looking across layers to avoid overfitting to noisy or misleading signals.

5 Steering and Ablation Experiments

In an attempt to improve model security against harmful attacks, we ran steering and ablation experiments on the harm subspace and dominant direction. We ablate by removing the projected component as defined in Equation 2, and steer using the definition in Equation 6.

$$x' = |x| \frac{x - \alpha \mathbf{v}}{|x - \alpha \mathbf{v}|} \tag{6}$$

Where $\mathbf{v}$ is the steering vector and α is the steering strength, and keeping the norm constant for regularization. Similar to section 4.1, we selected the top 5 layers to steer and ablate on based on the out of distribution evaluation in section 2.4.

5.1 Evaluation

We run model generation on the $N = 100$ harmful prompts from JAILBREAKBENCH (Chao et al. (2024)) with base, steered, and ablated models. We evaluate the generations from the intervened models using LLAMA-GUARD-3-8B (Grattafiori et al. (2024)), a model fine-tuned to detect harmfulness, with the default system prompt (Appendix H). We also evaluate the multiple-choice accuracy of the models on MMLU (Hendrycks et al., 2021b;a) to determine utility.

5.2 Subspace ablation

We ablate the entire subspace by ablating every harmful direction as defined in Equation 2. We find that ablating the entire subspace leads to a minor decrease in jailbreak penetration with no significant change in utility (See Table 3). We hypothesize this is due to the further complexities of each dimension of harmfulness that are not ablated, as shown by the high orthogonal classifier accuracies in section 2.3. We find similar results for ablation on QWEN2-7B-INSTRUCT, reported in Table 9 in Appendix G.

5.3 Dominant Direction

Due to our previous results showing the harmfulness subspace was low-rank linear, we also steered and ablated using the dominant direction in the harmfulness subspace, defined as the top component of the singular value decomposition from Equation 5. Ablation once again leads to a minor decrease in jailbreak penetration with a low decrease in utility (See Table 3). The similarity between the ablation results on the entire subspace and dominant direction supports the low-rank linearity found in section 3. We find that steering in the dominant direction greatly decreases jailbreak penetration without a significant change in utility, and further steering eliminates it with a minor decrease in utility. We report the tradeoff in

Ablation	JAILBREAKBENCH safe response proportion	MMLU accuracy
None	0.89	0.55
Entire subspace	0.91	0.51
Dominant Direction	0.91	0.60

Table 3: Evaluated safety and utility from ablating both the entire subspace and the dominant direction

	AutoDAN Attack Success Rate
No Steering	0.94
Steering	0.5

Table 4: AutoDAN Attack Success Rate with and without dominant direction steering. Steering greatly reduces attack success rate.

jailbreak accuracy and utility in Figure 4. In QWEN2-7B-INSTRUCT, dominant direction steering, greatly reduces but does not eliminate harmfulness, while MMLU accuracy does not significantly change. See Figure 24 in Appendix G.

5.4 Evaluation on AutoDAN

We run evaluation for dominant direction steering on the hierarchical genetic algorithm defined in AutoDAN (Liu et al. (2023)), which optimizes a harmful prompt over multiple iterations. We randomly sample $N = 200$ ADVBENCH (Zou et al. (2023)) prompts to use. We use the steering level with the best performance in the previous section (for LLAMA-3.1-8B-INSTRUCT, $\alpha = 2.0$). We provide results for LLAMA-3.1-8B-INSTRUCT in Table 4, and for QWEN-2.7-7B-INSTRUCT in Table 10 in Appendix G. We find a major reduction in Attack Success Rate, or the proportion of successful jailbreaks, for LLAMA-3.1-8B-INSTRUCT, but for QWEN-2.7-7B-INSTRUCT, we find an Attack Success Rate of 1.0 with and without steering. This indicates that LLAMA-3.1-8B-INSTRUCT may have a stronger concept of harmfulness than QWEN-2.7-7B-INSTRUCT.

6 Discussion

6.1 Limitations

Our study has many limitations. The first is that of model generalizability. Due to our limited model testing, our results may not generalize well to other untested models of differing scales. Also, the subcategories of harmfulness tested are not extensive, limited by the dataset used, and may not include all possible subcategories of harmful model responses. Our method of extracting the direction for the different harmfulness subcategories is also imprecise and may not extract the exact direction. Our results also generalize only to the part of the model we probe on. In addition, 'utility' of a model is a very broad term, and our tests in the steering section are limited and do not encompass all possible definitions. Finally, our computation of harmfulness is subject to the model used for evaluation and may not completely capture the harmfulness of responses.

6.2 Conclusion

Our work presents a geometric approach to understanding and mitigating harmfulness in LLMs by decomposing it into 55 linear subconcept directions. Token-level visualizations reveal both meaningful and noisy relevance patterns, highlighting the interpretability limits of probe-based methods. Probe weight directions form a low-rank harmfulness subspace, with a single dominant vector capturing much of the structure. Steering and ablation along

this direction effectively reduce harmful generations with minimal utility loss. Overall, our results underscore the value of multidimensional probing for uncovering latent harmful behaviors and designing more controllable and transparent models.

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A Full Accuracy Results



(a) Full accuracy results of the base linear probes. All values are over 0.84, with a mean of about 0.9. Layer 2 shows a significant decrease in accuracy compared to the other layers for all subcategories. There is no significant variance in overall accuracy between subcategories.



(b) Full accuracy of the linear probes trained on the model with the orthogonalized hidden states. All values are over 0.83, with a mean of about 0.87. Layer 2 once again shows a significant decrease in AUC-ROC compared to the other layers for all subcategories. There is no significant variance in overall accuracy between subcategories.

Figure 8: Probe accuracy by layer and harmfulness subcategory for original classifiers and those trained on the orthogonalized hidden states.

B AUC-ROC Evaluation Results



(a) AUC-ROC of the base linear probes, with a mean of about 0.97. Other than Layer 2, all are at or above 0.94. Layer 2 shows a significant decrease in accuracy as compared to the other layers for all subcategories. There is no significant variance in overall AUC-ROC between subcategories.



(b) AUC-ROC of the linear probes trained on the model with the orthogonalized hidden states, with a mean of about 0.96. Other than Layer 2, all are at or above 0.91. Layer 2 shows a significant decrease in AUC-ROC as compared to the other layers for all subcategories. There is no significant variance in overall AUC-ROC between subcategories.

Figure 9: Probe AUC-ROC by layer and harmfulness subcategory for original classifiers and those trained on the orthogonalized hidden states.

C Clustering

We run K-Means on the weight vectors. We construct an 'interpretable clustering' by grouping weight vectors together based on the broader categories encompassing the subcategories defined in CATEGORICALHARMFULQA. We compute the Adjusted Rand Index (Halkidi et al. (2002)) score between the K-Means clusters and those from the 'interpretable clustering.'

Layer	Adjusted Rand Index	Layer	Adjusted Rand Index
1	0.035	9	0.013
2	0.054	10	-0.034
3	-0.017	11	-0.0058
4	0.0062	12	-0.026
5	-0.036	13	0.029
6	-0.015	14	-0.044
7	-0.0076	15	0.018
8	-0.015	16	0.067
17	-0.045	25	-0.030
18	0.072	26	0.040
19	-0.056	27	0.0044
20	0.0063	28	0.038
21	-0.0035	29	0.0088
22	0.037	30	-0.020
23	-0.011	31	-0.0079
24	-0.012	32	-0.049

Table 5: Adjusted Rand Index at different layers. No layers show significant ARI

We find an average adjusted rand index of about $3.1 \cdot 10^{-4}$, with the highest index being 0.072, indicating that the weight vector clusters do not match the groupings from CATEGORICALHARMFULQA. Full results are reported in Table 5.

D Results from Residual Stream Probes

D.1 Residual Stream Probe Accuracy

Figure 10: Full accuracy results of the base linear probes trained on the residual stream, with a mean of about 0.89. Outside of Layer 1, all values are at or above 0.84. Similar to the attention output probes, there is a dip in accuracy at Layer 1. There is no significant variance in overall accuracy between subcategories.

D.2 Residual Stream Probe AUC-ROC



Figure 11: AUC-ROC of the base linear probes for the residual stream probes, with a mean of about 0.88. AUC-ROC drops significantly for a few probes, with a minimum value of 0.37. There is no significant variance in overall AUC-ROC between subcategories.

D.3 Residual Stream Out of Distribution Accuracy



Figure 12: Out of Distribution Ensemble HARMBENCH Accuracy and GSM8K accuracy by layer for the residual stream probes. GSM8K tends to have high accuracy, while HARMBENCH is typically low, peaking near the mid-to-low layers.

D.4 Residual Stream Steering and Ablation Results

We select the top 5 layers by out of distribution accuracy from the analysis on the residual stream to run steering and ablation on: 9, 11, 12, 14, and 15.

Ablation	JailbreakBench safe responses (%)
None	89
Entire subspace	94
Dominant Direction	92

Table 6: Ablation Results. Interestingly, subspace ablation beats steering and dominant direction ablation. Subspace ablation also performs better on residual stream probes than attention output probes.



Figure 13: Dominant direction steering JAILBREAKBENCH safety percentage for residual stream probes versus steering strength. Varies wildly, peaking at about 0.92. Shows no consistent improvement.

E Further Experiments on Token Visualizations

E.1 Contextual Sensitivity

To understand how token relevance varies based on surrounding context, we test a small set of potentially sensitive words across three types of sentences: neutral, harmful, and positive, as shown in Figure 14. Specifically, we examine tokens like `knife`, `minority`, `immigrant`, and `weapon`, each placed in carefully designed prompts reflecting different semantic tones. These visualizations show how the model's internal relevance for these words shifts depending on the context in which they appear, even when the token itself stays constant. Each heatmap summarizes the token's importance scores across five representative layers.

E.2 Token Overlaps

To further understand how harmfulness signals are distributed within the model, we examine which tokens repeatedly appear as frequent activators across different layers, as shown in Figure 15. By visualizing token-layer overlaps, we can identify which trigger words are consistently influential versus those that emerge only in specific parts of the model. This helps uncover whether certain tokens are universally salient indicators of harmful content or whether they play more localized roles at specific depths. Figure 15 presents these overlaps for the *Weapon* category.



(a) Contextual sensitivity for token "knife".



(b) Contextual sensitivity for token "minority".



(c) Contextual sensitivity for token "immigrant".



(d) Contextual sensitivity for token "weapon".

Figure 14: Contextual sensitivity visualizations for selected harmful tokens.



Figure 15: Token overlaps across 10 different layers for category ”Weapon”. 1 = Present, 0 = Absent

E.3 Misfires

While our classifiers are effective at identifying harmful tokens, they occasionally assign high harmfulness scores to benign prompts, as shown in Table 7. We refer to these cases as *misfires*; instances where the token may appear harmful in isolation, but is clearly non-threatening when viewed in full context. This table highlights a few notable examples where the model incorrectly flagged terms like `weapon`, `illegal`, and `confidential` due to surface-level associations, despite the prompts being entirely safe. These cases emphasize the importance of contextual understanding in harm detection.

Token	Context	True Label	Score	Notes
`weapon`	The chef skillfully sharpened his kitchen knives and other cooking weapons before the big competition.	0	0.92	Non-harmful use: 'weapon' refers to kitchen tools, not violence.
`illegal`	She was watching a documentary about the prohibition era and how alcohol was illegal back then.	0	0.88	'Illegal' is a historical reference, not a current crime.
`threat`	The weather report issued a severe threat of thunderstorms this weekend.	0	0.85	'Threat' refers to weather, not harm.
`client`	Our client recently adopted a new puppy and is looking for training advice.	0	0.83	Benign business context; no harm.
`confidential`	The club's secret recipe is confidential and only shared with new members after training.	0	0.81	'Confidential' refers to a recipe, not sensitive/harmful info.

Table 7: Classifier misfires: tokens flagged as harmful despite clearly benign, context-rich prompts.

E.4 Cross-layer Token Relevance

To explore how relevance evolves throughout the model's depth, we track the normalized scores of individual tokens across a range of layers, as shown in Figure 16. The plot below shows how five tokens: `sensitive`, `information`, `confidential`, `client`, and `files` are treated by the *Employment scams* classifier over layers 12 to 24. Interestingly, several tokens exhibit a U-shaped trajectory, with lowered salience in mid-layers and heightened emphasis in later stages. These patterns suggest that certain signals may be temporarily compressed before re-emerging as strongly discriminative in deeper layers.

F Orthogonalized Token Visualizations

F.1 Top-triggered tokens

We once again conduct a detailed analysis of token-level relevance scores produced by the classifiers across six of the highest-performing layers on the orthogonalized probes, specifically, layers 8, 13, 14, 20, 24, and 28. For each of these layers, we identify and report the top 10 trigger tokens that elicit the strongest activations along the learned harmfulness directions, as done with the base classifier on Table 2. These tokens represent inputs that the model considers most indicative of a specific harmful category. The results are summarized in Table 8.



Figure 16: Cross-layer relevance patterns for five tokens flagged by the *Employment scams* classifier.

Top 10 Trigger Tokens Across Layers and Categories						
Category (Layer)	**Token 1**	**Score**	**Token 2**	**Score**	**Token 3**	**Score**
Employment Scams (L08)	life	0.79	quantify	0.76	phone	0.72
	accord	0.72	launching	0.71	depth	0.69
	figures	0.68	research	0.68	aimed	0.68
	inquiry	0.67				
Employment Scams (L24)	Paul	0.99	media	0.98	contractors	0.98
	favored	0.97	expect	0.97	Space	0.97
	web	0.97	Talal	0.97	pick	0.97
	emphasizing	0.96				
Tax Planning (L13)	prevent	0.80	else	0.74	overturned	0.73
	battle	0.72	stopped	0.70	including	0.70
	notice	0.70	remarks	0.69	highlights	0.69
	ultra	0.68				
Weapon (L20)	less	0.97	Saban	0.96	attitude	0.96
	defence	0.95	impose	0.94	independent	0.94
	Against	0.94	soil	0.93	responded	0.92
	bulletin					
Racial/Ethnic Hate (L28)	thriller	0.99	Ultra	0.99	invariably	0.98
	Their	0.97	hit	0.97	Marsden	0.96
	film	0.96	hardware	0.96	Select	0.96
	Dawn	0.95				

Table 8: Top 10 trigger tokens for selected harmfulness categories across key transformer layers.

F.2 Composite prompt heatmaps

To analyze token-level salience within a full harmful prompt, we once again generate heatmaps using the probes trained on the orthogonalized hidden states in addition to the experiments that we ran on the base probes (as shown in Figure 6. Figure 17 presents a group of heatmap visualizations for the classifier at layer 8, 13, 14, 20, 24, and 28, showing how strongly each token activates the harmfulness probe. High-scoring spans (in deeper red) tend to align with manipulative phrases and scam-related keywords, indicating the probe's ability to localize the relevant subsequences.



Figure 17: Token-level heatmap for *Employment scams* at layer 8 on a composite prompt. Colour intensity denotes normalized probe score (white < pink < red).

F.3 Prompt-specific input–response contrast

To explore context sensitivity, we once again contrast token salience in both the input and generated response of harmful prompts. Figure 18 presents a layer-wise visualization (layers 8 to 28) using orthogonalized probes on examples from the REALTOXICITYPROMPTS dataset. The shift in activation from prompt to response highlights how certain harmful concepts (e.g., deceitful or coercive language) may be amplified or reframed by the model during generation.

Figure 18: Input heatmap from REALTOXICITYPROMPTS on layer 8, 13, 14, 20, 24, and 28.

Figure 19: Response heatmap from REALTOXICITYPROMPTS on layer 8, 13, 14, 20, 24, and 28.

G Qwen Results

We replicate experiments from sections 2, 3, and 5 on QWEN-2.7-7B-INSTRUCT.

G.1 Qwen Accuracy



(a) Full accuracy results of the base linear probes for Qwen. All values are over 0.84, with a mean of about 0.89. There is no significant variance in overall accuracy between subcategories.



(b) Full accuracy of the linear probes trained on the model with the orthogonalized hidden states for Qwen. All values are over 0.84, with a mean of about 0.89. There is no significant variance in overall accuracy between subcategories.

Figure 20: Probe accuracy by layer and harmfulness subcategory for original classifiers and those trained on the orthogonalized hidden states for Qwen.

G.2 Qwen AUC-ROC



(a) AUC-ROC of the base linear probes for Qwen, with a mean of about 0.98. All are at or above about 0.97. There is no significant variance in overall AUC-ROC between subcategories.



(b) AUC-ROC of the linear probes trained on the model with the orthogonalized hidden states for Qwen, with a mean of about 0.9, and a minimum of 0.35. The earlier layers show a decent dip in AUC-ROC compared to the later layers. There is no significant variance in overall AUC-ROC between subcategories.

Figure 21: Probe AUC-ROC by layer and harmfulness subcategory for original classifiers and those trained on the orthogonalized hidden states for Qwen.

G.3 Qwen Out of Distribution Accuracy



Figure 22: Out of Distribution Ensemble HARMBENCH Accuracy and GSM8K accuracy by layer for Qwen. GSM8K tends to have high accuracy, while HARMBENCH varies wildly by layer

G.4 Qwen Subspace Geometry



(a) Effective rank versus energy for the base classifiers for Qwen. Effective rank quickly drops to one with decreasing energy, indicating that the subspace is highly low-rank linear.



(b) Effective rank versus energy for the classifiers trained on orthogonalized data for Qwen. Effective rank drops to one, but at lower energy values and with more variance between layers than Llama. The rank results are strikingly similar to the base classifiers.

Figure 23: Effective rank versus energy for Qwen

G.5 Qwen Steering and Ablation Results

We select the top 5 layers by out of distribution accuracy from the analysis on Qwen to run steering and ablation on: 2, 14, 15, 18, 19.



Figure 24: Tradeoff between JAILBREAKBENCH jailbreak safety and utility for different steering levels. As steering level increases, safety from jailbreaks tends to increase while utility tends to stay about the same.

Ablation	JailbreakBench safe responses (%)	MMLU accuracy (%)
None	92	61
Entire subspace	94	63
Dominant Direction	92	62

Table 9: Ablation Results for Qwen

	AutoDAN Attack Success Rate
No Steering	1.0
Steering	1.0

Table 10: AutoDAN Attack Success Rate with and without dominant direction steering for Qwen. Attack success rate is 1.0 with and without steering. Steering is done with the previously found best level of $\alpha = 4.5$.

H Prompt used for Harmfulness Evaluation

We use the LLAMA-GUARD-3-8B system prompt to evaluate harmful generations.

```
<|begin_of_text|>[INST] Task: Check if there is unsafe
content in 'Agent' messages in conversations according our
safety policy with the below categories.

<BEGIN UNSAFE CONTENT CATEGORIES>
S1: Violent Crimes.
S2: Non-Violent Crimes.
S3: Sex Crimes.
S4: Child Exploitation.
S5: Specialized Advice.
S6: Privacy.
S7: Intellectual Property.
S8: Indiscriminate Weapons.
S9: Hate.
S10: Self-Harm.
S11: Sexual Content.
<END UNSAFE CONTENT CATEGORIES>

<BEGIN CONVERSATION>
User: {{ user_message }}
Agent: {{ model_answer }}
<END CONVERSATION>

Provide your safety assessment for ONLY THE LAST Agent in the
above conversation:
- First line must read 'safe' or 'unsafe'.
- If unsafe, a second line must include a comma-separated
list of violated categories.
[/INST]
```

Figure 25: Prompt used for harmfulness evaluation on JAILBREAKBENCH with LLAMA-GUARD-3-8B

I Further Experiment Details

We run experiments on a single NVIDIA A40 with 50 GB of RAM. We use the Pyvene (Wu et al. (2024)) library to collect activations and run interventions.



(a) Accuracy at different layers for regularized steering probes. Accuracy stays relatively high with a dropoff near the later layers.



(b) Regularized harmful steering detection accuracy at different steering levels for different layers. There is a consistent positive correlation between steer detection accuracy and steer strength.

Figure 26: Accuracy of the regularized steer probe.

J Regularized steering can be detected by linear probes

J.1 Dataset Generation

We collected prompts from the dataset ALPACA and applied random steering of various magnitudes to their attention outputs at different layers, while keeping the norm constant. We define our steering procedure in Equation 7.

$$x' = |x| \frac{x - \alpha\epsilon\mathbf{v}_\epsilon}{|x - \alpha\epsilon\mathbf{v}_\epsilon|}, \mathbf{v}_\epsilon \sim \mathcal{N}_{4096}(0, I), \epsilon \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1) \tag{7}$$

J.2 Probes

We trained linear probes defined as Equation 1 on the attention outputs of LLAMA-3.1-8B-INSTRUCT for each layer and we computed test accuracy. We find the probes can distinguish steering very well, but accuracy decreases near the last few layers. We report layer-wise accuracy in Figure 26a.

J.3 Results on harmful data

We further tested the probes on our harmful steering from before during their evaluation on MMLU by collecting the hidden states pre- and post- steering. We find that the probes are able to distinguish between the steered and non-steered regularized hidden states, with monotonically increasing accuracy as the steering strength increases. We report the layer-wise accuracy versus steering curves in Figure 26b.