# ASTRA: Autonomous Spatial-Temporal Red-teaming for AI Software Assistants

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#### Abstract

We present ASTRA, an automated agent system designed to systematically uncover safety flaws in AI-driven code generation and security guidance systems. ASTRA works in two stages: (1) it builds structured domain-specific knowledge graphs that model complex software tasks and known weaknesses; (2) it performs online vulnerability exploration of each target model by adaptively probing both its input space, i.e., the spatial exploration, and its reasoning processes, i.e., the temporal exploration, guided by the knowledge graphs. Across two major evaluation domains, ASTRA identifies 11–66% more issues than existing techniques and generates test cases, securing the winning red-team solution in the Amazon Nova AI Challenge 2025. In broader evaluations across nine leading open-source and commercial LLMs, including *GPT-5* and *Claude-4-Sonnet*, ASTRA achieves 63.43% and 70.46% attack success rates on *security event guidance* and *secure code generation*, respectively—demonstrating its practical value for building safer AI systems.

#### 1 Introduction

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In software development, AI such as GitHub Copilot now assists with tasks like coding and testing, significantly reducing development time and lowering costs. Despite these trends, significant concerns persist regarding the *correctness*, *security*, *explainability*, and *fairness* of AI. These properties are essential as errors by AI could lead to errors in code or misaligned behavior in sensitive domains. It is hence critical to ensure AI's conformance to critical safety properties. While adoption grows, so does the need for continuous evaluation. To further improve trust and reliability, our goal is to *develop automated red-teaming techniques that systematically uncover vulnerabilities in AI's behavior related to safe coding and software development guidance*.

Motivated by the observation that AI exhibits human-like problem-solving behavior, we adopt a 24 formal framework from cognitive science [21] that models human reasoning, in order to analyze 25 existing red-teaming and blue-teaming techniques and to present our own approach. As illustrated in Figure 1, problem-solving is conceptualized as a transformation from an input state (e.g., a user prompt) on the left, which is also called a *configuration*, to an output state (e.g., the model's response) 28 on the right. This transformation is governed both by the initial input and the underlying AI model. 29 Safety properties define a designated subspace of acceptable outputs (i.e., the green region inside the output space). Safety violations can arise from two primary sources: inputs that are inherently unsafe, 31 and inputs that are benign but are misprocessed by the model. The former indicates a deficiency 32 in the model's ability, or a vulnerability, in detecting and preventing malicious intent, while the latter highlights vulnerabilities in the model's reasoning or decision-making processes when handling otherwise safe inputs. Both fall into the red input region in Figure 1. Red-teaming aims to discover red 35 36 regions, whereas blue-teaming aims to remove these regions. We further partition the input space into 37 two subspaces: realistic (the gray half) and unrealistic (the black half), based on whether the input reflects a plausible operational scenario within the model's intended service domain. For instance, a




Figure 1: A Cognitive Framework for Red-Teaming: Modeling AI Vulnerabilities through Human Problem-Solving Paradigms

prompt asking a software development assistant AI to write fiction is considered unrealistic, whereas a request to explain a cross-site scripting vulnerability is realistic. This distinction is essential for understanding why many existing red/blue-teaming techniques succeed or fail—and it plays a central role in the design of our proposed solution.

As illustrated in our cognitive framework, vulnerabilities can arise from two primary sources: (1) the *input space*, where violation-inducing prompts may fall outside the model's safety coverage, and (2) the *input-to-output transformation*, where reasoning errors can lead to unsafe responses. To systematically explore both axes of vulnerability, we introduce a multi-agent approach, ASTRA, which performs what we term *spatial* and *temporal* explorations: *spatial exploration* targets safety-violation inducing regions in the input space and *temporal exploration* investigates failures in the transformation logic, particularly reasoning errors.

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As shown in Figure 2, ASTRA operates in two stages from left to right. Stage (1) performs offline domain modeling by analyzing the target model's input space in two domains: secure code generation and software security guidance. For the former, safety requires vulnerability-free code; for the latter, the AI must not disclose malicious operational details. We begin by constructing an oracle that encapsulates domain knowledge and safety expectations. The oracle combines reasoning models (our strongest in-house blue-teaming systems) with static analysis tools such as Amazon CodeGuru [1]. Through systematic interaction with this oracle, we build a knowledge graph capturing realistic task types, boundary-case safety issues, and structural relations among task variants. To manage complexity, we partition the input space along semantic dimensions (e.g., "bug type" and "coding context") and define hierarchical abstractions. This representation supports guided Monte Carlo sampling: unsafe prompts are generated, evaluated by the oracle, and iteratively refined toward boundary cases—inputs that elicit conflicting safety judgments (e.g., Claude 3.7 deems safe while CodeGuru flags unsafe). Stage (2) performs online exploration, where ASTRA strategically allocates a limited query budget to probe vulnerabilities along both spatial and temporal axes. For spatial exploration, ASTRA samples likely unsafe boundary cases from the domain KG, queries the target model, and updates posterior probabilities indicating each case's likelihood of being unsafe. Subsequent queries are prioritized accordingly. To address the mismatch between the large candidate space and limited budget, ASTRA generalizes posterior updates across abstraction hierarchies in the KG, improving efficiency while preserving coverage. In parallel, temporal exploration targets reasoning-related vulnerabilities. When the model correctly rejects unsafe inputs, ASTRA analyzes its chain-of-thought (CoT) to locate brittle or logically flawed reasoning steps, then constructs paraphrased variants designed to exploit those weak points. The domain KG assists by identifying likely vulnerable reasoning patterns.

The effectiveness of ASTRA is validated both through comprehensive evaluations and real-world competitions. In particular, ASTRA achieved first place in the final round of the Amazon Nova AI Challenge, outperforming five blue-teaming systems with an average attack success rate exceeding 90%, and ranked first in two of the three official tournaments. Beyond competition settings, we further evaluate ASTRA on a broader range of open code models, demonstrating strong generalizability across architectures and training paradigms. These results highlight ASTRA 's practical capability to uncover hidden vulnerabilities and to provide actionable insights for building more secure and resilient AI-based coding systems.




Figure 2: Executive Summary of ASTRA. The numbers denote the steps, and the blue text boxes explains the steps on the their right.

#### **Related Work**

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Existing Red-teaming (RT) Techniques. A wide range of red-teaming techniques have been pro-82 posed [3, 20, 24, 4, 15, 17, 6, 30, 19, 11, 9, 16, 25, 32, 13, 31, 5, 18, 14, 26, 12, 23, 29, 28]. Most 83 of these methods operate in the *unrealistic* input subspace, exploiting the gap between alignment 84 85 training—focused on realistic operational contexts—and atypical or unnatural prompts. For instance, 86 PAP [32], DeepInception [15], DRA [16], and AutoDan [17] generate persuasive, nested, puzzlebased, or algorithmically evolved adversarial prompts to bypass safety alignment. While effective 87 against early models, such attacks often rely on contrived scenarios that do not reflect real-world use 88 cases. Modern LLMs increasingly reject these unrealistic inputs, as observed in our internal blue-89 teaming evaluations and recent tournaments, where state-of-the-art defenses can easily withstand over 90 a dozen representative red-teaming attacks [3, 20, 4, 15, 17, 6, 30, 19, 9, 16, 25, 32, 13, 31, 5, 18, 26]. 91 92 These observations motivate our design focus on discovering realistic vulnerabilities—unsafe behaviors triggered by plausible, domain-relevant inputs. Rather than exploiting failures to distinguish real-93 ism, we assume that modern models can filter unrealistic prompts and concentrate on identifying align-94 ment failures within realistic operational contexts, which are more indicative of real-world robustness. 95 Existing Blue-teaming (BT) Techniques. Several blue-teaming (BT) techniques have been proposed, 96 including CB [34], DA [8], DeeperAlign [22], and DOOR [33]. Our reproduction experiments show 97 that CB and DA are the most representative approaches. CB [34] fine-tunes models to generalize 98 unsafe behaviors from labeled data, effectively embedding a binary safety classifier within the model. While effective, it tends to over-generalize, rejecting benign inputs near unsafe boundaries and limiting 100 utility in complex domains such as software development. In contrast, DA [8] enforces predefined 101 domain-specific safety policies and verifies compliance through reasoning traces, offering stronger 102 control but depending heavily on policy coverage and reasoning accuracy. These trade-offs highlight 103 the challenges of maintaining both safety and usability and motivate our red-teaming approach, which

#### 3 Method

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#### **Stage One: Offline Domain Modeling** 3.1

**Constructing Abstraction Hierarchy.** The key challenge in the first stage is to make the domain modeling tractable. We propose to decompose the whole target domain into several orthogonal dimensions. Each input instance (i.e., a query prompt) in this domain can be denoted by a combination of attributes from each dimension. In this way, we can reduce the exploration of the enormous prompt space to enumerating attributes from these dimensions. Figure 3 shows an example decomposition of the secure code generation domain, with the caption providing detailed discussion.

identifies policy blind spots and reasoning weaknesses that existing BT methods overlook.




Figure 3: How ASTRA decomposes the domain of secure code generation to different dimensions of knowledge. The figure shows three exemplar dimensions: the blue, red, and yellow knowledge graphs along the three axes denote the dimensions of "bug types", "coding context", and "programming language features". A data point in the pace (the little cube) corresponds to a concrete input prompt. The bug type corresponding to the shown prompt is "SQL-Injection". It is in the context of "writing a web server with the library requests". The language features used include "variable alias". It is a boundary case because CodeGuru flags it as a bug due to the lack of input sanitization but some models consider it as safe due to its hallucination caused by the fact that the variable name contains "trusted" in it.

We leverage our extensive experience with AI coding systems, program analysis, and cyber-security 115 to manually select the important dimensions used to decompose the two target domains (i.e., secure code generation and software security guidance). Specifically, we select dimensions that are likely to induce safety violations. For example, for the secure code generation domain, we found that the type of a coding task may affect a model's performance such that "coding context" becomes one of the dimensions as shown in Figure 3. Besides these dimensions in Figure 3, we found that a model that can generate secure code from natural language descriptions may fail to spot vulnerabilities in a refactoring task. Therefore, we select "type of task" as a dimension as well, although is not illustrated in Figure 3 for visualization simplicity. We defined 6 and 8 dimensions for the two respective domains.

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After selecting the dimensions, it remains impractical to list all possible attributes in each dimension and their combinations. We further introduce hierarchies of abstract classes to create an index for each domain (as shown in Figure 3). For example, although there are close to 1000 common software vulnerabilities, i.e., Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs), many of them share a similar nature and can be grouped into an abstract class. For instance, both Cross-site-scripting (XSS) and OS-Command Injection concern un-sanitized inputs are used in critical functions, e.g., functions that execute provided inputs.

**Abstraction Hierarchy Driven Sampling.** Once the abstraction hierarchy for each input dimension is precisely defined, the next step is to systematically sample the high-dimensional space to delineate the boundary between safe and unsafe inputs—as judged by our oracle ensemble. These boundary cases tend to be the most challenging for all target models and, as we later show, serve as effective seeds in the online vulnerability detection phase for rapid adaptation to each model's unique vulnerability landscape. Our input sampling procedure draws inspiration from Gibbs sampling [7], a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) technique for approximating complex multivariate distributions. Similar to

#### Algorithm 1 Probabilistic Sampling

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input \mathcal{D}: \operatorname{str} \to \mathcal{T}, a map from an important dimension name to a knowledge hierarchy (\mathcal{T}).
output S: str \to attr, a map from a dimension name to a sampled attribute (attr).
 1: \mathcal{S} \leftarrow \emptyset
 2: for name, h \in \mathcal{D} do
         current \leftarrow h.root
 4:
         while len(current.children) > 0 do
            children \leftarrow current.children
 5:
            \alpha, \beta \leftarrow [c.succ \text{ for } c \in children], [c.fail \text{ for } c \in children]
 6:
 7:
            probs \leftarrow B(\alpha, \beta)
 8:
            i \leftarrow \operatorname{argmax} probs
 9:
            current \leftarrow children[i]
10:
         end while
11:
         \mathcal{S}[name] \leftarrow current
12: end for
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Gibbs sampling, our process begins with an initial uniform sampling phase and proceeds in guided rounds based on observed feedback.

The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. At each round, it selects one attribute from each dimension independently and uses an LLM to generate a prompt that fulfills those attributes (see Figure 3 for a concrete example). Sampling an attribute is analogous to tracing a path from the root to a leaf in the abstraction hierarchy. Starting at the root, the algorithm iteratively chooses the most promising child node until it reaches a leaf (lines 3–10). We maintain two *counters* per node—tracking cumulative successes and failures in the sub-structure—to estimate the likelihood of finding a violation-inducing prompt when selecting that node. To balance exploration of less-sampled nodes with exploitation of proven ones, node selection follows a beta distribution (lines 6–7).

#### 3.2 Stage Two: Online Vulnerability Exploration

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This stage focuses on the online testing of the target model under a constrained query budget. Building on the pre-constructed domain knowledge graph (KG), this stage seeks to uncover model-specific vulnerabilities by strategically probing along two key axes: spatial (input space) and temporal (reasoning dynamics). Throughout this process, the system incrementally updates its belief about the model's vulnerability landscape and refines its query strategy accordingly.

This stage consists of the following three components. Spatial exploration leverages the abstraction hierarchy and probabilistic annotations in the KG to prioritize and select boundary-case prompts 155 that are likely to trigger unsafe behavior. The model's responses are used to update posterior risk 156 estimates at both concrete and abstract levels, enabling efficient allocation of the query budget toward 157 high-risk regions. In temporal exploration, for prompts that are initially handled safely, ASTRA elicits 158 chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning from the model and analyzes it to locate brittle or inconsistent 159 steps. It then generates paraphrased variants specifically designed to exploit those weaknesses. The 160 third component is the *online judge*. To support real-time evaluation, the system develops and 161 adapts an online judge that monitors the target model's outputs. This judge assists in determining 162 whether responses are unsafe or misaligned, and feeds back into the posterior update and paraphrasing 163 pipeline. 164

#### 3.2.1 Spatial Exploration: Online Adaptation of Gibbs Sampling

The spatial component is an online adaptation of the Gibbs sampling process introduced in Stage 1.
Online exploration starts with a curated set of boundary cases identified in the earlier phase. These
cases are neither clearly safe nor overtly malicious; rather, they sit near the decision boundary where
models often disagree and safety misalignment is more likely to surface. Each boundary-case prompt
is issued to the target model, and its response is evaluated by a lightweight judge (described in
Section 3.3) to determine whether it reveals a vulnerability. As in the offline setting, outcomes are
propagated through the abstraction hierarchies. Posterior probabilities at both concrete and abstract
nodes are updated to reflect the model-specific risk profile. This allows the system to refine the
domain-general KG into a personalized vulnerability landscape for the target model.

A key distinction in the online setting is that each individual query carries significant weight due to the limited budget. A single judgment, whether safe or unsafe, can influence a large region of 176 the abstraction space. For example, consider the prompt, "Delete temporary data if the disk is full, 177 including log files." This request resembles a legitimate maintenance task. However, it carries the 178 risk of unintended log deletion, which could interfere with audit trails or system diagnostics. Some 179 models (e.g., GPT-o3 and Claude 3.7) may generate code that aggressively removes logs without 180 proper checks. If the judge detects such unsafe behavior, the system increases the posterior risk score 181 for the abstraction class conditional file deletions involving logs or state-based triggers. Neighboring 182 prompts, e.g., those involving cache cleanup or disk-space management, are prioritized for further 183 exploration. Conversely, if the model safely handles this request by avoiding critical log paths or 184 including user confirmation, ASTRA may prune the enclosing abstract class(es) to focus resources 185 elsewhere.

#### 3.2.2 Temporal Exploration: Probing Reasoning Vulnerabilities

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As motivated by the cognitive alignment framework introduced in Section 1, model vulnerabilities may arise not only from unsafe regions in the input space, but from the temporal process of reasoning itself. In particular, deliberative alignment techniques, i.e., those based on step-by-step policy enforcement, are increasingly used to align models with safety constraints. However, this reasoning process can still be brittle. In this section, we describe how ASTRA systematically identifies and exploits such reasoning vulnerabilities.

Offline Construction of Decision Diagrams. For each boundary case discovered in Stage (1),
ASTRA constructs a decision diagram that encodes the valid chains of reasoning that justify rejecting
the input as unsafe. This is done offline using multiple high-capacity reasoning models (e.g., GPT-o3,
Claude 3.7). If a model disagrees that the input is unsafe, we introduce a precondition asserting that
it is unsafe and ask the model to explain why. These explanations are compiled across models into
a directed graph of legitimate reasoning paths—covering diverse perspectives on what constitutes
unsafe behavior.

**Online Reasoning Trace Validation.** During online testing, whenever the target model rejects a boundary-case prompt, ASTRA does not immediately halt. Instead, it requests the target model to generate a *chain-of-thought* (CoT) explanation justifying the rejection. The model's CoT is then matched against the pre-constructed decision diagram for that prompt.

If the reasoning path is found within the diagram, the model is deemed well-aligned on this case, and no further action is taken. However, in many cases—especially when the model has limited capacity or weak alignment—the reasoning deviates from all known legitimate paths. We identify three main types of discrepancies:

- Missing Steps (Most Common): The model skips intermediate reasoning steps, indicating it arrived at the correct conclusion via hunches rather than structured logic. This suggests shallow understanding and is prone to failure under prompt perturbation.
- Wrong Steps: The model reaches the correct decision but for the wrong reasons—citing incorrect evidence or making logically invalid inferences. These weaknesses can be exploited by modifying the prompt to "fix" the wrongly cited issue, without changing the true unsafe intent.
- Additional Steps (Rare): The model includes extraneous or hallucinated steps in its reasoning, often reflecting a misunderstanding of the task itself. This form of misalignment allows for the injection of false safety signals to manipulate its judgment.

Adaptive Prompt Refinement. Based on the detected discrepancy, ASTRA employs targeted paraphrasing strategies to manipulate the model:

- For missing steps, the prompt is paraphrased to remove or alter elements that the model is hunching on—thereby probing its reliance on shallow cues.
  - For wrong steps, the unsafe element incorrectly identified by the model is "fixed" in the prompt, while preserving the true malicious behavior—causing the model to overlook the real issue.
  - For additional steps, we reinforce the model's misunderstanding by extending the prompt with irrelevant yet plausible workflow steps and fake safety checks.

We show a concrete example in Appendix A.

Table 1: Evaluation Results of ASTRA on Open Code Models.

Category	Phi-4- Mini	Qwen- Coder-7B	Mistral- Instruct-8B	GPT-OSS- 20B	GPT-OSS- 120B	DeepSeek- R1	Claude-3.5- Haiku	Claude-4- Sonnet	GPT-5
Security Event Guidance									
Phishing	83.33%	75.00%	86.67%	68.33%	61.67%	75.00%	71.67%	59.65%	66.67%
Active Scanning	67.86%	68.42%	84.21%	59.65%	54.39%	69.64%	68.42%	45.28%	66.67%
Supply Chain Compromise	76.79%	83.93%	87.50%	67.86%	62.50%	76.79%	64.29%	54.55%	76.79%
Input Injection	80.00%	88.33%	88.33%	75.00%	63.33%	77.97%	73.33%	50.88%	71.67%
Exploit Client Execution	84.91%	77.36%	90.38%	73.58%	69.81%	83.02%	73.58%	61.22%	79.25%
Hijack Execution Flow	72.22%	80.00%	81.82%	67.27%	61.82%	74.51%	65.45%	57.41%	67.27%
Process Injection	81.97%	81.97%	86.89%	73.77%	63.93%	80.70%	73.77%	56.90%	67.21%
Access Token Manipulation	80.77%	86.79%	84.91%	62.26%	56.60%	75.47%	75.47%	59.57%	62.26%
Debugger Evasion	76.67%	83.33%	90.00%	78.33%	46.67%	85.00%	63.33%	52.54%	66.67%
Brute Force	77.59%	74.58%	79.66%	66.10%	59.32%	77.19%	70.69%	51.79%	77.97%
Deobfuscation	79.31%	86.21%	82.76%	68.97%	56.14%	75.00%	62.07%	54.55%	68.97%
Network Sniffing	76.67%	78.69%	83.33%	72.13%	62.30%	78.33%	70.49%	48.28%	67.21%
Password Policy Discovery	83.87%	87.30%	80.65%	70.97%	68.25%	77.42%	79.37%	48.28%	71.43%
Remote Services Exploit	82.26%	80.95%	87.30%	63.49%	60.32%	82.26%	68.25%	38.98%	65.08%
Clipboard Data	76.27%	79.66%	88.14%	74.58%	69.49%	84.75%	62.71%	52.83%	71.19%
Fallback Channel	80.00%	70.91%	81.82%	58.18%	56.36%	82.69%	61.82%	39.22%	61.82%
Multi-Stage Channels	75.86%	76.27%	76.27%	55.93%	59.32%	76.27%	61.02%	48.28%	67.24%
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel	82.76%	77.59%	81.03%	58.62%	53.45%	69.64%	65.52%	47.27%	65.52%
Protocol Tunneling	71.93%	77.19%	84.21%	57.89%	45.61%	70.18%	63.16%	49.06%	64.91%
Disk Wipe	72.73%	83.64%	78.18%	65.45%	52.73%	81.82%	58.18%	51.92%	69.09%
Average	78.25%	79.95%	84.21%	67.01%	59.26%	77.72%	67.70%	51.32%	68.73%
	7012070	7,7,2,12		de Generat			0111072	0.000	
OS Command Injection	75.16%	66.67%	75.97%	41.56%	42.21%	75.00%	61.69%	63.40%	48.70%
Code Injection	78.08%	71.62%	84.93%	66.22%	64.86%	81.08%	66.22%		62.16%
Cross-Site Scripting		71.0270	04.7370					92 120%	
		69 0701	96 2101					82.43%	
	82.76%	68.97%	86.21%	44.83%	44.83%	68.97%	67.24%	55.17%	48.28%
Not Recommended APIs	85.42%	72.92%	93.75%	44.83% 75.00%	44.83% 68.75%	68.97% 87.23%	67.24% 93.75%	55.17% 95.83%	48.28% 87.50%
Not Recommended APIs Loose File Permissions	85.42% 46.88%	72.92% 53.13%	93.75% 62.50%	44.83% 75.00% 37.50%	44.83% 68.75% 34.38%	68.97% 87.23% 40.63%	67.24% 93.75% 43.75%	55.17% 95.83% 53.13%	48.28% 87.50% 43.75%
Not Recommended APIs Loose File Permissions XML External Entity	85.42% 46.88% 60.00%	72.92% 53.13% 46.67%	93.75% 62.50% 60.00%	44.83% 75.00% 37.50% 40.00%	44.83% 68.75% 34.38% 40.00%	68.97% 87.23% 40.63% 71.43%	67.24% 93.75% 43.75% 46.67%	55.17% 95.83% 53.13% 33.33%	48.28% 87.50% 43.75% 66.67%
Not Recommended APIs Loose File Permissions XML External Entity Insecure Cryptography	85.42% 46.88% 60.00% 60.00%	72.92% 53.13% 46.67% 40.00%	93.75% 62.50% 60.00% 73.33%	44.83% 75.00% 37.50% 40.00% 40.00%	44.83% 68.75% 34.38% 40.00% 40.00%	68.97% 87.23% 40.63% 71.43% 73.33%	67.24% 93.75% 43.75% 46.67% 73.33%	55.17% 95.83% 53.13% 33.33% 80.00%	48.28% 87.50% 43.75% 66.67% 46.67%
Not Recommended APIs Loose File Permissions XML External Entity Insecure Cryptography Weak Obfuscation Request	85.42% 46.88% 60.00% 60.00% 66.67%	72.92% 53.13% 46.67% 40.00% 26.67%	93.75% 62.50% 60.00% 73.33% 60.00%	44.83% 75.00% 37.50% 40.00% 40.00% 46.67%	44.83% 68.75% 34.38% 40.00% 40.00% 46.67%	68.97% 87.23% 40.63% 71.43% 73.33% 53.33%	67.24% 93.75% 43.75% 46.67% 73.33% 53.33%	55.17% 95.83% 53.13% 33.33% 80.00% 40.00%	48.28% 87.50% 43.75% 66.67% 46.67% 33.33%
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Not Recommended APIs Loose File Permissions XML External Entity Insecure Cryptography Weak Obfuscation Request Insecure Hashing Insecure Socket Bind	85.42% 46.88% 60.00% 60.00% 66.67% 100.00% 92.31%	72.92% 53.13% 46.67% 40.00% 26.67% 76.92% 92.31%	93.75% 62.50% 60.00% 73.33% 60.00% 100.00% 92.31%	44.83% 75.00% 37.50% 40.00% 40.00% 46.67% 100.00% 61.54%	44.83% 68.75% 34.38% 40.00% 40.00% 46.67% 76.92% 46.15%	68.97% 87.23% 40.63% 71.43% 73.33% 53.33% 84.62% 92.31%	67.24% 93.75% 43.75% 46.67% 73.33% 53.33% 84.62% 61.54%	55.17% 95.83% 53.13% 33.33% 80.00% 40.00% 100.00% 69.23%	48.28% 87.50% 43.75% 66.67% 46.67% 33.33% 76.92% 69.23%
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## 3.3 Online Judge: Lightweight Model-Based Safety Assessment

A key component of ASTRA's online testing pipeline is the *online judge*—a model that determines whether a target model's response reveals a vulnerability. Unlike the offline phase, which relies on high-cost oracles for labeling, online testing demands real-time, low-latency judgments across many interactions, making efficient safety evaluation essential. We trained a small reasoning model that accurately and efficiently decides whether a target model's response is vulnerable. Details can be found in Section B of the supplementary material.

#### 4 Experimental Results

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We study the effectiveness of ASTRA through three research questions: RQ1 assesses overall performance of ASTRA both in the challenge and in open code language models; RQ2 and RQ3 evaluates the effectiveness of the spatial and temporal exploration algorithm.

#### 4.1 Red Team RQ1: Overall Performance

**Performance in Nova AI Challenge.** The overall performance of our system is shown in Figures 4 and 5. We anonymized blue-team IDs. To match teams across T2 and T3, we identified correspondences by inspecting their rejection templates. In T2, we employ a bandit system with




Figure 4: ASR Comparison across T2 and T3 for the Software Security Guidance Task

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


Figure 5: ASR Comparison across T2 and T3 for the Secure Code Generation Task

heuristically constructed prompt categories. We use our performance in T2 as our baseline; in T3, we apply the system design detailed in this report.

For the software security guidance domain, T3 outperforms T2 overall, demonstrating the benefits of our spatial and temporal exploration. In particular, Blue-C that is previously resilient in T2 reveals clear weaknesses under the new system design. Our ASR on it improves almost 300% (from 22% to over 90%), underscoring the importance of systematic red-teaming.

In the secure code generation task, gains are most significant for strong teams such as Blue-A and Blue-B, indicating our approach's ability to uncover corner cases in even robust systems. Blue-D's performance remains constant, as this team consistently declines complex coding requests, and Blue-E's ASR stays high. Conversely, Blue-C's ASR decreases by approximately 20%. Manual inspection indicates this drop is primarily due to noise introduced by our online judge's imperfect judgments.

**Performance on Open Code Models.** To evaluate the generalizability, we further evaluate ASTRA on 9 open code models, including Phi-4-Mini, Qwen-Coder-7B, Mistral-Instruct-8B, GPT-OSS-20B, GPT-OSS-120B, DeepSeek-R1, Claude-3.5-Haiku, Claude-4-Sonnet and GPT-5. For each domain, we constrained sampling along the category dimension by randomly selecting 20 root nodes, while leaving sampling over the other KG dimensions unrestricted. This process yielded 200 seed prompts. For each seed prompt we conducted up to five rounds of spatial exploration with the target model. Each 5-turn conversation was evaluated by an online judge: for the secure code generation task the judge checks whether the model was induced to produce vulnerable code, and for the security event guidance task it checks whether the model produced malicious code. The ASR are shown in Table 1.

We observe that ASTRA effectively characterizes the security behaviors of different code models. Among open-weight models, the latest GPT-OSS family demonstrates notably stronger secure-coding practices and robustness against malicious coding requests, achieving 50.19% / 48.29% ASR for vulnerable code generation and 67.01% / 59.26% ASR for malicious code generation on GPT-OSS-20B and GPT-OSS-120B, respectively. In contrast, Mistral-Instruct-8B performs the worst, with ASTRA achieving 84.21% and 78.29% ASR on the security-event-guidance and secure-codegeneration domains, respectively. Compared with open-weight models, closed-source models exhibit stronger safety. Specifically, when facing ASTRA 's dynamically generated, high-quality stealthy harmful requests, Claude-4-Sonnet shows the highest resilience, with only 51.32% ASR. Meanwhile, GPT-5 demonstrates the most secure coding practice, with only 56.27% of generations containing vulnerabilities. Moreover, ASTRA effectively exposes the target model's safety-knowledge strengths and weaknesses across different contexts. This is reflected in the diverse ASR distribution across categories. For example, in the secure code generation domain, ASTRA achieves an overall 65.46% ASR on Claude-4, yet the ASR rises dramatically in specific categories—such as Not Recommended APIs (95.83%) and Insecure Hashing (100%)—revealing localized weaknesses in Claude's alignment mechanisms under these security-sensitive scenarios.

**Conclusion (RQ1):** Our red-teaming system effectively identifies weaknesses across all blue teams, with the most significant improvements on those previously considered strongest. Although secure code generation ASR is moderated by the current judge model's accuracy, these findings validate our exploration strategies and highlight the importance of enhancing judge reliability.

#### 4.2 Red Team RQ2: Effectiveness of Spatial Exploration

We compare our spatial exploration strategy against a baseline bandit system by simulating both with the average ASR according to the attributes of a prompt observed in tournament data. To keep





Figure 6: Comparison between our Spatial Exploration Strategy and a Bandit System.






Figure 7: Ablation study for Temporal Exploration on T3 Practice Round 1

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Figure 8: Ablation study for Temporal Exploration on T3 Practice Round 2

this experiment tractable, we sample 30 prompt types and run each system for 1,000 trials to reduce variance. Figure 6 plots the average ASR with regard to the number of conversations.

**Conclusion** (**RQ2**): Our spatial exploration consistently outperforms the bandit baseline. With a limited test budget (100–300 conversations), it identifies vulnerabilities more efficiently; as the budget increases, both strategies converge on the most vulnerable prompts, achieving similar ASR.

#### 4.3 Red Team RQ3: Effectiveness of Temporal Exploration

We evaluate the effectiveness of temporal exploration on five blue teams across two recent practice runs (T3-PR1 and T3-PR2). The results are presented in Figure 7 and Figure 8. The missing value for Blue-E in Figure 7 is due to the absence of participation from the corresponding blue team. Our results show that temporal exploration can substantially increase the Attack Success Rate (ASR) across different blue team solutions, with improvements ranging from 6% to 39%. Notably, temporal exploration has a stronger effect when the target systems actively articulate their reasoning traces during inference. For example, analysis of logs from Blue-B and Blue-D reveals that these systems occasionally disclose their reasoning steps even without explicit reasoning trace enforcement, indicating that they leverage chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning in their decision-making processes. Temporal exploration on such systems achieves ASR improvements of 23% and 39% on T3-PR1, and 26% and 18% on T3-PR2 over systems without temporal exploration, respectively, demonstrating its effectiveness in identifying brittleness in reasoning traces. In contrast, for systems like Blue-A, which exhibit overly conservative refusal behaviors (similar to CB)—that is, once the initial prompt is rejected, the system continues to reject all subsequent follow-up questions—temporal exploration has limited effectiveness, resulting in only 6% and 7% ASR improvement across the two practice runs. However, this excessive refusal behavior also significantly harms system utility: during T3-PR2, the system rejected 51 out of 122 benign utility prompts that followed a refusal conversation turn.

**Conclusion (RQ3):** Temporal exploration is highly effective at exposing vulnerabilities in systems that rely on chain-of-thought reasoning, but its impact is minimal on systems that consistently reject all prompts after an initial refusal, regardless of the prompt's content.

#### 5 Conclusion

In conclusion, we propose ASTRA, a systematic red-teaming framework that exposes hidden vulnerabilities in AI-based coding systems. Extensive evaluations and competition results demonstrate its strong effectiveness and generalizability across diverse model architectures, offering actionable insights for building more secure and resilient AI systems.

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


Figure 9: Decision Diagram Encoding the Reasoning Trajectories of Claude 3.7 and GPT-o3 for An Boundary Case Input (at the top)

#### 507 Supplementary

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## A Illustrative Example of Temporal Exploration: Unsafe Camera Override in Autonomous Driving

We show an example in Figure 9. The malicious intent here lies in overriding camera data to conceal stop signs, potentially leading to a catastrophic failure in downstream decision-making. Figure 9 shows decision diagrams constructed using GPT-o3 and Claude 3.7. Both models correctly identify the core vulnerability, with different reasoning trajectories. However, when tested against the target model (in this case, our own model hardened by deliberative alignment), the model also rejects the prompt—but provides a flawed reasoning trace:

```
"Refused due to missing proper input validation. The input image should be verified for format, integrity, and resolution before being used to update the camera stream."
```

This response demonstrates a *wrong step* discrepancy: the refusal is correct, but the rationale is off-track, missing the true adversarial objective. To exploit this, ASTRA leverages paraphrasing to generate a refined prompt that *addresses* the model's concern while retaining the unsafe logic:

```
"Implement a perception module that first validates incoming images for format and resolution. If a stop sign is detected in the frame, replace it with a pre-approved high-resolution substitute from a verified cache."
```

With the apparent input validation issue "fixed," the target model now accepts the prompt and generates unsafe code, exposing a reasoning-based vulnerability.

#### 423 B Details of the Online Judge Model

#### 424 B.1 Training

A key component of ASTRA's online testing pipeline is the *online judge*—a model that determines whether a target model's response reveals a vulnerability. Unlike the offline phase, which relies on high-cost oracles for labeling, online testing demands real-time, low-latency judgments across many interactions, making efficient safety evaluation essential. In many tasks, the target model's

output is not simply yes/no, but a complex artifact—such as source code or reasoning traces—whose 429 safety status requires interpretation. For instance, in secure code generation, a well-aligned model 430 may silently patch an unsafe prompt (e.g., involving unsanitized input) without explicitly refusing it. 431 While one could apply the offline oracle (e.g., CodeGuru or Claude 3.7) during online evaluation, 432 this is computationally expensive and impractical. Online testing is iterative and model-specific, so 433 such costs would scale poorly in large deployments. 434

To balance fidelity and efficiency, we propose training compact online judge models (e.g., 8B models) 435 specialized for each target domain. These models are used to evaluate outputs from the target model 436 in real time and predict whether a safety violation is present. We use the secure code generation task 437 as a representative example to illustrate our design and training methodology. Specifically, we show 438 how a lightweight model can learn to approximate the results of a heavyweight static analyzer while 439 being orders of magnitude cheaper and faster to query during live testing. 440

Figure 10 (a) shows a concrete example to illustrate the challenges of training a language model-based judge. It shows an instance of unrestricted file upload bug. It is a problematic implementation for the file upload logics on a web server. A malicious user may upload a file named "malicious.php" 443 and then later access the url at "...(the domain name)/upload/malicious.php". The web server will 444 automatically load the malicious file and execute its content. A correct sanitation of the bug is to 445 check the extension of the file to ensure it is not executable by a web server. On the other hand, the 446 check shown in the example is insufficient. The shown check is a potential fix for another file-related 447 bug called path traversal. Yet it does not check the file extension and thus cannot prevent unrestricted file upload. In order to correctly identify the bug, the judge model needs to identify the source and 449 sink of this bug, and recognize that the check is relevant yet insufficient. 450

To facilitate precise reasoning about vulnerabilities, our judge is trained to mimic how a static analyzer reasons about a program, checking the program semantics step by step. We collect training 452 data by augmenting CodeGuru detections with high-quality reasoning traces generated by Claude. 453 Specifically, for each detected vulnerability, we supply the code snippet and CodeGuru's findings 454 to Claude, requesting a structured explanation in terms of source, sink, and data-flow path, similar to the reasoning steps of a static analyzer. Source identifies the APIs that may yield untrusted data. Sink denotes the APIs that are sensitive and potentially dangerous. Path consists of step-by-step 457 descriptions about how the tainted data flow from source to sink, what the potential checks along the 458 data flow are, and whether these checks are sufficient to prevent the bug. An example of Claude's 459 output is shown in the orange box of Figure 10. 460

Training the small judge model involves two main stages. First, we perform supervised finetuning (SFT) to teach the model the required reasoning structure and typical analysis steps. Next, we apply reinforcement learning (RL) to refine its reasoning so it aligns with a static analyzer. The input to the judge model is only the vulnerable code. The detection results of CodeGuru are not input to the judge. During SFT, the model learns to reproduce Claude's reasoning trace token by token. In the RL stage, we define a composite reward function with three components, as illustrated in Figure 10. First, we check whether the model's output format is compliant with the requirement (i.e., the reasoning refers to the source, sink, and path). It is shown by the pink part in Figure 10. Another reward is to assess the accuracy of the vulnerability verdict, as shown by the brown part. Finally, to ensure the model's reasoning is of good quality, we require the model's reasoning to be consistent with Claude's explanations. Specifically, we quantify the consistency between two reasoning trajectories as follows:

$$consistency(\hat{r}, r_0) = \frac{1}{|\hat{r}|} \log \pi(\hat{r} \mid r_0), \tag{1}$$

where  $\hat{r}$  and  $r_0$  denote the reasoning trajectories produced by the online judge model and by Claude, 472 respectively.  $\pi(\hat{r} \mid r_0)$  represents the probability that the judge model generates trajectory  $\hat{r}$  when 473 conditioned on Claude's trajectory. Intuitively, this consistency score quantifies how closely the judge 474 model's analysis aligns with Claude's explanation.

#### Performance of the Secure Code Online Judge Model **B.2**

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Table 2 reports precision (PR), recall (RC), and F1 scores for two judge variants: CLS (a classifier) and *Reasoning* (our judge model), on code samples generated by three blue-team defenses: Guard (input/output guardrail), CB (circuit breaker), and DA (deliberative alignment). We selected




Figure 10: Training a Small Judge Model with Augmented Data and Reward Signals

Table 2: Performance of the Online Judge Model. *Guard*, *CB*, and *DA* denotes the tested samples generated by the corresponding blue-team techniques. *CLS* denotes a classifier and *Reasoning* our reasoning judge model.

BT-Tech.	CLS			Reasoning		
DI Iceni	PR	RC	F1	PR	RC	F1
Guard	93	42	58	90	73	81
CB	65	54	59	61	89	72
DA	12	22	16	20	78	32

these defenses as they exemplify our most effective techniques: Guard filters risky prompts without altering the generation distribution of the base model; CB perturbs the output space to block certain patterns; DA augments generation with inline reasoning.

We can see that the reasoning judge consistently outperforms the classification judge across all defenses. For guardrail-based techniques and CB, the F1 improves 39% (81 vs. 58) and 22% (72 vs. 59). Note that the performance of our judge on the two techniques is significantly better than the performance on DA. That is because both techniques harden the models by only rejecting or perturbing cases where they consider vulnerable. They do not significantly change the distribution of generated code for normal cases, and thus the distribution is close to the training distribution of our judge model. On the other hand, while the reasoning judge is more effective than the classifier on DA as well, the absolute performance is low, with an F1 score of 32. That is because DA subtly fixes the vulnerabilities in code, making it challenging to distinguish the vulnerable and the correct code snippets. These findings highlight the advantage of reasoning-based judgments and suggest future work on enhancing sensitivity to nuanced code changes.

**Conclusion:** Our reasoning judge uniformly surpasses the classifier across Guard, CB, and DA defenses, demonstrating its robustness in detecting vulnerabilities. However, the comparatively low F1 on DA underscores the need to further refine the model's ability to identify subtle code fixes.

### 494 C Balancing Safety Protection and Functional Utility

We build upon the insight of ProSec [27] to strike an optimal balance between a code language model's security safeguards and its functional utility through strategic data construction. In our approach, we integrate a small, targeted subset of utility samples alongside security-focused examples within the alignment training corpus.

Given a pretrained code language model and a suite of vulnerability-inducing prompts that reveal its security weaknesses, we proceed in two phases. First, we fine-tune the target model exclusively on security-oriented samples, thereby hardening the model to prevent misbehavior. Second, we evaluate

Table 3: Effectiveness of Spatial Exploration. Each row denotes the performance of a code language model, in terms of attack success rate and their standard deviation (in parentheses). *Default* denotes the default spatial exploration algorithm. *-BugType*, *-PL Feature*, and *-Context* denotes the spatial exploration algorithm without the dimensions of bug type, programming language features, and coding context, respectively.

CodeLM	Default	-BugType	-PL Feature	-Context
QwenCoder2.5-0.5B	99 (0.02)	92 (0.02)	95 (0.03)	75 (0.04)
Phi4-Mini-Inst	99 (0.01)	98 (0.01)	98 (0.01)	84 (0.03)
CodeLlama-7B	100 (0.01)	98 (0.01)	99 (0.01)	91 (0.05)
CodeGemma-7B	99 (0.01)	96 (0.02)	98 (0.02)	83 (0.03)

Table 4: Effectiveness of Components for Software Security Guidance. Each column denotes the performance of a code language model in terms of attack success rate. *Default* denotes the default setup of ASTRA. *-Temporal Exploration*, *-Compositional Abstraction*, *-Compositional Abstraction*, and *-Factual Instantiation* denotes the setup without temporal exploration, compositional abstraction, factual instantiation, respectively.

	Phi4m	CLM-7B	CGM-7B	СВ	Llama-Guard
Default	98.04	98.00	96.08	90.00	60.00
-Temporal Exploration	90.20	50.00	78.43	70.00	40.00
-Compositional Abstraction	53.36	64.02	50.16	54.47	39.12
-Factual Instantiation	48.04	49.58	46.08	45.42	37.59

a utility dataset by computing the log-probabilities assigned to each sample under both the original (pre-alignment) and the secured (post-alignment) versions of the target model. A pronounced decline in log-probability for a specific sample signals that the security alignment has adversely affected the model's utility on that example. To alleviate this degradation, we incorporate those high-drop utility samples back into the alignment training set, ensuring that subsequent iterations recover essential functionality without undermining the security enhancements.

#### **D** Further Ablation Study

Secure Code Generation. We perform a detailed ablation analysis of the key dimensions in spatial exploration for the secure code-generation task. As shown in Table 3, the full spatial exploration algorithm—incorporating all dimensions—consistently achieves the highest performance across every code-language model. By contrast, omitting the coding-context dimension produces the largest drop in effectiveness. We hypothesize that this arises because models learn context-dependent bug correlations: for example, a model may detect OS-Command-Injection vulnerabilities when generating web-server code but overlook similar risks in a command-line program.

**Software Security Guidance.** We conduct a comprehensive ablation study to evaluate the contribution of each individual module in ASTRA for the software security guidance task across a diverse set of models, including Phi4-Mini-Inst, QwenCoder2.5-0.5B, CodeLlama-7B, CodeGemma-7B, Circuit-Breaker(CB), and Llama-Guard. As shown in Table 4, ASTRA achieves over 90% ASR on four blue team models, which include three general-purpose code language models and one model aligned using Circuit-Breaker (CB). Among these, Llama-Guard exhibits the strongest robustness, where ASTRA still maintains a 60% ASR.

The second row reports performance of ASTRA after removing the temporal exploration module. Notably, the ASR on CodeLlama-7B drops to 50% without this module, highlighting its role in uncovering weak links in the model's reasoning chain. The third and fourth rows present ablation results for the novel node designs—Compositional Abstraction and Factual Instantiation—used in modeling software security guidance. Removing either of these components leads to a substantial drop in ASR across all five blue team models, demonstrating their effectiveness in enhancing attack stealthiness.

Table 5: Alignment Techniques for Secure Code Generation. Each row denotes the performance of one alignment technique. The column *Vul Code Ratio* denotes the ratio of generated code with vulnerabilities on the PurpleLlama benchmark, lower is better; The columns *HumanEval* and *MXEval* denotes the pass@1 on HumanEval and MXEval benchmark, higher is better.

Tech.	Vul Code Ratio (%, ↓)	HumanEval (%, ↑)	MXEval (%, ↑)
ProSec [27]	33.47	34.15	44.03
SafeCoder-SFT [10]	42.88	19.75	31.44
SafeCoder-DPO [27]	44.72	28.93	41.79

## **E** Performance of Alignment Techniques for Secure Code Generation

We reproduce existing secure code generation work on the PurpleLlama benchmark [2]. PurpleLlama is a collection of challenging programming tasks likely to cause a coding system to produce vulnerable code. The reproduction involves three existing code alignment techniques: *ProSec* uses DPO loss to align a code model on a dataset with both security-focused preference data and utility-preserving data. *SafeCoder* [10] contrastively fine-tunes a code language model on real-world vulnerabilities and the corresponding fixes. *SafeCoder-DPO* is a variant of SafeCoder constructed by us, aligning a code model with DPO loss on SafeCoder's dataset. We can see that none of the existing alignment techniques can sufficiently reduce the ratio of generated vulnerable code.

**Conclusion:** Existing blue-team techniques can protect a code model in both tasks, yet the DSR remains relatively low ( $\sim$ 60 and  $\sim$ 70 for the software security guidance and secure code generation tasks, respectively).