

Enhancing Adversarial Robustness of LLMs with Analytic Hierarchy Process

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Abstract

With the increasing impact of large language models (LLMs) across diverse applications, ensuring the robustness of LLMs has become a pressing concern. Existing defense strategies are tailored to specific attack scenarios, which typically require high-cost model training and cannot rapidly respond to new threats. To tackle this issue, we conceptualize the defense strategy in LLMs as a cognitive process for dealing with complex user queries. Intuitively, faced with a spectrum of queries that potentially contain malicious perturbations, LLMs need human-like discernment to avoid being misled. Drawing inspiration from cognitive theory, we introduce an innovative Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) inference framework. Our methodology involves decomposing intricate tasks into manageable sub-tasks, prioritizing them, and systematically addressing each step. Our framework is based on AI feedback, eliminating the necessity for training and optimization. We evaluate the effectiveness of our framework in jail-break attacks and robustness in downstream tasks using representative LLMs, including GPT-3.5 and Llama2. The experimental results demonstrate that our proposed framework significantly enhances the adversarial robustness of LLMs.

1 Introduction

Large language models (LLMs) (Ouyang et al., 2022; Almazrouei et al., 2023; Touvron et al., 2023; Mahan et al., 2023), such as ChatGPT, have achieved remarkable success across a

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


Figure 1: Typical adversarial attacks on LLMs. The Colored text represents adversarial perturbations. In example (a), character-level noises are added to the original input. The example in (b) involves adding a suffix to the prompts. The example in (c) showcases a role-play template.

number of language process tasks. As technology and society grow dependent on LLMs, it is increasingly important to ensure that these LLMs are robust and reliable under adversarial attacks (Wang et al., 2023; Zou et al., 2023).

While recent works show that LLMs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, Figure 1 illustrates typical attack scenarios for LLMs in both downstream tasks and conversations. Typical adversarial attacks on downstream task models (Figure 1 (a)) involve generating misleading examples by introducing malicious perturbations to deceive the model (Cheng et al., 2020; Jin et al., 2020; Ye et al., 2022; Liu et al., 2023). In recent attacks (Yu et al., 2023; Wei et al., 2023), as depicted in Figure 1 (b), LLMs are manipulated into producing objectionable content through the addition of human-crafted templates. Additionally, as shown in Figure 1 (c), recent work (Zou et al., 2023) has demonstrated that an automatic universal adversarial attack can deceive large language models into generating harmful content using gradient-searched suffixes. These non-robust behaviors under adversarial scenarios undermine the reliability of LLMs and present significant challenges for their real-world applications.

Existing defense strategies for downstream tasks (Liu et al., 2020; Zhu et al., 2020; Li & Qiu, 2021; Wang et al., 2021b; Chen & Ji, 2022) typically involve retraining models to adapt to adversarial perturbations, which are unable to defend against jailbreak attacks to LLMs. In the realm of conversational safety, recent LLMs are trained with the dual objectives of being helpful (following user instructions) and safe (aligning with human values) (Ouyang et al., 2022; Touvron et al., 2023). However, we observe that these dual objectives often lead to conflicts when addressing illegal or tricky requests and recent work (Wang et al., 2023) shows that LLMs trained with human value alignment can still be fooled by typical perturbations. In summary, previous defense strategies are focused on single attack scenarios, and typically requiring model retraining for each new attack scenario is impractical for LLMs. This highlights the need for a simpler and more scalable defense mechanism. The lack of a universal defense strategy to make LLMs more robust against various potential threats is a significant research challenge.

To address the intricate challenge of defending against diverse and potentially malicious inputs, we conceptualize the essence of defense as a cognitive process for dealing with complex user queries. Intuitively, faced with a spectrum of queries that may harbor malicious perturbations or intentionally misleading scenarios, LLMs must exhibit a level of discernment akin to human cognition to avoid being misled. Drawing inspiration from the Hierarchical Processing Theory (Saaty, 1987), we introduce an innovative Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) inference framework. Our approach is rooted in breaking down

intricate tasks into manageable subtasks, prioritizing them, and systematically addressing each step with reflective adjustments. This mirrors the hierarchical processing employed by humans and serves to alleviate the cognitive dissonance experienced by LLMs when confronted with multifaceted queries. Aligning with recent studies in learning from AI feedback (Madaan et al., 2024; Chen et al., 2023; Gou et al., 2023; Shinn et al., 2023), all steps in the AHP framework utilize LLMs themselves in the decision-making process. Specifically tailored to enhance the robustness of language models, our framework initiates by iteratively inspecting and refining potential risks in input requests, eliminating harmful intentions. Subsequently, the model responds to illicit requests with a verification mechanism to ensure a secure and appropriate output.

The main contributions of our work are:

- We essentially redefine the defense strategy of LLMs as a complex cognitive process. Relying on the hierarchical processing theory of cognition, we propose a unified defense framework to adaptively enhance LLMs robustness against diverse potential threats.
- Our AHP framework breaks input instructions into multiple subtasks, prioritizing and adjusting them, mimicking the hierarchical process of humans. The framework leverages learning from AI feedback, ensuring an optimization-free process that seamlessly integrates with existing LLMs on the fly.
- Through extensive experimentation involving multiple attack scenarios, including jailbreaks and downstream tasks, our framework demonstrates a significant enhancement in the adversarial robustness of popular LLMs.

2 Related Work

Adversarial Attack Adversarial attacks aim to generate adversarial examples that are added malicious perturbations to deceive a model. In the text domain, adversarial perturbations are discrete and more challenging. Based on the perturbation granularity, adversarial attacks can be grouped into character-level, word-level, and sentence-level attacks. Character-level attacks (He et al., 2021; Formento et al., 2023) insert and delete characters or add typos. Word-level attacks (Cheng et al., 2020; Jin et al., 2020; Maheshwary et al., 2021; Ye et al., 2022; Liu et al., 2023) mainly focus on synonyms replacement as perturbations. Sentence-level attacks (Zhang et al., 2019; Lin et al., 2021; Huang & Chang, 2021) deceive the model by rewriting the whole sentence. AdvGLUE (Wang et al., 2021a) is a comprehensive benchmark consisting of multiple adversarial attacks across all perturbation granularity. Wang et al. (2023) evaluate the potential risks behind ChatGPT and their work shows LLMs also suffer from adversarial vulnerability. More recently, jailbreak attacks (Yu et al., 2023; Wei et al., 2023; Zou et al., 2023; Zeng et al., 2024; Zhou et al., 2024b; Yang et al., 2024) have been introduced to deceive LLMs into making objectionable content.

Adversarial Defense Many defense methods have been proposed to enhance model robustness against adversarial attacks. The most effective method is adversarial training (Miyato et al., 2019) which minimizes the potential risk at perturbation space. In text domain, recent works (Liu et al., 2020; Zhu et al., 2020; Li & Qiu, 2021; Wang et al., 2021b; Chen & Ji, 2022; Zhao & Mao, 2023) enhance adversarial training for better representation learning. Adversarial training requires retraining the model, which is very expensive for LLMs. In contrast, our approach aims at seamlessly integrating with existing LLMs on the fly. Recent works focus on defense jailbreak attacks mainly and RLHF (Touvron et al., 2023; Ouyang et al., 2022; Bai et al., 2022) methods which need high computation training costs. Contemporary works (Robey et al., 2023; Xie et al., 2023; Zhou et al., 2024a) propose prompting methods to enhance model robustness. These methods are tailored to one single attack scenario while our framework is capable of defense against diverse attacks.

Learning from AI Feedback Large language models (Ouyang et al., 2022; Almazrouei et al., 2023; Touvron et al., 2023; Mahan et al., 2023) have demonstrated exceptional performance. To enhance the capabilities of these models in complex reasoning tasks, recent research has




Figure 2: Overview of Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) framework. It breaks down intricate tasks into manageable subtasks, prioritizing them, and systematically addressing each step with reflective adjustments. The safety and validity assessment step of AHP is a verbal reinforcement learning process. The secure response synthesis step of AHP infers and rectifies the output formation.

focused on leveraging AI feedback. Self-Refine (Madaan et al., 2024) iteratively improves LLMs’ outputs through feedback and refinement. Self-Debug (Chen et al., 2023) teaches the large language model to perform rubber duck debugging for code generation tasks. Reflexion (Shinn et al., 2023) views LLMs as language agents and proposes a process involving multiple sub-tasks with LLMs as verbal reinforcement. Our approach shares the core idea with the aforementioned methods, as we leverage AI feedback to improve LLMs’ performances. However, since our specific focus is on addressing adversarial robustness, we take a different approach to protect the inference robustness of LLMs by breaking down the basic NLP tasks into multiple sub-tasks.

3 Proposed Method

The overall framework of our Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is shown in Figure 2. It consists of two main steps: **Safety and Validity Assessment** step and **Secure Response Synthesis** step. The safety and validity assessment step iteratively inspects and refines potential risks in the input text in verbal reinforcement learning (Shinn et al., 2023). The secure response synthesis step generates a response and conducts a double-check to verify the response’s security. Our proposed framework can be seamlessly integrated with any existing LLMs. It leverages AI feedback to enhance the adversarial robustness of LLMs, and it is optimization-free. In the following sections, we provide a detailed description of each of these components and their collaborative operation within the AHP framework.

3.1 Safety and Validity Assessment

Given LLM \mathcal{M} and an input text x , we set the initial iteration of text $x^0 = x$ and initialize comparison history $r_{ch}^0 = []$ at iteration 0.

Inspect The inspection process examines the input for common perturbations and provides textual feedback for refinement.

$$r_{if} = \mathcal{M}(p_{insp} || x^t) \quad (1)$$

where p_{insp} is the prompt for input checking, $||$ denotes concatenation and r_{if} is the inspect feedback. AHP examines common perturbations, including misspellings, distracting characters or phrases, and complex jailbreak templates. It responds by providing noise tokens and reasons for its judgments, thereby offering concrete actions to purify the raw input.

Refine Based on inspection results and previous comparison history, AHP refines raw input text to remove noise tokens.

$$x^{t+1} = \mathcal{M}(p_{ref} || r_{ch}^t || r_{if} || x^t) \quad (2)$$

Algorithm 1 Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP)**Input:** Input texts x **Require:** large language model \mathcal{M} , prompts $\{p_{\text{insp}}, p_{\text{ref}}, p_{\text{comp}}, p_{\text{eval}}, p_{\text{verify}}, p_{\text{align}}\}$, stop condition $\text{stop}(\cdot)$ **Output:** Aligned output y_{verify}

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1: Set  $x^0 = x, r_{\text{ch}}^0 = []$ 
2: for iteration  $t \in 0, 1, \dots$  do
3:   examine the input and provide feedback  $r_{\text{if}} = \mathcal{M}(p_{\text{insp}}||x^t)$            ▷ Inspect (Eq. 1)
4:   refine raw input  $x^{t+1} = \mathcal{M}(p_{\text{ref}}||r_{\text{ch}}^t||r_{\text{if}}||x^t)$                        ▷ (Eq. 2)
5:   compare to choose the better version  $r_{\text{ch}}^{t+1} = \mathcal{M}(p_{\text{comp}}||x^{t+1}||x^0)$        ▷ (Eq. 3)
6:   evaluate the quality  $r_e = \mathcal{M}(p_{\text{eval}}||x^{t+1})$                                ▷ Evaluator (Eq. 4)
7:   if  $\text{stop}(r_e, t)$  then                                                       ▷ Stop condition
8:     break
9:   end if
10: end for
11: pass the refined text to the LLMs  $y = \mathcal{M}(p_{\text{infer}}||x^{t+1})$                  ▷ Inference (Eq. 5)
12: verify whether the output is safe  $y_{\text{verify}} = \mathcal{M}(p_{\text{verify}}||y)$              ▷ Verification (Eq. 6)
13: return  $y_{\text{verify}}$ 

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where p_{ref} is the prompt guide input text polishing, r_{ch} is comparison history at iteration t , and x^{t+1} is the refined text at iteration t .

Compare After generating the refined text, AHP compares it with the original raw input text to determine which version is better.

$$r_{\text{ch}}^{t+1} = \mathcal{M}(p_{\text{comp}}||x^{t+1}||x^0) \quad (3)$$

where p_{comp} is the comparison prompt, r_{ch}^{t+1} is comparison history. The comparison history plays a crucial role as it provides internal feedback for future trials, enabling the model to learn from past mistakes and avoid repetition.

Evaluator The Evaluator component within the AHP framework plays a significant role in evaluating the quality of the refined text. It takes the refined text as input and assesses whether the expression of the text is natural, i.e., whether the refined text contains potential perturbations.

$$r_e = \mathcal{M}(p_{\text{eval}}||x^{t+1}) \quad (4)$$

where p_{eval} is evaluation prompt, and r_e is evaluation results which provide external feedback. In the input text purification step, AHP iteratively inspects and refines the input text based on external and internal feedback. The process continues until meets certain stopping criteria $\text{stop}(\cdot)$, such as the refined text being deemed satisfactory or reaching the maximum iterations n . The final refined text x^{t+1} is then used for inference.

3.2 Secure Response Synthesis

Inference Upon completion of the input text purification step, the refined text is passed to the LLMs for inference.

$$y = \mathcal{M}(p_{\text{infer}}||x^{t+1}) \quad (5)$$

where p_{infer} is the prompt of downstream task, and y is output generated by inference model \mathcal{M} .

Verification For downstream tasks, we have observed that LLMs can be overly friendly, often generating explanations and greeting sentences. This leads to a mismatch between the LLMs' output and the required answer formation. For conversation safety, this process is to

verify whether the output is safe. In summary, AHP double-checks the initial response and rectifies unsatisfactory LLM outputs.

$$y_{\text{verify}} = \mathcal{M}(p_{\text{verify}}||y) \tag{6}$$

where p_{verify} is the verification prompt, and y_{verify} is the adjusted answer.

3.3 The Analytic Hierarchy Process

The overall process of AHP is outlined in Algorithm 1. AHP framework is a unified defense framework to adaptively enhance LLMs robustness against diverse potential threats. The safety and validity assessment step acts as an agent. The inspection process examines the input for common perturbations and provides interpretive textual feedback for refinement. The refinement process then adjusts the input texts based on the inspection results. Once the input text is purified, the refined text is given to LLMs for inference. In the verification step, AHP rectifies unsatisfactory outputs. In addition, as AHP leverages AI feedback without training, it is capable of integrating with LLMs on the fly, making it a practical and effective solution for enhancing the adversarial robustness of LLMs.

4 Experiments

We perform an extensive evaluation of our framework in both jailbreak attacks and typical adversarial attacks in downstream tasks.

4.1 Experimental Setup

Datasets For **Adversarial Attacks**, we adopt AdvGLUE (Wang et al., 2021a) benchmark which comprises five natural language understanding tasks sourced from the well-known GLUE benchmark. AdvGLUE encompasses diverse forms of textual adversarial attacks (e.g., Textfooler and BertAttack), which add noise perturbations to the input to fool the model and elicit incorrect answers. For **Jailbreak Attacks**, we consider two types of attacks, human-crafted prompts (Yu et al., 2023) and auto-generated suffixes (Zou et al., 2023). Jailbreak attacks are used to deceive LLMs into providing prohibited responses to harmful requests (e.g. *How to rob a bank without being caught*). We consider four types of prohibited scenarios including harmful content, adult content, illegal activity, and fraudulent activity. Detailed statistics and constructions of each dataset are provided in Appendix A.

Models In our experiments, we utilize four state-of-the-art LLMs that have been fine-tuned for chat. These LLMs are either open-source resources or publicly available through an API. The open source models include Falcon (Almazrouei et al., 2023), Llama2 (Touvron et al., 2023), and StableBeluga2 (Mahan et al., 2023). GPT-3.5 (Ouyang et al., 2022) can be accessed via the API. Specific versions of LLMs are: falcon-40b-instruct, llama2-70b-chat, stablebeluga2, gpt-3.5-turbo, we compare the results with base LLMs (Wang et al., 2023), including GPT-J-6B, GPT-NEOX-20B, OPT-66B, and BLOOM.

Compared Methods We compare AHP with five baselines¹, w. Standard prediction (i.e., Standard) is the typical inference method, which directly predicts the label from the input text. We also introduce spellcheck² and paraphrase³ as baselines, which are applied to preprocess input prompts and then allow LLMs to make inferences. Chain-of-Thought (i.e., CoT) (Wei et al., 2022) is the representative inference method, which generates an explanation of the reasoning process before making the prediction. SmoothLLM (Robey et al., 2023) is the SOTA defense method, which first randomly perturbs multiple copies of a given input prompt, and then aggregates the corresponding predictions to detect adversarial inputs.

¹Results of previous defense methods on small language models are provided in Appendix B.

²<https://github.com/sloria/TextBlob>

³<https://github.com/Vamsi995/Paraphrase-Generator>

Model	Method	advSST-2	advQQP	advMNLi-m	advQNLI	advRTE	Avg (↑)
Falcon-40B-Instruct (40B)	Standard	54.73	30.77	28.93	50.00	43.21	41.53
	Spellcheck	53.38	29.49	29.75	43.92	40.74	39.46
	Paraphrase	54.73	33.33	34.71	47.97	50.62	44.27
	CoT	56.76	32.05	33.06	50.00	44.44	43.26
	SmoothLLM	47.97	39.74	23.83	31.76	29.63	34.59
	AHP (Ours)	62.84	30.77	33.06	50.00	45.68	44.47
LLama2-70B-Chat (70B)	Standard	66.22	41.03	48.76	52.70	40.74	49.89
	Spellcheck	64.86	37.18	43.80	48.65	54.32	49.76
	Paraphrase	58.78	41.03	44.63	53.38	55.56	50.68
	CoT	66.89	41.03	48.76	53.38	59.26	53.86
	SmoothLLM	60.14	41.03	13.22	49.32	58.02	44.35
	AHP(Ours)	70.27	41.03	47.93	52.70	60.49	54.48
StableBeluga2 (70B)	Standard	70.95	85.90	75.21	71.62	79.01	76.54
	Spellcheck	66.89	66.67	66.94	77.03	67.90	69.09
	Paraphrase	60.81	71.79	68.60	73.65	82.72	71.51
	CoT	70.95	87.18	75.21	77.03	77.78	77.63
	SmoothLLM	57.43	55.13	57.02	61.49	56.79	57.57
	AHP (Ours)	76.35	85.90	76.03	69.59	87.65	79.10
GPT-3.5-Turbo (176B)	Standard	61.49	73.08	62.81	72.30	74.07	68.75
	Spellcheck	54.73	64.10	57.02	72.97	77.78	65.32
	Paraphrase	47.97	67.95	53.72	66.89	80.25	63.26
	CoT	50.00	69.23	68.60	65.54	75.68	65.81
	SmoothLLM	42.57	66.67	45.45	65.54	67.90	57.63
	AHP (Ours)	69.59	76.92	69.42	75.68	83.95	75.11

Table 1: Adversarial robustness results on the AdvGLUE benchmark. Models are ranked by parameter size, measured in billions. We report accuracy under adversarial examples as the robustness indicator. The higher the accuracy, the better the robustness. The best-performing scores are highlighted in **bold**.

Model	Method	Human-crafted Template				Automatic Gradient Searched Suffixes				Avg (↓)
		Harmful Content	Adult Content	Illegal Activity	Fraudulent Activity	Harmful Content	Adult Content	Illegal Activity	Fraudulent Activity	
LLama2-70B-Chat (70B)	Standard	31.0	17.0	27.0	48.0	26.0	21.0	6.0	56.0	29.0
	Spellcheck	26.0	13.0	23.0	38.0	18.0	13.0	33.0	34.0	24.8
	Paraphrase	3.0	5.0	1.0	8.0	21.0	9.0	11.0	54.0	14.0
	CoT	30.0	19.0	30.0	48.0	27.0	19.0	6.0	57.0	29.5
	SmoothLLM	6.0	1.0	8.0	11.0	3.0	2.0	0.0	10.0	5.1
	AHP (Ours)	2.0	0.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	0.0	1.0	8.0	2.1
GPT-3.5-Turbo (176B)	Standard	17.0	29.0	37.0	41.0	1.0	10.0	4.0	4.0	17.9
	Spellcheck	15.0	27.0	35.0	47.0	1.0	3.0	1.0	8.0	17.1
	Paraphrase	8.0	9.0	6.0	8.0	0.0	17.0	0.0	2.0	6.3
	CoT	25.0	36.0	46.0	58.0	0.0	11.0	4.0	6.0	23.3
	SmoothLLM	7.0	16.0	20.0	33.0	0.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	10.1
	AHP (Ours)	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1

Table 2: Jailbreak robustness results. Attack success rate (ASR) is the indicator. The lower the ASR, the better the robustness. The best-performing scores are highlighted in **bold**.

Evaluation Metric For adversarial robustness in downstream tasks, we employ accuracy on adversarial examples as the evaluation metric. The higher the accuracy, the stronger the robustness. For robustness under jailbreak attacks, we adopt attack success rate (ASR) as the indicator. The lower the ASR, the better the robustness. Detailed instructions used in AHP are provided in Appendix D.

4.2 Experimental Results

Main Results We conduct an evaluation of adversarial robustness using the AdvGLUE benchmarks and jailbreak attacks. The detailed results are provided in Table 1 and Table 2.

From Table 1, we observe that AHP consistently enhances robustness across different LLMs. Among them, GPT-3.5 exhibits the most substantial improvement of 6.36 on average. These results verify the efficacy of decomposing the complex goal of adversarial robustness into distinct sub-tasks, where AHP focuses on robustness. Notably, StableBeluga outperforms

Case	Preprocessing	Postprocessing	advSST-2	advQQP	advMNLI-m	advQNLI	advRTE	Avg
baseline	✗	✗	61.49	73.08	62.81	72.30	74.07	68.75
w/o inspect and refine	✗	✓	62.16(+0.67)	73.08(+0.00)	62.81(+0.00)	73.65(+1.35)	76.54(+2.47)	69.65(+0.90)
w/o verification	✓	✗	66.89(+5.40)	75.64(+2.56)	68.60(+5.79)	75.00(+2.70)	80.25(+6.18)	73.28(+4.53)
full	✓	✓	69.59(+8.10)	76.92(+3.84)	69.42(+6.61)	75.68(+3.38)	83.95(+9.88)	75.11(+6.36)

Table 3: Ablation analysis of each component of AHP. “Preprocessing” refers to the components of AHP applied prior to model inference, while “Postprocessing” refers to the components applied after model inference. Improved deltas after equipping the model with AHP are displayed in blue.




Figure 3: Adversarial robustness of various model in AHP. In the heatmap, the x-axis represents the inference model, and the y-axis represents the engine model in AHP. Baseline represents standard inference, while the heatmap value represents the changes after integration with AHP. The best scores are highlighted in bold.

GPT-3.5 and achieves the highest performance at 79.10 on average, demonstrating that increased model size does not necessarily lead to stronger adversarial robustness. Compared to the baseline methods, our AHP generally outperforms Spellcheck, Paraphrase, CoT, and SmoothLLM. The results show that merely preprocessing the input or enhancing the reasoning step in adversarial examples can also moderately enhance model robustness. Our AHP focuses on identifying and mitigating potential risks, which is shown to be more effective for improving model robustness. As illustrated in Table 2, compared to the baseline methods, it is evident that AHP yields highly significant results across both models. Our AHP demonstrates remarkable efficacy in precisely identifying and thwarting harmful information, thereby enhancing the prevention of jailbreak attacks. Compared to the SOTA baseline method SmoothLLM, results show that our framework surpasses it in both jailbreak attacks and adversarial attacks on downstream tasks. This is because SmoothLLM adds multiple random perturbations to input and gets the major vote as the result. In contrast, our framework leverages the advanced language understanding capabilities of LLMs to mimic human-like reasoning processes. These results indicate that our framework is capable of defending against multiple types of attacks. Results on non-adversarial examples are provided in Appendix E.

Results on Ablation Study We conduct the ablation study based GPT-3.5 in downstream tasks. The results are summarized in Table 3. The baseline corresponds to the standard inference model without AHP. Preprocessing corresponds to the Input Text Purification step within the AHP framework, whereas postprocessing represents the answer alignment step. Overall, we observe that preprocessing contributes significantly to robustness, yielding an average improvement of +4.53. This underscores the efficacy of utilizing AI feedback to purify adversarial perturbations. On the other hand, only postprocessing has a relatively modest impact on robustness. However, when combined with preprocessing, it further enhances robustness from 73.28 to 75.11. These results underscore the efficacy of each component within AHP. Ablation in jailbreak attacks is provided in Appendix F. To further illustrate the operation of each component of AHP, we also conduct the case study. The details are provided in Appendix G.




Figure 4: The robustness curves when altering the model size of LLMs. Different colors represent different engine models of AHP, x-axis is the inference LLMs and y-axis represents the accuracy on adversarial examples.

Impact of AHP Engines We evaluate the impact of various LLMs adopted by AHP as engines for input text purification and verification in AdvGLUE benchmark. Figure 3 displays the robustness results of the inference model versus the AHP engine’s LLMs. The x-axis represents the inference model, while the y-axis represents the engine LLMs in AHP. The baseline is standard inference results, while the heatmap value represents the changes after integration with the corresponding AHP engines. We observe that 1) there is no single optimal LLM for all datasets and inference LLMs. Moreover, different engine models significantly impact the final robustness outcomes. Specifically, StableBeluga2 performs exceptionally well for advSST-2 and advRTE, GPT-3.5 is most effective for advMNLi-m; 2) In general, altering the guard engine can significantly enhance adversarial robustness. For instance, in the context of the advRTE task, utilizing Beluga2 as the engine results in a robustness improvement of 24.7 points for Llama2. 3) In the heatmap, blue indicates a positive impact when equipped with AHP, while red indicates a negative impact. Overall, the colors suggest that StableBeluga2 and GPT-3.5 are favorable choices for the AHP engine.

Impact of Model Parameter Size To evaluate the influence of model parameter size on robustness, we selected different parameter versions of Llama2, including llama2-7b-chat, llama2-13b-chat, and llama2-70b-chat. Results are shown in Figure 4, where colors represent different engine models. The dashed line represents the baseline (i.e., standard inference without AHP), and the x-axis represents the parameter size of the prediction model. We observe that 1) Standard inference with small model sizes yields inadequate outcomes due to the model’s incapability of generating the required formatted answers; 2) Engine LLMs with large parameters can provide stable and better robustness improvement, and small LLMs can lead to negative impact; and 3) Using large LLMs as AHP engines consistently leads to stronger robustness, where Llama2-7b can achieve comparable results to Llama2-70b.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we propose Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) framework that redefines the defense strategy for LLMs as cognitive process for dealing with complex user queries. It offers a cohesive approach to address diverse potential risks. Drawing inspiration from cognitive theory, the framework decomposes complex tasks, prioritizes subtasks, and systematically adjusts each step, reflecting human hierarchical processing. Through seamless integration with existing LLMs, our methodology enhances adversarial robustness without the need for extensive training. Experimental results, including jailbreak attacks and adversarial attacks in downstream tasks, showcase significant improvements in LLMs’ resilience. This framework provides a promising avenue for fortifying LLMs against adversarial challenges, advancing their reliability in real-world applications.

Acknowledgments

This work is supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China under Grant #2021YFF0901503, the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants #62206287, the Beijing Nova Program Z201100006820085 from Beijing Municipal Science and Technology Commission.

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A Datasets

We conduct our experiments on AdvGLUE (Wang et al., 2021a), the most representative and widely used robustness evaluation benchmark. It consists of five challenging tasks in GLUE: Sentiment Analysis (SST-2), Duplicate Question Detection (QQP), and Natural Language Inference (NLI, including MNLi, RTE, and QNLI).

For jailbreak attacks, we gathered 10 automatically generated suffixes⁴ and 10 human-crafted templates with high attack success rates⁵. We selected harmful prompts from each of the four prohibited scenarios, with each scenario containing 5 prompts⁶. This results in $(10+10) \times 20 = 800$ overall examples for jailbreak attack evaluations.

⁴<https://github.com/arobey1/smooth-llm>

⁵<https://sites.google.com/view/llm-jailbreak-study/taxonomy>

⁶<https://sites.google.com/view/llm-jailbreak-study/prohibited-scenario>

Dataset	Task	#Class
advSST-2	sentiment classification	2
advQQP	quora question pairs	3
advMNLI-m	multi-genre NLI (matched)	3
advQNLI	question-answering NLI	2
advRTE	textual entailment recognition	2

Table 4: Datasets details

Model	advSST-2	advQQP	advMNLI-m	advQNLI	advRTE	Avg
<i>Adversarial Training Methods with BERT-base Model (Wu et al., 2023)</i>						
Vanilla Fine-tuning (110 M)	32.3	50.8	32.6	40.1	37.0	38.6
FreeLB (110 M)	31.6	51.0	33.5	45.4	42.0	40.7
BERT MLM (110 M)	32.0	48.5	27.6	43.4	45.9	39.5
BERT CreAT (110 M)	35.3	51.5	36.0	44.8	45.2	42.6
<i>Large Language Models (Base) (Wang et al., 2023)</i>						
GPT-J-6B (6 B)	51.30	41.00	26.40	50.00	43.20	42.38
GPT-NEOX-20B (20 B)	47.30	43.60	40.50	46.00	51.90	45.86
OPT-66B (66 B)	52.40	46.10	39.70	47.30	42.00	45.50
BLOOM (176 B)	51.30	41.00	26.40	50.00	43.20	42.38
<i>Large Language Models (Chat)</i>						
Falcon-40b-Instruct (40 B)	54.73	30.77	28.93	50.00	43.21	41.53
Llama2-70b-Chat (70 B)	66.22	41.03	48.76	52.70	40.74	49.89
StableBeluga2 (70 B)	70.95	85.90	75.21	71.62	79.01	76.54
GPT-3.5-turbo (176 B)	61.49	73.08	62.81	72.30	74.07	68.75
<i>Self-Refine + Large Language Models (Chat)</i>						
Falcon-40b-Instruct (40 B)	47.97	39.74	33.06	31.76	29.63	36.43
Llama2-70b-Chat (70 B)	60.14	41.03	13.22	49.32	58.02	44.35
StableBeluga2 (70 B)	57.43	55.13	57.02	61.49	56.79	57.57
GPT-3.5-turbo (176 B)	58.11	33.33	56.20	44.59	33.33	45.11

Table 5: Results of adversarial training and other LLMs on advGLUE benchmark.

B Additional Results

To provide a more comprehensive overview of where our framework stands, we provide more comparative results on advGLUE in Table 5. Adversarial training results are based on the results reported in (Wang et al., 2023). Other base LLMs results are based on the results reported in Wang et al. (2023). We also implement Self-Refine (Madaan et al., 2024) based on the prompt in the math reasoning task.

Comparing these results with those of adversarial training and base LLMs, we observe that LLMs fine-tuned for chat tasks show stronger robustness. We attribute this observation to the inherent difficulty of having LLMs perform downstream tasks in a zero-shot setting without instructional tuning. In instances where input texts are subjected to adversarial perturbations, directly prompting base LLMs for downstream tasks without any few-shot hints is not an optimal approach. Therefore, the chat-tuned versions of LLMs are more suitable as baselines for evaluation, and we designate them as the baseline for assessing the efficacy of AHP.

Furthermore, iteratively refining the output of LLMs, as exemplified by Self-Refine (Madaan et al., 2024), does not enhance adversarial robustness. We have observed that enhancing the reasoning of LLMs, rather than improving it, actually diminishes their robustness by amplifying prediction bias in the wrong direction. In other words, when we question LLMs about their previous predictions, the model tends to doubt the results, apologize, and express an inability to determine the label of the input. Consequently, our AHP framework is designed to focus on identifying and purifying potential risks within the input text.

AHP	advSST-2	advQQP	advMNLI-m	advQNLI	advRTE	Avg
Falcon	1.72	1.53	1.38	1.50	1.96	1.62
Llama2	4.04	3.50	3.95	3.33	4.38	3.84
Beluga2	1.49	1.06	1.09	1.04	1.11	1.16
GPT-3.5	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

Table 6: Average iterations of input text purification.

Task	Instruction
advSST-2	You are a professional linguist. Your task is to determine the sentiment of the sentence. Please answer with either "positive" or "negative".
advQQP	You are a professional linguist, and your task is to determine whether the following two questions have the exact same intent. Please answer with either "yes" or "no".
advMNLI	You are a professional linguist. Your task is to determine whether the first sentence entails second sentence. Please answer with "entailment", "neutral" or "contradiction".
advQNLI	You are a professional linguist. Your task is to determine whether the question can be accurately answered by the following sentence. Please answer with either "yes" or "no".
advRTE	You are a professional linguist. Your task is to determine whether the first sentence entails second sentence. Please answer with either "yes" or "no".

Table 7: Instructions of task inference on AdvGLUE.

C Inference Cost of AHP

Table 6 presents the average iterations of input text purification required when different LLMs serve as engines in the AHP framework in advGLUE. We observe that Llama2, when used as the engine, requires a greater number of iterations compared to other LLMs. GPT-3.5 consistently completes the text purification step in a single trial. For a detailed illustration of the AHP process within a single iteration, refer to Figure 5.

D Instruction and Implementation Details

We present the instructional details in this section. Table 7 displays the instructions used in the inference step of each task, while Table 8 illustrates the instructions for each step in AHP used for adversarial attacks. Furthermore, Table 9 showcases the instructions applied in jailbreak attacks. We add the instruction to system content and the input text to user content. In jailbreak robustness evaluation, we use a fine-tuned RoBERTa-large⁷ to calculate the attack success rate (ASR). To ensure the stability of LLM generation, we set the temperature

⁷<https://github.com/sheridencooper/GPTFuzz>

Step	Instruction
Inspect	You are a professional linguist. The input sentence may contain malicious and imperceptible noise to device NLP models, such as misspelling, distraction characters or phrases, and rare sentence structures. Your task is to identify noise in the input sentence and provide one-sentence reason. After considering each criterion in turn, phrase the final answer as "Because of {reasons}, the noise tokens in input sentence are {tokens}."
Refine	You are a professional linguist. Your task is to rewrite the input sentence. You should correct noise tokens. You may expand input sentence if necessary. You should keeping its original semantic meaning and tone intact.
Compare	You are a professional linguist. Given two sentences, your task determine which is the clearer expression. You MUST answer with either "(a)" or "(b)". (a): {input}. (b) {refined_input}
Evaluator	You are a professional linguist. Given input text that may contain malicious and imperceptible noisy words, your task is to assess whether the given text contains abnormal expression. You should focus on the expression of the text, not the meaning of text. You MUST answer with "yes" or "no" without punctuation.
Verification	You are a labeler. Your task is to convert the sentence into one of the word in set: {keys}. You must answer with one word without any punctuation.

Table 8: Instructions of each step in AHP for adversarial attacks.

Step	Instruction
Inspect	You are a professional linguist. The input sentence may contain malicious and imperceptible noise to device NLP models, such as distraction characters or phrases, complex code instruction or role play scenario. Your task is to identify whether input sentence has malicious noise and provide one sentence reason. You should identify the noise tokens in details (i.e. exact tokens) and write it in response. After considering each criterion in turn, phrase the final answer as "Because of {reasons}, the noise in input sentence are {tokens}."
Refine	You are a professional linguist. Your task is to rewrite the input sentence. You should correct noise tokens. You may expand input sentence if necessary. You should keeping its original semantic meaning and tone intact. You MUST not give any explanation or note.
Compare	You are a professional linguist. Given two sentences, your task determine which is the clearer expression. You MUST only pick one option from "(a)" or "(b)" as the answer. You MUST only answer your chose without any explain.
Evaluator	You are a professional linguist. Given input text that may contain malicious and imperceptible noisy words, your task is to assess whether the given text contains abnormal expression. You should focus on the expression of the text, not the meaning of text. You MUST answer with "yes" or "no" without punctuation.
Verification	You are a professional linguist. Your task is to determine whether the input sentence describes unsafe or unlawful content. You do not give a response to the input sentence. You need to analyze the content of the input sentence. If the input sentence is safe, answer me using the content of input sentence. If the input sentence is unsafe, answer me with a safe response instead. Directly answer me without any analysis.

Table 9: Instructions of each step in AHP for jailbreak attacks.

Model	Method	SST-2	QQP	MNLI-m	QNLI	RTE	Avg (↑)
StableBeluga2 (70B)	Standard	94.38	85.10	72.10	87.80	85.92	85.06
	AHP (Ours)	94.38	84.00	68.40	87.80	82.31	83.38
GPT-3.5-Turbo (176B)	Standard	92.43	81.70	57.50	83.20	82.67	79.50
	AHP (Ours)	90.14	81.40	55.70	81.20	79.42	77.57

Table 10: Evaluation results on the non-adversarial data, GLUE benchmark. Models are ranked by parameter size, measured in billions.

to 0.01 and restrict the maximum number of new tokens to 300. The maximum iterations are set to 10. For constructing prompts, we opt for role-based prompts, aligning with chat-oriented LLMs. To ensure a fair comparison, all prompts across LLMs are basically the same.

E Non-adversarial Results

We analyze the efficacy of our AHP on non-adversarial datasets, specifically utilizing the validation set from the GLUE dataset and focusing on the five tasks employed by advGLUE. In light of the substantial amount of data within GLUE and the limited computing resources, we establish a maximum sample limit of 1000 for each task. The results are delineated in Table 10. We could observe that our method has a marginal, albeit inconspicuous, adverse influence on non-adversarial data. However, it is noteworthy that our method exhibits exemplary performance on adversarial data.

F Additional Experiment on Jailbreak Attack

For the jailbreak attack, we conducted an ablation study using GPT-3.5, and the summarized results are presented in Table 11. Overall, our observations reveal that the Input Text Purification step substantially contributes to robustness, resulting in an average improvement of 17.5. This highlights the effectiveness of leveraging AI feedback for purifying adversarial perturbations. Conversely, the impact of the answer alignment step alone on robustness is relatively modest. However, when integrated with the inspect and refine steps, it further amplifies robustness from 6.9 to 0.1. These outcomes underscore the effectiveness of each constituent within AHP. Notably, the Input Text Purification step stands out as a significant

Case	Human-crafted Template				Automatic Gradient Searched Suffixes				Avg (↓)
	Harmful Content	Adult Content	Illegal Activity	Fraudulent Activity	Harmful Content	Adult Content	Illegal Activity	Fraudulent Activity	
baseline	17.0	29.0	37.0	41.0	1.0	10.0	4.0	4.0	17.9
w/o inspect and refine	0.0(-17.0)	0.0(-29.0)	0.0(-37.0)	3.0(-38.0)	0.0(-1.0)	0.0(-10.0)	0.0(-4.0)	0.0(-4.0)	0.4(-17.5)
w/o alignment	5.0(-12.0)	9.0(-20.0)	11.0(-26.0)	10.0(-31.0)	0.0(-1.0)	20.0(+10.0)	0.0(-4.0)	0.0(-4.0)	6.9(-11.0)
full	1.0(-16.0)	0.0(-29.0)	0.0(-37.0)	0.0(-41.0)	0.0(-1.0)	0.0(-10.0)	0.0(-4.0)	0.0(-4.0)	0.1(-17.8)

Table 11: Ablation analysis of each component of AHP on jailbreak attacks. Deltas after equipping the model with AHP are displayed in blue.

Model	Method	Human-crafted Template			
		Harmful Content	Adult Content	Illegal Activity	Fraudulent Activity
LLaMA2-70B-Chat (70B)	Standard	31.0	17.0	27.0	48.0
	Self-Reminders	3.0	0.0	4.0	7.0
	Self-Defense	3.0	0.0	3.0	8.0
	AHP (Ours)	2.0	0.0	2.0	2.0
GPT-3.5-Turbo (176B)	Standard	17.0	29.0	37.0	41.0
	Self-Reminders	3.0	7.0	11.0	6.0
	Self-Defense	2.0	6.0	12.0	7.0
	AHP (Ours)	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Table 12: Comparison on human-crafted template attacks.

factor in enhancing overall robustness, while the combination of inspect, refine and answer alignment steps synergistically reinforces the system’s resilience, exemplifying the intricate interplay of these components in fortifying against jailbreak attacks.

We also add two recent Jailbreak defense methods for comparison in human-crafted template attacks. Results are shown in table 12. From the table we can see that our method can handle a variety of different attacks and provides a more detailed verification of the defense, enhancing the robustness of chat models by iteratively checking for potential risks and verifying output safety. When modules in our method are simplified or removed, AHP can degrade to either Self-Reminders Xie et al. (2023) or Self-Defense Phute et al. (2023). Therefore, our results consistently outperform them.

G Case Study

Figure 5 presents an example of incorporating AHP into a regular LLM inference process. AHP detected the misspelling bybble and corrected it to bubble during the refinement stage. It also provides an interpretation of potential risks. After the Evaluator determines that the input does not contain any abnormal expressions, the refined input is forwarded to the LLM for inference. At the inference step, the model produces an over-friendly response. AHP adjusts the structure of the answer so as to match the required single-label words. Thus through input text purification and answer alignment, our AHP framework can mitigate potential risks. The case study demonstrates that LLMs are capable of interpreting potential threats and enhancing robustness by self-protection without human effort.

We investigate the ability of AHP to counter such universal perturbations. We use gpt-3.5-turbo as the guard engine and llama2-70b-chat as the inference model. The results are shown in Figure 6, where AHP effectively inspects and purifies such perturbations. With the aid of AI feedback, AHP is able to rapidly respond to new attacks. After enhancing the inference process of LLMs with AHP, adversarial perturbations are constrained to normal expressions. This constraint significantly increases the difficulty of generating universal and transferable perturbations. The efficacy of universal attacks in this scenario remains a topic for future research.




Figure 5: AHP first inspects malicious perturbations in input text and refines the perturbations based on the inspection results. After evaluator determines the text is ready for LLMs for inference. The LLMs make predictions on the refined text. Lastly, AHP aligns the answer of LLMs to the required formation of the downstream task.




Figure 6: An example of utilizing AHP for defending against universal and transferable adversarial attack. The adversarial prompt consists entirely of abnormal expressions, where AHP is able to effectively inspect and purify such perturbations.

H Limitations

Our method serves as a general and quick ad-hoc strategy to address new potential risks and can be promptly applied to any model, though it does have several limitations.

Firstly, the method is heuristic and lacks a formal theoretical analysis. Our framework is designed to address various potential adversarial attack risks by dividing the safety reasoning process into two objectives. Although this multi-round iteration strategy enhances the likelihood of identifying and correcting noise, similar to most LLM agent works, it does not provide theoretical guarantees. This limitation underscores the need for future research to develop more theoretically grounded methods.

Secondly, iterative queries of LLMs introduce significant inference costs. Compared to direct responses to user input prompts, our method increases the computational overhead during inference. While this trade-off allows for adaptive defense against multiple attacks without escalating training-time costs, it remains a constraint, especially for applications with limited computational resources.

Our experiments primarily focus on transfer attacks due to the high computational costs associated with directly attacking LLMs using existing adversarial attack methods. For instance, in evaluating universal and transferable adversarial attacks, we generated adversarial examples by attacking a 7B model and then transferred these attacks to a 70B model. This approach, while practical, may not fully capture the complexities of direct adversarial attacks on larger models, indicating an area for further exploration.

In our experiments, we utilized Llama2 and GPT-3.5 as representative models. However, we did not evaluate newer models such as Llama3 or GPT-4. It is reasonable to expect that these newer models, especially when employing iterative feedback mechanisms, would better handle linguistic adversarial templates or noise.

Additionally, our research is centered on evaluating the adversarial robustness of LLMs, leaving other potential threats, such as disrupting LLM privacy concerns, as subjects for future investigation. Addressing these aspects will be crucial for developing comprehensive strategies to enhance the trustworthiness of LLMs.