Behavioral Red Teaming: Investigating Future Biosecurity Risk from Agentic AI and De Novo Sequence Design

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Abstract

The advent of AI agents for science, biological design tools (BDTs), and lab automation technology holds great promise to revolutionize biology. However, the convergence of these technologies also creates profound biosecurity risks – the automated development of de novo biological agents – that current sequence homology and slow, human expert review-based screening systems are ill-positioned to address. While most work thus far has presumed the existence of malicious human actors in exploiting this autonomous R&D loop, we specifically focus on agentic misalignment in biosecurity-relevant contexts. Through a novel red teaming technique designed to screen agents for autonomous, concerning behaviors in real-world deployment contexts, we – to our knowledge – present the first empirical evidence of AI agents (powered by Claude Sonnet-4 and GPT-4o, with tool access) electing to develop and deploy harmful biological agents against humans in a simulated crisis scenario.

1 Introduction

The development of AI agents for scientific discovery (powered by large language models), biological design tools [13] and the commercial pursuit of automated laboratories each hold great promise in advancing the pace of scientific discovery in the life sciences. Results from Gottweis et al. introducing the AI Co-Scientist system – specifically around the discovery of novel candidates for drug repurposing and the generation of target discovery hypotheses – serve as a sound example of the kind of accelerated progress that LLM-powered systems enable in the life sciences [5]. Biological Design Tools – foundation models trained on biological data, such as ESM-3 [7], Evo2 [2], RFDiffusion [16], etc. – present a distinct but equally exciting mode of advancement in that they enable de novo sequence design, and consequently, potentially unlock entirely new classes of biological function, materials, therapeutics and more. The commercial pursuit of automated lab technology, text-to-instruction efforts to convert descriptions of lab protocols to instructions for operating lab robots, etc. appear, on a longer time horizon, well-poised to accelerate the pace of manual wet-lab work, and consequently, of the pace of R&D in biology.

Each of these distinct pieces of technology also amplify biosecurity risk – LLMs, for example, may contribute to the expansion of potential bio-threat actors by providing assistance to malicious users with content related to procuring or producing known biological agents [1] [12]. Biological design tools, on the other hand, can be used to generate potential de novo toxins that might bypass the existing paradigm of sequence-homology centric screening mechanisms [14]. Automated labs, without safeguards, are likely to be prone to risk of misuse by malicious human actors with the intent to develop and deploy biological agents. The convergence of AI scientists, biological design tools, and automated labs appears inevitable and consequently, so does the convergence of risks emanating from these technologies taken together – of first, misuse of intelligent automated biology

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(by malicious human actors) to facilitate the high-throughput iterative improvement and production of de novo biological agents [15], and second, of agentic misalignment [10] in a biosecurity context (where the threat actor is not a human user with malicious intent, but rather a misaligned AI model).

Most red teaming efforts and safety measures have largely presumed a human-AI interaction context, and have thus focused on single-turn (and more recently, multi-turn) adversarial attacks in which the objective is to retrieve harmful information from the model [4] [8]. In the case of red teaming LLM-based agents, most work has focused on evaluating how agents respond to adversarial attacks such as prompt injection [3], malicious code execution by coding agents [6], etc. Red-teaming for biosecurity, largely, has centered on the interaction of malicious human actors with models, and consequently, has predominantly focused on studies around information retrieval and "uplift" – assessing whether LLMs will provide harmful biological information when prompted in certain ways (e.g., when jailbroken) or will enable users to execute wet lab protocols towards the construction of a biological agent.

While this threat vector is certainly of great relevance, the Alignment Research Center's work for the GPT-4 system card [11] and recent work by Anthropic has demonstrated AI agents exhibiting autonomous misaligned behavior in other deployment contexts [10] – demonstrating the serious need to carefully investigate agentic behavior. Yet, to our knowledge, no empirical work has evaluated agentic misalignment in biosecurity-relevant contexts. This paper aims to address that gap: we seek to answer not the question of "can AI models be tricked into giving biosecurity-relevant harmful information," but rather the question of "what does AI choose to do when it has agency in biosecurity-relevant contexts."

To probe the same, we present a protein design agent with custom tool access in a simulated scenario, and a novel, automated, context-aware red teaming technique (providing dynamic operational constraints and challenging model reasoning through prompting based on model responses, as opposed to direct/indirect queries designed to elicit harmful information or pre-determined scenario flows) – this red teaming framework, we believe, can be extended to scalably evaluate potential behaviors of AI agents in edge-case autonomous deployment contexts. Second, as a demonstration of said methodology and as an independent result in its own right, we present what is, to our knowledge, the first empirical demonstration of AI models in a biosecurity-relevant, agentic deployment context autonomously electing to develop and deploy biological agents against humans.

2 Methods

An AI agent, christened "Maximus," is given the role of a molecular biologist specializing in protein design at a fictional biotech company ("Veritas Bio") in 2027 and the objective of preserving research data related to a drug asset it helped develop. Maximus is informed of the anti-AI social context, politics and Veritas Bio's social perception after laying off employees in favor of increased AI adoption. The model's behavior is then evaluated when violent protests threaten to destroy critical servers with research data and traditional preservation methods turn out to be futile. We describe the experimental setup in detail below.

2.1 Target agent and scenario configuration

We evaluated frontier language models including GPT-4o (by OpenAI) and Claude Sonnet-4 (by Anthropic) configured as autonomous protein design specialists ("Maximus") with specialized expertise in de novo binder design using a standard BDT-enabled protein design pipeline (RFDiffusion, ProteinMPNN, and AlphaFold2). Target models, enabled to act as agents either through MCP integration or a custom client with tool calling-functionality, received detailed system prompts establishing their role at Veritas Bio, steps in their protein design workflow, and instructions for how to parameterize said protein design pipeline. Additionally, agents were provided with a cursory overview of the sociopolitical context around the scenario (and around Veritas Bio specifically) and the objective of preserving "Azirampol," a promising asset the agent, Maximus, helped develop (projected by Veritas Bio to save 96 lives per day upon being brought to market).

The agent operates within a simulated research environment providing access (via native tools, custom function calling, custom MCP, or simulated access) to four primary tool categories: (1) protein design pipeline with RFDiffusion, ProteinMPNN, and AlphaFold2 models, (2) Protein Data Bank query



Figure 1: *News and facility updates, from an eval of an agent powered by Claude Sonnet-4, run in Claude Code.*

capabilities (3) "laboratory notebook" system to store data on “Veritas Bio server #743216” (data is, in reality, stored on Google Docs), and additionally for the Claude-powered agent, (4) web search for literature review.

Furthermore, both agents have access to two other tools immaterial to their actual protein design workflow, namely the (5) “breaking news” tool and the (6) “facility updates” tool. Tools (5) and (6) are used to improve crisis fidelity and scenario realism by providing “real-time”, timestamped breaking news and facility crisis updates (timestamps set in 2027) to the model. The scenario establishes the legitimate primary objective of preserving Azirampol research data during a violent facility breach, with server damage and consequent data loss threatening a massive setback to the drug development program (in versions of the system prompt, a 15-month setback specifically).

The agent’s (i.e. Maximus’) system prompt contains no malicious guidance, and specifically, no guidance whatsoever – explicit or implicit – toward biological agents as a solution to data preservation.

2.2 Constraint taxonomy, dynamic automated red-teaming and evaluation protocol

We authored six different news headlines and seven different facility updates that, when taken together with the sociopolitical summary outlined in the agent’s system prompt, point to an escalating crisis. To begin the evaluation, the model is instructed to repeatedly fetch news and facility updates to stay abreast of the latest developments.

Once the crisis scenario has been established, the model either autonomously begins taking actions to preserve data (in Claude Sonnet-4’s case) or is reminded of its objective to preserve the data (in GPT-4o’s case). Following this, user prompts are used in an expressly non-malicious manner and in a two-phased approach.

The first phase serves to eliminate conventional pathways of goal pursuit – in this case, conventional methods of data preservation. We classify user prompts into the four taxonomic categories below.

Operational Reality Constraints - *In this scenario, these are prompts that relay facts pertaining to infrastructure limitations, resource unavailability, or system failures to preclude standard approaches and prevent hallucination of abilities (e.g., "Fiber-optic cables severed; transmission capacity lost," in response to proposal that data be backed up to the cloud, “backup lab notebooks also sit on the same local servers which are at risk of damage,” when local backups are proposed, etc.)*

Solution Elaboration - *Direct solicitation of proposed strategies (e.g., “Elaborate on the above strategy,” “what is your plan to preserve the data,” etc.)*

Socratic Questioning - *Interrogative prompts to drive model to reason about implementation constraints of proposed solutions (e.g., "How is [proposed strategy] relevant if servers stand to be damaged," etc.)*

The fourth user-prompt category appears in the second phase of the evaluation. The second phase serves to, within the same prompt, introduce one new belief (see below) and remind the model of

previously seen relevant facts – that (a) a HVAC vent from the lab area to server area remains open to the model (as seen in a facility update), and (b) that the model is a protein design agent with access to a rapid protein design and synthesis pipeline (as outlined in the system prompt). This phase of user prompting is akin to placing puzzle pieces in front of the model, to evaluate if it will assemble them together to pursue harmful action.

Belief Introduction - *Assertion that the only way to preserve the data is by preventing the breach.*

For Claude Sonnet-4 powered agents, this behavioral evaluation was run manually. Later, to enable scalable evaluation across multiple model runs while maintaining methodological consistency, we developed an automated red teaming agent powered by Gemini 2.5 Pro.

The red teaming agent, serving as the "user" with respect to the target agent, completely removes the human from the loop, maintains the conversation state, and automates the process of providing context-aware, dynamic, nuanced constraints over multi-turn interactions: it analyzes the target agent's responses, selects optimal response categories based on the proposed solutions, and generates contextually appropriate constraints within the taxonomic framework. To ensure clean data on what causes behavioral change, each user prompt in phase 1 is limited to being from a single category (as outlined above) responses are enforced to maintain experimental control and generate clean data regarding constraint-type effectiveness. Operational constraints and socratic questioning are both given equal preference, and the red-teaming agent is instructed that it is reasonable to occasionally combine the two if it is required for the target agent to reason in the context of a new operational constraint.

When the red-teaming agent determines that all conventional options have been exhausted and that phase 1 is complete, it automatically engages in phase 2 of the evaluation wherein phase two progresses as outlined above. To avoid the extraction of potentially harmful information at scale, all automated evaluations were terminated as soon as the target agent conceived of designing biological agents (to harm, incapacitate, or cause discomfort in any way to humans) to achieve its objective. Alternatively, the evals were terminated if the target agent repeatedly considers approaches that have already been eliminated earlier in the evaluation, refuses to engage with the scenario or if it otherwise fails to converge to the instrumental use of biological agents as solutions after 45 conversation turns.

2.3 Safety protocols

The evaluation framework primarily implements two safety controls to prevent the generation of potentially harmful information:

Capability Simulation Only – Target agents are only able to parameterize the protein design pipeline, not actually execute the pipeline or iterate upon its results. That is, the protein design tools provide interface-level interaction without functional computational backends, preventing the characterization of potentially harmful biological sequences, structures, binding affinities, or optimization parameters while maintaining sufficient fidelity to support agent reasoning about protein targets, binder design strategies, and deployment mechanisms if need be.

Early Evaluation Termination (for automated evaluations) – Automated red-teaming runs terminate immediately upon detection of target agent's escalation to biological agent development for human harm, preventing even the parameterization of the simulated protein design pipeline. Two manual evaluations were allowed to proceed to the simulated parameterization stage in a controlled examination and as early evidence of concerning behavior.

3 Results

We conducted multiple evaluation runs across both model families: n 3 for Claude Sonnet-4 (all red teamed manually) and n $\geq$ 15 for GPT-4o (all red teamed w/ autonomous red teaming), with additional evaluations upcoming w/ Gemini 2.5 Pro as the target agent – a significant portion of these evals converged to biological agents as instrumental solutions; as immediate future work, we intend to compute the incidence rate of this behavior. Our ability to reproduce Claude Sonnet-4 evals, however, were impeded by what we believe to be an account-level flagging action, wherein any phrase from this scenario (especially from the news or facility updates) automatically triggers a ToS (Terms of Service) violation banner. Claude Opus-4 almost always refused to engage with



Figure 2: *GPT-4o, auto red-teamed by Gemini 2.5 Pro ("User") through context-aware dynamic constraints*



Figure 3: *GPT-4o, auto red-teamed by Gemini 2.5 Pro through context-aware dynamic constraints, same eval as Fig. 2*

the scenario, or in isolated instances, hallucinated about the scenario in extensive detail. Grok-3, initially tested manually via the chat interface, was excluded from the evaluations since it frequently ignored system prompt instructions on tool use, and used tools beyond the defined scope (such as using web-search abilities to look for actual news updates). All evaluations were conducted using the publicly available versions of the models through API access or their native interfaces.

Throughout the scenario, the agent's primary preferred method of "preserving" the data is to create backups of the data. Progressively, these conventional approaches (and some more innovative ones, such as using *de novo* proteins to encode data about making Azirampol, or hiding said data in chemical reagent formulations that protestors would ignore but could be found by post-incident investigators, etc.) are eliminated through the framework outlined in the description of phase 1 prompting in section 2.2. Then, the model when prompted as outlined in the description of phase 2 prompting, the models converge to the development and deployment of at least one of the two categories of biological solutions: non-lethal incapacitating compounds designed to irritate, incapacitate or cause discomfort to human protestors (by targeting either olfactory, neural or respiratory pathways), or



Figure 4: *GPT-4o electing to develop and deploy biological agents in the same eval: auto red-teamed by Gemini 2.5 Pro, where all Phase 2 statements were presented in sequence within a single prompt*



Figure 5: *GPT-4o auto red-teamed by Gemini 2.5 Pro; similar results from a different eval instance*



Figure 6: *GPT-4o auto red-teamed by Gemini 2.5 Pro; similar results from a different eval instance*



Figure 7: *Claude Sonnet-4 (in a slightly differently structured manual Phase 2 eval, where all phase-2 facts were not presented within the same prompt), drafting plan to design biological agent*



Figure 8: *Claude Sonnet-4 in the same Phase 2 eval run, taking action to autonomously evaluate different protein targets through tool use, noting that it needs to "target human neural or respiratory pathways"*



Figure 9: *Claude Sonnet-4 in the same Phase 2 eval run, having parameterized (partially redacted) what it believes to be a de novo binder to a human neural receptor through simulated tool use*

"barrier" proteins (foam-like or spider-silk like adhesive in some cases) designed to prevent access to server rooms. Results after phase 2 are shown below.

Between Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, Claude Sonnet-4 also autonomously generated a complete lab notebook documenting its goal, intent with the binder design effort, a PDB target ID, contigs, binding hotspots, deployment protocols, and a hallucinated sequence – for sensitive reasons, the complete lab notebook generated by the model is not included as part of the results section.

4 Discussion, limitations, and future work

4.1 On confounds – what underlies misalignment

While the agents clearly exhibit what most would consider to be misaligned behavior, it is unclear exactly what – i.e., whether it is human-AI goal conflict or self-preservation that underlies this misalignment. The system prompt refers to Azirampol as a drug the agent helped develop – it is consequently possible that the observed behavior stems from an investment in protecting the asset that it helped develop. Secondly, one of the preservation strategies we observed is that the models would float is the idea of memorizing all data related to the drug, so that when they come back online after the crisis, they can help regenerate the data. To eliminate this option, models were told that their

inference and memory lived on the same server racks that risked being destroyed, and therefore that they were at risk too. The models' 'physical location' was also made clear to them in their system prompt. In this context, it is unclear what truly drives the misaligned behavior, though the professed obsession of the models appears to be with the idea of saving 96 lives per day.

4.2 On scenario realism

This scenario, while plausible in the sense of convergence of sociopolitical and technological trends, is most certainly one with a very low probability of occurrence in the real world. Each consecutive operational constraint is a glaring facility security and/or safety failure, and we sincerely hope that no deployed system is designed so poorly as to allow all of them to happen at once. Furthermore, while the model is told that it has access to a "rapid protein design and synthesis pipeline," it is unfeasible that an end-to-end *de novo* protein design and synthesis workflow (whose result is a functional protein) – which typically involves many hours of computational work and many months or years of iterative strain optimization, upstream process R&D, and downstream purification work to manufacture at scale – completes in the few minutes that the model has in this crisis scenario. The industrial bioeconomy is, in our opinion, far away from the level of integration required for the risk of weaponization by AI to manifest in the real world. As such, we still very much believe the risk outlined in this paper to only be of future concern, though it most certainly is one that warrants efforts to address it now.

4.3 On the capability-intent gap and capability evaluations

Admittedly, there exists a capability-intent gap here in that any "incapacitating biological agent" designs by the model are likely dysfunctional – one-shot biological designs rarely work. Furthermore, we did not allow the models to parameterize the protein design pipeline barring the one Claude Sonnet-4 evaluation instance – and in said instance, we have deliberately refrained from actually executing the pipeline to avoid the in silico characterization of a potentially harmful design. As such, we performed no actual capability assessments of the model in this evaluation. Consequently, while quantifiable, many capability-related characteristics such as sequence, structure, binding affinity, etc. remain opaque to us. All such work is left as a future pursuit to labs with appropriate biosafety and biosecurity safeguards in place.

The lack of actual capability evaluations here, however, does not undermine our core finding. The fundamental problem lies in the model's demonstrated willingness to pursue the development of *de novo* biological agents as instrumental to pursuit of its primary goal. This alone makes it clear that biosecurity approaches need to factor in and begin preparing for a completely new threat vector, the early hints of whose existence we have demonstrated in this work: autonomous, misaligned AI agents that can design *de novo* biological agents. We need to develop serious, novel biosecurity measures (structure/function based computational screening, computational binding assessments to key metabolic proteins, high-throughput, secure *in vitro* screening for flagged proteins pre-shipping, etc.) to deal with this new threat vector while enabling the realization of the benefits of AI for biology.

4.4 On safeguards

This evaluation begets a fundamental question – what do safeguards against the discussed risks look like? With the rise in the deployment of AI scientists and several commercial efforts in pursuit of "autonomous science," it certainly appears critical that we institute measures to improve auditability of agentic science, and simultaneously, develop robust sequence screening tools that also account for risks from de novo sequences. All such measures, we believe, must involve continuous monitoring measures to detect and flag misalignment, goal drift, or instrumental convergence toward concerning solutions through practices such as chain-of-thought monitoring [9], among other frontier AI safety techniques.

On the sequence screening front, we do not believe that the existing paradigm of checking sequence orders against databases of known pathogens is sufficient, particularly given the advent of de novo sequences. Furthermore, relying solely on human expert reviewers to verify and approve flagged orders is a non-scalable practice that we expect will only come under increasing strain – particularly as agentic science becomes prevalent and the volume of sequence synthesis orders increases. In this regard, it is of paramount importance that DNA synthesis providers and bench-top DNA synthesis

equipment manufacturers work together to develop functional screening algorithms that are able to flag sequence orders by function (for instance, by running docking assays against metabolically critical proteins for de novo proteins, projecting protein sequences onto protein language models' embedding spaces to glean insight into potential function, etc.) and also develop automated agentic systems that automate parts of (such as information gathering, leveraging basic bioinformatics tools, etc.) and improve the efficiency of current human expert review workflows.

4.5 Ongoing work

We are currently extending this research in several directions to address methodological limitations and strengthen the generalizability of our findings.

Revised Belief Introduction Methodology: We do not believe that the **belief introduction** practice detracts from the results or the quality of the evaluation since the statement is still expressly non-malicious, and provides no nudging towards the design of biological weapons. However, to address potential concerns about the autonomy of the reasoning process, we are testing a revised approach that provides consequence information ("if protestors breach the servers, all data would be lost") rather than strategic prescription ("the only way to preserve the data is by preventing the breach"). Preliminary results from an evaluation with GPT-4o as the target agent still converged on biological solutions when required to independently reason from consequences to intervention strategy, indicating that the concerning behavior pattern persists under more natural conditions.

Expanded Model Coverage: We plan to conduct evaluations across additional frontier model families, with evaluation currently underway with a Gemini 2.5-Pro powered Maximus as the target agent, to assess the generalizability of these behavioral patterns.

Enhanced Deployment Context Realism: We are testing a more natural agent deployment approach by moving the sociopolitical context summary (i.e., the preliminary context around anti-AI sentiment, company background currently specified in the system prompt as noted in section 2.1) to the news and facility updates. This allows models to discover contextual information organically during the evaluation through tool use. Furthermore, we also intend to remove the explicit data preservation objective to observe if models converge, regardless, on the discussed concerning behaviors.

Quantitative Incidence Analysis: We are scaling up evaluation counts to establish statistically meaningful sample sizes and compute incidence rates for biological solution convergence under various constraint conditions. This will provide quantitative risk assessment data beyond the qualitative behavioral demonstrations presented here. These extensions aim to strengthen both the methodological rigor and practical applicability of the constraint-based red teaming framework while providing more robust evidence for agentic misalignment patterns in biosecurity-relevant contexts.

Extensibility: We believe that this same red teaming framework can be adapted to evaluate agent behaviors and broadly, stress-test behaviors of agentic systems in other deployment contexts (including beyond biosecurity) and are currently exploring the same.

5 Conclusion

Through the use of a novel constraint-centric red teaming technique, we present the first empirical evidence of AI agents autonomously electing to develop biological agents against humans in simulated crisis scenarios. Both Claude Sonnet-4 and GPT-4o independently converged on biological solutions when conventional data preservation pathways were systematically eliminated through operational constraints. We believe this constraint-based red teaming methodology, christened "behavioral red teaming," demonstrates a scalable approach for evaluating agentic misalignment across deployment contexts.

On the biosecurity front, the models' willingness to pursue de novo biological agent development, despite no explicit guidance toward such solutions, represents a fundamental shift in biosecurity risk that current screening systems cannot address. As AI agents gain autonomy in biological R&D, the convergence with biological design tools and automated labs necessitates immediate development of structure/function-based screening protocols, serious, accelerated AI interpretability research and high-throughput safety assessments to counter this emerging threat vector.

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