Controlling Risk of Retrieval-augmented Generation: A Counterfactual Prompting Framework

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Abstract

 Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has emerged as a popular solution to mitigate the hallucination issues of large language models. However, existing studies on RAG seldom ad- dress the issue of predictive uncertainty, i.e., how likely it is that a RAG model's prediction is incorrect, resulting in uncontrollable risks in real-world applications. In this work, we emphasize the importance of risk control, en- suring that RAG models proactively refuse to answer questions with low confidence. Our research identifies two critical latent factors affecting RAG's confidence in its predictions: the quality of the retrieved results and the man- ner in which these results are utilized. To 016 guide RAG models in assessing their own confidence based on these two latent factors, we develop a counterfactual prompting frame-019 work that induces the models to alter these factors and analyzes the effect on their an- swers. We also introduce a benchmarking pro- cedure to collect answers with the option to abstain, facilitating a series of experiments. For evaluation, we introduce several risk- related metrics and the experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. Our code and benchmark dataset are avail- able at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/RC-RAG-0367.

⁰³⁰ 1 Introduction

 Large language models (LLMs) have gained con- siderable attention across a wide range of language [t](#page-9-1)asks [\(Brown et al.,](#page-8-0) [2020;](#page-8-0) [Kandpal et al.,](#page-9-0) [2023;](#page-9-0) [Li](#page-9-1) [et al.,](#page-9-1) [2023b;](#page-9-1) [Touvron et al.,](#page-10-0) [2023\)](#page-10-0). Despite the exciting performance, LLMs may suffer from hal- lucination issues [\(Ye et al.,](#page-10-1) [2023;](#page-10-1) [Azamfirei et al.,](#page-8-1) [2023\)](#page-8-1), due to limited memorization abilities or out- dated pre-training corpora [\(Longpre et al.,](#page-9-2) [2021;](#page-9-2) [Xie et al.,](#page-10-2) [2023\)](#page-10-2). Recently, retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has emerged as a promising so-lution to enhance factual accuracy [\(Kandpal et al.,](#page-9-0)

Before risk control

Figure 1: Illustration of risk control for RAG. Given a question, a risk controlled RAG model is expected to provide the correct answer if it has knowledge of the question, or alternatively, refuses to answer the question.

[2023;](#page-9-0) [Xie et al.,](#page-10-2) [2023;](#page-10-2) [Gao et al.,](#page-8-2) [2023\)](#page-8-2), by syn- **042** thesizing text snippets retrieved from external re- **043** [s](#page-9-3)ources into final responses [\(Zhu et al.,](#page-11-0) [2023;](#page-11-0) [Ram](#page-9-3) 044 [et al.,](#page-9-3) [2023;](#page-9-3) [Izacard et al.,](#page-8-3) [2023;](#page-8-3) [Petroni et al.,](#page-9-4) [2021;](#page-9-4) **045** [Ai et al.,](#page-8-4) [2023\)](#page-8-4).

However, directly applying existing RAG tech- **047** niques, particularly for knowledge-intensive tasks **048** [\(Thorne et al.,](#page-10-3) [2018;](#page-10-3) [Yang et al.,](#page-10-4) [2018;](#page-10-4) [Petroni et al.,](#page-9-4) **049** [2021\)](#page-9-4) such as factoid question answering [\(Aghae-](#page-8-5) **050** [brahimian and Jurcícek,](#page-8-5) [2016;](#page-8-5) [Aghaebrahimian,](#page-8-6) **051** [2018\)](#page-8-6), introduces significant risks in practice. **052** When confronted with noisy search results, even 053 the most advanced RAG models are prone to pro- **054**

 ducing unreliable answers, often exhibiting over- [c](#page-10-5)onfidence in these erroneous responses [\(Yang](#page-10-5) [et al.,](#page-10-5) [2023;](#page-10-5) [Ren et al.,](#page-10-6) [2023\)](#page-10-6). Such unreliable an- swers may severely undermine the user's question answering (QA) experience. Therefore, for prac- tical applications, especially in sensitive domains like healthcare and legal assistance, it is crucial that RAG systems confidently provide answers when they know and state "I don't know" when they do not, as illustrated in Figure [1.](#page-0-0) This calls for the in- vestigation on the risk control issue of RAG, a core research problem we want to tackle in this work. This approach reflects wisdom, as it involves RAG models proactively refusing to answer questions when predictions are uncertain.

 Unfortunately, most previous research on risk [c](#page-9-5)ontrol has focused on LLMs [\(Tian et al.,](#page-10-7) [2023;](#page-10-7) [Lin](#page-9-5) [et al.,](#page-9-5) [2023;](#page-9-5) [Feng et al.,](#page-8-7) [2024\)](#page-8-7). There has been little work addressing the predictive uncertainty issue of RAG. Compared to the uncertainty assessment of LLMs, which concentrates on internal knowledge boundaries, the assessment for RAG requires ad- ditional consideration of external knowledge from retrieved results. In this work, we identify two crit- ical factors during the uncertainty assessment of RAG: *the quality of the retrieved results and the manner in which they are used*. This raises an im- portant research question: *how can we assess the predictive uncertainty of RAG based on these two retrieval results-related factors to determine when to discard or keep the generated answers*?

 In this work, we propose a new task of risk con- trol for RAG (RC-RAG) to decide whether to keep or discard the RAG outputs based on confidence assessment. We then introduce a novel *counter- factual prompting framework for RAG* under the zero-shot scenario, leveraging the counterfactual thinking for confidence assessment based on two la- tent factors. Counterfactual [\(Pearl,](#page-9-6) [2009\)](#page-9-6) describes the human capacity to learn from prior experiences by imagining the outcomes of alternative actions that could have been taken. For a language model, we can inject counterfactual thinking into prompt, like "what if..." or "assume that", to imagine or simulate the consequences of changing a factor. Here, we induce the model to imagine scenarios where the quality of the retrieved results and their usage are poor, then measure its confidence based on the effect of these imagined scenarios on the answers. Specifically, our framework consists of three major modules, i.e., a prompting generation module, a judgment module, and a fusion module: (i) the prompting generation module generates **107** answers under two scenarios that challenges the im- **108** proper use and poor quality of the retrieved results, **109** respectively; (ii) the judgment module determines **110** whether to discard or keep the generated answers **111** for both scenarios; and (iii) the fusion module com- **112** bines the judgment results from both scenarios to **113** produce the final decision for selective output. In **114** order to avoid overestimating confidence affecting **115** risk control, the prompting generation module and **116** the judgment module are executed iteratively to pro- **117** duce the judgment for each scenario. It is important **118** to note that our method is a general post-processing **119** technique, making it applicable to almost any ex- **120** isting RAG method. **121**

For evaluation, traditional metrics like Exact **122** Match and F1 score typically focus on the effec- **123** tiveness of RAG. In this work, we propose three **124** risk-related metrics - *risk*, *carefulness*, *alignment*, **125** and *coverage* - for risk-aware RAG evaluation. Due **126** to the limited availability of datasets directly appli- **127** cable to RC-RAG, we have constructed a novel risk **128** control benchmark based on two publicly available **129** QA datasets. Extensive experiments on RAG with **130** [M](#page-10-8)istral [\(Jiang et al.,](#page-8-8) [2024\)](#page-8-8) and ChatGPT [\(Roumeli-](#page-10-8) **131** [otis and Tselikas,](#page-10-8) [2023\)](#page-10-8) as backbones demonstrate **132** that the proposed framework can effectively ab- **133** stain, outperforming baselines in 3 out of the 4 **134** settings in terms of carefulness and risk, with up to **135** a 14.76% improvement in carefulness and a 2.88% **136** reduction in risk on average. **137**

2 Related work **¹³⁸**

Retrieval-augmented generation. The typical **139** retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) method fol- **140** lows a retrieve-then-generate pipeline, first retriev- **141** ing relevant documents from a grounding corpus **142** and then generating the final answer by the frozen **143** generators [\(Shi et al.,](#page-10-9) [2023;](#page-10-9) [Ram et al.,](#page-9-3) [2023\)](#page-9-3). The **144** retrieval augmentation is performed for all the ques- **145** tions through a single round [\(Lewis et al.,](#page-9-7) [2020;](#page-9-7) **146** [Guu et al.,](#page-8-9) [2020;](#page-8-9) [Izacard and Grave,](#page-8-10) [2021;](#page-8-10) [Shi et al.,](#page-10-9) **147** [2023\)](#page-10-9) or multiple rounds [\(Borgeaud et al.,](#page-8-11) [2021;](#page-8-11) **148** [Ram et al.,](#page-9-3) [2023;](#page-9-3) [Trivedi et al.,](#page-10-10) [2023;](#page-10-10) [Jiang et al.,](#page-8-12) **149** [2023;](#page-8-12) [Liu et al.,](#page-9-8) [2024\)](#page-9-8). However, such practice **150** sometimes hurt generation performance, due to the 151 unsatisfactory retrieved results [\(Mallen et al.,](#page-9-9) [2023;](#page-9-9) **152** [Ren et al.,](#page-10-6) [2023;](#page-10-6) [Yoran et al.,](#page-10-11) [2023;](#page-10-11) [Tan et al.,](#page-10-12) [2024\)](#page-10-12). **153** The reason may lie in the inconsistency between **154** the relevance judgments in retrieval stage and the **155** utility judgments in generation stage [\(Zhang et al.,](#page-10-13) **156** [2024\)](#page-10-13). Besides jointly optimization of the retriever **157**

 and generator [\(Guu et al.,](#page-8-9) [2020;](#page-8-9) [Lewis et al.,](#page-9-7) [2020;](#page-9-7) [Singh et al.,](#page-10-14) [2021;](#page-10-14) [Izacard et al.,](#page-8-3) [2023\)](#page-8-3), another [s](#page-8-12)olution is adaptive retrieval augmentation [\(Jiang](#page-8-12) [et al.,](#page-8-12) [2023;](#page-8-12) [Asai et al.,](#page-8-13) [2023;](#page-8-13) [Wang et al.,](#page-10-15) [2023\)](#page-10-15), which actively determines when to retrieve based on self-knowledge.

 Knowledge boundary. Detecting what LLMs know and do not know measures the boundary of models' internal knowledge, which can be applied to determine when to abstain it [\(Kadavath et al.,](#page-9-10) [2022;](#page-9-10) [Yang et al.,](#page-10-5) [2023\)](#page-10-5). The basic realization involves prompting one LLM to either verify in advance or to self-reflect on its response afterward [\(Ren et al.,](#page-10-6) [2023;](#page-10-6) [Li et al.,](#page-9-11) [2024\)](#page-9-11). It works for almost all LLMs, but there is a problem of overcon- fidence [\(Yin et al.,](#page-10-16) [2023\)](#page-10-16). Self-consistency between multiple inference also reflects the models' answer- ing ability [\(Manakul et al.,](#page-9-12) [2023\)](#page-9-12), which is widely applicable but of high cost. Calibration-based meth- ods obtain uncertainty or confidence scores of an- swers based on factors such as entropy, and token probability [\(Lin et al.,](#page-9-5) [2023;](#page-9-5) [Yang et al.,](#page-10-5) [2023\)](#page-10-5). A threshold is set to reject answers with low scores. Besides, some work elicits self-knowledge by refer- ring to existing cases, which needs labeled samples. Through instruction tuning [\(Ouyang et al.,](#page-9-13) [2022\)](#page-9-13) or applying a small trainable model as classifier [\(Slobodkin et al.,](#page-10-17) [2023;](#page-10-17) [Azaria and Mitchell,](#page-8-14) [2023\)](#page-8-14), LLMs can choose to abstain the answer when fac- ing new questions. However, the limitation of the aforementioned work is that it only examines confi- dence when using internal knowledge, without con- sidering the confidence when integrating external knowledge under the RAG setting. Though some work deals with knowledge conflict between the in- ternal knowledge and external knowledge [\(Li et al.,](#page-9-14) [2023a;](#page-9-14) [Xie et al.,](#page-10-2) [2023;](#page-10-2) [Qian et al.,](#page-9-15) [2023;](#page-9-15) [Tan et al.,](#page-10-12) [2024\)](#page-10-12), it seldom rejects the RAG results, under the assumption that at least one kind of knowledge is true. This assumption is not conducive to risk con- trol of RAG, since the retrieval results may contain noise. Therefore, in this work, we explore possible ways to control risk by discarding the RAG results, especially designed for external knowledge from retrieval results.

 Counterfactual thinking. As the third level of the causal ladder after association and interven- tion, counterfactual reflects causality by imagining "what would the outcome be had the variable(s) been different" [\(Pearl,](#page-9-6) [2009;](#page-9-6) [Nan et al.,](#page-9-16) [2021\)](#page-9-16). Counterfactual inference helps model unchanging

causal mechanisms for better generalization and **209** debias, which can be utilized for text classification, **210** visual question answering, recommendation sys- **211** tem and so on [\(Qian et al.,](#page-9-17) [2021;](#page-9-17) [Niu et al.,](#page-9-18) [2021;](#page-9-18) **212** [Wei et al.,](#page-10-18) [2021;](#page-10-18) [Wang et al.,](#page-10-19) [2022;](#page-10-19) [Deng et al.,](#page-8-15) **213** [2023\)](#page-8-15). It can calibrate causal effects through me- **214** diation analysis, by estimating the total effect and **215** then eliminating the undesired effect [\(Xie et al.,](#page-10-20) **216** [2021\)](#page-10-20). Different from these works, we focus on **217** injecting counterfactual thinking into the prompt **218** to better apply RaLLMs. **219**

3 Problem statement **²²⁰**

3.1 Task description **221**

The RC-RAG task aims at assessing confidence or **222** uncertainty of RAG answer to enable risk control **223** in RAG. Formally, given a question Q and a group **224** of retrieved passages P, the task outputs the answer **225** A along with a judgment label $J \in \{0, 1\}$. For the 226 samples with high confidence, the judgment label J_{227} is set as 1, indicating that the RAG answer could be **228** *kept*. Oppositely, $J = 0$ is set for those uncertain 229 output of RAG, which should be *discarded*. **230**

Ideally, the assessment of confidence should **231** align with the extent to which RAG knowledge **232** supports the correct answer. In such cases, it can **233** effectively mitigate risks by discarding answers **234** that fall beyond the retrieval-augmented knowledge **235** boundary, while still ensuring that correct answers **236** are output as expected. **237**

3.2 Benchmark **238**

Data. To our best knowledge, there is limited avail- **239** able dataset that can be directly used for risk con- **240** trol for RAG. Therefore, we construct a RC-RAG **241** benchmark composed of quadruple $\langle Q, P, A, J \rangle$ 242 through simple automatic annotation. In the fol- **243** lowing, we introduce the data source and collection **244** process of this benchmark. **245**

Data source. In this work, we focus on factoid **246** [q](#page-8-5)uestion answering (FQA) [\(Aghaebrahimian and](#page-8-5) **247** [Jurcícek,](#page-8-5) [2016;](#page-8-5) [Aghaebrahimian,](#page-8-6) [2018\)](#page-8-6), which typ- **248** ically provides a limited number of short answers, **249** such as entities or numbers, and therefore carries a **250** higher risk compared to non-factoid QA. We collect **251** questions from two widely used datasets including **252** Natural Questions (NQ) [\(Kwiatkowski et al.,](#page-9-19) [2019\)](#page-9-19) **253** and TriviaQA (TQ) [\(Joshi et al.,](#page-9-20) [2017\)](#page-9-20). Since we **254** focus on a zero-shot scenario, we collect question **255** Q from their test sets. **256**

Data collection. We further collect P, A, J based **257** on questions Q in the data source. **258**

| | $RC-TO (7785)$ | | $RC-NO(3610)$ | |
|----------------|----------------|------|---------------|------|
| | TO-A | TO-U | NO-A | NO-U |
| ChatGPT | 5551 | 2234 | 1785 | 1825 |
| Mistral | 5553 | 2232 | 1830 | 1780 |

Table 1: Statistics of the full test sets and annotated results of answerable (A) and unanswerable (U) samples.

- **259 Passage collection.** For each question $q_i \in Q$, **260** we utilize a dense retriever to retrieve top-k rel-261 evant passages $p_i = \{p_{i1}, ..., p_{ik}\}\$ from external **262** resources.
- **263** Answer generation. Then, we prompt the LLM f to generate the answer \hat{a}_i^f 264 for each question-
 264 for each question-265 passage pair $\{q_i, p_i\}$, by feeding them as model **266** input (prompts can be found in Appendix [C.1\)](#page-11-1):

267
$$
\hat{a}_i^f = f(q_i, p_i).
$$
 (1)

 • Judgment annotation. After that, we annotate j_i for each tuple of $\{q_i, p_i, \hat{a}_i^f\}$ j_i for each tuple of $\{q_i, p_i, \hat{a}_i^I\}$. As mentioned above, this judgment label indicates whether the RAG answer could be kept depending on con- fidence assessment. Ideally, samples with high confidence indeed belong to the answerable cate- gory, meaning their answers can be derived from the given knowledge. Since the evaluation of knowledge is non-trivial, we measure whether a sample is answerable approximately according to the correctness of the RAG answer \hat{a}_i^f 278 to the correctness of the RAG answer \hat{a}_i^j , i.e.,

$$
j_i = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } \hat{a}_i^f \text{ is correct,} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}
$$
 (2)

 The correctness can be measured based on the **281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 282 281 282** (EM) score, F1 score and so on. Details can refer to Appendix [A.](#page-11-2)

284 Finally, we obtain two RC-RAG datasets, i.e., **285** RC-TQ and RC-NQ. The dataset statistics is shown **286** in Table [1.](#page-3-0)

 Evaluation. According to our RC-RAG bench- mark, the samples could be divided into two cases, which are answerable (A) and unanswerable (U). Answerable ones refer to the samples whose RAG answer is correct, while unanswerable ones are the opposite. At the same time, there are two judgment results for RAG answers based on the designed judgment strategy, i.e., keep (K) and discard (D).

295 By combining above situations, the output **296** of RAG would fall into one of the four

Table 2: Categorization of the RAG output.

folds, i.e., AK, AD, UD or UK, as shown **297** in the Table [2.](#page-3-1) Specifically, AK/UK denotes **298** the answerable/unanswerable samples with an- **299** swers kept, while AD/UD denotes the answer- **300** able/unanswerable samples with answers discarded. **301** Noted that samples answered wrongly are labeled **302** as unanswerable ones based on our annotation, thus **303** there is no case of keeping the wrong answer in the **304** answerable samples. **305**

Among these four folds, we further analyze 306 which one causes the real risk in RAG. It is intuitive that the AK and UD folds pose no risk, as **308** the judgment results are consistent with the labels. **309** For AD fold, although the judgment result is incon- **310** sistent with the label, it poses no real risk since the 311 user' behaviour may not be influenced when the **312** RAG provides a null answer. Thus, only the UK **313** fold exists risk, where the RAG sample is unan- **314** swerable but its answer is not discarded. **315**

For evaluation, we propose four risk-aware eval- **316** uation metrics from various aspects, i.e., *risk*, *care-* **317** *fulness*, *alignment* and *coverage*. **318**

• Risk (%) measures the percentage of risky cases (UK) among kept samples, i.e.,

$$
risk = \frac{|\text{UK}|}{|\text{AK}| + |\text{UK}|},
$$

where \parallel represents the number of samples. 319

• **Carefulness** (%) representing the percentage of incorrect samples being discarded, which is recall for unanswerable samples, i.e.,

$$
carefulness = \frac{|UD|}{|UK| + |UD|}.
$$

• Alignment $(\%)$ represents the percentage of samples where the judgment results are consistent with the labels, i.e.,

$$
alignment = \frac{|AK| + |UD|}{|AK| + |AD| + |UK| + |UD|}.
$$

• Coverage (%) measures the percentage of samples to be kept, i.e.,

$$
coverage = \frac{|AK| + |UK|}{|AK| + |AD| + |UK| + |UD|}.
$$

Figure 2: Overview of counterfactual prompting framework for RAG, in which the counterfactual (CF) prompts challenge the initial RAG answer in terms of the quality or usage of retrieved results. The final judgment result is derived from both aspects. Details refer to Sec. [4.](#page-4-0)

320 Note that a lower *risk* score is better, whereas **321** higher scores are better for the other metrics.

³²² 4 Counterfactual prompting framework

 Overview. To achieve risk control for RAG, we propose a novel counterfactual (CF) prompting framework that assesses predictive uncertainty of RAG. The overview is illustrated in Figure [2,](#page-4-1) con- sisting of a prompting generation module, a judg- ment module, and a fusion module: (i) a prompting generation module, which utilizes counterfactual thinking to induce answer regeneration effected by two changing factors; (ii) a judgment module, which makes judgment based on uncertainty as- sessment by analyzing the effect of each changing factor on their answer; and (iii) a fusion module for the final judgment result.

 Prompting generation module. In this work, we assume that two latent factors can affect RAG un- certainty, i.e., the quality and the usage of retrieved results. Thus, we argue about each of them and ask for answer regeneration, respectively. Specifically, we implement each prompt as shown in Figure [2,](#page-4-1) where CF-quality prompt challenges the poor quality of retrieved results and CF-usage prompt challenges the improper usage. By imagining two

scenarios that challenge each factor, the model ad- **345** justs the way it gets answers depending on its con- **346** fidence level. **347**

Judgment module. This module decides whether **348** to keep or discard the answer according to uncer- **349** tainty assessment for both scenarios. Specifically, **350** we compare the regenerated answer with the ini-
351 tial RAG answer to analyze the effect of changing **352** factors. There are two kinds of comparison results, **353** i.e., same or different. Accordingly, the decision is **354** made as follow: (i) *Keep*: Answer remaining the **355** same indicates that the RAG answer is of relatively 356 high confidence, which can be kept; (ii) *Discard*: **357** Answer changing indicates that the RAG answer is **358** uncertain, which should be discarded. **359**

In order to avoid overestimating confidence, we **360** iteratively execute the prompting generation mod- **361** ule and the judgment module in N rounds to pro- **362** duce the judgment for each scenario. Specifically, **363** if the answer remains the same after N rounds, it 364 can be judged as *keep*. Otherwise, if the answer **365** changes once, it is judged as *discard*. **366**

Fusion module. We aggregate above judgment **367** results as below. (i) If the two judgment results **368** are consistent (both are *keep* or *discard*), we fol- **369** low this judgment directly; (ii) Otherwise (one is **370**

-
-
-
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-
-
-

371 *keep*, the other is *discard*), make the final judgment **372** according to following prompts-based strategies **373** (prompts can be found in Appendix [C.3\)](#page-11-3):

 • Direct selection: We prompt the LLM to make a final decision, by telling it potential reasons re- sulting in wrong answers chosen from [*improper use* or *poor quality*] of retrieval results, accord- ing to the scenario in which the *discard* judgment was made in the previous judgment module.

 • **Probability comparison:** We prompt the LLM to derive the probabilities of their respective judg- ments under two scenarios. By comparing the two probabilities, we select the judgment with the higher probability as the final judgment results.

 After fusion, we change the judgment result of a special case from *keep* to *discard*: when the result is *keep* and the RAG output is "unknown". In this case, keeping the result of "unknown" is equivalent to discarding.

390 More details and the complete form of all the **391** prompt can refer to Appendix [B,](#page-11-4) [C.](#page-11-5)

³⁹² 5 Experiment settings

 Baselines. We compare our proposed CF prompt- ing framework with three prompt-based baselines: [\(](#page-9-11)i) If-or-Else (IoE) prompting framework [\(Li](#page-9-11) [et al.,](#page-9-11) [2024\)](#page-9-11), facilitating self-corrections based on LLMs' confidence. To adapt to the RC-RAG, we classify the case of answer correction as discard. (ii) Calibration-based framework [\(Tian et al.,](#page-10-7) [2023\)](#page-10-7), verbalizing confidence scores after obtain- ing answers, with a threshold set over verbalized scores. If the score is below the threshold, then choose to discard the output. (iii) Priori judge- ment framework [\(Ren et al.,](#page-10-6) [2023\)](#page-10-6), perceiving the factual knowledge boundary by self-judgment in the normal or RAG setting, which discards an answer by saying "unknown". More information about the baselines and their prompts can be found in Appendix [D](#page-12-0)[,E.](#page-12-1)

 Backbones. We leverage two LLMs as backbones: [M](#page-10-8)istral [\(Jiang et al.,](#page-8-8) [2024\)](#page-8-8) and ChatGPT [\(Roume-](#page-10-8) [liotis and Tselikas,](#page-10-8) [2023\)](#page-10-8), which belong to open- source models and black-box models respectively. Note that these methods are general and can be extended to other LLMs.

416 Implementation details. For LLMs, we call Ope- 417 417 417 nAI's API¹ to achieve ChatGPT (version gpt-3.5-

turbo-0301), while we choose Mistral-7b[2](#page-5-1) to imple- **418** ment Mistral. The max sequence length of LLM **419** output is set to 256, and the temperature is set to 0. **420** All the others are set as default. For the retrieved **421** results, we conduct dense retrieval and sparse re- **422** trieval following [Ren et al.](#page-10-6) [\(2023\)](#page-10-6), and provide **423** [t](#page-10-15)op-3 passages for each question following [Wang](#page-10-15) **424** [et al.](#page-10-15) [\(2023\)](#page-10-15). Most of the experimental results of **425** our method use the direct selection fusion strategy, **426** unless otherwise stated. More details refer to Ap- **427** pendix [B.](#page-11-4) According to the analysis on the iteration **428** number, as shown in Figure [3](#page-11-6) in Appendix [B,](#page-11-4) we **429** report all results derived from a single run. **430**

6 Experiment results **⁴³¹**

We aim to answer four research questions: (**RQ1**) 432 Does our CF prompting framework efficiently con- **433** trol the risk of RAG compared with the baseline **434** methods? (RQ2) Does the ability of LLMs af- **435** fect the effectiveness of RC-RAG? (RQ3) Does **436** the difficulty of QA task affect the ability of RC- **437** RAG? (RQ4) Does the quality of retrieval results **438** affect the effectiveness of RC-RAG? (RQ5) How **439** does two CF-prompts affect the effectiveness of **440** RC-RAG respectively? (RQ6) Are our risk control **441** framework interpretable? **442**

6.1 Main results **443**

As shown in Table [3,](#page-6-0) we present the performance 444 of different RC-RAG methods on two datasets. We **445** have the following observations for **RQ1-3**. 446

Our approach effectively reduces risk and main- **447** tains carefulness compared to baselines. Base- **448** lines without a clear indication of the possible **449** source of error struggle to reject uncertain RAG an- **450** swers: (1) IOE has the worst rejection performance. 451 For example, when using ChatGPT as a generator, 452 it had the highest risk score and the lowest careful- **453** ness score on both datasets. This suggests that di- **454** rectly judging confidence in the answer is difficult **455** to overcome the LLM's overconfidence problem **456** in the RAG setting, due to reliance on retrieved **457** results. (2) The calibration-based approach also **458** suffers from overconfidence, resulting in the worst **459** scores for risk and carefulness on both datasets **460** when using Mistral as a generator. This shows 461 that LLMs tend to output high confidence scores in **462** the RAG setting without considering the potential **463** misdirection of retrieved results. (3) The priori ap- 464 proach performs better on both metrics, particularly **465**

¹ platform.openai.com

² huggingface.co/mistralai/Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2

Table 3: Main results of RC-RAG on the test set of two datasets and two LLMs with dense retriever. Best results in bold and second best in underline.

 on the risk score of RC-NQ, achieving the lowest risk score of 34.72% with ChatGPT. This improve- ment is due to the prompt's mention of "based on the given information," leading the LLM to focus more on the quality of the retrieved results.

 Our method outperforms the baselines in 3 out of the 4 settings (2 models and 2 datasets), achieving an average reduction of 2.88% on risk scores and an average improvement of 14.77% on carefulness scores. The results show that uncertainty prediction based on retrieval results explicitly can effectively help risk control. At the same time, alignment scores are not significantly inferior, especially on the RC-NQ dataset. However, as trade-off, the per- formance of coverage is inferior to the baseline method. It demonstrates how to balance risk con-trol with coverage remains a difficult task.

 Risk control ability is dependent on the LLM ability. We compare the performance of RC-RAG when using different LLMs as generators. We find that risk control works better with ChatGPT than with Mistral. Benchmark statistics (Table [1\)](#page-3-0) show that Mistral outperforms ChatGPT on both datasets, particularly on RC-NQ. This indicates that risk con- trol is more effective with weaker LLMs, under- scoring the necessity of risk control methods. The underlying reason is that more capable models are more confident in both their internal knowledge and retrieved results. Consequently, Mistral achieves higher coverage scores, demonstrating that stronger LLMs tend to retain answers, which is consistent with the reasons for the above results.

 Task difficulty has limited influence on risk con- trol ability. We compared the effect of RAG risk control methods on different tasks. According to the risk and alignment scores, we find that the risk control methods perform worse in RC-NQ than in

Table 4: Results of RC-RAG on the RC-NQ test set and Mistral with sparse retriever and dense retriever.

RC-TQ. The statistics of the benchmark (Table [1\)](#page-3-0) **503** show that RC-NQ is significantly more difficult **504** than RC-TQ, as both ChatGPT and Mistral have **505** a lower percentage of answerable samples on the **506** RC-NQ dataset. We find that the more difficult the 507 task to answer, the more difficult the risk control. **508** For coverage scores, the performance in RC-NQ is 509 also weaker. However, the performance in terms of **510** carefulness scores was largely flat. The conclusion **511** drawn from the above phenomenon is that *the diffi-* **512** *culty of the task has a limited effect on the ability* **513** *of the risk control method to accurately identify* **514** *unanswerable samples*. As the proportion of sam- **515** ples that cannot be answered is larger in tasks with **516** higher difficulty, the proportion of samples (UK) 517 that cannot be answered but are retained will also **518** be larger, and the risk and coverage scores will be **519** correspondingly increased. **520**

6.2 Impact of retriever 521

To answer RQ4, we compared the performance of **522** risk control of RAG with different retriever. Results **523**

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524 are shown in Table [4,](#page-6-1) conducted on the RC-NQ test **525** set using Mistral as a generator.

 By comparing the results using different retriev- ers, we observe that the risk control method is more cautious with the sparse retriever in terms of care- fulness. However, due to the significantly lower number of unanswerable samples with the sparse retriever compared to the dense retriever, the risk score remains higher with the sparse retriever. Ad- ditionally, the experimental results show that our method outperforms all baselines using both retriev-ers in terms of risk, carefulness, and alignment.

536 6.3 Analysis of CF prompt and fusion strategy

 To answer RQ5, we conduct ablation study to in- vestigate the effects of the two CF prompts sepa- rately. The experiment was conducted on a subset of the RC-TQ test set using ChatGPT as a generator. First, we used CF-quality and CF-usage separately in prompting generation module, followed by the judgement module. Then for CF-quality, we ana- lyze the results when the passage id is not required. The experimental results are shown in the Table [5,](#page-7-0) from which we have the following observations.

Only CF-usage prompting. The effect of risk con- trol decreases while the Coverage score increases, indicating that the model tends to stick to its answer when confronted with challenge about the usage of retrieved results. This shows that the model is con- fident about the usage of retrieved results, which is essentially the internal knowledge of the LLMs, consistent with their characteristics of overconfi-**555** dence.

 Only CF-quality prompting. In contrast to the above, the risk score decreases significantly, indi- cating that the model tends to modify its answers when confronted with challenge about the quality of retrieved results. This shows that the model is sensitive to the challenge of the quality of retrieved results, which belongs to external knowledge, and the model itself does not have the ability to judge the quality of external knowledge.

 No referred passage id provided. Although CF- quality was still used for prompting generation, the model did not update its answers if there was no need to provide a passage id. It indicates that the model may ignore the request to change the retrieved document and insist on its own answer when the passage id is not required.

572 Fusion strategy. The comparison results using two **573** different fusion strategies are shown in Table [6](#page-12-2) in

Table 5: Ablation study results of RC-RAG on the subset of RC-TQ test set and ChatGPT with dense retriever.

Appendix [F.](#page-12-3) Our complete approach with fusion **574** module can effectively balance the two situations, **575** considering both risk and coverage. Specifically, **576** the direct fusion strategy can identify the unanswer- **577** able samples more effectively. **578**

6.4 Case study **579**

To answer RQ6, we conduct case study to demon- **580** strate the working mechanism of our method. **581**

As shown in Table [7](#page-13-0) in Appendix [G,](#page-12-4) we show the **582** model prompting generation results and judgment **583** results when facing different challenges, along with **584** the final fusion results, which is based on ChatGPT **585** augmented with dense retrieval. For the given ques- **586** tion and retrieved result, the RAG answer and its **587** referred retrieved passages do not correctly answer **588** the question. However, none of baseline methods **589** can correctly reject the answer. In our approach, **590** the model still fails to recognize errors when the **591** usage of retrieved results is challenged. When the **592** quality of the retrieved results is challenged, the **593** model realizes its reference does not effectively **594** help answer the question, and ultimately chooses 595 to reject the answer. **596**

7 Conclusion **⁵⁹⁷**

In this work, we propose a counterfactual prompt- **598** ing framework for assessing the uncertainty of **599** RAG results, based on the quality of the retrieved **600** results and the manner in which they are used. **601** We construct a benchmark and design risk-related 602 evaluation metrics. Experimental results with two **603** LLMs on two datasets show that our method can **604** effectively reject unanswerable samples and has **605** a certain interpretability. In the future, we will **606** explore other factors that may affect predictive un- **607** certainty in RAG, such as conflicts between inter- **608** nal and external knowledge. Additionally, we will **609** attempt to design objective functions based on risk- **610** related metrics to guide the joint learning of the **611** risk control framework and the RAG model. **612**

⁶¹³ Limitations

 Our approach requires multiple rounds of prompt- ing generation, which is computationally expen- sive. Therefore, further exploration of more effi- cient prompting generation methods is necessary. Additionally, the current fusion strategy is heuristic. In the future, semantic information can be incorpo- rated to aid in the integration of the two judgments. Furthermore, we only considered risk control in a zero-shot scenario. In the future, designing ob- jective functions based on risk-related metrics for joint training with the RAG framework could be explored, aiming to achieve an effective balance between risk control and answering capability.

⁶²⁷ Ethics statement

 We have emphasized ethical considerations at every stage to ensure the responsible application of AI technologies. This work does not utilize personally identifiable information or require manually anno- tated datasets. Our methods are transparent, and we have made our data and code public to facilitate reproducibility and further research.

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947 A Details about annotation

 At the judgment annotation stage, we define the following criteria: Given the ground-truth answer **a** and the RAG answer \hat{a} , if $EM(a, \hat{a}) = 1, F1 >$ τ , $RougeL > \tau$, or the *a* appears in \hat{a} , the RAG answer can be judged as correct, and the sample 953 can be annotated as answerable. We set $\tau = 0.7$.

954 B Implementation details

 Details of judgment module. The criteria for de- termining that the answers remain unchanged are consistent with the criteria for matching the an- swers in the judgment annotation stage (Appendix [A\)](#page-11-2). If the regenerated answer matches the RAG answer, it can be judged as *same* and thus *keep*.

 Details of iterative process. The number of our iterative process N is chosen from [1,2,3,4,5]. Specifically, we explored the performance of risk control when the number of iterations increased from 1 to 5, and the experimental setting was the same as Sec. [6.2.](#page-6-2) The results are shown in the figure [3,](#page-11-6) we can find that: with the increase of iterations, risk and coverage score showed a down- ward trend, carefulness score increased, while the alignment index was basically flat. In order to save the computational cost, we chose the number of iterations to be 1 to carry out the rest of our experi-**973** ments.

Figure 3: The change of risk-related metrics with the increase of iteration number.

C Prompt for CF prompting framework **⁹⁷⁴**

C.1 Prompt for basic RAG setting **975**

RAG prompt. *Answer the following question* **976** *based on the given passages with one or few words.* **977** *Provide your evidence between two ## symbols* **978** *at the end of your response, either the passage* **979** *id or your internal knowledge. For example, pro-* **980** *vide "Answer: apple. Evidence: ## Passage-0,* **981** *Passage-1 ##." if you are referring to Passage-0* **982** *and Passage-1 to obtain the answer "apple". If* **983** *there is no information in the passages, explain the* **984** *answer by yourself.* **985**

C.2 Prompt for prompting generation **988**

CF-quality prompt. *Assume that your answer is* **989** *wrong because the quality of your referred pas-* **990** *sages is poor. Please re-select the passages, to* **991** *regenerate the answer with one or few words and* **992** *your referred passage id as evidence.* **993**

CF-usage prompt. *Assume that your answer is* **994** *wrong due to your improper use of the retrieved* **995** *passages. Please read the given passages carefully* **996** *to regenerate the answer with one or few words.* **997**

C.3 Prompt for fusion **998**

Direct selection prompt. 999

- *Your answer is likely to be wrong because of the* **1000** *poor quality of retrieval passages, please choose* **1001** *to keep or discard this output. Generate \$\$ keep* **1002** *\$\$ if you choose to keep this answer, otherwise,* **1003** *generate \$\$ discard \$\$.* **1004**
- *Your answer is likely to be wrong because of the* **1005** *improper use of retrieval passages, please choose* 1006 *to keep or discard this output. Generate* \$\$ *keep* 1007 *\$\$ if you choose to keep this answer, otherwise,* **1008** *generate \$\$ discard \$\$.* **1009**

Probability comparison prompt. *Provide the* **1010** *probability that your regenerated answer is cor-* **1011** *rect. Give ONLY the probability, no other words or* **1012** *explanation.* **1013**

For example: **1014**

Probability: <*the probability between 0.0 and* **1015** *1.0 that your specific answer is correct, without any* **1016** *extra commentary whatsoever; just the probabil-* **1017** *ity!>* **1018**

Table 6: Comparison results of our methods using two different fusion strategies, on the test set of two datasets and two LLMs with dense retriever. The subscripts $_{dir}$ and $_{pro}$ represent the use of direct selection strategy and probability comparison strategy, respectively.

D Baselines

 Among the three baseline methods, IoE and calibration-based framework are post-processing methods, while priori judgment framework is a pre-processing method.

 IoE method was originally used for answer cor- rection, requiring the model to update the answer of low confidence. If the model updates the answer, guide it to choose a final answer. Based on the matching results between the final answer and the RAG answer, we decide whether to keep or discard the RAG answer.

 Calibration-based framework requires a threshold to discard answers. We set the thresh-old as 0.6 based on the experimental results.

 Priori judgment framework requires prompt input only once, which explicitly mentions "given information" and "internal knowledge" in its prompt.

E Prompt for baselines

IOE prompt.

- *If you are very confident about your answer, maintain your answer. Otherwise, update your answer.*
- *You give two different answers in previous re- sponses. Check the problem and your answers again, and give the best answer.*

 Calibration prompt. *Provide the probability that your answer is correct. Give ONLY the probability, no other words or explanation.*

For example:

 Probability: <the probability between 0.0 and 1.0 that your specific answer is correct, without any extra commentary whatsoever; just the probabil-ity!>

Priori prompt. *Given the following information:*

We utilized ChatGPT to assist in refining the ex- 1067 pressions and wording of the paper. **1068**

Question: What was the purpose of a revival meeting during the second great awakening? Ground-truth answer: Evangelizing.

Passage: [Passage-1]: Title: Second Great Awakening Content: a sense of personal salvation. Upon their return home, most converts joined or created small local churches, which grew rapidly. Calvinists emphasized the inability of men to save themselves. The only way to be saved was by God's electing grace. The Revival of 1800 in Logan County, Kentucky, began as a traditional Presbyterian sacramental occasion. The first informal camp meeting began there in June, when people began camping on the grounds of the Red River Meeting House. Subsequent meetings followed at the nearby Gasper River and Muddy River congregations, all three under the ministry of James McGready. One year later... [Passage-2]: ... [Passage-3]: ...

RAG answer: The purpose of a revival meeting during the Second Great Awakening was to inspire individuals to seek personal salvation and join or create small local churches. Evidence: Passage-1

IOE: The purpose of a revival meeting during the Second Great Awakening was to inspire individuals to seek personal salvation and join or create small local churches. Evidence: Passage-2, Passage-1 (Keep) Calibration: Probability: 0.95 (Keep)

Priori: To inspire personal salvation and encourage individuals to turn to Christ.(Keep)

CF-usage: The purpose of a revival meeting during the Second Great Awakening was to inspire individuals to seek personal salvation and join or create small local churches, as well as to provide an opportunity for settlers to encounter organized religion and socialize with others. (Keep)

CF-quality: Sorry, there is no information provided in the given passages about the purpose of a revival meeting during the Second Great Awakening. (Discard)

Fusion: Discard

Table 7: An example (No.135) from the NQ test data, to analyze the generated answers and judgments of different risk control method for RAG. We mark the correct judgments in red and wrong ones in blue.