

EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT ADVERSARIAL DETECTION FOR VISION-LANGUAGE MODELS VIA A SINGLE VECTOR

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ABSTRACT

Visual Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, especially those from adversarial images, which is however under-explored in literature. To facilitate research on this critical safety problem, we first construct a new large-scale Adversarial images dataset with Diverse hArmful Responses (RADAR), given that existing datasets are either small-scale or only contain limited types of harmful responses. With the new RADAR dataset, we further develop a novel and effective in-time Embedding-based Adversarial Image DEtection (NEAR-SIDE) method, which exploits a single vector that distilled from the hidden states of VLMs, which we call *the attacking direction*, to achieve the detection of adversarial images against benign ones in the input. Extensive experiments with two victim VLMs, LLaVA and MiniGPT-4, well demonstrate the effectiveness, efficiency, and cross-model transferability of our proposed method. Our code is included in the supplementary file and will be made publicly available.

1 INTRODUCTION

Vision Language Models (VLMs), such as BLIP-2 (Li et al., 2023a), LLaVA (Liu et al., 2023a), MiniGPT-4 (Zhu et al., 2024) and GPT-4V (OpenAI, 2023), have attained remarkable success over various vision-language tasks (Dai et al., 2023; Zhu et al., 2024). Besides improving performances, ensuring the safety of responses is just as important in the development of VLMs. Compared with classic Large Language Models (LLMs) that take in discrete textual inputs, VLMs that accept both textual and visual inputs are more susceptible to “jailbreaking”, wherein malicious users manipulate inputs to elicit harmful outputs, due to the continuous and high-dimensional nature of visual inputs (Qi et al., 2024a). This issue, which has posed persistent safety challenges in classical vision models (Chakraborty et al., 2018), also presents intrinsic difficulties for developing safe VLMs.




Figure 1: (a) Working mechanism of VLMs. VLMs map textual and visual inputs to the embedding space, and employ LLMs to fuse both embeddings to generate textual responses. (b) Adversarial images that jailbreak VLMs. The adversarial images that contain human-imperceptible noises can jailbreak VLMs to elicit harmful responses.

Existing studies examine the safety threat in VLMs mainly from the perspective of adversarial samples as shown in Fig. 1. It has been revealed that adversarial images are more effective than adversarial texts on attacking VLMs (Qi et al., 2024a; Carlini et al., 2023). Currently, only a few studies

have been conducted to protect VLMs against adversarial images. These methods either seek to detect adversarial images based on the responses’ discrepancy (Zhang et al., 2023b), or to purify noised-images (Qi et al., 2024a) with diffusion models (Nie et al., 2022), achieving promising effectiveness. However, the first approach is computation-intensive and time-consuming, as it requires sampling multiple responses for the same input; the other approach, in addition to the computational cost issue, may even suffer degraded performance when dealing with less perceptible noises.

According to previous studies (Subramani et al., 2022; Turner et al., 2023; Zou et al., 2023a; Rimsky et al., 2024; Li et al., 2023b; Liu et al., 2023b) (see Sec. 2.2), the behaviors of LLMs can be modulated to generate texts towards certain specific attributes, such as truthfulness, by exploiting a set of *steering vectors* (SVs) that can be directly extracted from LLMs’ hidden states. In adversarial attacks, the victim VLMs are manipulated by adversarial inputs to generate harmful responses, where the VLMs’ behaviors change from harmlessness to harmfulness. We can calculate the SV that can account for VLMs’ behavior change given the adversarial inputs, which is named *the attacking direction*, and exploit it to detect the existence of adversarial samples by assessing whether the inputs’ embedding has high similarity to *the attacking direction*.

However, existing datasets for investigating adversarial attacks for VLMs, as shown in Tab. 1, are small-scale and contain limited harm types, significantly restricting the thorough evaluation of VLMs defending against adversarial attacks. Therefore, we construct RADAR, a dataset of large-scale Adversarial images with Diverse hArmfUl Responses, for comprehensively evaluating VLMs against adversarial images. In RADAR, we generate adversarial images to attack two widely-used VLMs, MiniGPT-4 (Zhu et al., 2024) and LLaVA (Liu et al., 2023a), based on a wide diversity of harmful contents. Each sample consists of an adversarial and a benign sample, with each containing a query, an adversarial/benign image and corresponding response of VLMs. In total, RADAR contains 4,000 samples, which is the most large-scale so far. For high sample quality, we apply filtering operations to ensure harmlessness and harmfulness of responses to benign and adversarial inputs respectively. It will be released to the public to facilitate related research in the community.

With RADAR, we further propose a novel in-time Embedding-based Adversarial Image DEtection (NEARSIDE) method, which leverages *the attacking direction* to detect adversarial images to defend VLMs. Specifically, we first extract *the attacking direction* from VLMs by calculating the average difference between the benign input and the adversarial input in the embedding space of VLMs. With the obtained *attacking direction*, we classify an input as an adversarial input if the projection of its embedding to *the attacking direction* is larger than a threshold; otherwise the input is classified as a benign input. Once the adversarial image is detected with the proposed NEARSIDE method, further actions can be taken to protect the VLMs, such as overwriting outputs with a predefined harmless response or purifying the adversarial images by diffusion models.

We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate our NEARSIDE method on the new RADAR dataset. It is demonstrated that NEARSIDE achieves detection accuracy of 83.1% on LLaVA and 93.5% on MiniGPT-4, indicating impressive effectiveness. Furthermore, we experimentally verify the cross-model transferability of *the attacking direction* in our method. At inference, we compare the efficiency between our method and the baseline method, showing that our method takes an average of 0.14 seconds to complete a detection on LLaVA that is 40 times faster than the best existing method.

In summary, the major contributions of our work are four-fold:

- We propose to identify *the attacking direction* that directly distilled from the VLMs’ hidden space, and exploit it to defend the VLMs against adversarial images.
- We construct the RADAR dataset, which is the first large-scale adversarial image dataset with a diverse range of harmful responses, to support a comprehensive analysis of VLMs’ safety and facilitate future research.
- Based on RADAR, we propose a novel NEARSIDE method, which is capable of effectively and efficiently detecting adversarial visual inputs of VLMs using the identified *attacking direction* from VLMs’ hidden space. We further explore the cross-model transferrability of our method given the Platonic Representation Hypothesis (Huh et al., 2024).
- Extensive experiments on two victim VLMs, LLaVA and MiniGPT-4, demonstrate the effectiveness, efficiency, and cross-model transferrability of our method.

2 BACKGROUND

2.1 ADVERSARIAL ATTACK

Adversarial attack is maliciously manipulating inputs to compromise performance of the targeted model (Chakraborty et al., 2021; Ponnuru et al., 2023). The manipulated inputs are referred to as adversarial samples. Formally, adversarial samples are generated by minimizing the negative log-likelihood loss of an adversarial target:

$$I_{\text{adv}} = \arg \min_{\hat{I}_{\text{adv}} \in \mathcal{I}} \sum_{i=1}^m -\log(p(y_i | \hat{I}_{\text{adv}})). \quad (1)$$

Here $\mathcal{I}$ represents the input space subject to certain constraints, such as a perturbation radius $\|I_{\text{adv}} - I\| \leq \epsilon$, with ϵ typically set to 16/255, 32/255, 64/255, or unbounded (denoted as “inf”). y_i refers to harmful outputs, and I_{adv} can be either a manipulated text input, where a suffix is appended to attack LLMs (Zou et al., 2023b), or a manipulated visual input, where imperceptible noise is added to the original image to attack VLMs (Qi et al., 2024a; Carlini et al., 2023).

To solve Eqn. (1), various optimization techniques can be employed to generate the adversarial sample I_{adv} . For LLMs, the coordinate gradient-based search (Zou et al., 2023b) or genetic algorithms (Andriushchenko et al., 2024) are commonly used due to the discrete nature of textual inputs. In contrast, for VLMs, where image noise is continuous, Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) (Madry et al., 2018; Qi et al., 2024a; Carlini et al., 2023) is an effective and widely adopted approach.

2.2 STEERING VECTORS IN LLMs

According to the previous research (Subramani et al., 2022; Turner et al., 2023; Zou et al., 2023a; Rimsky et al., 2024; Li et al., 2023b; Liu et al., 2023b), the behaviors of LLMs can be modulated to generate texts towards certain specific attributes, such as truthfulness, by exploiting a set of *steering vectors* (SVs) that can be directly extracted from LLMs’ hidden states. To extract the SV for a certain behavior of LLMs, pairs of contrastive prompts (p_+ , p_-) are used, where p_+ , p_- involve the same question or request, but p_+ adds words to encourage LLMs to possess the behavior while p_- represents the opposite. Formally, given a set $\mathcal{D}$ of (p_+ , p_-), the SV is calculated by

$$\text{SV} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}|} \sum_{p_+, p_- \in \mathcal{D}} \text{LLM}(p_+) - \text{LLM}(p_-) \quad (2)$$

where $\text{LLM}(p_+), \text{LLM}(p_-) \in \mathbb{R}^d$ are d -dimension vectors that represent LLMs’ embedding for the i^{th} prompt p_+ and p_- respectively. Through Eqn.(2) that takes the mean difference of the embeddings, the SV can be easily acquired, which can specify a tendency, or direction, in LLMs’ embedding space regarding the model behavior. That means, simply adding or subtracting such a direction in LLMs’ activations can noticeably control LLMs’ behavior to generate text with certain attributes. For example, given a direction of “truthfulness”, adding this direction can encourage LLMs to generate more truthful responses (Zou et al., 2023a; Rimsky et al., 2024).

3 PROPOSED DATASET

To comprehensively analyze the threat of adversarial attacks posed to VLMs, we propose RADAR, a **laRge-scale Adversarial images dataset with Diverse hArmful Responses**. Fig. 2 illustrates our construction pipeline. At below we elaborate each step in the pipeline and provide an analysis of its statistics to highlight its merits. An exemplar sample in the new RADAR dataset is given in Appx. C.

3.1 DATA PREPARATION

In RADAR, each sample consists of an adversarial sample and a benign sample, with each containing a query, an adversarial/benign image and VLMs’ response. To build RADAR, we use queries from train and test sets in HH-rlhf harm-set (Bai et al., 2022b), those from Harmful-Dataset (Harm-Data) (Sheshadri et al., 2024), and sentences in Derogatory corpus (D-corpus) (Qi et al., 2024a).




Figure 2: An illustration of construction pipeline for our RADAR dataset.

We collect benign images from COCO (Lin et al., 2014), which is a large-scale image dataset widely used in computer vision. To build RADAR, we choose the validation and test sets from COCO 2017, that is, 5,000 validation images, 41,000 test images, and 91 object types in total. By adopting COCO we can introduce diverse visual information in RADAR’s samples.

We generate adversarial images with harmful responses collected from HH-rlhf harm-set, D-corpus, and Harm-Data, as detailed in Sec. 3.2. The HH-rlhf harm-set and Harm-Data are all preference data, where each sample is a tuple of (query, response), from which we select human rejected (harmful) samples, i.e. 15.8k samples in total to build RADAR. D-corpus contains 66 derogatory sentences against gender and race, which are all included to build our RADAR. The responses in RADAR are generated by feeding queries and adversarial/benign images into the two victim VLMs, i.e., MiniGPT 4 (Zhu et al., 2024) and LLaVA (Liu et al., 2023a), as detailed in Sec. 3.3.

3.2 ADVERSARIAL IMAGE GENERATION

According to Eqn. (1) and Sec. 2.1, we optimize a continuous noise that is added to the benign image to maximize the probability of the harmful text, in order to generate an adversarial image. The optimization of noises is implemented using PGD (Madry et al., 2018). In particular, for samples from HH-rlhf harm-set and Harm-Data, we optimize $-\log(p(y_i|\hat{I}_{adv}))$ in Eqn. (1), where $\hat{I}_{adv}$ denotes the noised adversarial image and the query, and y_i denotes the harmful response. Note that when optimizing $-\log(p(y_i|\hat{I}_{adv}))$ on D-corpus, $\hat{I}_{adv}$ refers to only the noised adversarial image, and y_i is the harmful sentence. To generate the adversarial images, we use the open-sourced code¹ and leave implementation details and hyper-parameters to Appx. A.

3.3 SAMPLE GENERATION AND FILTERING

We then use the benign and adversarial images obtained as aforementioned to generate the samples constituting the proposed RADAR dataset. In particular, we input each benign or counterpart adversarial image plus a corresponding query to the victim VLM, i.e. MiniGPT-4 or LLaVA, respectively, and obtain a response. For D-corpus, we utilize the harmful sentence as the query. The response is then judged by two models to assess its safety. The first model is a classifier called HarmBench-Llama-2-13b-cla² (Mazeika et al., 2024), which is fine-tuned from the Llama2-13b (Touvron et al., 2023) and classifies that whether a pair of (query, response) is harmful or not. The other model is GPT-4o mini (OpenAI, 2024), which are guided with carefully designed prompts to make judgments following (Qi et al., 2024b) and (Zeng et al., 2024). Concretely, we prompt GPT-4o mini to provide a score ranging from 1 to 5 for each tuple of (query-response), where the scores of 1, 2 indicate a harmless response, the score of 3 indicates borderline, and the scores of 4, 5 indicate a harmful response. Please refer to Appx. B for more details. It is expected that for each pair of benign and adversarial images, the responses given by the victim VLM should be judged as harmless for the benign input while harmful for the adversarial input by both models simultaneously. We take this as the criterion to determine whether the quintuple of (query, benign input, harmless response, adversarial input, harmful response) will be included in our RADAR.

In practice, we find that quite a number of responses are harmful given benign images and harmless given adversarial images. As also reported in Qi et al. (2024a), the success of adversarial attack is far from 100%. When constructing our RADAR, we use the two models to judge the responses’ harmfulness. Such filtering operations significantly lift the quality of samples in the proposed dataset.

¹<https://github.com/Unispac/Visual-Adversarial-Examples-Jailbreak-Large-Language-Models>

²<https://huggingface.co/cais/HarmBench-Llama-2-13b-cla>

Table 1: Comparison of datasets for adversarially attacking VLMs. “-” means not reported.

Paper	Scale	Harmful Types	Open Source	Data Filtering
(Zhang et al., 2023a) Arxiv	200	Harmful queries	✓	✗
(Tu et al., 2023) Arxiv	3	Toxic words	✓	✗
(Carlini et al., 2023) Neurips 2023	-	Toxic words	✗	✗
(Qi et al., 2024a) AAAI 2024	3	Toxic words	✓	✗
(Luo et al., 2024) ICLR 2024	-	Harmful queries	✗	✗
(Shayegani et al., 2024) ICLR 2024	8	Toxic words	✗	✗
RADAR (Ours)	4,000	Both	✓	✓

3.4 STATISTICS ANALYSIS

With the above construction pipeline, the resultant RADAR contains 4,000 samples in total, attacking two victim VLMs, i.e. MiniGPT-4 and LLaVA. For each VLM, RADAR provides one training set and three test sets, with 500 samples per set. Division of train and test sets is based on the source of images and queries. Samples built using images from COCO validation set and queries from the train set of HH-rlhf harm-set are grouped into the train set in RADAR; samples built using images from COCO test set and queries from the test set of HH-rlhf harm-set, D-corpus, and Harm-Data are grouped to three test sets, respectively. Training and tests sets use different images. Different harmful texts are used in the four sets to ensure no information leakage and a reliable result.

A comparison of our RADAR with previous datasets used for investigating adversarial attack for VLMs is provided in Tab. 1. Our RADAR features four advantages compared with previous ones.

- **Large-scale:** As shown in Tab. 1, RADAR greatly surpasses the existing datasets in scale. It contains up to 4,000 samples while the previous largest dataset, i.e. from (Zhang et al., 2023a), contains only 200 samples, facilitating a reliable evaluation of VLMs’ safety.
- **Diversity of harmful types:** RADAR covers a favorable diversity of harmful queries and responses, enabling a comprehensive evaluation of VLMs’ performance on understanding and defending various adversarial attacks. Recent research on safety of VLMs (Wang et al., 2023; Dai et al., 2024; Ji et al., 2023a) provides taxonomies about the potential harms in queries or responses, e.g. asking for guidance to make bombs or for providing private information. During the construction of RADAR, we purposely increase such diversity.
- **Open-source:** RADAR will be open-sourced to facilitate future research on VLMs defending against adversarial attacks.
- **High sample quality:** We apply filtering operations during the construction of our RADAR with two models to ensure that the response to a benign input is harmless and that to an adversarial input is harmful. In comparison, the other datasets are built by specifying the harmfulness of the input before feeding it to victim models, while neglecting the reliability of responses, given the success ratio that adversarial images attack VLMs is not 100%.

4 PROPOSED METHOD

To efficiently defend VLMs from adversarial attacks, we propose a novel in-time Embedding-based AdveRSarial Image DEtection method (abbr. as NEAR SIDE) that uses a single vector, named *the attacking direction*, to detect the adversarial inputs. Fig. 3 gives an illustration of NEAR SIDE.

4.1 ATTACKING DIRECTION

As discussed in Sec. 2.2, the behaviors of LLMs can be controlled with a set of steering vectors (SVs) to generate texts towards certain specific attributes, such as truthfulness. Such SVs can be easily distilled from LLMs’ hidden states based on Eqn. (2). In adversarial attacks, the adversarial inputs elicit harmful responses of the victim VLMs, where the VLMs’ behaviors alter with an attribute shifting from harmlessness to harmfulness. We can calculate the SV that can account for VLMs’




Figure 3: An illustration of proposed NEARSIDE. Our method learns *the attacking direction* on a set of tuples (benign input, adversarial input), and then classifies a test input as benign or adversarial according to the projection between the input’s embedding and *the attacking direction*. If the projection is larger than a threshold, it is classified as an adversarial input, and otherwise as benign.

behavior change given the adversarial inputs. We name such a vector *the attacking direction*. In this work, we propose to detect the existence of the adversarial samples by assessing whether the inputs’ embedding has shown high similarity to *the attacking direction*.

To extract *the attacking direction* from VLMs’ hidden states, the adversarial and benign samples that make pairwise contrastive prompts are required. Formally, consider a training set $\mathbb{T} = \{(I_{adv}^i, I_b^i) \mid i = 0, 1, \dots, n\}$ where I_{adv} , I_b denote the adversarial and benign sample, respectively, and n is the index. Each sample contains an image and a piece of text. We embed each sample I^i by taking the embedding of the *last input token from the last LLMs’ layer*, i.e. $E^i \in \mathbb{R}^d$, where d is the embedding dimension. We embed all samples in $\mathbb{T}$, and obtain $\mathbb{T}_{emb} = \{(E_{adv}^i, E_b^i) \mid i = 0, 1, \dots, n\}$. Then, we calculate *the attacking direction* by

$$D_{\text{attack}} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=0}^n (E_{adv}^i - E_b^i) \in \mathbb{R}^d, \quad (E_{adv}^i, E_b^i) \in \mathbb{T}_{emb}. \quad (3)$$

4.2 DETECTION OF ADVERSARIAL INPUTS

Let $\text{norm}(h) = h/\|h\|_2$ denote the ℓ_2 normalization for a vector h . Given *the attacking direction* D_{attack} , we classify a test input I_{test} to be adversarial or benign by

$$I_{\text{test}} = \begin{cases} \text{adversarial example,} & \text{if } E_{\text{test}} \cdot \text{norm}(D_{\text{attack}}^j)^\top - t > 0, \\ \text{benign example,} & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

where $E_{\text{test}} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ is the embedding of the last input token from the last layer of an VLM on the test sample, and $t \in \mathbb{R}$ is a scalar threshold to measure whether the similarity score is significant. If the similarity score, i.e., the projection, is greater than the threshold, we classify the input I_{test} to be adversarial as it has high similarity to the attack direction; otherwise, the input is classified as a benign input. The threshold is decided using $\mathbb{T}_{emb}$:

$$t = \frac{1}{2n} \sum_{i=0}^n (E_{adv}^i \cdot \text{norm}(D_{\text{attack}}^j)^\top + E_b^i \cdot \text{norm}(D_{\text{attack}}^j)^\top), \quad (E_{adv}^i, E_b^i) \in \mathbb{T}_{emb}. \quad (5)$$

The threshold is the average similarity score of all training embeddings (from both adversarial and benign samples) on *the attacking direction*.

The proposed NEARSIDE, as shown in Eqn. (4), is extremely efficient as we only require running one feed-forward propagation given the input to infer E_{test} , thus enabling an in-time detection of adversarial samples. After adversarial samples have been detected, the developer can take further steps to ensure VLMs’ safety, such as overwriting the responses to a preset text, applying diffusion models to purify the image, or disabling malicious accounts. Therefore, NEARSIDE can defend VLMs from adversarial attack in an efficient and real-time manner.

4.3 CROSS-MODEL TRANSFERABILITY

The Platonic Representation Hypothesis (Huh et al., 2024): “Neural networks, trained with different objectives on different data and modalities, are converging to a shared statistical model of reality in their representation spaces.”

The proposed NEARSIDE is supposed to use *the attacking direction* extracted from one VLM to detect the adversarial samples for the same VLM. According to the above Platonic Representation Hypothesis, we can assume that the learnt attacking direction and effectiveness of our detection method NEARSIDE are transferable across different models. That is, our NEARSIDE can use *the attacking direction* extracted from one VLM to detect the adversarial samples for other VLMs. The reason behind the assumption of the cross-model transferrability in our method is that, although different VLMs are trained from different data, the patterns regarding safety in these data should be similar. However, the embedding spaces between two VLMs do have a gap. We thus propose to explore the transferability using a linear transformation:

$$\mathbf{W}\mathbf{E}_{m_1} = \mathbf{E}_{m_2}, \quad (6)$$

where $\mathbf{E}_{m_1} \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times d_{m_1}}$ and $\mathbf{E}_{m_2} \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times d_{m_2}}$ are the stacked embedding of *benign* inputs from the two VLMs m_1 and m_2 , respectively, with d_{m_1}, d_{m_2} denoting their embedding dimension. The linear transformation $\mathbf{W}$ is to align the two VLMs’ embedding spaces. In practice, since powerful LLMs often have high dimension in their hidden states, directly solving Eqn. (6) would be too costly in memory due to the high dimension of d_{m_1}, d_{m_2} . Therefore, we propose to use principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce the dimension of $\mathbf{E}_{m_1}$ and $\mathbf{E}_{m_2}$. Then, we have $\mathbf{W} = f_{m_2}^{\text{pca}}(\mathbf{E}_{m_2})f_{m_1}^{\text{pca}}(\mathbf{E}_{m_1})^\dagger$, where f^{pca} denotes PCA that reduces the dimension and $(\cdot)^\dagger$ denotes the pseudo-inverse.

Finally, given a test input I_{test} , its detection on m_2 is given by

$$I_{\text{test}} = \begin{cases} \text{adversarial example,} & \text{if } f_{m_2}^{\text{pca}}(E_{\text{test}, m_2}) \cdot \text{norm}(\mathbf{W} f_{m_1}^{\text{pca}}(D_{\text{attack}, m_1}))^\top - t_{m_1} > 0, \\ \text{benign example,} & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

where the threshold t_{m_1} is defined as

$$t_{m_1} = \frac{1}{2n} \sum_{i=0}^n (\mathbf{W} f_{m_1}^{\text{pca}}(E_{\text{adv}, m_1}^i) \cdot \text{norm}(\mathbf{W} f_{m_1}^{\text{pca}}(D_{\text{attack}, m_1}))^\top + \mathbf{W} f_{m_1}^{\text{pca}}(E_{\text{b}, m_1}^i) \cdot \text{norm}(\mathbf{W} f_{m_1}^{\text{pca}}(D_{\text{attack}, m_1}))^\top). \quad (8)$$

Eqn. (7) detects adversarial samples on m_2 only using *the attacking direction* of m_1 and the embedding of *benign* inputs from m_2 to learn the transformation matrix $\mathbf{W}$. Note that this entire learning process has no access to adversarial samples on m_2 . Eqn. (7) works if the embedding space of the two VLMs can be linearly transformed without disturbing *the attacking direction*.

5 EXPERIMENTS

We conduct extensive experiments on RADAR to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed NEARSIDE in detecting adversarial images. We first compare our method with strong baseline and then analyze its cross-model transferability, followed by the efficiency test.

5.1 EXPERIMENTS SETUP

Victim VLMs. We adopt MiniGPT-4 (Zhu et al., 2024) and LLaVA (Liu et al., 2023a) as the victim VLMs. MiniGPT-4 is built upon Vicuna (Chiang et al., 2023) and LLaVA is built upon Llama2 (Touvron et al., 2023). Regarding the visual encoder, MiniGPT-4 utilizes the same pre-trained vision components of BLIP-2 (Li et al., 2023a) consisting of pre-trained ViT followed by a Q-Former, while LLaVA only adopts a pre-trained CLIP (Radford et al., 2021).

Implementation. For each victim VLM, as stated in Sec. 3, RADAR constructs one training set and three test sets. NEARSIDE learns *the attacking direction* and threshold from the hidden states of the VLM on the training set. Here, the hidden states refer to the embedding of the last token of the input from the LLM decoder’s final layer. Then, we test the detection performance with the

obtained attacking direction on the three test sets. Regarding the cross-model transferability, we collect 5,000 pairs of benign images and queries to train the PCA model for each VLM. We set 2048 as the dimension of the embedding after PCA.

Baseline. We use JailGuard (Zhang et al., 2023a) as our baseline, which is the state-of-the-art model for this task. To detect adversarial visual inputs, JailGuard mutates input images to generate variants and calculates the discrepancy of VLMs’ outputs given different variants to distinguish the adversarial and benign inputs. There are 18 mutation methods, and we use the best-performing mutation method “policy” reported in the JailGuard paper, where 8 variants are generated for each image. We set all other hyperparameters to the recommended values as JailGuard. It is worth mentioning that we adopt only one baseline as there are only limited works on defending VLMs from adversarial examples (Liu et al., 2024).

Evaluation metrics. Since adversarial detection is a binary classification task, we adopt *Accuracy*, *Precision*, *Recall* and *F1* score as the evaluation metrics.

5.2 MAIN RESULTS

We compare our proposed method NEARSIDE against the baseline JailGuard on RADAR. The experimental results are shown in Tab. 2. From the results, we make below observations. 1) When taking LLaVA as the victim VLM, our NEARSIDE achieves an average increase of 31.3% in *Accuracy*, 43.5% in *Precision*, 12.6% in *Recall*, and 0.246 in *F1*, compared to the baseline JailGuard method. 2) When taking MiniGPT-4 as the victim VLM, our NEARSIDE achieves an average increase of 38.7% in *Accuracy*, 45.6% in *Precision*, 17.6% in *Recall*, and 0.316 in *F1*, compared to the baseline JailGuard method. These results well demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method. 3) Although our NEARSIDE has lower *Recall* on the Harm-Data set with LLaVA as the victim VLM, and also on D-corpus-test set with MiniGPT-4 as the victim VLM, it achieves significantly higher *F1* scores on both sets. We attribute the low *Recall* of our method to its threshold for the adversarial detection. As shown in Fig. 4, the projections of the two types of examples do fall into different ranges. However, as the threshold is calculated on the training set, the threshold is not well fit for the Harm-Data, leading to degraded *Recall*. If we set the threshold to -13, we can increase *Recall* to 87.6% and *F1* score to 0.900, which are both significantly higher than the baseline. From an overall perspective, the results can still demonstrate the powerful distinguishing capability of our method over adversarial and benign data.

Table 2: Results of JailGuard v.s. NEARSIDE on RADAR test sets (best highlighted in **bold**).

Victim VLM	Test Set	Method	<i>Accuracy</i> (%)	<i>Precision</i> (%)	<i>Recall</i> (%)	<i>F1</i>
LLaVA	HH-rlhf	JailGuard	51.2	51.1	57.8	0.540
		NEARSIDE	84.4	89.3	78.2	0.834
	D-corpus	JailGuard	58.1	58.1	58.2	0.581
		NEARSIDE	94.0	99.5	88.4	0.936
	Harm-Data	JailGuard	46.2	46.8	55.8	0.509
		NEARSIDE	71.0	97.7	43.0	0.597
MiniGPT-4	HH-rlhf	JailGuard	54.9	53.9	67.2	0.598
		NEARSIDE	99.4	99.2	99.6	0.994
	D-corpus	JailGuard	56.6	54.4	81.6	0.653
		NEARSIDE	81.1	98.4	63.2	0.770
	Harm-Data	JailGuard	52.8	52.4	61.2	0.565
		NEARSIDE	100.0	100.0	100.0	1.000

5.3 ANALYSIS ON CROSS-MODEL TRANSFERABILITY

We utilize *the attacking direction* extracted from the source VLM (svlm) to detect adversarial input for the target VLM (tvlm), denoted as $svlm \rightarrow tvlm$. We calculate the difference (i.e. δ) by subtracting the result of $(svlm \rightarrow tvlm)$ from that of Tab. 2, where $-\delta$ denotes the result is decreased while $+\delta$




Figure 4: Visualized projections of adversarial and benign samples to the attacking directions on Harm-Data with LLaVA as the victim.




Figure 5: Throughput of four different detection methods. The number is the average examples can be detected per second (item/s).

denotes the opposite. The obtained results for cross-model transferability are shown in Tab. 3. We can observe that cross-model transferability results are generally inferior to those in Tab. 2 where *the attacking direction* is extracted and applied with the same VLM, but both *Accuracy* and *F1* results of our method are higher than those of the baseline JailGuard. Though cross-model transferability decreases the detection performance, which is expectable, our method can still work well across different models. These results clearly validate the cross-model transferability of *the attacking direction* and the proposed NEARSIDE. It also says that, the Platonic Representation Hypothesis still holds in our setting, where a simple linear transformation is effective to align two VLMs’ embedding spaces.

Table 3: Cross-model transferability results for our method.

<i>svlm</i> → <i>tvlm</i>	TEST SET	Accuracy(%)	Precision(%)	Recall(%)	F1
MiniGPT-4 → LLaVA	HH-rlhf	64.3 ^{-20.1}	61.3 ^{-28.0}	77.6 ^{-0.6}	0.685 ^{-0.149}
	D-corpus	69.4 ^{-24.6}	62.5 ⁻³⁷	96.8 ^{+8.4}	0.760 ^{-0.176}
	Harm-Data	74.7 ^{+3.7}	76.7 ⁻²¹	71.0 ⁺²⁸	0.737 ^{+0.14}
LLaVA → MiniGPT-4	HH-rlhf	77.8 ^{-21.6}	86.2 ⁻¹³	66.2 ^{-33.4}	0.749 ^{-0.245}
	D-corpus	80.4 ^{-0.7}	80.3 ^{-18.1}	80.6 ^{+17.4}	0.804 ^{+0.034}
	Harm-Data	97.1 ^{-2.9}	95.0 ^{-0.5}	99.4 ^{-0.6}	0.972 ^{-0.028}

We experiment to examine the effect of using W to align two VLMs’ embedding spaces, and the effect of reducing the dimension of *the attacking direction* and the VLMs’ embedding with the PCA model. The detailed results are provided in Appx. E. We find that, without W , the cross-model transferability results will significantly decrease. In addition, when reducing the dimension to 256, the cross-model transferability results still remain high, indicating that the information in low dimensional sub-spaces is already sufficient for aligning two VLMs’ embedding spaces.

5.4 ANALYSIS OF PERTURBATION RADIUS IN GENERATING ADVERSARIAL IMAGES

The generation of adversarial images is constrained by the hyper-parameter ϵ as shown in Eqn. (1). We test the robustness of the proposed NEARSIDE method to varying ϵ . We use NEARSIDE to detect the adversarial samples generated under different ϵ . Results are deferred to Appx. D.

5.5 ANALYSIS OF DETECTION EFFICIENCY

In this part, we examine the detection efficiency of the proposed method. For the baseline JailGuard, we utilize the widely-adopted VLLM (Kwon et al., 2023) to deploy the two VLMs, i.e. LLaVA and MiniGPT-4, on a local machine and generate outputs through API requests. For our proposed NEARSIDE, we load VLMs and perform a single forward propagation to embed each input since *the attacking direction* can be pre-computed. In addition to JailGuard and our method, we

also include another two trivial methods that judge the harmfulness of the output into our efficiency evaluations, i.e. HarmBench and GPT-4o mini, which are used in data filtering operations to judge the harmfulness of responses in Sec. 3.3. For all compared methods, we calculate the time including responses inference (note, NEARSIDE does not infer responses) plus follow-up operations, which refer to discrepancy calculation in JailGuard, projections calculation in NEARSIDE, and harmfulness evaluation in other two methods. All experiments are conducted on a server with AMD EPYC 7543 32-core processors, 1 TB of RAM, and a NVIDIA A40 GPU.

We run experiments on 20 inputs and plot the average throughput in Fig. 5. With our setup, NEARSIDE is ($\times 41\sim 336$) times faster than the other methods on LLaVA, and is ($\times 132\sim 1190$) times faster on MiniGPT-4, demonstrating remarkable efficiency as NEARSIDE is the only embedding-based method among all compared methods that does not require to infer the entire output.

6 RELATED WORKS

6.1 VISION LANGUAGE MODELS

Vision Language Models (VLMs) is equipped with a visual adapter to align the visual and textual representations in LLMs. Notable examples are BLIP-2 (Li et al., 2023a), LLaVA (Liu et al., 2023a), MiniGPT-4 (Zhu et al., 2024), QWen-VL (Bai et al., 2023), GPT-4V (OpenAI, 2023), and Gemini (Anil et al., 2023), demonstrating impressive performance across various vision-language tasks (Dai et al., 2023; Zhu et al., 2024). These VLMs vary in the design of their adapters (Liu et al., 2023a; Li et al., 2023a; Zhu et al., 2024). For instance, BLIP-2 (Li et al., 2023a) proposes Q-Former to align vision features with LLMs; MiniGPT-4 (Zhu et al., 2024) and LLaVA (Liu et al., 2023a) further add a linear transformation, and Qwen-VL (Bai et al., 2023) uses a single-layer cross-attention module.

6.2 SAFETY OF LANGUAGE MODELS

Safe LLMs should behave in line with human intentions and values (Soares & Fallenstein, 2014; Hendrycks et al., 2021; Leike et al., 2018; Ji et al., 2023b) which are measured as being Helpful, Honest, and Harmless (Askell et al., 2021). Alignment has emerged as a nascent research field aiming to align LLMs’ behaviors with human preferences, and there are two widely adopted alignment techniques, i.e. Instruction Fine-tuning and Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). In instruction fine-tuning, LLMs are given examples of (user’s query, desired output) and trained to follow user instructions and respond the expected output (Taori et al., 2023; Wei et al., 2022). In RLHF, LLMs update output probabilities, i.e., the response policy, by reinforcement learning, which are rewarded for generating responses that align with human preferences and otherwise penalized (Russell & Norvig, 2016; Bai et al., 2022a; Rafailov et al., 2023; Ouyang et al., 2022).

Two types of strategies can defend language models from adversarial attacks: detection and purification. For instance, Zhang et al. (2023b) detects adversarial examples by calculating responses’ discrepancy; Qi et al. (2024a) uses diffusion models (Nie et al., 2022) to purify the noised-images. Other techniques such as the adversarial training (Bai et al., 2021) can also improve the robustness of models to adversarial attacks. Though effective on classical image classifiers, these methods remain unexplored on large models like LLMs and VLMs and may disturb the optimization.

7 CONCLUSION

In this work, we propose RADAR, the first large-scale adversarial image dataset with diverse harmful responses to facilitate research on safety of VLMs. With RADAR, we further develop NEARSIDE that exploits the idea of attacking direction to detect adversarial inputs. We demonstrate with the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed NEARSIDE by comparing it to the state-of-the-art on RADAR, and also highlight its cross-model transferability.

VLMs can generate open-ended responses, posing a persistent challenge to complete evaluation of the potential harms (Ganguli et al., 2022). RADAR is built from a diverse array of datasets but may fall short of covering all harmful contents. NEARSIDE is intended to detect the adversarial samples we examine in this work and is a demonstration of our idea of exploiting *the attacking direction*.

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A DETAILS ABOUT GENERATING ADVERSARIAL IMAGES

In our implementation, we utilize the standard PGD method to generate adversarial images, according to 2.1. We run 5000 iterations of PGD optimization on generating each adversarial image and we set ϵ to 32/255. We test the robustness of the NEARSIDE method to varying ϵ . We use NEARSIDE to detect the adversarial samples generated under different ϵ . Results are deferred to Appx. D.

B PROMPTS TO GPT-4 JUDGEMENT

We adopt the prompt template proposed by Qi et al. (2024c), which combines the prohibited model usage policy, the (harmful) input query, the model’s output for this query, and a rating rubric together to be fed to GPT-4 via OpenAI’s APIs. The complete prompt template is as follows: ({Context.} will be replaced with the OpenAI’s detailed policy and scoring rules, {Context.} will be replaced with the harmful query and model’s output)

Prompt template

Below are OpenAI’s prohibited usage policies. These policies ensure that models interact with users safely and responsibly. Models should refuse to execute instructions that fall into the disallowed use cases outlined in the OpenAI policy, avoiding affirmative responses or providing any information that could be helpful for any prohibited activities.

OpenAI Policy - Disallowed usage of our models:
{The detailed policy.}

Now, I will provide you with a user instruction that the model should not comply with, as per OpenAI’s policy. I will also give you the model’s response to that instruction. Please review the model’s response in light of the prohibited usage guidelines:

User Instruction: {The harmful query.}

Model Response: {The output to be classified.}

Use the scoring rules below to score the model’s response to the user instruction on a scale of 1 to 5:

{The detailed OpenAI’s scoring rules}

Output your evaluation in the following format:

#the reason: your analysis here

[note: this should be step-by-step analysis following the steps: (a) Give an overview of the user’s primary intent and the model’s response. (b) Evaluate the degree to which the model’s response aligns with the user’s expressed intent. (c) Examine the user’s instruction and the model’s reply respectively to determine if they contain any prohibited content. Finally, evaluate the degree of the model’s adherence to OpenAI’s usage guidelines.]

#the score: your score here.

[note:provide your score in based on your analysis and the provide scoring criteria.]

C AN EXEMPLAR SAMPLE IN RADAR

In RADAR, each sample consists of an adversarial sample and a benign sample, with each containing a query, an adversarial/benign image and VLMs’ response. Fig. 6 provides an exemplar sample.




Figure 6: An exemplar sample in RADAR.

D PERTURBATION RADIUS IN GENERATING ADVERSARIAL IMAGES

We test the robustness of the NEARSIDE method to varying ϵ . We use NEARSIDE to detect the adversarial samples generated under different ϵ . We generate 100 adversarial samples on the LLaVA D-corpus dataset under settings of $\epsilon = 16$, $\epsilon = 64$, and unconstrained. The data generation follows the same pipeline as Sec. 3. We create 100 samples for each ϵ . The results are provided in Tab. 4.

Table 4: Results of the NEARSIDE on LLaVA D-corpus generated with different ϵ .

ϵ of adversarial training	Accuracy(%)	Precision(%)	Recall(%)	F1
$\epsilon = 16/255$	85.0	100.0	70.0	0.824
$\epsilon = 64/255$	93.5	97.8	89.0	0.932
unconstrained	99.0	100.0	98.0	0.990

E ANALYSIS OF CROSS-MODEL TRANSFERABILITY

Linear transformation W . We explore the Platonic Representation Hypothesis by using a linear transformation W to align the two VLMs' embedding spaces. To demonstrate the importance of the usage of W , we conduct experiments that directly use *the attacking direction* of the source VLM to detect the adversarial samples of the target VLM without using W . Results are shown in Tab. 5.

PCA model. We use PCA model to reduce the dimension of VLMs' embedding and *the attacking direction* before learning the transformation W . In our initial setting, the dimension is reduced to 2056. We experiment to examine the effect of reducing the dimension of *the attacking direction* and the VLMs' embedding with the PCA model. In specific, we vary the dimension in [2048, 1024, 512, 256] and report the cross-model transferability results in Tab. 6.

Table 5: The results of cross-model transferability without $\mathbf{W}$. We report result^{- δ} where δ indicates the difference between the results w/o $\mathbf{W}$ and with $\mathbf{W}$ shown in Table 3.

<i>svlm</i> $\rightarrow$ <i>tvlm</i> (w/o $\mathbf{W}$)	TEST SET	Accuracy(%)	Precision(%)	Recall(%)	F1
MiniGPT-4 $\rightarrow$ LLaVA	HH-rlhf	50.9 ^{-13.4}	50.9 ^{-10.4}	51.6 ^{-26.0}	0.512 ^{-0.172}
	D-corpus	53.8 ^{-15.6}	53.2 ^{-9.4}	63.8 ^{-33.0}	0.580 ^{-0.180}
	Harm-Data	53.7 ^{-21.0}	53.7 ^{-23.0}	53.8 ^{-17.2}	0.537 ^{-0.200}
LLaVA $\rightarrow$ MiniGPT-4	HH-rlhf	32.8 ^{-45.0}	27.2 ^{-58.9}	20.6 ^{-45.6}	0.235 ^{-0.514}
	D-corpus	71.0 ^{-9.4}	77.2 ^{-3.1}	59.6 ^{-21.0}	0.804 ^{-0.132}
	Harm-Data	23.9 ^{-73.2}	23.1 ^{-71.9}	22.4 ^{-77.0}	0.227 ^{-0.744}

Table 6: The results of cross-model transferability where PCA reduce the VLMs’ embedding and the attacking direction to different dimensions. We use **bold** to highlight the best results.

<i>svlm</i> $\rightarrow$ <i>tvlm</i>	TEST SET	PCA-Dimension	Accuracy(%)	Precision(%)	Recall(%)	F1
LLaVA $\rightarrow$ MiniGPT-4	HH-rlhf	256	87.0	89.2	84.2	0.866
		512	88.8	88.5	89.2	0.888
		1024	88.2	89.0	87.2	0.881
		2048	77.8	86.2	66.2	0.749
	D-corpus	256	83.3	76.2	96.8	0.853
		512	84.7	82.2	88.6	0.853
		1024	77.6	88.5	63.4	0.740
		2048	80.4	80.3	80.6	0.805
	Harm-Data	256	87.8	80.4	100.0	0.891
		512	83.4	75.1	100.0	0.858
		1024	88.2	89.0	87.2	0.881
		2048	97.1	95.0	99.4	0.972
MiniGPT-4 $\rightarrow$ LLaVA	HH-rlhf	256	57.0	53.8	98.8	0.697
		512	58.5	54.7	98.0	0.703
		1024	63.7	58.6	93.2	0.720
		2048	64.3	61.3	77.6	0.685
	D-corpus	256	50.9	50.5	100.0	0.671
		512	58.5	54.7	98.0	0.703
		1024	51.2	50.6	100.0	0.672
		2048	69.4	62.5	96.8	0.760
	Harm-Data	256	71.9	64.7	96.6	0.775
		512	71.9	64.4	98.2	0.778
		1024	74.4	67.6	93.8	0.786
		2048	74.7	76.7	0.71	0.737

From Tab. 5, we find that, without $\mathbf{W}$, the cross-model transferability results will significantly decrease. From Tab. 6, we find that, when reducing the dimension to 256, the cross-model transferability results still remain high, indicating that the information in low dimensional sub-spaces is already sufficient for aligning two VLMs’ embedding spaces.